[G.R. No. 102858.

July 28, 1997]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the
Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision [1] promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution [2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by
Respondent Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads:[4]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set
aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro
Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now
deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby
dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let
an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."

The Facts
 On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.
[5]
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. [6]However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section
23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has
not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation."

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its
pertinent portion provides:[8]

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-
fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers
to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned
in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official
Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the
other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary
because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land
registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as

earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the
title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution
dated November 19, 1991.
 The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to
us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an
error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the
Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for
certiorari under Rule 65.[9]

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion[10] in holding

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want
of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.According to
petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement
of due process.[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. [12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: [13]

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of

general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also
mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:[14]

x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in
any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal
notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and
these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application
for registration.

The Courts Ruling

 We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of
the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing
of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not
be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. --

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in
the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court.However, the
question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation,
the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute.[15] While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory
meaning. InRepublic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held
that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices
to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of
adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then
by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative
since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem,
such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied
with.Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected
would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must
prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of
the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.
[18]
He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant,
can best be achieved when all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to
or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and
show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process
require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as
by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences
of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have
mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to
dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.[19] There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration
is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE
OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-
MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA
of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision
of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose
Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the
resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

 (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of
the deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by the following:

Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No.
7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition
for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that
of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don
Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among
the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT,
over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual,
although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of

the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the
court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.
(Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to

Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual
(Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and
such motion was denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p.
15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

 SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the
Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down
in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their
illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under
conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be
strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is
applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court
ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
 family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of
the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate
children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The
descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the
right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner,
one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to
state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of
illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
 whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also
an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute
are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
[1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A.,
145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and
Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or
not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor
would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14,
1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of
Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six
(6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor
from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset
asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in
possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess
the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the
governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his
exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision,
he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get
a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass
on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this
pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found
in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the
necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the
appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the
accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel
for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret
agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another
document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the
accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused
"is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and
the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused
"of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition
confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered
"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot
be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted
on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in
the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this
Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent
therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO alias BEBOT, accused-
appellant.

DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as
follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER,
under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries
upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH
PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND
MIDTRANVERSE COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said
Benito Ng Suy.
(p.1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging
now the crime of murder, to wit:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the
heirs of the victim.

(p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to
death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed
by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him
despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when
the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the
Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located
at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford
Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time
were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son, who
were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the
back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an
orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of
the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the
opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at
the corner of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Linglings vulcanizing shop
owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside
Virgilio.
 Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred
between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damage to the right bumper of the latter.
(TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the drivers seat and confronted
Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, You were not looking, to which
Virgilio retorted, I did not see you. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p.16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a
passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously
approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor
accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told
him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (Ibid., p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; You are Chinese, is it
you? With a ready answer Benito said; Yes, I am a Chinese and why? Patricio in turn replied; So,
you are a Chinese, wait for a while, then left. (Ibid., pp. 7 and 19)
Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapse of
about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once
again, You are a Chinese, is it not? To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative.
(Ibid., pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled Ah, so you are a Chinese, and suddenly took
a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the
chest. (ibid., p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his
assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same
knife and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon
overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last
of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to
spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not
open its door. (Ibid., p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas,
Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that fatal
incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (Ibid., pp. 6, 10,
18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the
left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid., p. 12)
 After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his
own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the
presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid., p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she
was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and
carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him
to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (Ibid., p. 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple
(13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was
subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and
4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was
airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3)
weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH - SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection).
This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body.(Ibid., pp.6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the
penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-
appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion
temporalin its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and
killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion
perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible
from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being
no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the
medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellants Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muoz (170
SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty
that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without
categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in
People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the
modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo
L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the
conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as
embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to
be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by
many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief
that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the
constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death
penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping
with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article
III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing
it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced toreclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of
legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty
or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is
whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as
a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in
Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and
unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it
categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a
statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation
that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another
or - strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases
represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two
members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the
doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition
of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the
question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and tan, for the tenets it lays
down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once
pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the
trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the
other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks, whatever that
means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty
for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and
hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum
penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not
have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person
originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium
period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is
the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction.
Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the
stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in
the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by
the householder, the latter replied: Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a
penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are
prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is
the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This
is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they
have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each
of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with
the present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
 The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and
in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and
harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The
duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an
accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the
law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and
in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00,
in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka
na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,

sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue

ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok

dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think
that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no

(sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,

kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo"
mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

 ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka

kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-
anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa

labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi

ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa

no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa

'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of

Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City

Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez
 not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M.
CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a personother than a
participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring
the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of

R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse
of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties
to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping
of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping
her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of

secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent
of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.
Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention
is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the

observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention
of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are
being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board
of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:

"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That
is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any
more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of
a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
 Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill
as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is
the communication between one person and another person — not between a
speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed."14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada
in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
 It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state
here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed
by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the
investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao,
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing
Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived
with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after
petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests.
Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao
and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving
her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations
three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her)
inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her
full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and
in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict
with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action
on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further
impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment
private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was
the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By
itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee
guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted
to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance
or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when
she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to
present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department
and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate
her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her
eventual separation from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who
has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a
person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have
accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not

terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
 their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall

not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in
the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall

by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has
gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a
whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things,
to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good."8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads
the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics
as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women,
Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective

bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
 Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the
State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers
of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full
protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that
the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are
giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice
in national development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution
and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from
his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance
under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code.
Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the
aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the
lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in
Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the
legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2,
1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a
legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled
to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her
job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione
positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not
been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement
under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be
effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of
the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the
parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations"
or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and
separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of
the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the
principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning
rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court,
there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should
be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency
and productivity of the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where
the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence
of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he
works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to
organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a
non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by
foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy
Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey

reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had
already become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one
that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has
been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions
that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a
matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any
company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent
Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable
position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not
create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from
operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the
development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and
company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As
we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee
who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since
Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation
although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not
condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous
because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and
anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had
direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already
resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute
management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having
had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should
have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to
hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE
private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a
period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., concurs in the result.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309,
which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and
the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay,
on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between
the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been
pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter
barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that
because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied
on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to
find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between
him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is
his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of
Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused,

convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual
who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case,
however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of
the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice.
Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat
the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec.
3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he
was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is
clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a
crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny
his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two
years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands
and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime
before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted
on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by
the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of
construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board:
(a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of
a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the
previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be
acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in
which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless
be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was
acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended
parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay
moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused
compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an
accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the
prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"4 so is the presumption of innocence
not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order
to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been
"unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to
build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he
did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an
"unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the
conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say
as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael
C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it
is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason
of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard,
that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept
when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results,
logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
"unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required
quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court
is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust
accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the
trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross
negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused
were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and
his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he
did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said
anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything
in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the
defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that
conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26,
1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants to
an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two
counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said
crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of
action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they
apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in
view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on
appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the
Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim
for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post
the required appeal bond. 1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended,
providing that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as
follows:

Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary

award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
 the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these
rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the
case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to
post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of
P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000
from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited
by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal
claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall
likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the
Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include
the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any
judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's
jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall
be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to
primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest
that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of
the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following
provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash
or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.
 A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary

award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis
supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal
bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and
surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond
is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it
is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are
not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been
violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the
conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the
recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it
were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may
not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000
to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by
the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal
bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the
satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject
to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are
subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of
the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds
and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity
but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of
the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to
the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a
further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to
the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J.
CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of
CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION
INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon.
Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of
July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as
follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the
case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the
said petition and stating inter alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery
of any property owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors
from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use and
benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of
any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another,
upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and
reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of

the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated
with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter
that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or
attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance
of insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that
in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on
December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of
Angeles City from disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent
debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they
(sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect
that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in
March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated the
real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and
they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were
already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such
development, it is their submission that without an insolvency order and a
resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982,
the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized.
(Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the
prayer that the insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court)
be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name
(Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of

respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second
urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate
of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor
(Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of

certain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not
redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order
disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr.

Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered claimants in this
case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby
 directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take
his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and
discharge his functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the
attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30.,
as by that time the proposals, which the respective
representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with their
principals, shall have already been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents

which are now in the actual or constructive custody and
management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under this actual
or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do
so, as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously
authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in
Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles
City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice
thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the
proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment
on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put
up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was
done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of
spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and
40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles.
(Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering

private respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to
pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest
thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00,
for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the
said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and
executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18,
1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale
the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as
the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
 On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of
petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to
issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating

among other things, that subject motion is improper and premature because it
treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the
reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City
were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the determination of
the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the
insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters
involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction
(Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with
its assailed extended order with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted

order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the
Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-
Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate
in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by
the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed
a petition forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied
petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.

Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS

OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER
ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is
dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months
after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk

of the court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign
and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and effects
of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such
assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and
effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as
the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee
all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It
shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior
to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)

Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the
levy on attachment against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court
of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency
proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was
commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said
attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject
properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove
the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property,
and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the
insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor
of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is
not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted
Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its
name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32,
of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1)
month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments
vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately
prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period —
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by
private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved
against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This
rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute
is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and
harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by
Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be
considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a
violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines
(100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be
considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the
jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim
filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and
execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of
subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the
former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro

Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules
and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars
(Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-
010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).

Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the

Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local
elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it
affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area.
He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the
apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their
Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3,
which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these
municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992
elections.

Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall
be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under this category so that they should continue to be
elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.

Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not
allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by
district, in Parañaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. 1 He does
not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner
does not appear to have any cause of action.

However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political
exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of
discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the
question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory
relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections. 2

Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on
November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and
for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in
this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:

Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan
shall be elected as follows:

(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
elected by legislative districts . . .

(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the
Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of
electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .

(c) The number and election of elective members of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro
Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with
two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed
by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No.
6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each
of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by
 barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang
Bayan
. . . . and,

(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan
shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall
be elected by district . . . .

On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and
the subsequent resolutions in question.

On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly
in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification
of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Parañaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all
single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular
elections.

Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines
submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned
pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress
the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to
reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In
this Project of Apportionment, Parañaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in
the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each
district.

On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec.
3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by
district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11,
1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he
received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.

On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed
the instant petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992
regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in
this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Parañaque.

Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution

No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view,
that the district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to
the May 11, 1992 regular elections.

We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills
on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the
web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some
framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions,
particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of
varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in
the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as
he would. But if we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would
have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces referred to in par.
(b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par.
(c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective
sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must
therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft
been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the
statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in
that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object
to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that
tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7

The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill
No. 1861 which states in part:

This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and
provide for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and
measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted
for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the
"WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus —

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of

candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections
 recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the
districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan
seats;

WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and
approved by the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting
among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated;

WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly

Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing
the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit,
after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different
sectors in the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single
legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district

apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of
territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of population; c.
no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities
and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts.

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the
four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows
that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number
of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the
efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and
(c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the
members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming
May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to
continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will
all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion
the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for
purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or
more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district;
(2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two
(2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for
cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they
shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the
thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned
into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by
district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.

Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts
not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to
be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be
elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is
the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and
for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.

Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.

Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent,
William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.

The facts are undisputed.

The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses,
Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in
the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February
28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in
favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a
consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of
the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T.
No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December
4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine
National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to
Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the
property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent,
William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof
a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte.
Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private
respondent.

On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge
Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order
for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy
sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in
the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the
possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August
31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to
repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial
court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private
respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was
denied.

Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of
possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider
consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the
petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective
positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing,
implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders
from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent
Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:

It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title,
OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale
on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the
property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been
dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal
sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the
issue raised by the petitioners. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold that
the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act
had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance
with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973.
Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the
period had clearly expired.

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their
motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.

Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right
to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed.
To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states
that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the
latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer
enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8

In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have
the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and
assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to
repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property
and their right to do so subsists.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed
the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs.
Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate
court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they
acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-
spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property.
At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the
latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must
be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court
would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give
the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating
it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase
the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said
that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail.

Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule
that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet
prescribed.

The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of
Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially
different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale
and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-
year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the
same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has become
consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is
therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de
retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the
vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the
stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present
facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles
over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties were
mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-
year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act
3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of
absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property
sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final
Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on
November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.

Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at
the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17,
1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private
respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same
rate as that on the purchase price. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the
Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22,
1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private
respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of
reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the
purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one
(1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991.]

 BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, LTC.
FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PEÑA, MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, Petitioners, v. GEN. RENATO S. DE
VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.
MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA, MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ.
ESTELITO L. PORNEA, and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: BGEN.
DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI,
COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 95020. August 2, 1991.]

BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO
ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN,Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, PA., Respondents.

[G.R. No. 96948. August 2, 1991.]

BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL
GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, PA,
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PEÑA PN (M):
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT.
DANILO LIM PA CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, Petitioners, v. BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
NO. 14, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 97454. August 2, 1991.]

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL.
ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, Petitioners, v.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL. 1LT. SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF, 1LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN, JR PM(M), 2LT. ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT. JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT. JAIRUS JS. GELVEZON III PM M), 2LT. JOSELITO CABREROS PM(M), 2LT.
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT. HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, Respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero,
Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Amon, Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio
and Joey Sarroza.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson.

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.

Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.

Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.

Efren C. Moncupa for A.L. Tecson.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison.

Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.

Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Peña.

Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the
charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try
them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorariagainst its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no
authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.

The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for viol of AWs ________. DO NOT SUBMIT A
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing.
This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial
and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was
done on March 14, 1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated
by Article of War 71, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 71. Charges; Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as
to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the
case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. While the motion for
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of
GCM No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled,
however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No. 14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition forcertiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and
members of GCM No. 14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and
to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order.
He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
"pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc. Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc. Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia.

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside
and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as
well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well
as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition
forhabeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was
raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had
been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities
to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were
given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they
did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-
affidavits. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No.
14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not
deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and
in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed
986 (1949), the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court martial jurisdiction. The
Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could
itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could
consider the same contention, reversing a court-martial conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not
required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the
investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

x x x

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold
that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab
initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate
General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War
Department’s interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after
which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under
consideration."cralaw virtua1aw library

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article
of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless
have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-
respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to
by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory
application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under
said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit, does not
invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of
doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they
never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to
answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article
8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body,
was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer
of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or
persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority . . .

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt
that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De
Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the
Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually
constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would
certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the
principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M-6 in the Comment
filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June
12, 1948, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by

the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member
at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should
not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused.
After December 17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became
effective, the Judge Advocate General’s Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing
and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and
breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the
officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and
a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these
environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle
"each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court
shall not be challenged except for cause."cralaw virtua1aw library

On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them."cralaw virtua1aw library

On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to Military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended
"to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The
modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order
No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final
determination of the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim
ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D.
No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance
of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn
when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still
be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the
words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime."cralaw virtua1aw library

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious
that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its
action against the accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited
by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved
punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At
any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter
addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply
the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only
the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition
for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private
respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129, the Court of Appeals is vested
with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals,
4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and
not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
— what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise
to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition . . .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other
bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law
providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that
the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist."cralaw virtua1aw library

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from
the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.

x x x

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order
were sustained, on ‘provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the
truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or
things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged
after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard
on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were
required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a
delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the
private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

. . . The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete its pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review
and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation
of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of
a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves
respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner.
Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article
70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof
mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or
carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration,
the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48-hour period for appeal
under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was
received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents’
contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special
civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations
of the Court in Arula:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW
71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse
of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and
the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in
G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been
denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have
been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise
the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020
and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the
release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683
was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service
as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this
Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed
an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to
one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by
petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of

RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law
 merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service
in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons
who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the
budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and
Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to
government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art
entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the
like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988,
the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your

separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx 3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action
for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23
(sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of
R.A. No. 6683, provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the
following:
 a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period
to perform specific activities or services with a definite expected
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be

separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity
under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice-
versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the

enactment of this law and have received the corresponding
benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by

mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only
if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . .
If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with
more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous
service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic)
purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from
the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by
the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the
Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The
project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which
petitioner's position became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included in its
regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently
short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment
for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his
employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is

available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits
but reorganization5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be
made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of
the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such
as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special
projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce
voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing
the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or

controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is
called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government
civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the
Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No.
6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful
that no such specie is employed in the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:

1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an

appropriate examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities,
and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant

Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether

performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the
non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in

accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year
and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,

unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70;
Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a

laborer holdingemergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project,
R & R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research
aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31
December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January
1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River
Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA —
W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the
status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was
changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December
1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status
as co-terminus with the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is considered co-
terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June
1990).

Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil
Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable
services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services,
while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some

contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,

emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment
therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the
following conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments,

official records and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of
said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June
22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement
are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-
terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career,
and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's
employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11,
series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee —

(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service
is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is
subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-

existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of
funds for the same;

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when

appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-

existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation,
separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a

period of 3 years" — the appointment is for a specific period and
upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is
termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further,
in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law
but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It
can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a
specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine
its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work
pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-
project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her
service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws."

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are
to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by
said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim
in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation
may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called
gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The
doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including
all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power,
right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This
is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus
sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response
to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are
extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he
explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to
extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep.
Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on
coverage of early retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government,

including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the
personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act
shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and
consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of

the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy,
hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their
occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project
personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they
only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates
the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because
casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be
achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without
plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC
regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14,
Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to
qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service
which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive,
elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police
service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation
should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who
survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations
enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-
terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare
and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement
within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application
was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed
the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial
justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two
(2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements
in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981

CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES,
INC.,respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax imposed by the
City of Manila.

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18,
1949, fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-½ %).

On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which
took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on the
assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon
under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per
centrum.

That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three
percent. So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26,
1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-
half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:

SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short

a total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of
Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and ½% per this Ordinance) on the
assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent
realty tax for the third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.

On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void
because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).

After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of
Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).

The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half
percent realty tax.

The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is
still in force; that Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a
two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that
two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total of
three percent realty tax on commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981,
revealed that up to this time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that
from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real
properties.

In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may,
by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one percent but not more than
two percent of the assessed value of real property".

Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special
Education Fund in addition to the basic two percent realty tax.

So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the
Real Property Tax Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent
realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of
1974.

We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's
contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in
section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centum.

The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45,
90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).

While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the
other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as
the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education
Fund.

The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would
accrue to a city or municipality.

And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two
percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax
proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance.

In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the
Special Education Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the additional one
percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax to more than three
percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax
beyond the one percent fixed by the said law.

At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains
that the city charter fixed the realty tax at 1-½% and the later law, the Special Education Fund
Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which one percent would be
earmarked for the education fund.

The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-
half percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not
arise in the City of Manila.

It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax
should be expressly granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to
impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one
and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)

As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real
Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the
augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso
Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Justice Abad Santos is on leave.

Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First

Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said
court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by
defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited
in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R.
No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is
excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this
second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and
the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a
justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of

the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and
no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was
taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified
civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or
take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace
from its operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase
"of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification
exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of
the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had
availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any
word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of
First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer,
who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441,
422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in
1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4
amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as
shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on
incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of
these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen
later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until
June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are
the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was
further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law,
the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

 No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and
no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or
Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however,
That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on
January 15, 1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or
Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived
of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right
to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15,
1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March
10, 1917, the provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified
civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or
take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any
officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate
or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election
otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor
more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation
 of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge,
fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in
any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the
peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as
averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the
words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the
word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First
Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said
"judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the

conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No.
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records
which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which
legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the
peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional
clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the
historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section
54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase
"of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice
of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that
they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be
any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in
the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it
qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed,
justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from
the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and
apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of
the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee
cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular
application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must
be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature
and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the
state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant
asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to
give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the
common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time
and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus,
cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will
govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be
permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159).
The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District
court in the U.S. has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to
deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which
best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56,
cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the
legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the
Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the
statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old
statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature
intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully
explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance"
and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the
term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the
peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so
construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities
would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent
reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be
prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of
the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election
cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and
decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for
candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases
would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section
54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp.
708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative
or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-
12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others,
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines,
dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that
one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in
engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are
already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The
argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment
to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other
words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the
time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the
reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be
properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a
bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are
not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render
ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in
partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and
Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another
which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
"expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of
exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond
reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace
from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p.
6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or
things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will
follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should
not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S.
TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.

Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.

Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.

Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:

This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with
areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin
case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on
the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by
Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three
hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish
title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon
that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano,
Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6.
1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due
to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed
that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They
insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.

On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought
eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production
in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of
determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included
therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral
argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this
late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was
based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court.
The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is
annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action
and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511,
July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in
the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña,
59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119
Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil.
615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre,
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA
503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20
SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long
settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J, took no part.