De Bisschop v.

Galang, 8 SCRA 244

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is
dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court a quo is hereby
dissolved, with costs against petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop. So ordered.

FACTS:

The case of George de Bisschop involved an American citizen who was allowed to stay in
the Philippines as a prearranged employee of Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he was the
president and general manager. He applied for an extension of his stay, but the
Commissioner of Immigration denied his application based on confidential reports
suggesting that the company was involved in gambling and that he had evaded income tax.
The Commissioner issued a letter advising de Bisschop to depart within five days. De
Bisschop did not request a reinvestigation but instead filed a case for prohibition on
September 18, 1959, to prevent his arrest and deportation. The lower court issued a
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Commissioners of Immigration were required by law to conduct

formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay for aliens.
2. Whether or not the Commissioners were required to promulgate written decisions in
such cases.

HELD:

1. NO, the Commissioners of Immigration were not required by law to conduct formal
hearings on all applications for extension of stay for aliens. The court held that the
administration of immigration laws fell within the exclusive responsibility of the
Executive branch, and the extension of stay for aliens was a discretionary matter.
Since the Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 was silent on the procedure for these cases, the court
concluded that the judiciary had no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative
practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as
the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. The
court also found that the requirement for aliens to leave before deportation
proceedings was merely a preliminary step and did not constitute a final
decision.
2. NO, the Commissioners were not required to promulgate written decisions in such
cases. The promulgation of decisions in writing, the court held that the word
"decision" referred to the number of "votes" necessary to constitute the
decision of the Board of Commissioners and that the immigration law did not
require written decisions for extension of stay cases.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

1. George de Bisschop, the petitioner, contended that the Commissioners of

Immigration were required to conduct formal hearings and promulgate written
decisions for extension of stay applications for aliens.

DEFENDANTS:

1. The Commissioner of Immigration argued that the immigration administration was an

executive matter, the extension of stay was discretionary, and there was no
requirement for formal hearings or written decisions for extension of stay
applications. The Commissioner also emphasized that the right to a notice and
hearing in administrative proceedings was not essential to due process of law.
Furthermore, the Commissioner asserted that prohibition was not an appropriate
remedy, and habeas corpus was the proper means to challenge deportation
proceedings and ascertain whether jurisdiction had been exceeded.

SUPREME COURT:

1. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this
particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart
in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final,
because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the
"requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an
advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to
take steps for his expulsion".
Globe Telecom v. NTC 435 SCRA 110

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22
November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the
NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.

FACTS:

Globe and private respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) are both grantees of
valid and subsisting legislative franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS), utilizing the Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSM) technology. Among the inherent services supported by the GSM
network is the Short Message Services (SMS), also known colloquially as texting, which has
attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication.

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to
effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc.
(Globe). Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts
request for the interconnection of SMS. Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts
complaints and moved to dismiss the case.

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued the Order where it ruled that
both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Orderfor their lack of
cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for
having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse and penalized both on the
ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the
NTC. Globe filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside
the Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe

HELD:

NO, being an agency of the government, NTC should, at all times, maintain a due regard for
the constitutional rights of party litigants. In this case, NTC blindsided Globe with a punitive
measure for a reason Globe was not made aware of, and in a manner that contravened
express provisions of law. Consequently, the fine imposed by NTC on Globe is also invalid.
Otherwise put, since the very basis for the fine was invalidly laid, the fine is necessarily void.

The assailed NTCs determination and corresponding penalty were rendered in the exercise
of quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, all the requirements of due process attendant to the
exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present case. The seven (7) Cardinal Primary
Rights in justiciable cases before an administrative tribunals in the case of Ang Tibal vs CIR
are as follows:
 1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.
3. "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial."
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not
only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case.
Globe claims that the issue of its authority to operate SMS services was never raised
as an issue in the Complaint filed against it by Smart. Nor did NTC ever require Globe
to justify its authority to operate SMS services before the issuance of the Order
imposing the fine.

SUPREME COURT:

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision, upheld the power of NTC to impose a fine and
to make a pronouncement on Globe's alleged lack of operational authority without need of
hearing, simply by citing the provision of the Public Service Act which enumerates the
instances when NTC may act motu proprio.
Section 17 - Proceedings of [the National Telecommunications Commission] without
previous hearing. The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to
established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary

This provision was cited by the NTC: Section 21 - Every public service violating or failing to
comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or
regulations of the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
per day for every day during which such default or violation continues; and the Commission
is hereby authorized and empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing.

As earlier stated, the Court is convinced that prior to the promulgation of the assailed Order
Globe was never notified that its authority to operate SMS was put in issue. There is an
established procedure within NTC that provides for the steps that should be undertaken
before an entity such as Globe could be subjected to a disciplinary measure. Section 1,
Rule 10 of the NTC Rules of Procedure provides that any action, the object of which is to
subject a holder of a certificate of public convenience or authorization, or any person
operating without authority from NTC, to any penalty or a disciplinary or other measure shall
be commenced by the filing of a complaint. Further, the complaint should state, whenever
practicable, the provisions of law or regulation violated, and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. While a complaint was indeed filed against Globe
by Smart, the lack of Globe's authority to operate SMS was not raised in the Complaint,
solely predicated as it was on Globe's refusal to interconnect with Smart.

DEFENDANTS:

Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request
for the interconnection of SMS.

SUPREME COURT:

In the Order, after noting that both Smart and Globe were "equally blameworthy" for their
lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and
for having "unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse," NTC held that since
SMS falls squarely within the definition of "value-added service" or "enhanced-service" given
in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS
interconnection is mandatory pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 59.
Korematsu v. U.S. (U.S. 1944)

CONTEXT:

Pearl Harbor attack, (December 7, 1941), surprise aerial attack on the U.S. naval base at
Pearl Harbor on Oahu Island, Hawaii, by the Japanese that precipitated the entry of the
United States into World War II.

FACTS:

On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor, leading to American
involvement in World War II. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066, allowing the military to exclude and intern Japanese-Americans, particularly those on
the West Coast, in the name of national security. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American
man, refused to comply with the order, leading to his arrest. German and Italian Americans
were not subjected to widespread internment like Japanese-Americans and were assessed
before internment. Korematsu and his lawyers appealed his conviction, arguing that the
order violated his Fifth Amendment rights.

ISSUE:

Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast at the time that they were excluded?

HELD:

YES. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified. The Court through Justice Hugo
Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large number of
American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our shores
are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.

Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion, stating that there was no racial prejudice in
the order or its implementation. He argued that the order was strategically necessary due to
national security risks. The decision also noted that during a national emergency, racial
classifications were not necessarily suspect. The majority opinion relied in part on the
previous case of Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), which had come to a similar
conclusion. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a concurrence, emphasizing concerns about
espionage and sabotage.

Dissenting:

Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over the
brink of constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must extend
great deference to the judgments of the military, it is essential that there be definite limits to
military discretion. Moreover, the military order is not reasonably related to the dangers it
seeks to prevent.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States
Constitution (Constitution) to approve everything the military may deem expedient.

Justice Frank Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion, characterizing the Court's decision as a
"legalization of racism." Justice Robert Jackson also dissented, arguing that the decision
legitimized racism and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
He referred to the internment camps as "concentration camps" and stated that the Executive
Order was outside the scope of presidential authority.
Adarand Constructors v. Peña 515 U.S. 200 (1995)

CONTEXT:

At the time this case was litigated, many contracts led by agencies of the United States
federal government contained financial incentives for the prime contractor to employ
subcontractors that were owned or controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals." The US Small Business Administration would certify certain businesses as
disadvantaged. That usually meant that the business was owned by racial or ethnic minority
groups or by women

FACTS:

In 1989, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded a highway construction

contract in Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company. Mountain Gravel
solicited bids for a subcontract for guardrails along the highway. The lowest bid was
submitted by Adarand Constructors, with a higher bid being submitted by Gonzales
Construction. However, Gonzales Construction had been certified by the Small Business
Administration as a disadvantaged business and so Mountain Gravel awarded the
subcontract to Gonzales because of financial incentives in the Mountain Gravel's contract for
employing disadvantaged businesses. Adarand filed suit in federal court against DOT by
arguing that the subcontracting incentive clause, or bonus, that caused Adarand to lose a
subcontract was unconstitutional. The federal district court and circuit court ruled in favor of
DOT and against Adarand, which then appealed to the US Supreme Court. The case was
docketed as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
because Federico Peña was the US Secretary of Transportation at that time. Mountain
States Legal Foundation represented Adarand Constructors.

ISSUE:

Whether the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, as well as the consequent
allocation of favored treatment, was a discriminatory practice that violates the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment as well as the Due Process clause of the 5th
Amendment.

HELD:

YES. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial
classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict
scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation
programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated
under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for
a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based
classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of
past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court
remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied
strict scrutiny.
DISSENTING:

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, dissented from the majority
regarding the congruency between the 5th and 14th amendment. Justice Stevens argues
that the concept of congruence "ignores important protected and legal differences federal
state and local decision makers...a rule of 'congruence' that ignores a 'purposeful
incongruity' so fundamental to our system of government is unacceptable."
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 US 547 (1990)

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

These cases questioned the constitutionality of two minority preference policies adopted by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

First, the FCC awards an enhancement for minority ownership and participation in
management, which is weighed together with all other relevant factors in comparing mutually
exclusive applications for licenses for new radio or television broadcast stations.
Second, the FCC's so-called "distress sale" policy allows a radio or television broadcaster
whose qualifications to hold a license have come into question to transfer that license before
the FCC resolves the matter in a noncomparative hearing, but only if the transferee is a
minority enterprise that meets certain requirements.

The FCC adopted these policies in an attempt to satisfy its obligation under the
Communications Act of 1934 to promote diversification of programming, taking the position
that its past efforts to encourage minority participation in the broadcast industry had not
resulted in sufficient broadcast diversity, and that this situation was detrimental not only to
the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public.

The Metro Broadcasting challenged these policies as denials of the guarantee of equal
protection that the Court has recognized in the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.

ISSUE:

Whether the two FCC policies violates the equal protection guarantee in the Fifth
Amendments due process clause?

HELD:

NO. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that the FCC's minority preference policies were
constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and
were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity.
The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced,
Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options.
The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just
minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted
that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did
not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small
number of cases, when no competing bids were filed and the licensee elected to sell at a
lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation (see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena).

FURTHER DISCUSSION:
The FCC policies do not violate equal protection, since they bear the imprimatur of
longstanding congressional support and direction and are substantially related to the
achievement of the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity

(a) It is of overriding significance in these cases that the minority ownership programs
have been specifically approved -- indeed mandated -- by Congress.
(b) The minority ownership policies serve an important governmental objective.
Congress and the FCC do not justify the policies strictly as remedies for victims of
demonstrable discrimination in the communications media, but rather have selected
them primarily to promote broadcast diversity.
(c) The minority ownership policies are substantially related to the achievement of the
Government's interest in broadcast diversity.
(d) The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority ownership and
broadcast diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping.
(e) The minority ownership policies are in other relevant respects substantially related to
the goal of promoting broadcast diversity.
(f) For the majority of the Court, the FCC's policies easily satisfied this test. The interest
in diversifying broadcast programming accorded with the long-recognized policy of
the Federal Communications Act to ensure the presentation of a wide variety of
views.

The Supreme Court had recognized this need in the context of the scarcity of electronic
frequencies in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), sustaining the FCC's "fairness
doctrine." The FCC had quite reasonably determined that racial and ethnic diversity in
broadcast ownership would promote diversity in programming, and Congress had repeatedly
endorsed this view by rejecting proposals that would arguably reduce opportunities for
minority ownership, such as a proposal to deregulate broadcasting.

The Court, said Justice Brennan, must give great weight to the joint
administrative-congressional determination of a connection between minority ownership and
programming diversity. The minority ownership policies did not rest on impermissible
stereotyping, but on the need to diversify programming. The FCC had considered other
means of achieving this diversification and had reasonably concluded that these means
were relatively ineffective. The burden imposed by these two policies on nonminority
applicants for broadcast licenses was not impermissibly great.

DISSENTING:
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)

CONTEXT:

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding
the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy. In a 6–3
decision announced on June 23, 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, ruled
the University's point system's "predetermined point allocations" that awarded 20 points
towards admission to underrepresented minorities "ensures that the diversity contributions of
applicants cannot be individually assessed" and was therefore unconstitutional.

FACTS:

The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its College of
Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions, the University
implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A student that is from an
underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points towards his or her over all score.
The groups of students typically come from African-American, Hispanic, and Native
American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary artistic talent only receives 5 points
under the admission system. Also every student that is from an underrepresented group,
and is otherwise qualified, is typically accepted into the school. A group of white student’s,
that were determined qualified by the University, where denied admission.

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of
Michigan’ College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of
Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that,
although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on
first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the
University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission
procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse
student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of
1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to “holding seats” for certain minority
groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to
the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that
began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day
as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University’s admission policies in that
case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of
opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the LSA’s admission guidelines were narrowly tailored to achieve
interest.
 2. Whether a School’s admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points to
students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

HELD:

1. NO. The LSA’s admission guidelines were not narrowly tailored to achieve
interest.

In this case at bar, the District Court determined that the admissions program
the LSA began using in 1999 is a narrowly tailored means of achieving the
University's interest in the educational benefits that flow from a racially and
ethnically diverse student body.

However, the court emphasized that the LSA's current program does not
utilize rigid quotas or seek to admit a predetermined number of minority
students. The award of 20 points for membership in an underrepresented
minority group, in the District Court's view, was not the functional equivalent of
a quota because minority candidates were not insulated from review by virtue
of those points. Likewise, the court rejected the assertion that the LSA's
program operates like the two-track system Justice Powell found
objectionable in Bakke on the grounds that LSA applicants are not competing
for different groups of seats. The court also dismissed petitioners' assertion
that the LSA's current system is nothing more than a means by which to
achieve racial balancing.

The court explained that the LSA does not seek to achieve a certain
proportion of minority students, let alone a proportion that represents the
community.

In the court's view, the University's prior practice of "protecting" or "reserving"

seats for underrepresented minority applicants effectively kept nonprotected
applicants from competing for those slots. This system, the court concluded,
operated as the functional equivalent of a quota and ran afoul of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke.

To withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents must demonstrate that

the University's use of race in its current admissions program employs
"narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."
Id., at 227. Because "[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification and classification,"
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting),
our review of whether such requirements have been met must entail "'a most
searching examination.'" Adarand, supra, at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)). We find
that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or
one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
"underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim
justifies their program.
 Therefore, that because the University's use of race in its current freshman
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted
compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. YES. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or
town where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous
cases, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant
should be individually assessed. Each student’s admission should be based
on the student’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.
An admission system that grants points for certain characteristics such as
race is not an individual assessment. When applicants are being chosen for a
program and part of the reasoning is based on race, any discrimination made
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since
the White students are being discriminated based on race, they are a suspect
class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show the
system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the
admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not
narrowly tailored. Simply

DISSENTING:

The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race sole reasons for
denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things such residency,
grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan design is better fit than
other plans to ensure diversity.

SCHOOL CONTENTION:

The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with individual assessment
will be impractical. However, this court states that just because it will be difficult to achieve
such standards, it does not render their actions constitutional.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

CONTEXT:

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke is a 1978 Supreme Court case which held
that a university’s admissions criteria which used race as a definite and exclusive basis for
an admission decision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Affirmative action programs that take race into account can continue to play a role in the
college admissions process, since creating a diverse classroom environment is a compelling
state interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. State universities go too far, however, when
they set a certain quota for the number of minority students who enroll.

FACTS:

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the
University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school
reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as
part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair
minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test
scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's
applications were rejected.

Previously, the school implemented a quota system where white applicants could only
compete for 84 out of 100 spots, and the remaining 16 were reserved for racial minorities.
Bakke sued the school, arguing that the clear-cut racial quota system was
unconstitutional and a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bakke contended, first in
the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely
on the basis of race.

ISSUE:

Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the
repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

HELD:

YES. The Court held that these admission criteria violated the Equal Protection Clause and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court blended the analysis of the two, finding that a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause is discrimination, which the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits. In this case, the court applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that the Equal Protection
Clause requires that a government have a compelling interest with narrowly tailored means
to blatantly base their actions on race alone, as was the case here. In so reasoning, the
court extends the heightened scrutiny on race discrimination to all races and does not limit it
to the protection of racial minorities.
FURTHER DISCUSSION (NO):

The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in
higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well,
contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the
Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke)
while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

The medical school argued that their racial quota system served a compelling government
interest by remedying the traditional underrepresentation of minorities in the medical
profession and that the diversity in the classroom enhances the free exchange of ideas.

COURT’S ANSWER:

The Court rejected the University’s arguments though, finding that there are other ways to
achieve representation of traditionally underrepresented groups and classroom diversity
without a blatant racial quota system.

What is meant by Compelling Interest?

In this case, the court applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that a government have a compelling interest with narrowly tailored means to
blatantly base their actions on race alone, as was the case here. In so reasoning, the court
extends the heightened scrutiny on race discrimination to all races and does not limit it to the
protection of racial minorities.

The medical school argued that their racial quota system served a compelling government
interest by remedying the traditional underrepresentation of minorities in the medical
profession and that the diversity in the classroom enhances the free exchange of ideas. The
Court rejected the University’s arguments though, finding that there are other ways to
achieve representation of traditionally underrepresented groups and classroom diversity
without a blatant racial quota system.

That is, the Court left the door open for race as a consideration among many in admissions.
But the Court ruled that a quota system which excludes candidates because of their race
alone is racial discrimination and that the University did not have a compelling reason with
reasonably tailored means to overcome the constitutional standard of strict scrutiny.

DEFINITIONS:

Scrutiny Test Elements:

Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that there is a compelling, or very
strong, interest in the law, and that the law is either very narrowly tailored or is the
least speech restrictive means available to the government.
Compelling Interest:

A compelling state (or governmental) interest is an element of the strict scrutiny test by
which courts exercise judicial review of legislative and executive branch enactments that
affect constitutional rights, such as those found in the First Amendment.

An interest is compelling when it is essential or necessary rather than a matter of choice,

preference, or discretion.

Narrow Tailoring:

The Supreme Court has ruled that government regulation of First Amendment rights must be
“narrowly tailored,” which means that laws must be written precisely to place as few
restrictions as possible on First Amendment liberties. Narrow tailoring is linked to the
overbreadth doctrine, which the Court invokes when a law sweeps too broadly and inhibits
protected, as well as unprotected, expression.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

CONTEXT:

The second wave feminism movement took place in the 1960s and 1970s and focused on
issues of equality and discrimination. Starting initially in the United States with American
women, the feminist liberation movement soon spread to other Western countries.

Primary Holding: Heightened scrutiny applies to disparate treatment based on gender, so a

law is unconstitutional if it gives benefits to the spouses of only male but not female service
members.

FACTS:

Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's
allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military
automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however,
were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over
one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was
turned down.

The Petitioner, Frontiero (Petitioner), alleges that this policy denies her the equal protection
of laws afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

ISSUE:

Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal
dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause?

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment
for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause and
the equal protection requirements that clause implied.

A majority could not agree on the standard of review, however. The plurality opinion written
by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based
classification as it would to racial classification, found that the government's interest in
administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices.

But a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell and joined by Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun would not go so far as to hold sex discrimination to
the same standard as race, choosing instead to argue that statutes drawing lines between
the sexes alone necessarily involved the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Constitution," an approach employed in the Court's prior decision in
Reed v. Reed. Justice Potter Stewart concurred separately that the statutes created
invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Justice William H. Rehnquist
dissented affirming the reasoning of the lower court opinion.
United States v. Virginia, (U.S. 1996)

CONTEXT:

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), is a landmark case in which the Supreme
Court of the United States struck down the long-standing male-only admission policy of the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in a 7–1 decision. Justice Clarence Thomas, whose son was
enrolled at the university at the time, recused himself.

Primary Holding: A state must have an exceedingly persuasive justification for applying a
classification based on gender. The justification must not consist of overgeneralizations
about the inherent differences between genders.

FACTS:

Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public
institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men
prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. Using an "adversative method"
of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental
discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. Reflecting the high value
alumni place on their VMI training, VMI has the largest per-student endowment of all public
undergraduate institutions in the Nation.

The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only
admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause.

On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found
VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional.

Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women.

On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer
"substantively comparable" educational benefits.

The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a

male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

HELD:

NO. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was
unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's
gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to
educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was
created or maintained in order to further educational diversity.

Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men.
The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty,
courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI
affords its male cadets.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was
misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was
a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based
classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such
"heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the
same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the
equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsburg's announcement of the Court's opinion
may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful
summary of the majority position.]
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)

CONTEXT:

Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the
Court upheld the validity of laws relating to U.S. citizenship at birth for children born outside
the United States, out of wedlock, to an American parent. The Court declined to overturn a
more restrictive citizenship requirement applying to a foreign-born child of an American
father and a non-American mother who was not married to the father, as opposed to a child
born to an American mother under similar circumstances.

Primary Holding: It is permissible to place greater burdens on foreign-born children of

unwed U.S. citizen fathers in the citizenship process than on foreign-born children of unwed
U.S. citizen mothers.

FACTS:

In 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a
Vietnamese citizen. At age six, Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident.
At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a
child. Subsequently, the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation
proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained
an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of
Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied
with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a
citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Nguyen and
Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules
for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon
whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father.

ISSUE:

WON Sec. 1409(a) create a gender-based classification that is in violation of the equal
protection right of the Fifth Amendment when it creates different rules for determining the
citizenship of children born out of wedlock and outside of the United States and its territories
to one U.S. citizen parent based upon which parent is the U.S. citizen?

HELD:

NO. Sec. 1409(a) does not create a gender-based classification that violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law when it creates different
procedures for determining the citizenship of children born out of wedlock and outside of the
United States and its territories to one U.S. citizen parent based upon which parent is the
U.S. citizen.

This statute places requirements on the children of citizen fathers that the children of citizen
mothers do not face. A gender-based classification will survive equal protection analysis if
the challenged classification serves an important government objective and is substantially
related to achieving that objective. Section 1409(a)(4) requires a child of a citizen father and
noncitizen mother to get legitimization, a declaration of paternity under oath by the father, or
a court order of paternity in order to be granted citizenship. This law serves two important
governmental objectives—ensuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists, and
ensuring that the child and citizen parent have an opportunity to develop a relationship that
creates a connection between the child and citizen parent, and by extension, the United
States. A mother’s biological connection to the child is easily verifiable by the birth itself and
the birth certificate and hospital records that reflect it. A father, on the other hand, is not
necessarily present at the birth and if he is, his presence does not prove fatherhood.
Defendant argues that Sec. 1409(a)(1)’s requirement that a father provide clear and
convincing evidence of paternity should be enough to establish paternity with the use of DNA
evidence. However, the statute does not require DNA testing and Congress cannot be
required to choose one particular means of establishing paternity over others. Even a facially
neutral rule would require fathers to take steps that would not be required of mothers
because mothers can rely on birth certificates and hospital records to establish her
relationship to the child. An opportunity for a mother and child to form a meaningful
connection comes at birth, but that opportunity is not always guaranteed for fathers of
children born out of wedlock. Service members stationed overseas and other citizens
traveling throughout the world may not know when a child is conceived.

Equal protection principles do not require Congress to ignore this reality. This statute
ensures that the same opportunity for a relationship that is inherent in a mother-child bond is
available for citizen fathers before citizenship is granted to the child. Congress may refuse to
require the country to grant citizenship upon the child until the opportunity for this
relationship is proven. The statute is not based upon gender stereotypes. There is nothing
irrational in acknowledging that at birth the mother’s knowledge of the child and her
parenthood is established in a way that is not guaranteed to an unwed father. Congress
chose to serve these two government interests by means that substantially relate to those
interests. Some act linking the child to the father must occur before the child is 18. Calling all
acknowledgments of differences stereotypes serves only to obscure the misconceptions and
biases that are real.

The distinction between the genders is not based upon prejudice or disrespect, it
acknowledges the very real difference between men and women in the birth process. Equal
protection does not prohibit Congress from addressing an issue in a manner specific to each
gender.

NOTES:

The general requirement for acquisition of citizenship by a child born outside the United
States and its outlying possessions and to parents who are married, one of whom is a citizen
and the other of whom is an alien, is set forth in Sec. 1401(g). The statute provides that the
child is also a citizen if, before the birth, the citizen parent had been physically present in the
United States for a total of five years, at least two of which were after the parent turned 14
years of age.

As to an individual born under the same circumstances, save that the parents are unwed,
Sec. 1409(a) sets forth the following requirements where the father is the citizen parent and
the mother is an alien: "(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence, "(2) the father had the nationality of the United
States at the time of the person's birth, "(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in
writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18
years, and "(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years- "(A) the person is legitimated
under the law of the person's residence or domicile, "(B) the father acknowledges paternity
of the person in writing under oath, or "(C) the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court."

In addition, Sec. 1409(a) incorporates by reference, as to the citizen parent, the residency
requirement of Sec. 1401(g). When the citizen parent of the child born abroad and out of
wedlock is the child's mother, the requirements for the transmittal of citizenship are
described in Sec. 1409(c): "(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this
section, a person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of
wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the
mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the
mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of one year."
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)

CONTEXT:

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case
dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to
address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws
criminalizing sodomy were constitutional.

Primary Holding: Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
cannot amend its constitution to deny homosexuals the same basic legal protections that
heterosexuals receive.

FACTS:

Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial,
legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on
their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."
Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court
entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.

ISSUE:

Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official

protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

HELD:

YES. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State
Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and
bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and
receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection
clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to
"advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal
protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate
interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)

CONTEXT:

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), was a U.S. Supreme
Court case involving discrimination against the intellectually disabled.

In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) submitted a permit application seeking approval
to build a group home for intellectually disabled people. The city of Cleburne, Texas refused
to grant CLC a permit on the basis of a municipal zoning ordinance. CLC then sued the City
of Cleburne on the theory that the denial of the permit violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection rights of CLC and their potential residents.

Applying rational basis review, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as
applied to CLC. The Court declined to rule that intellectually disabled people were a
quasi-suspect or suspect class.

Primary Holding: There is no elevated level of scrutiny for government regulations that
affect mentally retarded people, but these regulations still can be invalidated under rational
basis review.

FACTS:

The Respondent bought a property from a private owner with the intention of starting a group
home for the mentally retarded. It was expected that 13 persons would reside in the house of
4 bedrooms and 2 baths. Petitioner required Respondent to apply for a special use permit
and then denied the application.

ISSUE:

Did the denial of the permit violate the Equal Protection rights of Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
and its potential residents?

HELD:

YES. In a unanimous judgment, the Court held that the denial of the special use permit to
Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded, and hence unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the Court declined to grant the mentally retarded the status of a
"quasi-suspect class," it nevertheless found that the "rational relation" test for legislative
action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination.

DISCUSSION:

The mentally retarded do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class because the lack of
history of discrimination and they are not politically powerless. As a group they have been
able to attract the attention of lawmakers on several issues.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)

CONTEXT:

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), was a landmark decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States concerning the scope of Congress's power of enforcement under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case also had a significant impact on historic
preservation.

Primary Holding: If a law that enforces Fourteenth Amendment rights is preventive rather
than remedial, it must be congruent and proportional to the goal that it is aiming to achieve.

FACTS:

The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the
1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his
church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church
was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new
construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this
local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's
finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA
which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?

HELD:

YES. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]"
religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and,
even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while
Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of
religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance
of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by
overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most
appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that
Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was
based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

DISCUSSION:

Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must
be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law
support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amendment.
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be
a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.

The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or
congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. If an
objector can show a substantial burden on his free exercise, the State must demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of
furthering its interest.
People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated
that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation
of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

HELD:

YES. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights
which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one
of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another
province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within
the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while
another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits.
This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards
to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that
probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards.
DISCUSSION:

The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of
equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957)

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engaged in the retail
industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the
prohibition of persons, not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations not wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections
1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in
the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one
breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged
that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the
retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue
of fact merits serious consideration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted

principles.
2. Whether or not the law deny the equal protection of the laws?

HELD:

1. YES, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality
amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced””; and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.””

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

2. NO. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter
of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected;
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

DOCTRINE:

The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to
the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country”. But the
nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries,
except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon
the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law (U.S. vs.Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

Patricio Dumlao is the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and
he has been receiving retirement benefits. He filed for re-election to the same office for the
January 30, 1980 local elections. Meanwhile, Romeo Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter
and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a
resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was passed (paragraph 4 thereof) providing disqualification for the
likes of Dumlao:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of

the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1
hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been
6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. (Emphasis supplied)

Dumlao assailed the B.P. averring that it is based on purely arbitrary grounds and therefore
class legislation. Hence, he claims it is unconstitutional.
His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. However, these two have different
issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of B.P. 52 regarding:

Sec. 7: Term of office of the elected officials (6 years)

Sec. 6: Length of the campaign (To be fixed by COMELEC in accordance with Art.
XII-C, Sec. 6 of Constitution; Dec. 29 1979 – Jan. 28, 1980)

Sec. 4: Provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.

In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection of law

HELD:

NO. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the
same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be
considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by
theoretical inconsistencies”
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree No. 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from
paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies
of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

NO. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not
prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a bereaved

family whose gross income does not exceed P2000 a month. The resolution was referred to
respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the
resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.
COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between
the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public safety,
general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also argued that. "Resolution No.
60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the
Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of the equal protection
clause in the constitution.

HELD:

NO. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the
welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban
poor, etc.

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw
the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are
members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced
by the abovenamed measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354
(see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the petitioners).

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA No.7354 is unconstitutional because it is discriminatory and encroaches

on the independence of the Judiciary.

HELD:

YES, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents
is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw
it altogether from all agencies of government.

The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need
it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.

Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

DISCUSSION:

"franked mail", or mail matter transmitted without payment or postage under the autographic
or facsimile signature of officials to whom this privilege is extended by law, and under such
rules promulgated by the Corporation to prevent the unauthorized use thereof.
Telebap v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

In this case, the court considers the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that
the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes property without due
process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides
for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the equal protection of
the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA
Network, Inc.

There are two petitioners in this case. Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP), Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered
voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners
challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.” Petitioners challenge the
validity of §92 on the ground
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation;
(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and
(3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election

ISSUE:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

YES. Petitioners’ assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal
protection of the law has no basis. The COMELEC is required to procure free air time for
candidates “within the area of coverage” of a particular radio or television broadcaster so
that it cannot, for example, procure such time for candidates outside that area.

Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of
the law has no basis. In addition, their plea that §92 (free air time) and §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646 (ban on paid political ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the
old regime where moneyed candidates could monopolize media advertising to the
disadvantage of candidates with less resources. That is what Congress tried to reform in
1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the judgment of
Congress, especially in light of the recent failure of interested parties to have the law
repealed or at least modified.
Loong V. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty.
Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the
elections in Sulu.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates
in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result
in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and
immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the
problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the
local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to
read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local
candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who
attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor
Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should
be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some
recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated
counting (Loong AND Jikiri).

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not
working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao,
Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong
sequence code.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en
banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire
Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747
ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation
and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute
Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu
assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable.

HELD:

NO. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or

other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a
special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the
right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected
officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.
These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If
manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private
respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.
International School v. Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13

CONTEXT:

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), is a domestic educational institution

established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. Foreign- hires are also paid a salary
rate 25% more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor"
and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure
to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals
in the field of international education. The compensation package given to local-hires has
been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired
locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate
labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well
as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining
unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to
the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored
the School. Hence this petition.

Petitioner: Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign- hires constitutes
racial discrimination.

Respondent: The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty
members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired
locally and classified as local hires. The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these
non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.

ISSUE:

Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires.

HELD:

YES. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is
not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the
employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice
foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.

Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the
local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These
benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of
the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would
not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART.

NOTES:

The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified
as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a
female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in
Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay
for equal work;
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for
services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court said that:
"Salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or
industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more
fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental
idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these
stipulations.