Rudolph 2005

International Studies Review (2005) 7, 1–20
REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION
Sovereignty and Territorial Borders

in a Global Age1
CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH
BMW Center for German and European Studies,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
In an age marked by economic globalization, regional integration, and

increasing transborder flows, some have questioned the continued vi-
ability of state sovereignty and territorial borders. This essay examines
the conditions of sovereignty and borders in a world of trading states,
exploring how conceptions of sovereignty are reflected in the grand
strategy of advanced industrial democracies. By disaggregating sover-
eignty into its constitutive parts, the essay not only provides insights into
how these facets affect modern statecraft but also reveals an undercon-
ceptualized dimension: societal sovereignty. Whereas sovereignty is will-
ingly ceded by states to gain economically from increased trade and
capital mobility, public concern over the social, political, and economic
effects of high levels of international migration indicate a growing sen-
sitivity to the maintenance of sovereignty over access to social and
political community. In this process, borders serve an increasingly im-
portant symbolic function in maintaining stable conceptions of national
identity that constitute the cornerstone of the nation-state.
Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is doubtless the most
precious.
FEmerich de Vattel (1883:154)
We live in an age characterized by regional integration, economic globalization, and

permeable borders (Smith, Solinger, and Topik 1999). Even though there has been
little disagreement that such processes are generating change in international so-
ciety, interpreting the significance of such changes has sparked heated debates.
Some have argued that current processes of globalization, the rise of nonstate
political actors, and the proliferation of human rights norms suggest that sover-
eignty is in decline (see Zacher 1992; Gottlieb 1993; Fowler and Bunck 1995; Lyons
and Mastanduno 1995). David Harvey (1990) has taken this position one step
1
Thanks to Martin Heisler, Nicholas Onuf, and the anonymous journal reviewers for comments and suggestions
on prior drafts. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28–31, 2003.
r 2005 International Studies Review.

Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
2 Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age
further, proposing that globalization is nothing less than the harbinger of moder-
nity’s demise. Susan Strange (1994, 1996) had a similar point of view, arguing that
the Westphalian system was being swept away by the global changes evident in our
contemporary world. Others (Sassen 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999; Rosenau 1997) have
added that these processes of globalization are eroding the fundamental basis of
international societyFstate sovereigntyFand that its decline represents a revolu-
tionary transformation in the Westphalian structure of the international system. At
issue are the following questions: Does globalization threaten the core institutions
of world order, including sovereignty and the nation-state? Are we moving into a
borderless world?
The short answers to these important questions are ‘‘probably not,’’ ‘‘certainly
not,’’ and ‘‘quite the opposite.’’ In terms of a threat to the institution of state
sovereignty, processes of globalization may, indeed, be serving to change our con-
ceptions of sovereignty and how it is used in world politics. Rather than compro-
mising sovereignty, it would be more accurate to say that globalization is prompting
us to take a closer look at sovereignty and how our understanding of it has evolved
in response to a changing global environment. In terms of a threat to the nation-
state system, arguments that suggest globalization is rending nation-states obsolete
are little more than ivory-tower nonsense (Held 1990). First, the notion of an
inviolable sovereignty has rarely, if ever, existed in practice (Krasner 1999). Second,
globalization has served to generate pressures to maintain a strong link between the
polity and the state that lies at the core of the institution of sovereignty. Lastly, in
terms of the continued significance of borders, much has been made of our in-
creasingly borderless world. Indeed, there is reason to believe that in the process of
continuing globalization the territorial aspect of sovereignty is indeed evolving.
However, it is important to recognize that these changes are proceeding in different
ways depending on whether we are considering the movement of goods and capital
flows across borders or whether we are considering the movement of people. Pat-
terns of trade and capital flows provide a strong argument that the global economy
readily transcends national boundaries. In contrast, the globalization of migration
flows has served to increase the importance of territoriality as a central component
of sovereignty and as an ordering principle in world politics (Albert, Jacobson, and
Lapid 2001).
This essay examines the condition of sovereignty and borders in a world of
trading states and how conceptions of sovereignty are reflected in the grand strat-
egy of advanced industrial democracies. ‘‘Unbundling’’ sovereignty into its various
constitutive parts not only provides insights into how these facets affect modern
statecraft but also reveals an underconceptualized dimension: societal sovereignty.
What emerges is an increasingly complex characterization of international society in
which sovereignty exists as a constitutive ideational construct as well as operates as
a tool of statecraft in a complex web of ‘‘sovereignty bargains’’ used to craft an
optimal grand strategy.
Sovereignty Is Complex
The perception that we are witnessing unprecedented systemic change has
spawned a cottage industry of scholarly work dealing with the subject of sover-
eignty (see Onuf 1991; Bartleson 1995; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Philpott 1997;
Krasner 1999; Caporaso 2000; Giacomello and Mendez 2001; Cranston and
Cranston 2004). However, as James Caporaso (2000:3) rightly notes, ‘‘While a lively
research program exists, progress is impeded by the lack of clarity and agreement
on basic concepts. As a result, we often speak past one another. Separate research
fails to accumulate and individual efforts do not add up.’’ Sovereignty has tradi-
tionally been conceived of as a singular, unified concept. ‘‘If sovereignty means
supreme authority, it stands to reason that no two or more entitiesFpersons,
CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH 3
groups of persons, agenciesFcan be sovereign within the same time and space’’
(Morgenthau 1948:259; see also Fowler and Bunck 1995). Indeed, such a statement
is consistent with F. H. Hinsley’s (1966) later analysis in which he defined sover-
eignty as referring to final and absolute political authority in the political commu-
nity. If we accept this singular, unified view of sovereignty, it is no wonder that the
contemporary period has seen so many works declaring sovereignty to be threat-
ened by the increase in global flows, growing economic and political interdepend-
ence, and the rise of supranational political entities that make delineation of
sovereignty more problematic.
An important question to ask when considering sovereignty in the context of
globalization is the following: Are these trends in globalization a function of largely
autonomous structural forces or, conversely, the result of state interests? If sover-
eignty is based on the idea of ultimate authority, then choice becomes the key factor
in determining its relevance. ‘‘The concept of ‘sovereignty’ is usually taken to mean
that a nation state has power and control over its own future. . . . A loss of sov-
ereignty implies a loss of legal and actual control over the determination of the
direction of national policy’’ (Held 1990:407). Multilateralism and increased trans-
border flows are usually equated with a decline in sovereigntyFa decline generally
expressed in terms of degree. Often, however, sovereign states self-limit their sov-
ereignty by accepting constraints on their actions in order to gain certain benefits
from inclusion in international regimes or organizations (Keohane 1991). Similar
strategies are evident in state behavior regarding increasingly globalized cross-
border flows; they are not only endured, but also facilitated, by states in order to
forward their national interest. Instead of being passive objects operating amidst
the engine of globalization, one must recognize that trading states have been in-
strumental in establishing the current system of openness and globalization.
‘‘States, for the most part, need not participate in processes of globalization and
multilateralization, but choose to nonetheless. They do this not out of weakness,
but out of a conscious consideration of the tradeoffs’’ (Barkin 2001:45; see also
Rosecrance 1986). Taken in this context, the transgression of borders becomes an
essential affirmation of sovereignty rather than evidence of its decline or growing
irrelevance. It is the expression of choiceFof authority. In contrast, it is only when
choice is constrained by exogenous forces that one could argue sovereign authority
has been circumscribed. This perspective suggests that sovereignty is, in fact, more
complex than our traditional definition allows.
Recent scholarship has put forward more complex theories of sovereignty to
address the fundamental weakness in traditional (that is, singular, unified) frame-
works. Stephen Krasner (1999) has suggested that sovereignty can be broken down
into four distinct types: Westphalian, domestic, interdependence, and international
legal (see also Krasner 1995/1996; compare with Ruggie 1993; Thomson 1995;
Liftin 1997; Burch 2000; Caporaso 2000). Whereas ‘‘domestic sovereignty’’ refers
to the organization of government authority within a state, ‘‘Westphalian sover-
eignty’’ is defined as those aspects that exclude external actors from a state’s do-
mestic authority configuration. ‘‘Interdependence sovereignty’’ refers to the
control of transborder movements, and ‘‘international legal sovereignty’’ is
limited to those factors that involve the mutual recognition of states within the
nation-state system. In addition, Krasner makes the distinction between aspects of
sovereignty dealing with ‘‘authority’’ and those dealing with ‘‘control,’’ noting that
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty deal exclusively with authority,
whereas interdependence sovereignty deals exclusively with control, and domestic
sovereignty has elements of both (Krasner 1999:9–25). By disaggregating the con-
cept of sovereignty, we can more readily see how sovereignty is not only relevant to
the issue of authority but is also responsive to changing contexts and can be
manipulated as a tool of statecraft to forward evolving interests. Several scholars
(see, for example, Liftin 1997; Krasner 1999; Mattli 2000) have suggested that
dimensions of sovereignty can be ‘‘bargained’’ to promote overall grand strategy

and to maximize other dimensions of sovereignty. In this sense, sovereignty is being
conceived more in terms of a set of ongoing norms and practices that can display
variation and flexibility.
The notion of ‘‘sovereignty bargains’’ raises an important question: what are the
terms of these trade-offs? Specifically, what is the relationship between Westphalian,
interdependence, and domestic sovereignty under conditions of globalization?
Moreover, is there a dominant ‘‘sovereignty bargain’’ reflected in the grand strategy
of advanced industrial states? To answer these questions, we need to trace the
historical evolution of the use and application of sovereignty, not just the evolution
of ideas pertaining to it (Bartleson 1995; Philpott 1997). In the process we will build
an understanding of the linkage between sovereignty and conceptions of nation-
alism that appear to be threatened by the processes of globalization.
Sovereignty and the Modern State

Most scholars of international relations associate the rise of modern sovereignty
with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, although some (see Hinsley 1966; Bueno de
Mesquita 2000; Osiander 2001) have suggested that its origins can be traced con-
siderably further back in time. The emergence of Westphalian sovereignty was not
the product of a rational rethinking of political order, but rather a necessary means
to assure the most basic of human needs: survival (Herz 1957). During the Thirty
Years War (1618–1648), bloody sectarian conflict consumed nearly one-third of
Europe’s population. In providing a means to end the slaughter, the Treaty of
Westphalia reorganized and consolidated the complex matrix of overlapping ju-
risdictions of political authority in feudal Europe into a system of sovereign states
(Watson 1992; Krasner 1993). Westphalian sovereignty consolidated political au-
thority within a distinct territory that excluded external actors from domestic
authority structures. Under the Westphalian system, borders clearly demarcated
‘‘outside’’ from ‘‘inside’’ and established the ‘‘ultimate’’ authority of the state within
its domain (Herz 1957; Kratochwil 1986). With the emergence of the territorial
state, it is important to recognize that common definitions of sovereignty in its
Westphalian sense do not refer to a social–political community as such, but rather to
the territory within which sovereign authority is granted regarding political
leadership (Onuf 1991:430; Herz 1957). In the emergent absolutist monarchic
states of the Westphalian era, ‘‘citizenship’’ essentially consisted of subjecthood,
defined solely by geography. In that system, ‘‘national identity’’ was a function
of territory and government authority legitimized by divine right. Under the prin-
ciple of cujus regio, ejus religio, the sovereign monarch was empowered to establish
order and peace within the territory by confirming his religion as the religion
of the land.
If the interests of survival and security provided the necessary shock for systemic
change, material interests would serve to make this new system enduring. Sover-
eign territorial (Westphalian) states remained the dominant mode of political
organization in the Western world because this Westphalian model provided ad-
vantages in mobilizing a given society’s resources (Spruyt 1994). Compared with
other forms of political organization evident during the period, including the
Hanseatic League and the Italian city-states, Westphalian states were better able to
create a more unified economic climate by reducing economic particularism.
Moreover, the rulers of the Westphalian states were better able to maintain
credible commitments for their members in terms of trade by providing ‘‘a clear
and final decision-making authority which could bind their subjects’’ (Spruyt
1994:185).
Although elements of sovereignty predate the Peace of Westphalia, the rise of
the territorial state is considered one of the most significant ‘‘revolutions’’ in its
evolution (Philpott 1997).2 Unfortunately, scholars typically understate (or miss

altogether) the crucial role of nationalism as a critical element of sovereignty.
Whereas sovereignty in the Westphalian sense centered on the authority granted to
the monarch within a delineated territory, the rise of popular sovereignty through
the revolutions of the eighteenth century in the United States and France signaled
the rise of the sovereign nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990; Keitner 2001). This shift in
authority from a single monarch legitimated by divine right to the collective ‘‘peo-
ple’’ altered the relationship between sovereignty, authority, and the land. Prior to
the emergence of popular sovereignty, sovereignty was inherently linked to the
monarch, who was then linked to the territory. People were merely subjects and
were similar to the land in that they were subject to the desires of the sovereign
(although people could migrate to a land with a different sovereign). In the tran-
sition to an emergent system of nation-states, the French Revolution played a
prominent role in codifying this new idea of a sovereign ‘‘people’’ (Keitner 2001).
As documented in the French Declaration of Rights in 1795, territory was now
increasingly associated with the ‘‘nation’’ that occupied it. ‘‘Each people is inde-
pendent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and
the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is inalienable’’ (quoted in
Hobsbawm 1990:19).
Although revolutionary constitutions of the eighteenth century did not neces-
sarily stipulate that the ‘‘people’’ were a fixed social entity tied to the land, the
myths of nationalism that have evolved since then have generally encompassed
such a notion (see Horowitz 1985; Greenfeld 1992; Smith 1991). As Eric Hobs-
bawm (1990:19) notes, ‘‘the equation nation ¼ state ¼ people, and especially sover-
eign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since the structure and
definition of states were now essentially territorial.’’ National identity was a nec-
essary construct because popular sovereignty moved the locus of sovereignty from
an individual (or royal family) to a collectivity. Westphalian sovereignty is bestowed
upon an indivisible social entity and, as such, it was necessary to create the concept
of a national identity so that sovereignty could be seen as enjoyed by all within a
particular collectivity. As democracy became the dominant form of political rep-
resentation in European nation-states, this idea of ‘‘the nation’’ assumed an even
more prominent role in governance, given that elected representatives served as
stewards of popular sovereignty rather than having sovereignty bestowed upon
them as had been the case under the absolutist system. In the European system of
nation-states, sovereignty, people, and territory were intrinsically bound together:
‘‘The state is the land, the people, the organization of coercion and a majestic idea,
each supporting and even defining the other, so that they [become] indivisible’’
(Onuf 1991:437).
In addition to the emergent link between sovereignty and national identity,
changes in security propelled nationalist sentiment forward. With the decline of the
mercenary armies of feudal Europe, national defense was now dependent on the
conscription of standing national armies (Bean 1973; Hintze 1975; Tilly 1985). A
strong sense of national identity was paramount to increasing citizen commitment
to military duty as well as to increasing cohesion within military units. Paul
Kennedy (1987:75) notes that ‘‘the monopolization and bureaucratization of mil-
itary power by the state is clearly a central part of the story of ‘nation-building’; and
the process was a reciprocal one, since the enhanced authority and resources of the
state in turn gave to their armed forces a degree of permanence which had often not
2
Daniel Philpott (1997) argues that sovereignty has endured several ‘‘revolutions’’ since medieval times, the
product of both shifts in material power and the spread of intellectual ideas. He traces changes in the ‘‘constitution
of international relations’’ to revolutions in ideas about justice and legitimate authority, focusing on the rise of
sovereign statehood (Westphalia 1648), minority protection norms (codified in the Versailles Treaty), and the
process of decolonization evident in the period following World War II.
existed a century earlier.’’ Increasingly, defense of Westphalian sovereignty was a

function of military capacity, which was, in turn, at least partially a function of
nationalism and national identity.
Although this helps us understand the historical context in which such linkages
were established, it does not explain how such ideas came to be accepted as global
norms beyond the European sphere. Nationalism and the conceptions of sover-
eignty that have come to be associated with our modern system of nation-states may
have originated in Western Europe but they were spread globally in part through
the process of imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Spruyt
2000). Imperial powers sought to promote a more expansive definition of
‘‘national identity’’Fone inclusive of colonial possessionsFin order to maintain a
close connection with colonists. In this imperial form of nationalism, equality be-
tween home and colony was considered a necessary condition to maintain loyalty
and allegiance. This notion of equality within the imperial realm was, in theory,
comprehensive, pertaining equally to colonial citizens as well as colonists. In prac-
tice, however, this was clearly not the case. In describing British colonization in
India, Jawaharlal Nehru (1995:251) writes:
The spirit of the age is in favor of equality, though practice denies it almost
everywhere. We have gotten rid of slavery in the narrow sense of the word, that a
man can be the property of another. But a new slavery, in some ways worse than
the old, has taken its place all over the world. In the name of individual freedom,
political and economic systems exploit human beings and treat them as com-
modities. And again, though an individual cannot be the property of another, a
country and a nation can still be the property of another nation, and thus group
slavery is tolerated.
Among European colonists, imperial identity forged sentiments that maintained

affective ties with the homeland. In contrast, among the subjects in the colonies, it
confirmed the stratified nature of the Westphalian system and cultivated new na-
tionalist sentiment among the colonized, even among peoples of disparate racial,
ethnic, religious, or linguistic backgrounds. ‘‘Whatever ethnic background one had
or whatever language one spoke, in being treated uniformly as different from
Europeans, the indigenous peoples developed a unified identity’’ (Spruyt 2000:86).
Rather than rejecting the notion of national sovereignty that developed in the land
of the imperial powers of Europe, the nationalist leaders of colonial independence
movements generally defined their political objectives within the same framework
that linked sovereignty, territory, and national identity. Thus, not only did impe-
rialism spread conceptions of the nation-state as the dominant paradigm of inter-
national organization, but it also instilled nationalist sentiment and growing desires
for self-determination (sovereignty) and, ultimately, statehood.
What is important to recognize here is the process by which sovereignty became
both inseparable from notions of territoriality and with conceptions of an enduring
national identity. Moreover, ‘‘nationalism gave rise to the principle that every nation
needs and deserves the protective shell of a sovereign state in order to fulfill its
potential’’ (Onuf 1991:439). ‘‘Westphalian’’ sovereignty, as applied in practice, rep-
resents more than simply authority within a given territoryFit represents the au-
thority granted to the state by a defined national group to defend its interests.
Changing strategies for defending sovereignty have subsequently served to alter
the types of sovereignty bargains in which states engage.
Defending Sovereignty
In the current world order, the state’s primary function is to keep the nation
sovereign. What exactly does this mean given the relationship between the people
and the state under popular sovereignty? And what is the best way to achieve this
aim? In the Westphalian sense, military defense underlies the aim of remaining
sovereign. However, security in this sense also requires material resources (eco-
nomic strength) and national unity. Moreover, geopolitical security is not the sole
element involved in the defense of sovereignty in a system of nation-states. Rather,
if nation-states are imagined as comprised of distinct ‘‘nations’’ with distinct ways of
life and a common history (Anderson 1983; Smith 1991; Renan 1995), then the
sovereignty of this identity must be defended if the nation-state is to survive (Wæver
et al. 1993; Huntington 1996). As such, security (maintaining sovereignty) can be
modeled along three dimensions: geopolitical, material, and societal (Rudolph
2003a). With regard to these three dimensions, transformations in the grand strat-
egy of states have not only served to facilitate the processes of globalization but have
also affected which dimension of security is emphasized in a given structural en-
vironment (Rudolph 2003b).
The imperial grand strategy of the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries
was predicated on the logic of accumulating the material resources needed for
military defense through conquest (see Doyle 1986; Rosecrance 1986; Kennedy
1987; Snyder 1991; Kupchan 1994). In effect, not only did imperial grand strategy
provide the natural and human resources necessary to maximize material power,
but it also served to forward societal security interests by exporting culture abroad.
It affirmed notions of cultural superiority while at the same time seeking to make
the rest of the world more like the nation-state that was executing the strategy.
Indeed, this notion was often underscored by a high sense of moral purposeFone
was engaged in ‘‘civilizing’’ the uncivilized world or doing what the British referred
to as dealing with the ‘‘White Man’s Burden’’ (see Rudolph 2004).
Over time, however, the benefits of imperial grand strategy were increasingly
outweighed by its costs (Rosecrance 1986; Kennedy 1987). Decolonization occurred
for both instrumental and normative reasons. Maintaining control over extensive
land holdings throughout the globe led to overextension. Moreover, the economic
benefits of colonization declined over time (Friedberg 1988; Snyder 1991). In ad-
dition, empire became viewed as inconsistent with modern notions of democracy
(Watson 1992; Jackson 1993). Lastly, self-determination emerged as a key norma-
tive element of early Cold War geopolitics and among polities in peripheral colonial
nations (Spruyt 2000; Heinlein 2002).
Whereas previously sovereignty was best defended through conquest and the
accumulation of stocks (raw materials, goods, capital, human capital, and so on), the
material requirements of security are now increasingly tied to the ability to manage
the movement of flows (Rosecrance 1986). This change has occurred in large part
as a result of the renewed popularity of the Ricardian principle of comparative
advantage in the post-World War II era and the widespread belief among pundits
and policymakers that openness is necessary to avoid the economic catastrophe
evident during the interwar period (Kindleberger 1973). Comparative advantage
suggests that specialization, coupled with international trade, is a superior means of
increasing both national and global wealth when contrasted with the mercantilist
approach (Ricardo 1955). Likewise, open capital markets not only allow investment
to go where higher returns are generated, but capital markets can serve as an
adjustment mechanism for distortions in a nation’s balance of payments. Further-
more, though it has long been considered a substitute for trade (Mundell 1957),
recent research has shown that labor mobility not only generates economic gains
but may also be a complement to trade (Collins, O’Rourke, and Williamson 1999).
As such, migration must be considered a necessary condition to achieve maximum
gains from trade. In the emergent trading state system, then, defending sover-
eignty through the accumulation of material power should logically be based on
facilitating such transborder flows (Rosecrance 1986).
What effect does such a transition have on conceptions of sovereignty and its
application to statecraft? From the standpoint of maximizing the economic goals of
the grand strategy, deciding to relinquish a degree of ‘‘interdependence sover-

eignty’’ (control over transborder flows) in order to reap higher economic gains
makes sense. However, we must also recognize in this state-sponsored bargain that
one facet of sovereignty is willingly suspended in order to bolster other dimensions
of sovereignty. Clear linkages exist between maximizing economic gains and the
maintenance of both Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. States unable to gen-
erate sufficient economic productivity are more likely to become dependent on
stronger nations and to have less capacity for ensuring their military defense, both
of which are crucial elements in the maintenance of Westphalian sovereignty.
Moreover, the ability of the state to provide an improved standard of living for its
citizenry can have a significant impact on the relationship between the state and the
people. Maximizing domestic economic growth can only serve to strengthen do-
mestic state sovereignty, whereas neglect can only serve to weaken the relationship
between state and society. Sovereignty is not simply ‘‘sold’’ for economic gain, but
dimensions of sovereignty can be ‘‘traded’’ (decreasing control over one dimension
in order to increase others) to forward the interests of the state.
In terms of trade and capital flows, there is ample evidence that most advanced
industrial states have adopted a trading state approach, spurred in part by the
leadership of the contemporary world hegemon, the United States (Stein 1984;
Gilpin 2000, 2001). The creation and growth of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and its subsequent transformation into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) have served to create an environment conducive to such a
Ricardian approach. Within the framework of the GATT/WTO, barriers to inter-
national trade have dropped steadily in the post-World War II period and levels of
trade have steadily grown (WTO 2000). Likewise, the creation of a global capital
market has led to even larger levels of growth in capital mobility (Sassen 1988,
1996). This neoclassical grand strategy has been facilitated through multilateral
agreements and institutions.
The most advanced example of ‘‘sovereignty bargaining’’ in the context of
neoclassical strategy is the integration regime of the European Union (EU). Not
surprisingly, the rise of EU integration is often used as an example of how such
institutions compromise state sovereignty and, hence, contribute to its demise. This
view, however, neglects the role of authority and choiceFcentral elements in sov-
ereignty itself. In response to desires for security as well as for increased economic
and welfare returns in the post-World War II period, European policymakers
sought policies that could best promote these interests (Milward 1994). Integration
was a response to all three interests, providing a means to promote collective se-
curity as well as to pool national factor endowments and enable access to each other’s
markets. ‘‘Driving regional integration is the assumption or belief that the benefit of
integration, namely increased national prosperity, is worth the cost in terms of di-
minished national policymaking autonomy and power’’ (Mattli 2000:150).
Of course, not all European countries were equally drawn to such an approach
or, at least, to the type of deep integration articulated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957
that began the process of European integration. States hesitant to relinquish the
degree of sovereignty required by the Treaty of Rome chose instead in 1960 to form
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Mattli 2000). Included among EFTA
members were the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria.
However, the European Community’s (EC) ability to attract higher levels of foreign
direct investment from the United States, combined with the fact that the EFTA
group of states experienced much smaller economic growth than the EC member
states, prompted Britain to reassess its concerns about ceding sovereignty and to
apply for membership to the EC in 1961. Although French obstructionism delayed
Britain’s entry into the EC until 1973, the important factor to note here is the
‘‘sovereignty bargain’’ willingly undertaken by Britain in seeking the material ben-
efits of deeper European integration.
Hedley Bull (1977) has described the changes associated with the creation of
supranational political entities (such as the European Union) as a move toward a
‘‘neo-medievalism,’’ in which borders become blurred and authority overlaps. Bull
(1977:254) has suggested that it ‘‘might . . . seem fanciful to contemplate a return to
the medieval world, but it is not fanciful to imagine that there might develop a
modern and secular counterpart of it that embodies its central characteristic: a
system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty.’’ Although Bull’s moniker
of a ‘‘neo-medievalism’’ suggests that sovereignty is in demise, such is only the case
if one considers sovereignty to be a singular, unified concept. In terms of the
disaggregated notion of sovereignty discussed in this essay, trading elements of one
type for another simply represents a new strategy for maintaining national
strengthFfor defending sovereignty. Particularly in terms of capital and trade,
bargains that trade degrees of interdependence sovereignty to bolster domestic and
Westphalian sovereignty do, indeed, render borders less meaningful in the oper-
ation of international economic transactions.
However, even though the contemporary sovereignty bargain is relatively clear
among states in the Atlantic Community with regard to issues dealing with trade
and capital flows, it is much more complex for migration. Although the dominant
logic involved in the grand strategy of trading states has been predicated on open-
ness in trade and capital flows, trends in government policies toward labor mobility
have taken a nearly opposite course of action (Cornelius et al. 2004). Why is labor
mobility different, especially given its importance to the economic objectives that
promote openness to other types of global flows?
National Identity and Societal Security

To understand what makes labor mobility different, it is important to consider
changes in patterns of international migration and their impact on state behavior.
What emerges from the available empirical evidence (Shanks 2001; Rudolph
2003a) suggests that, in contrast with trade and capital flows, migrant-receiving
societies seem acutely sensitive to the types of migration flows, not just their volume.
Migration does not simply refer to commodified ‘‘labor,’’ as economists tend to treat
it, but to people, who carry with them an identity and culture and who can be
instrumental in shaping identity and culture in a new social environment after
relocating. This characteristic of migration has significant implications for our con-
ception of sovereignty and the significance of national borders (Shanks 2001).
As an integral part of Europe’s imperial grand strategy, migration patterns dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries generally flowed from more developed
(European) countries to the less developed colonies. These patterns reversed after
World War II. Indeed, flows now usually move from less developed to advanced
industrial countries and are characterized by diverse racial and ethnic composition
(Massey et al. 1998). Although advances in transportation and information tech-
nology contributed to this globalization of migration, elements of state grand strat-
egy have also contributed to these changes. Ironically, although such policies were
enacted to defend state sovereignty, they have also served to create new security
interests with implications for other dimensions of sovereignty (Rudolph 2003b).
The unique connection between international migration and sovereignty is ev-
ident in state reluctance to use similar institutionalized multilateral approaches to
managing migration as is being done for trade (through the ITO, GATT, and then
the WTO) and capital (World Bank, International Monetary Fund). However, states
did display a willingness to use more Ricardian openness with respect to labor in
the early Cold War period. Between 1945 and the late 1960s, international labor
recruitment programs were established by many advanced industrial states, in-
cluding the United States, Germany, and France. Similarly, Great Britain estab-
lished an open regime for international migration within the Commonwealth
through the provisions of the British Nationality Act of 1948 (Hansen 2000).
Although they were initially hailed as an important factor in Europe’s postwar
‘‘economic miracle’’ (Kindleberger 1967; Hollifield 1992), the changing patterns of
migration associated with labor recruitment soon led to political sensitivities and the
eventual demise of such programs (Rudolph 2003a). In France and Germany, labor
inflows first originated in countries whose populations were considered socially
proximate to the receiving society (that is, other European countries). However, as
labor market conditions tightened, these sources of labor increasingly originated in
what were considered to be less culturally proximate sending countries (Silverman
1992; Martin 2004). In Britain, preferred migration from the Old Commonwealth
countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) was increasingly surpassed by migra-
tion from the New Commonwealth countries of the Indian subcontinent and the
West Indies (Paul 1997; Spencer 1997; Money 1999; Hansen 2000). In the United
States, immigration flows included increased proportions of immigrants from
Mexico, Latin America, and Asia as well as rising numbers of illegal aliens circum-
venting the official Bracero program recruitment channels (Reimers 1985; Calavita
1992).
Societal insecurities with these changing migration patterns were reflected in
public opinion polls, policymakers’ statements, anti-immigration initiatives, and a
gradual increase in the popularity of right-wing partiesFespecially in Europe
(Fetzer 2000). Subsequently, new policies were enacted to curb these flows. In
Britain, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act established the first of a series of
increasingly restrictionist policies aimed at reducing the levels of New Common-
wealth immigration. France and Germany ended labor importation programs in-
creasingly dominated by North Africans and Turks, respectively, in 1973–1974. The
United States abolished the Mexican Bracero program in 1964. It is important to
note, however, that restrictionism was not directed at migration per se but rather to
specific streams of migration that were considered less societally proximate in the
receiving society. Europe remained committed to an open migration regime as an
integral part of the process of integration and the United States maintained gen-
erally liberal visa quota allocations for naturalized immigration (Tichenor 2002).
The effectiveness of these policy responses in reducing perceptions of societal
threat was limited, however. Once established, the pathways of migration tended to
become both stronger and larger in scope over time, making it increasingly difficult
for states to curb flows once they were established (Massey et al. 1998). But there
has been a consistent pattern of government policy aimed at trying to control such
flows. In Europe, these have generally focused on tightening the asylum channel of
entry. As front-door labor recruitment channels closed, migrants sought entry
through the asylum channel, especially in Germany, which offered the most liberal
asylum regime in Europe, growing out of a desire to distance itself from its to-
talitarian past and to project a new image of toleration to the world ( Joppke 1999).
When labor recruitment was halted, levels of asylum applications rose sharply,
nearly doubling in the year following the end of the Gastarbeiter program. These
levels continued to increase annually, reaching a peak of approximately 100,000 by
1980 ( Joppke 1997:277). France and Britain also experienced increases in asylum
applications during this period.
Because of the free movement provisions codified in the institutions of European
integration, the ability of member states to control entry of third-country nationals
depended on achieving cooperation from other EU countries (Newland and
Papademetriou 1998). Policymakers became aware of the practice of ‘‘asylum
shopping’’ among migrants, in which migrants denied asylum in one European
country would simply reapply in another until they were successful (Koslowski
2000). Once their application was accepted by one EU member state, they were free
to move anywhere within the Union. To curb such practices, in 1990 the Dublin
Convention was created to establish policy harmonization among signing countries
(Papademetriou 1996). It stipulated that asylum applications must be submitted

in the country of first entry, which would then be responsible for a decision
binding for all EU countries. In addition, the notion of the ‘‘safe third country’’ was
established to reduce asylum claims. Adopted by most European nations, the
safe third country principle automatically dismisses asylum claims if applicants
arrive from other European nations (consistent with the Dublin Convention)
or transit countries that do not prima facie produce refugees. Lists of ‘‘safe coun-
tries’’ were established in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and are generally consistent among EU nations. Combined
with domestic measures to ‘‘fast track’’ asylum proceedings to dismiss ‘‘patently
unfounded’’ claims, asylum levels have dropped significantly. In Germany,
applications dropped by 70 percent from 1992 to 1995, and in France applica-
tions declined by 30 percent between 1990 and 1996 (Newland and Papademetriou
1998).
In terms of sovereignty, the turn toward policy harmonization through the Dub-
lin Convention may be seen as yet another example of a ‘‘sovereignty bargain.’’
Gaining control over entry of third-country nationals required policy coordination
if the free movement provisions of EU integration were to be maintained. In fact,
some scholars have suggested that acceptance of the Dublin Convention was a
precondition for general acceptance of the single European market (Newland and
Papademetriou 1998:643). In other words, closure from outside Europe was
deemed a necessary condition for general acceptance of openness within the
European Union.
In the United States, the focus of state control in response to changing migration
patterns has not been on refugees and asylum seekers. Rather, it has been directed
at the US-Mexico border and at addressing the unanticipated consequences of the
1965 changes to US immigration law (Reimers 1985). After a series of government-
sponsored studies initiated in the 1970s, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA) established measures aimed at curbing illegal immigration into the
United States, especially from Mexico. In addition to sanction provisions that leg-
islated penalties for employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens, IRCA was the
first of many policies that directed additional resources at the southern border
(Rolph 1992; Andreas 2000). In the 1990s, focus on border enforcement gained
even more momentum through the creation of Operation Gatekeeper (and others
like it along the southwest border with Mexico) and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that financed this strategy. The border
enforcement strategy centered around deploying a highly visible police presence
along key sectors of the border with historically high numbers of migrant crossings,
such as San Diego, Nogales, and El Paso (Cornelius 1998; Andreas 2000). Annual
budget allocations for Border Patrol activity increased nearly three-fold during the
mid-1990s, a period that witnessed volatile domestic reaction to immigration, es-
pecially in those areas in which migrant crossings were concentrated like California
(Andreas 2000).
In addition to a sharper focus on ‘‘securing’’ the country’s southern border, US
policy also sought to ‘‘correct’’ the unanticipated consequences of the 1965 changes
in immigration law. After the 1965 amendments to immigration law, migration
patterns into the United States shifted from being primarily European in origin to
being increasingly dominated by Latin Americans and Asians. The 1990 Immigra-
tion Act established an allocation of ‘‘diversity visas’’ (DV-1) for applicants from
countries ‘‘adversely affected’’ by the 1965 changes. In the first allocation of such
diversity visas, nearly 50 percent were allocated for immigrants from European
countries. The absolute number of these DV-1 visas was actually quite small in
proportion to overall immigration levels in the country. Nonetheless, they offered a
token government responseFhowever symbolicFto those disturbed by changing
migration trends since the mid-1960s.
These policies have had a very limited impact on changing migration patterns.
Diversity visas represent only a small part of the 800,000 to 1,000,000 visas allo-
cated annually. Moreover, border enforcement has not resulted in a dramatic
decline in border crossings from Mexico. Rather, flows have simply moved around
the reinforced areas to more rural zones where there is a lower police presence
(Cornelius 1998; see also US INS 1998:209). Although these measures have not
succeeded in significantly altering migration patterns, they have been successful in
defusing perceptions of an ‘‘alien invasion’’ that had gained political currency in the
1990s (Andreas 2000; Rudolph 2003a). They have done so by reaffirming the
resilience and significance of the border, even if the gesture is largely symbolic.
What insights can be drawn from the European and US responses to migration?
In each case, the changing ethno-cultural characteristics of the migrants associated
with the globalization of flows appear to be more threat-inducing than simply
changes in volume, though certainly a combination of the two evokes the sharpest
response. Although all four of the countries we examined in this essay engaged in
increasingly liberal behavior concerning migration during the early Cold War pe-
riod (consistent with a trading state logic), when such programs unexpectedly al-
tered the composition of migration flows, state responses generally reversed course.
This does not mean, however, that migration policy has been characterized by a
digression from trends regarding trade and capital flows. Rather, policy closure was
for the most part directed at those aspects of migration that generated perceptions
of societal threat. Policy developments in the late 1980s and the 1990s must be
taken in the context of general economic trends favoring flexible production modes
and the growing importance of human capital. These factors have placed the state
in a quandary, with macroeconomic interests pressing for openness and societal
security interests pressing for closure.
Societal Sovereignty
Observing how states have struggled with the issue of migration reveals much about
contemporary sovereignty and the role borders play in the world political economy.
The connection between the various facets of sovereigntyFespecially interde-
pendence (control over transborder flows), Westphalian (maintenance of borders
and territory), and domestic (relationship between government and people) sov-
ereigntyFmakes focusing only on some of these dimensions without regard to the
other dimensions problematic. Domestic sovereignty is maximized when the gov-
ernment is able to provide (1) territorial security (defense of Westphalian sover-
eignty) and (2) the material resources and knowledge to maintain economic
growth. Yet this again creates a tension; maximizing domestic and Westphalian
sovereignty within a trading state system requires ease of factor mobility as well as
tradeFelements that would appear to weaken interdependence sovereignty. How-
ever, easing interdependence sovereignty in terms of labor mobility has been as-
sociated with rising societal insecurities and compromising Westphalian and
domestic sovereignty.
In terms of Westphalian sovereignty, large influxes of immigrants or refugees can
create diaspora communities within a state, defined as a segment of the population
that tends to retain a sense of connection to the homeland (to varying degrees) both
socially and politically (Smith 1981; Sheffer 1986; Weiner 1992; Weiner and
Teitelbaum 2001). These diaspora groups often directly affect the decision making
of host states through increased opposition to the sending state regime or through
maintaining loyalties to the homeland and those associated with it. Consider as two
illustrations the political activism of Cuban Americans and the violent protests by
Kurds throughout Europe after the arrest of Abdulah Ocelan in 1999. The
increased ability to communicate between members of diaspora communities
and the home country not only maintains a sense of connection between these
geographically separated groups, but also increases the ability to exert influence on
the governments of both sending and receiving states (Sheffer 1993; Weiner 1993).
By potentially limiting independence from external sources of influence,
these dynamics weaken the Westphalian dimension of sovereignty, although the
threat they represent is often exaggerated by migrant-receiving states (Weiner
1993:13–14).
More salient, perhaps, is the linkage between ceding interdependence sover-
eignty over migration and the resultant effects on domestic sovereignty. Citizenship
is the institution that creates the link between state and subject, which defines
domestic sovereignty. Here the critique of sovereignty levied by postmodernists and
poststructuralists who challenge the assumption that sovereignty is solely an at-
tribute of the state becomes relevant. Roxanne Doty (1996:121) argues that ‘‘by
conceptualizing the state as a given, unitary entity, the dominant realist approach
has undermined the distinction between state, nation, and sovereignty. This per-
mits questions of national identity and its relevance to sovereignty to be dismissed
because they are presumed not to be problems.’’ Deconstruction along these lines
focuses less on the dimensions of sovereignty (as identified by Krasner) and more on
the object of sovereignty, proposing that the term ‘‘nation-state’’ be disaggregated
and sovereignty be analyzed from two distinct, though interwoven, perspectives.
Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996:2) prompt us to consider where sov-
ereignty resides: Does it reside in an apparently homogeneous people (‘‘nation’’ or
Volk) or among the residents of a territorially bounded political entity?
What appears to be happening as the trading state grand strategy has emerged as
the dominant program among advanced industrial democracies is that contempo-
rary approaches to defending territorial sovereignty have exhibited a growing
awareness of sovereignty’s societal dimensions and an increasing desire for stability
in this emerging domain. Andrew Linklater (1998:114) has proposed that ‘‘the
social bond which has linked the members of each modern European state together
but also separated them from other states and the rest of humankind is being
challenged by subnational groups and eroded by the advance of regional organ-
izations and globalization. These pressures combine to challenge the exclusionary
nature of sovereignty and traditional ideas about community and citizenship.’’ To
some, these processes represent an opportunity to move beyond nationalist iden-
tities. Note the following remark by Linklater (1998:117) that ‘‘the steady weak-
ening of the old bonds linking citizens to the state creates unprecedented
opportunities for new forms of political community attuned to the principles of
cosmopolitan democracy and transnational citizenship’’ (see also Soysal 1995).
Empirical evidence drawn from the United States and Europe, however, suggests
that a large portion of the populations in these states find these developments
unsettling, if not outright threatening (Feldblum 1998). James Rosenau (1997:220)
points out that ‘‘to the extent that people have a need for community and a sense of
independence, then to that extent the achievement and maintenance of sovereignty
for their nation [serves] important human longings’’ (emphasis added). In a world of
unprecedented migration, the implications of this societal dimension of sovereignty
(and its link to domestic sovereignty) become evident. ‘‘When it is no longer clear
who makes up the nation, a state’s internal sovereignty and the existence of the
state itself is threatened’’ (Doty 1996:122). Control over migration, both in the
forms of citizenship and border control policies, is thus not only an aspect of what
Krasner refers to as interdependence sovereignty, but it is intimately linked with
domestic sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.
The rise of ‘‘societal sovereignty,’’ thus, adds another dimension to an already
complex amalgam of ideas and norms that constitute modern sovereignty. The
result of this evolution is that ‘‘the social organization of the world . . . has become
much more complex. Bordering has become much more multifaceted, in terms
of both geographic and non-geographic forms, as well as of social, political, and
economic character’’ ( Jacobson 1998:455; Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001).

Although some scholars point to the process of globalization as one based on the
gradual eradication of borders (and, thus, some have argued, sovereignty), in actu-
ality borders have in many ways increased in their sociopolitical importance. On the
one hand, borders serve as important symbolic points of economic connection
between trading partners as opposed to symbols of separation among advanced
industrial countries in Europe and America. The self-limiting of interdependence
sovereignty, however, does not suggest that these borders cease to exist but rather
that they display a ‘‘softer shell’’Fa semipermeable membrane as opposed to a wall
(Herz 1957). Emphasizing the symbolic qualities of borders as points of connection
instead of separation as well as articulating the benefits to be had from such open-
ness and interdependence play an important role in maintaining regimes.
On the other hand, even though borders do serve as important symbols of eco-
nomic connection, they also remain significant because they provide social closure
and symbolic separation between peoples and cultures. Borders, together with the
institution of citizenship, designate both inclusion and exclusion and define the
sociopolitical community both in terms of ‘‘who we are’’ as well as ‘‘who we are not’’
(Brubaker 1992). Traditional means of ‘‘imagining the community’’Fethnicity,
language, cultureFremain salient markers of societal inclusion (and exclusion),
even amid academic discourse on the emerging multicultural society and the rise of
regional integration regimes that also have an identity-building component, as in
the case of the European Union (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1991).
Our global age is characterized by a central tension; whereas markets are highly
elastic and responsive to change, social identities are not. Although borders are
important in maintaining economic ties and serve as symbolic ‘‘points of connec-
tion,’’ maintaining stable national identities requires at least the image of the border
as highly resilientFa ‘‘hard shell’’ rather than the ‘‘soft shell’’ characterized in
economic discourse.
This communitarian impulse toward social closure has been reflected elsewhere
in the term ‘‘societal security’’ (Wæver et al. 1993; see also Huntington 1996;
Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001). Yet, establishing grand strategy in terms of the
equilibrium between economic and societal security yields an imperfect fit in liberal
states that display an increasing degree of ethnocultural heterogeneity and a strong
modern national identity (Hollifield 1992; Smith 1997; Rudolph 2003a, 2003b).
Even though it is true that there remain large numbers of people in these nations
that do feel genuinely threatened by the presence of foreigners deemed less eth-
nically or culturally proximate than those who came in prior inflows of migration,
an even larger majority seem more concerned with the loss of societal sovereignty
than societal security. European and American policies have displayed racial and
cultural preferences regarding migrant inflows, yet the evidence (Andreas 1999;
Shanks 2001; Rudolph 2003a) suggests that insecurity since the early 1970s has
been generated primarily by a sense of declining societal sovereignty with the rise in
illegal immigration and a sense that social borders can be transgressed without
community consent. As liberal polities become increasingly multicultural over time,
societal sovereignty and territory as components of societal security will no doubt
remain politically salient. Continued flows of legal immigration, inter-ethno/cul-
tural miscegenation, and the generally higher birthrates of immigrant families in
migrant-receiving states make defining societal security in purely ethnocultural
terms problematic, because the lines between ethnic and cultural groups within
polyethnic societies become increasingly blurred and ‘‘gray areas’’ become more
commonplace. Note, for example, the large number of race categories used by
the 2000 United States Bureau of the Census to capture the ever-evolving notions
of identity.
As a result, analyzing state grand strategy solely in terms of the concept
of ‘‘societal security’’ becomes difficult for two reasons: (1) it presupposes social
homogeneity, and (2) it presumes that social identities should (and can) be main-
tained in a static fashion. Finding societal homogeneity among advanced industrial
democracies is an increasingly difficult challenge, making the first assumption hard
to reconcile with contemporary social realities. Moreover, even though the stability-
creating aspect of social identity is predicated on a myth of historical stasis, such a
condition is indeed a myth. Identities are, to varying degrees, in a continual state of
change in response to factors both internal and external to the society. Even among
societies insulated from other cultures, change can (and most often does) occur
across generations without necessarily creating perceptions of threat or acute
insecurities. Focusing instead on societal sovereignty as a salient dimension of soci-
etal security allows us to move beyond these limitations.
The empirical evidence (see Silverman 1992; Smith 1997; Feldblum 1999;
Rudolph 2004) drawn from Europe and the United States suggests that national
identity is not necessarily constituted in the same way. In fact, among these Western
countries different conceptions of national identity have engendered a significant
degree of political conflict. These differences can be articulated as those occurring
between the ethnocultural facet of identity and the liberal facet of identity. If
we speak only in terms of ‘‘societal security,’’ which of these dimensions is being
secured? The evidence does suggest, however, that there is widespread consensus
that deliberations regarding identity are held within the domain of the polityF
liberal policies that extend rights to noncitizens or allow entry into the community
(whether as a citizen or nonnaturalized denizen of the territory) are established as
manifestations of the nation’s liberal facet of identity (Hollifield 1992). Conversely,
the adoption of restrictive legislation established to reduce the degree and speed of
societal change reflects a belief that polities have the moral authority to enact such
policies in order to maintain their own societal conception of self.
The Challenge of Sovereignty

If the emergence of a societal dimension of sovereignty is one characteristic of the
contemporary global age, what are its political implications? As discussed above, the
exchanges that occur between dimensions of sovereignty are commonly referred to
as ‘‘sovereignty bargains.’’ Although the same could theoretically be done with
regard to national identity and the movement of persons across borders, this is
unlikely because the logic of societal security runs counter to the logic of economic
security in a trading state system. As Linklater (1998:120) has pointed out: ‘‘Glo-
balization confronts states with difficult choices about the appropriate level of en-
gagement with regional organizations and about the current relevance of national
sovereignty. Central governments are finding it increasingly difficult to generate a
commanding consensus about questions of national identity and national purpose
as a result.’’ Given the interrelationships between the various facets of sovereignty
and the countervailing logics of its economic and societal dimensions, what kind of
‘‘sovereignty bargain’’ best exemplifies modern grand strategy among the world’s
advanced industrial democracies? When societal dimensions of sovereignty are in-
cluded in the analysis, ‘‘sovereignty bargains’’ are far more complex than ‘‘trading’’
one dimension of sovereignty for another. Rather, the bargain crafted will be
characterized by a matrix of nuanced exchanges and a state actively seeking to
finesse dimensions that display contradictory logics (Rudolph 2003a, 2003b). What
we have seen in practice is the use of symbolic policy aimed at emphasizing state
capacity for control and an increased acceptance of multilateral approaches in
moving toward this goal (Newland and Papademetriou 1998; Andreas 2000;
Rudolph 2003a). These practices include policies such as ‘‘Operation Gatekeeper’’
deployed on the US southern border. Although, as observed earlier, the program
has done little to stop the aggregate flow of undocumented migrants from Mexico
since its implementation, it has served to effectively quell public concerns about a
loss of control over illegal immigration (Cornelius 1998; Andreas 1999; Rudolph
2003a).
What do these developments tell us about the nature of sovereignty? First
and foremost, sovereignty is an institutionFa set of norms and rules that include
normative statements regarding authority and international recognition. It is often
seen as the ‘‘immoveable cornerstone’’ of world order. However, when viewed as a
disaggregated collection of distinct dimensions, the institution of sovereignty dis-
plays a remarkable degree of flexibility. As Krasner (1999) has pointed out, sov-
ereignty has never been absolute, though it is often presented in such terms. Rather
than being in a state of decline, what we see today is simply an increased awareness
of sovereignty’s various dimensions and the gains to be reaped by making trade-offs
between them. Sovereignty is, and always has been, a dynamic institution, although
the exact types of sovereignty bargains executed by individual states have varied at
different times. In the contemporary period, state behavior has been marked by
two distinct sovereignty bargains. First, in the economic realm, interdependence
sovereignty is willingly ceded in order to bolster Westphalian and domestic sov-
ereignty. Second, in the societal realm, Westphalian sovereignty has been increas-
ingly ceded in order to bolster interdependence sovereignty (control over
migration flows), domestic sovereignty (the relationship between government and
polity), and societal sovereignty (identity). Although these two bargains lead to
opposite impulses with regard to interdependence sovereignty (control over flows),
this tension can be (and evidence suggests largely is) addressed both by the use of
symbolic policies intended to craft the image of secure borders and social identities,
and a predominant belief that neoliberal economic policies will, in the long run,
serve to mitigate migration pressures that are the source of societal insecurities in
receiving states (Martin 1998).
The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., will
no doubt serve to further complicate the ‘‘sovereignty bargains’’ exacted in the
coming years. These events made the connection between international migration
and the construction of global terror networks clear to the public and policymakers
alike (Camarota 2002; Flynn 2004). In terms of sovereignty, the September 11
event certainly raised the stakes concerning the importance of interdependence
sovereignty as a prerequisite to defending other aspects of sovereignty. Exactly how
this will be achieved remains to be seen, but it will no doubt spark even more debate
regarding sovereignty. In his oft-quoted book, Hinsley (1966) observed that pre-
occupations with the question of sovereignty are most acute during periods of rapid
change. Events in the early stage of this new millennium suggest that we live in just
such a volatile time.
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International Studies Review (2005) 7, 1–20

REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION

Sovereignty and Territorial Borders

In an age marked by economic globalization, regional integration, and

FEmerich de Vattel (1883:154)

We live in an age characterized by regional integration, economic globalization, and

r 2005 International Studies Review.

dimensions of sovereignty can be ‘‘bargained’’ to promote overall grand strategy

Sovereignty and the Modern State

evolution (Philpott 1997).2 Unfortunately, scholars typically understate (or miss

existed a century earlier.’’ Increasingly, defense of Westphalian sovereignty was a

Among European colonists, imperial identity forged sentiments that maintained

the grand strategy, deciding to relinquish a degree of ‘‘interdependence sover-

National Identity and Societal Security

(Papademetriou 1996). It stipulated that asylum applications must be submitted

economic character’’ ( Jacobson 1998:455; Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001).

The Challenge of Sovereignty

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