Société québécoise de science politique

Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? Reducing National Unity Crisis in the
Neoliberal Era
Author(s): Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.
44, No. 4 (December 2011 decembre), pp. 769-787
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science
politique
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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda?
Reducing National Unity Crisis in the
Neoliberal Era

Nadine Changfoot Trent University

Blair Cullen Trent University

Electorally, Quebec sovereignty aspirations have waned. In Quebec's 2008

election, the federalist Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ) captured its third con-
secutive mandate, a rare feat in Quebec politics. It has now held the reins
of government since 2003. The PLQ's success has come at the expense
of the Parti Québécois (PQ). As PQ leader Pauline Marois acknowl-
edged, "support for the PQ has been eroding since 1994" (Patriquin,
2007). This decline culminated in Quebec's 2007 election when the PQ
suffered its worst defeat in 34 years. Following this defeat, the PQ openly
acknowledged its lack of appeal and has since rebranded its image and
changed its strategy.1 This new strategy was tested in Quebec's 2008 elec-
tion. It returned mediocre results since the PQ regained second place in
the Quebec legislature with 51 seats. This was a modest improvement
over the 2007 election's seat count of 3 1 seats. Nevertheless, this gain
should not be interpreted as resurgent support for separatism since the
PQ itself has reduced demands for sovereignty to a double, if not triple,
pianissimo. The Bloc Québécois (BQ) has also changed its firm stance
on separatism; the BQ has become a party that Quebecers will vote for
knowing it will advocate Quebec's interests in Parliament without hav-

Acknowledgments: We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on the earlier draft of this paper. We would also like to thank the
participants for their helpful comments at the 2008 "The State in Transition" confer-
ence organized by Michael Behiels at the Univerity of Ottawa/Université d'Ottawa.
All errors are our own.

Nadine Changfoot, Political Studies, Trent University, 1600 West Bank Drive, Peter-
borough ON K9H 7B8, Email: nadinechangfoot@trentu.ca
Blair Cullen, Frost Centre for Canadian Studies and Indigenous Studies, Trent Uni-
versity, 1600 West Bank Drive, Peterborough ON K9H 7B8, Email: blaircullen@
trentu.ca

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

44:4 (December/décembre 2011) 769-787 doi:10.1017/S000842391 1000746
© 2012 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique)
and/et la Société québécoise de science politique

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770 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
ing to commit firmly to sovereignty.2 As well, historical lows for support
for sovereignty in Quebec have been recorded in polls since 2006.3 What
explains the languishing condition of separatism?
Several scholars have recently commented on the curtailment of sov-
ereigntist forces and their agenda in Quebec. One explanation has to do
with social movements channelling their energies away from sovereign-
tist activism. According to Dufour (2005), Quebec social movements have
shifted their emphasis from a Quebec national project to social justice,
addressing poverty, redistribution of wealth and radical democratic poli-
tics. They also connected with the rest of Canada and global allies in
response to globalization forces (Dufour, 2005: 145-47). Between 1996
and 2000s neither the PLQ nor especially the PQ emphasized a strong
social agenda that meshes with the kind of social project that unions and
social movements have advocated. Indeed, governments under both the
PQ and the PLQ have focused on cuts to the welfare state and increasing
flexibility in employment that weakens unions.4 Salée noted that the PQ
in the late 1990s no longer appeared a plausible vehicle of social change
for the Quebec left (2002: 186). One of the consequences of this right-
ward shift of the PQ, according to Graefe, has been that unions and social
movements have been focusing their energies within civil society and less
on a specific nationalist agenda (2005a: 169-70). In particular, Quebec
labour unions have been alienated by the Quebec state's direction (Lafor-
est, 2009; Graefe, 2005a). In this changed context, Laforest explained how
the Charest government has been largely effective in sidelining and mar-
ginalizing labour, women's and community voices from input and influ-
ence in the development of a societal agenda through a reorganization in
government consultation and media attack on the community sector (2009:
175-81). One significant outcome noted by Dufour (2009) has been that
energy directed to create the Québec Solidaire party by individuals from
the social, environmental and labour movements signals a shift on the part
of sovereigntist support to enter partisan politics to reclaim or reassert a
social justice agenda. On a related sociological note, Mendelsohn and col-
leagues observed that Quebec youth are largely depoliticized and do not
identify with the sovereignty project, especially that of the 1980s and 1990s
(2005: 29). As well, Mendelsohn and colleagues stated that even though
half of francophone Quebecers support sovereignty at an ideological and/or
rhetorical level, the majority has been unwilling to expend energy advo-
cating or engaging in the actualization of sovereignty (30). These devel-
opments appear to have undercut the social left-leaning project so integral
to sovereignty in its manifestation in the 1970s to mid-1990s. As Dufour
(2005) noted, the shift toward a left-right debate in part removes sover-
eignty from the agenda because the groups that support sovereignty are
on the left and have been under attack both in funding from the Quebec
state and their social and political role in the Quebec public sphere.

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Abstract. The development of federalism in the context of the neoliberal era in the 2000s has
partly created the conditions for a more stable co-operation between the federal and Quebec gov-
ernments, contributing to the trend of separatism being sidelined in Quebec. In the context of
neoliberalism, federal-provincial agreements have created conditions for just enough asymme-
try in the relationship between the federal government and Quebec, something that Quebec has
historically demanded, for separatism to remain off the agenda. What separates this relationship
from past ones is a significant change in the context whereby the neoliberal orientation is becom-
ing the common currency for co-operation. If Canadian federalism continues its present course
under neoliberalism without any major mishaps, for the first time since the divisive period of
the 1990s and early 2000s, federal-Quebec relations likely will be stable without national unity
crises of the kind that culminated in the 1980 and 1995 Quebec referenda on sovereignty.

Résumé. Le développement du fédéralisme dans le contexte de l'ère néolibérale dans les années
2000 a en partie créé les conditions pour une coopération plus stable entre les gouvernements
fédéral et québécois, contribuant ainsi à la tendance du séparatisme au Québec d'être margi-
nalisés. Dans le contexte du néolibéralisme, des ententes fédérales-provinciales ont créé les
conditions pour un peu assez de relation asymétrique entre le gouvernement fédéral et du Québec,
quelque chose que le Québec a toujours exigé, au séparatisme de rester hors l'ordre du jour. Ce
qui sépare cette relation de celles du passé est un changement significatif dans le contexte dans
lequel l'orientation néo-libérale devient la monnaie commune pour la coopération. Si le fédéra-
lisme canadien continue son cours actuel sous le néolibéralisme sans encombre majeur, pour la
première fois depuis la période de division des années 1990 et début des années 2000, les rela-
tions fédérales-Québec probablement seront stable sans crises unité nationale du genre qui a
culminé dans les années 1980 et 1995 référendums sur la souveraineté du Québec.

That Quebec's recent demands have been met may also be a reason
for dampening a sovereigntist groundswell. The need to win Quebec fed-
eral seats (75 of 308) 5 to form a federal majority government influences
why the federal Liberal and Conservative parties pay special attention to
Quebec, particularly at election time. In the year following the January
2006 election, Stephen Harper made good on his promises and estab-
lished a formal role for Quebec at the United Nations Education, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), acknowledged the fiscal
imbalance between federal and provincial governments, and even pre-
empted the Bloc Québécois 's attempt to secure Quebec's recognition as a
distinct society by initiating Parliament's recognition that the "Québé-
cois form a nation within a united Canada." In early 2007, he assigned
$2.3B out of $39B in transfers to Quebec, just in time for the Quebec
election that year. Electoral gains in Quebec were no doubt a factor under-
lying these actions.
Yet a deeper foundation for these Quebec-specific initiatives had been
laid by the changing contours of federalism shaped by neoliberal exigen-
cies. As noted above, a political culture of withdrawal along neoliberal
lines of the Quebec state from civil society has led to social movements
who championed sovereignty to focus their efforts within civil society ver-
sus sovereigntist activism. Given the federal government's powers in rela-
tion to provincial jurisdiction (such as spending power, transfer payments,
international agreements), intergovernmental relations have continued to

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772 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
be a source of tension for the federal and Quebec governments that can-
not be simply addressed by solely playing to the electoral power of Que-
bec. If they could be simply addressed in election promises, then one
would expect that federal bidding for Quebec seats would go higher; yet,
given the era of fiscal constraint, this is likely improbable and it does not
completely explain the current basis for co-operation and the PQ's hav-
ing taken the goal of a referendum off its party platform for the foresee-
able future. As well, in 2008, Harper misstepped by cutting funding to arts
and culture the summer before the election. He underestimated the con-
nection Quebecers make between Quebec's identity as a distinct nation
with funding to arts and culture. Even so, support for sovereignty was at
a remarkable low (37 per cent) after the federal election in spite of the
federal gaffe. As well, Harper's Conservatives maintained ten seats in Que-
bec in the 2008 election and won a precious Quebec by-election in Novem-
ber 2009. 6 We suggest that another convergence has emerged, making
federal and Quebec government co-operation viable enough to preempt a
separatist groundswell and keep separatism off the agenda.
The neoliberal direction taken by the federal government in inter-
governmental relations supplements explanations provided above for why
separatism has been curtailed since the 2000s onward. In 1996, Morris
and Changfoot predicted that separatism would likely grow with the neo-
liberal regime then taking root, since the decreases in federal transfers
weakened what they saw was a key source of national unity. In contrast
to their prediction, the neoliberal state has instead facilitated a space of
co-operation between the federal and Quebec states whereby just enough
of Quebec's demands have been met to demonstrate that federalism still
works for Quebec. Salée foreshadowed in 2002 that "if the whole Que-
bec nationalist project boils down simply to asserting jurisdictional bound-
aries and administrative prerogatives, and if the respective, internal logics
driving the Quebec state and the Canadian state become increasingly
blurred and indistinguishable, the Quebec public may well wonder what,
then, is the point of nationalism, and, by extension, of pursuing sover-
eignty" (2002: 170). We will show that developments of Quebec-federal
intergovernmental relations since the late 1990s largely confirms Salée 's
prediction, still importantly facilitated by existing federal monies even
if within a neoliberal context. At the same time, the character of those
relations and Quebec's demands suggest a change in the kind of Que-
bec nationalism and sovereignty compared to the Quebec model of a
common French language, ethnocultural background, social justice and
stronger state interventionism of the Quiet Revolution up to the 1990s.
Indeed, in the current context, Quebec's demands appear now more
acceptable and achievable in ways they did not in the 1980s and 1990s
because of the changed character of federal-provincial agreements that
emerged in the late 1990s as well as understanding of federal-provincial

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? 773

relations in the 2000s. Economic development and prosperity, and Que-

bec culture without the connection to social justice, appear more sale-
able for national unity.

Quebec's Historical Demands in the Neoliberal Context

Put into historical context, Quebec has been adept at working within
the federal-provincial framework. Beginning in the post-war period,
following the recommendations of the 1940 Rowell-Sirois Commis-
sion, the federal government undertook a comprehensive nation-building
project. It began construction of what has come to be known as the Cana-
dian welfare state. Despite its rhetoric against welfare centralization,
nationalism in Quebec had few consequences for the Canadian welfare
state during the 1940s and 1950s (Béland and Lecours, 2006: 81). This
situation changed in the 1960s, as the Quebec state began a nation-
building project of its own. Under this project, French Canadian nation-
alism developed into a more proactive Québécois nationalism with a
tremendous political will to promote and protect Quebec's distinctive-
ness and autonomy. Because of this, the Quebec government went beyond
the Duplessis rhetoric to seek the powers and financial resources with
which Quebec could undertake the same kinds of policies on behalf of
the Québécois nation that the federal government was undertaking on
behalf of the English-Canadian nation (Robinson and Simeon, 2004: 1 13).
By the 1966 budget, Quebec indicated its ambitions when it suggested
that it should participate directly in areas of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion by contributing to the development and execution of fiscal, mon-
etary and trade policies (Gagnon, 2004: 132).
During the 1970s, the Quebec government continued its search for
greater autonomy, urging that it be given additional powers and the nec-
essary revenues. At the same time, Canadian nation building took full
flight with the arrival of the Trudeau government. Consequently, the polit-
ical modernization of Quebec through a Quebec nationalist state chal-
lenged the legitimacy of Canadian federalism as the provincial state
expanded into more areas of social life; it continually came into conflict
with the federal government. As Premier Levesque put it, English Can-
ada looked to rationalize, simplify and centralize powers to the central
government while Quebec demanded the complete opposite. For Quebec-
ers, the federal spending power, especially on the scale it was being used,
constituted an affront to their nationalist aspirations. Accordingly, it
became central to Quebec's dissatisfaction with the Canadian federation
(Anderson, 2007). Hence, the federalism of late 1960s and 1970s could
not douse the embers of Quebec's nationalism and actually fuelled it (Mor-
ris and Changfoot, 1996).

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IIA Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
Fast-forward to the current neoliberal era: the federal spending power
has been arguably reduced and the federal government has retreated
substantially from regional development and social policy fields in
terms of setting out specific policy terms for provinces.7 The transfor-
mation of the Canadian state into a neoliberal state began in the
mid-1980s. Influenced mainly by the forces of globalization, this
process has occurred incrementally beginning with the signing of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1993
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) established in 1995 (Clark-
son, 2002). These signalled a neoliberal pattern of continental integra-
tion that has promoted free markets while constraining forms of
government intervention.8 Under this new regime, the federal govern-
ment is viewed as an impediment to the supposed natural needs of the
market (Romanow, 2006). The neoliberal direction at the federal level
has influenced the shape of federalism. We highlight two developments.
First, the federal economic agenda especially since the mid-1990s has
given provinces more room to develop their own social policy and eco-
nomic development not so much through positive incentives of increas-
ing federal monies but, ironically, through a neoliberal withdrawal of
federal monies and a noticeable reduction in federal direction to prov-
inces on how and where to spend the money. Provinces have responded
by building with what relatively fewer resources are made available fed-
erally within their own respective jurisdictions. Nation building of the
1960s and 1970s has become another renewed phase of, or emphasis
on, province building in the late 1990s and 2000s. Province building
started in the 1960s when provinces became more ambitious vis-à-vis
the federal government (Cairns, 1977; Noël, 2003: 51). The current phase
of province building is noteworthy in that it accommodates Quebec's
longstanding goal for autonomy. We shall chronicle these developments
below.
The Progressive Conservatives left office in 1993, leaving Canada
with a debt of $450 billion. Under Mulroney's tenure, the government
more than doubled the accumulated debt. In 1993, the Liberals entered
office focused on restoring Canada's finances. The breadth of these finan-
cial difficulties made the implementation of this mandate challenging.
In the 1995 budget, Ottawa cut funding for post-secondary education,
health care and social services by more than one-third, $6 billion over
two years (Gagnon and Segal, 2000: 2). The federal government also intro-
duced the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST).9 Instead of equally
sharing the costs of assistance programs between the federal and provin-
cial governments (as historically had been the case), this legislation imple-
mented a block grant strategy aimed at controlling and lowering federal
social assistance spending.

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? 775

The outcome of the 1995 federal budget was significant for two rea-
sons. First, because of massive cuts to health, post-secondary education
and social assistance, provincial governments had to cover a much greater
share of the cost of these programs. This provoked an outcry in provin-
cial capitals; cash-strapped governments had to absorb costs they could
not afford. These cuts hurt the provinces since the federal government
removed its commitment to permanent subsidies (Kent, 2008). They also
weakened the federal government's legitimacy as a leader and partner in
social policy. The reduction in transfers created an increasing unwilling-
ness to accept federal leadership. Second, although the cuts were sub-
stantial, the introduction of the CHST meant a rearrangement in the
funding formula for these programs. By adopting a block grant formula,
the federal government removed the conditions under which provinces
received funding. In addition, the federal government was willing to loosen
its grip on program design and delivery, thereby giving more, or at least
the possibility of more, autonomy to the provinces (Taucar, 2000: 172;
Graefe 2005b: 5). In an attempt to limit provincial discontent through
the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), the federal govern-
ment combined unilateral retrenchment with a normative deregulation of
social assistance. As a result, the provinces gained greater autonomy of
the management of their social assistance programs (Bashevkin, 2000).
Following this, then Finance Minister Paul Martin requested the prov-
inces' input for designing social policy principles (Courchene, 2004). This
marked a shift in control of these policy areas, as provincial govern-
ments now enjoyed greater freedom to legislate and administer these pro-
grams as they saw fit. This decentralization marked the beginning of a
predominant provincial role in setting the direction for and in super-
vising the management of social policies (Brodie and Trimble, 2003;
Bashevkin, 2000; Forget, 2001). Graefe noted that greater federal toler-
ance for diversity among provinces in the policy areas of agreements
allowed for more space for provincial autonomy, but only within the agree-
ments themselves (2005b: 6). Thus, autonomy was circumscribed by the
agreements, but, nonetheless the space for autonomy remained. Noël saw
these developments in another light. The federal government lowered
expectations without giving up as much control as would appear by cre-
ating suboptimal conditions for co-operation among provinces (2003: 56).
According to Noël, provinces signed on (with the exception of Quebec)
because it "incorporated some of their demands, albeit in a diluted ver-
sion, ... and it institutionalized a pan-Canadian vision that they and their
electorates considered valuable" (2003: 59). Nonetheless, Quebec even-
tually decided to play because of the National Child Benefit (Noël, 2003;
Béland and Lecours, 2005).
The pattern of these agreements included greater, even if limited,
provincial autonomy for setting the priorities for each of these policy

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776 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
areas (Inwood, 2000: 135; Graefe, 2005b: 5-6), and a "stepping back"
on the part of the federal government to identify broad overarching pri-
ority areas flexible enough for provinces to "plug in" or follow their own
priorities.10 While the details of the agreements vary, a common theme
is that federal monies have changed from pan-Canadian social programs
to targeted benefits (Noël, 2003: 49, 58) and have been made available
to develop capacities within provinces to support the development of pol-
icy and programs within their own jurisdictions (Graefe, 2008: 69-75).
Graefe (2005b) predicted that in the case of Quebec, a thin form of asym-
metry between Quebec and the federal government would develop, mean-
ing that Quebec's reporting on agreements in a way different from other
provinces would likely not be a source of conflict with either the federal
or provincial governments. Quebec would still need to conform to the
federal government's broad policy guidelines and accept the federal
government's agenda-setting role in core areas of provincial jurisdiction
(2005b: 6). This continues to be a dynamic that Quebec nationalist schol-
ars find highly unsatisfactory, such as Fortin (2006), Gagnon and Iacovino
(2007), and Noël (2006, 2003). Still, the agreements continue to work in
spite of, or alongside, ongoing dissatisfaction between the Quebec and
federal governments, and Quebec continues to play within this federal-
provincial agreement framework.
Indeed, the federal-provincial agreements developed in the late 1990s
meshed well with Harper's open federalism in that they provided the fed-
eral government enough room to offer what money it could to provinces
and agenda-set in a general way. Provinces, in turn, could apply for the
money and specify their own priorities. Open federalism marked the first
time the federal government embraced an agenda that clearly limited the
federal spending power; 1 1 however, skepticism remains over the extent
to which the federal spending power is indeed limited. For example, Graefe
(2008) sees the proposal as weak, especially in terms of the federal gov-
ernment pledging comparable compensation to opt out versus full com-
pensation with federal monies being overstated. Noël views it as vague
with modest expectations on all sides (2006). One way of understanding
the effects of Harper's open federalism is that the provinces have more
autonomy, however, without the kind of discretion that would come with
more money. Instead, provinces have more autonomy because the fed-
eral government is loosening the reins of policy direction in the few areas
where the federal government has been giving money. Coincident with
budget surpluses in the late 1990s to mid-2000s, the federal government
provided targeted transfers in areas of social assistance (such as child
benefits, disability policy, job training) where there had already been fewer
standards and control.12 Thus, the current phase of province building has
been shaped in part by the room created by the federal government and
where space existed for provinces to define their own needs. There was

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? Ill

neither a lot of room nor space; however, there was enough for provinces
to play within the field the federal government set out.
As the federal government has decreased the specific policy criteria
by which provinces must abide, the most obvious areas of disagreement
between the Quebec and federal governments have been reduced. No lon-
ger is the federal government expanding into policy areas with specific
national standards or attempting to increase its influence to the extent it
was in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Essentially, the federal government
is now "letting go"; it is, as Graefe says, "dis-spending" (2008: 89) ver-
sus spending, "steering" (2008: 90) versus setting. This is a trend contin-
ued since the SUFA years (Inwood, 2000: 135). This does not mean that
conflict disappears, especially in terms of the public stage; the conflict
between Quebec and the federal governments in environmental and crim-
inal sentencing policy are highly visible in mass media. As well, not sur-
prisingly among Quebec nationalists, federal spending even in reduced
form, continues to be an undesirable incursion into Quebec's jurisdic-
tion.13 The federal-provincial agreements, however, have changed the
dynamics of the Quebec-Canada state relationship just enough to allow
both for co-operation that dampens sovereigntist activism (especially
among party leaders in Quebec), and yet also maintains a hardline stance
against the federal government where there is policy disagreement. The
federal government is agenda steering in areas that Quebec can capital-
ize upon even when it disagrees with related aspects of overarching fed-
eral policy. Funding arrangements have been able to facilitate co-operation
and cushion conflict at the political level. Open federalism also included
establishing a formal mechanism for provincial input into the develop-
ment of the Canadian position in international negotiations or organiza-
tions where provincial jurisdiction is affected (Harmes, 2007: 419). This
change, in part, has allowed Alberta to attract foreign workers or Quebec
to sign a labour mobility agreement with France.14
In addition to federal fiscal constraints and some movement in social
assistance programs, the other factor driving province building in the
2000s has been the re-orientation of provincial trade directions in the
Canadian economy. Historically, Canada was built on an east-west trad-
ing axis. However, with the implementation of the CUFTA in 1988 and
later NAFTA in 1993, east-west provincial trade underwent a rearrange-
ment. With the removal of foreign tariffs and the opening of the
US-Canada border, provinces were trading increasingly with their south-
ern neighbours (Boismenu and Graefe, 2000: 218). In fact, by 2001,
every province, save Manitoba, exported more to the US than to their
provincial counterparts (Courchene, 2004). Because of this, according
to Courchene, "Canada has become a series of north-south, cross-
border economies rather than a single east-west national economy" (24). 15
Each province's prosperity has depended more on their success and

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778 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
co-operation with their cross-border counterparts than with their sister
provinces. Increasingly, the provinces began to have a common agenda,
a trade focus outside Canada that gives all provinces a common cause
in seeking more policy autonomy from the federal government in order
to adopt, adjust and tailor their policies to enhance their economic pros-
pects in NAFTA economic space (Courchene, 2004). In this context,
Quebec's demands have become more tolerable to other provinces as
long as they each make headway on their economic agendas vis-à-vis
the federal government.
The combination of weakening fiscal federal legitimacy and increas-
ingly province-specific economic agendas provided a basis for and
became a common rallying point among provinces. This contributed to
political unity among provinces and introduced a new dynamic to federal-
provincial relations. Because of the federal government's withdrawal from
key policy areas of health and social services, the provinces have had
less to dispute on a national level and have found common cause in
seeking more provincial autonomy as well as more capacity within their
respective asymmetric relationships with the federal government. This
co-operation has expressed itself through renewed interprovincialism, as
provinces co-ordinate their strategies and goals when negotiating with
the federal government. For example, according to Fortin, interprovin-
cialism intensified in response to the 1995 federal cuts to address the
state of social policies and programs within Canada as a union (2006:
342-43). Concern over the delivery of social programs funded by the
federal government at the time of the SUFA was not new and it was
provinces that were key in putting the social union on the federal
agenda.16
Institutionally, renewed interprovincialism has registered itself
through the Council of the Federation (COF), developed in 2003. The
COF addressed the weaknesses of the annual premiers meetings that pre-
dated the COF and, in the process, added institutional capacity to the
interprovincial forum (Peach, 2007: 8). The purpose of the COF was to
create a forum for provinces to co-ordinate their positions and build
stronger provincial leverage in relations with Ottawa (Pelletier, 2007:
220). Charest led in the initiation of the COF (Graefe and Laforest, 2008:
51; Fortin 2006: 360). 17 In the initial stages of the COF, provinces saw
themselves as both building and having influence on national policies
through interprovincial co-operation and interprovincial resolution of con-
flict without federal intervention (Simeon, 2006: 325). For example, one
of the primary reasons this forum was created was to lobby the federal
government to address the fiscal imbalance (Graefe and Laforest, 2008;
Courchene, 2004). In May 2005, the COF set up an advisory panel on
the fiscal imbalance. Its mandate was to examine the underlying causes
of fiscal imbalance and make recommendations on ways to restore fis-

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? 119

cal balance. Harper responded by campaigning to address the fiscal

imbalance in the election of 2006. Besides lobbying, the COF also gave
the provinces a forum to develop a united front to either support or
oppose federal government policy. For example, in July 2006, the pre-
miers threw their undivided support behind the Kelowna Accord.18 In
this case, a united COF voice on a single issue lent its support to the
federal government. Each of these examples illustrates the flexibility of
the COF as an instrument for the provinces. On the one hand, prov-
inces can pressure and crowd out Ottawa, but on the other hand, they
can co-operate with Ottawa. This flexibility gave the provinces an influ-
ential voice both in intergovernmental affairs in relation to the federal
agenda. The 2007 budget attempted to rectify the fiscal imbalance by
giving the provinces $39 billion over seven years through a new equal-
ization formula, a boost in transfer payments for post-secondary educa-
tion and changes to health and social spending (Johnson, 2007). Of this
$39 billion, Quebec received $2.3 billion, a substantial sum for a fis-
cally strapped government.19 Since Harper's attempt to address the fis-
cal imbalance in 2007, he has largely ignored the COF (Telford, 2008:
41); however, this does not discount the initial influence the COF had
in 2006-2007. As well, the Prime Minister's avoidance of the COF may
signal the depth of conflict between the provinces and the federal gov-
ernment to meet in this forum and move beyond the status quo, mean-
ing it may also signal the willingness to continue the "business as usual"
method of federal-provincial agreements and that they are working well
enough at present.20
Through Harper's federal-provincial agreements under open feder-
alism, the opportunity for Quebec to province build has continued even
though this province-building has been based on federal withdrawal of
spending. At the same time, province building for Quebec has included
recognition for that province as a distinct nation within a nation,21
separate representation at UNESCO,22 and the capacity to make inter-
national agreements. A more recent example of Harper's open federal-
ism used by Quebec is the Green Initiatives Fund announced in May
2009. This fund identifies Green projects as a broad federal priority
to which provinces and municipalities can apply, according to their
own priorities. In January 2010, Harper announced commitment of $13
million in funding to an environmental project in Rivière du Loup,
Québec, whereby the Quebec government will maintain control over the
project. This agreement, however, does not erase conflict and tension
that inflects Quebec rhetoric in its differences with the federal govern-
ment. "There's not a single word I would change," Charest stated at
the January 2010 announcement of federal-provincial funding for the
environmental project regarding his public excoriation of Harper at the
major December 2009 Cophenhagen conference on climate change.23

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780 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
Harper responded by emphasizing the shared priority of the environ-
ment: "We're not going to always agree but that doesn't mean we're
miles apart, it doesn't mean we don't work together on the things we
have in common as we have done and will continue to do, particularly
on important environment projects that everyone supports" (Canadian
Press, 2010).
Graefe asserted that open federalism "was made first and fore-
most to gain support of Quebec francophones (2008: 60), yet the effects
have extended to other provinces as well. Quebec was not the only
province taking advantage of this new context. Provinces have reached
a level of governmental capacity, empowering them to act inde-
pendently and move in their respective chosen directions. British Colum-
bia and Alberta's Trade Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement
(TILMA) are examples of this. TILMA's purpose was to eliminate
interprovincial trade barriers in an effort to stimulate economic activ-
ity. It represented provinces dealing independently with the federal
government on an issue that has affected them both. Similar agree-
ments followed at an Ontario-Quebec economic summit in June
2006 and at the 2008 Council of the Federation meeting. Separate direc-
tions also have occurred as in the current negotiations on the environ-
ment. Ontario and Quebec have been ready to embrace a cap-and-trade
system, while British Columbia has already implemented a carbon
tax approach. Yet Alberta has stood firm on not starting reductions
of greenhouse gasses until 2020 and remains opposed to any system
related to curbing greenhouse emissions. These conflicting positions and
this piecemeal approach to climate change is reflective of the cur-
rent shape of Canadian federalism, one in which provinces increasingly
move in their own direction and negotiate separately with the federal
government.
Writing in 2006, Alain Noël was ambivalent over the extent to which
open federalism could bring Quebec and Ottawa into a better relation-
ship: "The path toward reconciliation is indeed long and narrow" (35).
At the same time, he noted that Quebec's demands appeared moderate,
public opinion was receptive to open federalism and there was a clear
sense of direction that made further changes plausible and appealing
(2006: 35). Noël noted that autonomy and recognition have been two
important and consistent needs for Quebec in federal relations. We have
argued how both these needs are met in the new context of neoliberal
federalism that is shaped by neoliberal exigencies that underlie open
federalism, federal-provincial agreements and the relationship between
Quebec and the federal government. This new context supplements expla-
nations for sovereignty's waning as it allows for just enough autonomy,
recognition and public conflict to pre-empt a sovereigntist push and a
national unity crisis.

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? 781
Moving Forward: What Does This Mean for Canadian Federalism?

Federal dis-spending, increasingly distinct provincial agendas aimed

toward a common target of economic prosperity and an active interpro-
vincialism create a new normal in federal-provincial agreements along
neoliberal lines that has contributed to the development of a new context
for federal-provincial conflict, on the one hand, as well as continued
co-operation between provinces and the federal government, on the other.
For Quebec, the new federal-provincial context provides enough oppor-
tunities to keep the embers of separatism from igniting. Guay has com-
mented that "la souveraineté est de l'ordre d'une reaction defensive" and
that support for separatism rises to perceived hostility in English Canada
and subsides in better moments (2007: 81-82). McRoberts has also noted
that the call for separatism is more an expression of deep dissatisfaction
with federalism, not an outright desire for Quebec statehood (2004). With
the emergence of a new partnership between Quebec and Canada, the
current context is one of the better moments. Neoliberal federalism has
created the opportunity for Quebec to redefine itself and make demands
within Canadian federalism with success in relation to, and alongside,
the other provinces and the federal government. In the process, Quebec
has carved for itself a new place in the Canadian federation. Quietly and
incrementally, Quebec and the federal government have moved towards a
restructuring of their relationship that continues to allow for very public
disagreement. This relationship appears to be a foundation for compro-
mise that avoids the pitfalls of a hardline approach by either partner.
Although the process has been slow in the making and along with other
factors we outlined above, it has taken separatism off the table and polit-
ically made possible an ongoing relationship between Quebec and Can-
ada sufficiently co-operative since the mid-2000s. This is a dramatic turn
of events, as compared to the past thirty years in which Canadians have
witnessed failed referendums, failed constitutional accords, the Supreme
Court of Canada Reference on Secession and the Clarity Act that enflamed
conflict between Quebec and Canada. As Pelletier notes, asymmetric fed-
eralism can allow for a harmonious coexistence under reduced tensions
(2006: 545). Tensions between the federal and Quebec governments have
been reduced by, although not limited to, recognition of Quebec as a
distinct nation within Canada, as its own self-representing province at
UNESCO, continued federal transfers and fiscal agreements that are a
sufficient retardant to previously ignited sovereigntist forces, and just
enough withdrawal of the federal spending power.
In conclusion, it must be remembered that "Quebec's historical posi-
tion on constitutional questions or intergovernmental issues is not going
to become outdated or obsolete with the passage of time, developments
in globalization or the increasing interdependence of peoples and gov-

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782 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
ernments" (Tremblay, 2000: 155). Quebec will continue to preserve its
identity, distinctiveness, and autonomy. In light of this reality, the change
in federalism under a neoliberal banner and its ability to accommodate
Quebec should neither be underestimated nor underappreciated. Further-
more, a new partnership between Quebec and Canada is not only prom-
ising but also crucial as many Quebecers have "dual allegiances,"24
to both Quebec separatism and federalism and do not want to have to
choose between the two. However, if forced, they can withdraw to their
Quebec identity, a Quebec identity that itself is in the process of change.
The sovereigntist forces that were a combination of French language,
ethnocultural background, social justice and stronger state intervention-
ism are recombining in the face of growing franco-ethnic diversity. As
well, a Quebec neoliberal state has largely sidelined social movements
that supported sovereignty and taken advantage of strengthening Que-
bec recognition and federal-provincial agreements. Amidst this recom-
bination and sidelining, neoliberal governance has been able to create
the basis of continued national unity, emphasizing areas in symbolic rec-
ognition, federal spending and provincial autonomy with which Quebec
can work if at the cost of the place of a strong welfare state in Quebec
nationalism. If Canadian federalism continues its present course under
neoliberalism without any major mishaps, for the first time in recent
memory, it may continue to offer a viable alternative to a separatist
agenda, an agenda that has been dispersed in part by neoliberal forces
within Quebec itself.

Notes

1 As opposed to being the party of independence, the PQ now seeks to reclaim its
place as the protector of Quebec's identity and the defender of Quebec's interests. Its
tabling of the Quebec Identity Act , coupled with its removal of the its referendum
promise, are but two indications of its new goal. Its new strategy focuses on moving
the province closer to independence in an incremental manner (Perreaux, 2009).
2 The BQ did this by providing Quebec's view on national issues and suggesting ways
the federation could be better tailored towards Quebec. Examples of this included
the BQ's suggestion that Quebec should collect its own taxes or its proposal that Bill
101 apply to all federal institutions in Quebec. Such policies have contributed to the
BQ's appeal and help explain its electoral success in recent elections. Both this appeal
and success have come from the BQ's new approach, adopted because of a political
environment with little appetite for separatism. The BQ went from 49 seats to four in
the 201 1 federal election; the future of the BQ and its influence remains uncertain.
3 CROP reported that support for sovereignty was 34 per cent after the January 23,
2006, federal election (Canadian Press, 2006), 37 per cent in November 2008 (Spec-
tor, 2008), and Angus Reid reported 34 per cent in June 2009 (QMI Agency, 2009).
The lows indicate generally weaker support for sovereignty in that support for sover-
eignty has consistently fallen versus risen from the 40 per cent mark in the latter
2000s and help demonstrate that sovereignty has not been a flashpoint during this

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Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? 783
period. As well, an Angus Reid poll in 2009 reported that 74 per cent of Quebecers
believe separation is unlikely (QMI Agency, 2009).
4 Laforest noted that Quebec pursued a neoliberal agenda under the guise of decentral-
ization and democratization (2009: 171) Graefe described the PQ agenda of the mid-
1990s to the early 2000s as one of "competitive nationalism" (2005c: 54-58), an agenda
that has been consistent with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism refers to a political ideol-
ogy and socioeconomic political platform that supports tax cuts to individuals and cor-
porations, a smaller welfare state, a smaller civil service, unregulated markets for
putatively freer market competition, and an emphasis on individual responsibility and
independence from the state. Neoliberalism began to take hold in Western developed
nations such as the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Canada in the early to
mid-1980s and continues to be the prevailing worldview on the part of political and
economic elites. Neoconservatism espouses a similar socioeconomic political plat-
form of neoliberalism and it also tends to emphasize traditional views of women's
capacities and the centrality of religion and religious values for a better society.
5 The number of seats in the House of Commons will rise to 338. Quebec seats will
incerease to 78; Alberta and British Columbia will each gain six seats, and Ontario
15. Predictably, the BQ fought against this bill with the federal Liberal party support-
ing more seats for Quebec. The BQ wanted Quebec's current proportion of seats
(24.4%) made permanent.
6 The riding of Montmagny-L'Islet-Kamouraska-Rivèrière-du-Loup.
7 Turgeon (2006) argued that there is a gradual transition from a neoliberal state to a
social investment state whereby the federal government will invest more in social
development and infrastructure. Following Mahon (2005) and Noël (2006), an impor-
tant qualification we would add to Turgeon 's argument is that the term "social invest-
ment" largely remains consistent within (even circumscribed by) a larger neoliberal
framework. There remains overall reduced spending that is putting strain on munici-
palities and what spending there is, it is channelled into targeted individual benefits
versus broader social programs, all toward the neoliberal principle of economic com-
petitiveness (Jenson, 2004).
8 For accounts of continental integration, where a federal state that has transferred pow-
ers upward to transnational organizations, outward to the market, see Boismenu and
Jenson (1998), Clarkson and Lewis (1999), Inwood (2000) and Harmes (2007).
9 The creation of the CHST meant that funding for health care, social assistance, and
post-secondary education were lumped into one grant and then transferred to the prov-
inces. The CHST represented unilateral decentralization, as the creation of predeter-
mined block grants replaced traditional matching funds (Béland and Lecours, 2006:
87).
10 For details on these agreements, see Graefe (2005b: 2-5). At the same time, greater
provincial autonomy does not necessarily translate into provincial expansion into a
policy area. Reduced federal and provincial funding has created increased strain in
policy areas such as child care in terms of reduced number of spaces, working con-
ditions for child care staff, specifically in Toronto, Ontario (Mahon, 2005: 349, 354).
1 1 "Our Government believes that the constitutional jurisdiction of each order of gov-
ernment should be respected. To this end, guided by our federalism of openness, our
Government will introduce legislation to place formal limits on the use of the federal
spending power for new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive provincial juris-
diction. This legislation will allow provinces and territories to opt out with reason-
able compensation if they offer compatible programs" (Government of Canada, 2007).
12 Graefe (2006) noted that the trend has been consistent since 1995 for limited forms
of convergence in terms of federal agenda setting or steering with provinces. This
convergence has allowed for significant provincial autonomy to implement and admin-
ister social assistance programs.

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784 Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen
13 See Gagnon and Iacovino (2007), Noël (2000), Graefe (2008).
14 The Quebec-France labour mobility agreement was expanded as of April 27, 2009,
to include up to 16 professions, with recognition of more professions before the end
of next year. These agreements are believed to serve as a template for negotiations of
a Canada-EU trade agreement.
1 5 Inwood noted that the shift away from the east-west axis trading pattern in Canada
to a north-south axis between provinces and their southern US neighbours was pre-
dicted by the New Canadian Political Economy School (2000: 141).
16 For a succinct history of the emergence of the social union in Canada, see Fortin
(2006: 342-51).
17 Hébert noted that Quebec had developed the largest federal/provincial expertise over
years of Quebec-Ottawa squabbling and the provinces benefitted from this knowl-
edge through the COF (2007: 85).
1 8 The Kelowna Accord was a $5 billion agreement reached in November 2005 between
the federal government, provinces, territorial leaders and five national aboriginal orga-
nizations to improve the education, employment, and living conditions of aboriginal
peoples. Stephen Harper came to power with a minority government in January 2006
and announced that his government would not implement the Kelowna Accord since
it was an agreement reached by the previous Liberal government under Paul Martin.
19 Jean Charest, then leader of the Parti Libéral de Québec (PLQ), immediately announced
the federal transfer would go directly to Quebecers in the form of a tax credit, much
to the disgruntlement of Prime Minister Harper.
20 Graefe noted that the Harper Conservative government "seems content to operate
within the framework of these agreements" (2008: 83).
21 By recognizing Quebec as a nation, the federal government has further diffused the
possibility of a national unity crisis, fulfilling a demand made by Quebec since at
least the Meech Lake negotiations. A primary obstacle between Quebec and the rest
of Canada had been the lack of recognition as a nation (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007:
169). Graefe and Laforest noted that Harper's move broke "a seeming taboo about
recognizing Quebec as a nation, and in the process raised the possibility of changing
the terms of debate around the national question" (2008: 55).
22 Banting noted that the formalized role for Quebec at UNESCO built on existing prec-
edent (2006: 83). At the same time, the announcement arguably augmented recogni-
tion for Quebec within Canada.
23 Charest criticized the federal government for not adopting more aggressive targets to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
24 In a recent CROP poll of Quebeckers, 22 per cent of respondents said they were partly
federalist and sovereigntist, and 25 per cent said they were neither. (Montpetit, 2010).

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