Able OF Ontents

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10th RMLNLU SCC OnLine Moot, 2022

Best Team Memorial - Applicant
RMLNLU - SCC OnLine International Media Law Moot Court Competition, 2022
In the International Court of Justice Peace Palace
The Hague, Netherlands
To Submit to the International Court of Justice on the Differences between them concerning the Ban
on Chirp and Other Matters under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
The Socialist Republic of Qinquest … Applicant;
Versus
The Republic of Winland … Respondent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ii-iv
List of Abbreviations v
Index of Authorities vi-xxiii
Statement of Jurisdiction xxiv
Statement of Facts xxv-
xxvi
Statement of Issues xxvii
Summary of Arguments xxviii-
xxix
1. That, the Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction over the matter at hand 1
1.1. The instant matter classifies as an international dispute maintainable 1
before the Court
1.1.1. There exists a dispute which posits a bonafide question of interpretation and 1
application of International Law
1.1.2. There is a genuine relationship between the object of the claim and the 2
provisions invoked
1.2. The Court has Competence de la Competence to determine its jurisdiction 2
1.3. The instant matter is not one that falls under the domestic jurisdiction of 3
Winland
1.3.1 It vitiates the test for domestic jurisdiction under international law 3
2. That, the ban on Chirp vitiates the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression 4
propounded by the Constitution of Winland as well as International Law
2.1. The impugned ban, is not saved by Article 29 of the Constitution of 4
Winland and is ultra-vires of the Constitution
2.1.1. The ban does not embody the least restrictive measure that could have been 5
taken by the State and vitiates Doctrine of Over breadth
2.2. The ban imposed on Chirp is oppugnant to the principles of Freedom of 6
Speech and Expression propounded by international instruments
2.2.1. The verbatim of the presidential order that mandates the ban, lacks precision 7
2.2.2. The impugned ban does neither pertains to a ‘pressing social need’, nor is 8
‘relevant and sufficient’ in pursuant of a legitimate aim
3. That, the ban imposed on Chirp, is contentious to the Right of Self- 9
Determination and Right to Life and Personal Liberty warranted by the
Winlandan Constitution as well as International Instruments
3.1. The ban on Chirp proves nugatory to the Right to Life and Personal Liberty 10
on individuals enshrined in Winlandan Constitution
3.1.1. The ban is at variance with the Doctrines of Reasonability and Proportionality 10
3.1.2. The ban fails the tests of Necessity and Balancing of Interests 11
3.2. The ban imposed on Chirp is repugnant to the Doctrine of Self- 11
Determination manifested in international law
3.2.1. The Runerian minority population qualifies as “people” and their Right to Self- 12
Determination is a non-derogable Jus Cogens right
3.2.2. The Right to Self-Determination is an erga omnes right 13
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4. That, the Presidential Order mandating the ban on Chirp and the subsequent 13
directive of mandatorily divesting the assets of Chirp and its affiliate entities,
is not tenable
4.1. The Presidential Order falls beyond the vires of the powers of the 14
executive as prescribed by the Winlandan Constitution
4.1.1. The impugned order is ineffective insofar as it lacks capacity to regulate the 14
functioning of Holding Company of Technocrat
4.1.2. Presidential Order is violative of the enabling act (GFEPA) and engages in 15
palpable usage of discretionary power
4.2. In arguendo, the Presidential Order is antithetical to the global 16
environment of free trade and competitive markets
5. That, President Palpatine's rhetoric of addressing Sickness Virus as 17
“Dragonvirus qualifies as an act of fefamation of the State of Qinquest
5.1. The remark was aimed at disrupting political order of Qinquest by 18
reducing its reputation
5.1.1. The remark is directly attributable to the State of Winland as the same was 19
made by its President, acting in his power of being the head of the State
5.2. The remark was malafide in nature insofar as it tainted the reputation of 20
Qinquest before the Global Community
5.2.1. Truth cannot serve as a good defense in the instant case 20
Prayer for Relief xxx
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion
& And
¶ Paragraph
Annex. Annexure
Anr. Another
art. Article
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
cl. Clause
Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal
HLR Harvard Law Review
Hon'ble Honourable
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESR International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
ILR International Law Review
S. Section
SCC Supreme Court Cases OnLine
UDHR United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND INSTRUMENTS TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Bibliographic Information Corresponding
Page
1. African Charter on Human and Peoples', art. 9, 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR) (1981) 7
2. American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, art. 7
13, B-32 (1969)
3. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art. 10, 213 UNTS 1932 (1950) 7
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 18
(1947)
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh Agreement 2
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33
I.L.M. 1167 (1994)
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6. IACHR, Freedom of expression and the Internet, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (2013) 7

7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 19, 999 UNTS 2
171 (1966)
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), art.1, 13
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966)
9. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36(1), 33 UNTS 993 (1946) 1
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Refugee Convention, art. 19, 189 2
UNTS 137 (1948)
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 13
(1980)
INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Page
1. G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, International Convention on the Elimination of All 20
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965)
2. G.A. Res. 31/91 (XXXI), Non-interference in the internal affairs of States at ¶ 1 19
(1976)
3. UNGA, Communications report of Special Procedures, A/HRC/31/79 (2015) 8
4. UNGA, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 12
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Friendly Relations Declaration), A/RES/25/2625 (XXV) (1970)
5. UNGA, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 13
with commentaries (ARSIWA), Report by the International Law Commission, ch. III,
¶2, UN GA A/56/10 (2001)
6. UNGA, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, 7
UN Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (2012)
7. UNHRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian 8
Federation, UN Doc CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (2015)
8. UNHRC, General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, 7
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011)
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
1. Beneficial Ownership (Companies) Regulations (2019 Revision), Acts of the Legislative 15
Assembly (Cayman Islands)
2. Local Companies Control Act (2019 Revision), Law 47 of 2018, Acts of the Legislative 15
Assembly (Cayman Islands)
3. Russian Model Law 2009 No 32-9; Yarovaya Law 2016 8
4. The Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Privy Council (India) 20
JUDGMENTS OF THE PCIJ AND ICJ
Page
1. Australia and New Zealand (intervening) v. Japan, ICJ GL No 148 20
2. Australia v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep 253 20
3. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20) 1
¶52
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, [2007] ICJ 2 20
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, [2007] ICJ 2; Iran v. U.S. 20
6. Cameroon v. Nigeria, 1999 ICJ 1029 20
7. Colombia v. Peru, 1951 ICJ 4 20
8. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Preliminary Objection, 1948 ICJ 15 3
9. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, [2005] ICJ Rep 168 20
10. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Jurisdiction, 1995 ICJ 90, ¶ 22 2
11. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June, 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, pp. 99-100, 2
para. 22
12. El Salvador and Nicaragua (intervening) v. Honduras, [1992] ICJ Rep 351 20
13. Federation Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 ICJ 14 20
14. Fisheries (Spain v. Can.) 1998 ICJ 432, ¶37-38 3
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15. Germany v. Italy, ICGJ 434 20

16. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and Montenegro v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 3
2004 I.C.J. 1307, ¶33
17. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgement No. 2, 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2, 2
p. 11
18. New Zealand v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep 457 20
19. Nicaragua v. Colombia, ICJ GL No 124 20
20. Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 ICJ 14 20
21. Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 27 2
22. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary Objection, [1953] ICJ Rep 111, 18th 3
November, 1953, at 120
23. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ 253 (Dec. 20) ¶24 1
24. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 ICJ 803, ¶16 2
25. S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10; Prosecutor v. Duško 20
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A
2
26. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962
ICJ 319
27. Ukraine v. Russian, ICJ GL No 166 20

28. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania, 1949 ICJ 4 20
29. United States of America v. Iran, [1980] ICJ Rep 3 20
ADVISORY OPINION OF THE ICJ
Page
1. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations 2
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June, 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p.
27, para. 35
2. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, 2
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 74
3. Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. Upon Complaints Made 1
Against the UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 ICJ 77, 89
4. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 20
226
CASES ADJUDICATED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Page
1. Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App no 40984/07 (ECtHR, 2010) 7
2. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 1976) 7
3. Janowski v. Poland, (2000) 29 EHRR 705 (ECtHR 2000) 9
4. Lingens v. Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407 (ECtHR, 1986) 9
5. Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 14 EHRR 153 (ECtHR 1991) 9
6. Tammer v. Estonia, (2003) 37 EHRR 43 (ECtHR 2003) 9
7. The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, [1979] ECHR 1 (ECtHR, 1979) 9
8. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 1979) 8
CASES ADJUDICATED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Page
1. B.J. v. Denmark, CERD/C/56/D/17/1999 20
2. Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, CERD/C/63/D/27/2002 20
3. Kashif Ahmad v. Denmark, CERD/C/56/D/16/1999 20
4. M.B. v. Denmark, CERD/C/60/D/20/2000 20
5. Mahali Dawas and Yousef Shava v. Denmark, CERD/C/80/D/46/2009 20
6. Miroslav Lacko v. Slovakia, CERD/C/59/D/11/1998 20
7. Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 20
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
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Page
1. Leonardus Johannes Maria de Groot v. The Netherlands, Comm no 578/1994 UN 8
Doc CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994 (UNHRC, 1995)
CASES EMANATING FROM DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
Page
1. A.G. v. Reynolds, [1979] 3 All ER 128 (PC) 5
2. A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27 : (1950) 1 SCR 88 5
3. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 SC 710 15
4. Abrams v. Unites States of America, 250 US 616 (1919) 7
5. Aires Rodrigues v. Subodh Kantak, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 1309 20
6. Ahamad Nasser v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 166 of 1999 5
7. Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274 20
8. American Commc'n Networks v. Williams, 568 S.E.2d 683 20
9. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) SC 1725 6, 11
10. Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC 598 16
11. B. Sharma Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1967) 2 SCR 650 17
12. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24 11
13. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2006) 3 16
SCC 434 : (2006) 3 Scale 1
14. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1982] A.C. 888 19
15. C. Narayanaswamy, etc. v. State of Karnataka, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 141 15
16. C.J.R v. Radfordshire, (1855) 24 LJQB 81 (84) 10
17. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 11
18. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case, (2007) 4 SCC 669 12
19. Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 17
20. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] INSC 3 4
21. DevDutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 10
22. Devi Dass Gopal Krishan v. State of Punjab, 2009 25 VST 434 17
23. E. Balanandan v. State of Kerala, 1978 KLT 592 15
24. East Coast Railways v. Mahadev Appa Rao, (2010) 7 SCC 678 6
25. Emma Sue Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761 (1956) 20
26. Excel Crop Care v. Competition Commission of India, (2017) 8 SCC 47 6
27. Fagu Shah v. State of WB, (1974) 4 SCC 152 : AIR 1974 SC 613 5
28. Francis Manjooran v. Government of India, AIR 1966 Ker 20 11
29. Goodricke Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 951 of 1989 5
30. Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, C.A. No. 8270 of 2001 17
31. Gujarat Ambuja Cements v. Union of India, (1998) 8 SCC 208 5
32. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. v. The Asstt. Commissioner Of Sales, (1974) 17
2 SCR 879
33. Haradhan Saha v. State of WB, (1975) 3 SCC 198 : AIR 1974 SC 2154 5
34. Hatfill v. The New York Times, Co., 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2008) 20
35. Haycox v. Dunn, 104 S.E.2d 800 20
36. Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1 6
37. Hustler v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180 20
38. Hindustan Granites v. Union of India, (2007) 5 Scale 587 6
39. Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360 : AIR 1980 SC 470 5
40. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 11
41. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369 6
42. Kerala Samsthan Chethu Thozhilali Union v. Union of India, [(2006) 4 SCC 327] 16
43. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 : 11
(1963) 2 Cri LJ 329
44. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574 16
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45. Khudiram v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81 : AIR 1975 SC 550 5
46. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1 15
47. Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of Himachal Pradesh, C.A.No. 1424 of 2000 16
48. M.R. Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1997 SCC OnLine Mad 239 15
49. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 10
50. Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Union of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, 6
(1995) 2 SCC 161 : AIR 1995 SC 1236
51. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353 12
52. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and, Weaving Mills Delhi, 17
AIR 1968 SC 1232
53. National Legal Services Association v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 : AIR 12
2014 SC 1863
54. Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121 11
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) 20
56. Noonan v. Staples Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 85 (2010) 20
57. Om Kumar v. Union of India, SLP (C) 21000 of 1993 6
58. P. Ratnakar Rao v. Govt. of A.P., ((1996) 5 SCC 359) 17
59. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 5
60. Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1958] INSC 36 17
61. Paramjit Bhasin v. Union of India,W.P. No. 136 of 2003 17
62. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 US 767 (1986) 20
63. Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727 6
64. R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 (Canada) 8
65. R v. Goldstein, [1983] 1 WLR 151 11
66. R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai, 19
107 ILR, p. 462
67. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada) 8
68. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564 5
69. R.M.D. Chamarbaughwala v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930 17
70. Rajesh Churiwala v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine All 501 20
71. Ram Narayan Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC 276 : AIR 1984 5
SC 1213
72. Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2011) 11 SCC 347 7
73. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC 130 7
74. Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1 5
75. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564 15
76. S. Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 7
77. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 1989 2 SCC 574 4
78. S.N. Sarkar v. State of W.B., (1973) 1 SCC 856 : AIR 1973 SC 1425 : (1973) 1 5
SCC 856
79. Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of 12
India, (2012) 10 SCC 603
80. Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. 7
Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407
81. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73 6,7
82. State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, 1952 SCR 654 7
83. Shri Baburao Shankarrao Chavan v. Shaikh Biban Baban Pahelwan, 1983 SCC 20
OnLine Bom 120
84. State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath, (1983) 2 SCC 402 16
85. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293. 11
86. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramachandran, AIR 1977 MP 68 4
87. State of Madras v. V.G Row, 1952 SCR 597 6
88. State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar, AIR 1966 SC 424 11
89. State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1999) 1 SCC 297 10
90. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deepak Petrochemicals and Fertilizers, 2007 10 SCC 5
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342
91. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, AIR 1952 SC 75 11
92. State v. Kulwant Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 193 7
93. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law, (2016) 7 SCC 221 20
94. Suchita Srivastava v. Administration of Chandigarh, AIR 2010 SC 235 12
95. Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 Punj 27 4
96. Thirubhuvanam Silk Handloom Weavers' Coorp. Production & Sales Society Ltd. 15
v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 SCC OnLine Mad 502
97. Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam and Sons, (2015) 10 SCC 681 5
98. Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510 4
99. Union of India v. S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683 16
100. V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196 11
101. Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003) 7
102. Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 15
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& COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (2014)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
aa/file/295276/March_14_Hate_speech_freedom_of_expression_and_fr
eedom_of_religion_final___.doc
6. Larry Greenemier, Hatred Goes Viral: Inside Social Media's Efforts to Combat 17
Terrorism, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 24 2017)
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/when-hatred-goes-viral-inside-social-
medias-efforts-to-combat-terrorism/
7. Limitations, ARTICLE 19 (Nov 25 2021) 8
www.article19.org/pages/en/limitations.html.
8. Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission releases its full account of massive violations 15
by military in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States, UNHRC (September 18 2018)
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?
NewsID=23575&LangID=E
9. Principles of the trading system, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (June 15 2017) 17
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#:∼:
text=without%20discrimination%20%E2%80%94%20a%20country%
20should,giving%20them%20%E2%80%9Cnational%20treatment%E2%80%9D
10. Regional expert meeting on Article 20, Towards an interpretation of article 20 of 12
the ICCPR: Thresholds for the prohibition of incitement to hatred Work in Progress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(OHCHR February 9, 2010)

https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/expression/iccpr/vienna/crp7callamard.pdf
11. Toby Mendel, Hate Speech Rules Under International Law, CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY 10
AND TECHNOLOGY (February, 2010)
http://www.paccusa.org/hate-speech-international-law-v-u-s-law/#_ftn7
12. Tanya Lokshina, Draconian Law Rammed Through Russian Parliament HUMAN 8
RIGHTS WATCH (July 7, 2016)
www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/23/draconian-law-rammedthrough-russianparliament
-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-
It is humbly submitted that, the Applicant has approached the Hon'ble International Court of Justice
(ICJ) under Article 36(2)1 of the ICJ Statute. The dispute in question relates to the rights under Article
19 of ICCPR2 , Article 9 of UDHR3 , Article XXIV of GATT4 and other provisions of international law.
The Applicant respectfully requests the Hon'ble Court to adjudge the dispute in accordance with the
rules and principles of international law, including any applicable declarations and treaties.
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
I. RELEVANT DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO NATIONS:
QINQUEST WINLAND
POLITICAL PROFILE
Qinquest is an emerging global superpower and is Republic of Winland is a fast-growing country
solely governed by the Qinquest Communist Party and is currently governed by the Winlandan
(QCP). Mr. Cho Hak Wei is currently the leader of Republican Right Party (WRRP), headed by Mr.
QCP. Palpatine.
RELIGION
Although Qinquest officially espouses state The religious spectrum of Winland is bifurcated
atheism, Runeria is also widely practised by the into two main communities: majority comprising
people of Qinquest. of Devoteds and around 10% constituted by
Runerians.
CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS
QCP has been focusing on bolstering native Recently, the cancel-culture atmosphere in
entrepreneurial ventures in Qinquest and their Winland has sparked animosity between the two
global proliferation and has also been working communities and resultant oppression of
through international organizations, like the UN, for Runerian minority in Winland, both by citizens
the same. and the Government through intolerant policies
for Runerian immigrants.
II. FACTS OF THE DISPUTE:
LAUNCH OF CHIRP APP
Chirp, a social media application by Technocrat, was initially launched in Qinquest, and later on, it was
launched worldwide with an aim to facilitate free internet and seamless exchange of ideas. The
ultimate beneficial owner of Technocrat is based out of the Cayman Islands. Chirp allows sharing of
information in all digital forms, and has a myriad of rules for operation, for example, privacy policy,
parental control, etc.
SICKNESS PANDEMIC AND HUMILIATION OF RUNERIANS IN WINLAND
A uniquely hazardous Sickness Pandemic engulfed the world, with 5 million deaths worldwide.
Countries, including Winland and Qinquest, developed vaccines to combat it. However, rumours
against Runerians being the ‘superspreaders’ of the Sickness pandemic in Winland started spreading,
which resulted in massive exploitation of Runerians both in public places and by the government, via
intolerant policies for immigrants.
CENSORSHIP BY QCP
In Qinquest, Chirp censored the content that was against the ideologies of QCP under its Intelligence
Law. It was alleged that information shared by users on Chirp can be accessed by Qinquest authorities
to track individuals and build dossiers that could be deployed for potential blackmail.
CHIRP BAN IN WINLAND
President Palpatine declared a financial emergency under GFEPA, and banned Chirp and directive to
divest the assets of Chirp and its affiliates, in spite of the fact that Winland has the highest number of
chirp users in the world. He stated national security threats due to surveillance by Qinquest via Chirp
as the reason for the same. The Runerian minority used the platform to express their dissent against
the immigration policies of the government and their humiliation in the wake of fake rumours during
pandemic and this ban has broken that bridge. A faction of users started alleging Runerians to be the
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‘superspreaders’ of the Sickness pandemic in Winland, which led to astrocities against Runerians.
DEFAMATION OF QINQUEST BY PRESIDENT PALPATINE
In a backlash to the criticism received from Qinquest on the ban on Chirp in Winland, President
Palpatine called out Sickness Virus as ‘Dragonvirus’. Qinquestians condemned this remark as being
defamatory since Dragon is their national symbol.
-STATEMENT OF ISSUES-
ISSUE 1
WHETHER, THE INSTANT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE COURT?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER, THE BAN ON CHIRP VITIATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION PROPOUNDED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AND I NTERNATIONAL LAW ?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER, THE BAN INVOKED ON CHIRP IS CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND RIGHT TO LIFE
AND LIBERTY WARRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AND I NTERNATIONAL I NSTRUMENTS?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND SUBSEQUENT DIVESTMENT OF ASSETS OF
CHIRP AND ITS AFFILIATE ENTITIES, IS TENABLE?
ISSUE 5
WHETHER, PRESIDENT PALPATINE'S RHETORIC OF CALLING SICKNESS VIRUS AS ‘DRAGONVIRUS’ QUALIFIES AS AN ACT
OF DEFAMATION OF THE S TATE OF QINQUEST?
-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-
I. THAT, THE INSTANT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON'BLE COURT
Firstly, here exists a dispute with positively opposed claims, which posits a bonafide question of
interpretation and application of International Law. Qinquest submits that Winland has violated its
obligations under UDHR, ICCPR and GATS, and has also maliciously defamed the State of Qinquest by
calling Sickness virus as ‘Dragonvirus’ and hence, the case is maintainable under Article 36(2) of the ICJ
Statute.
Secondly, the Hon'ble Court has Competence de la Competence to determine its jurisdiction over the
matter under Article 36 (6) of the ICJ Statute.
Thirdly, the present case is not one that falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland as firstly,
international obligations outweigh the municipal laws of Winland, and secondly, the dispute invariably
involves the interests and applicable laws of a third State; i.e, Cayman Islands where Technocrat is
based.
II. THAT, THE BAN ON CHIRP VITIATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION PROPOUNDED
BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL LAW
Firstly, the ban on Chirp is ultra vires of the Constitution of Winland since the restrictions imposed
under Article 29 of the Constitution are not the least restrictive measure that could have been taken by
the State (as highlighted in a volume of cases like Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India). These restrictions
also vitiate the Doctrine of Overbreadth laid down in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, which makes this
ban grossly unconstitutional.
Secondly, the ban is violative of Freedom of Speech and Expression under the strict interpretation of
three-part test based on Article 19 of ICCPR, and opined in cases like The Sunday Times v. The United
Kingdom. Furthermore, the verbatim of the Order is vague in construction.
III. THAT, THE BAN ON CHIRP IS CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND RIGHT TO
LIFE AND LIBERTY WARRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS
Firstly, with regards to the Constitution of Winland, the ban fails the four-pronged Doctrines of
Reasonability and Proportionality, which are based on the landmark judgements such as K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India. It is further at variance with the Tests of Necessity and Balancing of
Interests envisaged in again a volume of case like the Sahara case.
Secondly, with respect to international instruments, the Runerian minority population qualifies as
“people” and their Right to Self-determination is a non-derogable Jus Cogens right under article 1 of the
ICESCR and ICCPR. Winland cannot contravene these rights by banning Chirp, which acts as a mode of
self-determination for Runerians. Moreover, the right to self-determination is an erga omnes right, the
derogation of which is impermissible under the legal framework of international law.
IV. THAT, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND SUBSEQUENT DIVESTMENT OF
ASSETS OF CHIRP AND ITS AFFILIATE E NTITIES, IS NOT TENABLE
Firstly, the Constitution of Winland being pari materia to Indian Constitution, Article 123 of the
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Indian Constitution mandates that the ordinance promulgated by the President must not be a misuse of
power. The impugned Order is incapable of regulating the functions of holding company of Technocrat,
the ultimate beneficiary of all financial holdings of Chirp, because it is located in the Cayman Islands,
which, lies beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the laws of Winland. Moreover, the Order is violative of
Section 1701 of GFEPA and engages in palpable usage of Discretionary Powers.
Secondly, in arguendo, the Presidential Order is discriminatory with respect to free trade guaranteed
under WTO, that both Winland and Qinquest are signatories to. It does not fulfil the basic requirements
entailed under Article XXIV of GATT, and hence is violative of the principles of free trade promulgated by
the World Trade Organization.
V. THAT, PRESIDENT PALPATINE'S RHETORIC OF CALLING SICKNESS VIRUS AS ‘DRAGONVIRUS’
CONSTITUTES DEFAMATION OF THE STATE OF QINQUEST
Firstly, the remark made by President Palpatine, which is directly attributable to the Republic of
Winland under ARSIWA, was aimed at disrupting the political order of Qinquest, which no state has a
right to, as substantiated by the cases such as Ukraine v. Russian Federation.
Secondly, the remark made by the President on violations of Right to Freedom of Speech by
Qinquest was malafide as well as fallacious and hence, is condemnable under Article 1 of CERD and
various other provisions of international law.
1. THAT, THE HON'BLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER AT HAND
1. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that, the instant matter is maintainable before the
Court which has axiomatic jurisdiction over it, because [1.1] the instant matter classifies as an
international dispute maintainable before the Court, [1.2] the Court has Competence de la Competence
to adjudicate over the matter, and because, [1.3] the present matter is not one that falls under the
domestic jurisdiction of Winland.
1.1. The instant matter classifies as an international dispute maintainable before the Court
2. It is humbly asseverated that Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice5
(hereinafter, “ICJ Statute”), to which both, the Applicant and Respondent are parties6 , entails that the
Court can exercise jurisdiction upon the concurrence of two elements, firstly, there must be a dispute7 ,
and secondly, some genuine nexus must exist between the object of the claim and the provisions
invoked.8 In light of these prerequisites, it is humbly submitted that the dispute is maintainable on the
grounds, [1.1.1] the dispute posits a bonafide question of interpretation of International Law, and
because, [1.1.2] there is a genuine relationship between the object and claim and the provisions
invoked.
1.1.1. There exists a dispute which posits a bonafide question of interpretation and application of
International Law
3. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that a dispute exists when there are positively
opposing claims between parties on a point of law or fact.9 In numerous judgements such as those of
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions10 and Northern Cameroons11, this Court has defined a dispute as a
“disagreement on point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties”12 and it is
upon the court to determine it objectively13 . In the present case, the Applicant and Respondent have
starkly different legal opinions on many issues, like, whether the Presidential Order to ban Chirp and
divest from all its assets14 , breaches GATS15 on account of trade-related discrimination, whether the ban
on Chirp violates the rights to expression, self-determination, life and personal liberty of the Runerians
mandated under the UDHR16 and ICCPR17 , whether the use of terms such as ‘Dragonvirus’ by the
President has resulted in defamation of Applicant18 , and others19 .
1.1.2. There is a genuine relationship between the object of the claim and the provisions invoked
4. The object of the claim must have a nexus with the provisions invoked, and to determine the
existence of such genuine relationship, the Court must ascertain whether it has jurisdiction rationae
materiae.20 In determining such jurisdiction, the concern is whether the object of the claim is capable of
violating a treaty provision.21 In the present case, the ban on Chirp which was the main platform used
by Runerians to express their dissent against their humiliation by Devoteds, is certainly capable of
violating its international obligations under the UDHR and ICCPR. Therefore, the present matter fulfils
both the essentials requisite for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter.
1.2. The Court has Competence de la Competence to determine its jurisdiction
5. It is humbly adduced that the Court, whose powers derive from its Statute, has the express power
to determine its own jurisdiction, should any dispute arise on the matter.22 The Court has consistently
exercised this power before determining the merits of the case.23 Article 36(6) of the ICJ Statute,
provides that:“In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.”24 Article 36(6), suffices to invest the Court with the power to
adjudicate on its jurisdiction in the present case.25 Henceforth, in the present matter as well, the Court
has undoubted Competence de la Competence to adjudicate.
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1.3. The instant matter is not one that falls under the domestic jurisdiction of Winland
6. It is humbly submitted that, in the present matter, Chirp, the prominent social media application
developed for global use in one State (i.e., Qinquest) has been completely banned along with
divestment by the government of another State (i.e., Winland), and the ultimate beneficial owner of
Technocrat has been registered in a third State (Cayman Islands)26 . Such a dispute is transparently not
one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland because [1.3.1] it vitiates the test for domestic
jurisdiction under international law.
1.3.1 It vitiates the test for domestic jurisdiction under international law
7. It is humbly submitted that the dispute no longer limits to the ban of Chirp in the jurisdiction of
Winland but also involves the devolution of Technocrat (ultimate owner being the Holding Company
registered with Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CAMA)27 , Chirp and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and
resident Qinquest shareholders in Winland. Moreover, disclosure of all data obtained or derived from
Chirp application users in Winland is not restricted to the nationals but anyone residing in Winland,
which again is a blatant violation of right to privacy guaranteed under various international instruments.
8. Hitherto, it is most humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court, that keeping in purview the grave
and lachrymose scenario that the pandemic has rendered upon the nation, the Court should consider the
hard realities of life.28 For the want of justice in such a scenario, it is pleaded before the Court to relax
the technicalities when it comes to maintainability of the application and hear the case for greater good
of the international community.
2. THAT, THE BAN ON CHIRP VITIATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION PROPOUNDED
BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL LAW
9. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that, the ban on Chirp vitiates the Right to
Freedom of Speech and Expression propounded by the Constitution of Winland as well as international
law, because, [2.1] the impugned ban, is not saved by Article 29 of the Constitution of Winland and
because, [2.2] the ban imposed on Chirp is oppugnant to the principles of Freedom of Speech and
Expression propounded by international instruments.
2.1. The impugned ban, is not saved by Article 29 of the Constitution of Winland and is ultra-
vires of the Constitution
10. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that, freedom can be restricted for the welfare of
freedom alone, and not otherwise.29 Restrictions, whenever imposed, must be justified on the anvil of
necessity, and not on the quicksand of convenience or expediency.30 Additionally, nothing less than
endangering the foundation of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the
rights of freedom of speech and expression.31 A strict interpretation of the verbatim of Article 29 of
Winlandan Constitution32 must be made in the instant, so as to not arbitrarily widen its ambit, thus
whittling down justice.
11. It is humbly pleaded before the Hon'ble Court that, as entailed by the provision enshrined in
Article 13(2) of the Constitution33 , any post-constitutional law, not in absolute agreement with
fundamental rights, is void ab initio.34 The soundness of all laws has to be tested on the touchstone of
the constitution and have to be infallible when subjected to safeguards mentioned in Part III of the
constitution.35 The ‘test of constitutionality’, is often used as a euphemism for ‘test of reasonableness’36
and the restrictions laid down by an impugned legislation, must be viewed from a perspective of
reasonability.37 In the much-decorated judgment of V.G. Row v. State of Madras, this Hon'ble Court
functions as a sentinel on the qui vive when it comes to the infraction of fundamental rights.38 Taking
into consideration the aforesaid ratios, the applicant would seek to appeal to this Hon'ble Court, to put
the impugned provision through tests of strict judicial scrutiny and hold the state responsible for
contravention of fundamental rights caused by the ban imposed on Chirp, considering the fact that
Article 16(1) and (2) of the Winlandan Constitution, clearly protect the freedom of expression as well as
that of dissemination and receiving of information.39
12. Furthermore, in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India,40 it was held that validity of laws affecting
fundamental rights should be judged by the said rights and not with reference to the object of the
legislator.41 In the instant case, the object of the legislator, which is to protect the national interests and
security of the state, is perspicuous, however, the end-objective behind the act cannot be the sole
ground of determining the validity of the law.42 Thitherto, the State of Winland may not seek to defend
their action of banning Chirp solely on the grounds mentioned in Article 29 of the Constitution of
Winland43 thus, the limitations upon the applicability of Article 29 of the Winlandian Constitution may be
further emphasized on grounds that, [2.1.1.] the ban does not embody the least restrictive measure
that could have been taken by the State and vitiates doctrine of overbreadth and, [2.1.2.] the verbatim
of the presidential order that mandates the ban is vague in construction.
2.1.1. The ban does not embody the least restrictive measure that could have been taken by the State
and vitiates Doctrine of Overbreadth
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13. It is humbly asseverated before the Hon'ble Court that, in cases where state action lays down
discernible set of restrictions upon fundamental rights, question frequently arises whether he has
imposed the least of the restrictions or the reasonable quantum of restriction etc.44 The Winlandan
Courts have had occasions to consider whether the restrictions imposed by legislation were
disproportionate to the situation and were not the least restrictive of the choices and had held that
burden of proof to show that the restriction was reasonable laid on the State, as was observed in the
pronouncements of Om Kumar v. Union of India45 as well as Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India46 .
Corroborating the forestated dicta with the case at hand, the State of Winland must prove that the
decision of banning Chirp, was indeed the least restrictive measure they could have taken, to achieve
their goals of national interest and that nothing less of the same would have sufficed.
14. It is humbly pleaded that when provisions of law cast a wide-net of restrictions upon expression
of Fundamental Rights, they are struck by the vice of overbreadth.47 As was discussed in the case of
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, any provision that, takes within its sweep protected speech and speech
that is innocent in nature, would have to be struck down on the ground of overbreadth.48 In the instant
case, firstly, there existed nothing to suggest that there existed any form of data or privacy breach of
Winlandan users of chirp, as the same was stored separately from the user data of other Chirp
products49 , secondly, no unusual or extraordinary threat, economic or political, could have been
foreseeably caused by Chirp to Winland, as it was merely a platform wherein Winlandans expressed their
views, which were personal to them, and weren't necessarily shared by Chirp itself50 , and lastly, while
the Winlandan Constitution empowered the President to prohibit mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers that
threaten national security51 , there existed nothing to indicate that there existed any kind of financial
irregularity in the transactions of Chirp, thereto pointing at a blatant misuse of executive authority.
2.2. The ban imposed on Chirp is oppugnant to the principles of Freedom of Speech and
Expression propounded by international instruments
15. Freedom of expression is a basic condition for the progress of democratic societies and for the
development of each individual.52 It is a fundamental and universal human right that applies equally to
speech communicated on the internet and speech communicated through traditional means.53 While not
unlimited, this freedom is subject to restrictions only if they are ‘construed strictly’ and ‘established
convincingly’.54 In the instant case, Winland's goals of protecting national security interests while
ensuring vaccination for all, during the demanding times of Sickness pandemic, although
understandable, do not warrant for imposing a complete ban on Chirp. This shall be further argued on
the grounds that, [2.2.1] The verbatim of the presidential order that mandates the ban is vague in
construction and [2.2.2] the restrictions permissible upon Freedom of Expression under International
Law must be strictly interpreted.
2.2.1. The verbatim of the presidential order that mandates the ban, lacks precision
16. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the doctrine of vagueness55 can be put forth
in the situation when neither the person put on notice knows what offence they have committed, nor the
law enforcing agencies know what exactly constitutes the offence, owing to its subjectivity.56 For a
restriction to be prescribed by law, a statute must be sufficiently precise57 as to the rule's constraints,
limitations, and penalties.58 This foreseeability allows citizens to know when their actions will constitute
an offence and enables them ‘to regulate [their] conduct’.59
17. Furthermore, vague and overly-broad laws are often found to be impermissible since they provide
officials with discretionary power to make arbitrary decisions.60 The UNHRC expressed ‘repeated
concerns’ about Russia's extremism laws61 lacking ‘violence or hatred’ in their vague classification of
‘extremism’. This omission resulted in its ‘increasing use to curtail freedom of expression, including
political dissent’.62 In the instant case, a bare perusal of the Presidential Order that imposed a ban on
Chirp, indicates that, firstly, the same does not define the ambit of “information and communication
technology and service”63 , thereby widening the ambit of applicability, secondly, does not limit the scope
of which entities may be listed as “foreign adversaries”64 , thus providing a free hand to the executive to
decide the same, per their discretion, thirdly, the functionality of “undue risks” and “unacceptable risk”
mentioned in clause ii(a) and (b) of the Presidential Order are overbroad65 and include a catena of
circumstances and events under its ambit that, when liberally interpreted, is prone to being misused to
falsely incarcerate entities.
2.2.2. The impugned ban does neither pertains to a ‘pressing social need’, nor is ‘relevant and sufficient’
in pursuant of a legitimate aim
18. It is humbly proffered before the Court that, under the ambit of Article 19 of the ICCPR, for a
restriction to be legitimate, a three-part test must be met; firstly, the interference must be provided for
by law. This requirement will be fulfilled only where the law is accessible and “formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”,66 secondly, the interference must pursue a
legitimate aim. The word “necessary” means that there must be a “pressing social need”67 for the
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restriction. The reasons given by the State to justify the restriction must be “relevant and sufficient”68
and the restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued.69
19. Corroborating the forestated principles of international law with the case at hand, the burden of
proof rests squarely on Winland to prove that the ban qualifies all the three limbs of the test in order to
not be in contravention of the ICCPR. Albeit the burden of proof lies on the respondents, the applicants,
for the welfare of the Court, shall prove that the ban vitiates the test. Firstly, there was a lack of
precision in the verbatim of the order that imposed the ban, as it did not allow Chirp a chance to
regulate its conduct in a manner that is more suited to national interests, and directly went on to
suggest the creation of a committee that then ordered for its devolution.70 Secondly, the legitimacy of
the aim of national security interests must be balanced against the fundamental rights of the citizenry,
and the interests of the state, cannot trump the Freedom of expression of the people.71
20. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that, keeping in purview the grave
scenario rendered by the impugned provision upon the nation, the Court should take a realistic than
doctrinal and pragmatic than pedantic approach72 , and must hold the ban imposed on chirp to be in
contravention of both, the Winlandan Constitution as well as the principles of International Law.
3. THAT, THE BAN IMPOSED ON CHIRP, IS CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND RIGHT
TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY WARRANTED BY THE WINLANDAN CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
21. It is humbly adduced before the Court that, the common definition of “personal liberty” implies
that certain qualifications and limitations rest upon this power, which are known to the law and enforced
by it without infringing upon constitutional liberty.73 It is also apposite to note that, the idea of “Right to
Life”, is not limited to mere animal existence alone, in a state of absolute drudgery, and encompasses a
life worth living.74 On similar lines of thought, an expressly recognized right under treaty and customary
international law, self-determination includes the right of a people of an existing State to choose freely
their own political system and to pursue their own economic, social, and cultural development.75
However, in the instant case, the ban on Chirp, [3.1] proves nugatory to the Right to life and personal
liberty on individuals enshrined in Winlandan Constitution and [3.2] is repugnant to the doctrine of self-
determination manifested in international law.
3.1. The ban on Chirp proves nugatory to the Right to life and personal liberty on individuals
enshrined in Winlandan Constitution
22. It is humbly posited before the Hon'ble Court that, it is pertinent at this conjecture, to glean upon
Justice Bhagwati's golden verbatim in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India76 wherein he opined, “the right
to life and personal liberty is an important basic human right, for, it nourishes the independent and self-
determining creative character of the individual”. In yet another judgment, it has been further observed
that restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of movement, of profession, are founding commitments
and serious restraints on them must be strictly restricted77 and that, harsher the restriction is, the
heavier will be the burden to prove its reasonableness.78 The standard of adjudging the reasonableness
of an enactment is contingent upon the restriction it imposes and the vice it seeks to cure through such
restriction.79 Applying the forestated dicta upon the instant case, the Winlandan government's decision
of banning chirp, coupled with the ruling party's animosity towards the minority community of
Runerians, which manifests itself in myriad forms, including hatred for Qinquest,80 stringent anti-
immigration norms against Runerians,81 defamatory and demeaning speeches against Runerians,
including the Dragon virus rhetoric,82 etc, strips Runerians of their right to live with dignity, thus
deeming such state action to be antithetical to the spirit of Article 22 of the Winlandan Constitution.83
Hitherto, the applicants argue the vitiation of Right to life and personal liberty on the grounds, [3.1.1]
the ban is at variance with the Doctrine of Reasonability and Proportionality and, [3.1.2] the ban fails
the tests of Necessity and Balancing of Interests.
3.1.1. The ban is at variance with the Doctrines of Reasonability and Proportionality
23. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that, proportionality is an essential facet of the
guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the encroachment on the right is not
disproportionate to the purpose of the law.84 In the landmark judgment of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India, four sub-components of proportionality which need to be satisfied were taken note of; firstly, a
measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal, secondly, it must be a suitable means of
furthering this goal, thirdly, there must not be any less restrictive but equally effective alternative, and
lastly, The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right-holder85 . Corroborating the
ratio of the forestated judgment with the instant case, albeit the respondents may argue that Winland
had a legitimate aim behind their actions, the indisputable truth remains that they did not explore other,
lesser restrictive alternatives before imposing the ban, thitherto, disproportionately compromising the
rights of the Citizenry.
3.1.2. The ban fails the tests of Necessity and Balancing of Interests
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24. It is humbly adduced before the Hon'ble Court that, in a democracy with interests, it is
reasonable for certain interests to clash against each other, and to resolve such dispute, the tests of
necessity and balancing of interests are applied.86 According to the test of necessity suggested in
Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case87 and Sahara India case88 , the balancing test
scrutinizes excessive penalties and imbalance of considerations while the necessity test requires
infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. Adding emphasis to the precedents
stated above, the impugned ban must be tested against the touchstones of the forestated tests.
3.2. The ban imposed on Chirp is repugnant to the doctrine of self-determination manifested in
international law
25. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that, the Friendly Relations Declaration proclaims
that by virtue of the principle of equal rights and Self-Determination of peoples enshrined in the UN
Charter, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.89 Hitherto, Winlandan Government
too, must recognise the Right to Self-Determination of the Runerian population and rescind the ban
imposed on Chirp, on the grounds that, [3.2.1.] the Runerian minority population qualifies as “peoples”
and their Right to Self-determination is a non-derogable Jus Cogens right and because [3.2.2] the Right
to Self-Determination is an erga omnes right.
3.2.1. The Runerian minority population qualifies as “people” and their Right to Self-determination is a
non-derogable Jus Cogens right
26. Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR recognizes Self-Determination as a universal right.90 Where no
distinction has been elucidated between “peoples” and “minorities,” Runerians, as minorities, also fall
under the term “peoples,”91 thus, afforded the Right of Self-Determination under the ICESCR. The right
to self-determination covers the freedom to pursue one's “economic, social and cultural development.”92
Such right is provided given that “cultural well-being is a higher collective good which society cannot
afford to forgo.”93 The Runerian population, thus, is entitled to practice its polytheistic religious beliefs,
without any discriminations being practiced by the state, be it overt or covert considering the fact that,
without such cultural practice, the distinctiveness of their identity will be lost.
27. Jus cogens is a norm from which no derogation is permitted and can be modified only by a
subsequent jus cogens.”94 Self-Determination is considered a jus cogens norm.95 The character of jus
cogens is an attribute of the principle of Self-Determination because it is a prerequisite for the exercise
and effective realization of human rights.96 Thitherto, in light of self-determination being a jus cogens
norm, Winland may not act in contravention of the same, by banning Chirp, which acts as a mode of self
-determination and for the Runerians.
3.2.2. The Right to self-determination is an erga omnes right
28. The International Court of Justice has pronounced in the East Timor case that Portugal's assertion
that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations
practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable.97 Erga omnes rights are those owed by States
to the international community as a whole, and that by reason of “the importance of the rights involved”
all States have a legal interest in their protection.98 According to the International Law Commission, the
examples which ICJ has given of erga omnes obligations all concern obligations which, it is generally
accepted, arise under peremptory norms of general international law.99 Thitherto, stressing upon the
forestated provisions of international law, Qinquest too, being a member of the global international
community, has vested interests in the protection of Right to self-determination of Runerians.
29. It follows therefore that the right of the Runerians to self-determination arises, as an erga omnes
right, from a peremptory norm. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
a treaty will be void ‘if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law’.100 This rule will also apply in the context of customary rules so that no derogation
would be permitted to such norms by way of local or special custom.101 As an established jus cogens
norms, sitting atop the hierarchy of international law, no State may derogate from the people of
Runerians exercise of their right to self-determination, or if questions or doubts thereto are raised, it
must be resolved in favour of the holder of the right even against a treaty, or a custom.
4. THAT, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND THE SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIVE OF
MANDATORILY DIVESTING THE ASSETS OF CHIRP AND ITS AFFILIATE ENTITIES, IS NOT TENABLE
30. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that, the Presidential Order is implausible on the
grounds that, [4.1] the Presidential Order falls beyond the vires of the powers of the Executive as
prescribed by the Winlandan Constitution and because, [4.2] in arguendo, the Presidential Order is
antithetical to the global environment of free trade.
4.1. The Presidential Order falls beyond the vires of the powers of the Executive as prescribed
by the Winlandan Constitution
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31. It is humbly asseverated before this Hon'ble Court that; an ordinance is described as a legislative
power of the President. The constitution of Winland is pari materia to Indian Constitution102 and Article
123 of Indian Constitution103 provides for President to promulgate ordinance during recess of parliament
if he is satisfied that there exist circumstances that make it necessary for him to take an immediate
action. Such an Ordinance can be challenged in the court of law on the grounds that “immediate action”
was not required and that the Ordinance was just a misuse of power exercised only to avoid the
discussion and debate in the legislature, as was observed in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of
India.104 Adding emphasis to the forestated dictum, the applicants challenge the impugned order to be
unconstitutional considering the lack of evidence to suggest the need of “immediate action” on the
grounds that, [4.1.1.] the impugned Presidential Order is ineffective insofar as it lacks the capacity to
regulate the functioning of Technocrat, and because [4.1.2] the Presidential Order Presidential Order
qualifies as Subordinate Legislation and is violative of the Enabling Act (GFEPA).
4.1.1. The impugned order is ineffective insofar as it lacks capacity to regulate the functioning of the
Holding Company of Technocrat
32. It is humbly posited before the Hon'ble Court that, the Holding Company of Technocrat, the
ultimate beneficiary of all financial holdings of Chirp, is located in the Cayman Islands105 , which,
essentially lies beyond the vires of the territorial jurisdiction of the laws of Winland. Caymanian laws,
namely, the Local Companies Control Act (2019 Revision) governs foreign ownership and control of
businesses doing business within the Islands, and ordinarily requires 60% Caymanian ownership and
control.106 Similarly, all beneficial holdings operational within Cayman Islands, are mandated to file an
annual notification in respect of economic substance under the Beneficial Ownership (Companies)
Regulations (2019 Revision).107 Thus, considering all the records of financial transactions as well as the
regulation of such transactions is carried out under the auspices of Caymanian laws, the Winlandan
Presidential order, is inutile in devoluting assets of the Holding Company
4.1.2. Presidential Order is violative of the Enabling Act (GFEPA) and engages in palpable usage of
Discretionary Power
33. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that, the standard for ascertaining the
constitutionality of a subordinate or delegated legislation, is contingent upon two distinct limbs, firstly,
whether the said delegation aligns itself with constitutional standards, and secondly, whether it falls
within the vires of the legislation that it was promulgated under108 . Placing reliance upon the aforesaid
judicial doctrine, in the instant case, the Presidential Order (hereinafter, “Order”) promulgated by the
Republic of Winland109 , has to not only satisfy the conditions of constitutional legitimacy, it also has to
fall within the bounds of the legislation it was promulgated under, which, in the instant case, refers to
the Global Financial Emergency Powers Act110 (hereinafter, “GFEPA”).
34. It is further asseverated that, conferment of quasi-legislative power by a rule making body, upon
an otherwise executive body, does not entail for the executive to traverse beyond the scope of power
provided by the legislative.111 It is sine qua non for the delegated legislation to abide itself by the
general power of the parent legislation and align with its scope and objectives, as observed in the case
of State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath.112 Firstly, Section 1701 of the GFEPA categorically states
that President may declare a national emergency and exercise presidential authorities if there is an
unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, economy, etc.113 The said situation in Winland is
not indicative of any threat that is unusual or extraordinary in nature. Secondly, Section 1701 of the
GFEPA expressly mentions that the presidential authorities does not include the authority to regulate or
prohibit import or export of any information regardless of the format or the medium of transmission.114
However, the Order goes a step beyond GFEPA, and bans Chirp, orders for divesture of its assets and
properties and conceding of data collected of Winlandan users, thereby causing hinderance in the flow of
incoming and outgoing information.115
35. Subordinate legislation ought not be ridden with the vices of excessive delegation and palpable
discretion.116 The legislature cannot abdicate its essential powers of legislation to the executive, by the
means of delegated legislation, and should set a standard for the guidance of the officials towards the
execution of laws, as was discussed in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India.117 The Constitution
confers a power and imposes a duty on the legislature to make laws, which is inclusive of legislative
policy, and the same cannot be left out for the executive.118 Each statute has to be examined to find out
whether there are guidelines therein which prevent delegation from being excessive119 . Placing reliance
on the ratios, it is contended that, in the instant case, the Order suffered from the vice of excessive
delegation, as, the Order violated the constitutional rights as well as the provisions of the Enabling Act
(GFEPA).
4.2. In arguendo, the Presidential Order is antithetical to the global environment of free trade
and competitive markets
36. Without any prejudice to the forestated arguments, it is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble
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Court that, WTO Rules are based on certain basic principles like Most-favoured nation that lays down the
countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners, freer trade, promoting fair
competition, etc.120 In the instant case, the Winland by way of imposing a ban on Chirp violated the
basic principles of WTO agreement as [4.2.1] the impugned Presidential Order is brazenly
discriminatory in nature, and vitiates the principles of free trade promulgated by the WTO.
4.2.1. The impugned order is brazenly discriminatory in nature, and vitiates the principles of free trade
promulgated by the World Trade Organization
37. It is humbly asseverated before the Hon'ble Court that, to ensure freer trade and open, fair and
undistorted competition, WTO allows certain tariffs and other forms of protection. These rules, to
safeguard the fair conditions of trade, are based on the principles of non-discrimination (MFN and
national treatment). However, Winland has acted in discriminatory way by arbitrarily imposing a ban on
the Qinquest-based Chirp and Technocrat without any incriminating evidence. The forced and mandatory
divestment of Chirp's assets and properties by the subsidiaries, affiliates and Winland-residing
Qinquestian shareholders of Technocrat and disclosure of Winland's user data121 is draconian and
violated of principle of trading without discrimination and free trade tenets.
38. Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) needs to meet 4 basic requirements in order to be in compliance
with Article XXIV122 of GATT, firstly, duties and other restrictive commercial regulations need to be
removed, secondly, substantially all trade must be covered, thirdly, external tariffs and commercial
regulations applicable may not be higher or more restrictive than what used to be in force before the FTA
or interim agreement was formed, and lastly, interim agreements must contain a plan and schedule to
achieve these goals within a reasonable period of time.123 Clearly, Winland imposed restrictive
regulations by way of the Presidential Order and banned the operation and business of Chirp and
Technocrat in its territory, and hence violated principle of free trading.
5. THAT, PRESIDENT PALPATINE'S RHETORIC OF ADDRESSING SICKNESS VIRUS AS “DRAGONVIRUS”
QUALIFIES AS AN ACT OF DEFAMATION OF THE STATE OF QINQUEST
39. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that, referring to the commonalities of municipal
laws and the general principles, defamation of a state may be defined as a “statement made by one
State which reduces the reputation of another, thereby destabilizing its political, social or economic
order.”124 The UNGA Resolution 31/91 on the Non Interference in the Internal Affairs of the State is
premised on the principle of right of territorial sovereignty possessed by each nation.125 It condemns
defamation aimed at disrupting the political, social or economic order of other States.126 For a statement
to qualify as defamatory towards a State, it needs to fulfil three requisites, firstly, the statement needs
to be attributable to the accused State, secondly, the statement should reduce the reputation of the
affected State, and lastly, it should destabilize the affected State's political, social, or economic order.127
Corroborating the forestated dicta with the case at hand, Palpatine's unverified statement of calling
Sickness causing virus as ‘Dragonvirus’ is defamatory as, [5.1] the remark was aimed at disrupting
political order of Qinquest by reducing its reputation and because, [5.2] the remark was malafide in
nature insofar as it tainted the reputation of Qinquest before the Global Community.
5.1. The remark was aimed at disrupting political order of Qinquest by reducing its reputation
40. It is humbly averred before this Hon'ble Court that, no State has right to interfere in the political,
social or economic matters of another state.128 However, President Palpatine by way of giving an
unwanted advice emphasized that the censorship policies of Qinquest to be violative to that of Winland's
idea129 , which is an unnecessary intervention in the internal functioning of Qinquest, as has been
suggested in the case of Ukraine v. Russia.130
41. Furthermore, the resolution also condemns all forms of overt and highly sophisticated techniques
of coercion, sub-version and defamation aimed at disrupting the political, social or economic order of
other States131 , as has been reaffirmed in the case of United States of America v. Iran132 . Winland, by
way of unwarranted criticism and covert coercion, poked into the political order of Qinquest questioning
their intention of employing 130 QCP members in the Chirp head office.133 Additionally, the statement
made by Palpatine was with an intention to reduce Qinquest's reputation worldwide and also posed a
threat to its economic stability. It is further argued that Winland should be held liable for issuing such
defamatory statements as its directly attributable to the State of Winland because [5.1.1.] the same
was made by its President, acting in his power of being the head of the State.
5.1.1. The remark is directly attributable to the State of Winland as the same was made by its President,
acting in his power of being the head of the State
42. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that actions of the head of the state is the
responsibility of the State and is also attributable to the State.134 The principle is governed by the
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which states that
actions of a person vested with legislative, executive, or judicial authority could be attributable to the
State135 , as was observed in Military Actions Case.136 Considering the aforementioned authorities, the
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words spoken by President Palpatine are attributable to the Republic of Winland as he did so while in
capacity of head of the State.
43. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that the sobriquet used by Palpatine was racially
discriminatory towards the Runerians. Article 1(1) of the International Convention on Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD)137 prohibits racial discrimination based on race, colour, descent, etc. It
mandates each State Party to end all forms of racial discrimination, take action and ensure that no
public entity does so138 . States shall not support or defend racial discrimination139 and must also nullify
the existing laws that create potential continue it140 , particularly in the context of statements made by
members of political parties, as held in the case of Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark.141 President, being the
head of the State, has internationally issued statements and remarks that have been discriminatory
towards Runerians and has subjected them to global hatred.
5.2. The remark was malafide in nature insofar as it tainted the reputation of Qinquest before
the Global Community
44. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that international law permits limited
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in order to protect various interests, including
reputation.142 It is argued that such statements are baseless and made to taint the reputation of
Qinquest as [5.2.1] truth cannot serve as a good defense in the instant case.
5.2.1. Truth cannot serve as a good defense in the instant case
45. It is humbly asseverated before the Hon'ble Court that; truth can't hold as a good defense for
defamation always and if the statements are false then they itself become defamatory.143 Additionally,
truth may not be used as an affirmative defense, as observed in the case of Philadelphia Newspapers v.
Hepps.144 For a statement to be fallacious, a mistaken belief is required. President Palpatine emphasised
that the censorship policies of Qinquest are violative of Winland's idea of freedom of speech and
expression, showing that the statements were fallacious as he conveniently omitted the evident reason
given for doing the same.145 Palpatine jumped to the conclusion that QCP was afraid of being exposed
and hence curbed the citizens' freedom of speech and expression.146 Such statements, based on
rumours, are substantially untrue, xenophobic and defamatory, as has been held in Saleeby case.147
-PRAYER FOR RELIEF-
Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, it is
most humbly implored before the Hon'ble Court that it may be pleased to:—
• Firstly, observe that, this Court has competence to adjudge upon this instant case;
• Secondly, declare that, the ban imposed on Chirp by the virtue of the Presidential Order is violative
of the principles of speech and expression enshrined both in the Winlandan Constitution and the
International Law;
• Thirdly, hold that, the ban imposed on Chirp by the Presidential order, is antithetical to the Rights
to Life and Personal Liberty as well as that of Self-Determination of the Runerians under the
Winlandan Constitution as well as International Law;
• Fourthly, observe that, the Presidential Order and the subsequent directive are not tenable under
the principles of international law;
• Lastly, hold that, the statement made by President Palpatine as the head of state for Winland, in
respect to the Qinquestian people, wherein he refers to the Sickness virus as ‘Dragonvirus’
constitutes as a direct insult of the Socialist Republic of Qinquest.
And/or pass any other order that it may be pleased to, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience, and for this act of kindness, the counsels on behalf of the Applicant shall duty bound forever
pray.
———
1 Article 36(2), ICJ Statute:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 19, 999 UNTS 171 (1966).
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Refugee Convention, art. 19, 189 UNTS 137 (1948).
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).
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5
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36(1), 33 UNTS 993 (1946).
6 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 6, ¶14.
7Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ 253 (Dec. 20) ¶24; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 ICJ 69 (Dec.
20) ¶52.
8
Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. Upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 ICJ 77, 89.
9East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Jurisdiction, 1995 ICJ 90, ¶ 22; South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary
Objections, 1962 ICJ 319.
10 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgement No. 2, 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2, p. 11.
11
Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 27.
12Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgement No. 2, 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2, p. 11; Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p.
27; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June, 1947,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 27, para. 35; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June, 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 99-100,
para. 22.
13 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74.
14
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 12, ¶54.
15General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS ), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Refugee Convention, art. 19, 189 UNTS 137 (1948).
17
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 19, 999 UNTS 171 (1966).
18 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 15, ¶59.
19 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 16, PRAYERS .
20
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 ICJ 803, ¶16.
21 Id., at ¶51.
22 ANDREAS ZIMMERMAN , ET AT ., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CO U R T OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 109 (Oxford University Press 2012);
Fisheries (Spain v. Can.) 1998 ICJ 432, ¶37-38.
23
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and Montenegro v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 2004 ICJ 1307, ¶33; See also Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Albania), Preliminary Objection, 1948 ICJ 15.
24 ICJ Statute supra note 5 at art. 36(6).
25 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary Objection, [1953] ICJ Rep 111, 18th November, 1953, at 120.
26
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p.6, ¶17.
27 Id.
28 Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia, (2005) 7 SCC 764.
29
Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510.
30 S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
31 Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 Punj 27.
32
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, ANNEXURE C.
33 INDIA CONST ., art. 19(2).
34INDIA CONST ., art. 13. See also, Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] INSC 3; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramachandran,
AIR 1977 MP 68.
35
A.G. v. Reynolds, [1979] 3 All ER 128 (PC).
36 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deepak Petrochemicals and Fertilizers, (2007) 10 SCC 342.
37See, In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam and Sons, (2015) 10 SCC 681; P.A. Inamdar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537; Gujarat Ambuja Cements v. Union of India, (1998) 8 SCC 208.
38
V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196.
39 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, ANNEXURE C.
40 R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564 : (1970) 1 SCC 248.
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41
A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27 : (1950) 1 SCR 88. See also, S.N. Sarkar v. State of WB, (1973) 1 SCC 856 : AIR 1973
SC 1425 : (1973) 1 SCC 856; Haradhan Saha v. State of WB, (1975) 3 SCC 198 : AIR 1974 SC 2154; Fagu Shah v. State of WB, (1974)
4 SCC 152 : AIR 1974 SC 613; Khudiram v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81 : AIR 1975 SC 550; Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of
Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360 : AIR 1980 SC 470; Ram Narayan Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC 276 : AIR 1984 SC 1213.
42 Goodricke Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 951 of 1989.
44
See, Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727; East Coast Railways v. Mahadev Appa Rao, (2010) 7 SCC 678;
Hindustan Granites v. Union of India, (2007) 5 Scale 587; State of Madras v. V.G Row, 1952 SCR 597.
45 Om Kumar v. Union of India, SLP (C) 21000 of 1993.
46 Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) SC 1725.
47See, Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369; Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Union of India v. Cricket
Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 : AIR 1995 SC 1236; Excel Crop Care v. Competition Commission of India, (2017) 8 SCC 47.
48 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.

49 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 15.
50 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N.
52 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 1976).
53UDHR & ICCPR supra note 16 & 17; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 1932 (1950); American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, art. 13, B-32 (1969); African Charter on Human and Peoples', art. 9,
21 ILM 58 (ACHPR) (1981).
54IACHR, Freedom of expression and the Internet, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (2013). See also ICCPR art.19(2); ECHR art 10(1); ACHR art 13;
ACHPR art 9; UNGA, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (2012); UNHRC,
General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011); Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App no
40984/07 (ECtHR, 2010).
55S. Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574. See Also Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC
130; Abrams v. Unites States of America, 250 US 616 (1919); Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003); State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi,
1952 SCR 654.
56Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1. See Also Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2011) 11 SCC 347; Sanjay
Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407; State v. Kulwant Singh, (2003) 9
SCC 193.
57 JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY , F REEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION , (Article 19 1995).
58 Leonardus Johannes Maria de Groot v. The Netherlands, Comm no 578/1994 UN Doc CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994 (UNHRC, 1995).
59 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April, 1979).
60 www.article19.org/pages/en/limitations.html.
61 Russian Model Law 2009 No 32-9; Yarovaya Law 2016.
62UNHRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation, UN Doc CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (2015). See also
Tanya Lokshina, Draconian Law Rammed Through Russian Parliament HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 7, 2016)
www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/23/draconian-law-rammed through-russianparliament; Evgeniya Melnikova, Yarovaya Law. The Death of the
Russian Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11 2016) www.huffingtonpost.com/evgeniya-melnikova/yarovayalaw-the-
deathof_b_10864882.html.
63 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 12. ¶ 54.
64 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 12. ¶ 54.
65 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 13, cl. ii (a & b).
66 DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA -SINIARSKA , PROTECTING THE RIGHT T O F REEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(Council of Europe 2018). See also, Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 14 E.H.R.R. 153 (ECtHR 1991) and Lingens v. Austria,
(1986) 8 EHRR 407 (ECtHR, 1986).
67Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 14 E.H.R.R. (ECtHR 1991). See also, Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, (1996) 24 EHRR
1 (1996); I.A. v. Turkey, 22479/93 28/09 (ECtHR, 1999).
68Leroy v. France, No. 36109/03 (ECtHR, 2008). See also, Willie v. Lichtenstein; Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, App. No. 10890/84
(ECtHR, 1990); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, No. 12726/87 (ECtHR, 1990).
69 See, Janowski v. Poland, (2000) 29 EHRR 705 (ECtHR 2000); Tammer v. Estonia, (2003) 37 EHRR 43.
70 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p.8, ¶29.
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71 See, Om Prakash v. State of U.P, (2004) 3 SCC 402, V.K. Ashokan v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, (2009) 14 SCC 85; Kerala
Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala, (2006) 4 SCC 327; Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188; Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304; Otis Elevator Employees' Union S. Reg. v. Union of India, (2003) 12 SCC 68,
206.
72 DevDutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725.
73 T.M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitation 339 (1st Indian Reprint).
74 State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1999) 1 SCC 297.
75 DANIEL T HURER AND T HOMAS BU R R I , SELF-DETERMINATION , The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University
Press 2008).
76 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597.
77 Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329. See also, A.K. Gopalan v. Union
of India, AIR 1950 SC 27; Francis Manjooran v. Government of India, AIR 1966 Ker 20.
78 Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121.

79State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar, AIR 1966 SC 424. See also Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295; State of West Bengal
v. Anwar Ali, AIR 1952 SC 75; V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC
293.
80 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 10 ¶ 40.
81
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 9 ¶ 38.
84Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 25. See also, Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118;
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24.
85K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. See also, Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353;
National Legal Services Association v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 : AIR 2014 SC 1863; Suchita Srivastava v. Administration of
Chandigarh, AIR 2010 SC 235.
86 Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2012) 10 SCC 603.
87 Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case, (2007) 4 SCC 669.

88 Id.
89UNGA, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Declaration), A/RES/25/2625 (XXV) (1970).
90 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), art.1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966).
91
SUMMERS , PEOPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW : HO W NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION SHAPE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF NATIONS 173-74 (2007).
92 ICESCR supra note 90.
93 CRISTECU , T HE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION : HISTORICAL AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT O N THE BASIS OF UN INSTRUMENTS 102 (UN 1981).
94 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980).
95 East Timor (Port. v. Aus.) I.C.J. Reports 1995, 90 & 102 at ¶29.
96Decent, A fiduciary theory of jus cogens, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 331, 339 (2009); William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the
Sovereignty Norm through Human Rights Litigation, 25 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 261, 261 (2002).
97 Id.
98 UNGA, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries (ARSIWA), Report by the
International Law Commission, ch. III, ¶2, UN GA A/56/10 (2001). See also, 1 Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 79; 7 Report No. 62/02. Case 12.285. Michael Domingues, United States. 22 October, 2002.
99
Id.
100 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT), art. 53, 1155 UNTS 331.
101 MALCOLM N. SHAW , INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2008).
102
CLARIFICATIONS , p. 6, n. 20.
103 INDIA CONST ., art. 123.
104Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564. See Also, Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,
(2017) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 SC 710; Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
752; E. Balanandan v. State of Kerala, 1978 KLT 592; Thirubhuvanam Silk Handloom Weavers' Coorp. Production & Sales Society Ltd. v.
State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 SCC OnLine Mad 502; M.R. Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1997 SCC OnLine Mad 239.
105
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 6, ¶ 17.
106 Local Companies Control Act (2019 Revision), Law 47 of 2018, Acts of the Legislative Assembly (Cayman Islands).
107 Beneficial Ownership (Companies) Regulations (2019 Revision), Acts of the Legislative Assembly (Cayman Islands).
108
See, Union of India v. S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683; Kerala Samsthan Chethu Thozhilali Union v. Union of India, (2006) 4 SCC 327;
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574; Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action
Group, (2006) 3 SCC 434 : (2006) 3 Scale 1; Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC 598.
110 CLARIFICATIONS , ANNEXURE-I, p. 7.
111
Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of Himachal Pradesh, C.A.No. 1424 of 2000.
112 State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath, (1983) 2 SCC 402.
113 GLOBAL F INANCIAL EMERGENCY POWERS AC T , s. 1701.
114
Id.
116 See, Paramjit Bhasin v. Union of India, W.P. No. 136 of 2003; P. Ratnakar Rao v. Govt. of A.P., ((1996) 5 SCC 359); Gwalior Rayon
Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. v. The Asstt. Commissioner Of Sales, (1974) 2 SCR 879; B. Sharma Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry,
(1967) 2 SCR 650.
117
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 671. See also, Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal v. State of U.P., (1972) 4 SCC 485 :
AIR 1972 SC 1168.
118 Devi Dass Gopal Krishan v. State of Punjab, (2009) 25 VST 434.
See, R.M.D. Chamarbaughwala v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930; Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107; Pandit
119
Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1958] INSC 36; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and,
Weaving Mills Delhi, AIR 1968 SC 1232; B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1967) 20 STC 215.
120
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#:∼: text=without%20discrimination%20%E2%80%94%20a%
20country%20should,giving%20them%20%E2%80%9Cnational%20treatment%E2%80%9D.
121 MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 15, ¶ 58.
122 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).
123
Id. See Also, Free Trade Agreements and the WTO Exceptions, CRS 7 (2008); Walter Goode, Negotiating free-trade agreements: a
guide, DFAT (2005); Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, Free Trade Agreements and Public International Law, 321 Uni. of Mlbrn. Lgl. Stu.
(2008).
124
Geeta Moni & Raghav Srinivas, Defamation in International Law: The Legal Implications of Trump Calling COVID-19 “Chinese Virus”,
53 Cornell Int. Law J. 49, 50 (2020).
125 Carolyn A. Dubay, A Refresher on the Principle of Non-Intervention, Spring ed. Int. Ju. Mntr. (2014).
126
G.A. Res. 31/91 (XXXI), Non-interference in the internal affairs of States at ¶ 1 (1976).
127
Geeta Moni supra note 124.
128 G.A. Res 31/91 supra note 126.
129
MO O T PR O P O S I T I O N, p. 10 ¶ 40.
130 Ukraine v. Russian, ICJ GL No 166. See Also, Federation Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 I.C.J. 14; Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda, [2005] ICJ Rep 168; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania, 1949 ICJ 4; Colombia v.
Peru, 1951 I.C.J. 4; Australia v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep 253; New Zealand v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep 457; El Salvador and Nicaragua
(intervening) v. Honduras, [1992] ICJ Rep 351; Cameroon v. Nigeria, 1999 I.C.J. 1029; Nicaragua v. Colombia, ICJ GL No 124; Germany
v. Italy, ICGJ 434; Australia and New Zealand (intervening) v. Japan, ICJ GL No 148.
131 G.A. Res. 31/91 supra note 126.
132
United States of America v. Iran, [1980] ICJ Rep 3. See Also, Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 I.C.J. 14; Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, [2007] ICJ 2; Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226
134 ARSIWA supra note 98.
135
Id.
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136 No. 10; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A; Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, [2007] ICJ 2.
137 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965).
138
Id.
139 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) supra note 137.
140 Id.
141
Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, CERD/C/63/D/27/2002; See Also, Mahali Dawas and Yousef Shava v. Denmark, CERD/C/80/D/46/2009;
M.B. v. Denmark, CERD/C/60/D/20/2000; Miroslav Lacko v. Slovakia, CERD/C/59/D/11/1998; B.J. v. Denmark, CERD/C/56/D/17/1999,
Kashif Ahmad v. Denmark, CERD/C/56/D/16/1999; Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, CERD/C/54/D/10/1997.
142 ICCPR supra note 17.
143 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).
144
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 US 767 (1986). See Also, Shri Baburao Shankarrao Chavan v. Shaikh Biban Baban Pahelwan,
1983 SCC OnLine Bom 120; Noonan v. Staples Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 85 (2010); Aires Rodrigues v. Subodh Kantak, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom
1309.
145 Moot Proposition, p. 10 ¶ 39.
146 Moot Proposition, p. 10 ¶ 40.
147 Emma Sue Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761 (1956).
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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Wednesday, September 20, 2023

10th RMLNLU SCC OnLine Moot, 2022

6. IACHR, Freedom of expression and the Internet, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (2013) 7

15. Germany v. Italy, ICGJ 434 20

27. Ukraine v. Russian, ICJ GL No 166 20

Bibliographic Information Corresponding

3. David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative 11

(OHCHR February 9, 2010)

(a) the interpretation of a treaty;

(b) any question of international law;

48 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.

78 Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121.

87 Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case, (2007) 4 SCC 669.

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