UNIVERSITY  OF  SAN  CARLOS  

COLLEGE  OF  LAW  
A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
 
 
 

PROBLEM  AREAS  IN  

LEGAL  ETHICS  
 

 
COMPILATION  OF  CASE  DIGESTS  AND  OTHER  
STUDY  MATERIALS  
 

 
 
EH502  –  PELAEZ  MOOT  COURT  
 

 
ATTY.  AMY  ROSE  SOLER-­‐RELLIN  
LAW  PROFESSOR  
 
 
 
 Table  of  Contents  
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 5  
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD  ...............................................................................................................................................................................  5  

PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION vs. AGRAVA  ................................................................................................................................  6  

IN RE: AL C. ARGOSINO  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  7  

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH  .......................................................................................................  8  

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON  .............................................................................................................  9  

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA  .....................................................................................................  10  

IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO  ...................................................................................................................................................................  11  

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,  BENJAMIN M. DACANAY.  .....................................................................  12  

IN RE: MEDADO PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS  .................................................................................................  14  

CATU VS. RELLOSA  ........................................................................................................................................................................................  15  

JUVY P. CIOCON-REER VS JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO  .....................................................................................................................  16  

RULE 138  ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................  17  

RULE 138-A  .......................................................................................................................................................................................................  17  

B.M. 1645 (Amendment of RULE 139-B)  ......................................................................................................................................................  18  

CANON 1 ................................................................................................................................................... 19  
BONGALONTA VS CASTILLO  .......................................................................................................................................................................  19  

MARIA ELENA MORENO,  COMPLAINANT, VS.  ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA,  RESPONDENT.  ......................................................  20  

EDUARDO A. ABELLA VS RICARDO G. BARRIOS JR.  ...........................................................................................................................  21  

EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, RESPONDENT.  .....................................................  22  

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, RESPONDENTS.
 .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................  23  

CANON 2 ................................................................................................................................................... 26  
ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC,INC.  ......................................................................................................................................................................  26  

MANUEL G. VILLATUYA V. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS  ..................................................................................................................  29  

BAR MATTER NO. 2012  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  30  

CANON 3 ................................................................................................................................................... 31  
KHAN VS. SIMBILLO  .......................................................................................................................................................................................  31  

CANON 5 ................................................................................................................................................... 32  
BAR MATTER NO. 850 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION  .........................................................................................  32  

BAR MATTER NO. 1922  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  39  

RIVERA-PASCUAL V. SPOUSES LIM  ..........................................................................................................................................................  40  

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014  .......................................................................................................................................................................  41  

CANON 6 ................................................................................................................................................... 42  
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN  ...........................................................................................................................................................................  42  

CANON 7 ................................................................................................................................................... 43  
IN RE: MELING  .................................................................................................................................................................................................  43  

RULE 139-A  .......................................................................................................................................................................................................  44  

IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON  ......................................  47  

SANTOS V. LLAMAS  .......................................................................................................................................................................................  48  

CANON 8 ................................................................................................................................................... 49  
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO  ..........................................................................................................................................................................  49  

CANON 9 ................................................................................................................................................... 50  
 ETERNAL GARDENDS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION VS SPS. LILIA SEVILLA AND JOSE SEELIN  ...................................  53  

CANON 11 ................................................................................................................................................. 55  
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO, VS. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.  .........................................................................................................................  55  

KELLY R. WICKER AND ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE RTC, MAKATI, BRANCH 134, RESPONDENT.  ............................................................................................................  56  

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY  ...................................................................................................................................................  57  

CANON 12 ................................................................................................................................................. 59  
SOLEDAD NUEZ, REPRESENTED BY ANANIAS B. CO, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR COMPLAINANT, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY.
ROMULO RICAFORT, RESPONDENT.  ........................................................................................................................................................  59  

SANTIAGO V. ATTY. RAFANAN  ....................................................................................................................................................................  60  

CANON 13 ................................................................................................................................................. 61  
CESAR L. LANTORIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, RESPONDENT.  ...................................................................  61  

ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN  .................................................................................................................................................................  62  

CANON 14 ................................................................................................................................................. 64  
SANTIAGO VS FOJAS  ....................................................................................................................................................................................  64  

CANON 15 ................................................................................................................................................. 65  
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., AND BEN A. NICOLAS VS. ATTY. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO  ............................................  65  

ARTEZUELA V. MADERAZO  .........................................................................................................................................................................  66  

PNB VS. ATTY. TELESFORO CEDO  ..........................................................................................................................................................  67  

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN  .....................................................................................................................................................................  68  

CANON 16 ................................................................................................................................................. 71  
UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO G. MACALINO, RESPONDENT.  .....  71  

ROSARIO JUNIO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO, RESPONDENT.  ................................................................  72  

PELMOKA V. JUDGE DIAZ, JR.  ....................................................................................................................................................................  73  

DANIEL LEMOINE VS. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR.  ..........................................................................................................................  74  

NAVARRO VS. SOLIDUM, JR.  .......................................................................................................................................................................  76  

CANON 17 ................................................................................................................................................. 77  
ROSACIA V. BULALACAO  ..............................................................................................................................................................................  77  

LORENZANA FOOD CORP. V. ATTY. DARIA  ............................................................................................................................................  78  

STEPHAN BRUNET AND VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET VS ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN  ......................................................  80  

CANON 18 ................................................................................................................................................. 81  
CESARIO ADARNE VS. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA  ................................................................................................................................  81  

CARLOS B. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, RESPONDENT.  ................................................................  82  

VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ V. AGLERON SR.  ...................................................................................................................................................  83  

CANON 19 ................................................................................................................................................. 84  
NICANOR GONZALES VS. ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN  .......................................................................................................................  84  

CANON 20 ................................................................................................................................................. 85  
LEVISTE V CA  ...................................................................................................................................................................................................  85  

LICUDAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS  ...........................................................................................................................................................  86  

ANA F. RETUYA VS. ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ  .....................................................................................................................................  87  

RAMOS VS NGASEO  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  88  

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ AND SPS LARRAZABAL  ........................................................................  89  

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES CADAVEDO ET AL. V. VICTORIANO LACAYA  ..........................................  90  
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY AND PROCEDURE AGAINST LAWYERS ............................................. 95  
BENGCO V.BERNARDO  .................................................................................................................................................................................  95  

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE VS. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO  ..................................................................................................................  96  

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN VS. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS ET AL  ..........................................................................................  97  

VILLALON, JR. V. IAC  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  98  

PLAZA VS. AMAMIO  ........................................................................................................................................................................................  99  

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA  ......  101  

FIGUERAS VS. JIMENEZ  .............................................................................................................................................................................  104  

ADELIA V. QUIACHON V. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS,  ..............................................................................................................  105  

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, RESPONDENT.  ...........................................................  106  

IN RE TORRES  ...............................................................................................................................................................................................  107  

BAR MATTER 1645  ........................................................................................................................................................................................  109  

NOTARIAL PRACTICE ........................................................................................................................... 110  

RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE  ...........................................................................................................................................  110  

BAUTISTA V. BERNABE  ...............................................................................................................................................................................  111  

TALISIC V. RINEN  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  113  

ANG V. GUPANA  ............................................................................................................................................................................................  114  

 
   
INTRODUCTION  

CAYETANO VS. MONSOD

FACTS: Monsod passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-
1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in
1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990.

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the COMELEC. The

Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection,
based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice.

Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that
said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and
other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers
employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they
use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The Court also cited an article in
the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of
their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law, particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION vs. AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of
Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends
that one who has passed the bar examination and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law
in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess
of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed
the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time
he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before
the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well
as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all
other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of
the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a
board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
IN RE: AL C. ARGOSINO
246 Scra 14 (1995)
Facts:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations. The Court however
deferred his oath taking due to his previous conviction in a case for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide which arose from the death of Raul Camaligan during fraternity
initiation rites. Argosino was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period a ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years. He and the other accused (colleagues) filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The same was granted. Less than a month
later, after he passed the bar exams, Argosino filed a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. The court required him to
submit evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. So he presented no less
than 15 certifications among others from: 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members of
religious order. He, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of the hazing victim.

Issue:

Whether or not Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be
admitted to the practice of law

Ruling:

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective
and efficient administration of justice. The issue in this case required weighing and
reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner’s admission for the practice
of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence
of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant, and uncalled for.

The court understood and shared the sentiment of the victim’s father, Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan and commended the latter for having forgiven the accused given the
circumstances in this case. After a very careful evaluation of this case, the court resolved to
allow petitioner to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession after the court has been persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. In giving him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious, and uncalculating, the
petitioner was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality
before the practice of law. Every lawyer must at all times weigh his actions according to the
sworn promises and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court hoped that the
community assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more
unfortunate members of the society
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was convicted of Reckless Imprudence Resulting In

Homicide due to a hazing incident which caused the death of a neophyte, Raul
Camaligan. Argosino was sentenced of imprisonment but was later discharged on
probation in 1993, the same year when he passed the Bar. Based on the order of
discharge from probation, Argosino filed a petition to be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
oath. The Court then issued a resolution requiring petitioner Argosino to submit
evidence so that he may be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

Petitioner submitted certifications and letters issued by prominent people and members
of the church. The Court also sought the opinion of the victim’s father. The father, in his
statement, forgave the Petitioner and his
Co-accused but had reservations for he is not in a position to say whether petitioner is
morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submitted the matter to the sound
discretion of the Court.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE ALLOWED ADMISSION TO THE BAR

DESPITE HIS PREVIOUS CONVICTION OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING
IN HOMICIDE.

HELD:

The Court allowed Argosino to take the Lawyer’s oath and then admitted to the
Bar. “We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for
everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON

FACTS: Sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, while Ventura was sleeping in the maid’s
room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her
lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found
blood stain in her panty. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old
shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned
her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint, complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School.
She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent went
on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody
could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that respondent forced her to ride a
multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated
shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

The complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their
respective Affidavits of Desistance. Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her
in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed
against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty of Disbarment is proper

RULING: The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the
bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer may be it in the lawyer’s
public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee,
constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual
intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did
nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very
young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human
person and the ethics of his profession. Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on
him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the
sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act.
Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should
be disciplined accordingly.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings
in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as
a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief
to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA
Facts:

This is a petition for disbarment by complainant Bunagan-Bansig against Respondent Atty. Celera for
Gross Immoral Conduct.

Bansig, sister of Bunagan narrated that, respondent Atty Juan Celera and Gracemarie R. Bunagan,
entered into a contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan,
respondent contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent
and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba,
and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice

Ruling:

For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and is grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO

Facts:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, who has for some 16 years, from
1978-1995, been instituting and prosecuting in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. Under the illusion that
his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he
ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. The results had
been disastrous and in the process, he composed and circulated many scurrilous statements
against the courts, judges and their employees, as well as his opponents. In those publicly
circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the
Constitution and the laws and so much more.

Issue: Whether or not lawyers are entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech
towards the court.

Held:

No. Borromeo is guilty of contempt for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and
processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding,
obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. He stubbornly litigated issues already
declared to be without merit, rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings
which had become final and executor, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application
of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal and
erroneous reading of the constitution and the law. He has insulted the judges and court officers,
including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets
and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his
repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. On the contention that he
was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials. The constitutional right invoked by him afford no justification for
repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court
employees; and other person, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their
time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,  BENJAMIN M.
DACANAY.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice
of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada
in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He then became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

§ Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. THE RULES OF COURT MANDATES THAT AN
APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR BE A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications; passing the bar examinations; taking the lawyer’s
oath and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.

§ Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines?

General Rule: NO.

(The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law.)

Exception: WHEN FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP IS LOST BY REASON OF NATURALIZATION

AS A CITIZEN OF ANOTHER COUNTRY BUT SUBSEQUENTLY
REACQUIRED PURSUANT TO RA 9225.

(This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another

country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.)
 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

(SC’s decision: THE PETITION OF ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. DACANAY WAS GRANTED,

SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS STATED ABOVE AND
SUBMISSION OF PROOF OF SUCH COMPLIANCE TO THE BAR
CONFIDANT, AFTER WHICH HE MAY RETAKE HIS OATH AS A MEMBER OF
THE PHILIPPINE BAR.)
IN RE: MEDADO PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
FACTS: Medado graduated from UP Law and passed the bar exam the same year. He took the attorney’s oath at
PICC and was scheduled to sign in the roll of attorneys but failed to do so because he misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys when he went to his province for vacation. Several years later, while looking thru his college files
and already working, he found the Notice and realized that he had not signed the Roll of Attorneys and what he
signed was just the attendance at PICC.

He was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer” and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its
urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”

When Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Office of Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit and offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll.

RULING: GRANTED. Subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from
the practice of law. At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

• For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention
to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the
passage of more than 30 years.
• For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,17
which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the
Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
• Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions
at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the
Energy Development Corporation.

While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

II. However, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction. Petitioner has been
engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys

The moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein
that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking
the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court,
and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. But formal charge must be filed first.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates.

Violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-
fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty
akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For
CATU VS. RELLOSA
AC No. 57 38 – Feb. 19, 2008

Facts:
Complainant Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building. His mother and brother, Regina and Antonio contested the
possession of Elizabeth and Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Respondent, as punong barangay summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.

The IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Whether or not respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713?

(3) Whether or not respondent breached the prohibition of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:

(1) Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As
worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in
which he intervened while in said service. Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed
the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

(2) Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in
the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.

While certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned. As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor.
This he failed to do.

(3) The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of
this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and is sternly warned that any repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
JUVY P. CIOCON-REER VS JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ

FACT:

Complainants are the plaintiffs in a civil case for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction.
Karaan represented as the attorney-in-fact in their case. His modus operandi is offering free
paralegal advice and then making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would
make him an agent of the litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions with
himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his clients. The defendant defaulted in their
answer, Karaan alleged that the former should be deemed to have waived their right to adduce
evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from and
Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision. Thus, Karaan filed an administrative case against
Judge Lubao.

Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is
engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to
require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for unauthorized practice
of law.

Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the issues at hand. The OCA
found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear that Karaan was
engaged in the practice of law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Karaan is engaged in the practice of law.
2. What are the sanctions for appearance or practice of law without authority?

RULING:
1. YES.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.

It was established that he would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his
favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the
necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact,
agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he
was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not
detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.

Karaan stated that he never represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and
that his paralegal services, rendered free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he
assists organizations which represent the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of
the community with limited means. The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause order
unsatisfactory.

2. What are the sanctions for appearance or practice of law without authority?

He is cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve an imprisonment of ten days at the
Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or
any similar or other offense against the courts, judges or court employees will merit further and more
serious sanctions. A memorandum is issued to all courts of the land to notify the judges and court
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed
courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education.
The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be
filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial
law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major
or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed
by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between

attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting
for the legal clinic.

Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of
professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate
supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December
19, 1986).
B.M. 1645 (Amendment of RULE 139-B)
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of
any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether
or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals
with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions.

If the complaint is filed before the IBP, six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP
Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.

A. Proceedings in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 5. Service or Dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator

shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to
the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the Investigator will recommend to
the Board of Governors the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, the procedure in Section 12 of this
Rule shall apply.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the
Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that
there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the
respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter No.
356)

Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board of Governors. —

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the
Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the
Investigator's report.

c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.

B. Proceedings in the Supreme Court

Section 13. Investigation of Complaints. — In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in

other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court. The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.

C. Common Provisions
CANON 1

BONGALONTA VS CASTILLO
FACTS:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 5, 1995 addressed to the Commission

on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of
the Philippines Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with RTC-Pasig for Estafa
against the Spouse Abuel. She also filed a separate civil action where she was able to obtain a
writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig,
Rizal and registered in the name of Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the RTC-Pasig, against Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case,
the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file necessary responsive pleading
and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in
favour of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these there (3) aforementioned
cases, Atty. Castillo and Atty. Martija places the same address, the same PTR and the same
IBP receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin
was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.

IBP thus issued a resolution ordering the suspension of Atty. Castillo from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-
respondent. The complaint against Atty. Martija is dismissed for lack of evidence.

RULING:

The Supreme Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the IBP. It
is said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State in those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candour. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candour and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court.
MARIA ELENA MORENO,  COMPLAINANT, VS.  ATTY. ERNESTO
ARANETA,  RESPONDENT.

A complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of
debts. filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno.
The action involved Aranetas nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno
alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show
to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest
possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the
same assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought
repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in
her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000.
However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to
her marked Account Closed. She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand
letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.
Araneta denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two
undated checks in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He
avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the
bank where she was working that she had money coming to her. Araneta further claims that he
warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not
be encashed.
Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against
a closed account.

held: the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other
for P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that
money was coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an
act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless
commercial documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the
complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.

Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.[20]
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently
been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a
crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.[24] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[25]
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
EDUARDO A. ABELLA VS RICARDO G. BARRIOS JR.
Facts:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor
Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional
Arbitration Branch which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5)
months, complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for
Execution. However, still, there was no action until the complainant agreed to give respondent
a portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would
be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the
complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein
complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it modifies the DECISION of the
CA. Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for
(a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a
wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

Held:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate
the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against
lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03
proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for
any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in
government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines

that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads
the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross
misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a
previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore
precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court
deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize
respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future.
EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA,
RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 10135. January 15, 2014.]

FACTS:

Administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against Atty.
Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) for violation of her
attorney's oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co- detainees.

Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech: SEIDAC

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to
approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases
against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and
improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in
the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) months.

ISSUE:

WON the advice given by Atty. Mendoza was a violation of a lawyer’s duty under the CPR

RULING:

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areola's
charges against Atty. Mendoza — that she told her clients"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be
dismissed

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza's improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges
must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits
of a case. Atty. Mendoza's careless remark is uncalled for.

A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit
of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.

The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to
cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, RESPONDENTS.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960's when they were
both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the
paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez). Atty. Catindig however
claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a
scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer
any impediment to their marriage.

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child.

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally
adopt their son.

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig's scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed
by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty.
Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty.
Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his
marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Further, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he
did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour and denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason
that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted
that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did
not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January
2001.

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig's romantic overtures; she told
him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
 The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, which
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully
well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal
conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed
for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair
between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain
one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than
just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from
the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor." Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of
 one amounts to a grossly
immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig's own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible
to a high degree.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez.
The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig's sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant
and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that
Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr.
Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.

Atty. Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By
his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal
skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar,
which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to

prove the affair between the
respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed
amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her
claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and
the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a
letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations
therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
CANON 2
ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC,INC.
223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law." cdrep

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The

Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. cdphil

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUES:

1. whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. The activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.

2. NO. It cannot properly be the subject of advertisements.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented."

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law.

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA V. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS
A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012

FACTS:

Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. Complainant averred that he was
employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation
cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every
Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the
respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the
amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two
financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant
accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage
was subsisting.

Respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but
rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged
that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement
between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful
solicitation. He attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the
affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages
with two other women

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by non-payment of fees to complainant;

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.

RULING:

1. Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not
licensed to practice law. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed
the charge against respondent on this matter.

2. He violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not
prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature
or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be
used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it
is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court
affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

3. SC have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a
negative pregnant.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage
was still subsisting. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
BAR MATTER NO. 2012
February  10,  2009  

As provided under Bar Matter No. 2012, all practicing lawyers must render a minimum of sixty (60)
hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants in a year. The minimum amount of time is spread
within twelve (12) months, which means that a practicing lawyer must render a minimum of five (5) hours
of free legal aid services each month.

Not all lawyers are covered. The Rule defines a practicing lawyer —

Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of
law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations Commission,
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous Peoples.
The term “practicing lawyers” shall exclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law
schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples’ organizations (POs) like
the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent
and pauper litigants and

(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are employed in the private
sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.

One of the penalties include the prohibition of the lawyer to appear in court or any quasi-judicial
bodies as counsel.

Section 7. Penalties. –

(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months from the
receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the said period,
the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, however, that the
"not in good standing" status shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-month period until and
unless the penalty shall have been paid.
CANON 3

KHAN VS. SIMBILLO

Facts:

Atty. Simbillo publicized his legal services in 3 major newspapers, the PDI, MB, and the PhilStar, which
read"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," and claimed as an expert in handling annulment cases, and that
he can guarantee court’s decree within 4 to 6 months time and that the fee was Php 48,000.

Then petitioner Khan, in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed administrative charges in IBP against the respondent for improper advertising and soliciting
legal business.

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation
per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on
lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by
a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.

However, the IBP found the respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Issue:

WON the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of CPR.

Held:

Yes. The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is
the primary consideration; Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Rule 2.03 A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” and by this he undermined the stability and
sanctity of marriage —encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is
not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of
the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar.

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year and was sternly warned that are petition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely.
CANON 5

BAR MATTER NO. 850 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL

EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP,
endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve,
as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of

members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their
career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the
approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall
be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt
under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of
continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36
hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent
to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural
laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the
day after the end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE
requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro
Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to
Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to
Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity
wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE
requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment
of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of
the program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their
Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first
day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of
all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after
admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program
requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after
admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of
hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole
number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT

HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under
the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity.
The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting
documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE

EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF

SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF

BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-
participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be
claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions,
symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table
discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator,
resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education
activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may
 (b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on

actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour
reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar
are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and
retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar
Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy
program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar
are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member
may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical
disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of
time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE
Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the
 SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the
MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing

regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education
program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the
activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of
Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide
continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education
activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal
subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g.,
accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice
law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional
experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials
must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or
before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be
free from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be

done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon
written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-
house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application
for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall
agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall
include the member on the official record of attendance only if the members
signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys
and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the
amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics,
etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities
prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the
MCLE COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants

identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved

continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE,
members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the
Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance
with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors.
The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE
MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall
be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may

be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any
of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for
the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider
referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after
notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or

accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the
Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE
 SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain
sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The
record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of
Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of
non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in
Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-

compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of
exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such
compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members
failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency
and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying
the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice
shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM
DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED
BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice

may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for
compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the
excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed
 SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at
the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent
member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be

terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement,
including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary
credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period
the member is on inactive status. These credit unitsmay not be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period
requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The
termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be
made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5)

members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4)
members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall
be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such
compensation as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE
fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme
Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform
the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the
Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and
maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

BAR MATTER NO. 1922

RIVERA-PASCUAL V. SPOUSES LIM

FACTS:

• Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 1 and
March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals
• On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the
Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to
be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo
Deato
• During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale
was registered on December 21, 2004
• Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead
Spouses Lim as respondents.
• The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012- 04, was granted by
Regional Adjudicator in favor of Consolacion.
• On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar
of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to
accept the amount of P10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial
hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.
• On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a
Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated June 2, 2008.
• On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court with the CA.
• On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within five
(5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of
Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-
Forum-Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition
his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter
No. 1922.
• Also, the jurat of Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping
failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her
community tax certificate.
• Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a
Resolution19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition

ISSUE: Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA’s strict application of the rule requiring
her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule rendering the
jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping defective in the absence of the details of
any one of her current identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and
signature.

RULING:

• The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by
the CA in dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of petitioner’s
unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
• Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not
explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested
leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the
relaxation of the rules
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE OFFICE OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR,
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 1922 (RE: RECOMMENDATION OF THE MANDATORY

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION [MCLE] BOARD TO INDICATE IN ALL PLEADINGS FILED
WITH THE COURTS THE COUNSEL'S MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE OR
CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPTION)

In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-cited administrative
matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:

(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required information would subject the
counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action”; and

(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption
number in the pleadings:

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for the
second offense and P4,000.00 for the third offense;

(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and regulations; and

(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall be
allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to demand the return
of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.

This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and any prior circular from the
Office of the Court Administrator on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby
superseded.
CANON 6
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it
to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK
failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA
Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres
Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al.
before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict”
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning
of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or
the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held
that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in
stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code
of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil
sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered
as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial.
He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding
the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Petition assailing
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied. Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo: Rule 6.03 is a
restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.” Indeed, the restriction against a public official from
using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain
matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the service.
CANON 7

IN RE: MELING
B.M. No. 1154

Facts:
Atty. Melenderez filed with the Office of Bar Confidant (OBC) a petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his petition to take the bar examinations his 3
pending criminal cases and that Meling has been using the title Attorney, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.
In his answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melenderez because he believed in good faith that the case would be settled as advised by his former
professor who is also a retired judge and he further denied the charges and that such acts do not involve
moral turpitude. He admitted that some of his communications contained the word Attorney but were
typed by the office clerk.

Issue:
Does Meling’s non-disclosure and fraudulent use of the title attorney warrant disqualification from
the 2002 bar exam and disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Sharia Bar?

Held:
The OBC decided that the Meling’s reasons are ludicrous since only courts of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor, and since such cases are still
pending, he is required to disclose the same.
The merit of cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing which constitutes dishonesty.
The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar.
As regards Meling’s use of the title Attorney, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters.
The OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.
Furthermore, Melings concealment of the fact that there are three pending criminal cases against
him indicates lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
th
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar. Meling is an executive clerk of the 4 Judicial Sharia
District in Marawi City, and used the title Attorney in his private capacity. Persons who pass the Sharia
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine bar, hence only practice before Sharia courts. The title
attorney is reserved to those who have obtained the necessary law degree and successfully taken the
Bar Exams and have been admitted to the IBP and remain members thereof in good standing.
The Petition is granted and Meling’s membership to the Sharia Bar is suspended. The Petition
seeking to prevent Haron Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorney as a
member of the Philippine Bar is dismissed for having become moot and academic.
RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro,
Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern
Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan,
Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte,
Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao
del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, determine
the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow provided,
every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;

(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common concern.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the
day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for
more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of April of each year
for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the
transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be
requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to
consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether
annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected
by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor
shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall
come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of
all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special meetings may be called by the President or by five
members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility
for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon
the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the
Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the
Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the
vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he
represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their
successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become the President for the next
succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the
Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than
one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be required by the Board of
Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for
such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice
President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President during the remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of
both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the
next succeeding election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated Bar shall
be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy
therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his membership by filing a written
notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme
Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys.
Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the
enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or
disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the
Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or
Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the
funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the
discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to
make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to
be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of
which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-
exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the
Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end
shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational
meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time
and place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President,
a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in
proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each
Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the
Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of electing a Board of
Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The
Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY.
MARCIAL A. EDILLON
(IBP  Administrative  Case  No.  MDD-­‐1)  A.M.  No.  1928   August  3,  1978  

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of
the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillon to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Ruling: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

The provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS
Facts:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at
all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already.
On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that
he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

Issues:

(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.

Held:

(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and
default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment
covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from
the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited”
practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does
not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of
membership or association dues.

(2)YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule
10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merits the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age,
his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
CANON 8
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on
their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James
Grogorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00.
Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his defense, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.

Issue:

Whether the respondent encroached the professional practice of complainant.

Held:

Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with
Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance
chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence
(consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred
to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent could produce a more favourable result. Based on the foregoing,
respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the
CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect
the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession
CANON 9

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA VS. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE

A.C. No. 7269

FACTS: Complainant was the counsel for Irene Bides while Busmente was the counsel
for defendant Ulaso in a civil case involving the annulment of a deed of sale. The deed
was later annuled thereby leading to the filing of another case for ejectment against Ula
so. Neo-Lacsama alleged in the complaint against Busmente that a certain Elizabeth De
la Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in the ejectment case 9 times from
25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005, and that the court orders and notices specified
Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon veri
fication with the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Del
a Rosa was not a lawyer. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and wa
s his paralegal assistant for a few years but his employment with him ended in 2000. Fu
rther, he claimed that Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawy
er with the help of Regine Macasieb, his secretary. Busmente claimed that he did not re
present Ulaso in the ejectment case and that his signature was forged.

ISSUE: Whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her ill
egal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

RULING: Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of l
aw.

The Court explained: the lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauth
orized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the pra
ctice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The p
ermissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawa
l if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to pr
otect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves up
on a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession e
njoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make pos
sible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law make
s it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.

In this case, the Court ruled Busmente assisted in Dela Rosa's illegal practice of law. Busmente'
s office continued to receive all the notices in the ejectment case and the 7 December 2004 Ord
er of Judge Panganiban showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in th
e case. Further, the Court ruled that the counter affidavit of Ulaso proved that Busmente was th
e former's counsel. It stated that Ulaso presumed that Dela Rosa has legal qualifications to repr
esent them in their cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany t
hem and attend the hearings.

Thus, Busmentes was suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.
TAPAY VS BANCOLO
FACTS:

Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration received an
Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each
other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the
Complaint was not his. Thus, Atty.Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the said signature. This affidavit
was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature
of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s
case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.

The case was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainant alleged
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. In their Answer,
respondents admitted that due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1of the same Code, and recommended that
Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor
lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with
his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
provides:

CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST INTHE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01

A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
CANON 10

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JAMES

BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, RESPONDENT
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
FACTS: Complainant and Respondent are estranged couple with two children ages 5 and 3 who are in
the former's custody.

Sometime in December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental
and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed
complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly
granted his motion for temporary child custody but he failed to show the original copy of such.
Complainant's lawyer did not also receive any motion filed by respondent.

Upon close examination, found out that it bore two dates, sensing something amiss she refused to give
custody of the children.

In Jan. 15, 2002, respondent accompanied by armed men supposed to be NBI arrived and demanded for
the surrender of custody while the complainant and children are in the school. Complainant then sought
the assistance of the Tanjay City Police and at the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the
Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the
appellate courts resolution/order.

In order to difuse the tension complainant allow children to sleep with the respondent within the City. She
later on received information that the children were to be taken to Bacolod City which prompted her to go
to the hotel where the children are and transfered to other room.

Respondent filed with RTC Dumaguete a verified petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution
meanwhile the complainant was able to obtained a Certificaiton from the CA that no such resolution had
been issued. Respondent did not appear during the hearing.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to
enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling: Yes.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable
if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to
the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then
that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at
the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The lawyers
arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be
of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a
sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of
speech demanded of a lawyer.
ETERNAL GARDENDS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION VS SPS. LILIA
SEVILLA AND JOSE SEELIN
FACTS:

• Private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against
Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
• The trial court ruled in their favor which was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R.
No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992.
• The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for
execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.
• Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an
Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein
petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not
submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit
between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner
of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good
faith.
• On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion. Another Order was
issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Petitioner went to the CA in a petition for certiorari, which court dismissed the petition.
• The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18,
1993.
• On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G. R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. Upon finality of said
resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993.
• Private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution
before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
• Petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially granted on August 29,
1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 by Judge Emilio L.
Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were
issued.
• Petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of
Appeals, arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it
was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private
respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the
judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the
issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents title is being questioned in another case.
• CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower
court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory
• The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996.
• Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioner is bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 9297

2. WON a determination on the issue of possession is still needed
1. Yes. Since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision
rendered therein by respondent Judge. Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be
bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee
2. No. Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and
logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the
rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not
have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
3. No. The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic
against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment
in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners title which originated from
Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be
executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this
Court.

Note of Caution:

The case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the
prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution,
interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally
terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice. While lawyers
owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right,
they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
CANON 11

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST

ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, VS.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

Facts:
Atty. Almacen, a counsel for the defendant in a civil case, received a copy of the adverse
decision of the trial court and moved for its reconsideration. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
dismissed such for the reason that the motion for reconsideration served to the adverse counsel
does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and, therefore, did not interrupt
the running of the period to appeal. Consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen appealed to the Supreme Court by certiorari. The Court refused to take the case,
and by minute resolution denied the appeal. At this juncture, he gave vent to his disappointment
by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," which contain insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the Court as well as its
individual members. Instead of showing cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him, his written answer and oral arguments, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers-no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen's act constitutes a violation of his duty to give respect to the
courts.

Ruling:
An attorney does not surrender his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. It is not a whit less than a classic example
of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons
of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked.

Accordingly, Atty. Almacen was suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
KELLY R. WICKER AND ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, MAKATI,
BRANCH 134, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 112869 January 29, 1996

FACTS:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and
Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises,
Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park,
which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of
the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case
was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was
replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent
Judge Arcangel from the case. Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and
contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him and to
show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court. In a pleading entitled
"Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff
Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not
necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative
capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly Wicker. Finding petitioners' explanation
unsatisfactory, respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition
filed by complainants and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to
suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit.

In their petition before the Supreme Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos
contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for
contempt. They argue that "when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a
respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby
become guilty of contempt."

ISSUE:

Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners

liable for direct contempt.

HELD:

We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to
be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it
be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. The Court
sustained Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos cannot
evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of
his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a
lawyer which he could not overstep.

Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as

much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case."
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED  “RESTORING  INTEGRITY:  A  STATEMENT  BY  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  THE  
PHILIPPINES  COLLEGE  OF  LAW  ON  THE  ALLEGATIONS  OF  PLAGIARISM  AND  MISREPRESENTATION  IN  THE  
SUPREME  COURT”  

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 08 March 2011, EN BANC, (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves.

The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino comfort women during the
Japanese occupation, the counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’
human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement thereto
asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true
intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.

Vis-a-vis the Court’s formation of an ethics committee tasked to investigate the

veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their
respective letters to the Supreme Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of
their articles. Hence, in their articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual
slavery can be classified as crimes against humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status;
consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary stand.

In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a

statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court” (Restoring Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against
Justice del Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said
statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the
Supreme Court. The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein,
the Court believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the
Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance to such resolution was unsatisfactory,
except for one respondent.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom of
expression
2.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors

HELD:
 A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the
said pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise
to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements
that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding
the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.

The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of

expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the use of unnecessary language
which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of
the members of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.

The Show Cause Resolution does not violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors

There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the
subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who
teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even
if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

Academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The

constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s
faith in the legal profession and the justice system. The Court believes that the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force
to the academic freedom of law professors.

The Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in
the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of
their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
CANON 12
SOLEDAD NUEZ, REPRESENTED BY ANANIAS B. CO, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
FOR COMPLAINANT, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT,
RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian

represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982
she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000.
She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded
in selling the lots, but despite complainants repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the
proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action
for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

For failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and was required to pay the
principal obligation in the amount of P16,000. An alias writ of execution was issued remained
unsatisfied for P13,800. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks
drawn against his account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which
they were drawn was closed. Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf
ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct.

RULING:

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that

respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with
palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds
of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his
deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he
appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step
because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to
prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully
belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to
complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining
unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay
complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him,
respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this.
Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent
SANTIAGO V. ATTY. RAFANAN
A.C.  No.  6252,  October  5,  2004    

FACTS: This is a case for disbarment filed by complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), against respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03,
Canon 5, and Canons 12.07 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when
respondent executed an affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where
he is actively representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the hearing of the case,
respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant and after confronting the latter,
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. Respondent denied
said allegations. However, he admitted that he executed an affidavit in favor of his client and offered the
same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing his client but in his defense stated that
lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder.
Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is
very essential to the ends of justice.” The IBP Board of Governors found that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification
in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. However, the other charges
-- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of
the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: WoN a lawyer may testify on substantial matters relative to the cause of the party which he is
actively representing in a case, without violating the CPR?

HELD: YES.

Under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to
privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such rule is the
difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from
that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction,
advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.Thus,
although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause,
the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and
should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. Notwithstanding this guideline and
the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following reasons: First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every
remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in
which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake. Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent,
as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. The
Affidavit executed by Atty.Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed
out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could
not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does
not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second, paragraph (b) of
Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated
purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty,malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a
public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to befollowed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it
important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which
CANON 13

CESAR L. LANTORIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI,

RESPONDENT.
Facts:

Respondent Bunyi sent letters to complainant, and the letters showed that respondent had
the draft of the decisions in Civil Cases Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant. In addition, those letters
indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the decisions. Moreover, respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed
with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil
cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.

Ruling:

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as
follows:

3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge,

uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge
and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer
should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a
pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or
attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-
respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial
or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only
proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench
and bar.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality

to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence
the court where he had pending civil case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof.
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:

• This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his
counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. praying that:

1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court
disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

2. That the the subject Sandiganbayan resolutions be vacated and set aside;

• Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the
members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule
5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating
in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices
have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency which in effect would
mean that they have prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken
by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353
SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and
due process.

• On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying their motion to include
obviously undeniable material facts regarding Chief Justice Davide’s acts in relation
to the Proclamation of President Arroyo during EDSA 2, which would be the only
defense of Preseident Estrada, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner.
According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon the three justices of the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he
averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming
gago, and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition
thereto, remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos
and disorder.

Held:

• The Supreme Court has dismissed the foregoing petition as the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the
authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he
would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and
due process.

• Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.

• Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within
the judicial forum; he has also repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of
the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the
fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration
 clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters
pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has
strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from
further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia
appears to persist on end.

• The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our
peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.

• The attention of Atty. Paguia has been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -

What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play
were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his
petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party -
GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation
of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their
own act?

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.

Thus, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
CANON 14

SANTIAGO VS FOJAS
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995

Facts:
Complainants were officers of the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA). Salvador
commenced with the DOLE a complaint against the complainants for illegal expulsion from the union.
Med-Arbiter declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union to reinstate Salvador's name in
the roll of union members. This resolution was affirmed by the SOLE. Subsequently, Salvador filed with
the RTC a civil complaint against the complainants for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

Atty. Fojas, the complainants counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved
was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. RTC granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of
the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, RTC reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a non-extendible period of 15 days. Instead of filing an
answer, the Atty. Fojas filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having
been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the
CA. Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the Atty.
Fojas still did not file the complainants' answer hence complainants were declared in default. Atty. Fojas
then filed a motion to set aside the order of default but to no avail. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
the complainants herein to pay Salvador damages. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The complainants allege that serious misconduct of Atty. Fojas is tantamount to malpractice and
negligence in the performance of his duty to defend complainants and that Atty. Fojas either abandoned,
failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against the complainant.
That under false pretenses, Atty. Fojas assured complainants that he had already answered the
complaint only to disclose later that he never answered it because he was a very busy man.

Respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the answer but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of
a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that the case was a
"losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the
FEUFA which was declared unlawful in the final decision. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the
Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed
from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. ."

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action,
in failing to file for the complainants an answer.

Ruling:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon
14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
CANON 15

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., AND BEN A. NICOLAS VS. ATTY.

MACARIO D. ARQUILLO

A.C.  No.  6632.  August  2,  2005  

Facts:
Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the
National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein,
complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as
attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6
months. The governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.

Held:

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent
conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients’ written consent, given after a full disclosure of
the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three separate tests:

(1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is
also duty-bound to oppose it for another client;

(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any
knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (

3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to
give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine
grounded on public policy that a lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The
proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however
slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the practice
of law.
ARTEZUELA V. MADERAZO
A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002

Facts:
Echavia crashed the car he is driving which is owned by Kiyami, but was registered in
the name of Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. The
destruction of the carinderia caused the cessation its operation, resulting to her financial
dislocation. Artezuela incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped
sending her two children to collguege. Artezuela hired Maderazo in filing a damage suit against
Echavia, Villapez and Kiyami. For his services, Artezuela paid Maderazo 10,000 as attorneys
fees and 2,000 as filing fee. However, the case was dismissed, allegedly upon the instance of
the Artezuela and her husband. Because of the dismissal of the case, Artezuela filed a civil case
for damages against the Maderazo. The case was dismissed.
Artezuela filed for disbarment against the Maderazo. Artezuela argues that Maderazo
engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, Maderazo prepared
Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
Maderazo’s office. Artezuela further averred that it was Maderazo who sought the dismissal of
the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.
Maderazo denied Artezuela’s allegations. However, he admitted that Echavia’s Answer to the
Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and
having acted as counsel of Echavia.
Case was referred to IBP. IBP investigated the case. IBP found Maderazo guilty of
representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics.

Issues:
(1) Whether Maderazo violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 (conflict of interest) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
(2) Whether Maderazo had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint.

Held:
YES to both.
Maderazo was actually giving advice to Echavias but he was not the counsel of record.
Maderazo does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make
his efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record. It is enough that the
counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming
adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature
of the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. Good faith and honest
intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative. The lawyer is an
officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional
ethics.
PNB VS. ATTY. TELESFORO CEDO
A.C. NO. 3701

Facts: Respondent-lawyer was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management
Group of the complainant bank. While he was still an employee, he facilitated in arranging the
sale of a steel sheet in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for a certain amount of money and even noted
a gate pass authorizing the pull out of the sheets in a compound. When a civil action was filed
by the bank against Mrs. Ong Siy, the respondent act as the counsel for the defendant after he
resigned from the complainant bank. Similarly when PNB also file an administrative case
against one of its employees, respondent again was the counsel of the erring employee. This
prompted the complainant to file an administrative case against the respondent lawyer in
violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service

The Respondent admitted that he is the counsel for Ong Siy but only with regards the execution
pending appeal but did not participate in the main litigation. He even alleged that he never
appeared in the case of Almeda against the bank. While the law firm” Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo
and Associates” it is only Atty. Ferrer who handled the case and never been form a partnership
with Atty. Ferrer. Each of them handles their cases separately and independently.

HELD:

The court cited the case of Hilado vs. David

"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity
of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information
given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case
ofHilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of
good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice, It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. Respondent lawyer
must be suspended for 3 years violation of Canon 6 of the CPR,
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential
Commission on Good Gov’t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs.
Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all
were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings.

In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of
clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.

PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised he’ll reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33.

Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired & confederated
w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-
defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in
the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants
like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.

Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditions precedent.
However, during said proceedings, Roco didn’t refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client
involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.

In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions required by PCGG. It
held, “ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis
for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.”

ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini,
likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, assailing SB’s resolution on
essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely:

SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of agency.

SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving equal treatment

SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits
petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds,
w/ due consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners

PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not
w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected,
WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) &
THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PCGG

YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract
of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services
are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency)
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to
the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee

An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed
on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment
in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of
fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.

Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”) Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer
and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. Thus, the
Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.

The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.

Reasons advanced for the general rule:

• Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

• Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.

• Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship

• Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.

Exceptions to the gen. rule:

Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of
the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both.

Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldn’t reveal name of his client as this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: “We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to w/c
it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.”

Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
 Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule:

• if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance

• where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed & it is the identity w/c is intended to be
confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would
lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-
client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in the
case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their
client's shareholdings.

Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary
link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.

While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal
and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used
or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against
him.

The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege,
i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled
disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule in
what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against
their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his
client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination
of the relationship.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized exceptions to the
rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible
litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.
CANON 16

UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, VS.

ATTY. DANILO G. MACALINO, RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 4566 December 10, 2004

FACTS

An ice plant corporation owned a parcel of land leased to a corporation dealing in cars and motors vehicles. A dispute
regarding the lease contract arose and led to a lawsuit. The ice plant hired Atty. Macalino as counsel. The petitioner
fishing corporation substituted the ice plant as they were merged. Atty. Macalino advised the fishing corporation to
severe all contractual relationship with the cars dealer to evict the latter from the leased property. Upon that advice,
the lease was terminated. Atty. Macalino also advised the Petitioner to return the guarantee deposit to the lessee
cars dealer. The Petitioner gave a crossed check payable to the cars dealer. Atty. Macalino volunteered to bring this
check to the cars dealer himself to make them accept it. He sent his representative to get the check from the
Petitioner. Atty. Macalino represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check to the cars dealer. The suit
between the Petitioner and the cars dealer continued for several years while Petitioner changed counsels, replacing
Atty. Macalino with someone else. The suit was amicably settled, and in the process, the cars dealer informed
Petitioner that it never received the guarantee deposit made through the check. The cars dealer never received the
check. Petitioner asked Atty. Macalino to explain but the latter never responded. Hence, Petitioner sued Atty.
Macalino for damages for misappropriation. An employee of the bank testified that the owner of the account where
the crossed check was deposited is Atty. Macalino.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Macalino abused the fiduciary relationship with his client.

RULING

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It
is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of
the client".15 So it is that the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

The Canon of Professional Ethics is even more explicit when it states:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstances be commingled
with his own or be used by him. (par. 11)

His repeated failure without any valid reason to comply with the orders of the Court requiring him to comment on the
complaint lends credence to the allegations thereof and manifests his tacit admission of the same. A lawyer, under
his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
client. It is clear, therefore, that respondent, by depositing the check in his own account and subsequently deceiving
his client into believing that he delivered the same to Wheels is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not merely to himself but to the noble profession to which
he belongs
ROSARIO JUNIO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SALVADOR M.
GRUPO, RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 5020. December 18, 2001]

FACTS:
Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be used in the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no reason at all,
Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so the property was forfeited. Because of this, Junio wanted the money back but Grupo
refused to refund. Instead, Grupo requested that he use the money to help defray his children’s educational expenses. It was a
personal request to which Grupo executed a PN. He maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very close since Junio’s
sisters served as Grupo’s household helpers for many years. Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was
purely gratuitous or “an act of a friend for a friend” with “consideration involved.” He concluded that there was no atty-client
relationship existing between them.

The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility which
forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

Respondent takes refuge in the intimate and close relationship existing between himself and the complainants family on the basis of
which his legal services were purely gratuitous or simply an act of a friend for a friend with no consideration involved. Unfortunately,
his efforts to redeem the foreclosed property, as already stated, did not produce the desired result because the mortgagee would
not budge anymore and would not accept the sum offered.

Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client [relationship] existing between them. Rather,
right from the start[,] everything was sort of personal, he added.

Granting to the respondent the benefit of the doubt, we shall assume that there was in reality a loan in the amount of
P25,000.00. This is likewise confirmed by the execution of a promissory note on 12 December 1996 by the respondent who
undertook to pay Mrs. Junio on or before January 1997 (Annex B of complaint). Moreover, the demand letter of 12 March 1998
(Annex B) mentions of reimbursement of the sum received and interest of 24% per annum until fully paid giving the impression that
the funds previously intended to be used for the repurchase of a certain property (Annex A of complaint) was converted into a loan
with the consent of the complainant who gave way to the request of the respondent to help defray his childrens educational
expenses (par. 8 of Answer).

Be that as it may, the duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken. Having utilized the sum to fulfill his urgent need for
some money, it is but just and proper that he return the amount borrowed together with interest.Five (5) years had already passed
since respondent retained the cash for his own personal use. But notwithstanding the same and his firm promise to pay Mrs. Junio
on or before January 1997 he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to his creditor[,] although admittedly there
w[ere] occasions when complainants sister came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant, worse, the passage
of time made respondent somehow forgot about the obligation.

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility). This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over the client.This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an
immense ascendancy over the complainant who, as well as two of his sisters, had served respondents family as household helpers
for many years.

Respondents liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latters interests are protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondents liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any
security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could
not pay the loan because circumstances . . . did not allow it and that, because of the passage of time, he somehow forgot about his
obligation only underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound to
[8]
observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of complainants parents, he
did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has no merit. As
[9]
explained in Hilado v. David,

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established . . . .

WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and orders him
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the amount
of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed from December 12, 1996.
PELMOKA V. JUDGE DIAZ, JR.

Flaviano A. Pelmoka charged Judge Felix T. Diaz, Jr. with serious misconduct in connection with a
civil case. The charge against Judge Diaz is for gross ignorance of the law and judicial proceedings;
failure to protect the complainant's charging lien as one of the lawyers who intervened in the
aforementioned civil case; and partiality, bias prejudice or malicious motive.

The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien for his
attorney's fees when he allowed plaintiffs to withdraw their share from the said deposit. He likewise
charged respondent judge with bias and partiality when he allowed all the parties to withdraw their
respective shares while the complainant was not allowed to do the same in so far as his charging
lien is concerned.

Respondent judge, in his answer, stated that he allowed the parties, including defendant Ester
Garampil who is not a compulsory heir, to withdraw their respective shares from the cash portion of
the estate in order to implement the compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and their
respective lawyers.

With respect to the charge of the complainant that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging
lien or f& attorney's fees, the respondent judge explained that he did not grant complainant's motion
for payment of his professional fees because he could not ascertain the exact amount of
complainant's just, reasonable and fair fee, considering that his claim of P79,186.00 was contested
by the plaintiffs as being exorbitant.

Deputy Court Administrator Mendoza has assessed the charges against Judge Diaz in the light of
the record as follows:

The respondent judge was likewise justified in granting the motion of the parties to withdraw their
respective shares from the cash portion of the estate. The respondent judge only implemented the
compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and signed by all their respective lawyers
including complainant herein. With respect to complainant's professional fees, it was specified in the
compromise agreement that the parties would be separately responsible for the payment of the fees
of their respective lawyers. Since the plaintiffs (complainant's clients), refused to pay complainant's
claim for attorney's fee in the amount of P79,186.00 on the ground that the same is exorbitant, the
remedy of the complainant is to file a separate action for recovery of his fees where the parties win
be afforded the chance to prove their respective claims and defenses.

Issue:

WON respondent judge failed to protect the complainant's right to collect his professional fees

Ruling:

The respondent should not have allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw their shares from
the cash deposit without extending ample protection to the latter's claim. This error was compounded
by his order allowing even Ester Garampil to withdraw her share when she did not sign the
compromise agreement of July 1, 1981.

It was grossly unfair for the respondent to leave the complainant holding an empty bag, so to speak,
after he had rendered his professional services as counsel to the plaintiffs. True it is that the
compromise agreement stipulates that the parties shall be separately responsible for the payment of
the fees for their respective lawyers; nevertheless, the respondent should not have improvidently
allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw their shares without first determining his
reasonable fees.

A lawyer has the right to claim the fruits of his labor. He has the equitable right to be paid his fees
out of the judgment which he has obtained from a court of justice. Any allegation of exorbitant or
DANIEL LEMOINE VS. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR.
A.C. No. 5829 October 28, 2003

Facts:

Complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance, the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As
complainant’s claim was rejected, his friend, Garcia, arranged for the engagement of respondent’s services.

Respondent advised complainant, that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being
recovered, an advance payment of P50,000.00;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every
court hearings;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . .
and other miscellaneous but related expenses.

The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s conformity, he not having
agreed therewith.

Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant’s claim, to which respondent confirmed his acceptance of
its offer to settle the claim of complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage which is P525,000.00."

When complainant left for France, he signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing
respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of complainant’s
claim as well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and receive payment" from it. The Special Power of
Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check
payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim.7 The check was received by
respondent.

Complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the same month. On
inquiry about the status of his claim, respondent said that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and
that it was still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it forP350,000.00 representing
fifty percent thereof.

On complainant’s personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that his claim had long been
settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before. Complainant demanded from
respondent the proceeds of his claim.

Respondent acknowledged having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained,
however, as attorney’s lien pending complainant’s payment of his attorney’s fee, equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of
entire amount collected. Respondent protested what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior"
complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at respondent’s office. Respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the
insurance claim and complainant instituted the administrative action.

Complainant alleged that there was ‘irregularity’ with the check," it having been issued payable to him, but "and/or
AMADEO BALON" was therein intercalated after his (complainant’s) name.

Respondent asserted that his continued retention of the proceeds of complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his
lien for unpaid attorney’s fees. He expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once he got paid
fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by
practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his attorney’s fees. He assert that his
inability to contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to encash the check and keep the
proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor.

Complainant stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent’s proposal that he be paid 25% of the actual
amount collected for his legal services.1.nét

Respondent declared that he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so
respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less attorney’s fees and
expenses. Respondent alleged that there was no need for written memo since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-
Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding complainant’s claim.

Respondent declared that his retention of complainant’s money was justified in light of his apprehension that
complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the Philippines, might leave the country anytime without
settling his professional fees.
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in
him.

RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.

RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

A lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment
entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received
for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand. Respondent
breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant’s insurance claim, he did not report it to
complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect
to complainant.

By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done
on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds
thereof.

A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and
devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.

That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of his duty to account for
it. The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of
attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being
unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his
fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the
amount of such fees.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney’s fees. After he received the check and after
complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant
communicated to him. The intercalation of respondent’s name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable
solely in favor ofcomplainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.

Respondent’s threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and
justness.

Respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice
of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED.
NAVARRO VS. SOLIDUM, JR.
A.C.  No.  9872,  January  28,  2014  

Facts:
Complainant Presbitero engaged the services of respondent to follow up the release of the payment
for the former’s property which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department
of Agrarian Reform and to represent her in a case against PNB who has a claim on the property.
Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to handle
the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses
for the registration of the property.

Respondent also obtained loans from Navarro and Presbitero on different occasions. For each loan
they executed a MOA which provides that the obligation must be secured by a particular real estate
mortgage owned by respondent. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to
cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered checks
to them.

However, respondent failed to pay the obligation. The checks issued could no longer be negotiated
because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed.

Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants
but he could not account for all of them. Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-
hectare lot, claimed that respondent received P265,000 from her. Respondent countered that
P105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for P15,000.
Respondent claimed that he paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but
again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the
registration of Yulo’s property. As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory
hearing that respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records
do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the
money he received from Presbitero.

Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, the client.

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that
the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually
questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed
on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored
because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case,
CANON 17

ROSACIA V. BULALACAO
Background Facts of the Case:
1. By virtue of a written Agreement, Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of Tacma Corporation.
2. Later on, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was
severed as shown by another agreement of even date
3. After almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils.,
Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the
purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal.
4. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by
filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf.
3

5. Because of this, Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for disbarment
Bulalacao for breach of lawyer-client trust even after the termination of their relation.
6. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
7. The IBP investigating commissioner found that respondent breached his oath of office and
accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months
which was later on adopted by the board.
Issue presented before us:
8. The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for
representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their
attorney-client relationship.
Ruling of the Court:
1. Yes, the respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for three months.
2. Respondent even does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent
admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his
4
attorney's oath". However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to
reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition
3. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not
good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former
5
client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. It
behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration
6
of justice. The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree.
7
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and
8
confidence reposed in him. An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No
opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the
confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the
loss of the confidence of the people.
LORENZANA FOOD CORP. V. ATTY. DARIA
A.C. No. 2736

Facts:

1. Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981 as
its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later.
2. On May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
other monetary claims against complainant before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and
Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the
requirement that position papers be submitted.
3. During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset to
June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date
respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the
Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 28, 1983. Respondent received
on June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).
4. In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting
the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983. Faced with a conflicting schedule, respondent decided
to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case.
5. However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his
secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement. Respondent's
telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June
28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's complaint and
affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper.
6. After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay
Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol's evidence alone.
7. For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol
case which resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter,
the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen
him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second
hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not.

8. With regard to his second non-appearance, the respondent justified his absence by claiming that
he had another hearing on the same date and that he told his secretary to call up the Office of the
Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed.

9. While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes,
issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 to its employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring
him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash
advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 was issued this time by complainant's
internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant's president, summing up San
Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of this
memorandum. The executive committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on
his unliquidated advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan
under preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984

10. San Juan failed to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the
assistance of respondent in the preparation of his counter-affidavit in January 1985.
Respondent prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it. San Juan then submitted his
counter-affidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal

Issue:

1. Can the respondent extricate himself from the charge of negligence since he was able to
persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings thereby said charge should
be considered moot and academic already?
1. Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter
cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the
two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have
been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of
complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-
counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he
had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier. From
the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

2. Yes. Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the
counter-affidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his
(respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counter-affidavit
to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him;
and that San Juan filed the counter-affidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name
and signature still on it. It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's
explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the
complaint.

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his
former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit
him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of
negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his
former client's confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
STEPHAN BRUNET AND VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET VS ATTY.
RONALD L. GUAREN
A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014

Facts:
Spouses Brunet alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of
a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a
fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding;
that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the
title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling
of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of
exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver;
that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always
reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was in
progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they
demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the
same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to
answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship
between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case
pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Ronald admitted charging P10,000.00 as acceptance fee from the spouses,
as well as receiving the P1,000.00 and P6,000.00. He denied, however that the
acceptance included the expenses relative to the titling of the lot; that their
agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the spouses paid in full
the acceptance fees; that he did not take all the documents pertinent to the titling
of the lot; that the special appearance he made was only made in behalf of Atty
Ervin Estandarte, the counsel on record who failed to attend the said hearing.

Issue:
Whether or not resondent violated the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00
as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation
to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
CANON 18
CESARIO ADARNE VS. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA
[A.C. No. 801 . June 27, 1978.]
Facts:
At the hearing of civil case for forcible entry before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
respondent attorney, who was then present in court to attend the trial of an electoral case, to
appear as counsel for them and ask for the postponement of the trial, was prevailed upon the
complainant to appear for him and his co-defendants and to ask for the postponement of the
trial as their counsels of record had not arrived. Respondent, who is a third degree cousin of the
complainant, agreed, and entered a special appearance and was able to obtain favorable action
on a motion to dismiss. On appeal, however, this order was set aside and the case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. At the hearing of the case where
respondent was again requested by complainant to appear in his behalf, respondent argued that
defendants be allowed to file an action for quieting of title to be heard jointly with the pending
action for forcible entry. On the day of the scheduled hearing of both cases, the defendants
were declared in default for non-appearance, a decision was rendered and a writ of execution
therefor was issued. Because of this, respondent was charged with gross negligence,
misconduct and malpractice.
Issue:
WON respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misconduct and malpractice for failure to give
his entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client,
and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the judgment by default rendered against complainant cannot be
attributed to respondent attorney as the blame lies with the former for having engaged the
services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had
given them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. To add to
the confusion, the complainant had also requested the clerk of court of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to
him. He also filed a motion by himself, 11 thus implying that he was handling his case
personally. Respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a
special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle
his case. It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief. An
attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care
and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like
any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as
long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. Finding no
convincing proof to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney, the administrative complaint
filed against him was dismissed.
Administrative complaint dismissed.
CARLOS B. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.
VITAN, RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 5835. April 15, 2005]

A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Indeed, it is
his sworn duty not to delay no man for money or malice; and to conduct himself in a proper
manner not only to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias Vitan for
gross negligence.
The complaint alleges that sometime in June 2001, complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services of
respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his
sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter’s niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide
with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ordering the partition of the
properties left by complainants brother Damaso B. Reyes; and that respondent, after receiving the amount
of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainants case.
Complainants referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued several orders to respondent directing him to
file his answer to the complaint, but he failed to do so. He only sent his secretary to represent him during the
proceedings.
On April 18, 2001,[3] IBP Commissioner Navarro submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report
and Recommendation quoted as follows:
“…As it is, nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his client for the legal fees he
collected which was paid by the complainant as reflected in the receipts issued by the respondent in
handwritten forms and signed by him.
Respondent not only violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Cannon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and did not inform complainant the status of his case but
also disregarded the orders of the Commission without reasons which amounted to utter disrespect of
authority and unethical conduct in the practice of his profession, thus, should be sanctioned…”
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Vitan violated Rule 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES. When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood
that he agreed to take up the latter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with competence
and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion.

The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More
specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights.[4] An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the
client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days from
VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ V. AGLERON SR.
(A.C.    No.  5359,  March  10,  2014)  

Herein petitioner, Ermelinda, is the surviving spouse of Felix Dominguez who died in a vehicular
accident with the truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Ermelinda decided to file a case
against the Municipality, so she hired the services of Atty. Agleron. In the occasions, Ermelinda
gave Atty. Agleron money amounting, in total, to Php10,050.00. After the lapse of 4 years, no
complaint was ever filed by Atty. Agleron. He attributes this non-filing to the alleged non-
payment of Ermelinda of the filing fee and 30% of his attorney’s fees, but Atty. Agleron admits
that he in fact received the Php10,050 and it is deposited in a bank pending the filing of the
complaint.

The IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Agleron liable and suspend the latter, which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court with modification as to the period of suspension. The IBP Board
of Governors cited Rule 180.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. In this case, Atty. Agleron neglected the legal matter entrusted
to him by Ermelinda. Atty. Agleron claims that he was not able to file due to the lack of filing fee
which the Supreme Court brushed off by saying that he could have easily called up Ermelinda
and raised such issue. The SC also continued by saying that this Rule should always be
practiced regardless whether the services of the lawyer was for a fee or not. In this case, the
allegation of Atty. Agleron that he was not paid the 30% of his attorney’s fees would have,
nonetheless, not exempt him from the responsibility enshrined under the Rule.

SC imposed suspension of 3 months.

CANON 19

NICANOR GONZALES VS. ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN

Adm. Case No. 4380 / 249 SCRA 276 October 13, 1995

FACTS
An administrative case was filed by Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B.Pantanosas against Atty. Miguel
Sabacajan. In a verified complaint, it alleged that complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants’ owner’s duplicate of title covering their lands, Transfer
Certificate of Titles were entrusted to the office secretary of the respondent who in turn entrusted the
same to respondent. However the latter admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in
his custody and has even shown the same the complainant Salud but when demanded to deliver the said
titles to the complainant in a formal demand letter, the respondent refused without any justification to give
their titles and when confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court
even in the Honorable Supreme Court. That respondent’s dare or challenge is a manifestation of his
arrogance taking undue advantage of his legal profession over innocence and ignorance of the
complainants, one of whom is his blood relative, his aunt, for which complainants shudder with mental
anguish. In spite of repeated demands, the respondent still refused to surrender the said titles to the
rightful owners, the complainants which act is tantamount to willful and malicious defiance of legal and
moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law
and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants.

In an answer, the respondent admitted having met Salud but claims that, to his recollection, “Nicanor
Gonzales/Serdan” has never been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged anyone to
file a case in any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant
Pantanosas to his client, Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the
segregation of the titles, two of which are the subject of the instant case. Respondent likewise submitted
xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates of title of
complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. However, an examination of
the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent’s claim. In fact, the two sets of certificates
of title appear to be entirely different from each other.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Sabacajan has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for his refusal
without just cause to return/give to complainants their certificates of titles?
HELD
YES.
The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of
lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary
obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since
there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a
debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody
of said certificates of title.

As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the
interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead
of merely resorting to unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants.
Also, he cannot be unaware of the imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that
would cause injustice to the adversaries of his client.

Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the
laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of
titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to
impress the latter of his power to do so.

In addition, Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely
skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same.
CANON 20
LEVISTE V CA
FACTS:

On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the
Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late
Maxima C. Reselva. It was agreed that the contingent fee would be 35% of the property Rosa will receive
upon the probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario,
informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to “conflicting interest.”

On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for
Professional Services but was soon denied since he had not filed a claim for attorney’s fees nor recorded
his attorney’s lien. On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a formal statement of Claim for Attorney’s Fees
and Recording of Attorney’s Lien.

Despite the denial of his motion to intervene, Atty. Leviste kept on receiving copies of the court’s
orders, as well the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. On
November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a motion To
Withdraw Petition for Probate. They alleged that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise and agreed
that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the
properties left by the decedent. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public policy. The court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity
were not satisfied as only two witnesses.

Atty. Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest.
Atty. Leviste opposed the motion claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought
to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner but was denied. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, he suffered the same fate. Leviste brought this case to the Supreme Court
asserting Art. 1052 of the Civil Code: ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of
his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the
persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong.

Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35%
thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect
his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client’s refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal
provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The
payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will.
Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney
Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Also, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of
the late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract for contingent attorney’s fees neither gives, nor purports to
give, to the lawyer any right whatsoever, personal or real, in his client’s share of the properties. The
amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. SC claimed that the lower court did not
err in holding that notice of an attorney’s lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in
lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is
awarded a certain sum by the court. DENIED for lack of merit
LICUDAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 91958 January 24, 1991)
Facts:
The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to
review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the
respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair
advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by
him after the trial court awarded him attorney's
fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of
the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood and affinal relationship
between him and his clients.
The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have
won the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer.
They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages
considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is
claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would
also go to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of
usufruct for ten (10) years.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the
nature of contingent fees?
Held:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September
12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Ratio Decidendi:
The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the
charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when
engaged as counsel. Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer fees are fair and reasonable,
Rule 20- 01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the
said issue. A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which partly states that:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable
ANA F. RETUYA VS. ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ

Ana F. Retuya filed a claim for workmen's compensation against the employer of her husband
who died. The decision awarded her P8,792.10 consisting of (a) P6,000 as compensation
benefits, (b) P2,292.10 for medical and hospitalization expenses, (c) P200 as burial expenses
and (d) P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Iñego Gorduiz. The employer proposed to compromise
the claim by paying only one-half of the total award. Ana accepted the proposal. After she had
cashed the check, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee. Then, unexpectedly she
was served with a warrant of arrest for estafa. It turned out that Atty. Gorduiz executed an
affidavit stating that Ana had misappropriated his attorney's fees amounting to three hundred
pesos and that he had demanded payment of the amount from her but, she refused to make
payment and instead, she went to Cebu and starved there for a long time. The estafa case was
not tried. Atty. Erasmo M. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty. Gorduiz the sum of five
hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted. The estafa case was
dismissed but inspite of it, Ana felt aggrieved by the proceedings therein and she asked for the
disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag. Retuya testified that she was
willing to pay Gorduiz six hundred fifty pesos as his attorney's fee but he demanded a bigger
amount. He lodged a complaint for estafa against her and was arrested. As already stated
above, the estafa case was later dismissed when Ana paid Gorduiz sum of five hundred pesos.
Gorduiz denied that he demanded as attorney's fees an amount higher than three hundred
pesos. He explained that he filed the estafa case because after Ana had received payment of
the award, she did not turn over to him the attorney's fees of three hundred pesos in spite of her
promises to pay the same and his demands for payment.

HELD:

Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed
misappropriation of his attorney's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled him
and, therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he had filed
a suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is from the practice of law for a period of six months counted
from notice of this decision. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar
Confidant's office.
RAMOS VS NGASEO
Facts:
Ramos engaged the services of Atty Ngaseo in a case involving a parcel of land. The decision was
adverse to them in the trial court. However, Atty Ngaseo filed the appeal 3 days after the lapse of
reglementary period. Thereafter, Ramos received demand letter from Atty Ngaseo asking for the delivery
of 1000 sq. m piece of land. Ramos alleges that he did not promise to pay Ngaseo 1000 sq m of land as
appearance fees. Ngaseo also threatened Ramos that he would file a case if he would not settle his
obligation. Ngaseo alleges that when Ramos went to his office, he was assisted by his brother because
he was deaf and could only speak Tagalog haltingly. Respondent alleged that the complainant offered, in
lieu of the appearance fee the 1000 sq m of land from the subject matter of the case if they win or from
another land if they lose. He also claimed that after the trial court dismissed the case, he filed a timely
notice of appeal and moved to be discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. But Ramos
offered to double the piece of land he promised. The CA rendered decision in favor of Ramos with
regards to the disputed land which became final. Thereafter, Ramos allegedly failed to contact Ngaseo,
which compelled him to send demand letter. Ramos filed complain before IBP against Ngaseo for
violation of CPR for demanding the delivery of the piece of land subject of litigation. IBP found him guilty.

Issue: WON Ngaseo violated CPR

Held:
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or
assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by
virtue of their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private
individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. However, the said prohibition
applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client’s property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the
case, there is no violation.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only
made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for
delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Moreover, the demand letter was made long after the
judgment of civil case. Still, Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal
profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ AND SPS
LARRAZABAL
Facts:
Maximo Abarquez was plaintiff in a case for annulment of sale of a parcel of land against his sister
Agripina. Since he had neither properties nor money to pay his counsel Atty. Alberto Fernandez, he
contracted with the latter for contingent fees as payment for his services. The consideration for such
contract was half of the land to be awarded to Abarquez. Abarquez was able to annul the sale. Thereafter,
Atty. Fernandez waited for Abarquez to comply with his obligation under the document executed by him
by delivering the one-half (1/2) portion of the said parcels of land. Abarquez refused to deliver the portion.
Instead, he offered 2/3 of the parcel for sale to the Sps. Larrazabal. Atty. Fernandez immediately filed
with the trial court a motion to annotate his attorney's lien on the TCT of the property and by notifying the
prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of land. He also filed an affidavit of
adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Cebu. By virtue of the registration of said affidavit, the
adverse claim for one-half (1/2) of the lots was annotated on the TCT. Despite these developments,
Abarquez still sold 2/3 of the land to the spouses. When the land was sought to be registered, the
adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This
annotation was subject to a cancellation proceedings filed by the spouses which was denied by the lower
court. They appealed the decision immediately to the Supreme Court. The spouses contend that a
contract for the contingent fee herein violates Article 1491 (5) of the NCC because it involves an
assignment of a property subject of litigation.

Issue: WON the contract for a contingent fee is prohibited by the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and
Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Held:

No. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer and his client, of property
which is the subject of litigation. In other words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of
the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. A contract for a
contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the property in
litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the attorney's fees
of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Abarquez might recover from his share in the
lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Therefore, the transfer actually takes effect
after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property in question. Neither does the contract violate the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Canon 13 of the Canons expressly recognizes contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10. While
Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ". . . any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allows a reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A
contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances
of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." In the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in
the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the
court will amply protect him.
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES CADAVEDO ET AL. V.
VICTORIANO LACAYA
G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014

FACTS: The Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter
parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte.
They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to
the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames. The present
controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC against the
spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter
failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the
services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was
substituted by Atty. Lacaya. On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to
assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses
Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation
specifically reads: 10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a
lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will
pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees. Eventually Atty.Lacaya represented the Cadavedo
spouses I two other cases in connection with the subject lot. On appeal to the CA the appellate
court granted attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty.
Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00 ISSUE:
Whether or not the award by the CA of attorey's fees is valid.

HELD: No. The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is void; the
petitioners are entitled to recover possession. The written agreement providing for a contingent
fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement providing for one- half of the subject lot.
Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.33 A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is
subject of the judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in
litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the
following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses
Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the
RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and
the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after,
the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took
possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty.
Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.
CANON 21

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY,

RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 1890. August 7, 2002]

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty.
Rafael G. Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who
was privy to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they
parted ways because of politics and respondent's overweening political ambitions in 1964,
respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of
confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise
harassing him at every turn.

Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to

Specify His Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential
information or intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which
he allegedly used against complainant when the relationship terminated.

Issue : was there a violation of the attorney-client relationship?

Ruling: YES,

A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of
the attorney-client relation As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant
failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is
unavailing to help respondent's cause for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry
of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainants cause. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition
precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance
the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what
they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation
of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his
new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the
attorneys inaccurate version of the facts that came to him x x x x

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice x x x x It is founded on principles of
public policy, on good taste x x x x [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
CANON 22

MONTANO V IBP
FACTS:

The complainant Felicisimo M. Montano hired the services of Atty. Juan S.

Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending
before the Court of Appeals docketed wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-
appellant.

The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty
percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining
balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the
amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney’s fee.

Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief
and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the
termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.

Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demanded
payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do
so, respondent lawyer withdraw his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his
prior knowledge and/or conformity.

Thus this complaint charging respondent with misconduct and praying that he be
“sternly dealt with administratively.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed misconduct and violated provisions of the

CPR.

HELD:

Yes. The Court finds respondent’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he
may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,
under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as
complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted
honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well
of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4
of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the Code.

The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum
ELMER CANOY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ,
RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 5485 March 16, 2005

Facts:

Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) services were engaged by Elmer Canoy (Canoy), who
was illegally dismissed by his employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The latter
submitted all important files necessary for the establishment of the case. After the filing
thereof, Canoy made several trips to Atty. Ortiz office to no avail. His last trip prompted
him to follow the case up with the NLRC by himself. He was aghast to discover that the
case was already dismissed two years before.

In his defense, Atty. Ortiz commented that he had the intention of filing a motion to enter
a compromise agreement. Unfortunately, he was not able to do so because of his tight
schedule, being a newly-elected Councilor of Bacolod City.

Issue:
1. WON Atty. Ortiz failed to exercise the degree of competence and diligence required
of him in prosecuting his clients & his withdrawal of service was for a good cause and
with notice to client.

HELD:
Atty. X should be suspended from the practice of law.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He is expected to be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. Moreover, he is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that;

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.

Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer

lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

Here, Atty. Ortiz already took up the cause of his client. In doing so, he impliedly
imposed upon himself the legal obligation to champion said cause until its termination
with competence and diligence. Such competence requires that he does not neglect any
legal matter entrusted in him. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

Being elected to a public office is not enough cause to leave one's client in
the dark. Such act does not only erode the public's confidence in the lawyer, in
particular, but also in the judiciary, in general. Hence, Atty. X must be held liable. The
his/her services. Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective
until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that
purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the
adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however,
cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz
claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was
informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were
true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper
had not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible
of Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients
whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele.
Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill
afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will
not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent
acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal
representation. They deserve quality representation as well.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the
same negligence will be dealt with more severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY AND PROCEDURE AGAINST LAWYERS

BENGCO V.BERNARDO
(A.C. No. 6368)

Facts: This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Bernardo. Complainants alleged that Atty.
Bernardo wilfully and with intent to defraud the complainants. Atty. Bernardo, with one Magat,
connived in defrauding the Bengcos to give the former Php495,000.00 for them to be able to
expedite the titling of the land of the Miranda’s in Tagaytay. Atty. Bernardo even represented
that he had connections in the CENRO, DENRO, NAMREA and Register of Deeds that will help
them expedite the titling. A further representation made by Atty. Bernardo was that he was,
according to him, the lawyer of Wiliam Gatchalian who was the prospective buyer, after the land
would already have a title. All the representations were allegedly made with the knowledge of it
falsity. In the said disbarment case, Atty. Bernardo requested multiple times to extend his period
to answer but when, finally, a mandatory conference was called by the Commisioner, Atty.
Bernardo never showed up.

Simultaneous with the disbarment case was a criminal case filed in court for Estafa, which
ended with the conviction of Atty. Bernardo and Magat.

One of the defences of Atty. Bernardo was that the action was already prescribed because the
alleged act was committed on 1997 but the action was only filed on 2004.

Issue: WON Atty. Bernardo is liable for the acts commited.

Ruling:

The SC emphasized the duty of every lawyer not just to maintain legal proficiency but also high
standards of morality, honesty and integrity, since in that case the peoples faith and confidence
of the legal system is ensured. Under Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer should not do acts primarily to solicit legal business and a lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services, respectively.
The act of Atty. Bernardo in making representations that he can expedite the titling of the land
for Php495,000.00 is a blatant violation of the rule. Much more, the wilful act of deceiving the
Bengcos is an express violation of the rule.

SC said that the practice of law is not a enterprise. It is primarily for public service, more than
anything. Furthermore, the SC took the failure of Atty. Bernardo to immediately file his answer
and his failure to appear in the mandatory conference is showing of his little regard to the legal
system, a system that he took oath to protect. The SC suspended Atty. Bernardo for 1 year.
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE VS. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO
A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.

Facts:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an
affair with Carmelita Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while
Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results. Zaguirre then
got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter. The latter, who was already a lawyer,
notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not
materialize after the birth of the child. The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral
Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and
agrees to support her. In his defense, the latter presented different certificates
appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character. His wife
even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father
despite the affair. More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court,
Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a
photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to
December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making
him punishable of Indefinite Suspension.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty
of gross immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite
Suspension. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement
recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain
unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a
noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-
marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that
"men by nature are polygamous," and that what happened between them was "nothing
but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the
reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the
community is a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite
suspension to a definite suspension of two years. Furthermore, the Court noted that
Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper
court in a proper case.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN VS. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS ET AL
[G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.]
Facts:
Petitioner filed a case for contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and other respondents, including media
groups for violating the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for
indirect contempt of court. Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before
this Court, which case is still pending. Petitioner alleged that respondent media groups posted, published,
broadcasted and discussed on national television the disbarment case against petitioner, including its
principal points. Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential
nature of disbarment proceedings. He also alleged that opinion writers wrote about and commented on
the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and personal reputation to attack. Respondents,
in their comment, denied the allegations that they conspired with Atty. Quinsayas in disseminating the
details of the disbarment complaint against him. The alleged that the disbarment complaint was posted,
published, broadcasted and discussed on national television without any unfair, critical, and untruthful
comment and that they acted in good faith and without malice.
Issue:
WON respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt
for indirect contempt of court.
Ruling:
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in
other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free
from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation
of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable.
Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment
or both at the discretion of the Court
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are
confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however,
the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it
arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The Court explained that the public's primary interest is in the event; the
public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to
absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and
because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members
of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until their final
determination. Only the final order of this Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

On the other hand, Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the
VILLALON, JR. V. IAC
G.R. No. 73751 September 24, 1986

Facts:
A civil case for annulment of a deed of sale, among others, was filed by Neval et al
against Atty. Villalon. Previously, Neval et al also filed a disbarment proceeding against
Atty. Villalon. During the trial of the civil case, Atty. Villalon introduced in evidence some
of Neval et al’s testimonies in the disbarment proceeding which were allegedly
inconsistent with their testimonies in the civil case for the purpose of impeaching their
testimonies. The trial court granted the Motion to Strike filed by Neval et al on the
ground that its admission would violate the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings;
and that the same cannot be waived.
Issue: WON the attorney subject of a disbarment proceeding may waive his right to its
confidentiality and thus present the inconsistent testimonies therein in a civil case.

Held:
Yes. That is a defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 providing:
Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.-A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the
witnesses, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense.
Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. -Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony,
the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times
and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so; allowed to explain them If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them .
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to
impeach the credibility of their adverse parties’ witnesses (granted under Secs. 15 & 16
of R. 132) by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent
with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are
material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment
proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners’
favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said deed
of absolute sale is sought.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except
for the final order which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privileged/ right
which may be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose
personal and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that
rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others.In
fact, the Court also notes that even private respondents’ counsel touched on some
matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and which were the
subject of cross examination.
PLAZA VS. AMAMIO
Facts:

1. The complainant alleges that sometime in the first week of July 2007, he heard that some of the
personnel of RTC (Branch 26) were planning to hold a Sara Lee party in the Argao Hall of Justice
and that upon learning of the plan, he informed the personnel of the said court about
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 prohibiting the use of the Halls of Justice for residential or
commercial purposes.
2. The complainant claims that in the morning of July 14, 2007, a Saturday, the security guard on
duty, Mr. Roger O. Jimenez, telephoned him with the information that there were persons from
Sara Lee who wanted to enter the Argao Hall of Justice to put up the decorations, sound system
and catering equipment for the Sara Lee party. The complainant states that he directed Mr.
Jimenez not to allow the persons to enter the premises. He then called up Atty. Amamio to inform
her of the situation and of the infraction that would be committed should the Sara Lee party push
through. The complainant alleges that Atty. Amamio insisted that she had authorized the Sara
Lee party and raffle draw.

3. The complainant then recounts the events that transpired as recorded in the security logbook of
the Argao Hall of Justice x x x. In the logbook, Mr. Jimenez wrote that at around 11:05 in the
morning of July 14, 2007, he received a telephone call from Ms. Vasquez approving the use of
the entrance lobby for the raffle draw which she claimed was authorized by Atty. Amamio.
According to the entries in the logbook, the raffle draw started at around 2:00 p.m. and ended at
5:00 p.m., with fifty-one (51) participants attending the event.

4. The complainant adds that even the security guards on duty who recorded the Sara Lee event in
the logbook were later subjected to x x x harassment by the respondents who questioned the
guards [as to] why the said event was recorded in the logbook. He claims that Atty. Amamio even
reprimanded the guards x x x, castigating the latter for also jotting down in the logbook court
personnel who were not in uniform.

5. The complainant stresses that holding the party and raffle draw inside the Argao Hall of Justice
was a clear violation of Administrative Circular 3-92 and had exposed the properties and records
contained within it to risk of damage and loss.

6. The respondents do not deny that they allowed the holding of the Sara Lee raffle draw on July 14,
2007 at the ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice, but only after respondents Amamio
and Vasquez had fully discussed the matter upon receipt of the letter dated June 4, 2007 of Mrs.
Virginia C. Tecson, business manager of the Fuller Life Direct Selling and Personal Collection,
requesting permission to hold the raffle draw of Sara Lee at the Argao Hall of Justice.
7. The respondents argue that similar activities had been held before at the Argao Hall of Justice. They said
that during the fiesta of Argao in September 2006, a stage for beauty pageant was put up right at the
entrance of the Argao Hall of Justice.

8. The respondents also claim that at the Cebu City Hall of Justice, raffle draws were being
conducted regularly and that the latest, which was held on March 30, 2007, was sponsored by the
very same people from Sara Lee. The respondents contend that the prizes to this raffle draw,
which included a multicab, were displayed on the ground floor lobby of the building for one week.
9. The respondents added that since the building which houses the Argao Hall of Justice has been
declared a cultural heritage and is the centerpiece of the said municipality, then the activity
planned by Sara Lee was appropriate in promoting the town of Argao. Respondents Amamio and
Vasquez maintain that it was their honest belief that the building was not to be used exclusively
for court purposes, but also to be shown to visitors who wanted to visit and see the historical
building.

10. The respondents deny that a party was held, saying that only a raffle draw was conducted and
that only softdrinks and finger foods were served to the participants. They also claim that there
was no danger to the building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held at the ground
floor lobby and that those who attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority of them
being women. Neither was there any commercial activity or transaction which involved the buying
 to find out who attended the raffle draw and respondent Amamio merely called the attention of the
guards as to why even the trivial non-wearing of the office uniform of some employees were
entered when Circular No. 49-2007 dated May 15, 2007 directed the optional wearing of
uniforms.

12. Finally, the three respondents maintain that they had performed their duties to the best of their
abilities, acted with absolute good faith devoid of malice, and had no intention to prejudice the
interests of the Court. They insist that they have never violated any rule, regulation, or law in the
execution of their assigned tasks.

Issues:

A. WON respondents violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 by allowing the holding of a raffle
draw in the lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice

B. WON the proceedings should continue despite the complainant’s desistance

Ruling:

A. Yes. Indeed, the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice by the staff of Sara Lee
degraded the honor and dignity of the court and exposed the premises, as well as the judicial
records to danger of loss or damage. In Administrative Circular No. 3-92, we have already
reminded all judges and court personnel that the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes
directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to
any other use.

The Argao Hall of Justice is not meant to be used for festivities, and in fact should remain closed
to the public during such occasions. Time and again, the Court has always stressed in pertinent
issuances and decisions that courts are temples of justice, the honor and dignity of which must be
upheld and that their use shall not expose judicial records to danger of loss or damage. So strict
is the Court about this that it has declared that the prohibition against the use of Halls of Justice
for purposes other than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity
including their grounds.

If the building housing the Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical landmark, all the
more reason why activities, such as Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held within. At most, the
said Hall of Justice could have been made part of a regular local tour, to be viewed at designated
hours, which viewing shall be confined to certain areas not intrusive to court operations and
records.

B. This Court looks with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by complainants, especially if done
as an afterthought. Contrary to what the parties might have believed, withdrawal of the complaint
does not have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from any administrative disciplinary
sanction. It does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the
matter stated in the complaint. The Courts disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or
frustrated by private arrangements between parties. An administrative complaint against an
official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly
claims a change of mind. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY
OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
Background Facts of the Case:
1. Atty. Maquera is lawyer both in Guam and in the Philippines.
2. The Superior Court of Guam suspended Atty. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for 2
years on the ground of misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his
client’s case.
3. In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente,
the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera
served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land,
was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however,
retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period.
4. At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.
5. Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered
into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter.
6. Maquera then exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in
his name.
7. Subsequently, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred
Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
8. On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings
regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct.
9. Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral
and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the
transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client
relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal
services to Castro.
Conclusions of the Superior Court of Guam:
10. The Superior court of Guam found that:
a. the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely
terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of
redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987.
b. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castros property
to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00
in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00.
11. The Supreme Court of the Philippines was later on informed by the District Court of Guam about
this.
Proceedings in the Philippines:
12. The Supreme Court referred the matter of Maquera’s suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant
for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a
foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his
disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act
or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct,
or a violation of the lawyers oath.
 committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure
is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys
under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue presented before us:
15. The issue is whether a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney may be
meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in
the foreign jurisdiction.
Ruling of the Court:
16. Yes, he may be.
17. Maquera’s acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in
that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients.
They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and
confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession.
18. Take note though that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras suspension from
the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines. Under Section 27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts
which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court
of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a lawyer.
More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself
and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be
conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that
a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after
reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled
investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.
19. The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
“Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.”

20. The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera’s acts, namely: acquiring by assignment
Castros right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared
as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a
huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the
Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
21. The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising the
 22. The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public
policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
23. The case of In re: Ruste illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that
case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel
pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was
made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The
Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances
obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
“Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by
financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter’s behest, as contended by the
complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon
or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential
relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both.”

24. The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros right of redemption,
his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits
were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an
exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of
redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed
by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right
of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his
legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
On the matter of non-payment of IBP dues as a ground for suspension:
25. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice
of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section
10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one
year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
FIGUERAS VS. JIMENEZ
A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
Facts:
Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. The Spouses Federico and Victoria
Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag before the
RTC for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of
way. The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and
hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days
even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA resolution
became final.

Eight years later , complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of
the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling
the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

Respondent contends that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as
they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part
of the IBP-CBD.

Issue: Whether or not complainants have the personality to file the disbarment complaint even if
they were not his clients.

Held: The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person
who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome."
In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio
may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis
for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

Court’s Ruling: Suspended

ADELIA V. QUIACHON V. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS,
FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by complainant, against her lawyer respondent representing her in a labor and special
proceeding case. Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the
NLRC. The NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant’s behalf. A Petition for
Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the NLRC’s reversal of the LA’s Decision. The Notice of the
CA Decision was received by respondent on 23 November 2010.

After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask respondent about the status of her case. The latter
always told her that there was no decision yet.

While complainant was in respondent’s office, she noticed an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon and
was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CA’s Decision. Respondent assured her that “it was
alright” as they still had six months to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the
labor case were ever communicated to complainant.

With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision.
Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.

Complainant filed the instant disbarment Complaint against respondent.

Respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He claimed that he had told complainant that
he “cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a
Petition for Review with the Supreme Court;”7 thus, he supposedly advised her to “respect the decision of the Court of
Appeals.”library

Complanant withdraw the complaint.

HELD:

This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the investigating commissioners and the members of the Board of
Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction
of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In the present case, Almeyda, the investigating officer recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even
after finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared to have “been remiss in
failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by him in behalf of complainant.” Still,
Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case, because “without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding
of liability.” The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the recommendation.

The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention
of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member
of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers
who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another
counsel.

Respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy
that would promote the client’s cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.All lawyers owe fidelity
to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of
the law in support of that cause.Whenever lawyers take on their clients’ cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due
diligence in protecting the client’s rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable to the client,
the courts and society.

Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found GUILTY of negligence and is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months. He isWARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. MANUEL T.
MOLINA, RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014

Facts:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound. The clients of Atty. Molina
entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a
document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters
such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security.
Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not
agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.

1
Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty.
2
Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble
was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

3
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that
4
the Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential
compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.

Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and Recommendation. He

recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only
of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he
could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.

The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Molina is guilty of Dishonesty for giving incorrect legal advice

Ruling:

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of
12
proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant.

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges
Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble
is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of
giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the
corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal
advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on
mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not
liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be
imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a
conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is
no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad
faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.
IN RE TORRES

FACTS:
Complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial
ethics.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the
commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or
omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed
by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late
spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to
transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The
forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment
was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. Respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when
he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under
the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that
it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12
August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine
National Bank, of which he was an employee.
HELD:
The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the
exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have
forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH

I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the
pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it
mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all
times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
[6]
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the
respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by
his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the
deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to
complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with
[8]
them while she was in the Philippines. Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of
Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his
wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
[9]
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification of complainants
signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement. Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power
[13]
of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds
[14]
to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be
held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-
[15]
heirs. Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal
[16]
documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to
law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of
Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
[17]
processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
[18]
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make himself
[19]
more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest,
[20]
immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any
[21]
such unbecoming act or conduct.
[24]
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court, and he
never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
[25]
case. Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as
[26]
guilty of false testimony.
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
[27]
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. This Rule was clearly and
openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings
aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title
involving Lot 1605.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant
to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where
[34]
the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find
that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we
therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
BAR MATTER 1645
(RE: AMENDMENT OF 139-B), 13 OCTOBER 2015

The new rules under Bar Matter 1645 are as follows:

1. Sections 1, 5, 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are amended to read as follows:

“RULE 139-B Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline filed
against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against
lawyers in the government service, whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such
complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the complaint is filed before the IBP, six ( 6) copies
of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit
the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.”

A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

“Section 5. Service or dismissal. - If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service.

If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not
meritorious, the Investigator will recommend to the Board of Governors the dismissal of the complaint.

Thereafter, the procedure in Section 12 of this Rule shall apply. No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same,
unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that there is no
compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.”

(AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED MAY 27, 1993 RE BAR MATTER NO. 356)

“Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted
to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal
of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent.

The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
reasons on which it is based.

The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.”

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

“Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other proceedings when the interest
of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of
the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections
6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.”

C. COMMON PROVISIONS

“Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the
Supreme Court, motu propio, or upon the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, may suspend an attorney from the
practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such
suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.”

The amendments shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ordered to revise its rules of procedure in accordance with the amendments to Rule 139-B.
NOTARIAL  PRACTICE  

A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC February 19, 2008

RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

-
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules
Governing Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to
wit:

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated February 19,
2008.

"A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC-Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. – The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries
Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:

Rule II

DEFINITIONS

xxx

"Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport,
driver’s license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social
Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman’s book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certification
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

(b) xxxx."
BAUTISTA V. BERNABE
AC 6963 February 9, 2006
[1]
In a Complaint filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
[2]
(IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant Victorina Bautista prays for the suspension or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his
duties as a notary public and a lawyer.

Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized

[3]
a Magkasanib na Salaysay purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainants
[4]
mother, Basilia de la Cruz. Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land
in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30
years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3,
[5]
1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961.
[6]
In his Answer, respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed
any knowledge about Basilias death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested
for Basilias presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia,
to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word by on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent
maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the
signature ofPronebo.
[7]
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation attaching thereto the affidavit of
[8]
desistance of complainant which reads in part:

Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng

naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO

EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;

2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmaha

n lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL
MORFE MAGSINO
at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C.
VILLARIN;

3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin

ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pang
alan nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;

4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO
ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
[9]
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal
profession for one (1) month;

2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be

revoked; and

3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted

[10]
a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year.

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified
for reappointment as notary public for two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

 A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify
[11]
the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.

Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants
[12]
is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
[13]
the Notarial Law. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe
that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the
affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondents conduct is fraught
with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our
courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost
diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the
[14]
law.

Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which
they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in the said documents as the one
who executed the same. That is the only time the representative can affix his signature and personally
appear before the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who
executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge
[15]
the document.

Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an
end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised
on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
[16]
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
[17]
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos, respondent lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document
despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked
and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
[18]
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2 of complainants affidavit of desistance,
[19]
she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized her SinumpaangSalaysay dated November 12, 2004
which was attached to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without
requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must
likewise be investigated.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility,
the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to
investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
theSinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the latters
personal appearance.
TALISIC V. RINEN
A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014

Facts:
An administrative case was filed by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against
Atty. Primo R. Rinen (Atty. Rinen), charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial
Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia
(Spouses Durante) of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto’s mother, Aurora Corpuz
(Aurora). Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on
Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Wilberto claimed that his mother died and left behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio
Talisic, and their three children, namely: Arlene, Wilberto and Alvin. It was only after his father’s
death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject
parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that his father’s signature on the deed was
authentic, his and his siblings’ signatures were merely forged.
Atty. Rinen denied the charge and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he
came to know of the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they
approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal.
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner
Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation
of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of
one year.
The report indicated that per Atty. Rinen’s admission, the subject deed was prepared in
his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of forgery on his part,
he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as
proof of identity. Atty. Rinen’s failure to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also
shown by the inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: “1994 as to the
execution; 1995 when notarized; (and) entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book xxx”.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rinen committed violations of his notarial duties.

Ruling:
It must then be stressed that, “a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a
notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity.” Towards this end, the Court emphasized that “(a) notary public
should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.”
In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of
all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared
before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details
of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the subject deed’s acknowledgement portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the
part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-
officio. The lapses he committed in relation to such function then justified the recommendations
presented by the IBP.
“Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.”
Thus, “notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties.” Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined. The notarial commission of Atty. Rinen was revoked for one year.
ANG V. GUPANA
A.C.  No.  4545,  February  5,  2014  

Facts:
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang
alleged that he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William
Magpayo, executed an Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partitiion involving a land which was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2, 003 square meters designated as Lot
No. 2066-B-2-4, together with all the improvements thereon.
However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT number had already been
cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs had been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante,
Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. And Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the
commission of forgeries and falsications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss
and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of
Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on Paril 17, 1090, was antedated and
Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu since the Notarial Report undubitably showed that the document
executed was an affidavit, not a Deed of Absolute Sale.
As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994,
it could have been executed by hear as she Died three years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact and executed a Deed of Sale selling
the lot to Lim Kim So Mecantile Co even though a civil case was pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing. According to the respondent, in the pending civil case, Ang anchored
his claim on the Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for
reconveyance of the subject parcdel of land. However, because of Angs’ admission that he is not an heir of late
Candelaria, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the title of land were ordered cancelled and the land became
available for disposition. Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang
would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for
the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the
instant case in abeyance pending resolution of civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent is
administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months.
She held that respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of
the subject property through a deed of sale executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Cebu.
The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that respondent “delegated the notarial functions to the
clerical staff of their office before being brought to him for his signature.” This, according to the commissioner, “must
have been the reason for the forged signature of the parties in the questioned document…as well as the erroneous
entry in his notarial register. Respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for violating the nortarial law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
The Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require
the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo. It is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents. In the case at bar, the
jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at
Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear the the jurat was
made in violation of the notarial law.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appeartaining to his office, such duties bing dictated by public policy impreesed with pulic interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgement or jurat is sacrosanct. The
Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Respondent likewise violate Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that “(a) lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of an task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.”
In notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts
and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order.