DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Author(s): Seongyi Yun
Source: Asian Perspective , Winter 1997, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1997), pp. 145-171
Published by: {lrp}

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704149

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 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 145-171

DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA:

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Seongyi Yun

This paper analyzes the efforts and roles of social move-

ments during democratization in South Korea from 1980 to
1987. The basic assumption of this study is that civil society's
preparedness was more critical than any other factor in the
success or failure of democratization in South Korea. This
study refutes the basic assumption of elite-focused theories of
democratization , which argue that no transition to democracy
is possible without significant divisions within the authoritar-
ian regime itself.
The preparedness of civil society for democracy is indicat-
ed by two factors : the resources of social movement organiza-
tions , and the alliances of diverse social sectors , including stu-
dent -, labor ; dissident groups and the urban poor. The amount
of resources and the relative success of alliances are influenced
by four aspects of the political opportunity structure: repres-
sion of the state , elite fragmentation , external support and the
overall power configuration in the political society.

Is "elite fragmentation" a prerequisite for democratic transi-

tion? Can democratic transition occur without a division among
regime elites? The South Korean case refutes the basic assump-

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146 Seongyi Yuri

tion of elite-focused theories of democratization, that "there is no

transition whose beginning is not the consequence-direct or indirect-of
important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally
along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners "x
After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in
October 1979, there was a critical power vacancy in Korea. Even
the military, the most influential actor, was divided into two
groups: the "new military" group led by Chun Doo Hwan and a
group of senior general officers. Yet, the transition to democracy
in Korea did not occur in 1979, but rather in 1987. And, contrary
to what we might have expected in Korea at this latter time,
based on the tenets of elite theories of democratization, there
were no significant divisions among the elite, and President
Chun Doo Hwan still held real power.
The critical difference between the aborted transition in
1979 and the successful transition toward democracy in 1987 can
be found in the different levels of pressure on the authoritarian
leaders from the opposition forces, especially from social move-
ments. In late 1979 and early 1980, social movements in Korea
were very weak and isolated from each other, and their strug-
gles against the regime were weak and ineffective as well. On
the other hand, social movements in 1987 were much better
organized, were able to cooperate under the leadership of a
peak organization, the National Headquarters for Democratic
Constitution, and played a critical role in the transition. In short,
it was organization and powerful social movements in civil soci-
ety, not elite fragmentation that facilitated democratic transition
in South Korea.
Where do these movements come from? Two factors deter-
mine the level of readiness of civil society for democratization:
the resources available to social organizations and the creation
of alliances among diverse social sectors. As social sectors such
as student, labor, dissident groups and the urban poor build
sound organizations, with plentiful resources, strong leadership,
reliable quantity and quality of membership, etc., they become
better equipped to carry out more productive and robust protest
against authoritarian regimes." Alliances among diverse social
sectors are often essential for an effective struggle by civil soci-
ety. Korea, for example, does not have a class structure in which
one class, like labor, is dominant enough to conduct a successful

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 47

democratization movement alone. The strength of civil society-

comes instead from cooperation among diverse sectors. When
the sectors were divided as during the aborted democratization
of 1980, they were not able to successfully resist military inter-
vention. On the other hand, when the sectors succeed in build-
ing umbrella organizations, they demonstrate more power and
put more pressure on the authoritarian regime as in the 1987
transition.
The increase and decrease in the level of resources and the
success and failure of alliance formation must be placed in the
context of the political opportunity structure and social move-
ments. The political opportunity structure is "consistent - but
not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the politi-
cal environment that provide incentives for people to undertake
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or
failure."2 When the political opportunity structure expands,
social sectors have more chances for increasing their resources
and establishing alliances. In my study, the expansion and con-
striction of the political opportunity structure is determined by
four variables: state repression; conflict in the ruling elite; exis-
tence of supporting forces outside of social movement organiza-
tions; and the power configuration in the political society (i.e.
political parties).
As the level of repression increases the political opportunity
structure for social movement organizations will be constricted,
and vice versa. In South Korea, alleviation of repression from
late 1983 is a key factor in explaining the revitalization of social
movements and the transformation from authoritarianism to lib-
eralization. Elite fragmentation, the variable stressed by
O'Donnell and Schmitter, is important, but only as one dimen-
sion of the political opportunity structure. Elite fragmentation
certainly opens space for opposition forces, however, it is only
one of four variables forming the political opportunity structure.
Elite fragmentation occurs when hard-liners and soft-liners dif-
fer on how to handle explosive demonstrations. The existence of
sustained support from outside social movement organizations,
in the Korean case the middle class and the United States, large-
ly explains the difference between the aborted democratization
in 1980 and the successful transition in 1987. The emergence of
strong opposition parties and their alliance with social move-

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148 Seongyi Y un

ment forces put significant pressure on the authoritarian regime

and facilitated democratic transition. The success of the opposi-
tion party, the New Korean Democratic Party, in the 1985
National Assembly elections provided an expanded political
opportunity structure for the opposition forces.
The relationship between the political opportunity structure
and social movements is reciprocal. That is to say, an expanded
structure of political opportunity provides social movement
forces more political resources and greater chances for success,
and simultaneously the strengthened social forces can transform
the political opportunity structure in its favor, (see Figure 1)
To explain the democratization process in South Korea from
1979 to 1987, this paper first describes the specifics of the politi-
cal opportunity structure and its changes through four phases of
the Korean democratization process. These phases are: aborted
democratization and shrunken social movements (October 1979-
December 1983), liberalization (January 1984-April 1987), transi-
tion (April 1987-June 1987) and the post-transition period (July
1987-December 1987). It then highlights how changes in the
political opportunity structure, its expansion or constriction,
affected resource mobilization and alliance building by diverse
social sectors.
Secondly, it demonstrates that "civil society" cannot be viewed

Figure 1.

(ID) (DV)

Social Movement Organizations

1. resources

Politi
1. repr
2. elite
3. exis
organ
4. pow

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 49

as a united actor or set of actors in the pursuit of democratization.

At some phases, diverse social sectors cooperated with each other
and at others they split. Even though they agreed in their hostility
against the authoritarian regime, their versions of democracy and
methods of struggle were not necessarily identical. Their political
opportunity structures were not the same either. As the structure
of political opportunity transformed, some social sectors or orga-
nizations in one sector gained more strength, while others lost
vitality.
In sum, changes in the Korean political opportunity struc-
ture had varying impacts on each sector of society: labor, stu-
dents, intellectuals and church communities. By closely looking
at the changes in political opportunity structures, the paper
examines why and how each social sector gained strength and
altered its goals, strategies, and alliances in the quest for demo-
cratic governance.
This study is significant in three respects. First, it refutes the
basic argument of elite-focused theories of democratization.
Most democratization studies assert that there can be no transi-
tion without important divisions within the authoritarian
regime itself.3 Many Latin American and Southern European
cases support this argument. In the Korean case, however, no
clear signs of division within the ruling elite were observed
before the transition. At the time of transition ruling elites were
cohesively united around the departing president, Chun Doo
Hwan.
Even though divisions within the elite exist as in many
Latin American and Southern European countries, we still need
to see why the authoritarian regime faces elite fragmentation.
Many of the existing studies focus on the collapse of an authori-
tarian regime in the face of a crisis, rather than why and how the
regime entered such a crisis in the first place. Actually, in most
transition cases, the ruling elite do not voluntarily initiate demo-
cratic transition and do not step down from power without any
significant challenges from below. Therefore, I argue that a
study focused on why and how the regime faced challenges
from opposition forces is necessary.
Secondly, a complete picture of democratization cannot be
drawn by looking only at regime elites or interactions between
the state and some parts of civil society. We may properly explain

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150 Seongyi Y un

critical aspects of democratization such as causes of success

and/or failure, extension, speed, etc., of democratization only
when the whole arena of polity composed of the state, political
society and civil society are considered.4 This study views the
dynamics of the democratization movements in Korea, especially
concerning civil society's efforts and roles. I highlight not only the
relations of civil society with the state and political society but
also the horizontal relations of the civil society within itself. This
study analyzes dynamic interactions among diverse social sectors
such as student, labor, dissident groups and the urban poor. Most
of the previous studies on democratization focus on the state only
or a single sector. Interaction among various social sectors have as
much significance as interaction between social sectors and the
state. Collaboration and division among various social sectors
were significant factors affecting the relative success or failure,
speed and scope of democratization in Korea. Actually, the pro-
cess of the democratization movement in Korea can be explained
by looking at the process of the formation and dissolution of
umbrella organizations among opposition forces. That is, when
they cooperated under the leadership of peak organizations they
could produce favorable political opportunities and an effective
struggle against the authoritarian regime.
Thirdly, this study introduces the new sociological idea of
"political opportunity structure" and tries to demonstrate its use-
fulness in the study of democratization. O'Donnell and Schmitter
argue that "normal science methodology" is inappropriate in
rapidly changing situations as liberalization and democratization
and instead should be analyzed with distinctive political concepts,
however vaguely delineated and difficult they may be to concep-
tualize.5 The theory of political opportunity structure, in my opin-
ion, is good enough to satisfy these requirements. The idea of
political opportunity structure was originated and developed from
studies of social movements.6 Therefore, this idea has strength in
explaining unstable and rapidly changing political situations. The
idea of political opportunity structure is not organized in a neat
framework. Studies dealing with different cases of political oppor-
tunity structure produce different variables that influence the suc-
cess or failure of social movements in different contexts. This flexi-
bility, however, seems to be effective in explaining diverse and
rapidly changing political situations.

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 51

Aborted Democratization and Shrunken Social Movements:

October 1979-December 1983

Political Opportunity Structure

For most of this period, political opportunity structure for

the social movements was very limited. As the "new military"
group strengthened their political power, the level of state
repression increased. The United States supported the military
regime, not the opposition forces because stability on the Korea
peninsula took precedence over its democratization in U.S. for-
eign policy. Seized with the fear of military brutality, the middle
class could not protest the military dictatorship. While, the
opposition party was divided and totally incompetent.
After the assassination of the authoritarian leader, Park
Chung Hee, Korean society had a crucial chance for democrati-
zation. The structure of political opportunity seemed to sudden-
ly change in favor of democratic forces. As a result of the demise
of the authoritarian leader, the brutal repression of opposition
forces was lifted and a schism opened among governing elites
and their coalitions. However, the dismissal of the authoritarian
leader did not precede either the development of a civil society
or a transition toward democracy. In 1979, there were no viable
alternative forces to the authoritarian regime in Korea. Unpre-
pared and divided opposition forces and civil society were ill-
prepared to take advantage of the divisions in the ruling elite,
and were unable to resist a military coup d'etat and the advent
of another military government led by Chun Doo Hwan.
No political groups had a specific plan for action after the
demise of the holder of absolute power, Park Chung Hee. Along
with Park's demise, his pillars of power were also shattered.
Kim Jae Kyu, the assassin, and his followers were arrested by
the military and later executed. Another main pillar of power,
Cha Ji Cheol, the director of the Presidential Security Forces,
was killed with Park. The government party, the Democratic
Republican Party (DRP), also found itself in a difficult situation
after the death of their leader. The DRP was faced with the
demand by their young legislative members for the retirement
of old and corrupt members and the purification of the party. In
addition, the DRP also failed to gain support from the military.

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152 Seongyi Yuri

The military was the only group that could fill the power
vacancy left by the demise of Park. However, the military, the
real power holder behind the facade of Choi Kyu Ha's civilian
government, was also divided in their attitude toward the
Yushin system. The "new military" group led by Major General
Chun Doo Hwan was the main beneficiary of Park's patronage
and did not want democratization or any abrupt departure from
the Yushin system. On the other hand, a group of senior general
officers including Martial Law Commander Cheong Seung Hwa
stated their political views favoring constitutional revisions to
pave the way for genuine civilian rule. Differences and antago-
nism between the "new military" group and senior general offi-
cers were irreconcilable.
Chun's forces succeeded in gaining supremacy over the
senior general officers through an intra-military putsch on
December 12, 1979. After a successful intra-military coup d'etat,
General Chun placed Lt. Gen. Lee Heui Seung at the post of
Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander and put his
men at three powerful cabinet positions - Defense, Home
Affairs and Justice. With these appointments, Chun became the
number one man in Korea and state affairs were decided by his
own will, rather than by the acting president Choi Kyu Ha.
On 18 May 1980, approximately 5,000 students clashed with
police in Kwangju, demanding the end of martial law, the
release of their local hero Kim Dae Jung, and the resignation of
General Chun. The brutality of police and Special Paratrooper
Forces infuriated the townspeople and, as a result, several thou-
sand citizens joined the student demonstrations. During the nine
days of violent clashes between police and civilians, an uncount-
ed number of people were seriously injured or killed.7 After the
uprising, the new military assumed a tight rein on national
affairs. They devised supra-constitutional organizations and
revised the constitution and many laws for the sophisticated
and systematic repression of opposition forces. For the consoli-
dation of their already strong grasp on power, the new military
established a 26 member Special Committee for National Securi-
ty Measures (SCNSM) in late May.
The success of social movements is largely contingent on
support from outside the movement's organizations. Attitudes
and the support of two actors, the ordinary people who were

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 53

not involved in movement organizations and the United States,

were critical to the social movements and their role in the
democratization of Korea. Although both the ordinary people
and the United States did not assume any initiatives or leader-
ship, they exerted an important influence on social movements
and democratization in the early 1980s.
The ordinary Korean people (middle class) were sympathiz-
ers rather than active participants in South Korean social move-
ments. Even though they showed their grievances against the
government through elections, concerned that violent demons-
trations and political disorder might hurt economic develop-
ment, they did not actually support political disorder.8 After the
demise of Park intense aspirations toward democratization
formed, however they did not do much to achieve it. Most of the
people of Korea kept silent during the December 12 military
putsch and the tragic Kwangju Uprising. Even though the
Kwangju citizens gallantly resisted the barbarous military, they
were brutally quelled without much support from people out-
side the city.
Since liberation in 1945, the United States has had a substan-
tial impact on Korean politics and democratization. The United
States gave indirect help to the opposition forces in Park's era by
criticizing and checking the government for infringements
against human rights. Until the Kwangju Uprising, students and
ordinary people believed that the United States would support
democratic movements in Korea. During the Kwangju Uprising,
a student organization encouraged citizens to support the demo-
cratic movement by saying that two U.S. aircraft carriers were
anchored at Pusan port to stop the brutal murder by the Special
Forces.9 However, it was not true and turned out to be precisely
the opposite. Although Ambassador William H. Gleysteen
argued that the U.S. government encouraged a peaceful settle-
ment by putting pressure on the Korean Army, he also admitted
allowing the Twentieth Division to be released from the U.S.-
ROK Combined Forces Command to retake the city that was
under the control of demonstrators.10
Power configuration in the political society is another struc-
tural factor that has a critical impact on the development of
social movements. Social forces were lacking nationwide popu-
lar leaders and lacked the financial independence to undertake

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154 Seongyi Yuri

political struggles against the authoritarian regime. The ideolo-

gy and strategy of social forces, especially student and labor
groups, were more or less radical and unrealistic, so that ordi-
nary people did not consider them a desirable alternative to the
authoritarian regime. Therefore, the existence of a strong oppo-
sition party was a significant factor for a successful democratic
transition.
The military coup of May 17, 1980 and the promulgation of
Martial Law Decree No. 10 made the already fragmented oppo-
sition party, the NDP, completely impotent by shutting down its
headquarters. Chun disbanded all political parties of the Fourth
Republic and purged its leaders. The new constitution, effective
on October 27, formally disbanded the National Assembly and
all existing political parties. The nine member Political Renova-
tion Committee appointed by President Chun Doo Hwan
screened all politicians and eventually banned 567 politicians
from engaging in any political activities. They charged that these
politicians amassed illegal fortunes, created social unrest, politi-
cal irregularities and demagoguery, and engineered labor dis-
putes and campus agitation.11
Chun Doo Hwan, however, could not totally discard consti-
tutional formalism for fear of criticism from the people and
other countries. Chun allowed political parties and elections to
enhance his political legitimacy. On November 19, 1980, the Leg-
islative Assembly for National Security passed the new Political
Party Law which replaced the previous two-party system with a
multi-party system by easing requirements for the creation of
new political parties.12 On November 21, the Military Martial
Command partially lifted the ban on political activities allowing
more than 15 new political parties to be formed by late January
1981. Even though opposition parties were established, none of
them could be a significant threatening force against the authori-
tarian regime because only pro-government and cooperative fig-
ures were allowed to participate excluding all the three power-
ful Kims - Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil -
and their followers.

Social Movements

In the first period of the Korean democratic movement

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 Demoer a tiza tion in South Korea 1 55

(1979-1983), social movements were not active at all due to a

political opportunity structure which was not conducive to
action by social forces. Only student groups expressed their
voices and waged the struggle against the authoritarian regime
under atrocious repression. All other opposition forces, includ-
ing labor, dissident groups and opposition politicians, were
wholly inert.
After Decree 9 was lifted, 639 of approximately 800 students
ousted since 1973 were reinstated and 25 out of the 39 expelled
professors were rehired.13 Student movements, initially, con-
fined their protests to intra-campus affairs including the abolish-
ment of the Student Defense Corporation and the restoration of
autonomous student associations, the resignation of collabora-
tionist professors, and the end of campus surveillance - avoid-
ing direct confrontation with the regime. As the government's
political reform dragged on, however, student groups broad-
ened their demands by including political issues such as the
immediate removal of martial law and transferring the job of
drafting a new constitution from the administration to the
National Assembly. With broadened demands, the rallies
moved from the campuses to the streets. On May 14, 1980, the
deadline set by the students for officially ending martial law,
about 50,000-60,000 students gathered in downtown Seoul and
other major cities to violently protest the unnecessary delay of
political reform.
However, even though student groups contributed to keep-
ing the Korean democratization movement alive by providing
momentum against the harsh oppression internal divisions along
many different ideological perspectives became evident. After
the Kwangju Uprising and aborted democratization movement,
the student activists entered into a heated dispute on the causes
of the failed democratization attempt and the future direction of
student movements. This dispute split the students into two
groups, Moorim and Hokrim 14. The Moorim group emphasized the
protracted strengthening of movement organizations arguing
that reckless demonstrations would face harsh repression from
the authoritarian power and result in the destruction of student
organizations. On the other hand, the Hakrim group emphasized
a continuous and acute political struggle against the authoritari-
an regime. Beginning in early 1981, the Hakrim led the initiative

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156 Seongyi Yuri

in subsequent student movements.15 In 1982, strategic debates in

the student movement developed into the Y ahi (Critique of Night
School) versus Jeonmang (Prospect of Student Movement) debate.16
While the former group emphasized the mobilization of masses
of students by focussing their struggles on intra-campus affairs,
the latter emphasized a direct political struggle and street
demonstrations.17
Even though there was an explosion of labor protests in
early 1980 taking advantage of loosened controls by the caretak-
er government, they were organized at the factory level which
was a relatively isolated social sector. As a result they did not
have any links to political parties or other social forces. Sporadic
and spontaneous labor movements without strong organization
and leadership were ineffective in fulfilling their immediate
demands. In addition, such movements were ill-suited to bring-
ing about any form of democratic transition. To make things
worse, martial law authorities dissolved more than one hundred
unions and dismissed 191 union leaders who were active in the
democratic movement before the May coup.18

Decompression and the Resurrection of Social Movements:

January 1984-April 1987

Political Opportunity Structure

In the second period of the South Korean democratization

movement, political opportunities for social movements were
expanded by two factors: the relaxation of governmental repres-
sion, and the emergence of a strong opposition party, the New
Korea Democratic Party.
In late 1983 and early 1984, the Korean government announced
a series of measures designed to relieve some of the social tensions
that had arisen as a result of earlier protest and societal mobiliza-
tion.19 Some of these tactics included the reinstatement of expelled
professors and student activists, the rehabilitation of 202 purged
politicians, police withdrawal from campuses and the release of 306
"security-related" prisoners including at least 131 arrested student
activists since May 1980.20
The government's liberalization policy can be explained by

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 57

several factors. First, Chun's government revived public confi-

dence in the rebounding South Korean economy. The national
economic indexes were very positive in many respects. GDP rose
steadily, the unemployment rate decreased from 5.4 percent in
1980 to 4.1 percent in 1983, and inflation was down from 32.2
percent in 1980 to 2.4 percent in 1983.21 Secondly, the ruling elite
believed that the opposition movement could be controlled by
more sophisticated means than physical violence. They had con-
fidence in their institutional mechanisms of control, such as the
police and the internal intelligence agency, the Agency for
National Security Planning, and tight restrictions on the press,
assembly and demonstrations. Thirdly, their legitimacy was
badly damaged by the brutal repression of opposition move-
ments, especially the Kwangju Uprising. As a result, the authori-
tarian regime needed to recover this lost legitimacy by showing
gestures of reconciliation toward the people. Above all, because
repression tactics were unsuccessful in quelling protests against
the authoritarian regime, the government felt it had to imple-
ment a decompression policy. Despite the harsh repression of
opposition movements, student movements did not perish. In
fact, many ordinary people became more sympathetic to their
cause because participants in many of the earlier repressed social
movements were able to utilize martyr images to their benefit.
Therefore, the state needed different strategies in order to isolate
movement forces from the ordinary people and choke off this
possible venue for opposition to the authoritarian regime.
However, the results of these decompression policies turned
out to be quite contrary to what the ruling elite intended. Eased
repression helped opposition forces to regain momentum in revi-
talizing themselves and, as a result, outbursts of autonomous
organization emerged in each movement sector.
As one of the decompression measures, the government lift-
ed the ban on political activities by purged politicians. By allow-
ing purged politicians to participate in institutional politics the
government intended to further decentralize opposition parties
and weaken social movement forces by absorbing members of
the movements into the institutional political arena.
However, under the strong leadership of Kim Young Sam
and Kim Dae Jung, the New Korea Democratic Party, the newly
formed opposition party, achieved considerable electoral sue-

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158 Seongyi Yuri

cess in the 1985 National Assembly elections. The result of the

elections was completely different from the authoritarian elites'
intentions. Even opposition politicians themselves and the social
movement forces did not expect such a strong performance by
the NKDP, which had been formed just three weeks before elec-
tion day. Even though the ruling Democratic Justice Party still
obtained a legislative majority, reportedly owing to illegal cam-
paign practices and the manipulation of the electoral system,
they were badly outperformed by the NKDP in major cities.
The elections of 1985 showed the heightened possibility of
alliance formation between the opposition political party and
social movement forces. Throughout the campaigns of the elec-
tions, social movement organizations mobilized thousands of
voters for the NKDP. Throughout the election, the NKDP and
various social movement organizations also mobilized against
the authoritarian regime by emphasizing potent issues such as
the military dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan, the ill-fated
Kwangju Uprising, direct presidential elections, and possibly
the most threatening issue of all, the legitimacy of the Chun
regime.

Social Movements

The decompression policies discussed above, which were

used by the authoritarian regime to deflate the atmosphere of
social unrest, increased the "space" available for action by the
social movements. Since 1984, various social forces including
students, labor and dissident groups began to form representa-
tive organizations. They also tried to take advantage of the
decreased repression by building cooperative linkages between
themselves. In this period (January 1984-April 1987) social forces
were somewhat successful in broadening their popular bases
and movements were led by representational organizations,
rather than a few notable individuals.
While in the first period, the student movements were iso-
lated and led by small groups, in the latter period, the student
movements showed more sophisticated patterns in their battles
against the regime. In December 1983, the government inaugu-
rated policies which increased the autonomy of universities
including the acquittal of arrested students, reinstatement of dis-

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 59

missed students and policy withdrawal from campuses. This

policy provided student activists with a wider platform for
organizations and movements.
The sophistication of the student movement can be seen in
the establishment of nationwide organizations. In March 1984,
student activists organized the "Hakwon jaeulwha chujin euiwon-
hoi" (Committee for the Promotion of Campus Autonomy) as the
preparatory organization for rebuilding autonomous student
representative bodies.22 Until late 1984, most universities resur-
rected general student associations and tried to build linkages
between individual universities. As an effort to build umbrella
organizations linking individual universities, Jeonkuk Haksawng
Daepyo Gigu Hoieui (The Representative Organ of the National
Student) was established by 42 university student bodies. In
April 1985, the student movement succeeded in building a more
systemic umbrella organization, "Jeonguk haksaeng chongyeon-
hap"( Jeonhakryon) (National Federation of Student Associa-
tions) which had regional organs nationwide.23 By building
nationwide organizations, the students could unfold coopera-
tive and systematic struggles against the repressive regime.
Another characteristic of the student movement in this
phase was organizational duality. Along with the official and
legal student organizations, underground and illegal organiza-
tions existed for intense and effective strife against the govern-
ment. An organization which brought together the illegal orga-
nizations in each university was Sammintuwi (Struggle Commit-
tee for Three Mins: People, Nation, and Democracy). This allied
association was the political arm of Chunhakryun(National Fed-
eration of Student Association).24 Most of the student actions
from 1985 to the spring of 1986 were carried out under the lead-
ership of the Sammintuwi.
The promotion of student-labor solidarity was the most
vivid development in the student movement during the second
period of democratization. Since the early 1980s, many students
had received jobs as factory workers by concealing their educa-
tional background to educate workers and help organize labor
unions. "Disguised" student workers served as connection
points between labor organizations and students. The participa-
tion of student activists in labor problems developed increased
political consciousness and action of the workers.

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1 60 Seongyi Yun

In spite of the organizational development and increased

solidarity between student groups and other social forces, ideo-
logical differences still existed among student groups. These dif-
ferences often revolved around the groups' concrete analysis of
the current politico-economic situation. Overall, their ideologies
became increasingly radical. The goal of their struggle had
moved beyond the establishment of liberal democracy. Revolu-
tion was promoted as the goal of the student movement in this
period, and their radical ideology alienated ordinary people as
well as the mass of students. As a result, Korean student groups
which appeared to be winning ground in the struggle for politi-
cal change, isolated themselves from the sectors which had
helped them achieve this accomplishment.
After the mid-1980s, the labor movement centered around
workers at large enterprises and Jaebol (conglomerate) groups.
Their homogeneity facilitated close communication and cooper-
ation with each other. To overcome the disadvantages of indi-
vidual and isolated struggle and to broaden workers' solidarity,
in March 1984 the first national labor organization, Hanguk
Nodongja Bokji Hyeopeuihoi (The Welfare Council of Korean
Workers) was formed by ex-workers dismissed because of their
involvement in democratic movements in the early 1980s.
Another distinctive feature of the labor movement in this
period was the joint action with other social sectors, especially
with students. A group of former student activists in the labor
field played a significant role in educating workers through
"night school" and connecting labor organizations to student
activism. The Kuro alliance strike in 1985 was the most vivid
case of joint action in which six democratic unions and student
activists staged solidarity strikes for several days. In this move-
ment 30 workers were arrested, 20 were charged and more than
1,000 lost their jobs.25
The "Kuro alliance strike" could be considered the critical
turning point in labor movement activism in contemporary
Korea in two respects. First, it expedited the building of regional
unions to overcome the weakness of struggles at small group
and company union levels. After the Kuro strike, two large
regional organizations were established by fired workers and
"students-turned-workers". In August 1985, Senoryon (Seoul
Area Labor Movement League) was formed and in February

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 Democra tiza tion in Sou th Korea 1 61

1986, Innoryun (Inchon Area Labor Movement League) was

established. Second, after the Kuro strike, the focus of the labor
movement shifted from the economic struggle of workers
against employers to a political struggle against the authoritari-
an state. Leaders of the labor movement argued that, since the
military dictatorship had always repressed their demands on
behalf of employers, labor demands could not be realized with-
out the overthrow of the authoritarian regime.
In the wake of the relaxation measures, dissident groups
were able to broaden their mass bases and intensify the focus of
their organizations. In June 1985, the Minminhyup (People's
Democratic Movement Council) was organized by young leaders
of youth, labor and farmers' movements. Some old notable lead-
ers of the democratic movement from the 1970s formed the Min-
joo Tongil Kukminhwieui (the National Conference for Democracy
and Unification) in October 1984. In March 1985, the two organi-
zations merged and formed a unified organization of democratic
movement forces, the Mintongryun (the United Minjung [Peo-
ple's] Movement for Democracy and Unification, UMMDU).26
The UMMDU was the first umbrella organization that
included broad sectors of opposition forces of workers, youth,
farmers, religious communities and journalists. As an organiza-
tion with broad sectoral appeal, it set up regional branches in
many provinces. The UMMDU helped increase the productivity
of the democratic movement by arbitrating common agendas
and tactics among diverse associations. The leadership of the
UMMDU, however, was limited and could not have binding
power over the members because they joined as a group, not
individuals, and each group maintained independence from the
umbrella organization.

Democratic Transition and the Explosion of Social

Movements: April 1987-June 1987

Political Opportunity Structure

The most striking variations in the political opportunity

structure in this period appeared in the reactivation of a former-
ly quiescent and passive middle class as well as the U.S. govern-

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162 Seongyi Y un

merit's support for the democratic movements internationally.

The roles of ordinary people and the U.S. government's support
were critical to the success of social movements and democratic
transition in Korea.

During the earlier democratization process, middle class

people had not been politically active. They were not eager to
assume the risks that they might incur by confronting a militant
authoritarian regime, and were instead satisfied with the role of
stabilizer, rather than active participant. The momentum that
ignited the participation of quiescent and passive middle class
people was the April 13 measure in 1987, which prohibited any
political discussion of the constitutional revision for direct presi-
dential elections.27 Chun's announcement of this measure which
would cripple prospects for constitutional change infuriated
many moderate intellectuals and ordinary people who were
aspiring to select the president directly.
Another incident that turned ordinary people into active
supporters for the social movement forces was the torture and
death of a college student at Seoul National University. The inci-
dent clearly disclosed the brutality of the military regime and
provided a clear moral justification for the struggle of social
movement forces against the increasingly harsh regime.
The U.S. government had and continues to have a definite
interest in Korean domestic stability, due to its geopolitical and
strategic importance. As a result of this interest, the U.S. govern-
ment sometimes stood on the side of the military regime, when
they judged that social movement caused political instability.
However, the participation of hundreds of thousands of mem-
bers of the "silent middle class" in the democratic movements in
1987, conveyed a clear message to the U.S. and other countries
that dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime was not con-
fined to radical students, laborers, dissident groups or opposi-
tion forces. Dissatisfaction and repulsion in South Korean soci-
ety were no longer confined to any particular social group.
Facing the outbursts of mass demonstrations and the peo-
ple's increasing expression for democratization, the U.S. govern-
ment could no longer adhere to a policy which advocated the
precedence of political stability over democratization. Through
various channels, the U.S. government sent a strong message to
the authoritarian elite in Seoul that they opposed any form of

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 Democratization in South Korea 163

military intervention or martial law in dealing with the

protesters. To confirm this stance, Assistant Secretary of State,
Gaston J. Sigur Jr., visited Seoul on June 23, 1987.28

Social Movements

As the radical groups of students and labor were enfeebled

by the government's brutal repression and their extreme strug-
gles failed to obtain the support of the ordinary people, moder-
ate social forces such as dissident groups and intellectuals began
to take the initiative in the democratization movement. Most of
the social forces agreed on their immediate goal, constitutional
revision calling for direct presidential elections, and a moderate
strategy for pursuing it. The agreement on the goal and strategy
made it possible to form a grand coalition and to awaken the
frightened ordinary people by lowering the risk factors.
It was Chun's awkward management of the political crisis
that ignited a grand coalition among diverse social forces. On
April 13, 1987, President Chun issued a special announcement to
conclude the on-going debates on constitutional revision on the
pretext of a peaceful transition in February 1988, and of holding
a successful Olympics in Seoul in 1988. The "April 13 measure"
which allowed for the indirect election of the president by elec-
toral college under the current constitution enraged not only
opposition forces but also moderate intellectuals and the middle
class who had been anxious for the commencement of a direct
election of the Korean president. Beginning with 30 professors at
Korea University on April 22, thousands of intellectuals includ-
ing professors, religious persons, literary persons and artists
issued statements giving their views on the situation and urged
constitutional revision for direct presidential elections.29
Another incident decreased the morality and the legitimacy
of the authoritarian regime and urged moderate "ordinary" peo-
ple to join the democratic movement. On May 26, Father Kim
Seoung Hoon revealed that a Seoul National University student,
Park Jong Cheol, had been tortured to death during an interro-
gation by the police. Top ranking police officers were directly
involved in this death by torture of a young university student.30
In 1985 and 1986, the authoritarian regime felt it had a justi-
fiable excuse for the harsh repression of the democracy move-

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164 Seongyi Yuri

ment, since it lacked mass support, largely due to the activists'

radical ideologies and violent clashes with the government.
Most of the leaders of the radical movement organizations were
arrested in late 1986 and, during this time they had reevaluated
their strategy. Since 1987, the student leaders reconsidered their
violent and political struggles and focused their energy on intra-
campus affairs to broaden their support from the masses.
The existence of a common goal, constitutional revision call-
ing for direct presidential elections, and the agreement on a
moderate strategy of struggle provided anti-regime forces with
the necessary momentum for cooperation before their enemy.
On May 27, 1987, the RDP (Reunification Democratic Party) and
representatives of broad sectors of social movements succeeded
in forming a gigantic umbrella organization, the National Coali-
tion for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC). The NCDC, whose
founding members were composed of representatives from
most social sectors including politicians, Catholic, Protestant,
Buddhist, UMMDU, the literary world, academic circles,
women's organizations, farmers, urban poor, artists, workers,
journalists, youth, and relatives of political prisoners, was the
largest social movement organization to emerge in the struggle
for democracy in Korea.31
The NCDC's peaceful action guidelines including tactics
such as sounding car horns, turning off the television for 10 min-
utes, tolling church bells, etc., appealed to the ordinary people
who were reluctant to join earlier because of the government's
harsh repression of violent demonstrations. On June 10, the
NCDC organized the "People's Rally to Denounce the Cover-up
of the Torture-Murder and the Scheme to Maintain the Current
Constitution" and some 240,000 people from 22 cities participat-
ed. These "people's demonstrations" escalated all over the coun-
try day by day and peaked in the "grand peace march" on June
26, 1987, during which over a million people from 34 cities and 4
counties participated.32
In the face of continued massive demonstrations, the
authoritarian regime had only two options: mobilizing troops to
quell the demonstrations, or making concessions to the opposi-
tion forces. On June 29, the Chun government finally surren-
dered to the "people's power" and the presidential candidate of
the ruling DJP announced the so called "June 29 declaration"

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 Democra tiza tion in Sou th Korea 1 65

which referred to an 8-point democratization package including

a speedy constitutional revision leading to direct presidential
elections, amnesty for opposition leader Kim Dae Jung and
guarantees for human rights and freedom of the press.33

Decline of Social Movements after the Transition:

July 1987-December 1987

Political Opportunity Structure

The expanded political opportunity structure of the previ-

ous period was not sustained after the transition. The regime
elite was still united around the departing president Chun Doo
Hwan. Explosive labor strikes after the transition scared off the
ordinary people who preferred a gradual reform preserving
political stability and continuous economic development. A
division in the opposition party played havoc with the alliance
of the opposition forces. Two prominent opposition leaders,
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, failed to make a sole presi-
dential candidate from the opposition forces and both of them
were defeated by the governmental candidate, Roh Tae Woo, in
the subsequent election.
The "June 29 declaration" was not a triumph of the hard-lin-
ers over the soft-liners. Before and after the June 29 authoritari-
an regime's concession to the opposition forces, no serious splits
had appeared among the regime elite. President Chun contin-
ued to have strong support in the military and the number two
man and presidential candidate for the ruling DJP, Roh Tae
Woo, did not challenge the authority of Chun. As protagonists
in the 1979 military coup and the 1980 Kwangju Uprising, Chun
and Roh faced many of the same challenges from angry social
sectors. As a result, they had to win in the presidential elections
in order to avoid vengeance from the opposition forces.
The middle class, after the "June 29 declaration" and the
attainment of their goal of constitutional revision for direct pres-
idential elections, was soon demobilized. Although members of
the middle class shared democratic aspirations with the opposi-
tion forces, abrupt change and instability in existing social rela-
tions were not wanted. Explosive labor disputes in July and

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166 Seongyi Yuri

August 1987 stirred up strong concerns among the general pub-

lic over social stability and consistent economic development. In
July 1987 alone, there were more than 600 labor strikes, more
than the combined total for 1985 and 1986.34
When the regime elites accepted a direct election for the
president, they calculated that the opposition forces were not
likely to come to an agreement on their candidate for the presi-
dency and with a division in the opposition forces, the presiden-
tial candidate of the ruling DJP, Roh Tae Woo, would have a
good chance to win the elections. Their calculations proved to be
correct. After the June 29 concession, divisions appeared in the
opposition party concerning the selection of the sole candidate
for the presidential elections. The two prominent opposition
leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung could not concede
on a single point for the opposition candidacy. Each argued that
only they could defeat Roh in the presidential elections and
should present a unified candidate from the opposition forces as
they did in the spring of 1980.35

Social Movements

Diverse social sectors in the civil society cannot be consid-

ered as a united actor. Their versions of democracy, the desirable
extent of reform and methods of struggle were not necessarily
identical. They merely compromised and cooperated with each
other to breakdown their common enemy, the authoritarian gov-
ernment, and to accomplish their common goal for direct presi-
dential elections. After achieving their common and immediate
goal, however, diverse social groups began to disclose their dif-
ferences. Diverse social sectors succeeded in forming a united
front in their struggle against the authoritarian government, but
failed to arbitrate different political visions and projects.
This split between opposition politicians led to divisions
among the social sectors. Social forces were divided into three
groups. The first group, composed of UMMDU, Chundaeryun
(National Council of Student Representatives) and Minchun-
gryun (Democratic Youth League) "critically" proposed to sup-
port Kim Dae Jung. Although, Kim Dae Jung was not whole-
heartedly supported, they argued a better option was not avail-
abel. They believed that Kim Dae Jung had a more progressive

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 67

stance toward social and economic issues favoring workers,

farmers and the urban poor than Kim Young Sam. The second
group, the conservative pro-Kim Young Sam group criticized
the decision of the pro-Kim Dae Jung group arguing that rela-
tive progressiveness between the two Kims cannot be a deter-
mining factor in deciding the opposition candidacy. The third
group, the radical leftist group, rejected both Kims by present-
ing their own candidate, Paek Ki Wan.
Owing to divisions in the opposition forces, on December
16, 1987, Roh Tae Woo, the DJP candidate, was elected with only
36.6 percent of the total vote. Kim Young Sam came in second
with 28 percent followed by Kim Dae Jung who won 27 percent
of the votes.36 The fact that the two Kims receiving 55 percent of
the votes together demonstrates that the opposition forces could
have won the election if they put up a unified candidate.

Conclusion

The political opportunity structure of the South Korean sys-

tem in the 1980s expanded and contracted throughout the pro-
longed democratization struggle and process. Several distinct
patterns of societal behavior emerging at varying times of differ-
ent political opportunity structure may be observed.
As shown above, elite fragmentation did not automatically
lead to a democratic transition in Korea as would have been pre-
dicted under the current elite models of democratization. Imme-
diately after the assassination of long time dictator, Park Chung
Hee, no single power was able to fill the gap left behind. Even
the military, the most powerful force, was divided into two
groups, a "new-military" group versus a "senior generals"
group. The democratic transition predicted by many elite-
focused studies of democratization did not happen in South
Korea, because no opposition forces were prepared to utilize the
opportunity for democratization. Under long-term repression,
both social movement forces and the opposition party lacked
organization and cooperation that would have facilitated a chal-
lenge to the status quo.
On the other hand, in the period of the 1987 transition, the
ruling elite was strongly united, largely because of the president

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168 Seongyi Yuri

Chun Doo Hwan. Elite cleavages between hard-liners and soft-

liners, which are the central components of most elite-focused
studies of democratization, simply did not exist in the late-1980s
in Korea. Some studies on Korea democratization explain Chun
and Roh as a hard-liner and soft-liner respectively, and argue
that the transition was initiated by the soft-liner Roh Tae Woo's
announcement of the June 29th concession.37 As verified by
many sources, however, Chun under the intense pressure of the
social movements judged "peoples' power" to be uncontrollable
by physical violence and persuaded the reluctant Roh to accept
the direct presidential election.38
"Elite fragmentation," therefore, was not a prerequisite for
transition to democracy in Korea. The democratic transition in
Korea would not have been possible without the existence of a
united and well organized social movement forces. Governmen-
tal repression lacked the power to incapacitate social forces once
they were well organized and obtained a broad support base.
Even though social movements had been stagnant under the
harsh repression of the first period (1979-1983), social move-
ments, despite severe repression, were very active in the transi-
tion period. This was because social movement organizations
possessed a capacity to overcome harsh repression by taking
advantage of the weakened repressive measures in the decom-
pression period.
Support from the ordinary people and the U.S. were
extremely influential to the successful transition in 1987. How-
ever, it was the strongly united social movement forces that
drew support from the quiescent and passive ordinary people.
As a result of the well organized demonstrations by social
movement organizations and their limited strategy that focused
on the conception of direct presidential elections, ordinary peo-
ple in Korea capitalized on the decreased risks involved in con-
fronting the militant regime. Without the organized and focused
social movement organizations which overcame many
formidable obstacles, the transition to democracy in Korea
would not have been possible. Authoritarian elites do not volun-
tarily initiate democratic transition. They are forced to do so. In
Korea, it was the vigorous social movements that forced the
authoritarian elites to agree to the democratic transition.

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 69

NOTES

1. Guillermo O'Donnell & Phillippe Schmitter, Transition from Authorita

an Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 19.
2. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Acti
and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 85.
3. Philippe Schmitter, Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portu
gal, 19 75; O'Donnell & Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Unce
tain Democracies," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, an
Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transition form Authoritarian Rule (Baltimo
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Alfred Stepan, "Pat
Toward Redemocratization:Theoretical and Comparative Consider
tion," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transition from
Authoritarian Rule ; For Korean case, see Hyug-Baeg Im, "Politics of
Transition:Democratic Trasition from Authoritarian Rule in South
Korea, Ph.D. Disse., University of Chicago, 1989; James Cotton, "From
Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea," Political Studies , vol.
XXXVII (1989), pp. 244-259; In-Sub Mah, "Capitalist Development and
Democratization in South Korea: A Study on the Socioeconomic Struc-
ture and Political Process," Ph.D. Diss., Northwestern University, 1991.
4. For definition of the three arenas, please see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking
Military Politics Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1988), pp. 3-7.
5. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democra-
cies, p. 4.
6. For the development of the idea of political opportunity structure,
please see Peter Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in Amer-
ican Cities," American Political Science Review, vol. 67 (1973); Charles
Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publish-
ing Co., 1976); Doug McAdam, The Political Process and the Development
of Black Insurgency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Herbert
Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-
Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political
Science, vol. 16 (1986); Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics and Reform: Col-
lective Action, Social Movements and Cycle of Protest (Cornell University,
Western Societies Paper No. 21, 1989); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Move-
ment: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cam-
bride University Press, 1994).
7. The number of the dead has not become clear yet. While the Martial
Law Command estimated the number of the dead at less than 200, dis-
sidents claimed that about 2,000 were killed in Kwaneiu Uprising.
8. In the National Assembly election of 1978 the oppostion party(NDP)
outpolled the government party(DRP) by gathering 34.7 percent against

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I 70 Seongyi Yuri

30.9 percent, even though they could not win a majority of seats due to
the distorted PR system.
9. Seongbo Kim, "80nyeondae banmi undongsa," (History of anti-Ameri-
ca Movements in 1980s), Sahoewa Sasang (Society and Thought) (May,
1989), p. 135.
10. Mark Peterson, "Americans and the Kwangju Incident: Problems in the
Writing of History," in Donald N. Clark, ed., The Kwangju Uprising:
Shadows over the Regime in South Korea , p. 56.
11. Korea Annual (1982), p. 58.
12. Korea Annual (1982), pp. 58-59.
13. Washington Post (March 13, 1980).
14. The literally meaning of Moorim and Hakrim is not clear. It is believed to
be named by the police for some reasons.
15. Choi Yeongu, "80nyeondae haksaengundongeui yinyeomjeok jogikjeok
baljeonkwajeong," (Ideological and Organizational Development of the
1980s Student Movements) in Heeyeon Jo, ed., Hanguk Sahwoi Undongsa
(History of Korean Social Movement) (Seoul: Juksan, 1990), p. 247.
16. Yabi and Jeonmang are the titles of pamphlets published by each organi-
zation.

17. Ibid., p. 248.

18. Janghan Kim, 80nyeondae Hanguk Nodong Undongsa (The History of the
Korean Labor Movement in the 1980s), p. 39.
19. Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., "Prospects for Continuning Democratization In
Korea/' Current Policy, No. 829 (Washington: Unites States Department
of State), p. 2.
20. U.S. Congress, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1983.
Febuary 1984. (Washington: GPO).
21. Korea Newsreview (January 14, 1984), p. 10.
22. Chang Min Jeong, "80nyeondae Haksaengundongeui Nonriwa Hyun-
sil," (Logic and Reality of Student Movement in 1980s) in Jin Kyung Jo,
ed., Hankuksahwoieui Seonggyeokkwa Undong (Characteristics and Move-
ment of Korean Society) (Seoul: Gongdongche, 1987), p. 317.
23. Ibid., p.318.
24. Wongmo Dong, University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns
of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 40,
No. 2 (WI/SP, 1987), pp. 243-244.
25. Hangukyeoksa Yeonguhwoi (A Society for the Study of Korean Histo-
ry), Hanguk Hyundaesa 4 (Korean Modern History 4) (Seoul: Pulbit), p.
120.
26. National Democratic Movement Institute, Mintongryun (UMMDU):
Evaluation Report on People's Movement for Democracy and Unification
(1989), pp.5-6.
27. Korea Newsreview (April 18, 1987), pp. 4-5.
28. Washington Post (June 27, 1987).
29. Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD),
Kisayeon Report 1 (CISJD Report 1), p. 16.

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 Democra tiza tion in South Korea 1 71

30. Ji Hun jo, 80nyeondae Huban Cheongyeon Haksaeng Undong (The Youth
and Student Movement of the Late 1980s) (Seoul: Hyungsungsa, 1989),
p. 16.
31. National Democratic Movement Institute, Kiikminundongbonbii (National
Headquarters): Evaluation Report (1989), pp.4-10.
32. CISJD, 6wol Minjoohwadawtoojang (Great Democratization Struggle in
June), pp. 58-71.
33. Korea Ñewsreview (July 4, 1987), pp. 4-5.
34. The Federation of Korean Industries, Korean Eonomic Yearbook , 1988 edi-
tion (1989), p. 131.
35. Korea Newsreview (July 25, 1987), pp. 5-6.
36. Sung Joo Han, "South Korea In 1987/' Asian Survey, vol. XXVIII, No. 1
(January 1988), p. 57.
37. James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea/'
Political Studies , vol. XXXVII (1989), pp. 244-259; Hyug B. Im, "Politics
of Transition: Democratic Transtion from Authoritarian Rule in South
Korea," Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1989; In-Sub Mah, "Capital-
ist Development and Democratization in South Korea: A Study on the
Socioeconomic Structure and Political Process," Ph.D. Diss., Northwest-
ern University, 1991.
38. The most current material on this issue is Yong II Kim, "6.29eui Jin-
sang," (The Real Picture of the June 29th Concession) in WIN (March,
1995), pp. 52-59. Also see Seong Woo Kim, "Chun Doo Hwan, Yeok-
saeul wihan yuksong jeungeun," (Chun Doo Hwan, A Live Voice Testi-
mony for the History), Wolgan Chosun (January 1992 ), pp. 290-336;
(February 1992), pp. 292-401.

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