Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University

Mid-La Union Campus

PSIE 102 - Philippine Branches of Government & Administration

Compilation of Case Digest

Marvin Angeles
BAPS – 2

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Corazon C. Aquino
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986…………………………………………. 1
G.R. Nos. L-8777-79, August 14, 1956………………………………… 2

Fidel V. Ramos
G.R. No. 79173, December 1, 1987…………………………………….. 3
P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996………………………………. 4

Joseph Ejercito Estrada

G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009……………………………………. 5
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001……………………………. 7

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001…………………………………… 8
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424,
May 3 2006……………………………………………………………… 9

Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014…………………………………………. 10
G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019…………………………………………11

Rodrigo Roa Duterte

G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019…………………………………….13
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019………………………………….. 15

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 [G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO
VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

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 [G.R. Nos. L-8777-79. August 14, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CORAZON AQUINO

alias AZON, Defendant-Appellee.

Facts:

In three separate informations identically worded except that each referred to a different
offended party, Corazon Aquino was accused, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
of the crime of grave oral defamation for having allegedly uttered in public, on or about June
4, 1954, words to this effect: "You, Merrera lawyers, are stealers *** shameless ***
impolite." . Three informations were filed on the theory that, as there were three lawyers
bearing the surname "Merrera", three separate crime of defamation were committed. But the
lower court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the informations consolidated into one on the
ground that, as the defamatory statement was uttered but once and on a single occasion against a
group of persons not mentioned individually, the act complained of constituted only one offense.
From this order, the prosecution appealed to this Court.

In support of its order, the lower court cites various cases of libel decided by this Court
(among them, that of U. S. vs. Kelly, 35 Phil., 419) in which, regardless of the number of
persons libelled, the accused were sentenced for only one offense. The court also cites decisions
holding that a person who, on the same occasion and in the same place, steals properties
belonging to different owners, is guilty of only one crime of theft.

Issue:

Whether or not there is no criminal action for defamation.

Held:

In line with this latter decision, we have to hold that the utterance of the defamatory statement
complained of in the present cases should be regarded as only one offense and made the subject
of only one information, the utterance having been made but once and referring apparently to a
family of lawyers designated by their common surname but not separately mentioned.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

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 G.R. No. 79173 December 1, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N.
ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minors JUNE
ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA. THERESA, ANNA
ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and BART JOSEPH, all surnamed ABADILLA,
Petitioners, vs. General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO
DE VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary & Vice-Chief of Staff, AFP;
and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Commanding General, CAPCOM, PC,
Respondents.chan
Facts:
Col. Abadilla was the head of the group that seized GMA 7 in 1987. A subsequent mutiny was
done in Fort Bonifacio. The act was infamously known as the Black Saturday Revolt. The
mutiny failed and Abadilla was later detained. Ramos, the then Chief of Staff, issued an order
dropping the name of Abadilla from roll of regular officers in the military. Later, Susan, the wife
of Abadilla, filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus together with their
minor children. They questioned the validity of Abadilla’s detention. It was alleged that when
Col Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian
and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer
subject to military law. His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal
offense, either before a civil court or a court-martial
Issue:
Whether or not the detention of Abadila is legal.
Held:
The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead
to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a
conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before
his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer
would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to
surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular
officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts
for offenses he committed while still in the military service. Military jurisdiction had fully
attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service in the military. The record of the case discloses that Col Abadilla has
been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War (Mutiny or Sedition)
which is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him.
The detention of Col Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For
this reason, the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.

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 P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,

vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.

Facts:

The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992election.
In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in hercomment of the 29th
of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayedthat the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and therevision process in the pilot areas
be deemed computed.The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant andprotestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic byher
election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as suchon the 30th of
June in the year 1995.

Held:

YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned orconsidered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office asSenator and her discharge
of the duties and functions thereof.The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and
pursue the public interestinvolved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate.Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipatethe aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections,
therebyenhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
nationalrecovery.Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET
within 10days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she
stillwishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any suchintention,
such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

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 G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009
People vs Estrada
Facts:
3 cases (plunder, illegal use of alias and perjury were consolidated in this case against Estrada.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan
issued. An order for the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and
decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against
respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. Officers of
PCIB declared that Estrada opened an account with them signed Jose Velarde. The People filed
its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into
evidence in a Resolution. Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence on the following
grounds:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001
as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
Sandiganbayan had several points on its resolution,
1. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating
to what is described in the Information.
2. the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense.
3. The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of
anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a
legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed
depositors to hide their true identities.
Issue:
WON there was insufficiency of evidence presented & if the Ursua Ruling holds value in this
case

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Held:
The Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different
from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecution case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution evidence was
sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the
Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case
in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of
discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the
Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its
petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent
Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name
Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction;
and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud
in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The
People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No.
142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias
was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now
examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it
presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of
publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.

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 A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
FACTS:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N.
Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez formally filed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
HELD:
NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant:
"Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to
extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the
trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant,
telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and
distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is a
powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the
eyes of the public." The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be
installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more
judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused
shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right to a public
trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the
balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair
trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of
the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity
of a few grandstanding lawyers."Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but
to chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even
before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed,
is a price too high to pay.

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 Estrada Vs Arroyo

GR No. 146710 – 15, March 2, 2001

Facts:
The impeachment court decided not to open the controversial envelope. The prosecutors
tendered their resignation. The Senate postponed the impeachment proceeding indefinitely.
People started marching towards EDSA to call for Estrada’s resignation. AFP and PNP declared
that they are withdrawing their support of the Estrada administration. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
took oath as the New President of the Republic of the Philippines. Then Estrada and his family
hurriedly left Malacañang.

Issue:
Whether or Not Estrada resigned officially as a president

Ruling:
By virtue of his letter, Estrada has officially resigned and has in effect, relinquished his
power as president. The Congress had also expressed support to the new administration and that
decision made by co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court
Petition is dismissed.

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 DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006

FACTS:

Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to
prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police
arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the
proclamation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No.
1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

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 Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al,

GR 209287, July 1, 2014

FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the
Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is
defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They
aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings
and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their
part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not
have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection,
constitutional?
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers.
No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the
DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating thenational economy, the acts and practices
under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain
illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein
are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the
limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a
society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and
set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal
methods.

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KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, GR No. 210500, 2019-
04-02

Facts:

a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition... a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike... following
issuances: Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013; (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013
dated September 20, 2013;and (3) Circular No. 2013-010
On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.

Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security System members directly affected by the
premium hike, petitioners assert having the requisite locus standi to file the Petition... the
assailed issuances were issued per an unlawful delegation of power to respondent Social Security
Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the Social Security Act.

Section 18 allegedly offers vague and unclear standards, and are incomplete in its terms and
conditions.

has allowed respondent Social Security Commission to fix contribution rates from time to time,
subject to the President's approval.

the increase in contribution rate violates Section 4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act, which states
that the "increases in benefits shall not require any increase in the rate of contribution[.]"... an
invalid exercise of police power for not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
purpose sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive on the labor sector.

grossly unjust to the working class and is beyond respondents' powers.

the State is required to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare under the
Constitution.

a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the
implementation of the increase in contributions.

Issues:
This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security System premium hike, which
took effect in January 2014.
First, whether or not this Court can exercise its power of judicial review; Second, whether or not
there is an actual case or controversy; Third, whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies; Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the
Petition; and Finally, whether or not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and
with grave abuse of discretion.

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whether or not the assailed issuances are void for having been issued under vague and unclear
standards contained in the Social Security Act;... whether or not the increase in Social Security
System contributions is reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought and is
unduly oppressive upon the labor sector;... whether or not the revised ratio of contributions
between employers and employees is grossly unjust to the working class and beyond respondent
Social Security Commission's power to enact.

Ruling:

This Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.

Procedural infirmities attend the filing of this Petition.

This Court, however, notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated
workers' constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review.

Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without specifying how these rights
translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security System
contributions. Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy under
the ordinary course of law except through the instant Petition." Sections 4 and 5 of the Social
Security Act are clear that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute
arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. The aggrieved
party must first exhaust all administrative remedies available before seeking review from the
courts... not all petitioners have shown the requisite legal standing to bring the case before this
Court.

On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for Trade
Union and Human Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all
failed to show how they will suffer direct and material injury from the enforcement of the
assailed issuances. The increase in contributions has been in effect since January 2014. As such,
the issue of the validity of increase in contributions is of transcendental importance. The required
legal standing for petitioners must be relaxed.

For all these reasons, and despite the technical infirmities in this Petition, this Court reviews the
assailed issuances. Petitioners are putting in issue not only the validity of the exercise of the
delegated power, but also the validity of the delegation itself. They are, thus, collaterally
attacking the validity of the Social Security Act's provisions. Collateral attacks on a presumably
valid law are not allowed. Unless a law, rule, or act is annulled in a direct proceeding, it is
presumed valid. The "delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life."

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 De Lima vs Duterte,
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
FACTS:
May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President of the
Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless national crackdown on
illegal drugs.
August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a
stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown.
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo Roa Dutete
from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security through his
public statements:
August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the favorite whipping boy of
the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But, I have a special ano kaya no. She is a
government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy
her in public.” Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte insinuated that with the help of
another country, he was keeping surveillance of her. “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa
kanila. So while all the time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy, and
with the help of another country, listening to them.
The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17, 2016
wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government office he referred to earlier at
the same time accused her of living an immortal life by having a romantic affair with her driver,
a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs. “There’s one crusading lady, whose even
herself led a very immoral life, taking his driver as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya
nagging hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association. You know, when you are an
immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married. So you live with the driver, its concubinage.
The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and personal
life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades; that told of her being involved in
illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her driver/lover
with financing from drug-money
Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and demeaned her womanhood and
humanity. If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I’ll hang myself. Your life has been, hindi
lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-
resign. You resign. And “De Lima better hang yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo.
Any other woman would have slashed her throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang
x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos ng shooting, nakangiti…”
Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered President Durterte
while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called “Davao Death Squad.”

ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled to
court
HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
YES.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e.
permanent or temporary

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Extent:
Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions fell
within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary rather than ministerial –
conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant or routinely office work but rather
the challenged action must involve personal judgment. It attaches to the function instead of the
office.
Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove that at the
time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a good faith that his actions were
lawful – subjective element determined with the two-tier test:
If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the alleged
wrongful action
Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
Duration:
Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law suits that arise
out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating even private
suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers
Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. It is not intended to immunize the
President from liability or accountability.
Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s
behalf and that it was the President who had gone to court as the complainant
If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint brought
against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the
rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in
the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.
Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an
ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his tenure (not
his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.

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ZABAL v. DUTERTE
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019
FACTS:
 Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his plan to
shut it down during a business forum.
 President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting held on April 4,
2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr. wherein he
formally announced that the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six
months starting April 26, 2018.
 Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who were earning a living from
the tourist activities therein. Zabal builds sandcastles for tourists while Jacosalem drives for
tourists and workers in the island. Petitioner Bandiola claims to occasionally visit Boracay for
business and pleasure.
 Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had
been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough
to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and
irreparable damage.
 They filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order against respondents
President Rodrigo R. Duterte (President Duterte ), Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea,
and Secretary Eduardo M. Año of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
 petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their
original petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally
declaring a state of calamity in Boracay
 petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 475
petitioners assert that ( 1) this case presents constitutional issues, on whether President Duterte
acted within the scope of the powers granted him by the Constitution in ordering the closure of
Boracay and, whether the measures implemented infringe upon the constitutional rights to travel
and to due process and, (2) They also claim that President Duterte exercised a power legislative
in nature, thus unlawfully excluding the legislative department from the assertion of such power.

 Petitioners also argue that the closure of Boracay could not be anchored on police power
o Other arguments:
Petitioners likewise argue that the closure of Boracay could not be anchored on police power.
For one, police power must be exercised not by the executive but by legislative bodies through
the creation of statutes and ordinances that aim to promote the health, moral, peace, education,
safety, and general welfare of the people. For another, the measure is unreasonably unnecessary
and unduly oppressive.

o While petitioners acknowledge the President's power of supervision over LGUs, they
nevertheless point out that he does not wield the power of control over them. He cannot lay down
the rules himself as this already constitutes control.
 , respondents contend that the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is within the ambit of the
powers of the President, not contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers, and in accordance
with the mechanism laid out by the Constitution.

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ISSUES: The issues in this case are
1. WON Proclamation No. 475 constitute an impairment on the right to travel-NO
2. WON Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure-YES
RULING:
 2. The assailed governmental measure is within the scope of police power.
 The statutes from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions
which serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety,
and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate
objectives of governmental efforts and regulations.
 The pressing need to implement urgent measures to rehabilitate Boracay is beyond cavil from
the factual circumstances that precipitated the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 475. This
necessity is even made more critical and insistent by what the Court said in Oposa v. Hon.
Factoran, Jr. 52 in regard the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health, which
rights are likewise integral concerns in this case.
 Oposa warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
given continuing importance and the State assumes its solemn obligation to preserve and protect
them, the time will come that nothing will be left not only for this generation but for the
generations to come as well.
 SC ruled that the temporary closure of Boracay is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.
 the bulk of the rehabilitation activities involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and
construction. These works could not have easily been done with tourists present.
 Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may seem,
was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most
practical and realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and
carried out in the most efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the
executive determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing
circumstances
• First, President Duterte is dropped as respondent because settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case.
• Notwithstanding petitioners' lack of locus standi, this Court allowed the petition to proceed due
to its transcendental importance. (what Zabal and Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere
projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are sheer expectancies. Concomitantly,
an
assertion of direct injury on the basis of loss of income does not clothe Zabal and Jacosalem with
legal standing.)
On the 1st issue, the SC ruled that
• 1. Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an actual impairment on the right to travel
• The case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense. Any bearing that
Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of
Boracay and the ban of tourists and nonresidents therefrom which were necessary incidents of
the island's rehabilitation.
• If at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely
consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of time.

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• The proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the President did not usurp the
lawmaking power of the legislature.

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