Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University

Mid - La Union Campus College of Arts and Sciences

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements in

GECC 104 Ethics

“A New Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula”

Marvin R. Angeles

BAPS – 2B

Lester Hufalar

Instructor
Introduction

Over the years, the US has attempted to exert an influence on North Korea to
contain the latter’s potential threat to the security of East Asia in general and South Korea
in particular. In an effort to exhibit its power over North Korea, its ability to get North
Korea to do things the latter otherwise would not do, the US has sometimes threatened
the use of force, as it did at the height of the nuclear crisis in 1994. When the US
approved the dispatch of substantial military reinforcements to South Korea in the early
summer of 1994, it was widely believed that the Korean peninsula was at the brink of
another war. The intention of the US to resort to military force was vigorously protested
by South Korea and its neighboring countries.

At our present time, during the term of Former President Donald Trump of US
every time the North Korea launches test rockets, Trump uses Twitter to launch a volley of
tweets belittling that country’s leader Kim Jong-un or threatening a fiery end to his
country. When the Trump administration took over in 2017, it wanted to spend even more
—over a half billion more—with a large part of that increase going to speed up the
development of an improved air-launched cruise missile designed to fly stealthily for
thousands of miles and deliver a variable nuclear blast, from 5 to 150 kilotons. The
intended target wouldn’t see it coming and could experience destruction ranging from a
fraction to ten times that delivered by the bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima.
In 2017, North Korea showed the world it was capable of fielding several types of
successful missiles, each with a longer range than the last. A successful submarine-
launched missile test in 2021 showed that, despite earlier fabrications, North Korea was
now able to launch a missile from anywhere the submarine could go – greatly enhancing its
ability to launch a retaliatory attack, if needed. While North Korea only has one missile
sub, the Gorae/Sinpo, it would act as a possible deterrent at moments of heightened
tension between North Korea and its neighbors, especially South Korea. One missile tested
on January 5, 2022 appeared to have an enhanced capacity to maneuver in ways that
make it almost impossible to stop by missile defenses. The erratic flight path has been
confirmed by North Korea’s neighbors. The very last launch of test rockets of North Korea
was November 18, 2022 and named Hwasong-17, while on the other hand the United
States has been modernizing its own nuclear arsenal, adding yet more lethal and stealthy
weapons to its inventory. During the United Nations General Assembly in September of
2017, President Donald Trump said “The United States has great strength and patience,
but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy
North Korea.”
Body

At the present time, Kim Jong-un wants North Korea to be a nuclear superpower
which leads to the case of regional arms race. The recent claim by Kim Jong Un that North
Korea plans to develop the world’s most powerful nuclear force may well have been more
bravado than credible threat. But that doesn’t mean it can be ignored.The best guess is
that North Korea now has sufficient fissile material to build 45 to 55 nuclear weapons,
three decades after beginning its program. The warheads would mostly have yields of
around 10 to 20 kilotons, similar to the 15 kiloton bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in
1945.But North Korea has the capacity to make devices ten times bigger. Its missile
delivery systems are also advancing in leaps and bounds. The technological advance is
matched in rhetoric and increasingly reckless acts, including test-firing missiles over Japan
in violation of all international norms, provoking terror and risking accidental war. The
question now is how best to bring the pariah nation into the orbit of arms control
negotiations and international dialogue.

The new arms race is a huge threat to all human beings, arms race led many
people to fear that nuclear war could happen anytime, and some countries urged their
citizens to survive an atomic bomb. It affects also negative occurrence in both economic
and security terms. Large scale arms acquisitions require considerable economic
resources. If two countries spend large sums of money just to cancel out each other’s
effort, the expenditure might well be seen as wasted. If the conflict between US and
North Korea still occur many people might be affected, not only in economic and security
terms, it will also affect their mental health or state because the threat of a possible
nuclear will always be on their mind. For this reason, the primary goal of states is to
maximize their own security. However, many of the actions taken in pursuit of that goal
such as weapons procurement and the development of new military technologies will
necessarily decrease the security of other states. Decreasing the security of other states
does not automatically create a dilemma, but other states will tend to follow suit if one
state arms. They cannot know whether the arming state will use its increased
military capabilities for an attack in the future. For this reason, they will either choose to
increase their own military capabilities in order to reestablish the balance of power or
they will launch a preemptive attack to prevent the arming state from upsetting the
balance in the first place. If they choose the first option, the result may be a security
spiral, in which two (or more) states are tied in an arms race, with each state responding
to increases in weapons procurement and defense expenditure by the other state, leading
them both to arm themselves more and more heavily. That situation may lead to war in
the long run.

International conflict is not the result of “status quo” powers seeking to maximize
security but of “revisionist” powers seeking to maximize power. If all states were status
quo powers, such critics have argued, then military conflict would be extremely rare,
because the world would consist of status quo powers eager to signal
their benign intentions.

Discussion

The arms race on the Korean peninsula is moving into a risky new stage. Despite UN
sanctions that forbid it from doing so, North Korea has continued to increase both the size
of its nuclear and conventional arsenals since it restarted missile testing in 2019 following
a brief hiatus the previous year. Instead of the intercontinental ballistic kind that may
endanger America, it has concentrated on new missiles that might be better at dodging
the South's detection systems. In the meantime, the South has increased its defense
spending and bolstered its own weaponry.

It is difficult to continue arms control negotiations with North Korea since doing so would
require the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to recognize the North
as a nuclear state (NPT). In 1985, North Korea joined the NPT as a state party; however, in
2013, it withdrew and started working on nuclear weapons.

As Washington has long emphasized, Pyongyang's nuclear program is unlawful and subject
to UN sanctions; therefore, any participation in arms control negotiations with Pyongyang
would represent a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea. Washington stated that it is
still committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and underlined that it is
willing to meet with North Korea without holding any demands.

There is no question that North Korea is in possession of nuclear weapons. This has been
made abundantly obvious by six nuclear weapon test explosions and the launch of various
different kinds of missiles to carry them. It is also quite evident that Kim Jong Un, the
leader of North Korea, has no desire to negotiate the surrender of his country's nuclear
weapons. Kim declared North Korea's nuclear status is "irreversible" in September,
observing the ratification of a new legislation detailing a policy on the use of nuclear
weapons, even if Washington maintains sanctions for "a thousand years."
Despite this fact and despite predictions of a seventh nuclear test by North Korea, there is
an ongoing discussion in Washington and Seoul over whether it is time to recognize North
Korea as a nuclear power. Because the weapons are present and we cannot get rid of them
without starting a nuclear war, it may seem like semantics, but the risks are considerably
higher. The argument centers on whether it would be worthwhile to reduce the likelihood
of nuclear war and escalation in the short term at the risk of the United States being seen
as weak by allies, fueling fears of abandonment that increase the risk of proliferation in
Northeast Asia, and possibly causing long-term harm to the global nonproliferation regime.

The most crucial aspect of any step toward accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea would
be openly acknowledging the relationship of nuclear deterrence that exists between
Pyongyang and Washington and pursuing risk-reduction talks that start from the premise
that both sides hold a shared interest in preventing nuclear war. If disarmament remains
the only goal, there won't be any diplomatic efforts to promote stability in the deterrence
relationship that already exists and to provide a way out of the security crisis that is
spiraling out of control.

It would be ill-advised to let these facts prevent efforts at pursuing policies that could
significantly reduce the chances and repercussions of a nuclear conflict in Northeast Asia.
Given the expected course of future crises on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of
nuclear use by North Korea is increasing alarmingly. It would be the most crucial method
for the United States and its northeast allies to increase their own security, not as a kind
of altruistic gift to Pyongyang to celebrate the success of its now more than three
decades-long nuclear weapons program.

Recommendations

Given the history of the North and the struggle between pragmatists and idealists in
Pyongyang over the past ten or more years, it is wise to exercise caution. Within the
North's leadership, there are probably skeptics, and if rapprochement continues, cracks
could widen. If that occurs, Kim might find it more difficult to advance. As an alternative,
engagement might not meet expectations and lead to some cutbacks, or Chairman Kim's
prominence in the policy-making process might prove to be a problem.

U.S. policymakers should bear a few rules in mind when pursuing engagement. First,
creating an efficient policymaking system inside the executive branch, with Congress, and
with our allies will be necessary to deal with the shifting conditions on the peninsula.
Second, while policymakers can have endless discussions about Pyongyang's goals, the best
approach to ascertain Pyongyang's true intents still relies on ongoing diplomatic
investigations. Third, the US should maintain a clear focus on its priorities. Its primary
goal is to contain and lessen the security danger, not to change North Korean society.
Change in North Korea could result from such endeavor. Attempting to achieve both can
be a recipe for disaster. Fourth, Seoul in particular must believe that the United States is
actively promoting the peace process in Korea. To prevent compromising South-North
dialogue, close policy cooperation will be necessary. Fifth, Washington needs to be ready
for roadblocks, especially unforeseen provocations from the North that can jeopardize
engagement. Keeping a long-term perspective will therefore be essential. Finally, in order
to maintain a balance of power on the peninsula and garner support from abroad, the
United States will need to cooperate with others.

A comprehensive agreement between the US and North Korea that would virtually halt all
of its programs—from the medium-range Nodong missile to the longer-range Taepodong
missile—seems to have been under discussion. The pact would put a stop to such missile
shipments, testing, and possibly even development and deployment. The "reloads" for its
mobile launchers, the mobile missile stores, may also need to be destroyed. Technical
specifics are still challenging. For instance, it would be necessary to take stringent on-site
steps to verify broad restrictions on mobile missiles.

Such measures would benefit from using the U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons control accords
that restrict mobile missiles as a model. However, they might now be deemed undesirable
by North Korea. The incoming government had to be ready to take into account less
substantial, but nonetheless important, agreements like a permanent prohibition on flight
tests coupled with a restriction on the transfer of missiles and associated technologies.
These restrictions could be the start of a more thorough accord.

A "congressional observation group" made up of important Republican and Democratic

members of the committees overseeing the military, foreign policy, and intelligence
should also be created by the incoming administration. Members and staff would have
access to frequent, comprehensive briefings from the executive branch, would frequently
interact with important regional decision-makers, including North Korea, and would even
be invited to significant U.S. diplomatic talks with those nations.

The goals of a new administration remain the same: stability, nonproliferation,

reconciliation, and a strong US-ROK alliance. Controlling North Korean WMD and ballistic
missiles has been and will continue to be a critical US priority, but that does not preclude
a much more active effort to address what is likely to be a more critical threat: the
North's forward-deployed conventional military forces.

Conclusion

The American nuclear strategy toward North Korea has proved unsuccessful. Its intention
was to stop North Korea from acquiring and disseminating nuclear weapons, but the
opposite has happened. This failure was brought about by the George W. Bush
administration's sweeping rejection of the prior administration's strategy toward North
Korea, propensity to disregard professional counsel, neoconservative influence on foreign
policy, and internal conflicts that led to an inconsistent strategy.

This analysis demonstrates a daring new strategy in which the United States offers North
Korea full diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War as the first steps
toward the objectives established in the North Korea Six Party Talks of 2007, i.e., that
North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons programs and stop the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By eliminating its greatest external security
threat—the United States—North Korea's commitment to nuclear disarmament and
nonproliferation will be strengthened. These actions should be seen as a starting point
rather than a reward for compliance.

For more than 50 years, North Korea has served as the model for renegade governments. It
has pursued a nuclear weapons program, built and exported ballistic missiles, supported
terrorist activities, is suspected of engaging in the drug trade and counterfeiting, and
continuously posed a threat to U.S. allies and interests, leading to the stationing of
American forces in South Korea and Japan. But a policy trial has also been conducted on
it. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have made an effort to communicate
with Pyongyang in an effort to normalize relations and put an end to its troubling
behavior.

In light of this, there is no reason to think that the current course will lead to a return to
the "bellicose rhetoric" of 2017, when Trump and Kim's verbal battle suggested that
conflict on the peninsula might be nigh. The regional order, which has supported stability
on the peninsula, is nevertheless vulnerable. The South feels that it lacks complete clarity
over American alliance commitments. The North is wary of its growing political and
economic dependence on China. Even worse, North Korea believes that its diplomatic
outreach in 2018 and 2019 went unappreciated.
Even if Pyongyang's next moves are always uncertain, and the pandemic has only made
them so, the North Korean regime will probably be inclined to choose an alternative
course if it does not receive the desired level of international participation when it is
prepared to negotiate. When the Olympics are over, the pandemic is somewhat under
control, and if the right wins the South Korean presidential election, that temptation will
be at its strongest. Although there is no assurance that the United States and the South
will be able to avert that result with a diplomatic upsurge at the appropriate time, the
Biden administration and the two candidates for president of South Korea should be
gearing up to try.

These concurrent displays of power can be seen as a part of a struggle for military
dominance on the peninsula. Both sides have a motivation to want to stay up, as
Pyongyang keeps improving its missile and nuclear capabilities and Seoul makes its own
technological strides. But they were also influenced by bigger objectives.

The enmity created by nations threatening each other with indiscriminate, weapons of
mass destruction prevents development of global solidarity and trust we need to address
challenges like the climate crisis and pandemics.

References:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/17/asia/north-korea-missile-test-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/north-and-south-korea-missile-tests-arms-
race

https://theconversation.com/kim-jong-un-wants-north-korea-to-be-a-nuclear-superpower-
the-real-risk-is-a-regional-arms-race-195726

https://www.britannica.com/topic/security-dilemma