Republic of the Philippines

Laguna State Polytechnic University

Province of Laguna

LSPU Self-Paced Learning Module (SLM)

Course Ethics
Sem/AY Inter Semester/2022-2023
Module No. 4
Lesson Title FRAMEWORKS AND PRINCIPLES BEHIND OUR MORAL DISPOSITION
FRAMEWORKS
Week
1 week
Duration
Date July 17-21
Ethics deals with principles of ethical behavior in modern society at the level of the
Course person, society, and interaction with the environment and other shared resources
Description (CMO 20 s 2013).
Morality pertains to standards of right and wrong that an individual originally picks up
from the community. The course discusses the context of principles of ethical behavior
in modern society at the level of individual, society, and in interaction with the
environment and other shared resources. The course also teaches students to make
moral decisions by using dominant moral frameworks and by applying a seven-step
moral reasoning model to analyze and solve moral dilemmas.
The course is organized according to the three (3) main elements of moral experience:
(a) agent, including context - cultural, communal, and environmental; (b) the act; and
(c) reason or framework (for the act).
This course also includes the mandatory topic on taxation.

Learning Outcomes
Intended At the end of the course, the students must be able to:
Learning ● Differentiate between moral and non-moral problems
Outcomes
● Describe what a moral experience is as it happens in different levels of human experience

● Explain the influence of Filipino culture on the way students look at moral experiences
and solve moral dilemmas
● Describe the elements of moral development and moral experience

● Use ethical frameworks or principles to analyze moral experiences

● Make sound ethical judgments based on principles, facts, and the stakeholders affected

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

● Develop sensitivity to the common good

● Understand and internalize the principles of ethical behavior in modern society at the
level o the person, society, and in interaction with the environment and other shared
resources
Targets/ This section addresses the following questions:
Objectives ● What are the overarching frameworks that dictate the way we make our individual moral
decisions?
● What is my framework in making my decisions?

Stu dent Learning Strategies

Online Activities
(Synchronous/
Asynchronous)
Offline Activities A. Virtue ethics
(e-Learning/Self- Virtue ethics is a broad term for theories that emphasize the role of character and
Paced) virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s duty or acting in order to
bring about good consequences. A virtue ethicist is likely to give you this kind
of moral advice: “Act as a virtuous person would act in your situation.”
1. Aristotle
Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a scholar in disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics,
biology and botany, amongst others. It is fitting, therefore, that his moral
philosophy is based around assessing the broad characters of human beings rather
than assessing singular acts in isolation. Indeed, this is what separates Aristotelian
Virtue Ethics from both Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics.
a) Telos
The Greek term telos refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final
function of an object.
Aristotle’s claim is essentially that in achieving its function, goal or end, an object
achieves its own good. Every object has this type of a true function and so
every object has a way of achieving goodness. Also, according to him, we have
a telos as humans, which it is our goal to fulfill. This telos is based on our uniquely

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

human capacity for rational thought. Aristotle’s view of humans having a telos based
in our rationality leads directly to his conclusion in Book X that contemplation is the
highest human good.
b) Virtue as Habit
Aristotle defines moral virtue as a disposition to behave in the right manner and as a
mean between extremes of deficiency and excess, which are vices. We learn moral
virtue primarily through habit and practice rather than through reasoning and
instruction.
c) Happiness as Virtue
Aristotle’s concept of happiness consists only in virtuous activity ( Aristotle, (2004).
Happiness, which most of Aristotle’s interpreters call Eudaimonia, is the ultimate
goal/end of human life. This happiness or the ultimate end is genuinely
desired for its own sake or without qualification. So, actions which precede this end
become the most valuable and cannot be superseded by any actions driven by
ordinary kinds of ends. As Lear (2004:20) corroborates, “to choose for actions which
result in honor, wealth and power is definitely part of man’s inclination to seek
for happiness (as pleasure), but unfortunately this could not be the end of which offers
true happiness”
Like Eudaimonia, pleasure is also good. That is why Aristotle does not condemn man
for desiring pleasure because it is a significant part in human flourishing. But for
Aristotle, the desire and actions that lead to pleasure only presuppose limited value
since its end is temporary. Hence, the satisfaction that one gets from these actions
cannot be truly called happiness. For Aristotle, these actions, which only lead humans
into the pit of the two opposing vices (either excess or deficiency), drive them away
from the ultimate end. Hence, for Aristotle, only virtuous acts can lead a man toward
living a good life or happiness.
Genuine happiness lies in action that leads to virtue, since this alone provides true
value and not just amusement. Thus, Aristotle held that contemplation is the
highest form of moral activity because it is continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and
complete. (Nic. Ethics X 8) In intellectual activity, human beings most nearly
approach divine blessedness, while realizing all of the genuine human virtues
as well.
2. St. Tomas: Natural Law
a) The natural and its tenets
St. Tomas Aquinas wrote most extensively about natural law. He stated, "the light of
reason is placed by nature [and thus by God] in every man to guide him in his acts."
Therefore, human beings, alone among God’s creatures, use reason to lead their lives.
This is natural law.
The master principle of natural law, wrote Aquinas, was that "good is to be done and

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

pursued and evil avoided." Aquinas stated that reason reveals particular natural laws
that are good for humans such as self-preservation, marriage and family, and the
desire to know God. Reason, he taught, also enables humans to understand things that
are evil such as adultery, suicide, and lying.
b) Happiness as constitutive of moral and cardinal virtues
Through teachings, we implicitly making the connection between morality and
happiness in an attempt to restore “Ethics of the Good” and “Morality of Happiness.”
Morality of Happiness
The morality of happiness should be connected to our virtues in doing what is right
and good.
Morality of Happiness and The Four Cardinal Values
FOUR PRINCIPAL CARDINAL VIRTUES
PRUDENCE

● Concerned with intellect

● Guides the judgement of our conscience in discerning our true good and in
applying moral principles to particular circumstances

● "RIGHT REASON IN AN ACTION"

● The guide and measure for all the moral virtues

JUSTICE

● Concerned with the will

● Virtue that consists in giving to God and neighbor what is due to each,

● "GIVING TO THEM WHAT IS RIGHTLY BELONG TO THEM"

● To establish the peace and harmony that bring together people and allow the to
prosper while living in community
Fortitude

● "GIVE US STRENGTH TO DO IT"

● Allow us to remain strong and constant in our pursuit of what is good and give us

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

the strength to resist temptation that would pull us in the wrong direction
Temperance

● "MODERATION IN ALL THINGS"

● Involves the balanced use of the many goods given us so that their use remains
ordered and at the service of the development of the good, well-rounded and
complete person

B. Kant and rights theorists

1. Kant
a) Good will
Although we do not (and should not expect to) find in Kant’s writings any explicit
account of what the good will is, it might we worthwhile to try to construct such an
account, if only better to understand, and assess the truth of, Kant’s famous claim that
the good will is the only conceivable thing that is good without limitation.
The will and willing. The first thing we need to address in attempting such an account
is what Kant means by “will”. There is a strong temptation to understand claims about
the good will as claims about a certain kind of person (the person who has such a will).
It then seems innocent enough to identify the good will simply with the collection of
morally good qualities belonging to such a person (for instance, with the good
person’s moral virtues). The claim that a good will is the only unlimited good is then
naturally taken to be praise for a certain kind of moral character or the assertion of a
certain sort of moral ideal – of the absolutely best sort of person we think there could
be.
No doubt Kant’s claim about the good will has some implications for these matters, but
this line of thinking can lead to crucial mistakes if we are not careful to separate the
notion of a good will from that of a person who has one. 1 For once we see what Kant
means by the good will, I think we will see that a person who is basically bad can
(sometimes) exhibit a good will, and a person who is in general good can sometimes
exhibit a bad will.2 We will also see in due course that the good will is not the same as
moral virtue. We will see that Kant says explicitly that a person can have a good will
yet lack virtue.
A good will, Kant says, is good only “through its willing, i.e. good in itself” (Ak 4:394).
This means that the good will is its willing. To have a good will is to be a person with a
dispositional property, namely, a disposition to will in a certain way. About ‘willing’,

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

Kant tells us that it is “not a mere wish, but the summoning up of all means insofar as
they are in our control” (Ak 4:394). This claim implies that willing is an end-directed
activity, possibly that element in all conscious or intentional activities that involves
directedness to ends and also the choice of means to them. For, as Kant says later on in
the Groundwork, “whoever wills the end, also wills (insofar as his reason has decisive
influence on his actions) the means that are indispensably necessary to it and that are
in his control” (Ak 4:417). Kant repeatedly asserts the traditional doctrine that all
volition is directed at some end (Ak 4:427, 5:58, 6:385, 8:279, 28:1065). To will,
therefore, is (at least) to direct one’s powers to an end by way of some means.
Good willing. But Kant explicitly denies that the good will for Kant is simply the will
whose end is good (or the good, i.e. what is truly good). An action from duty (which, as
we have seen, Kant regards as the most resplendent example of the good will) does
not have its moral worth “in the aim that is supposed to be attained by it” (Ak 4:400).
No doubt Kant would agree with the traditional proposition that the good will does
will what is good as its end, but he breaks with (or at least intends to clarify) the
tradition by insisting that the good as an end must be defined subsequent to the good
will (as its proper object) (Ak 5:62-63). The right way to look at the will in Kant is
therefore to see it as the capacity for rational self-direction insofar as this involves the
adoption of normative principles. The choice of ends and the means to them are a
special, though pervasive, case of regulating our conduct in accordance with such
principles; every volition, in Kant’s view, involves that kind of regulation, but setting
ends and choosing means to them is a rational activity because it is also subject to
rational principles determining which ends we ought to set and which means to them
we ought to employ.
This is how I propose to understand Kant’s often-quoted (but far from transparent)
declaration in the Second Section of the Groundwork that “the will is nothing other
than practical reason” (Ak 4:412). Willing is the exercise of our capacity to give
ourselves rational principles (including, of course, but not limited to, those principles
specifying which ends to set and which means to employ toward them). Good willing
would then be the activity of adopting normative principles (or maxims) for one’s
conduct that are the morally right ones. A bad will also regulates its conduct by
maxims, but its maxims do not conform to valid moral laws (but rather violate them).
‘Duty’ is the “necessitation” or self-constraint we must exercise on our conduct, when
necessary, to insure that rationally valid normative principles are followed, especially
the highest of these principles, the laws of morality. Acting from duty, in cases where
such constraint is required (in the absence of inclinations to do as practical reason
bids, or even in opposition to inclinations tempting us to act contrary to rational
principles) therefore counts as the paradigmatic, even the supreme – though not the
only – example of willing which is good.
The Good Will as Good without Limitation
Kant says that the good will is the only thing “good without limitation” (ohne
Einschrä nkung). By this he obviously does not mean that it is the only thing that is
good, since he goes on to list and classify other goods whose goodness is not without

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

limitation. What he means is that considered in itself the good will is something
entirely good and in no respect bad. He explains this last point by saying that the good
will is the only good thing whose goodness is not diminished by its combination with
anything else – even with all the evil things that may be found in conjunction with it.
A good will, Kant says, often fails to achieve the good ends at which it aims. But its own
proper goodness is not diminished by this failure, or even by bad results that might
flow from it (contrary to its volitions). Even if the good will achieved nothing good --
even if it were combined with all manner of other evils -- “it would shine like a jewel
for itself, as something having its full worth in itself” (Ak 4:394). Kant does not say
whether, on the whole, we should prefer the combination of a good will with bad
consequences or other evils to the combination of a bad will with good results. But he
does think that the goodness of the good will itself is undiminished by such
combinations, whereas the goodness of all other goods (talents of the mind, desirable
qualities of temperament, power, wealth, honor, health, even happiness) is very much
diminished (or even transformed from good to bad) when these are combined with a
will that is not good (Ak 4:393-394). So while all other goods are limited in their
goodness by their combination with bad things, the goodness of the good will is
unique among goods in that it remains untarnished by such combinations.
b) Categorical imperative
Categorical imperative, in the ethics of the 18th-century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, founder of critical philosophy, a rule of conduct that is
unconditional or absolute for all agents, the validity or claim of which does not depend
on any desire or end. “Thou shalt not steal,” for example, is categorical, as distinct from
the hypothetical imperatives associated with desire, such as “Do not steal if you want
to be popular.” For Kant there was only one categorical imperative in the moral realm,
which he formulated in two ways. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can
at the same time will that it should become a universal law” is a purely formal or
logical statement and expresses the condition of the rationality of conduct rather than
that of its morality, which is expressed in another Kantian formula: “So act as to treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end and never as
only a means.”
Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is
a categorical imperative. It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to
agents who could follow it but might not (e.g. , “Leave the gun. Take the cannoli.”). It
is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we
possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not
have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have
antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves.
Categorical Imperative’s first formulation
First formulation (The Formula of Universal Law): "Act only on that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of nature]."
a) What is a maxim? A maxim is the rule or principle on which you act. For example, I

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might make it my maxim to give at least as much to charity each year as I spend on
eating out, or I might make it my maxim only to do what will benefit some member of
my family.
b) Basic idea: The command states, crudely, that you are not allowed to do anything
yourself that you would not be willing to allow everyone else to do as well. You are
not allowed to make exceptions for yourself. For example, if you expect other people
to keep their promises, then you are obligated to keep your own promises.
c) More detail: More accurately, it commands that every maxim you act on must be
such that you are willing to make it the case that everyone always act on that maxim
when in a similar situation. For example, if I wanted to lie to get something I wanted, I
would have to be willing to make it the case that everyone always lied to get what they
wanted - but if this were to happen no one would ever believe you, so the lie would
not work and you would not get what you wanted. So, if you willed that such a maxim
(of lying) should become a universal law, then you would thwart your goal - thus, it is
impermissible to lie, according to the categorical imperative. It is impermissible
because the only way to lie is to make an exception for yourself.
2. Different Kinds of Rights
a) Legal
Legal rights are those rights which are accepted and enforced by the state. Any
defilement of any legal right is punished by law. Law courts of the state enforce legal
rights. These rights can be enforced against individuals and also against the
government. In this way, legal rights are different from moral rights. Legal rights are
equally available to all the citizens. All citizens follow legal rights without any
discrimination. They can go to the courts for getting their legal rights enforced.
b) Moral
Moral Rights are based on human consciousness. They are supported by moral force of
human mind. These are based on human sense of goodness and justice. These are not
assisted by the force of law. Sense of goodness and public opinion are the sanctions
behind moral rights.
If any person disrupts any moral right, no legal action can be taken against him. The
state does not enforce these rights. Its courts do not recognize these rights. Moral
Rights include rules of good conduct, courtesy and of moral behaviour. These stand for
moral perfection of the people.
Moral rights were first acknowledged in France and Germany, before they were
included in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in
1928. Canada recognized moral rights in its Copyright Act. The United States became a
signatory to the convention in 1989, and incorporated a version of moral rights under
its copyright law under Title 17 of the U.S. Code. There are two major moral rights
under the U.S. Copyright Act. These are the right of attribution, also called the right of
paternity and the right of integrity.

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 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
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C. Utilitarianism
1. Origins and nature of theory
Origin of the theory
In normative ethics, a tradition stemming from the late 18th- and 19th-century
English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill that an
action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong if it tends to produce the
reverse of happiness—not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also
that of everyone affected by it. Such a theory is in opposition to egoism, the view that a
person should pursue his own self-interest, even at the expense of others, and to any
ethical theory that regards some acts or types of acts as right or wrong independently
of their consequences. Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the
rightness or wrongness of an act dependent upon the motive of the agent; for,
according to the Utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad
motive.
The nature of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question “What ought a
man to do?” Its answer is that he ought to act so as to produce the best consequences
possible.
Basic concepts
In the notion of consequences the Utilitarian includes all of the good and bad produced
by the act, whether arising after the act has been performed or during its performance.
If the difference in the consequences of alternative acts is not great, some Utilitarians
do not regard the choice between them as a moral issue. According to Mill, acts should
be classified as morally right or wrong only if the consequences are of such
significance that a person would wish to see the agent compelled, not merely
persuaded and exhorted, to act in the preferred manner.
In assessing the consequences of actions, Utilitarianism relies upon some theory of
intrinsic value: something is held to be good in itself, apart from further consequences,
and all other values are believed to derive their worth from their relation to this
intrinsic good as a means to an end. Bentham and Mill were hedonists; i.e., they
analyzed happiness as a balance of pleasure over pain and believed that these feelings
alone are of intrinsic value and disvalue. Utilitarians also assume that it is possible to
compare the intrinsic values produced by two alternative actions and to estimate
which would have better consequences. Bentham believed that a hedonic calculus is
theoretically possible. A moralist, he maintained, could sum up the units of pleasure
and the units of pain for everyone likely to be affected, immediately and in the future,
and could take the balance as a measure of the overall good or evil tendency of an
action. Such precise measurement as Bentham envisioned is perhaps not essential, but
it is nonetheless necessary for the Utilitarian to make some interpersonal comparisons
of the values of the effects of alternative courses of action.

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2. Business’s fascination with utilitarianism

Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical choice is the one that will produce the
greatest good for the greatest number. As such, it is the only moral framework that can
justify military force or war. Moreover, utilitarianism is the most common approach
to business ethics because of the way that it accounts for costs and benefits.
The theory asserts that there are two types of utilitarian ethics practiced in the
business world, "rule" utilitarianism and "act" utilitarianism.

● Rule utilitarianism helps the largest number of people using the fairest methods
possible.

● Act utilitarianism makes the most ethical actions possible for the benefit of the
people.
"Rule" Utilitarian Ethics
An example of rule utilitarianism in business is tiered pricing for a product or service
for different types of customers. In the airline industry, for example, many planes offer
first-, business-, and economy-class seats. Customers who fly in first or business class
pay a much higher rate than those in economy seats, but they also get more amenities
—simultaneously, people who cannot afford upper-class seats benefit from the
economy rates. This practice produces the highest good for the greatest number of
people.
And the airline benefits, too. The more expensive upper-class seats help to ease the
financial burden that the airline created by making room for economy-class seats.
"Act" Utilitarian Ethics
An example of act utilitarianism could be when pharmaceutical companies release
drugs that have been governmentally approved, but with known minor side effects
because the drug is able to help more people than are bothered by the side effects. Act
utilitarianism often demonstrates the concept that “the end justifies the means”—or
it's worth it.
D. Justice and fairness: Promoting the common good
The Nature of the theory
In A Theory of Justice (1971), the American philosopher John Rawls attempted to
develop a non-utilitarian justification of a democratic political order characterized by
fairness, equality, and individual rights. Reviving the notion of a social contract, which
had been dormant since the 18th century, he imagined a hypothetical situation in
which a group of rational individuals are rendered ignorant of all social and economic
facts about themselves-including facts about their race, sex, religion, education,
intelligence, talents or skills, and even their conception of the good life"-and then
asked to decide what general principles should govern the political institutions under

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 Republic of the Philippines
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which they live. From behind this “veil of ignorance,” Rawls argues, such a group
would unanimously reject utilitarian principles-such as political institutions should
aim to maximize the happiness of the greatest number-because no member of the
group could know whether he belonged to a minority whose rights and interests
might be neglected under institutions justified on utilitarian grounds. Instead, reason
and self-interest would lead the group to adopt principles such as the following: (1)
everyone should have a maximum and equal degree of liberty, including all the
liberties traditionally associated with democracy; (2) everyone should have an equal
opportunity to seek offices and positions that offer greater rewards of wealth. power.
status, or other social goods: and (3) the distribution of wealth in society should be
such that those who are least well-off are better off than they would be under any
other distribution, whether equal or unequal. (Rawls holds that. given certain
assumptions about human motivation, some inequality in the distribution of wealth
may be necessary to achieve higher levels of productivity. It is therefore possible to
imagine unequal distributions of wealth in which those who are least well-off are
better than they would be under an equal distribution.) These principles amount to an
egalitarian form of democratic liberalism. Rawls is accordingly regarded as leading
philosophical defender of the modern democratic capitalist welfare state.
Rawls makes it clear that his theory, which he calls “justice as fairness,” assumes a
Kantian view of persons as “free and equal,” morally autonomous, rational agents, who
are not necessarily egoists. He also makes it clear early on that he means to present
his theory as a preferable alternative to that of utilitarians. He asks us to imagine
persons in a hypothetical “initial situation” which he calls “the original position”
(corresponding to the “state of nature” or “natural condition” of Hobbes, but clearly
not presented as any sort of historical or pre-historical fact). This is strikingly
characterized by what Rawls calls “the veil of ignorance,” a device designed to
minimize the influence of selfish bias in attempting to determine what would be just.
If you must decide on what sort of society you could commit yourself to accepting as a
permanent member and were not allowed to factor in specific knowledge about
yourself—such as your gender, race, ethnic identity, level of intelligence, physical
strength, quickness and stamina, and so forth—then you would presumably exercise
the rational choice to make the society as fair for everyone as possible, lest you find
yourself at the bottom of that society for the rest of your life. In such a “purely
hypothetical” situation, Rawls believes that we would rationally adopt two basic
principles of justice for our society: “the first requires equality in the assignment of
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities,
for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society.” Here we see Rawls conceiving of justice, the primary social
virtue, as requiring equal basic liberties for all citizens and a presumption of equality
even regarding socio-economic goods. He emphasizes the point that these principles
rule out as unjust the utilitarian justification of disadvantages for some on account of
greater advantages for others, since that would be rationally unacceptable to one
operating under the veil of ignorance. Like Kant, Rawls is opposed to the teleological

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or consequentialist gambit of defining the right (including the just) in terms of

“maximizing the good”; he rather, like Kant, the deontologist, is committed to a
“priority of the right over the good.” Justice is not reducible to utility or pragmatic
desirability. We should notice that the first principle of justice, which requires
maximum equality of rights and duties for all members of society, is prior in “serial or
lexical order” to the second, which specifies how socio-economic inequalities can be
justified (Theory, pp. 12-26, 31, 42-43). Again, this is anti-utilitarian, in that no
increase in socio-economic benefits for anyone can ever justify anything less than
maximum equality of rights and duties for all. Thus, for example, if enslaving a few
members of society generated vastly more benefits for the majority than liabilities for
them, such a bargain would be categorically ruled out as unjust.

2. Distributive justice
a) Egalitarian
For a just distribution each member of society should get completely equal shares of
the burdens and benefits.
Egalitarian usually contend that there are no relevant differences among the
members of society to justify unequal treatment. Therefore, a just distribution
according to an egalitarian is one in which every member of society is given exactly
equal shares of society's benefits and burdens. The argument for this view depends
on the notion that all human beings are equal (in some fundamental respect) and that
in recognition of this they ought to be accorded equal shares of society's burdens and
benefits.

b) Capitalist
Capitalism in better thought of as a system of distribution rather than a theory of
distribution. I mean by that, that Capitalism is a system where burdens and benefits
are distributed more or less according to market forces. When individuals argue in
favor of capitalism as the best or the preferred system of distribution they usually do
so on the basis of other moral theories of distributive justice.

c) Socialist
Burdens and benefits should be distributed on the basis of abilities and needs. Or
more specifically, the position claims that work burdens should be distributed on the
basis of abilities and benefits should be distributed on the basis of need.
On this view, the just way of distributing the benefits and burdens of society is bases
on the needs and the abilities of the members of that society. As Marx put it, "From
each according to his abilities; to each according to his need.
Further, the benefits produced by such an arrangement should be distributed so as to
maximize the welfare of the society, aimed first at meeting the “basic biological needs”
of the members of society, then other “non-basic needs” on until meeting the “luxury
wants.”

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 Republic of the Philippines
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The state and the citizens: responsibilities to each other: The principles of
taxation and inclusive growth
The 18th-century economist and philosopher Adam Smith attempted to systematize
the rules that should govern a rational system of taxation. In The Wealth of
Nations (Book V, chapter 2) he set down four general canons:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the
state.…
II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.
The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be
clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.…
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely
to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.…
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets
of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state.…
Although they need to be reinterpreted from time to time, these principles retain
remarkable relevance. From the first can be derived some leading views about what is
fair in the distribution of tax burdens among taxpayers. These are: (1) the belief that
taxes should be based on the individual’s ability to pay, known as the ability-to-pay
principle, and (2) the benefit principle, the idea that there should be some equivalence
between what the individual pays and the benefits he subsequently receives from
governmental activities. The fourth of Smith’s canons can be interpreted to underlie
the emphasis many economists place on a tax system that does not interfere
with market decision making, as well as the more obvious need to avoid complexity
and corruption.
Distribution of tax burdens
Various principles, political pressures, and goals can direct a government’s tax policy.
What follows is a discussion of some of the leading principles that can shape decisions
about taxation.
Horizontal equity
The principle of horizontal equity assumes that persons in the same or similar
positions (so far as tax purposes are concerned) will be subject to the same tax
liability. In practice this equality principle is often disregarded, both intentionally and
unintentionally. Intentional violations are usually motivated more by politics than by
sound economic policy (e.g., the tax advantages granted to farmers, home owners, or
members of the middle class in general; the exclusion of interest on government
securities). Debate over tax reform has often centred on whether deviations from

LSPU SELF-PACED LEARNING MODULE: ETHICS

 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

“equal treatment of equals” are justified.

The ability-to-pay principle
The ability-to-pay principle requires that the total tax burden will be distributed
among individuals according to their capacity to bear it, taking into account all of the
relevant personal characteristics. The most suitable taxes from this standpoint are
personal levies (income, net worth, consumption, and inheritance taxes). Historically
there was common agreement that income is the best indicator of ability to pay. There
have, however, been important dissenters from this view, including the 17th-century
English philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes and a number of present-day tax
specialists. The early dissenters believed that equity should be measured by what is
spent (i.e., consumption) rather than by what is earned (i.e., income); modern
advocates of consumption-based taxation emphasize the neutrality of consumption-
based taxes toward saving (income taxes discriminate against saving), the simplicity
of consumption-based taxes, and the superiority of consumption as a measure of an
individual’s ability to pay over a lifetime. Some theorists believe that wealth provides
a good measure of ability to pay because assets imply some degree of satisfaction
(power) and tax capacity, even if (as in the case of an art collection) they generate
no tangible income.
The ability-to-pay principle also is commonly interpreted as requiring that direct
personal taxes have a progressive rate structure, although there is no way of
demonstrating that any particular degree of progressivity is the right one. Because a
considerable part of the population does not pay certain direct taxes—such as income
or inheritance taxes—some tax theorists believe that a satisfactory redistribution can
only be achieved when such taxes are supplemented by direct income transfers
or negative income taxes (or refundable credits). Others argue that income transfers
and negative income tax create negative incentives; instead, they favour public
expenditures (for example, on health or education) targeted toward low-income
families as a better means of reaching distributional objectives.
Indirect taxes such as VAT, excise, sales, or turnover taxes can be adapted to the
ability-to-pay criterion, but only to a limited extent—for example, by exempting
necessities such as food or by differentiating tax rates according to “urgency of need.”
Such policies are generally not very effective; moreover, they distort consumer
purchasing patterns, and their complexity often makes them difficult to institute.
Throughout much of the 20th century, prevailing opinion held that the distribution of
the tax burden among individuals should reduce the income disparities that naturally
result from the market economy; this view was the complete contrary of the 19th-
century liberal view that the distribution of income ought to be left alone. By the end
of the 20th century, however, many governments recognized that attempts to use tax
policy to reduce inequity can create costly distortions, prompting a partial return to
the view that taxes should not be used for redistributive purposes.

LSPU SELF-PACED LEARNING MODULE: ETHICS

 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

ENGAGING ACTIVITIES
Answer the following questions.

1. it refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final function of an
object.
__________________________________________
_______________________________________
2. These are the rights which are accepted and enforced by the state.
________________________________
3. Burdens and benefits should be distributed on the basis of abilities and needs
___________________________
4. What is the theory from the late 18th- and 19th-century by English
philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill? (It states that an
action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong if it tends to produce the
reverse of happiness—not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also
that of everyone affected by it)
_____________________________
5. Rights that are based on human consciousness.
______________________________

Learning Resources
https://iep.utm.edu/virtue/
https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/aristotle/section8/#:~:text=Aristotle%20defines%20moral%20virtue
%20as,than%20through%20reasoning%20and%20instruction.
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/atd-epcc-introethics-1/chapter/aristotles-virtue-ethics/

LSPU SELF-PACED LEARNING MODULE: ETHICS

 Republic of the Philippines
Laguna State Polytechnic University
Province of Laguna

https://philonotes.com/index.php/virtue-ethics/
https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-22-4-c-st-thomas-aquinas-natural-law-and-the-common-
good#:~:text=The%20master%20principle%20of%20natural,the%20desire%20to%20know%20God.
https://prezi.com/p/pdgejl1hvcsd/happiness-as-constitutive-of-moral-and-cardinal-virtues/?
frame=3b6a89f51169f7ed77193ab8d4e2b621c0b61a7f
Wood, Allen. The Good Will. Retrieved from: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:8K0tD3ZLZO0J:https://web.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/
GoodWill.doc+&cd=12&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ph
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp
https://www.britannica.com/topic/categorical-imperative
https://www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/kantian%20ethics.htm

https://www.civilserviceindia.com/subject/Political-Science/notes/rights-meaning-and-theories.html
https://www.utilitarianism.com/utilitarianism.html

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/utilitarianism.asp

https://iep.utm.edu/justwest/#SH5a

https://www.docsity.com/en/justice-and-fairness-promoting-common-good/5550653/

http://faculty.fiu.edu/~harrisk/Notes/Ethics/Distributive%20Jusitice.htm

https://www.britannica.com/topic/taxation/Principles-of-taxation

LSPU SELF-PACED LEARNING MODULE: ETHICS