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C Insights Quiel Jun18 1
C Insights Quiel Jun18 1
INSIGHTS
crashed or overturned vehicles, especially from design manuals. At best, wildfire exposure is
trucks carrying flammable cargo. Despite these briefly mentioned as a consideration in some
hazards, most bridges in the U.S. are designed state DOT documents such as those from
and maintained with little, if any, consideration Caltrans (2017), but the tanker and cargo truck
for fire resistance. With approximately 600,000 design scenarios are not directly addressed. The
bridges currently in use in the U.S., fire has most significant guidance is provided by NFPA
caused bridge failures at a rate consistent with 502, which addresses the design of both bridges
other hazards to which engineers dedicate sig- and tunnels for fire exposure (NFPA 2017).
nificant amounts of time and money to mitigate. According to Chapter 6 of that standard, the
A recent study from the State University of New primary structural elements of bridges or ele-
York at Buffalo surveyed 1,062 bridge failures vated highways shall be protected to achieve the
across the U.S. between 1980 and 2012 (Lee following functional requirements: 1) support
et al., 2013). As shown in Figure 1, common firefighter accessibility;
® 2) mitigate structural
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hazards such as flooding, collision, and over- damage and prevent progressive collapse; and
load constitute the majority of bridge failures; 3) minimize economic impact. The document
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however, fire causes failure at a rate at least com- also states that an “engineering analysis” is
needed to determine whether the collapse
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righ
t of the bridge due to fire would have adverse
Bridges, Fire, and the Structural Engineer
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y
Cop impacts to life safety or other unacceptable
implications. The analyst should determine a
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design fire size and heat release produced by
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parable to or exceeding those due to earthquake vehicles near or under the bridge. For truss or
Spencer E. Quiel, Ph.D., P.E.,
and Stephen P. Pessiki, Ph.D.
or construction defects, both of which are exten-
i n cable supported bridges, engineering analysis is
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sively addressed via design and inspection. explicitly required. While the type of “engineer-
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Tanker trucks carrying gasoline and diesel have ing analysis” is not defined, its results would
Spencer E. Quiel is the P.C. Rossin
g a
contributed to most of the recent severe bridge presumably determine the acceptable risk due
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Assistant Professor of Structural fire events, including the total collapse of two to fire, including possible collapse scenarios.
Engineering at Lehigh University. a
spans in the MacArthur Maze I-80//I-580/I-880 However, little guidance is provided regard-
Professor Quiel is a past member of
the ASCE Fire Protection Committee
m
interchange overpass in Oakland, CA, in 2007
(Figure 2). Also of concern are flammable mate-
ing the available approaches and performance
objectives for such an analysis. The document
(2008-17) and is the current vice rials that are stored underneath bridges, as was also states that its design provisions only apply
chair of the PCI Blast Resistance and the case for the very recent total collapse of an for bridges more than 1000 feet (300 m) in
Structural Integrity Committee. He can I-85 overpass in Atlanta, GA in March 2017, length, although most of the overpasses that
be reached at squiel@lehigh.edu. when a large quantity of HDPE pipe caught fire have collapsed in the last 15 years have lengths
under the bridge. under this cutoff. The standard is also unclear
Stephen P. Pessiki is a Professor Fire incidents for long-span bridges include a as to whether the 1000 feet corresponds to the
of Structural Engineering at Lehigh 2014 fire of a cargo truck on the deck of the Zakim total length of elevated highway or just the
University. Professor Pessiki is a current Bridge in Boston, as well as several incidents of length of each span.
member of the ACI Committee 216, single car fires on major
Fire Resistance and Fire Protection of bridges in New York City.
Structures. He can be reached at Fortunately, these fires have
pessiki@lehigh.edu. generally resulted in minor
to moderate structural
damage with no collapse,
since the fires were relatively
small compared to those
from tanker trucks. Since
most long-span bridges do
not restrict the transport of
fuel and other hazardous
cargo on their roadways,
recent infrastructure proj-
ects have increasingly
specified design scenarios
that include tanker truck
fires as part of a Threat,
Vulnerability, and Risk Figure 1. Cause of failure as a percentage of total surveyed bridge failures
Assessment (TVRA). (Lee et al., 2013)
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potential footprint, flame height,
and intensity. This step will produce
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a heat release rate, duration, and
fire geometry.
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2) C alculate the heat transfer from righ
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y
the fire to the structural ele- Cop
ments: The analyst should carefully
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consider how the fire is oriented
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toward the structural elements. If
directly underneath, the flames and
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smoke plume may engulf the ele-
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ments and provide both radiative
and convective heat transfer. If
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the fire is adjacent to the elements
but not underneath or engulfing a
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righ
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y
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