Cultural Differences

Between Arabs and Danes

The Intracultural Diversity’s Effect on
Intercultural negotiations

Ahmed Hamdoun Al-Soufi

A Master thesis in
EU Business and Law
Content page

1. Introduction 4
2. The method 7
3. Problem structure 10
4. Delimitation 12
Part 1
5. Theoretical background 13
a) Hofstede dimensions 14
b) Trompenaars dimensions 18
c) Hall theory 21
d) Phatak and Habib Model 23
5. What is culture 26
6. Anthropological overview 30
Part 2
7. Arabic culture 33
8. Danish culture 44
9. Comparing the cultures 48
a. Hofstede clusters 52
b. Trompenaars dimensions 68
Part 3
10. The language. 72
A. Signs 76
B. Linguistic aspects of the brand 78
C. Translation phenomenon in doing business 79
D. Verbal Communication (The Context) 80
E. Language and negotiations 82
F. High vs. low-context cultures 86
G. Negotiation and the context dimension 90
12. Negotiations and Culture 92
A. The Environmental Context 93
B. The Immediate Context 97
13. Conclusion 102
14. Appendix 104

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 Acknowledgment

I would like to thank my professor Torben Andersen for his leading and useful information
ideas, an all that wonderful discussions he led in the class room, which opened a wide range
of premises to me in choosing and further more to go on in the process of writing my thesis.
Also I would like to express my gratitude to Maria Anne Skaates for her great help in giving
me some valuable ideas that helped me in my work. And my special thanks for the people,
to whom I sent my questionnaire and received their responses.

Ahmed Al-Soufi

3
 1
Introduction
Background of the study:
Five years ago more than 20% of the world Gross Domestic Product GDP –
produced and consumed in global markets. (Harris & Moran, 1999: p. 1)
Within 30 years we estimate at least 80% of the world output will be in
global markets, by then, worldwide GDP will be around $ 91 trillion, so the
global accessible arena could $ 73 trillion – a twelve-fold increase in 30
years. (Bryan et al. 1999)

In the last few decades the knowledge, the technology, the economic and the information
flow outs growth are hundreds of times more than the sum of the growth of the last four
millenniums and that has led to the internationalization and globalization processes in the
economical sense, which was merely using and encountering the intercultural
communication to be able to fill up the gap between nations in order to smoothen the
process, as Barker indicates ‘many of the processes of globalization are economic in
character. Thus, one half of the world’s largest economic units are constituted by 200
transnational corporations who produce between a third and a half of world output’. (Barker,
2001: p.112)

The relationship between Danes and middle eastern Arabs is mainly economical, relations
outside trade sector are limited except for few diplomatic relations, or having three or four
expatriates seated in a cultural center like ‘Det Dansk Institut i Damaskus’, for this reason I
would like to focus on the communication process in the economic sector.

The new era shall bring to the sight the new supreme powers, which is mainly economic
powers, the country or the nation that builds up its economical position in the future globe,
will definitely have the needed power to fulfill its goals and aims. The balance of trade
between Europe and China is already in the deficit from European perspective, the same is
with the United State, Japan, and some of the Asian Tigers, and I think in the near future the

4
balance will be in the favor of India also. For all these reasons the European countries have
to find new markets, which is extremely limited, it is manly Latin America, Middle Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East. For geopolitical reasons the Middle East is the logical choice for
the European countries, due to the facts that Latin America is closer to the United States,
Middle Asian countries are closer to the china, Japan, and other Asian Tigers, therefore what
mainly left are the Middle East and African countries, the prior has enough money to by
while the later are poor countries that cant offer to bay the European goods without having
kind of subsidies.

Firms are under a big pressure from aggressive competitors around the glob to take its
positions in the global economical environment. Therefore Danish firms have no choice but
to find new markets, and or strengthen its relationships with the already existent markets.
Although there are no such studies, still I think the European closest neighbors, which is the
Middle East and North Africa will be the new booming area, with good reserves of oil –
Saudi Arabia and Iraq will be the last two countries that will sustain good amount of oil
reserves – both have the first and second discovered reserves of oil. With China, India, and
the Asian Tigers as big competitors, the European markets are mature markets, the
possibility of the growth is very small if it isn’t negative,1 and at the same time the Arabic
countries are really the huge potential markets in the foreseen future2. Yet, we have to take in
our consideration that Arab counties are young countries in a demographical sense (e.g., in
Iraq percentage of population aged between 0-29 is %70,04 or 16,489,188 out from
23,541,220 persons, in Syria this percentage is %69,89, or 12,292,810 out of 17,589,510
persons, while in Denmark it is %37,10, or 1,984,820 out of 5,349,210 persons), therefore,
by studying the culture of these countries, Danish firms can amplify its chances in
approaching those young people as a potential consumers.

A lot of the European corporations including Danish firms and business sectors started to
recognize the importance of approaching these markets, hence we can see some of these
firms such as Arla Foods and Danfoss having their joint venture or their 100% owned
subsidies in some of the region key countries. This is the bright sight of the picture. The
other side of the coin is that a lot of the European firms including the Danish firms have
faced severe problems in this part of the world.

1
In Denmark the real GDP growth is 0.50, while in Germany the EU largest economy it is at -0.10, see
appendix.
2
The real GDP growth in the Arabic Middle East countries varies from 3.0 for Lebanon to 10.0 for Kuwait.

5
 Cultural differences are one of the main reasons for the unsuccessful, unpredictable, and
insufficient business conducting in the region. Most of the European businessmen including
the Danes are aware of culture differences and its influence on doing business, therefore,
they study national culture-differences, organizational culture-differences, and intercultural
communications, but still they can’t figure what went wrong when they can’t fulfill their goal
in doing business with the Arabs. I think the main issue here is that the vast majority of the
European business schools and research centers make their cross-cultural knowledge by
focusing on Western vs. Eastern cultural perspective, assuming that since Arab countries are
collectivists like other Easterners, they can approach them the same way they do approach
other Asians, nevertheless, the most sensitive European business people toward cultural
differences, who assume that the Arab have their own culture, which is different than other
Asian cultures, do put the Arabs all in the same basket. This is a huge mistake man can
attribute. Arabs are not the same, there are a big culture differences between Arabs
themselves.

Doing business in Saudi Arabia is very different than doing business in Dubai, Egypt, or
Iraq. The firm, which is already, performs successfully in Egypt cant build on its prior
cultural knowledge to make its entry to the Saudi’s market; if it did so then I think it is in a
real problem.

Fore all these reasons I think it is important to study the Arabic culture in general, the
differences that lies between the national and ethnical cultures in the Arab countries, and its
influence on doing business and especially negotiating with the Danes. Such a study can give
the Danish business people an over look on the Arabic culture in general and the cultural
differences between the Arabs, the Danish corporation can probably gain an extra
competitive advantage by learning little bit about their close neighbors’ culture. To do this I
will use some of the cross-culture communication theories.

6
 2
The method
A method is: ‘the way of approaching things, or a way of attempting to realize one’s goals.
It comprises how data are collected and subsequently processed’ (Worm, 1997: p 26)3. In
this sense I would rather say that the main data that I have collected, has been through the
questionnaire I have done, or through the in-depth interviews, also I have collected some of
the data I am using in this study from public information streams, (e.g. internet, books).
In Denmark I have interviewed negotiators, managers, and personals in large firms, such as
Danfoss and Arla foods, some from small or medium size companies. And I sent others my
questionnaire by e-mail or by post. The total number of the questioned or interviewed people
were (16), from which (75%) were males and the rest were females.
In Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, I made some interviews with wide variety of people, some of
whom were blue workers, others white workers, some are peasants, traders,
businessmen…etc., while in Dubai, Lebanon, Qatar, and Bahrain I used questions sent by
ordinary mail or e-mails. The total number was (60), where 90% were males as mentioned in
the appendix. The main think that should be mentioned here is that, in countries such as
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain I couldn’t interview or question women, due to the fact
that no female can be approached by a male interviewer, so all the people included in my
questionnaire were men. Most of them were young people, as the average age in the Middle
East is significantly low, e.g. the mean age in countries like Iraq is ‘22,42’, Syria is ‘23,2’,
while in Denmark it is ‘38,48’. From both sides some accepted to be mentioned by names,
others refused to mention their names.
These interviews and questionnaires were carried out by two languages, English for
interviewing or questioning Danes, and Arabic for interviewing and questioning Arabs. The
last were translated into English to be appended to this study, this resulted in more time
consuming process.
Analyzing the data:
The collected data from respondents’ answers typically fall into two categories. First,
cultural specific behaviors, which each of the two cultures respondents found that it
determines the other national culture; and second, cultural specific attitudes, which
determine the negotiator cultural behavior. For the first category, the aim was to find out

3
Worm, 1997. Vikings and Mandarins. Copenhagen, CBS Press.

7
general ideals that could fit into the general patterns of culture dimensions, while from the
second category the goal is to find out empirical solutions of the negotiation problems.
The answers were determined by the most important differences that the respondents
themselves mentioned, and by the outcome of the questionnaire.
Then I made my comparison on two levels, the first, was a comparison of the outcome of the
information collected from the Arabic respondents, based on their nationality; secondly, a
comparison of the out come of the Arabs and the Danes interviews. These were only done,
when there was a clear cultural difference, since the aim is to minimize the cultural
differences between the Arabs and the Danes in order to build a sold base of collaboration
between the two nations. This is in the intercultural perspective, in the same time
highlighting the differences between the Arab countries, will help the Danes to be aware of
the culture specific behavior of their counterparts in the region.

I will start my work by trying to figure what is the problem, where it lies, and how we can
solve it. Then I will explain the theories I am using in my study and the delimitations. The
first thing I will do is to have a new look on culture in general, what are culture, its notion, its
constituents, and other theoretical perspectives. Later on I will talk about the national culture,
its dimensions, and how it could affect the business negotiations, ending with a comparison
of the cultures in question. And I will try to put some suggestions to the Danes who are doing
business with this part of the world.

As a point of start I will use interviews with some Arabs and Danes, and some of the
literatures that deals with this subject. In the questioning process I will use some questions of
mine and some I borrowed from others like Hofstede and Trompenaars.

The Questions:

I divided my questions in two categories the first was addressed to Danish negotiators and
includes questions like:

1. What is the main difference between the Arabs and the Danes?
2. In dealing with Arabic person, are you aware of his nationality?
3. In dealing with a person from the Middle East are you aware that he is an Arab or no?
4. To what extent does the cultural differences determine the outcome of the negotiation?

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5. Were the culture differences the main reason for the failure or the success of the
negotiation?

The second, was addressed to Arab negotiators and includes in addition to the previous
questions, numbered 1, 3, 5, I used some of the questions used in Hofstede’s questionnaire in
his IBM research.

Theoretical approach:

The basis of my departure will be the Hofstede’s work, in determining the concept of
national and organizational culture, its layers, and its dimensions. What Hofstede did was to
some extent unique, with a lot of criticism was made to his work; it stays the most popular
theory in the last two decades, especially in dealing with organizational cultures.

I will also use the Trompenaars and Hampden-turner approach ‘the seven-dimensional
model, the model they started in their ‘ridding the waves of culture’ and developed it in their
later work. And I will try to use other models, such as Hall’s high context vs. low context
cultures.

In analyzing the negotiation process, I will use some of the intercultural communications
theories such as the Edward Hall theories to talk on the interaction between groups in
general, while in dealing with the negotiation process in depth I will use the Phatak-Habib
model, which deal with two contexts that influence the cross-cultural negotiation; the
environmental context and the immediate context.

Finally I will use the approach that Usunier mentioned to determine the sources of culture,
as a basis for my model in determining how to explain the cultural differences. While I will
explain some of these sources, not all of them due to the limited time and space of this study,
I will make a special focus on the language, due to the fact that most of the
misunderstandings lie here, and that the language as I think determines the way that people
think and act. At the same time one of the major theories in cultural studies—high vs. low-
context theory—is better understood under studying language.

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 3
Problem structure

In my interviews with some Arabs and Danes and in my questionnaire, I found that a
major part of the unfulfilled goals and unsuccessful negotiations were due to cultural
differences that the counterparts weren’t aware of, of course it wasn’t the only reason.

As it is clearly obvious, Westerners in general, and of course, the Danes are among them,
are accused of not trying to engage with the Arabs more openly than they did until now, and
that they don’t make enough efforts trying to understand, study, or at least explore the
Arabic culture. While in the other hand, the Arabs are accused of not being so positive in
convincing the Westerners with the importance of studying their culture, and taking it as
seriously as they take other cultures such as the Chinese and the Japanese.

In the mean time the inter-business between both sides is limited and unstable, we can
work it out, by pointing our finger on the problem and explore it so other can carry on and
finish out what we started in this study.

The overall objective of my study is trying to find out the effect of the intercultural
differences between the Arab countries and its implication on the negotiation with the Danes.

I hope that the findings of this study will help me and others to improve and increase our
understanding of each other, and raise the possibilities of ‘gapping the bridge’ between these
cultures. Increasing the Danes knowledge about the Arabic cultures is important, due to the
fact that the Danes are the sellers, exporters, and they are the people whom have their
expatriates in the region, so they need to modify and accommodate with the local cultures. In
trying to do so, two major obstacles faced me; first, most of the firms consider the
information about its joint ventures negotiations of top secret, and no outsider allowed
looking through it. Second, most of the Arabs, can’t find out the differences between the
Danes and other Scandinavian, while very little of them can distinguish between the
Scandinavians and other West Europeans.

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 The aim of this study is to determine and analyze the most important cultural differences,
between the Arab countries in the Middle East (intra-cultural perspective) in one hand, and
between the Arabs and the Danes (cross-cultural perspective) in other hand. And then try to
find out which of these differences are crucial in conducting negotiations between the two
sides. To do so, I need to start with some theoretical descriptions of these cultures in the
beginning of the study. In more specific words, the study will focus and analysis how those
cultural differences could affect selected aspects of negotiation process in Arabs-Danes
business making.

In the applicability matter, my aim is to increase the Danish understanding of the intra-
cultural differences between the Arabs and how it could affect the inter-cultural contact
between them and the Danes. By increasing this understanding, it will be easier to put
suggestions on how to increase the efficiency, and build more sufficient inter-cultural
contact between the both sides.

The other aim is to find out which of the Arabic culture layers should be considered as
variables (changeable), and which should be granted as constant (unchangeable).

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 4
Delimitations
I will divide the delimitations into two groups:
• Geographical delimitations.
• Objective delimitations.
In Geographical terms, the Middle East constitutes of, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,
Turkey, Israel, PNT (Palestine National Territory), Cyprus, and Iran. Those are the major
countries in the Middle East. While the Arab countries, whom are considered as members of
the league of Arabs states are: Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria,
Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Comoros
Islands, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen.
I am taking in my study some of the Arabic Middle Eastern countries, these are; Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, due to the fact that these are the major countries
in the region because of their demographic or economic sizes, and they are either the
existent or the potential partners to the Danes in the region, I have excluded countries like
Turkey and Iran because they are too big to be studied with other countries in the first hand
and they are not Arabs, so they have another patterns of culture in the other hand, also there
is no fear of being mixed with other Arabic countries, also I have excluded Israel from the
study due to the fact that it Is not Arabic country in one hand, and its culture is will known
to the Danish business people.
In the objective delimitations, I am intending to analyze the influence of Arabic culture
differences on the negotiating process with the Danes and the role of culture in general in
Danish-Arabic cross-cultural negotiations. This will be done in relation with the bargaining,
exporting, importing, joint-venturing …etc.
Thus, other types of negotiation, such as political negotiations are excluded, also the effect
of culture on the after selling services, and the role of culture on the expatriates, the cultural
effect of the day to day business conducting in these joint ventures or the subsidiaries are not
examined.
Trust, is an important issue in studying negotiations, thus I will exclude it from my thesis.
The other important issue in the negotiation is the studying of credibility, especially in joint
venturing.

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 Part 0ne
5
Theoretical background

When we try to specify a culture characteristic, we have to remember that even

“communication is unique within each culture, and, at the same time, that systematic
similarities and differences exist, these similarities and differences can be explained and
predicted theoretically through the use of dimensions of cultural variability (e.g.,
individualism-collectivism)”(Gudykunst, p. 54).
I will use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as a starting point. Geert Hofstede, a Dutch
professor, who has carried out significant research on the basis of conducted interviews with
some of the multinational firm IBM employees from 50 countries and 3 regions (Hofstede,
2001)4, his goal was to identify the differences and similarities on a national basis.
Despite all the critics that were attached to Hofstede’s theory, we have to admit that he
brought this problematic non-agreeable issue to the world attention and consideration; a lot
of cross-cultural researches were conduct under the motivation and drives by his work.
Simply by his stereotyped dimension, he made it easer to the following researchers to study
cross-cultural issues. Yet, to construct and make well based cross-cultural transactions, the
counterparts has to dig deeper than Hofstede did and try to find more beneficial alternatives.
Hofstede mentions that culture is a mental programming system, it is part of the social
system, and “social systems can exist only because human behavior is not random, but to
some extent predictable” (ibid: P1). And every human being “carries within him or herself
patterns of thinking, feeling, and potential acting which were learned throughout their
lifetime (Hofstede, 1991: P4).5
I will start by giving a brief explanation of his dimensions, then I will discuss some of my
critiques of his ideas, and then I will try to interpret them in the area of my study – that is
Denmark and the Arab countries – using his findings whenever it exists.

4
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture Consequences. Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations
across nations. California, USA: Sage publications, Inc, 2nd Ed.
5
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations. Software of the mind. USA: McGraw-Hill Inc.

13
 a) Hofstede’s Model of Cultural Dimensions

On the basis of his extensive empirical work involving more than one hundred thousand
IBM employees in forty countries, Geert Hofstede (1980), a Dutch cross-cultural
management researcher, initially developed a model for classifying national cultures and
analyzing work behavior according to four underlying dimensions: power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individualism.
More recently, Hofstede (1993)6, see also (Hofstede, 1991: p.160) has added another
dimension to his model, after carrying out a collaborative study with Michael Harris Bond
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988)7. The study used a questionnaire known as the Chinese Value
Survey (CVS) and identified a fifth dimension.
“Hofstede claims that a person’s mental program consists of three elements namely the
universal program, the collective program, and the individual program.” (Rasmussen and
Bank-Mikkelsen, 2000:P.20)
When Hofstede talks about the universal program, he says that it has to do with what is
common for all human beings irrespective of race, gender, nationality, and color, e.g. love,
hate, joy, sorrow…etc.
“According to Hofstede, culture is that element of person’s mental program that he shares
with other members of his culture, and he calls this element collective program.” (Ibid)
Although the feelings as we said is universal, the way of showing them is culture related,
expressing these feelings differ around the world; some cultures express happiness openly,
while in other cultures the happiness are something personal and only can be expressed
privately.
The individual program of a human being is unique for each and every one of us, and is
partly inherited and partly formed by our surroundings (ibid). Although I share the feeling of
love with all human beings, and also share the way of expressing my feelings with my social
group as not to show it openly, I still have very special way of showing my love privately.
Hofstede had sequenced his dimensions in two different ways, in his book ‘Culture’s
Consequences, 2001’ he put them in the following order: ‘power distance’, ‘uncertainty
avoidance’, ‘individualism vs. collectivism’, ‘masculinity vs. femininity’, and ‘long- vs.

6 Hofstede, G. (1993) “Cultural constraints in management theories,” Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.81-94.
7 Hofstede, G. and Bond, M.H. (1988) “The Confucius connection: from cultural roots to economic growth.” Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp.4-21.

14
short-term orientation’. While in his ‘cultures and organizations, software of the mind:
1991’ he put them as: ‘power distance’, individualism vs. collectivism’, ‘masculinity vs.
femininity’, ‘uncertainty avoidance’, and ‘long- vs. short-term orientation’. Actually, I don’t
know the reason behind this difference in arranging his dimensions in two different ways.
Therefore I will sequence them as its relevant importance and influence on the negotiation
process as it appears to me. A brief description of the five dimensions is provided below:
I. Individualism vs. collectivism
Individualism is defined by an emphasis on the self as separate from others (coterminous
with the body), and as an end in itself (Gould & Kolb, 1964)8. Dominant or interrelated
ideas include personal goals, self-reliance (here perceived as independence), self-
development, autonomy, privacy, competitiveness, aggressive creativity, unrealistic
interpersonal relationships, as well as the perception of the individual as the basis of social
phenomena (Hsu, 1983; Lukes, 1973)9.
In collectivistic cultures the focus of the society members is on the group; it is more
important than the individual, so in the collectivist countries people are expected to give up
their loyalty to the group. In return for his loyalty individuals are protected and supported by
the group. While in individualistic cultures the individual is more important than the group;
people in an individualist country think in terms of “I” whereas people in collectivist
countries think in terms of “we.”

The extent to, which members of society stress self-interest as opposed to collective
interests. In the individualist cultures the society is organized around the individual, most of
the rules are made to fulfill his interests. On the other hand, in collectivist cultures, society is
based upon the group, which is considered the smallest unit in society, rules are made to
satisfy the group’s interests and the latter assumed to take care of the individual in return to
his loyalty to the group.
In collectivism, the self often overlaps with a group (e.g. family). Consequently, the focus
is on social norms and ingroup goals, interdependence, cooperation, self-sacrifice,
obedience, and ingroup harmony. The group constitutes the unit of social perception, and
individuals are seen as embedded in a universe of relationships (Lebra, 1984)10.

8 Gould, J. & Kolb, W.B. (1964) A dictionary of the social sciences. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
9 Hsu, F.L.K. (1983) Rugged individualism reconsidered. (taken from Ana Azevedo, Ellen A. Drost and Michael R. Mullen. 2002, Individualism and Collectivism:
Toward A Strategy for Testing Measurement Equivalence Across Culturally Diverse Groups. Cross-Cultural Management Journal, volume 9 no. 1.
10 Lebra, T. (1984) Japanese women: Constraint and fulfillment. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

15
“For example, Triandis (1989)11 suggested that members of an individualist culture share a
similar tendency to draw upon private or self-related cognitions (e.g. I am introverted), while
members of a collectivist culture sample more collective or group-based cognitions (e.g. my
colleagues expect me to be introverted), as well as public cognitions (e.g. people in general
think of me as being introverted)”12.
Other component in this schema is “self-definitions (e.g. knowing more about others than
about the self vs. knowing more about the self than about others), values (e.g. obedience vs.
freedom), attitudes (e.g. cooperation vs. competition), attributions (e.g. success attributed to
help from others vs. success attributed to one’s own ability), emotions (other-focused vs.
self-focused), norms (embeddedness in in-groups vs. independence from in-groups) and
social behavior (personalized relationships and communal exchanges vs. impersonal
relationships and contractual exchanges)” (Triandis, 1994, 1993)13.
In opposite with the one-dimensional assumption of the individualism-collectivism by
Hofstede (1980), Triandis found that the individual’s private and collective cognitions are
stored in different memory locations, therefore constituting separate cognitive structures
(Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991)14.
These results showed that “from the initial set of three content factors for individualism
(self-reliance, competition, and hedonism) and four factors for collectivism (closeness to the
family, interdependence, sociability and family integrity) a four-factor structure (2 and 2)
consistently emerged” (1990)15.
II. Power distance:
The extent to which, members of society accept and expect unequal distribution of power in
an organizational setting. In other words, this dimension is about to what extent members of
a society accept that some people are more or less powerful than others. People in countries
with a large power distance suppose that society constructed in a hierarchy, where
everybody has his proper place. “Companies in those countries often have centralized
organizational structures with powerful leaders” (Rasmussen & Bank-Mikkelsen, 2000:

11 Triandis, H.C. (1989) Self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 96, pp.269-289.
12 Ana Azevedo, Ellen A. Drost and Michael R. Mullen. 2002, Individualism and Collectivism: Toward A Strategy for Testing Measurement Equivalence Across
Culturally Diverse Groups. Cross-Cultural Management Journal, volume 9 no. 1
13 Triandis, H.C. (1993) Collectivism and individualism as cultural syndromes. Cross-Cultural Research, 27, pp.155-180. AND Triandis, H.C. (1994) Theoretical and
methodological approaches to the study of collectivism and individualism. In U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S. Choi & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and
collectivism: Theory, method, and applications (pp.41-51). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
14 Trafimow, D., Triandis, H.C., & Goto, S.G. (1991) Some tests of the distinction between the private and collective self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
60, pp.649-655
.
15 Triandis, H.C. (1990) Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism. In J. Berman (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp.41-133). Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press.

16
P.22). Countries with a small power distance culture, however, thinks in terms of equality
between peoples, and try to minimize differences in power, and “companies often have a flat
organizational structure where leaders often seek the advice of their employees” (ibid.).

III. Long vs. short – term orientation

The extent to which, members of a society stress the need of thrift, perseverance, and future-
directed actions. Hofstede have added this dimension later, by a joint research with Michael
Harris Bond they called it the Chinese Value Survey (CVS). The “long term orientation
stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular,
perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short term orientation, stands for the fostering of
virtues related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of
‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede, 2001: p. 359).
IV. Uncertainty avoidance
The extent to which, members of society feel uncomfortable with or threatened by murky,
unstructured, and risky situations. In other words, countries with weak uncertainty
avoidance cultures “tend to adopt a relaxed attitude to the uncertainties of life, and they are
willing to take risks” (Rasmussen & Bank-Mikkelsen, 2000: p.31). While in countries with
strong uncertainty avoidance cultures, “it is very important to observe the generally accepted
rules of for instance how to dress, communicate, hold meetings, and write reports.
Consequently, strong uncertainty avoidance countries have many rituals” (ibid.).
V. Masculinity vs. femininity
The extent to which, members of society emphasize assertiveness, monetary gains, and other
material possessions. In other words, some countries that are called masculine countries, are
generally dominated by males’ norms and values; in these countries men are “self/assured,
competitive, and dominant, while women are more caring, self-effacing, and educative.
Whereas, such differences in other countries are smaller. “These countries are called
feminine countries because people in those countries focus more on the quality of life, and
because they have sympathy for the weak” (ibid: p.35)

Hofstede, in his work, mentioned the cultural characteristics that distinguish each of these
five dimensions, which he has already, with the coauthors of ‘exploring culture’, grouped
them in what they called ‘the ten synthetic culture profiles’16, as shown in the figure below:

16
G. J. Hofstede, P. B. Pedersen & G. Hofstede, 2002. Exploring culture. USA: Intercultural Press, Inc.

17
Dimension One Extreme Other Extreme
Identity Indiv, for individualism Collec, for collectivist
Hierarchy Hipow, for large power distance Lopow, for small power distance
Gender Mascu, for masculinity Femi, for femininity
Truth Uncavo, for strong uncertainty Unctol, for uncertainty tolerance
avoidance
Virtue Lotor, for long term orientation Shotor, for short term orientation

Adapted from G. J. Hofstede ET. Al. 2002: p. 92.

These characteristics are very important, and one must be well aware of them, to be able to
deal across-cultures. Being aware of these five dimensions is important to conduct a
successful intercultural negotiation, although it is not the only factor that determines the
success of a negotiation. We can imagine the situation in a negotiation conducted by two
parties from two different and/or opposite synthetic culture profiles, e.g., an executive from
an extreme individualist culture with a group of extreme collectivist culture, I will deal with
it in more detail later on in the study. Another phenomenon I imagine no study (as I have
read) has gone through until now, is what if two opposite characteristics driven from two
dimensions, which one of them is dominant, or in other words which dimension will appear
sharply and color the culture. For example, in an individualist culture, everyone is supposed
to take care of him/herself, and the poor people are poor because they don’t work hard, so
they deserve to be like that, while in a feminine culture, society should take care of the
persons who can’t take care of themselves, and the needy should be helped. Don’t you
think these are two contradicting characteristics, in countries that are supposed to rank
highly both in individuality and femininity, like Denmark and all the Scandinavian
countries; the overwhelming characteristic should be for individualism or to feminism. This
also will be discussed briefly later.

b) The Fons Trompenaars model:

Another Dutchman who has done research on culture differences with the coauthor of the
famous book ‘Riding the Waves of Cultures’. In this research done on more than 30,000
participants and more than 30 companies working in more than 50 different countries. In
the mentioned book (2nd ed., 1999), Trompenaars takes his definition of culture from E.

18
Schein, who defined culture as “the way in which group of people solves problems and
reconciles dilemmas” (Trompenaars & Turner, 1999: p.6).

Like his Dutch rival Hofstede, Trompenaars thinks of culture as the way he sees an onion.
He suggests that culture consists of layers. He has described them as in the figure below

Artifacts and products

Norms and values

Implicit-Basic

Assumptions

Explicit

Source Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1999: P.22

He simply puts the manifestation of culture, the artifacts, all what can be observed, e.g. its
language, art, food, dance, the way people dress themselves, he puts them in the explicit
layer, which is rooted in the middle layer, the layer that contains the norms and the values
of the specific culture. In the inner layer of the onion lies the core of the culture, which is
defined by Trompenaars as “the subconscious and the basic assumptions which are a result
of the way culture relates to nature” (Rasmussen & Bank-Mikkelsen, 2000: P.58). Or in
Trompenaars (1999:p23) words “we see that a specific organizational culture or functional
culture is nothing more than the way in which groups have organized themselves over the
years to solve the problems and challenges presented to them.”

Definition:
Culture is man-made, confirmed by others, conventionalized and passed on for
younger people or newcomers to learn. It provides people with a meaningful
context in which to meet, to think about themselves, and face outer world.

Source Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1999: P.24

19
What Trompenaars actually does, is relating the existence of culture at its core level to the
environmental effects, and he went further to relate most of the differences between culture
to the differences in their environments. This assumption is partly true as I think, in my
model that is based basically on Usunier’s sources of culture, I have related the culture to
the environment by mentioning the geography, as the outlining source of culture. Though
Trompenaars has related his core assumption of culture to environment, he related only one
of his fundamental culture dimensions to it ‘how cultures relate to nature’, while he related
other five dimensions to relationship between people, and then two dimensions related to
time. These dimensions are:

I. Universalism vs. particularism (rules vs. relationships):

The Universalist approaches things as ”what is good and right can be defined and
always applies.17” while in particularist cultures the uniqueness of the circumstances
and the relationship’s obligations are in the center of the cultural attention. For
example, in particularists’ culture the kinship had its unique obligation and should
be given priority.

II. Communitarianism vs. individualism (the group vs. the individual):

It is almost the same dimension of Hofstede; hence, Trompenaars uses
’communitarianism’ instead of collectivism.

III. Neutral vs. affective cultures (the range of feelings expressed):

People in extreme neutral cultures are well known by their objectivity, the control
their feelings and don’t mix it with business relations, which is used just to reach
specific goals. On the other hand people in more affective cultures, are in the
opposite direction of being open to show their feelings, laughing loudly, gesturing,
leaving the negotiation process mostly depending on the situation. This dimension
could explain the need to study the verbal and nonverbal communicating styles.

IV. Diffuse vs. specific cultures (the range of involvement):

This dimension is generally connected to the degree of the involvement of the
parties in relationships beyond the business relations. In the specific cultures the
relationship is mostly determined by the contract, so they do not involve in more
than the relations specified by the contract, and hence will be ended after the
execution of the contract, unless there is a new contract established. Business

17
Trompenaars & Turner, 1999: p.8

20
 relations between colleagues are kept in the offices, and never been taken outside
business walls. While in more diffuse cultures, establishing a business contract is
more than doing business, it is making long lasting trustworthy relationship. The
boss at work is like father outside the business; he demands the same respect and
authority over subordinates when and wherever they meet.

V. How status is accorded:

This dimensions describes the way people accord their status in the society, as
Trompenaars mentions status could be maintained either by age, gender, social
connections, education, or profession.

VI. Time orientation (past, present and future):

Groups and individual differ in their relation to time. For some of them I am what I
have established in my past, and your history explains the way you will act in the
future, for others I am whom I am today in, the present is all what matters, because
what we do or achieve now will affect our future, and clearly we can discover today
something or some facts that make what we did in the past justifiable, or
unjustifiable. Others care more about their future, and what they are able to achieve
in long term.

VII. Sequentially and synchronically organized activities:

Trompenaars suggests that cultures differ in their way to conceive the time, some
conceive it as ‘a line of sequential events passing us at a regular intervals.’ While
others conceive it as repetitive or cyclical.

VIII. How cultures relate to nature:

A great difference between cultures derived from the way they relate to nature.
Some cultures tend to believe that people have to live in harmony with nature due to
the fact that nature is bigger and powerful than the human beings. Other cultures
believe that the nature is something can and should be controlled and individuals
can control and create their own destiny.

c) Hall’s theories:

The American anthropologist Edward T. Hall was born in 1914. His theory on cultural
perceptions of space was laid during World War II, when he served in the U.S. Army in
Europe and the Philippines. When he began to believe that basic differences in the way that
members of different cultures perceived reality were responsible for miscommunications of

21
the most fundamental kind. Along with his wife, Mildred Reed Hall, he has published
numerous practical and academic books on cross-cultural communication.

I. Personal space (proxemics):

Hall famous theory is associated with proxemics, the study of the human use of
space within the context of culture. He argues that human perceptions of space,
although something that all humans share, are molded and patterned by culture. He
argued that differing cultural frameworks for defining and organizing space, could
lead to serious failures in cross-cultural communication. He analyzes both the
personal spaces that people form around their bodies (the micro-level), and spaces
at the (macro-level), that means the cultural expectations about how streets,
neighborhoods and cities should be properly organized.

Hall's most famous theory has to do with the definition of the personal spaces that
surround individuals, which he describes as a ‘bubble):

• Intimate space—the closest "bubble" of space surrounding a person. Entry into this
space is acceptable only for the closest friends and intimates. Again estimating
friendship, kinship, whom to be considered as intimates is culturally oriented.
• Social and consultative spaces--the spaces in which people feel comfortable
conducting routine social interactions with acquaintances as well as strangers.
• Public space--the area of space beyond which people will perceive interactions as
impersonal and relatively anonymous.
II. Low/High-context cultures:
Edward T. Hall divided the cultures into, low-context culture (LC) and high-context
cultures (HC). In LC cultures, people use nonverbal communication means much
more than they used to communicate with verbal language. While in the LC cultures
people normally use the verbal language as the main process of communication. I
will focus on this theory later due to its influence on understanding the differences
in negotiation styles between Arabs and Danes.

III. Fast and slow messages:

Hall tried to distinguish between cultures by the way and the time the need to know
each other, he uses fast vs. slow messages. In fast message cultures, people often
made contact easily but not deep-rooted and rather superficial. Other cultures (slow

22
 message cultures), people need time to get to know each other well enough to start a
relationship, which will be long lasting and deeply rooted relation.

IV. Monochronic vs. Polychronic cultures:

It is a dimension that is close to aforementioned dimension of Trompenaars
(Sequentially vs. synchronically), what actually Hall means, is that in monochromic
cultures people tend to divide activities into linear segments, so they do things
systematically and one thing at a time.

d) Phatak & Habib theory:

I have to discuss more negotiating oriented theories, theories that can be easily attached to
the international negotiations. I will focus mainly on the two contexts theory (Phatak and
Habib, 1996). In this theory Phatak and Habib suggests that the contexts could influence
the international negotiation could be summed in two overall contexts: the environmental
context and the immediate context as shown in the figure bellow.

• The Environmental context:

The Phatak & Habib model is based on the important article written by Salacuse
(1988), when he suggested six of these factors, then Phatak and Habib added the
‘External Stakeholders’ factor. These factors are:

I. Political and Legal Pluralism:

Legal systems are varying across the world; it is simply based on the cultural
and political heritage of the country. Taxes, labor codes, the law enforcement,
and the different codes of contracts and trading law. At the same time the
political atmosphere may add extra pressure on the negotiators, for example,
negotiating in an open political environment differ from negotiations that take
place under a communist or a dictator’s regime.

II. International economics:

The exchange rates fluctuations plus the fluctuations in the values of the
currencies are major factors in bargaining around the globe. The party who is
going to pay in the other country’s currency face the highest risk, the more the
currency is unstable the higher is the risk. Other factor is the control
maintained by some governments on the flow of currencies across both sides of

23
 its boarders, some has to deal with hard currencies, e.g. the oil for food
program.

III. Foreign governments and bureaucracies:

The limitations imposed by governments on its nationals in making deals or
negotiations vary, also some industries are more heavily regulated (e.g.,
defense) than other industries. Firms in the Western world are expected to
move more freely from government’s controls than firms in the Middle East.

IV. Instability:
Some of the more advanced countries are much more stable than other
countries in the third world, European firms used to deal in a calm stable
political environment, but when they go abroad may bee faced by extremely
unstable political or economical environments they are not prepared or used to
deal with. Other forms of instability could be shortage of financial resources,
infrastructures and food and beverages …etc.

V. Ideology:
Westerns in general share the same ideology of capitalism and sacred
individuals rights and freedom, for them business is to make profit. Wile other
countries, who share collective values or communist ideologies, have another
perceptions of profit.

VI. Culture:
As it is my main theme of work I will skip this introduction to this dimension
for now.

VII. External stakeholders:

Phatak and Habib added this dimension as mentioned. They have defied it as
“the various people and organizations that have an interest or stake in the
outcome of the negotiations” (1996, p. 34). These stakeholders could be the
international organizations such as the UN or the EU, labor unions; business
segments associations, third national firms, and many other bodies.

• The Immediate Context

This context is from Phatak and Habib 1996 model.

I. Relative bargaining power:

24
 This factor deals with fact that parties in negotiations have different bargaining
powers, the relative bargaining power in joint ventures for example almost
associated to the party whom has the biggest amount of equity or the more
sufficient and developed managerial utilities, such as effective supply chain,
special government relation in the country targeted, special market access in
some restricted arias …etc.

II. Levels of Conflict:

The level conflict between parties historically, geographically, and
ideologically has a great influence on the negotiators and the out come of the
negotiations. The Middle East conflict, the Arabic Gulf conflict between Iraq
and Iran and other on going conflicts is an example of the conflicts has to been
taken care of when negotiating with parties from these regions. The way that
people perceive and try to solve these problems vary across cultures (Abu
Nimer, 1996) and (M. R. Signer).

III. Relationship between Negotiators:

Scanzoni (1979) followed by Usunier (1992, p. 549) in his famous book
‘marketing across cultures’ mention five stages of building relationship
between negotiating parties. And as Phatak and Habib suggest the relationship
is an on going process and negotiation is a part of this process. The deeper or
the longer the relationship is, the fruiter the outcome of the negotiation is.

IV. Desired Outcomes:

There are tangible and intangible factors that determine the outcome of the
negotiations. Some parties try to maintain national and international
achievements out of the negotiation, or try to make big concessions in
negotiations or even are willing to suffer losses in short term out comes in
order to establish a long-term relationship.

V. Immediate Stakeholders:
This factor includes all the persons or organizations that represented directly or
indirectly in the negotiation (e.g., the negotiators, the employees, the
management they represent, the companies, the associations, etc.). These
stakeholders can affect the negotiations by many means, such as their skills,
experience, knowledge, motivations, and other personal factors.

25
 6
What is culture?

An Arabic-European notion of culture:

Through the passage of time people made societies in there efforts to try to live in peace
and in complementarity, they tried to fulfill there basic needs, (The Maslow’s hierarchy of
human needs), but is it all what human beings need? I don’t think so; I think it was not
enough to interconnect them together. The wars, the conflicts, the disputes and the
straggles, are good examples that support our ideas; therefore, it was the greatest challenge
for the human beings to try to find a good solution for most of those problems. So people
have to find a higher level of ties, which will put the society together, a kind of social
phenomenon, and it was the culture. As the anthropologist Haviland (1993) suggested ‘that
people maintain cultures to deal with problems or matters that concern them18’ (p. 29)
I think that the notion of the term culture is part of the civilizational formation of a nation (I
am here writing as an Arabic, who assume that the civilization has much wider notion than
the culture do), which cannot be compared under any circumstances with other concepts;
simply there is no such parallel notions or concepts.
There are a lot of studies and ideas dealt with the concept of ‘CULTURE’, but still there is
no generally consensual definition of culture (Surber, Jere Paule, p4), no writer seems to be
satisfied with any of the definitions prior to his or her work, every one seems to disagree
with the others, some times it seems to me that some of the workers in this field have started
their work, just to oppose the other writers.
It is a long historical debate, started since Aristotle, who have mentioned that human beings
are themselves part of nature. Later in the beginning of the 8th century Prophet Mohammed
mentioned that (every person born on the same primitiveness, then his parents Jewdize him,
Christianize him or Magianize him).
It was clear since the beginning of the Islamic religion that the notion of culture was; “the
culture is the Islam when it becomes a way of life.”19

18
Haviland, W. A. 1993. Cultural anthropology. 7th ed. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.
19
Islamic Educational, Scientific and cultural Organization, ISESCO, 1997. The Cultural strategy of the
Islamic world, Morocco.

26
It is an acquired division of the human discipline, so every part of the culture is; gained by
experience, learned, or taught by parents or others (e.g. teachers, profits,
philosophers…etc.). In opposition to the later European school, which was finally expressed
its ideas through Malinowski, whom declared ‘we have to base our theory of culture on the
fact that all human beings belong to an animal species’ (Malinowski, 1944,p.75), so there is
as he emphasize a biological foundation to culture. This was in a clear contradiction with
Islamic principles (which also are found in Christianity and Judaism), which notify that; god
had created the first human being as a supreme creature. This basic concept of culture
understanding process had imbued the long history of the culture difference in the both sides
of the Mediterranean.
In the European (west) world the religion was a small part of the society’s culture, and the
local or let us say the national/regional cultures prior to the Christianity had shaped or
colored Christianity by its on colors (Jesus in the Catholicism is more like Hercules in the
Greek mythology, half human/half god, born from a God father and a mortal human being
mother), while in the eastern orthodoxy he is the God in his earthly shape (the incarnation is
quite familiar concept in the eastern ancient religions, which indicate that the souls of people
and even some gods are shifting from dead bodies to new flesh one). While in the Islamic
World it was all the way around, the Islamic principles has shaped the old local cultures with
its new color, people have to comply and adjust their prior cultures to the Islamic code.
In the Islamic concept, culture is part of (Sharia) the Islamic code in its wide concept. Every
behavior of the faithful follower should be complied with the principle of the ‘Sharia’, of
course it did changed through the centuries (we will discuss the culture change later on), but
still the idea has a wide acceptable base in some of what we could consider as more
fundamental states.
The development that has occurred in the western world in the last three centuries was far
away ahead of the Arab Islamic Countries, which started to leave their dark ages just few
decades ago. The gab between the elite and the public, in the Arabs societies still so big,
that they hardly can interconnect or intercommunicate
‘Culture is ubiquitous, multidimensional, complex, and all pervasive. Because culture is so
broad, there is no single definition or central theory of what it is’, (Samovar & Porter, 2000:
p.7). For that it is very difficult to find one acceptable definition to the term ‘culture’, and
as long as I am going to discuss the culture differences, I think it is suitable to start by

27
 saying that the first faze of those differences starts at the very beginning of the terminology.
It starts by the contradictory definitions of culture, so we can find more than 300 definition
of the term culture, stated in the books of well admired authors and researchers, that is
despite what are stated in, articles, thesis, journals and news papers, which can easily
double or triple this number20. So I find it is better to leave the culture without adding a new
and of course another unacceptable definition. So I am not going to be a part of the debate
on defining the term Culture. The only thing that I shall say is that, most of these definitions
are concurrent on the fact that: our culture influence the way that we perceive the right and
wrong, bad and well, and the evil and good.
Let say, I will try to present more than one definition at a time, depending on the prospective
I am going to introduce, and the method I am going to use. ‘While some of the studies deal
with culture as a science, others deal with it as an art, and thus they focus on various
elements of the topic. The definitions of culture vary primarily as a consequence of the
theoretical point of departure and secondly because of cultural contexts in which the
definitions had been formulated’ (Al-Soufi A. H., Andersen T. and Harry W.)21. If we
looked at the Arab world, one of the most important things we notice, that is the Arabs in
general and especially the Middle Eastern Arabs have a different notion or understanding of
the Culture, e.g. in Iraq the word culture is equal to the word literature [what Hofstede calls
culture one or the culture in the narrow perspective]. It is simply means the sum of the art’s,
literature’s, and poet’s history and values. Culture simply is connected with the intellect,
mind opinions, writing poetry, and reading. Therefore we will find that a lot of the terms
connected to the notion of Culture, e.g. the culturalists (the persons who are highly educated
and devouring reader), the cultural values, which are completely differ than the terms
traditions, conventions, customs, habits, consuetude, and social values. This differentiation
is unusual for the western reader, and cannot be translated sufficiently, without causing
misinterpretation, misunderstanding or even mistranslation.
The art and Culture in the Arabian society are really associated to an understanding or
comprehension level, which is higher than the common understanding standard, moreover
the perception of the poetry was considered to be a kind of speech that is over the level of
the normal speech, and for this purpose, the Arabs say; the poetry’s devil or the poetry’s
demon.

20
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn, In their book, specified 164 definitions of culture, those of which they could trace
between 1871 – when E.B. Tylor made his definition initiating the new ‘intellectual revolution’ according to
Kuper – up to 1950.
21
Unpublished research paper

28
 This concept has been developed in the last few decades, so we started to read new terms
like, westward acculturation, the struggle grew up about the modernism and post
modernism, all these terms were linked to the literature, language and fine arts. Here we can
notice that the surrealism was much closer to the Arabic mind, and more acceptable to the
Arabs than the Dadaism, Abstractionism, and Cubism. The notion of art is something
different in the Arab Land, for the Western eyes, ‘art can be understood as a socially created
category which has attached itself to certain external and internal signals by which art is
recognized22’(Barker, 2001: 42). And art is ‘a uniquely different kind of work, with a
unique, indeed transcendent, product is a mistaken notion, wrongly generalized and taken to
be essential value of art23’ (Wolff, 1980: 17). This is in contradicting with Arabs notion of
art, there are two contrary Arabic doctrines to the concept of art; the first is governed by the
principle of the art for the art, which is basically based on the aesthetic perception of the
class elites (that are the artists). The second doctrine is based on the principle of the popular
art, or simply art is for the people, and that means non-profitable production. Again this
come in contradiction with the Western idea based on; ‘art is an industry with its owners,
managers and workers operating according to the law of profit every much as is popular
culture and popular television’ Barker says that after he declares; ‘further, we may note not
just differences but similarities between high art and popular forms. Neither the Mona Lisa
nor Dallas is the outcome of the mystical practices of geniuses; rather, each is the product
of work, a human transformation of material environment through labor’ (Barker, 2001:
42). This can go very good with the many western approaches that seem to emphasize the
sharedness, the collectivity of values, and often also ideology, which in their sum determine
and construct the behavior of group of people. In addition many of them do rely on the
communicative and/or behavioral level in explaining differences between cultures. Western
definitions ‘range from the all-encompassing (it is everything) to the narrow (it is Opera,
Art, and Ballet)’ (Samovar & Porter, 2000: p.7).

22
Chris Barker, 2001, Cultural Studies, Theory and Practice, 2 nd ed. London: SAGE Publications.
23
Wolff, J, 1980, the social production of art. London: Macmillan.

29
 7
Anthropological overview
Once Clifford Geertz wrote:
While culture could be interpreted, it could not be explained, and certainly
explained away. There were no general, cross cultural, laws of culture.
One can ask why we start with an anthropological overview when writing or taking
business, as G. Ferraro (2001), divide the anthropological studies into four main disciplines:
(1) archaeological anthropology, the study of ancient and prehistoric societies; (2) physical
anthropology, the study of humans as biological entities; (3) anthropological linguistics, the
comparative study of languages; and (4) cultural anthropology, the search for similarities
and differences among contemporary peoples of the world, (P. 4).
Historically the term “culture” has touched the spirit of most of the writers, poets,
philosophers, and clerks, most of the great spiritual movements in the history, from the rise
of the Buddhism, Judaism, through Christianity and to the emergence of Islam have talked
in a way or another on the culture or its notion, if not so, it had shaped the cultures of the
plant by its own colors. Those religions shared the Greek philosophy its awareness that the
human beings is part of the nature, and they are to some extend may be subject to the natural
laws created by the God or the nature itself as Plato and Aristotle had suggested.
Furthermore, Buddha, Moses, Confucius, Jesus, and Mohammed confirmed this notion. ‘If
this was true, then human cultural products, institutions, and even history itself may be
subject to the natural laws that are just as binding as those governing nature’s lower
orders24’ (Surber 1998: 4). But for practical reasons, I have to stick to the disciplines and
theories that have emerged in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.
From the very beginning the studies of the anthropologists and sociologists, was the corner
stone of the foundation of the cultural studies, it was their work that changed the notion of
the culture in the West to be “technical anthropological sense”, “culture was a concept of
enormous, almost limitless, scientific premise”, (Kuper, 1999: x25). Even though, this

24
Surber, Jere Paul, 1998. Culture and critique, an introduction to the critical discourses of cultural studies.
USA: Westview Press.
25
Adam Kuper, 1999, Culture, The Anthropologists Account. USA, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

30
attempt to scientasize the process, this phenomenon was facing some skepticism from some
of the key figures in the sociological society, once Max Weber pointed that: ‘social and
historical reality consists of manifold actions and interests. When the investigator studies
this “chaos of facts” he does so from certain points of view. The statement of the problem
and the selection of the facts that the researcher makes are always related, consciously or
unconsciously, to cultural values. He studies what is important for him to study’ (Andersen
& Kaspersen, 2000: p.7826). In the other hand there were other sociologists went the other
way and supported the idea of the scientific notion of the social facts. Durkheim argued in
his “Rules” in 1895 that: ‘consider social facts as things existing outside, or independent of,
individuals, and imposing constrains on them27’. In other words, social facts have concrete
or objective existence – they constitute an inert, stable order, consisting of laws, functions,
and causal relations. This means that the sociologists may discover the structure and laws of
social order by methods similar to those used by physicists to discover the laws of nature,
(Andersen & Kaspersen, 2000: p.60). For Durkheim who had contradicted the idea that
knowledge comes by experience, in the favor of the outside ‘social facts’, which exists out
there beyond the individuals, and “socially constructed, culturally variable and is generated
of particular consciousness. For example, the beliefs, values, norms of religions, specifically
the contrast between Catholicism and Protestantism, are said to account for variable patterns
of suicide28” (Barker, 2001: p. 16). Durkheim assures this objective notion of the social
reality, when he argues that the social facts are not to be understood as a psychological
phenomenon. He went further, to say that society cannot exist without individuals and their
ideas, emotions, and moral points of view. Nonetheless, society is much more than the sum
of all these individual qualities and ideas.
Parsons has defined Culture as a system of signs and symbols, including “ideas and beliefs,
expressive symbols or value patterns”29 (Parsons 1951: 4). Thus culture was originally
divided into three parts: 1) cognitive ideas and beliefs (including scientific knowledge); 2)
expressive symbols, such as art, aesthetic forms and styles; and 3) value systems, including
ethical values (meaning culture consists of symbol related to “truth, goodness, and beauty”).
Parsons later added a fourth component, which is called “constitutive symbolization”,
concerned with the most basic existential questions of human life, the problems of meaning

26
Heine Andersen & Lars Bo Kaspersen, 2000. Classical and Modern Social Theory. UK, Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Inc.
27
Durkheim, Emile, 1982. The Rules of Sociological Method. London: Macmillan.
28
Barker, Chris, 2001. Cultural Studies, theory and practice. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Printed by The
Alden Press, Oxford.
29
Parsons, Talcott. 1951: The Social System. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

31
underlying the major religious and philosophical systems. Constitutive symbolization makes
the link to what Parsons calls the ultimate reality (Andersen & Kaspersen, 2000: p.221).
Further, Kroeber and Kluckhohn noticed that a new notion of culture is emerging, which
expresses and communicates cultural ideas in symbols:
The existence of culture rests indispensably upon development in early man
of the faculty for symbolizing, generalizing, and imaginative substitution.30
As did all other researchers, Kroeber and Kluckhohn could not resist the pleasure of
making their own definition of culture, finally they wrote:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols.31
At this point culture started to be considered as a “symbolic world of ideas and values”
(Kuper, 1999: p.71).
These different approaches led to further developments in the anthropological view
of culture.

30
Ibid. P.153
31
ibid. P.181

32
 8
The Arab’s
Culture, politics, and management
Introduction:
The major factor in successful intercultural communication is the understanding of the
communicated culture. As I have experienced myself and mentioned before, as most of the
Europeans, Danes has no intensive knowledge about the Arab’s culture. As we already
knew, the human beings behavior is culturally shaped and determined, this is why most of
the people find it difficult to understand the others reactions, and find it more difficult to
accept others acts and ideas.
Danes among other Westerns, find it difficult to acquaint themselves with the Arabic
cultural concepts, such as the notion of ‘insha’a Allah’ which simply means by God willing
or ‘Deo Volente’, and ‘qadha o qadar’ which descries the Arabic perspective of the fatalism.
By the other hand the Arabs are more skeptical about the Scandinavian culture in general.
I will use some of the aforementioned theories to try to highlight Arabic cultural
characteristics, and the most organizational related behavior. And try to put a shade on the
A. The Emergence of the Arabic Culture:
To talk about the Arabic culture I have to use the model I developed on the basis of
Usunier’s model ‘sources of culture’. The model is as shown below:

Culture

History Nationality Language Religion Education Ethnicity

Geography

Figure 1

33
 B. History and nationality
Most of writers use the term of Middle East meaning (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian territory, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain,
Oman, and Yemen). While when we are talking about the Arab Countries we mean the
countries that are members of the Arab League (see appendix).
As I mentioned in the delimitation, I will take some of the Arabic countries in the Middle
East region.
This region meanly was referred to as Mesopotamia. It was here the agriculture and
irrigation first developed along the valley between Tigris and Euphrates where the
Sumerians were the first settlers in the region. In the latest period the population were
largely Semites, and most of today spoken language in the area such as the Arabic, Aramaic
and Hebrew are derived from the Semitic language. In this area the first cities of the world
were founded, and the area was the center of the days civilization, as the its culture
produced to the world the farming, pottery, first written language, art, urbanization, wheels,
religions, complex legal and political systems, trading and architecture. I think the past
orientation (in terms of time orientations) of the people in these cultures is due to this deep-
rooted history of the region.
The first two boxes in the model are History and Nationality, and the dual influence is
obvious. Often national territory and the concept of nation are justifying the existence of
groups that are relatively homogeneous on an ethnic, linguistic, and religious level.
The present day Arabs do not only live where the Arabs once were. The region was
under a different waves of immigration since the first wave of the Sumerians whom
suggested to be of central Asian origins and up to day were millions of immigrant workers
from southern countries of Asia, e.g., Filipino, Indian, Thailand’s migrants. The Arabs
moved out of the Yemen in the early part of the current era mainly to northern Arabia, then
the major movement of Arabs was from Najd of Central Arabia particularly after the rise of
Islam. The ancient monuments found here by the archaeologists derive the history of the
region up to the year 7000 B.C, with the first urban centre, the first written law, and most
important of all the inventions (what Arabs call the soul of the inventions) the writing.
“The popular story goes, however, that (Arab) civilization started at Sumer, and soon the
rising up of the City State, which led to the modern states, the new kingdoms, many of

34
which later on occupied their neighbors. In this light the geographical area was characterized
by relative prosperity (there are reports of advanced Assyrian commercial organizations
about year 2000 B.C., with organizations operating with head office, branches etc. Looking
very similar to modern MNC’s: employees, nurturing new foreign markets, see More and
Lewis 1999).32”
C. Religion and Ethnicity:
As the homeland of the three main divinely religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam, in
addition to many other local or regional religions, such as, Yazidis, Mandais, the religious
rituals, values and taboos has played a main resource of the cultural identity of the people in
this region. Despite Turkey and Iran, the people in this region, mainly are Arabs Muslims,
the majority are Sunni Muslims in all these countries except in Iran where the majority are
Shiites. However, this does not deny the fact that there are some ethnic or religious
minorities in these countries, such as Shiites in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and
Lebanon, and the a good sum of Christians almost in all these countries, there said to be no
Christians in Saudi Arabia. However, the region was caught between large empires fighting
each other, the Seljuk 1055, the Byzantines in 1071 followed by the Mongols from 1200 to
1300. Since 1301 the great Ottoman sultans were the new rulers. The Ottoman Empire was
involved in many wars with the Persian Empire, using the Arab land as the field of their
battles. Romans, Turks, Egyptians and Ethiopians occupied or conquered parts of the Arabic
Middle East, until the beginning of the twentieth century when oil was discovered! The new
European empires caught and divided the region between them (Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, the
Gulf towns which became a mini-states under the English protection, and Egypt) these were
under the British mandating. While Syria, Lebanon, and some of the North African countries
were the French peace of cake. These historical facts can explain the contradicting
dimensions of the Arabic culture, in the way that each of these cultures contains a
contrasting set of synthetic culture profiles; while cultures in these countries can be
described as collectivist cultures, there are a lot of the individualist characteristics in their
core beliefs, and the same is valid in other dimensions as I will describe later. This is by
some authors presented as the key reason behind the rather similar language and the large
proportion of ethnic minorities. Because of these facts it is deceptive to try identifying
national cultures as based on very recently established nation states. Current borders have
been established post first world war after being moved several times through history. As for

32
Alsoufi et al., 2004.

35
example in their view of the area of Sham is considered a complete region by the Arabs even
if outsiders into Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/ Israel, and Jordan split it. This way, inhabitants
in this region have a more shared history, and comparing cultures based on very recent
national borders seems less relevant.

D. Arabic region

The region historically, has been dominated by the Islamic religion since the 7th century,
and to some extent Christianity. Islam has played a major role in the Arabs life (since 80%-
90% of Arabs are Muslims). The fatality derived from Islam had played a big role among
people, although it is declining but still has to be taken into consideration when we discuss
differences within the region, the results from my questionnaire conclude that there are huge
differences among the Arabic countries in concern with this dimension. It seems to be the
Qatari and the Saudi Arabians are deep believers in fatality, while Lebanese and Syrians are
less fatalist then other Arabs. I have put a scale of 6 as 6 answers to the highest fatality,
while 1 to the lowest fatality. I found that the score of the Arabic countries was as follows:
• Qatar =6
• Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain = 5
• Jordan = 4
• UAE, Syria = 3
• Lebanon =1
The concept of the fatalism is almost combined with the deep religions believes, and
modernity, yet we can see it is lower in the urban communities; at the same time it is higher
in the lowlands and villages, while it declines among highlanders.
As I mentioned before (qadha wa qadar) as the Arabic name of the fatality, had played a
major role in building up the collectivity of the society. If a problem or a disaster will
happen, no matter what man will do he can't prevent it. Though, he can soften its results by
sticking to the family (in its broad sense), the kin, the friends, and the Tribe.
This factor had led to the establishment of the family organizations.

36
 E. The family:
One of the central goals of an Arabic person is to build, strengthen, and protect his family.
The Islam as a religion has focused on strengthening the family and making all the members
of the family depended on each other, by minimizing the personal treasure by the
fragmentation of the wealth through the Islamic heritage system. The oldest in the family is
the leader; the grandfather then the father and this authority pass to the oldest of the family
sons. This perspective covers the organizations structure and even more the construction of
the state itself (e.g., the Saudis king is the most reasonable sun of king Abdul Aziz, in Iraq
and Syria the ministers and presidents should be over 40 years old). The older you become
the more respect you get, for this reason Arabs employ people of trust/confidence not people
of expertise.
The Arabs call the family the (nucleus) of the society they never deal with a person as an
individual but as a part of a network which contains the family, the bigger group such as the
organization he is working for, the tribe, or even the city he came from.
The Arab negotiator act on behalf of the in-group (the family or the organizational group),
so s/he almost adopt a win strategy, any compromises could be considered as a (betrayal or
at least letting down his group. But if he was just an ordinary employee who doesn't feel that
he is a part of the group (in the case of official/ governmental negotiators), it is mostly that
he accept personal gains or benefits, and he may legitimates it by considering it as the
benefit he will get and then he will use it to help other members of his ingroup.
As "The family pattern is often viewed as a function of economic development"33, which
generally means that the more developed the economy is, the smaller the family gets. In the
developed economies, the overwhelming form is the nuclear family, while in less developed
economies/countries the major form is the extended family; this is also, true to some extent
in the Arabic countries but within the same country, (e.g., the families in villages and
country cities is more extended than the families in big cities). While dividing the region
into countries could challenge this ideas due to the fact that the more developed economies
in the region such as Saudi Arabia or Dubai has the higher percentage of extended families,
(this has to be studied in depth in a separate study).
This family factor has shaped every part of the social and economical construction of these
countries, organizations are based on family relations, this is also true in the official and
governmental sector, (e.g. Iraq was controlled and governed by Saddam Hussein’s family,

33
Viking and mandarins

37
KSA is governed and even has had its name derived from the royal family, Syria governed
by Al-Asad family, Jordan by the Hashemite family…etc.

This family based system has generated respect for alders and differentiation of genders.
Respect for alders is great because the family generally dominated by the older of its males.
This can be noticed in all negotiating Arab teams, the leader of the team almost the older
member of the team, since he supposed to be more experienced. Now, can you imagine, the
consequences of sending a young leady as a negotiating team leader to negotiate a deal with
Arabic officials.

What is mostly distinguishing Arabic culture is the deep believe in idealism. This belief is
so strong that it could affect any decision an Arab may take. This falls in the very contrast of
the European’s (especially Scandinavian’s) pragmatic culture. This is one of the most
affecting contradictions between the two cultures. A Dane negotiator will always show up at
or even before negotiation’s scheduling and always well prepared. And he will be surprised
to be kept waiting for his Arab counterpart, who will show up late and yet not prepared.
Social attitude:
The Arabs are well known with their social attitudes towards others, they are easy to
engage and easy at making friends. The Arabic network is generally wider than the Western
social network. The later is mainly based on dyads and/or triads, while the Arabic network is
much bigger, I think the major difference lies on the way this network is constructed, and it
is mainly circular
F. Social Networks:
Generally, the social network consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or the
relations defined on them. After a brief research about this theme, one can realize that each
one of the researchers in this field made his own approach and statements, primary because
‘Social Networks’ is a broad and general area where everybody is welcomed to make
different kinds of assumptions and analysis, Social Network theory is clearly crossing a
process of evolution, new ideas are all the time helping toward the evolution of this theory
of course most of those ideas are based on prior researches, but without any doubts, most of
the researchers coincide in the fact that Social Network analysis study the patterning of
social connection that link sets of actors.
Many Western writers such as (Granovetter, 198234), (Haythornthwaite, 1999)35 and
(Wasserman & Galaskiewicz. 1994)36 view social networks in terms of dyads and triads. It

34
Granovetter, (1982). The strength of weak ties, A network theory revisited, STJ, 1983

38
seems that social network relates a Finite set of Actors to each other by the relations, which
could be a resource or an activity. In the Arabic region the set of actors are much more than
those in the western societies. This is due to the tribal condition of the relationships in Iraq,
Jordan, and the Arabic Peninsula. Wile in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt it is more likely to be a
finite set of actors but in a more extended degree.
In general the social network looks like the one in the figure below:

Relations

Actors Network
‘A’

Actors network Actors network

B C

Where ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ are dyad and/or triad social network, let us try to put them in a
more detailed figure:

A D´´ D
G
A´´ B´´ C´´
C B F E
The relationship here is between four social networks: A´´, B´´, C´´ and D´´, where..
A´´= ABC
B´´= GBF
C´´= DEF
D´´= AD
As one can notice, the connections between the networks are punctual. It means that two
net works mostly will connect to each other in one point or one person.

35
Haythornthwaite, C. (1999). A social network theory of tie strength and media use
36
Wasserman, S. & Galakiewicz, J. (Eds.) (1994). Advances in Social Network Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

39
 Whereas, in Arab world, the social network is more likely to be affected by the way Arabs
view the world, and again the way the use to think, due to their linguistic circularity. Arabic
relations, way of thinking and language are always moving in circles, as in the following
figure..
A´´, B´´ and C´´ are social networks, where A´´, B´´ and C´´ each as a head of a social
group, e.g. family, business or any other group, he will be placed at the centre of his
network. Where:
Network A´´= A, B, D, G, I, H, E and C.
Network B´´= A`, B`, C´, D`, H, F and C.
Network C´´= I, F, E, B´´, D`, E` and G`.

40
 The connections or the relations between the three networks are not as we saw in western
networks. They are not punctual, rather they are collective based relations, relationships in
the Arab’s network are quite complex, and it seems to the western observer irrational. To
relate this theory to negotiation, we can find significant results that can put lights over the
influence of outsiders (e.g., stake holders, officials, ingroup leaders, spouses, fathers and
much more) on negotiations. An Arabic negotiator rarely take a decision at negotiating table,
he always, has to go back to his leaders and seniors, this is because of the fore mentioned
thesis and the political systems in the region, which generally concentrated power within the
hands of few people and no one else can take the risk of making a decision even if have the
right to. In other words, Arab negotiators are expected to share and discuss information
about what was negotiated with others whom have nothing to do with what was negotiated,
in result, the deal will be a subject to the influence and advices of outsiders (father, brother,
wife…etc.).
G. Political systems:
The Arab countries in the Middle East were generated as in their current form in the
beginning of the past century. The countries that were under the English delegation, turned
to become Monarchies and most of them still do (except Egypt and Iraq both changed to
republican systems after bloody revolutions in 1952 and 1958), while Syria and Lebanon
which were under the French delegation were established as democratic republics. In the
present days, all of these countries are governed to some extent by a kind of dictatorship,
some are governed by single dictator like Egypt and Jordan, other countries are governed by
one party’s dictatorship like former Iraqi regime and the Syrian regime, while all other
countries are governed by family’s dictatorship (the only democratic exemption in the
region is Lebanon). Though, some of these countries started to enhance a kind of democracy
(in the reforms the have announced lately after international pressures). Yet there are kinds
of local councils, councils of state, power limited parliaments, and consultative chambers
with no real legislative authorities. This political differentiation led in my opinion to major
cultural differences between these countries. In countries like Iraq or Syria where the
ideologies of single socialistic party was enforced on people, it was taught to children since
the first class in the school up to their graduating day from university, we were taught
(many were convinced) that capitalism is equal to evil, the monarchies were the cancer that
is destroying the Arab nation. At the same time children in the kingly states were taught that
socialism is the synonymous of the atheism and that it contradict all the Islamic principles.

41
As I have said, these political systems were engaged in the construction of the new
generation’s ideology, they tried to change or at least affect their worldview.
These political ideas were built on the old traditional Arabic/Islamic belief in one absolute
truth; it is part of the Arabic utopian idea, which makes past oriented nation. This is one of
the major cultural values Arabs bring with them to be put on negotiation table. Generally
Arabs look through their counterpart’s history; what is their firm accomplishment in the past
and its financial history more than looking in its present status.
H. The face:
Although fear of loosing face is a global phenomenon, it is more crucial in the Arab
countries than in the western cultures. The Arabs are afraid and aware of any act, which can
cause them a loss of face, and at the same time they are aware of causing others to lose face.
The concept of face as defined by Ho is: “Face is lost when the individual, either through his
action or that of people closely related to him, fails to meet essential requirements placed
upon him by virtue of the social position he occupies” (Ho, 1976, 867)37.
The face is used metaphorically in all collective cultures in one way or another, “to
describe a person’s status, or lake of the same, in those groups with which s/he associates.
Face reflects one’s relationship with one’s social environment which is just as important as
the face” (Worm, P.145). This means that, the concept of face is linked to communicating
with others or in other words, it is an interpersonal concept. As it has not been proved or
studied in depth, I think that high-context culture values are mainly, derived from collective
values that emphasize saving face. In other words, people tend to use high context message
to avoid loosing face.
Arabs use the phrase ‘Water of the Face’ to express the meaning of the face concept. By
using the word ‘water’, the Arabs simply, emphasizing the importance of this concept, in
other words, as the water is vital to the life in the Arabian desert, the face concept is too, and
in the other hand it must be saved, because if it is spilled it cant be brought together.
By relating this concept to both, collectivity and high-context characteristic of the Arab
culture, we find that Arab negotiator will never say a direct ‘no’ to his counterpart, he will
probably say phrases such as (maybe, insha’a Allah, I hope, by the well of God or any other
synonymous), at the same time he will never refuse a proposal directly, he will simply come
with a counterproposal. This is the situation when he is convinced that his counterpart is a
member of a highly respected company or a company that had a good reputation in the

37
Hofstede, 1991, p.61.

42
business sector, and at the same time do rank highly in the firm or the organization he
represents, some of the Danish business people has more than one visit card, one to use in
Denmark, and others to use abroad, especially in Arab countries, a Danish manager showed
me the card he uses in Denmark and the one he uses in Dubai; in the prior one it was stated a
‘sales manager’, while the in the subsequent it is stated ‘Vice-president and the overseas
Marketing manager’. In other hand, if his counterpart is representing a small-not highly
respected firm or he ranks not so high in his organization, the Arab negotiator will not
hesitate to say a direct no.
This is clearly in the opposite of the Danish individualistic culture, a Dane will not hesitate
at saying a direct no to his counterpart if he does not agree with him, it would be considered
rude or even will be taken as an insult from an Arabic counterpart. This is due to “a strong
sense of internalization, having an internal locus of control. These cultures are called guilt-
cultures” (Worm, 2003: p.146). While collectivist cultures, on the other hand are
characterized generally, with “a strong sense f externalization, meaning their locus of
control is external, therefore these cultures are often referred to as shame-cultures” (ibid.).
I. Decision Making:
There is a huge differences between Arabs and Danes in the decision making process on a
hand, and on the other hand between Arabs themselves. Iraqis, Syrians, Jordanians and
Lebanese take longer time in making their decisions, due to the fact that most of the
enterprises in these countries lies in the public sector, and negotiators has to go back to their
seniors to make the decisions. While in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE
negotiators take shorter time in making decisions, due to the fact that most of the firms lies
in the private sector and are mainly family company, the owner is the main negotiator or
someone very close to him. While the Egyptians stand somewhere in-between. The
dimensions, which play major role in decision-making, are individualism vs. collectivism
and power distance dimensions.
Danes, on the other hand, as individualists make a clear separation between the family and
their work, they are more ease in making decision, employment rules are more relaxed,
which allow them making decision, and take a full responsibility of their decisions. While in
Arab cultures the one who make decision is a high senior in the organization or firm, while
the one who carry the responsibility is the negotiator or another subordinate, to save the face
of the senior.

43
 Danish culture
And politics

I will go briefly through the Danish history, culture, political system and managerial
aspects because this study is primarily directed to the Danes who want negotiate or do
business with Arabs, and yet there are a lot of published studies on Danish culture. Therefore
I will say in brief:

A. History and Religion:

Denmark is a small country (43,093 km2), composed of the Jutland peninsula and more
than 400 islands, of which 76 are inhabited, also with overseas territory, Greenland and the
Faeroe islands. Denmark is inhabited by 5,313,577 inhabitants 90% of them are Protestant-
Lutheran. It is the oldest monarchy in Europe, historically, like other Scandinavian countries
took part in shaping the history of the Nordic region, some times by the wars it was engaged
in, other times cooperation with other countries of the region, especially Sweden. This could
shade a light over what is considered a ‘Scandinavian culture’. Denmark is one of the
Scandinavian countries, which are (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Island and Finland), the
country’s language is ‘Danish’, which is one of the northern branch of the Germanic
language, it “has the same general rules and syntax as other Germanic languages of
Scandinavia” (Bendure and Friary, 1996: p.33)38.
Denmark has been founded as a unified country in the year 950, when Harald Blue tooth
completed his father’s work to “complete the conquest of Denmark, and he also spearheaded
the conversion of Danes to Christianity” (ibid: p.14)
Christianity was brought into Denmark by Frankish missionaries which built the first
catholic churches in Danish towns of Ribe and Hedeby (ibid.), and since ‘Harald den
Blåtand’ converted to Christianity in the year 960 AD, Denmark had spent the next six
centuries under Catholicism, until the end of the civil war which ended in 1536, when
Christian III “established Danish Lutheran’s church, the only state-sanctioned church and
was placed under the direct control of the king” (ibid: p.17). Denmark as its Scandinavian
brothers share the same “basis for the western absolute truth and victory of rationalism”

38
Bendure, G. and Friary, N., (1996). Denmark. (Lonely Plant Publications: Australia)

44
(Hofstede and Bond, 1989: p.1939), Danes are influenced by Protestantism ideals, which are
“characterized by a high degree of internalization in religious matters,” and “it is central to
Protestantism that only if one is free can one have faith, which is why spiritual and secular
powers were separated”. “Protestantism underlines the direct connection between the
individual and God” (Worm, 1997: p.75).
I am focusing on this matter, due to the fact that individualism was born from the womb
of Protestantism. Danes, generally, carry the quality, which characterize the protestant
cultures, yet Danish individualism “includes a sense of caring for weak and general rejection
of self of self-promoting impetuous individuals. Therefore, in Scandinavian countries,
individualism points towards self-realization rather than towards selfishness” (ibid.)
This is because femininity works as a restrainer to individuality. As I think, the
characteristics of the cultural dimensions are hypothetical, because some of the dimensions
are working as breaks to the others (e.g. femininity for individuality and power distance).
This socialized individualism resulted in high degree of interpersonal trust and solidarity, “in
consequence, trust in the individual’s judgment, development, and self-development with
the purpose of being able to act independently are important ingredients in the Scandinavian
socialization process” (ibid. p.76). This led to encourage the individuals to be and act
independent from the group that they are part of e.g., family, firm, school …etc.
While children are encouraged to be independent, the educational system in Denmark
aims also to build and develop their social attitudes, capabilities, and knowledge.
B. The Climate:
As a “country of 406 islands of those which 76 are inhabited; but only 7 of it have more
than 1000 residents” (Strange, 2003: p.1140), and located at the 56th northern latitude, it is
cold but not so bad as in other countries at the same latitude, because it is “moderated by the
effects of the warm gulf stream, which sweeps northward along the west coast” (Bendure
and Friary, 1996: P.23), “consequently, Denmark has a typical coastal climate with
generally mild winters, cool summers and precipitation spread out all through the year”
(strange, 2003: p.17).
I think this kind of climate had affected the Danes personality; Danes are often described
as cold feeling towards strangers. Whereas, the winter is about 9 months, they day are so
short in winter time that the sun rises about 9 clock morning and sunset about 15.30

39
Hofstede, G. and Bond, M. H. (1988) ‘The Confucian connection: from cultural roots to economic growth,’
Organizational Dynamics, 16, 4, 4-21.
40
Strange, M. Culture Shock; Denmark. 5th ed. (2003). GB: Kuperard.

45
afternoon, the temperature is around freezing point or lower, at these circumstances
conversations are not expected to take more than few words, simply, like ‘goddag’ or just
‘dav’ when people meet each other in the streets. This is in clear contrast with Middle
Eastern Arabic norms of long lasting conversation and endless greetings.
C. Political system:
Denmark has been a constitutional monarchy since king Frederik VII in 1849, allowed
Denmark -under public pressure- a free constitution, and elected parliament. The Danish
parliament (Folketinget) has 175 members from Denmark and 2 from each Greenland and
the Faeroe Island, whom are elected every four years, the nowadays Parliament consists of 8
parties which are: the Liberals, Social Democrats, Danish People's Party, Conservatives,
Socialist People's Party, Social Liberals, Unity List - Red-Green Alliance and the Christian
People's Party. This variety of political parties led to a high degree of transparency and
egalitarianism, due to the power rotation, since no one can stay to long at the power,
therefore he has to be clean-handed, transparent and ½in conformity with the law. While
most of the Arab executives are or think they are in their positions for the rest of their
working life.
This political democracy has as enormous effect on other cultural values of the Danes, such
as egalitarianism, informal behavior, anti-hierarchical attitude…etc.
D. Mediocrity:
Another main characteristic of Danish culture in mediocrity, “everybody is equal or should
aim to be equal” (Strange, 2003: p.37), as a result corruption is far less than in other
cultures. This mediocrity is derived by what is called the Jante Law (Janteloven), constituted
by a Danish/Norwegian novelist Axel Sandemose and confirms this mediocrity, as it
assures:

• Do not think you are anything.

• Do not think you are worth just as much as we are.
• Do not think you are wiser than we are.
• Do not think you are better than we are.

Source: Verner Worm, Vikings, and Mandarins, 1997: p.78

However, this law resulted from the Danes attitude toward egalitarianism, feminism, and

social obligations.

46
 E. Decision-making:

As a result of the egalitarianism code of Nordic countries Jante Law resulted in

nonhierarchical management style, where “the ideal organization is flat, containing as few

hierarchical levels as possible. Decision-making is usually delegated to a large number of

people who can make determinations within their field of responsibility.” (Worm, 1997:83).

On negotiation table, the Danish negotiator has the authority needed to make proposals and

make the proper decision at the proper time; he is rarely expected to discuss his decisions

with his superiors. Moreover Lindkvist (1991:34) argues that, “all employees demonstrate a

certain amount of managerial behavior. The effect of what I have just mentioned combined

with the highly emphasized interpersonal relationships, “results in efforts to reach consensus

in decision-making situation” (Worm: 84).

F. Time:
Scandinavian countries (which Danes are among) “perception of time is strictly
monochron” (Worm, 1997:79), time is money, meetings is strictly planned not only stated
when it will start, but also what time it should be ended.
For the time dimension, Danes are “oriented towards the present. History is of little
importance in every day’s life. Similarly they do not talk to much about the future” (ibid:
80).
In negotiations, Danes tend to negotiate one point at a time, while Arabs tend to negotiate
every thing at the same time.
G. Main characteristic of Danish culture:

Individualism, Femininity, Low Uncertainty Avoidance, Small Power distance Informality

Punctuality, Pragmatism, Future oriented, Medium-term oriented, Low-context, equality,

and softness. I will discuss some of these characteristics in more details later when

comparing the two cultures, or when I discuss the theories I am using.

47
 10
Comparing the two Cultures

Most of the scholars conduct the research through the main domain, which is West vs. East
culture comparison, and mostly their main object would be East Asia (e.g. Japan, China or
the Asian Tigers). Yet the more objective or focus oriented scholars based their studies on
the sub domain Western vs. Arab cultural studies, while others investigated one country
assuming that all other Arabs share same values. Anderson (1989:190) for example, studied
Saudi Arabian and American the advertisements during the 1973 oil embargo. Under the
title, “A comparison of Arab and American conceptions of ‘effective’ persuasion,” which
may give the “impression that rules for political debate in Saudi Arabia may be applied to
people of the entire region. Despite the fact, that Saudis projected the image of Arabs as a
unified group in their advocacy advertisement. It is important to note that people from other
Arab countries view themselves as quite different from Saudis, proud of their own national
heritages, and may object to being grouped by Saudis as “one” people. The point here is not
to encourage extreme relativism but to consider the generality of our words; only after we
have investigated communicative phenomena throughout the region can we speculate about
what is Arab in a broader, generalizable sense. At that time, we will be able to make more
valid statements and cross-cultural comparisons.41”
I don’t think these domains are enough to explain the problems arise from the intercultural
transactions. No one of these scholars have assumed or tried to assume that Arabs could
have more than one culture. Arabic society is heterogeneous one; constructed of many
ethnic groups; countries that were under colonialism by too many confronting super powers,
and since the fall of the Islamic empire in the 13th century there was rare or no
communication between parts of the ex-empire, if we knew that the destination between Iraq
and Morocco is about 5000 km we can imagine the impossibility of communicating between
the people of the two countries. So, is there an Arab nation? And if there is such a nation, do

41
Feghali, E. ’ARAB CULTURAL COMMUNICATION PATTERNS’. Int. J. Intercultural Rel. Vol 21, No. 3, pp. 345-378,
1997

48
the population share one culture with the same values, norms, rituals, symbols, moreover the
same language. Do Arabs share the same goals, aims and worldview so that we are able to
use the phrase ‘Arabic culture’? I will discuss in details the intracultural differences when
talking about the theories and models I am implementing in my thesis.
To more precise in my study I have to dig deeper and conduct my study from Danish vs.
Arabic intercultural perspective. To do so, I have to explain the mean characteristics of each
of these cultures.
If we take the ten cultural characteristics mentioned by Prakash G. Reddy42, an Indian
anthropologist, we can notice that most if not all is confronting with the Arabic cultural
values, the typical Dane characteristics are43:
• Democracy and Freedom. As individualists, Danes value democracy and personal
freedom, “they do not tolerate authoritarian or dictatorial tendencies43,” this should
be in clear contradiction with the Arabic authoritarian hierarchical culture. They do
what ever please them so long they don’t interfere with others personal freedom,
while in the Arabic collectivist culture, individuals do what their society expect
them to do, in Iraq we have a proverb which says ‘eat whatever you like, but do
and wear what ever people like.’
• Equality. Danes believe that people are equally important regardless their wealth,
job or social status, “they do not like any body to demonstrate superiority43.” While
Arabs, like all other collectivist Hipows, think and act under the fact that people are
not equals.

• Calmness and Moderation. Danes are moderate in their behaviors; they “are very
seldom thrown of their balance43.” While Arabs are assertive in showing their
feelings, they are expressive affective culture, they use the extreme ends of
everything, in opposite of the neutral reserved Danish culture.
• Modesty and Humility. “Danes dislike praise and flattery43,” they do not like
boastful people. In opposite with Arabs, who like to be praised, and accept even
false or fake praise. They are boastful, try to mention everything they had achieved
they had and be very happy when people appreciate their achievements.
• Individualism and Self-determination. I will talk about this value in details later.

42
Reddy, Prakash G., Danske dilemmaer. Grevas Forlag, 1998
43
Implemented from Rasmussen, Anne S. And Bank-Mikkelsen, G., Focus on Culture. Systime, 2000: p.9-11

49
 • No Dept of Gratitude. Danes don’t “want to be in dept of gratitude to other
persons, and do not want any persons to be in dept of gratitude to them as well.43”
in the other hand, Arabs have a great sense toward attitude, they like to be in dept
of attitude to others as well as others to be in dept of attitude to them. They use to
say ‘life is: give and take’ or ‘every thing is dept, even the tears of the eyes’ they
mean crying with others in their sad occasions. More over, if any one did them a
favor they will be in dept of gratitude for very long time, no matter how many
times they do him favors.
• Feelings. Danes don’t show their feelings publicly, and consider it as weakness,
while Arabs don’t mind showing their feeling publicly in very assertive manner.
• The Welfare System. Danes think that the state should take care of every body,
“they have a great faith in the system43.” In return Arabs thin that family members
should take care of each other.
• Coziness. The concept called ‘hygge’ is untranslatable to English, but it could be
easy translated to Arabic. I think it is the only shared characteristic between Arabs
and Danes.
In the other hand, the mean cultural characteristics of the Arabic Nomadic, which derived
from, the old Bedouin culture stands in contradiction with the typical Danish values. Some
of these values can be found in literatures as the below41:

• Hospitality. In collectivist Hipow societies interdependence is stressed, the social

behaviors are crucial. A Bedouin hospitality called ‘dhiyafa’ in Arabic, which
emerged as a “coping mechanism in the desert environment, where individuals were
extremely dependent on each other’s when traveling or for protecting themselves
from avengers or oppressors.” And is “impressed on children very early, hospitality
reflects a desired personal quality and symbolizes status. Certain occasions require
elaborate displays of hospitality. During “marriage, burial, circumcision, and the
completion of house-building; during the holy month of Ramadan, village-wide
visiting and sharing of meals is common” (Patai, 1983, p. 86).
• Generosity. Generosity is tied very closely with the rules of Islam and the Muslim
duty of ‘Zakat’ (paying a part of ones wealth to the poor). “Lavish generosity in
traditional Arabic society counterbalance the accumulation of wealth and the
development of extreme riches and poverty” (ibid: 87).

50
• Ird. According to Dodd (1973) honor or ‘ird, is a “controlling value, legitimating the
family structure and the ‘modesty code’ required of both men and women” (p. 40).
Honor is manifested in sexual conduct and behaviors, which exhibit or regulate
manliness, such as the number of sons a man fathers and the extent of hospitality one
bestows (Khalid, 1977; Mackey, 1987). As Mackey (1987) further describes, “One’s
honor determines one’s image. The key to saving face is the assiduous avoidance of
shame” (p. 125). ‘Ird appears to be a secular rather than a religious value, although
diverse religious teachings have indirectly supported it (Dodd, 1973).
I have to admit that there is clear misunderstanding in regarding this issue, the word
is untranslatable, and I could not find any equivalent in English or Danish. Ird differs
from the honor concept, what is derived from sexual behavior of women and also
men, is what is called ‘ird’. At the other hand, there is still the other meaning of the
concept of honor, that Westerners recognize, yet this concept do not carry the same
meaning and passion as for some Arab societies.
• Honor. In the Arab world, honorable behavior is that “which is conducive to group
cohesion and group survival, that which strengthens the group and serves its interest;
while shameful behavior is that which tends to disrupt, endanger, impair or weaken
the social aggregate” (Patai, 1976: 90).
• Courage. Courage “means essentially the ability to stand physical pain or emotional
strain such self-control that no sound or facial expression betrays the trail one is
undergoing” (ibid: 89). It is sometimes difficult to distinguish this value from the
concept of bravery, which requires that Arabs be willing to give their life for the
group, according to Patai.
• Self-respect. “Arab ethics revolve around a single focal point, that of self-esteem or
self-respect. The most important factor on which preservation of this self-esteem
depends is the sexual behavior of the women for whom the Arab is responsible: his
daughters and sisters” (ibid: 96). This value is group-based because self-respect
depends on other group members’ behavior.

51
 A. Hofstede Clusters:

Hofstede had considered the Arabs as one region (he did his research in Egypt, Iraq,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, KSA, and UAE). He got the results as below

Country PDA index UAI Index IDV Index MAS Index LTO Index
Score rank Score rank score rank score rank score rank
Denmark 18 51 23 51 74 9 16 50 30/ 11/16
35
Arab 80 7 68 27 38 26- 53 23 ? ?
Countries 27

Hofstede has represented the Danish culture under the first four dimensions; as to the
fifth dimension I have suggested the fore mentioned figures, by comparing Denmark with
Sweden. In the fore mentioned findings, we can notice that:

• In the PDI index Denmark score 18 with the rank 51, while Sweden score 31 in rank
47/48 together with Norway.
• In the IDV index Denmark score 74 in rank 9, while Sweden score 71 at rank 10/11
sharing the same rank with France.
• In the MAS index Denmark score 16 in rank 50, while Sweden score 5 in rank 53.
• Lastly in UAI index Denmark score 23 in rank 51, while Sweden score 29 in rank 49/50
with Hong Kong.
Based on those findings, I supposed that we can consider Denmark and Sweden are
culturally close to each other to the point that Denmark lies almost directly before or after
Sweden in Hofstede-Bond (LTO) index, Where Sweden out of 23 countries placed in rank
12 of the LTO score 33. For that we can suggest that Denmark score between 30-35 and

52
rank between 11-16, and it is mostly would be in the lower part of the index, in other words
towards short-term oriented countries, in figures I will go towards the 30 at rank of 15/16.
As Hofstede, investigated time forming another continuum, in a rather one-dimensional
way; either one can have a long term-orientation (mainly Asian cultures) or one can have a
short-term orientation (mainly Western cultures). Although Time is very important in
shaping the behavior of the individuals and furthermore the social groups, it also has effects
on the education system, the language, which is varying over time and it will change as the
nationality of the individual changes. So we have to consider the effect of the time over
these variables, and its effect on culture (Al-Soufi, Andersen and Harry, unpublished
paper). The three main findings about Arab culture and time, is: 1) Arab Muslim character
is often described as fatalistic, rather short-term oriented, and not future oriented (see
Usunier, 1999, p. 37 and Ferraro, 1990); 2) Arab societies are often characterized by a
polychronic approach to time (Hall, 1976), i.e. the emphasis is on relationship building,
rather than focusing on short-term gains. Time provides merely a reference point, and
simultaneous involvements are common (i.e. meetings can be disturbed many times, see
Adler 2002, p. 34); and 3) The relation-oriented culture means it takes time to make
friends, but friendships can be even stronger and more durable than contracts. These three
findings could be seen as rather conflicting, and they are not only linking to the time
dimension, but also just as much to the rural versus urban dimension.

To dig deeper and go inside these differences I will analyze them under each dimension.

a. Individualism vs. collectivism

Studies show that the most effecting dimensions of culture on negotiations across-culture
are: “the cultural value of individualism vs. collectivism; egalitarianism vs. hierarchy; and
low- vs. high-context norm for communication”44 (J. M. Brett, 2001: p.15). Yet, the most
studied one is this dimension, a lot of researchers had looked through it and under more
than one term, it is individualism vs. collectivism in Hofstede’s work, while it is
communitarianism vs. individualism in Trompenaars terminology, and it is Self-orientation
versus collectivity-orientation as in the “General Theory of Action” by functionalist
sociologist Talcott Parsons, published with the co-authorship of Edward Shils (1951). At

44
Jeanne M. Brett, Negotiating Globally, 2001. (San Francisco, U.S.A.: Jossey-Bass a Wiley Co.)

53
the same time it is one of the major dimensions that the Arabs confront the Danish culture,
at the same time there is a big gabs between Arab countries considering this dimension.
Almost every thing in an individualistic culture is self-oriented, while in collectivistic
culture things are group-oriented, Gudykunst and Yung (2001:p. 54) argue that: “members
of individualistic cultures, for example, emphasize person-based information to predict each
others behavior, and members of collectivistic cultures emphasize group-based information
to predict each others behavior”.
Generally Denmark rank high in the IDV index, while the Arab countries score relatively
low in this dimension, although, general tendencies exist within each culture, yet, not all of
its members share these tendencies. As I personally had experienced, although most of the
Danes have an individualistic tendencies, some of them have a good share of collectivistic
tendencies. Similarly, Arabs as mostly are collectivists; some of them share high
individualistic tendencies. At this point, we can identify a large difference between the
Arabs; the prime except from the high level of collectivism is Lebanon, but also Tunisia and
Morocco to some extent. All are categorized as being collectivist. However, dig deeper into
details of everyday life, you will see, that in these countries there are ethnic groups that are
individualists, departing from the main stream. It is mainly a question of ethnicity and
educational level, e.g. Qatar is one point lower (4.71) in Group and family collectivism than
many of the other countries, Morocco (5.87) and Kuwait (5.80) (see Kabasakal and Bodur
2002, p. 47).

Individualism

Lebanon Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

. Kuwait Morocco

Collectivism Yemen Iraq

Low high
Power distance

54
The figure above is not based on through empirical research – yet my later research had
confirmed some of its findings. However the Turkish GLOBE-research teams more recent
data (see Kabasakal and Bodur 2002), provides reason to believe that diversity does exist
here and there. Now, if a company representative only having read about the stereotypes
tried to approach people within the above-mentioned countries, clearly he would face
problems. This either as business partner, where bargaining is an important part of the
relationship, or if sales or production sites are to be established in one of the countries.
Earlier studies by Lauring indicate, that the very different types of nationality
characterizing employees in a Danish subsidiary in Saudi Arabia, has profound
implications on the allocation of tasks and jobs within the company (see Lauring 2001).
As individualist societies “tend to emphasize the work and dignity of the individual over
the group, independence rather than interdependence, and relatively few social obligations”
(Ferraro, 2001: p. 101), the Danes comply with these characteristics to some extent, yet
Danes emphasize the group work and conformity, which is a typical feminine
characteristic. While the Arab’s societies generally are collectivists, they tend to emphasize
and encourage their members to put the interests of the group above those of the
individuals, and value highly the stronger social ties within the ingroup.
Yet there is an unobserved differences between the Arabs in relation to this dimension (e.g.,
I found through my questionnaire that the Shiite Arabs and the Kurds are score higher in
collectivity than the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, while in the above figure, one can see the
differences between Arab countries.
The family ties tend to be weaker in individualist cultures such as the Danish culture, as
Ferraro argues “the constant preoccupation with self resulted in the truncation of extended
family ties, reducing the notion of family to its smallest possible unit – the nuclear family”
(ibid). This tendency had affected to some extend the way the Danes have designed their
homes and offices. The typical Danish home is small 2-3 rooms, to fit the small Danish
family (occupants per household at January 1st 2001, is 2.19, see appendix 2), in the other
hand offices are designed to obtain the individual privacy, typically small and simple.
While the Arabic office is designed to obtain the prestige and collectivity. In the other hand
the Arabic home generally are bigger due to the bigger family (occupants per household at
January 1st 2001 in Bahrain 4.03, Egypt 4.49, Iraq 5.26, Kuwait 6.62, Jordan 5.73, Lebanon
4.57, Qatar 4.38, KSA 6.04, Syria 4.91, and UAE 6.24, see the aforementioned appendix).
In countries like Iraq and the Arabic peninsula’s countries the home generally is designed
as a separated villa, which has the opportunity to be extended to accept more inhabitants,

55
especially when children grew up and get married, they usually live in the family house in
the first 15 years of their marriage. While in more modernized/urbanized countries like
Egypt, Lebanon and Syria the many homes are generally smaller, and designed as
apartments in a vertical accommodations.
As we already new, and all the researchers in cultural studies field argue, the cultural values
are learned since childhood, individualistic values are installed in the mind of the child
early, he will be encouraged to be self-sufficient and make his own decisions, as well as to
respect and value democracy, (actually one of the first culture-shock I experienced was
when my younger son refused a decision I made and asked me to take a democratic voting
within the family).
While in Arab countries people tend to determine their self as members of a specific group,
children are raised to accept and seek for the advice of the alders. Marriage is not a
personal choice, which an individual can take; it is rather a family decision. The individual
has to bear responsibility toward his ingroup and never to abandon or fail them even in
things that are observed as personal in individualistic cultures such as occupation and the
work profession he has to follow.
The Importance of Ingroups:
The ingroups as Triandis (1988) defines them: “are groups that are important to their
members.” The relative importance of these ingroups is one of the major factors that
differentiate individualistic and collectivistic cultures.
When we said that the difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures is that
the collectivistic cultures are group-oriented, while the individualistic cultures are person-
oriented, this does not mean that ingroups don’t exist in individualistic cultures, maybe it is
the opposite, as Samovar and Porter (1999, P. 66) argue. In individualistic cultures
“peoples personal goals take priority over their allegiance to groups like the family or the
employer. The loyalty of individualists to given group is very week; they feel they belong
to too many groups and apt to change their membership as it suits them, switching
churches, for example, or leaving one employer to another”(D. Goleman, The Group and
Self: New Focus on a Cultural Rift, New York Times, 22 December, 1990, 40.). In other
words, individualistic cultures had more specific groups than collectivistic cultures do,
groups such as, family, religion, social clubs…etc., individualistic cultures have many
specific groups “that might influence behavior in any particular social
situation”(Gudykunst, 1997: p. 57).

56
How this dimension affects negotiation:
This dimension has attracted many negotiation researchers; they had dragged the attention
that this dimension “appears to influence a broad range of negotiation processes, outcomes,
and preferences for conflict resolution procedures (Lewicki ET. Al, 2003: P.408).
One of the major facts that affect the negotiations is whether the negotiator carries
individualistic or collectivistic values. Hofstede suggests that, “the focus on relationship in
collectivist societies plays a critical role in negotiations” (Lewicki ET. Al., 2003: p. 408).
This cultural difference as I have said affects the way people negotiate, Smith, Dugan,
Peterson, and Leung (1998) found that within collectivistic countries disagreements are
resolved based on rules, whereas in individualistic countries conflicts tend to be resolved
through personal experience and training.
Negotiation processes:
Cai (1998) demonstrated ho individualism/collectivism influenced negotiation planning;
negotiators from a more collectivist culture (Taiwan) spent more time planning for long-
term goals, while negotiator from a more individualistic culture (U.S.) spent more time
planning for short-term goals.
“In addition, examination of the negotiation process revealed that negotiators from the more
individualistic culture made more extreme offers during negotiation than did the negotiators
from the more collectivist culture (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999)” (ibid: 408). It also
could affect and influence the accountability of negotiators during the negotiation process.
Negotiation strategy:
As I have said earlier, although, all cultures distinguish between in-groups and out-groups;
they differ in their commitment to their in-group. “In individualist cultures, self-identity is
likely to consist of attributes that are independent of in-group membership. A negotiator
from individualist culture might say, ‘I am tall; I am intelligent; I have sense of humor.’ In
collectivist cultures, self-identity is likely to be interdependent with in-group membership.
A negotiator from a collectivist culture might say, ‘I am a wife, mother, and daughter; I am
a Kellogg faculty member.’” (Brett, 2001: 15). In relation to the strategy used in
negotiation, researches show that, “both confrontational and motivational behaviors may
stem from this cultural value” (ibid.), as in the figure below.

57
 Confrontation Motivation

Individualism-Collectivism
Source: J. M. Brett, Negotiating globally (Jossey-Bass a Wiley co, 2001), p. 17.

Disinclination to confront directly in a negotiation is a result of emphasize on cooperation in

collectivist cultures. A direct ‘NO’ is a sign of rude and disrespect. “An indirect approach is
thought to be relationship-preserving.” (Ibid: 16)

What motivate negotiators are their cultural values for individualism versus collectivism.
“This cultural value reflects a society’s goal orientation. Individualist cultures emphasize
self-interests. Collectivist cultures emphasize collective-interests”(ibid: p.17).
Negotiation outcome:
Researchers have also found that the effects of individualism/collectivism may also
influence negotiations outcomes. Lituchy (1997) reported that negotiators from a more
collectivist culture (Japan) reached more integrative solutions than negotiators from a more
individualist culture (U.S.) or negotiation dyads where both cultures were present (Japan,
U.S.).
Conflict resolution:
There are plenty of good findings showing that this dimension affects the style negotiators
use in resolving conflicts. “Kim and Kitani (1998) demonstrated how
individualism/collectivism influenced preference for conflict resolution styles in romantic
relationships as partners from a more collectivist culture (Asian Americans) preferred
obliging, avoiding, and integrating conflict management styles, while partners from a more
individualistic culture (Caucasian Americans) preferred a dominating conflict management
style” (Lewicki et. Al., 2003: p. 411).
As, Pearson and Stephan (1998) found, negotiators from a more collectivist culture such as
Brazil, preferred accommodation, collaboration, and withdrawal compared to negotiators
from a more individualist culture such as the U.S.A., who preferred competition. Other
studies of the effects of individualism/ collectivism on conflict resolution styles, (the study
by Mintu- Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 200045) found that exporters from the Philippines (a
“high context” culture that is more collectivist) preferred less confrontational problem

45
Mintu-Wimsatt, A. & Gassenheimer, J. B. (2000). The moderating effects of cultural context in buyer-seller
negotiation. The journal of personaæ selling and Sales Management, 1, 1-9.

58
solving than did exporters from the United States (a “low context” culture that is more
individualistic).

In summary, the individualism/ collectivism dimension of culture appears to influence a

broad range of negotiation processes, outcomes, and preference for conflict resolution
procedures. (Lewicki ET. Al., p. 411)
b. Power distance
The other cultural dimension that affects cross-cultural negotiation is the degree of power
distance, which is constructed in the society. Although Hofstede mentions that these two
dimensions together affects the way people conceive organizations, he hadn’t focused on
this dimension in the same way he did with collectivism vs. individualism dimension.
When talking about power distance we mean generally: to what extent the people are
welling to accept differences and inequality among their society. I am not going to explain
this dimension, because explanations could be found in many books and resources (e.g.,
Hofstede, 1980, 1991), but I will focus on the facts that bring up this value and put it on
negotiating table.
The most seeable fact in this dimension is the degree of the distance between people who
hold power and those whom affected by this power. Arab societies generally are high in
power distance index than most of the westerners (e.g., Arabs score in rank 7, while Danes
score in rank 51 out of 50 countries and three regions.
At the same time, Arab countries differ widely on this dimension

Masculinity
Sau. Irq.
Ym. Om.
Kw. Qat.

Moro.
Leb.

Femininity
Low power distance High Power distance
An attempt to place selected Arab countries in Hofstede’s diagram

59
 Generally, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt ranked higher in the research I conducted,
while KSA, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the UAE (Arabic peninsula) had smaller power
distance.
What classifies Denmark as a small power distance culture, is the high degree of
egalitarianism, this was reflected in the smaller gabs between people, groups, generations
and genders. “This limited differentiation adds to the homogeneity of society. The goal is to
achieve uniformity in firms creating a situation where each person, whole fulfilling a certain
role or function, can be replaced just as well by another. In principle everybody is to be
treated equally. Normally, competition and power exist, but have a negative connotation.
The population in the Scandinavian countries primarily talks about cooperation and
responsibility. There is a tendency to forgive, and every body is equal no matter what their
position is in the society or at work. Naturally, many of these statements are ideological,
meant to make subordinates feel more satisfied with their jobs. There is no totally egalitarian
society in the world” (Worm, 1997: p.79).
Arab’s culture, as I have just said, is hierarchical; people are aware of the status; children
are raised to respect alders, status, teachers…etc. As collectivist culture characterized by
large power distance, lower ranked people are dependant on those who have more power,
and expected to accept their directions without discussions. We were told back in Iraq
‘execute or carry out orders then discuss’.
As Hofstede (1991:42) argues, “there seems to be a relationship between language area
and present-day mental software regarding power distance.” He thinks that the countries that
speak more romance language tend to score medium to high in the PDI, while countries with
Germanic roots of language score lower in the PDI, I have to agree with him in this part of
his assumption, due to the fact that “languages are constructed in such a way as to ensure
that one’s relative status is reflected in the very construction of the sentence” (Ferraro,
2001:106). People from high power distance cultures ‘Hipows’ are “usually soft-spoken, and
polite, wither they are powerful individuals or not.” They “will not hesitate to talk but will
be restrained and formal in their conversation, seeking to pleas you as best they can and
accepting blame for any failure to pleas you” (G. J. Hofstede et. al., 2002: 141). At the same
time the power is constrained in the hands of few people. Yet in low power distance
cultures, people are more equal in the division of power, and informal in their way of speech
and dress and by addressing each other. Language do emphasize this informality by, for

60
example, making no distinguish in the formal ‘you’ and the informal ‘you’, Danes usually
use the word ‘Deres’ only to address their queen.
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner used triangles to represent this dimension as following:

1 2
Where triangle 1 represent the hierarchical cultures, in which distance between those at the
base and those in the top is considerable. While triangle 2 represents societies with more
egalitarian cultures “in which there is relatively little social distance between the various
levels of the society” (Ferraro, 2001:105).

Informality:
A major value that flows from egalitarianism is the informality. Informal cultures value the
egalitarianism in organizations and value small differences between people. Business people
always show up at meetings wearing casual cloths, addressing others with their first names,
this could cause real uncomfortable negotiating conditions to their counterparts from Arabic
formal cultures, although not all Arabs are equal in their formality (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan are more formal than KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE), “in
formal, hierarchical cultures status differences are larger and more important than in
egalitarian, informal cultures. Formal ways of addressing people is one important way of
showing respect to persons of high status” (Gesteland, 1999: 45).

INFORMAL CULTURES
Australia
USA
Canada
New Zealand
Denmark, Norway, Iceland

FORMAL CULTURES
Most of Europe and Asia
The Mediterranean Region and the Arab World
Latin America

Source: Richard R. Gesteland, 1999. Cross-Cultural Business Behavior: p.45

61
 Generally Danes use Mr. and Mrs. Only when writing to people they don’t know or don’t
like, children use to call their teachers by their first names, “the horizontal distribution of
power contributes toward the Scandinavians’ informal behavior and dress as compared with
most other countries” (Worm, 1997: 77).
The formality differs in Arab countries as I have said. This is, in my opinion, due to the
differences in the political systems and the highlanders vs. lowlanders dimension, which
needs more empirical research. In my questionnaires, I found that, most of the respondents
from the Arabic peninsula region (which is mostly Sahara region), and mostly governed by
tribunal regimes, tend to be more informal than others from the other Arabic countries
(which all contains mountains).
Power Distance and Negotiation:
The differences in this dimension could have a significant effect on negotiations, and play a
unique role in business life. Negotiation may take days, weeks or even months, because
Arabs negotiators has to go back to their seniors every time they have to make a proposal,
agree on one or make a consensus. Other important issue is that, not all the employees from
a high power distance organization have the same type of information access, the higher the
person’s rank in his firm the bigger access he has to inside information. Most of
negotiation’s failure stems from this dimension, Hipows are very sensitive to towards the
way they are addressed, and the language their counterparts use while talking to them.
Nonverbal communication patterns are very important to Hipows; usually high power
distance cultures use a lot of cues and gestures in their communicating language.

c. Uncertainty Avoidance

Hofstede (1997: 113) defined uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which the members of
a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.” This can cause an anxiety;
societies had “developed ways to alleviate this anxiety46” (Hofstede, 1997: 110). These ways
could be religiously, technologically, scientifically, or legally. At the core of this value lies
“the inescapable truism that the future is unknown” (Samovar, 2001: 68).
Although Hofstede mentioned that people tried to avoid such circumstances by “maintaining
strict codes of behavior and a belief in absolute truth” (ibid), yet not all the cultures that
score high in UAI are cultures believing in an ‘absolute truth’.

46
Hofstede, G., 1997, 2nd ed., “Cultures and Organizations: software of the mind”. USA: McGraw-Hill Co.

62
I have noticed that neither Hofstede focused and concentrated in studying this dimension,
nor other scholars who dealt with this dimension in the same way they did with the
collectivism dimension. More over I have found that the countries scored high in UAI are
mainly believe in Catholicism, (e.g., Greece, Portugal, Uruguay…etc.). While countries with
Protestantic believes are among the lowest in the index, such as, Denmark, Sweden, GB,
USA…etc. at the same time countries without absolute truth believes such as Japan scored
high in the index, while Hong Kong among the lowest. At the same time Islamic countries,
such as, turkey and Arab countries scored medium to high, while other Islamic countries
scored relatively low, such as Indonesia. This part of the dimension needs more
investigations. The findings in this dimension could be explained by other values such as
high vs. low-context of Hall, or expressive vs. reserved cultures of Gesteland. At the same
time, country like USA, which scored low in the UAI have the most complex legal and
contract rules, a contract of two pages in Denmark or Iraq are written in tens of pages by a
US lawyer.
Arab countries are not equal or even nearly at the same level in this dimension. “The results
indicate that Saudi managers tend to have a high “uncertainty avoidance” orientation. For
example, Saudi managers, as Moslem Arabs, do not tolerate persons who deviate from
Islamic teachings and Bedouin traditions. They are very loyal to their organizations. Also,
they do not like conflict. However, if forced, they resolve disagreements by authoritarian
behavior” (Al-Meer, 1996). At the other hand, my questionnaire indicates that Iraqis score
lower in this index (it needs more investigation to prove this findings).
The impact of the UA on Negotiation:
The main impact of this dimension is on making decision and on risk level that the
counterparts are able to take. High- uncertainty avoidance don’t take risks and take more
time at making decisions.

d. Masculinity vs. femininity

These words are used not to define the self in its biological form; simply it isn’t man and
woman. It is rather the description of gender in its social form. It is how “Masculine or
Feminine traits are valued and revealed” (Samovar, 1999: 71). Hofstede (1991:82) defines
masculinity as “pertains to societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct (i.e.,
men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success whereas women are

63
supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life); femininity
pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap (i.e., both men and women are
supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life). Here I have to say that
I can’t agree with Hofstede. Some studies and researches conducted in this area suggested
that, women is masculine cultures are tougher and more assertive than men.
The two cultures stand at the opposite ends of the MAS index; Danish culture is well known
by its high degree of femininity, while Arabic societies are considered masculine. The main
characteristic that differentiates the two cultures are, while masculine cultures are formal,
feminine are informal; and masculine cultures normally are high-context cultures, while
feminine cultures are generally low context cultures.
As I think, this dimension doesn’t affect negotiations directly; it is rather work as brakes to
the extremism of individuality and collectivity. The feminine values of the Danish culture
work as breaks that hinder the Danes from going to the extreme end of individuality; one
can notice for example, that the competitiveness of the American culture are not so selfish at
Danish society, “interdependence and androgynous behavior are the ideal, and people
sympathize with unfortunate47” (Samovar and Porter, 2001: 72).
I would like to shade light over the intracultural differences between the Arabs and
intercultural differences. As Al-Meer48 mentions that, although, Saudi managers share a
similar language and Islamic heritage with their Arab neighbors, but differ from them in
their value system. “Ali49 attributed this variation in the Arab managers’ value systems from
country to country to different ideological and religious beliefs, as well as to the patterns of
production and living in each country48.”
In the other hand, researches show that this value system differs from the western value
systems. For example, when Bjerke and Al-Meer studied Saudi society in the bases of
Hofstede’s dimensions found that management theories in the areas of motivation,
leadership, and organization, which were developed in the USA, might not fit Saudi
society50.
These results indicate, “Saudi managers scored high on “power distance,” suggesting a

47
Samovar, L. A. and Porter, R. E., (2001) “Communication between Cultures”. Thomson Learning Inc. USA.
48
Al-Meer, Abdul-Rahim. “A comparison of the need importance structure between Saudis and westerners; an
exploratory study”, Journal of Management Development. Vol. 15 No. 5, 1996, pp. 56-64. MCB University
Press, 0262-1711
49
Ali, A., “A cross-national perspective of managerial work value systems”, paper presented at the Academy
of Management National Meeting, Best Papers Proceedings, Chicago, IL, August 1986.
50
1. Bjerke, B. and Al-Meer, A. R., “Culture’s consequences: management in Saudi Arabia”, Leadership & Organization
Development Journal, Vol. 14 No. 2, 1993, pp. 30-35.

64
social distance between supervisors and subordinates. According to their findings, this high
power distance orientation could be attributed to the Moslem belief about authority in
Islamic societies as well as to Bedouin traditions48.” And “they are very loyal to their
organizations. Also, they do not like conflict. However, if forced, they resolve
disagreements by authoritarian behavior. Saudi managers tend to prefer a tight social
framework in organizational as well as in institutional life (displaying a high collectivism).
Islamic and Bedouin traditions are important sources for this orientation. Saudi managers, as
Moslems, are required to co-operate with other Moslems and to share one another’s sorrow
and happiness. They are also required to offer non-Moslem groups social and cultural rights
on the basis of the common bonds of humanity.50”
Finally, “the results place Saudi managers on the “feminine” side of Hofstede’s fourth
dimension. This concern for others and for friendly relationships among people is also
attributed to Islamic teachings and Bedouin traditions.50” So they are “relatively lower on
masculinity.50”

e. The Concept of Time

“Our conception of time is strongly affected by culture because time is an idea rather than an
object51” (Trompenaars, 1999: 121)
The notion of this dimension is how cultures deal with the concept of time. Ferraro (2002:
114) argues that we have to look to time “from three specific perspectives:
• Time importance of a precise reckoning of time.
• The degree to which a culture use sequential or synchronized time.
• Whether a culture is past, present or future-oriented.52”
Ferraro (2002: 115) in his work uses the terms precise vs. loose reckoning of time; by that
he differentiates between cultures that “reckon time precisely52”, where time must be used
efficiently, time is strictly scheduled, timetables are established and deadlines expected to be
met. Countries like USA, Netherlands and Denmark are precise time reckoning. At the other
end of the pole there are countries such as in the Middle East and South America, where
“people take a looser, more relaxed approach to time” (ibid.). Scheduling of time and
deadlines are made to express intent rather than obligations. The main characteristic of

51
Trompenaars, F. and Hampden-Turner, C., 1999, “Riding the Waves of Culture”. UK. London: Nicholas Brealey Pub.

52
Ferraro, G. P. (2002). “the Cultural Dimension of International business” 4th ed. New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall.

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precise time reckoning cultures is high punctuality, while loose time reckoning cultures are
characterized by little punctuality. The second one is what Hall called ‘polychronic vs.
monochronic.’
Time is a 3D dimension, if I am able to use computer terminology as Hofstede did. First,
there is the long vs. short-term orientation of time by Hofstede-Bond; secondly, there is the
past-present-future orientation of time by Fons Trompenaars; finally, the monochromic vs.
polychronic culture orientation by Edward t. Hall.
Each one of the three scholars based his theory on the relation between human beings and
time. Though, each of these theories is very important in understanding cultural values and
furthermore explains differences between societies, it isn’t solely sufficient. In able to be a
good and efficient, any study has to be in 3D, what I mean is it has to take the three theories
together and in parallel.
As I mentioned in the beginning, Danes among other Scandinavians are monochronic
medium-long time present oriented, while the Arabs are generally polychronic medium-long
time past oriented.
Generally Arabs care less than Danes about meeting deadlines and scheduling their meetings
and showing in time; the Arabic proverb says ‘to arrive late is better than never’. I can
hardly explain this Arabic attitude towards time, historically and religiously Arab should
have more focus on time importance. The Islamic rules determine that Muslim should
observe an appointment and be on time, the religious rule says that ‘a sign of the believer
that if he made an appointment he shows on time’. But as I mentioned before the influence
of other cultures through the history on Arabic cultures turned this attitude to its current
status.
i. Trompenaars concept of time:
In his work on ‘how people manage time’ he adapt the observation of Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck of time, when they “identified three types of culture: present oriented, which is
relatively timeless, traditionless and ignores the future; past oriented, mainly concerned to
maintain and restore traditions in the present; and future oriented, envisaging a more
desirable future and setting out to realize it51” (Trompenaars and Turner, 1999: 121).
Cultures vary in their attraction toward past, present, and future. Danes are present to future
oriented, while Arabs are generally past oriented. This is part of the core Islamic believe, as
profit Mohammed puts it “best century is my century, then the next century, then the century
that follows”. This means that Arabs think that their best age is the ancient ages (the 7th
century).

66
 ii. Polychronic vs. Monochronic cultures:
In simple words, monochronic cultures divide activities in specific linear schedules. Do one
thing at a time, and after finishing go to the next. Time plays a significant role in every day’s
life. While in polychronic societies, people usually tend to do many things in the same time,
and their minds are programmed to do so automatically. People discuss many official things
while listening or watching a TV program and maybe writing something important in their
papers. Relationships are much more important than keeping deadlines, therefore Arabs are
not expected to show in the meetings at time and meetings on the other hand could last much
more than expected. As Trompenaars (1999: 125) puts it “meeting times maybe approximate
in synchronic (polychronic) cultures. The range is from 15 minutes in Latin Europe to part
or all of a day in the Middle East and Africa51.” Monochronic cultures are generally low-
context cultures, while polychronic cultures are primarily high-context cultures.
Danish is a monochronic culture, as its Scandinavian brothers/sisters “placing a strong
emphasis on solving problems one by one and keeping schedules” (Worm, 1997: 98). In
other words, Danish perception of time is linear. The outcome of a meeting between both
cultures is always unpredictable, this is because Danes try to keep schedules and meet
deadlines, and while Arabs try to discuss all matters and be sure that nothing will be
accomplished before they take all the time they need to discuss every single detail at the
same time.
iii. Long vs. short-term orientation:
This is Hofstede’s fifth dimension, which was called the Confucian dynamism, and other
scholars had adopted this concept and followed him and his colleague Bond. They noticed
that cultures differ in the way they perceive time, whether it is long-term or short-term
orientation. This dimension was developed to escape the black holes in the four dimensions
model of Hofstede in explaining the Southeast Asian growth. Yet it is difficult to place the
Scandinavian countries on LTO dimension. “The immediate reaction is that Scandinavia
does not relate much to any of the features characterizing the dimension,” furthermore I can
say that Arabs are also difficult to place on the LTO index. For example, researches
conducts that in long-term oriented cultures, savings rate is high (Worm, 1997: 96); yet we
can notice that the long-term attitude of the Arabs didn’t result in high savings rate, this is
due to the Arabic fatalism, i.e., Muslims believe that no matter what man do he can’t get
boon or subsistence more than God has destined to him; in the other hand savings rates is a
taboo in the Islamic law (Sharia) and is called ‘Reba’. Islamic rules of inheritance aim to
divide the wealth, and there should not be multi-rich.

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Time orientation and negotiations:
Generally, in Arab countries people take more time in negotiations, due to the fact that they
have to establish relationship and maintain trust. Arabs as individuals from a high context
culture, keep negotiating every detail –even though it had been negotiated before- until the
last minute and some times after signing contrast (as a negotiator from Danfoss says). They
need more time than Danes do, this could be because Arab societies are high-context
cultures. Scandinavia is “a low context area, where one thing is finished at a time (ibid).

B. Trompenaars Dimensions
a. Diffuse vs. Specific cultures
This dimension is about, to what extend people relationships are involved in business.
“The difference between specific and diffuse cultures is about how much you get involved
in a business relationship” (Rasmussen Mikkelsen, 2001: 66). In specific cultures, the
contract is what determines the relationships between the counterparts. People from more
specific cultures do not involved in a business relationship more than required by the
contract. Relationship at the workplace is a de-facto relation between colleagues. However,
the role of a boss is only valid at the workplace, while it is not maintained outside workplace
e.g., when you meeting at a restaurant. Authority is just maintained at workplace.
“Diffuse cultures do not separate professional life from private life as much as specific
cultures do” (ibid). A boss in a diffuse culture is more than a boss in a business matter. The
role of a boss is maintained also in other situations, his opinion is very important to his
subordinates in and outside workplace, normally he expects to be treated outside as inside
the workplace.
Danes separate between business life and free time indicates their specific culture. Danes
segregate their life into many independent sections. Arabs culture is more diffuse and less
segmented. Yet, it is usual for the Arabic businesspeople to have members of their family
working at their own workplace, whereas nepotism is not the proper behavior in Denmark.
Arabs tend to employ members of their families and say ‘people of trust better than of
experience’, in the terminology of Trompenaars (1993:82) Experience, or performance,

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means relatively less in the Arab countries than in Scandinavia. As a result of the diffuse life
style, Arabic managers get involved in their subordinates private life and repeatedly visit
them at their homes. Generally, Arabs have little trust in people whom they are not able to
associate with a more diffuse manner. As Worm (1997: 97) argues about Chinese culture,
which relatively at the same level of diffuseness of the Arabic culture, “The approach is very
indirect. They give high priority to time spent on getting to know business partners, and they
are reluctant to enter into business relationship with people whom they do not know.
Scandinavians, on the other hand, are straightforward and their reasons for contacting a
stranger are transparent. If the stranger is interested, one gets to know him by gradually
expanding one’s knowledge about him.”

Negotiations and diffuse cultures

When both cultures meet in negotiation, in the Arabic diffuse life style every thing is mixed,
they “refuse to do business in a mental subdivision called ‘commerce’ or ‘work’ which is
kept apart from the rest of life” Trompenaars, 1999: 87), Relationships has to be built before
one can do good business. People from specific cultures such as Denmark, tend to start
directly or after a short time their proposal and they are ready to negotiate conditions and
terms, they don’t need to know the other party and trust him contract is enough to start a
relationship, for Arabs it could take more time, maybe days or weeks to forward their
proposal, it is simply getting know each other.
In reality this dimension is about negotiation strategies. This dimension is very close and
could be mixed with Hall’s dimension ‘low vs. high-context culture.

b. Universalism vs. particularism (rules vs. relationships)

This cultural dimension “defines how we judge people’s behavior53”. There are universal
rules that are agreed on from most of the human beings such as love your children, don’t
steal, don’t lie. While “at the other extreme we encounter particular obligations to people we
know53”.
Universalist are rule-based cultures, “behavior tends to be abstract”. Rules should be
fulfilled without exceptions, equality is supposed and every one should fall under the
obligation of law.

53
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1999: 31.

69
In particularist cultures, the focus is on the situation or the persons involved. Man is
supposed too help and protect family members and friends, without thinking of his legal
obligations or what does the roles say. Or in the words of Trompenaars (1999: 31)
“particularist judgments focus on the exceptional nature of present circumstances. This
citizen is not ‘a citizen’ but my friend, brother, husband, child or person of unique
importance to me.”
The dimension is to some extent has adapted some of the collectivism/individualism
characteristics. People from particularist culture tend to be more relationship-focused, while
people from more universalist culture tend to be rule-focused.
Danes as universalists expect for example that the agreement should be fulfilled in definite,
even if this fulfillment could cause economical or practical problems. While for the Arabs as
particularists, contracts are seen as “rough guidelines or approximation” (ibid)
A Danish firm, which had signed a contract to export goods to Dubai, the contract was
singed in terms of euro. After some time, the exchange rate dramatically changed in the
favor of the USD. The Arab importer, from a particularist background, tried to change the
terms of contract to be in dollars in stead of euros. While for the Danish firm as the
marketing director told me, it is a sign of non-commitment. It was rejected by the Danish
firm and demanded a concrete fulfillment of the contract.

c. Neutral vs. Affective cultures (The range of feelings expressed)

The affectively neutral cultures don’t show their feelings publicly, the objectivity is the
mean characteristic of such cultures. People from these cultures don’t mix feelings with
business. While in the opposite side, people from high affective cultures don’t mind show
their feelings publicly and plainly, people are subjective, in negotiations they “the run the
whole gamut of emotions. They laugh, scold, gesticulate, and leave negotiations all
depending on the situation” (Rasmussen and Mikkelsen, 2001: 64). As Trompenaars states,
“reason and emotion are of course combined.” So, when our own approach is highly
emotional we are seeking a direct emotional response,” while 2when our approach is highly
neutral we are seeking an indirect response” (Trompenaars, 1999: 70)
In a workshop, which was carried by Trompenaars (ibid.), the Arabs where the highest
affective cultures, while Scandinavia score in the middle, where Ethiopia scored at lowest
with 81%.

70
Kuwait 15%
Egypt 18%
Oman 19%
KSA 20%
Bahrain 24%
Denmark 34%
Norway 39%
Sweden 46%
The differences between Kuwait and Bahrain are nearly the same between Bahrain and
Denmark. This means that, there should be more investigations on this dimension, to come
to clear and specific conclusion.
In opposite of Danes, Arabs like to show their feelings in an exaggerating way, again Arabic
language as a romantic language emphasize exaggeration and tend to respect and promote
emotions. Meetings are made in affectively emotional climate. When people meet each other
they kiss each other 3-4 kisses, or smell each others breath (if they were from the Arabic
Peninsula. Though, it is not only a matter of showing feelings plainly, but also over reacting
to show these feelings.

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 11
The Language

After I have mentioned Hall’s theory, I will discuss the high vs. low-context cultures at the
end of this chapter, but I have first to dig up deeper in language. That is because I am
convinced that the main and major differences between Arabs and Europeans in general and
between Arabs and Scandinavians including Danes rise from the huge differences in their
language systems. For this reason and also because language is the main mediator of
negotiations and it is the medium in which all our thoughts and proposals encompassed,
which is until now haven’t get enough attention from cross-cultural negotiation studies. And
for many other reasons that are included in the text below, I have to elaborate on this issue.
“Language is the key to the heart of a culture” (Samovar & Porter, 2001: P. 139), language
is the main visible symbol of the national or ethnic cultures. Ethnic groups do fight to have
their own language to be announced as a second or third language to be used in their region.
Language and culture are so related, “that language holds the power to maintain national
identity” (ibid). By using a specific language, we are not just applying a symbols in a special
rules, but we are using these symbols and rules to understand and “construct the reality. As
Nanda and Warms point out: language does more than just reflect culture: it is the way in
which the individual is introduced to the order of physical and social environment.
Therefore, language would seem to have a major impact on the way in which individual
perceives and conceptualizes the world” (ibid: p. 140)
Barker (2000) illustrates that “Language is not a natural medium for the formation and
transfer of values, meanings and knowledge which exit beyond its boundaries; rather,
language is constitutive of those very values, meanings and knowledge” (p.66). This means
that language is crucial for understanding a culture, its significance in the building of the
human knowledge is clear. He expresses this idea with two central reasons:
• “Language is privileged medium in which cultural meanings are formed and
communicated.
• Language is the means and medium through which we form knowledge about
ourselves and the social world.”(ibid)
Singer has defined the language as “the manifestation – verbal or otherwise – of the
perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs, and disbelief systems that group holds. Language,

72
once established, further constrains the individual to perceive in certain ways, but language
is merely one of the ways in which groups maintain and reinforce similarity of perception54’
(Singer, 1998: p.4). Another definition and could be one of the best definitions of the
language was produced by Montgomery (1995), he offers the following definition:
Language, indeed, is best understood as a set of interlocking relationships in which a
linguistic form takes on the meaning it does by virtue of its place within the total system of
signs55(P. xxv).
Language informs the way we think, we talk, we communicate, and the way we perceive the
world. The language was the first foundation of the human society – as I think – no one can
say when it was introduced for the first time and which means of communicating do our
ancestors use to communicate with each other. What I do believe and know for sure is that
the language was prior to the foundation of the societies.
Language is very important to any cross-cultural studies, due to the upper facts, and as we
put our ideas in the form of words, more over “language and culture are so intertwined that
Agar (1994) suggests we use the term languaculture rather than language and culture
separately” (Gudykunst and Y. Yun Kim, 1997: 194). Moreover language is supposed to be
a ‘natural behavior’ and as “Chomsky argues that we have within our mental frameworks an
inbuilt means of developing language” (N. Thompson, 2003: P.51). The importance of
language on studying the culture is crucial as Samovar L. A. & Porter R. E. (2001) put it
when they say that “language is extremely important to human interaction because of its
labeling, interaction, and transmission function. The labeling function serves t identify or
name a person, object, or act, so he, she, or it maybe referred to in communication”(p. 137).
This means that no two languages are equal in the way of perceiving the world, life, and
ideas, and from this point of departure the differentiation in the languaculture system came.
As Ezra Pound puts it “the sum of human wisdom is not contained in any one language, and
no single language is capable of expressing all forms or degrees of human comprehension.
Montgomery (1995: 251) emphasizes the importance of language:
Language informs the way we think, the way we experience, and the way we interact with
each other. Language provides the basis of community, but also the grounds for division.
Systematic knowledge about language and practical awareness of how it works is
fundamental to the process of building mature communities.

54
Marshall R. Singer, Perception & Identity in International culture, 1998. USA: Intercultural Press, Inc.
55
Montgomery, M. (1995) An Introduction to Language and Society, 2nd ed., London, Routledge.

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Language after all, is symbolic. If I attribute different meanings to your words than you do
(and mostly I often probably do), then there is no way we can communicate accurately. But
that is precisely the point being made here. “No two humans can communicate 100 percent
accurately because no two humans have learned to perceive identically” (Singer, 1998: 24).
There is a major difference between the Arabs as nation and other nations, especially the
Europeans in their attitudes towards the concept of the language, and towards their language
itself and what it does represents to them. And to understand the effect of Arabic language
on the Arabs, in shaping their culture and in modifying their worldview I think I should
make a small introduction to Arabic language and why it is so vital and crucial to the Arabs.
The language in the Arab life could nearly come to be sacred; it started back in the fifth
century, when it turned to be something with great value to the Arabs. The Arabs were
consisted of tribes, wondering in their endless desert, they had nothing to do, but following
the grass in order to pasture, and when they scarcely do find one, the herder sets down in a
well shaded area – if he can find one – and wait until the cattle finish its grazing, he keeps
on looking to the infinite range of vision in the open space less horizon. In his looking for
some position in his tribe, he has three opportunities, to become a knight, which could be
either dangerous, or he lacks the ability; the other opportunity is to become wealthy enough
to have himself ranked in good position, and that could be more difficult for him than the
first situation; the last way is to be a poet, who was at the time doing the job of the
information ministry of his tribe, and this was his best chance, poets were dealt with as
superstars in the society, they were welcomed wherever they go, they were offered the best
of the hospitality the tribes or the individuals can offer, because even a small poem is
enough to honor or disgrace a man for the rest of his life. Due to this fact it was said the
poetry is the Arabs council.
“Foucault historically determines that language develops and generates meaning under
specific material and historical conditions” (Barker, 2000: p.78). If this assumption is true in
most of the European languages, it would be a deadly suggestion in the Arabic linguistic
studies. Due to the fact that the Arabic language stopped progressing and developing since
the 7th century, precisely since the Holy Koran had been revealed, and from then the
grammatical rules stopped developing, there are no new emerging words and the rising of
new words and expressions came to be restricted and tied to the analogical rules syllogism.
There is a severe question, has every human being his own language? In the poetry studies,
the reviewers talk about the poet’s language, the poetry’s language…etc.

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What did the Koran do to the Arabic Language, was something inexperienced before. The
Arabic Language was since, kept in, between the two covers of this holy bock, unchanged,
and unable to change. The Koran text became the perfect example of the way that the Arabic
text should be.
This gave the Arab a little choice in the written language; in return they went on developing
a new ways of speech, an oral languages that were affected by the neighboring nations. Then
it became very difficult for the Eastern Arabs to communicate with the Western Arabs
without an interpreter. This helped in shaping different cultural values and norms in
different Arab’s countries. The main language effect is in the hierarchical, the collectivity,
and high vs. low-context dimensions.
This leads us to the assumption of Saussure when he writes of discovering ‘forces operating
universally’ and ‘general laws’ when he talks about the goals of linguistics. He suggests by a
very detailed analysis a holistic relation between model and evidence than might be
expected from such a mechanistically influenced view of science. It is the system as a
whole, which enable speech. Since the language is the absent system, which makes speech
possible, it cannot be apprehended directly but only through its institution in speech56
(Tudor, 1999: p.55)
When Saussure mentions that, ‘a language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence
comparable to writing, the deaf – and – dumb alphabets symbolic rites, forms of politeness,
military signals, and so on, it is simply the most important of such systems’ (ibid: 15). I am
sure he was aware that his argument is applicable to other system of signs. And in doing so
he makes it possible to put all these sign-systems under one potential science, which wasn’t
known before he envisages it, it is what he called ‘Semiology, and he conceives it as part of
social psychology’ (ibid: 56). Simply, this is what we call non-verbal communication
systems or styles.
We can’t talk about language without talking about cultural language. As there are spoken
and written languages there is what researchers call ‘cultural language’, as Arensberg and
Niehoff observe, “nothing more clearly distinguish one culture from another than its
language.” Therefore we can distinguish a male language than a female language, a doctors’
language, a butchers’ language… etc.
Language is a social phenomenon, that can’t be ignored when we have to study or discuss
any cross-cultural matters, “as Montgomery (1995) argues, language not only reflects

56
Decoding Culture Theory and Method in Culture Studies Andrew Tudor, 1999, London, Sage Publication Inc

75
structural differences within society, it also shapes and reinforce these differences.”
(Thompson, 2003: P.52)
A. Signs:
Language is a signifying system, which is “constituted by a series of signs which are
analyzed in terms of their constituent parts” (C. Barker, 2000: 67). And according to
Saussure, “meaning is produced through the process of selection and combination of signs”
(ibid). Signs, although often endowed with a certain natural expressiveness, are none the less
fixed by rules. It is the rule, which renders them obligatory, not their intrinsic value. We
may therefore, say that signs, which are entirely arbitrary convey better than others the ideal
Semiological process. (ibid: 68) p57
When we talk about signs, we have to notice that it is culture related, or culturally oriented,
for example, bowing or stooping is considered a sign of respect and it is the normal way of
greeting one another, while in the Islamic culture it is forbidden and it is a taboo. In the
other hand, greeting the emperor requires bowing nine times, while in the Western
imperial/royal traditions or etiquettes the requirement is for one long bow.
Language signs
To explain my idea I will use as an example, the word “summer”, if you said summer in Iraq
or in Saudi Arabia, it means; heat, hotness and burning sun, sweating and people thinking of
finding cold places to spent their time. While in Denmark or Sweden it means; warmth,
beautiful sunny and long lasting day, and people trying to find some warm places to spent
their time in. In the other hand in the southern part of the globe, it means; rain, coldness and
maybe snow.
Another example, is the language of colors, the black color is a symbol of the death for lot
of cultures, while the white is the symbol of death to the Far East cultures. In this
connection, there is a beautiful poem written by Amal Danqal a famous Egyptian poet,
called ‘The papers of the room no. 8) noticeably the Arabs are like the Europeans wear black
clothes in the funerals, he reject this ritual, saying that every thing in room number 8 in the
hospital, (where he actually was admitted and died) every thing was in white, he writes
The curtains are in white
The uniforms of the doctors are white,
The nurses wearing white
The bed sheets are white
The room was painted in white
Even the flowers brought by the friends were white

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Actually the white is the color of death.
He actually argued that people use to wear black in the funerals because it is the opposite of
the white, the death color, so they can feel that they are still alive.
Barker (2000) argues that, “language is not best understood as an innocent reflection of non-
linguistic meaning, nor simply in terms of the intentions of language users. Rather language
constructs meaning. To understand culture is to explore how meaning is produced
symbolically through the signifying practices of language. This has been the domain of
semiotics, broadly understood as the studying of signs, and developed from the pioneering
work of Saussure.”
Saussure, for most of the researchers in the linguistic and cultural studies field, is a founding
figure of structuralism because he refers to structured differences systems in language to
explain how a meaning is generated. “He explores the rules and conventions which organize
language (langue) rather than the specific uses and utterances which individuals deploy in
every day life (parole)” (ibid). Saussure and other structuralists in general, are very
important in the studying of language and culture due to the fact that they are more
concerned with how cultural meaning is produced, holding it to be structured ‘like a
language’. “A structuralist understanding of culture is concerned with ‘systems of relations’
of an underlying structure which forms the grammar which makes meaning possible.”(Ibid:
p67)
Moreover “Saussure (1960) argued that language does not reflect a preexistent and external
reality of independent objects but constructs meaning from with itself through a series of
conceptual and phonic differences”(ibid). So the relationship between the sounds and marks
of language, in most of the cases the letters, is not fixed for eternity.
The relationship in the Arabic language between the signs/letters is fixed in another way.
The Arabs take the base of three letters and use them in circularity

‫ﻝ‬/3

‫ﺡ‬/2

1/‫ﻡ‬
The relationship between the letters is in some way like the relationship between the
nombers in mathmatics. So if we supposed:

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1= ‫ ﻡ‬, 2 = ‫ ﺡ‬, 3 = ‫ ﻝ‬,
The possible relations we will have are
123 = ‫ = ﻡﺡﻝ‬barrennes, sterility, dearth, famine, cunning
132 = ‫ = ﻡﻝﺡ‬salt, pressing, urgent
213 = ‫ = ﺡﻡﻝ‬carry, bear, convey, transport, pregnancy, fructify, support, brace, undertake,
assume, harbor, hide, interpret....etc.
231 = ‫ = ﺡﻝﻡ‬dream, be sexually mature, forbearing, meek, patience, leniency, discretion,
prudence.
312 = ‫ = ﻝﻡﺡ‬glance at, sight, descry, to see, notice, to insinuate, intimate, refer indirectly to,
suggest indirectly.
321 = ‫ = ﻝﺡﻡ‬to weld, to fuse, flesh, meat, beef, soldering
The Arabic linguistic relations is circular, I think that had affected the Arabic personality, it
became circular, most of the things in the Arabic mind is supposed to move circularly, the
Arabs always return to the point of the start, for most of them we have to go back to our
roots and do exactly what our ancestors did.
I think I disagree with Robert B. Kaplan in his interesting article on the thought processes of
different linguistic groups, when he observed that the Arab scholars seem to use various
kinds of parallels in their thinking57. I think it is more likely that the Arab think and act in
circular way, they seem to move around helicoidally in their perception to what they
perceive in their daily life. Most of the time they do it all the way around, this means that
they compare the situation with the most similar situation from the near past and what was
the perception of their ancestors, and taking it back to the distant and even to the ancient
past.
B. Linguistic aspects of the brand:
Usunier (2000: p332) argues, that “brands are signs based on sounds, written signs (letters or
pictographs) and visual elements (logotype, brand design). The linguistic content of a brand
name has an influence on its verbal, auditory and intellectual meaning, and its interpretation
by consumers.” A brand name should generally be relatively easy to pronounce.
The Arabic language for example has a lot of what is called guttural letters, which are
extremely difficult to pronounce by most of the Europeans, in the other hand and after living
in Denmark for 8 years I still find real problems in pronouncing the Danish vowels

57
Robert B. Kaplan, 1966, Cultural Thought Patterns in Intercultural Education, in Language Learning 16, nos.
1 and 2.

78
especially the letters Ø and Y, and can hardly imagine a middle eastern Arabic who claim to
do so.
“It is not only the purely linguistic content of a brand name that has the influence on its
verbal, auditory and intellectual meaning. The design of a brand name also has extreme
importance.”(ibid) The way the logo of the brand Nike was written in a way that made the
company face many problems in the Islamic world because if we rotate the word vertically it
was very close to the way that the word God (Allah) written in Arabic, and man can imagine
what happened when Nike printed its old trade mark logo on the back of some of its shows,
so after discovering this mistake the company was clever enough to apologize and change its
trade mark to the new logo.
Semantic issues: untranslated versus unintended meaning
Furthermore he argues that meaning can be lost when a brand crosses boarders….It is,
however, not a major problem if consumers in other linguistic areas memorize the sound of
brand names easily and invest them with new, positive meanings.
Unintended negative meaning is the most dangerous. The brand name should not have an
unfortunate meaning in a different linguistic/cultural context…. There is no shortage of
examples: the German hair spray Caby-Net launched on the French market (cabinet is a
toilet in French)
A brand is a sensitive asset of symbols, suggested and maintained by diversified marketing
communications: sponsoring, advertising, communication, public relations, communication
through the product itself or even the style of outlets.
C. Translation phenomenon in doing business:
“Translation equivalence, even the sophisticated ones, might prove incapable of achieving
full comparability of data. This equivalence may be divided into the following
subcategories: lexical equivalence, idiomatic equivalence, grammatical-syntactical
equivalence and experiential equivalence (Sechrest et al., 1972). Lexical equivalence is that
which provided by dictionaries….
An idiom is a linguistic usage that is natural to native speakers. Idioms are most often non-
equivalent.” (Usunier, P216)
Grammatical-syntactical equivalence deals with how in a language words are ordered,
sentences are constructed and meaning are expressed.
Let take this example: The boy is coming.
The equivalence in Arabic is:
.‫ﺍﻝﻭﻝﺩ ﻕﺍﺩﻡ‬

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 .‫ﻱﺃﺕﻱ ﺍﻝﻭﻝﺩ‬
The last equivalent is (come the boy) if we translate it directly.
The Arabic language -in contrast with almost all of the European languages- starts generally
with the verb then the subject then the object or the complement, unless the Arab need to
confirm the subject, or that the subject was in especial importance to the speaker or the
listener, so if you were waiting to a especial boy to come and he came, then the sentence
would start with the word ‘boy’ then the verb ‘come’, but if the comer has no especial
importance to you, then the sentence will start with most important thing that is the verb
come then the subject whom is with no especial importance to you. This if not taken into
consideration will generate a great deal of misunderstanding, due to the fact that the
European listener wont be able to recognize that the Arabic speaker is asking or telling when
the sentence is starting with a verb.)
As Usunier (2000: p217) explores “Experiential equivalence is about what words and
sentences mean for people in their every day experience.” There is a name for almost each
hour of the 24 hours of the day, so you can have words equivalent to dawn, the time just
before dawn, and another word for the time just after dawn, little bit after that, before
sunrise, at sun rising time, the time just after that, and so forth. The same will be for
evening, and you can imagine the confusion or even the chaos that happens when any of
these timing mistranslated from Arabic to English or interpreted into Danish.

D. Verbal Communication: (The Context)

‘Verbal’ implies words and sentences and, in most of what follows, spoken discourse, not
written communication… However, language is legitimately seen as having prominent place
in communication, perhaps because it is largely explicit and therefore more easily amenable
to consciousness. Thus linguistic differences are perceived as one of the main causes
(though not the only one) of intercultural communication misunderstandings. (Ibid)
A first distinction in a language based communication is whether the message sent by
speaker is explicit, that is, to be taken literally and not necessarily to be set ‘in context’.
Setting message ‘in context’ would imply that what is literally said has to be in some way
reinterpreted using various cues taken from the context, particularly the cultural context of
the speaker. (Ibid, 416)
The Arabic language has a significance difference from the most of the European languages,
which is based on the fact that the Arabs actually have two levels of spoken language, the

80
two levels are used in parallel, and that is in communicating with the foreigner and even in
communicating with each other. The Arabs usually talk and discuss businesses and thoughts
by their local, popular and colloquial language, while in conferences, official meetings and
in public addressing they always use the classical Arabic, which ‘is used to convey the
Islamic worldview’ (Samovar, L. A. & Porter, R. E. 2000, p103)58. And this Classical
Arabic is sacred because it is the dialect of the Koran. Don’t you agree with me that this is a
unique problem, which will have a significance impact on the business communication with
Arabs, especially if the translator or the interpreter is not native Arabic speaker. Moreover,
even for a native Arabic translator it still could be really problematic issue if he was not
local interpreter. In regarding with this problem, I have noticed that most of the European
Arabists and or translators, used to learn a slang Arabic language (e.g. Egyptian, Iraqi or
Lebanese vernacular), they will be completely inefficient, and consequently the translation
will be insufficient, which might be very harmful to the communication process.
Any verbal communication sends a message, this message could be either explicit or
implicit, and the first impression is that the words carry an explicit message, which could be
a fault assumption. The message sending/receiving process is more complicated than that.

BOX
He can’t speak Arabic
In the year 1997, the Danish refugee’s helping center, called Dansk flygtninghjælp, hired a
Syrian translator to work as an interpreter between the center and an Iraqi group. The group
was accommodated in Kragelund accommodation center at a small town called Hammel in
Jutland. He supposed to help the center to solve some of the daily problems that were due to
the cultural differences and the misunderstandings between the group and the center, it turned
out to be a chaos, the problems became more, and there was no solution for any of the old
problems. During a boisterous meeting one of the refugees expressed the group feelings and
shouted in unger; you have brought us a translator who does not know how to speak Arabic.

The language is a complicated sole system, and this system is what people are using to
communicate with each other more than the words. The language we talk is not a sum of
words collected from some kind of dictionaries, it is much more than that, it is the way we
have told to talk to interact with other’s speech, it is something taught to the child by his

58
the article is written by Polly A. Begley

81
parents, as what, how, and when to say a specific term or phrase. It is a part of the
socialization and acculturation processes.
All of the world’s known languages share some general elements (e.g. grammar), it all shear
the fact that there are rules tell the speakers how they phonate or pronounce…etc., while at
the same time there is a uniqueness in every language that differentiate it from other
languages, it is what to say and when to say. In the sum, language is culture oriented
phenomenon, and it is arbitrary as much as the language, because it constructed by words,
and ‘words are symbols’(W. B. Gudykunst and Y. Y. Kim: 195). The real connection
between the meaning and the word is inside the speaker or the listener.
E. Language and negotiations:
No negotiations could be conducted without verbal communications, in other words,
language usage. In the communication between the Scandinavian and the Arabs, the
language and translation problems are doubled, due to the fact that, most of the business
meetings are carried out by using third language, which is English. The Nordic people, as
most of the Europeans as well as the Americans, using the assumption that the ‘discourse
strategy of opening the discussion with the speakers mean point. On the other hand the
Arabs among other Asians using a topic – comment order of presentation in which the main
point (or comment) is deferred until sufficient background of the topic has been done.59 (R.
and S. W. Scollon: 1)
We said that language and culture are entwined; this is very clear in discourses and contexts.
Arabs and a lot of other Asians are using the discourse in completely opposite way than do
the Europeans.
Generally we as Arabs start by:
1. Introduction of the problem.
2. Explaining the reason that caused the problem.
3. If there are any further details, it will be stated at this stage.
4. Then the main point is mentioned, or make the request they wanted to made.
Or as Scollon and Scollon (2001: p. 1) put it in the form of:
Because of
Y (topic, background, or reasons)
X (comment, main point, or action suggested)

59
R. Scollon and S. W. Scollon. 2001. Intercultural Communication, 2nd ed. Great Britain: Blackwell
Publishers.

82
While the Scandinavian way of addressing the opponents in stated in the form of a structure
that starts with point 4, then 2, then 1, and lastly point 3.
Or as Scollon and Scollon put it in the following formula:
X (comment, main point, or action suggested)
Because of
Y (topic, background, or reasons)
I myself have had a lot of problems in coping with this all–the–way–around European
structure, or way of writing, which led me to lose some points in my reports delivered in
some of the courses I attended at the ASB.
The ideal way that an Arab delegate addresses his presence is:
Because of the new law which came into action last month, and which demands a special
investigation to be carried on the goods that imported from some countries, and due to the
complexities that raised by the bank –which we are trying to resolve– we demand an
extended time to our contract.
While a Scandinavian delegate will do the same address in this way:
We need an extended time to our contract, we are trying solve some of the complexities that
were raised by the bank, because of a new law which came into action last month and which
demands special investigations on the imported goods from some countries.
These two ways of discourse approaches can lead to huge problems, due to the fact that, the
Scandinavian exporters will focus on the first sentence or first two sentences of the
conversation at the negotiation process, as the most crucial part of the speech, which carries
the main message of the speaker. While for Arabs, the last couple of sentences carry the
most important message addressed by the speaker.
These two contradicting ways in addressing the message in an ongoing conversation have a
significant effect on the negotiation process, the possible solution is to use an interpreter,
some one whom not only bilingual, but also a bicultural one.
You can figure out the misunderstanding situation that could arise from such contradictory
approaches, especially if another phenomenon is added, which is connected to other topic
which will be discussed in further details later in this thesis, that is the lose of the face and
its role in the collectivistic cultures such as the Arabic cultures. This role has made the
Arabs very sensitive towards the language they use. You will hardly find an Arabic person
who will say to you no directly in your face.
The lose of face is a role, which is a very big issue in the Arabs daily life, it is deeply rooted
in their culture that it had affected their language and the way that they use it in their

83
 business discourse. The Arabs have developed special phrases that are used to give the
impression of no without saying a clear sharp no, phrases such as (insha’a Allah) which
means by the well of God, I hope, or maybe, all these phrases mean no, but in a way that
wont cause the opponent any lose of face.
Telling an Arab employee that he was wrong could cause him to leave the job. Most of the
Arabs if they disagree with you wont tell
What I have just said flows directly in the favor of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the
hypothesis that the language is the sphere of ideas, ‘it is not merely a reproducing instrument
for expressing ideas; rather, it is itself the shaper of ideas’ (Gudykunst & Kim: 196)
If we followed Whorf’s hypothesis and his concentrating on the structural differences
between the languages, we can say that on of the differences between the Arabic and most of
the European languages; is the time orientation in the verbal system of the language, the
Arabic tend to differentiate the verbs in past, present and imperative mode (in Arabic called
the order mood), there is no past participle, the root of the word lies in the past tense, not in
the infinitive mood, as in English. So, using the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, we can say that the
previous example is in the favor of and supports this hypothesis. The Arabic culture is
collective, the family is much bigger, the social relationships are based on the respect of
older people, and the Arab countries rank very high in power distance index. The manager
and his subordinates relations are in somehow fatherhood oriented relations. So the order
mood is something accepted and expected in the language, both in the society and
organization.
The Arabic is an implicit language, its implicity affected the cultural behavior to a big
extent, and a good example is the word used to describe the blind person is the seer
(endowed with eyesight). The Arabs, in steed of saying one-eyed person, say noble-eyed or
honored-eye,.

There is a story that happened in the year 1920 and led to the uprising of the revels
against the occupation force (the British army) in Iraq, when the English army arrested
one of the Iraqi tribes leaders, called Mesh’al Abu Alchoon, and was planned to
transfer him to the mean jail in Baghdad he told the English soldiers that he need to
sent a massage to his son to bring him some of the things he might need, and send this
oral massage; I need 30 blankets and 20 eggs. The poor English soldier asked that is
all; he responded yes. What the soldier wasn’t aware of is the implicit massage lying
in the letter. The blankets meant that the soldiers guarding the prison were 30; the
eggs meant that he wanted 20 marksmen (shooters), whom were skilled enough to hit
an egg in the night. 84
By using Edward Hall terminology, Arabic language is defined as a high-context language,
and the Scandinavian language as low-context massage.
‘The implicit massages are emphasized in high context massage, and explicit verbal
massages are of central importance in low context message. The heavy reliance of users of
restricted codes on nonverbal and other contextual cues describes the common
communication patterns of collectivistic cultures; the primary reliance on elaborated,
explicit verbal messages describes the communication patterns of individualistic cultures’
(Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 198). ‘All languages share common objective, that is, they have a
common problem to solve, which is conveying meaning in an appropriate way from people
to people. But they achieve it differently, relying to varying degrees on precise words,
structured grammar or, in contrast, on contextual indications of how ambiguous meanings
should made precise’(ibid: 419). In contradiction to the specificity and explicit Scandinavian
languages as LC cultures, the massages in Arabic language as a High-context culture are
more diffuse, people really tend to generalize in their speech, people start by talking about
general every day’s matters, before starting to talk in business, they try to build a
relationship in their efforts to maintain and build the trust between the two parties. In the LC
cultures the customer is nothing else but customer, the colleague is just a colleague, so the
massage in these two examples are clear short and explicit, due to the fact that the sender
knows the notion of the relationship prior to sending his massage. In the other hand, the
massage is much more complicated in the HC cultures, because every customer, or
colleague is a potential friend, so the massage must not harm any of the to possibilities,
that’s makes the massage too diffuse, to be able to conduct one or some times the both of the
possibilities. I remember, to what extent I was astonished, when I met one of the salesmen,
whom I used to deal with and have had spent a good time in discussing many things with
every time I bought from Fona (a special shop for selling Electronics), he crossed me
looking strait in my eyes without saying hallow or even seems that he knows me.
The Arabic language is a restricted language were man has to understand the implicit
meaning of the words, history of the words and the linguistic system that lies behind the use
of the verbs, nouns and pronouns. The Arabs have a very high admire to their language, they
believe that it is the language in haven, it is the language of the angels, and God has and will

85
speak to us in the judgment day by Arabic. So they say ‘every occasion has its own wording
or speech’. The words which are used to address some people is not acceptable in addressing
others, so do the verbs, in this context man might notice that every English or Danish verb
has more than one verb to correspond to in Arabic. The words are chosen very carefully, the
Arabic proverb says: the wounds of the sword can heal up, but wounds of the tongue won’t.
For that the Arabs never say no directly to the person, this is a major difference with the
westerns who could easily say no to you if they mean it, you can imagine the hostility of the
situation and what the damage it can bring to the business, between the Arabs and
Scandinavians.
The other affect of the language on the culture shows up in the elaborated versus understated
interaction style as Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey called this dimension60, the Arabs tend to
exaggerate and more elaborated like the French, Latin Americans, and the Africans than the
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean in their daily languages and I think that is due to the fact that
the prior languages are much more complicated in their linguistic systems than the later.
To over light this phenomenon I have to discuss the high-context vs. low-context cultures
deeper in the following.

F. High vs. low-context cultures

“You see [Edward] Sapir was the one who really started this. We went out, the
Europeans went out and taught languages in terms of the European paradigms. And
the American Indian's languages were so different. There was no way on God's green
earth to fit these languages together with our European paradigms. So Sapir said in
effect, you have to start out afresh every time. Get your information from the system
not from some background data. This is an earth-shaking idea. It was so
revolutionary. It still has not caught on. I don't know how many years it's been since
then.... seventy or eighty years. So, you are after the reality of the culture as defined
by the people who share it. Not really anything else61”
(Hall in a meeting with Sorrells)

60
Gudykunst, W. B., & Ting-Toomey, S., 1988. Culture and interpersonal communication, Newbury Park, CA:
Sage

86
Hall has always used the word information. As when he describes high context, he says
these cultures live in a sea of information. He really makes the distinction clear between
information and meaning?
As Hall argues in a meeting on the web with Sorrells61 “information is everywhere and
everything, but the meaning is a very interesting thing. There is information transferred in
and out which I will call "A". Plus there is information that is stored in the system that we
will call "B". It takes these two to make meaning (see the figure bellow). It takes, both the
information that is transferred in and out and the stored information, the information in the
context, to make meaning. This is a very simple formula but it's one that is ignored all the
time.

Information and meaning based on Hall’s description

The person who is part of a culture and has the stored information, the memory is ("B"),
while the other person who comes in from outside the culture doesn't have all of that, and
therefore, cannot make meaning in accordance with the culture. So “what you have to do is
go from A to B. In other words, this is the context, which you have to understand” (ibid).
Generally context could be defined as “the information that surrounds an event; it is
inextricably bound up with the meaning of the event62” (Hall, 1990: 6). And after he puts the
cultures in linear division between HC and LC, he makes the distinction as the following:
A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the
information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very
little is in the coded, explicitly transmitted part of the message. A low context (LC)
communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the
explicit code” (ibid).

61
http://interculturalrelations.com/v1i3Summer1998/sum98sorrellshall.htm#santafe
62
E. T. Hall & M. R. Hall, understanding cultural differences: Germans, French and Americans (Yarmouth, ME:
intercultural Press, 1999)

87
He assumes that “context will influence communication without the participants being aware
of it” (Usunier, 2000: 417). Simply this means, prejudices, stereotypes unconsciously will
appear in the mind of the negotiator, e.g. can this black person be trusted, can this old leady
run this up-to-date hi-tech firma or can we trust Chinese. Or as Usunier puts it: “context
brings together the sum of interpretation mechanism that originate within a culture and allow
message to be explained.”

High-context cultures
Japanese
Chinese
Korean
African American
Native American
Arab
Greek
Latin
Italian
English
French
American
Scandinavian
German
German-Swiss
High-context:
As I have said earlier, differences in context-related communication styles could be
understood by using the notion of the diffuse vs. specific cultures, understanding the later
can help in understanding the other. In a high context cultures such as the Arabs, society
tend to be, “homogenous with regard to experiences, information net works”, and they
normally, use more broad conception. High context cultures value traditions, which
generally change very little over time. As Samovar (2001: 81) argues “These are cultures in
which consistent messages have produced consistent responses to the environment.” As a
result, (Hall and Hall, 1990) Halls say, “for most normal transactions in daily life they do
not require, nor do they expect, much in depth, background information.” Therefore, is not

88
necessarily, that words contain the main meaning. In Arab countries, as a high context
cultures, the main information is provided through gestures, the use of space, Arabs do say
‘if you read something don’t read the words in the lines, instead read what is between the
lines” they mean the coded message. High context cultures tend to be more aware of their
surroundings and their environment, for example, it is very important to Arabic negotiator
where he world be positioned in negotiating table, how much the chair provided to him is
differ than other chairs and in what extend. “In general, members of collectivist cultures
tend to be concerned more with the overall emotional quality of the interaction than with the
meaning of particular words or sentences” (Gudykunst and Kim, 1997: 201).
It is the collectivist cultures that are characterized by high-context cultural values, this is the
result of combining the IDV of Hofstede, and that’s of Hall.
As an indicator of this tendency to use nonverbal communication you can see how Arabic
language contains the word ‘lughat al oyon’, which means ‘eye language’. The Arabic
language as other Asian languages is characterized by its high ambiguity and it conceives
things in promotive vagueness. Arabs never say direct no, but they use to say an ambiguous
words that contains both, the meaning of ‘yes’ and ‘no’, and leave their counterpart to find
out what is the real meaning by interpreting the conversation conditions and its environment.
“In high context cultures, so much information is available in the environment that it is
unnecessary to verbalize everything. For instance, statement of affection, such as “ I love
you, are rare because the message is conveyed by the context. Meaning in high context
culture, is also conveyed “ through status (age, sex, education, family background, title, and
affiliation) and through an individual’s informal friends and associates” (Samovar: ibid.).
When they talked about high-context cultures, Gudykunst and Kim (ibid) connote from
Okabe (1983):
“The cultural assumptions of interdependence and harmony require that Japanese
speakers limit themselves to implicit and even ambiguous use of words. In order to
avoid leaving an assertive impression, they like to depend more frequently on
qualifiers such as ‘maybe,’ ‘perhaps,’ ‘probably,’ and ‘somewhat.’ (p.36)”

Low Context
When Samovar (2001: 81) discusses low-context cultures he mentioned that “in low context
cultures (German, Swiss, and American), the population is less homogeneous and therefore
tends to compartmentalize interpersonal contacts. This lack of a large pool of common
experiences means that “ each time they interact with others they need detailed background

89
information.” I have to say that I don’t agree totally with this hypothesis, if the American
society leak the homogeneity, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden) are in contrast to that, very homogenous countries. Yet it lies on the same pole,
low-context cultures.
Generally, in low context cultures, communication is based on explicit verbal message,
which contains “most of the information and very little is embedded in the context or the
participants” (Samovar, 2001: 81). Or as Usunier (ibid: 418) explain “the messages are
almost digital and could be translated into simple computer unites (bytes).” Low-context
(such as Danish) communication style tends to be direct and explicit, and implying precision
“with respect to time commitments and so on” (ibid.), yet, everything should be stated, and
well. Samovar (ibid.) loan the coming connotation from Althen to express “Americans´
fascination with language”:
Americans depend more on spoken words than on no nonverbal behavior to convey
messages. They think it is important to be able to “speak up” and “say what is on their
mind.” They admire a person who has a moderately large vocabulary and who can
express herself clearly and cleverly.88
It is more obvious in Danish culture as Worm (1997: 94) argues, Scandinavians prefer
people to express themselves directly. Scandinavians is a typical example of what Hall
refers to as low-context societies in which information is expressed as explicitly as possible.
Information must be understood without requiring extensive previous background
knowledge.”
Differences in perceived credibility are yet another aspect of communication associated with
these tow orientations. In high-context cultures people who rely primarily on verbal
messages for information are perceived as less credible. They believe that silence often
sends a better message then words, and anyone who needs words does not have the
information. As the Indonesian proverb stats, “Empty cans clatter the loudest.”
The differences between the two cultures do not appear just in language usage, rather it is
common in life style as a whole. It may affects the way people talk, the speed of the speech,
the pauses between the sentences, the self-concept, the conversation interaction (the Latin
style of interruption means showing interest63), silence and many other aspects.
G. Negotiation and the context dimension:
Negotiators from low-context cultures, when trying to approach high-context counterpart,

63
Usunier (ibid: 420)

90
they need to contextualize, this means to acquire as much knowledge as they can to be able
to understand the information they get from a high-context counterpart. Danish negotiators
are more likely to understand their Arabic counterparts, due to the fact that Danes are more
explicit so it is easier to the Arabs to understand the information they include in the message
they send.
These differences can therefore alter how conflicts are solved. “As Ting-Toomey has
observed, communication differences between high-context and low-context cultures are
also apparent in the manner in which each approaches conflict. For example, because high-
context cultures tend to be less open, they hold that conflict is damaging to most
communication encounters. (Samovar, ibid.)
In any intercultural communication between these tow cultures will result in
misunderstanding, due to the differences on what is the most vital and important to be dealt
with firstly. People from high-context cultures tend to spend more time in normal chit
chatting about many things outside the objective of the negotiations. While Danes as low-
context prefer to go into business as soon as possible.
“Harris and Moran summarize this dimension as follows:
Unless global leaders are aware of the subtle differences, communication misunderstandings
between low-and high-context communicators can result. Japanese communicate by not
stating directly, while Americans usually don the opposite—“spell it out.” The former is
looking for meaning and understanding in what is not said—in the nonverbal
communication or body language, in the silence and pauses, in relationships and empathy.
The latter places emphasis on sending and receiving accurate messages directly, usually by
being articulate with words” (samovar: ibid.)

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 12
Negotiations and Culture

“Negotiation is… a process in which two or more entities come to discuss common and
conflicting interests in order to reach an agreement or mutual benefit64” (Moran & Stripp,
1999: 72). This basically means that there are tow or more parties involved, also they have a
common interest or conflicting interests and trying to reach an agreement. It is also “a
decision making process that involves people and parties with different preferences65”
(Neale & Bazerman, 1992: 42). Phatak and Habib (1996: 30) defined negotiation as “a
process whereby two or more parties—be they individuals, groups, or larger social unites—
interact in developing potential agreements to provide guidance and regulation of their
future behavior66.”
To conduct a successful cross-cultural negotiations negotiator has to have a good
“understanding of different countries’ characteristics67” (Weiss, 2001: 282).
Culture is the identity of any nation or group of people, it includes as Brett68 (2001: 6) both
social and psychological elements. “Values and norms” are the psychological elements, wile
the “social structural elements: the economic, social, political, and religious institutions that
are the context for social interaction.”
The values measure out what “issues are more or less important and influence negotiators”
(ibid: 7) interests and priorities. While norms “define what behaviors are appropriate and
inappropriate in negotiations and influence negotiators’ strategies”(ibid.). These values and
norms are shared standards “for interpreting situations (this is a negotiation, therefore I
ought to . . .) and the behavior of others (she threatened me, therefore I should . . .)” (ibid.)
As Harris and Moran (2000:54) quoted from Fisher that, “there is a cultural dimension in the
way negotiators view the negotiation process.” The social dilemmas are very important in
international negotiations, the hospitality, protocols, formalities, and other social settings.
Language discourses, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the negotiators’ tone… etc.
64
R. Moran and W. Stripp, Successful International Business Negotiations (Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1991)
65
Neale, M. and Bazerman, M., Negotiating Rationality: the power and impact of the negotiator’s frsm, Academy of
management executive, August 1992, 42-52. (From: Weiss, J. W., Organizational behavior and the change, 2001, USA:
South-Western College Publishing.)
66
A. V. Phatak and M. M. Habib, the dynamics of. Business horizons, May 1996.
67
Weiss, J. W., Organizational behavior and the change, 2001, USA: South-Western College Publishing.)
68
Jeanne M. Brett, Negotiating Globally (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Co.)

92
I have said before, that negotiation is a process between two parties or more, having a
common interest and trying to have a benefit or a stake of the pie –the outcome of
negotiation. Are they willing to move away from their cultural standards or not? This
depends on the kind of these standards. Positions taken by negotiators are also culturally
manifested, the strategy negotiator adapt, i.e. whether to confront directly or indirectly. In
other words, these strategies are culturally based; Brett (ibid: 9) argues that, “negotiation
strategies are linked with culture because cultures evolve norms to facilitate social
interaction,”

“In any negotiation, the process and outcomes are influenced by contextual factors. Too
often academics and business press have focused on negotiating strategies without duly
emphasizing context. Even when negotiation context is discussed, it is usually presented as a
“cultural” issue. Only recently have some researchers examined and developed broad
frameworks focusing on the context of international negotiation66.”
Phatak and Habib Model
Phatak and Habib had suggested a ‘two-contexts’ model, in which two contexts works as
“two umbrellas,” that the entire process occurs under, ‘environmental and immediate
contexts’. The environmental context refer to “forces in the environment that are beyond the
control of either party involved in the negotiation” (Phatak and Habib, 1996), while the
immediate context “includes such aspects as the relative power of the negotiators and the
nature of their interdependence—factors over which the negotiators have influence and
some measures of control” (ibid.) (See the figure below.
A. The Environmental Context:
This context as I have mentioned before deals with factors that are out of negotiators
control. Therefore this reason it is the outer circle of the figure.
i. Political Pluralism.
There are 191 countries as members in the united nation, and there are also countries
that are not members, some are important countries such as Switzerland. Each one of
these countries has its own political system, which in many cases come to disputes with
other countries.
Generally, states and political entities contribute to social goals, while the main goal of
an enterprise is to maintain profit. And since, many of the economical sectors in this
region are held and or owned by governments, so the major clash will be between
private and public values, while in some other countries the privatization of the

93
 economy made it easier to the Danish firms to negotiate or do business, since both of
the parties are private entities looking for maximizing profits.
In my study I am talking about a region, which is consist of many countries (the term
‘Middle East’, generally means, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Arabic
Peninsula, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan and Libya). Political
systems vary, ideological and geographical disputes are often solved by wars, e.g. the
Iraqi-Iranian war, first gulf war, Arabic-Israeli conflict, and many other conflicts.
Danish negotiator has to be aware of such conflicts and disputes that even end with
embargo between the countries involved and some times with third parties, as in the
Arabic League resolutions concerning the embargo against Israel. These political
disputes should make the Danish negotiators aware of the constraints imposed by some
of these countries on negotiating deals or even political issues with other countries of
the region.
ii. Legal Pluralism.
Each of the region’s countries has its own different legal systems and laws that should
be followed in any transaction made with foreign entities. Some countries allow
investments in form of wholly owned or partly enterprises, while other countries limit
this possibility to its minimum range, or even prohibit it. Some limit the ownership to
lower than fifty percent, while other countries allow more than 50% ownership. Some
countries, e.g., Iraq consider the trade customs as binding as law if there isn’t eligible
clauses in the agreement.
iii. International Economics.
Exchange rates and international currency fluctuations are vital factors in doing
business around the globe. The currency in the Middle East countries fluctuate higher
and quicker than many other areas in the world, while some of these countries had fixed
its currency exchange rates (e.g., the US dollar = 3.75 SR), while at the same time the
SR exchange rate fluctuates in concerning other regional currencies. The other
important factor is that, transactions between Danes and Arabs typically carried out by
the US dollar or the euro, and these two currencies fluctuates against both the Danish
currency or the involved Arabic currency. “In addition, any change in the value of a
currency (upward or downward) can significantly affect the value of the deal for both
parties, changing a mutually valuable deal into a windfall profit for one and large loss

94
 for the other69” (Lewicki et. al., 2001: 187). I can add that, it is hypothetically possible
that currency fluctuation could lead to loss for both Danish and Arabic parties. Also
some of the Arabic countries made some restrictions or control over foreign or national
currency flaw through border. Under the former Iraqi regime trade was made in
‘counter-trade’ deal.
The second economical risk is the stability of the economy. Since most of these
countries depend totally on oil revenues, and since the prices of oil fluctuates the
instability of the economy in higher than other regions in the world. “Economic stability
means controlled growth, controlled inflation, and controlled unemployment68.” (Brett,
2001: 188).
vi. Foreign Government Controls and Bureaucracy:
“The extent of governmental interference in business in many nations is extensive”
(Phatak and Habib, 1996). Government agencies may regulate industries and
organizations. In many if not all the Middle Eastern countries governments have an
“absolute control” over some production sectors and any increase in production capacity
must be officially granted in advance. Most of the Arabs need to take their governments
approval to start conduct negotiations with foreign investors or foreign shareholders
…etc.
“In addition, political considerations, such as the effect of the negotiations on the
government treasury and the general economy of the country, may influence the
negotiations more heavily than what western business people would consider to
legitimate business reasons70” (Lewicki et. al., 2003: 400)). In some of these countries
private enterprises is almost forbidden or at least limited in sectors such as
telecommunications, health and water supply. Negotiations in this sort of business
“always include the government one of the parties with whom the a foreign firm is
negotiating, directly or indirectly. The government agency may not be physically
present at the negotiating table, but its silent presence is felt throughout the process
because every issue negotiated has to be considered in light of the pertinent
governmental regulations” (Phatak and Habib, 1996).
Bureaucrats usually resist changes, they are afraid of trying new way of doing things.
“One pitfall in dealing with bureaucracy is failing to understand the bureaucracy’s

69
Lewicki, R. J., Sanders, D. M. and Minton, J. W., 2001. Essentials of Negotiations, 2nd ed. Singapore: McGraw-Hill
Book Co.
70
Lewicki, R. J., Barry B., Sanders, D. M., and Minton, J. W., 2003. Negotiations 4th Ed., US: NY McGraw-Hill Book

95
 interests. Another pitfall is underestimating its power. Bureaucracies are usually
entrenched” (Brett, 2001: 193). The main interest of bureaucrats is to protect their
interests and positions. The Danish negotiators will be shocked for the amount and the
strength of the Arabic bureaucracy, which is generally stronger in Egypt, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia than other countries.
v. Instability and Change.
Since mid eighties the world started a rapid development towards market liberalization,
a huge flow of media through the satellite channels, which entered every town and
village around the globe, technological revolution are moving faster than ever. The fall
of the Soviet Union, the two gulf war, the after the nine-eleven world, the new single
supreme power world, and the huge focus on the globalization.
Lewicki ET. Al. (2001: 188) argues that, “Instability may take many forms, including a
lack of resources that American commonly expect during business negotiations (paper,
electricity, computers); shortages of other goods and services (food, reliable
transportation, potable water); and political instability (coups, sudden shift in
government policy, major currency revaluation).69”
These kinds of instability often occur in the Middle East region, where the illiteracy is
high, there is not enough electricity supplies, major political shifts and reforms, the
legal codes are instable …etc., Danish organizations generally and their negotiating
teams has to cope with such volatilities, they have to had expertise in the target country,
or have some experts, which are located or sited in the target country. At the same time
Danish firm has to study each country’s political and legal instability and its chances in
other countries of the region.
vi. Ideological Differences.
The ideology is “the body of ideas on which a particular political, economic, or social
system is based” (Phatak and Habib, 1996). Generally, Danish negotiators ideologies as
individualists, believe in the individual rights, and freedom of investments, speech,
work, and believes. These ideologies as the basis for the Danish culture, system, and life,
do not exist in any Middle Eastern Arabic country, some may exist in one or more
country, e.g., political freedom in Saudi Arabia is very limited, political parties is
forbidden, while this right is restricted in Egypt and Syria to the ruling party, the right of
election is limited in many of the regions’ countries, to an age, gender, or race. In most
of the Arabic Peninsula the women have no right to vote, while in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and

96
 Lebanon women have the same political rights and among women there are judges and
ministers.
Ideological clashes in this part of the world increase the instability of the region and
harden the negotiators job. The Kuwaiti government boycotted many firms and
organization because they had good trading relations with former Iraqi government.
vii. Culture Differences.
Almost all researchers and scholars in international negotiations agree on the fact that,
cultural norms and values, which negotiators carry, have a significant influence on the
way they behave and react in the negotiation process (Phatak and Habib, 1996, Lewicki
et. al., 2001, 2003, Brett, 2001, Gesteland, 1999, and Usunier, 2000). Trust building,
establishing a relationship, what is allowed and what is considered as a taboo, how to
address each other …etc., all these are cultural oriented and very important in the
process.
I won’t talk more about this aspect in this part of this study because this is the object of
my study.
viii. External Stakeholders.
This is the extended part that Phatak and Habib made on the work of Salacuse on the
effect of the environmental context on international negotiations. Phatak and Habib
(1996) defined the term ‘external stakeholders’ as “ the various people and organizations
that have an interest or stake in the outcome of the negotiations.”
In Arabic countries labor unions, business groups, customers and industry associations
as main external stakeholders that could affect negotiations in a country like Denmark,
aren’t strong enough to affect the outcome of the negotiations. Yet foreign competitors
such as other European, American, or Asian companies that are more familiar with the
region culture and bureaucracy and politics and politicians, and at the same time know
how to lobby to influence the negotiations. While the company’s shareholders in some
of the Arabic countries have the right and can affect the negotiations, their power are
very limited in other countries.

97
 Environmental Context Immediate Context

Political Legal pluralism External

Pluralism Stakeholders

Relative Bargaining power

and nature of Dependence
Levels of Conflict immediate
Currency Negotiation stakeholders Cultural
Fluctuations Process and Differences
And foreign Outcomes
Exchange desired outcomes
of Negotiations Relationship between
Negotiators
Foreign Govt.
Control and Ideological
Bureaucracy Instability Differences
And Change

Source: adapted from A. V. Phatak and M. H. Habib, “The dynamics of international Business
Negotiation,” Business Horizons 39 (1996), pp. 30-38.

B. The Immediate Context:

This context, which is in the middle circle of ‘Phatak and Habib’ model, “consists of factors
over which the negotiators have some measure of control and which have an impact on the
negotiation process, including strategies and outcomes” (ibid.)

i. Relative Bargaining Power and Nature of dependence.

One of the most studied elements of cross-cultural negotiations is the relative
bargaining power of the parties in the negotiations. Especially in joint ventures,
strategic alliances. Relative bargaining power of the negotiators is culture-oriented.
Brett (2001: 47) argues that “negotiators from cultures where the social structure tends

98
 to be egalitarian invariably talk about information, and when pressed, they talk about
their perceptions of their own and other parties alternatives.” While “negotiators from
cultures where the social structure is hierarchical, or differentiated into ranks, typically
engage in influence attempts in negotiation.” While Lewicki ET. Al. (2001) assure that
“relative power has frequently been operationalized as the amount of equity (financial
and other investments) that each side are willing to invest in the new venture. Yan and
Gray (1994) suggest that relative power is not simply a function of equity, but appears
to be due to management control. They add other factors such as, special access to
markets; distribution systems, or managing government relations.71 In some of Arabic
rich countries such as KSA and UAE foreign negotiators has to focus on information as
their relative bargaining power, while in other countries where man can find well
educated people in the economic section, such as Egypt and Syria, equity could be the
relative bargaining power of the Danish negotiator. At the same time, the power of an
Arabic negotiator in a closed market countries such as Syria, would probably be market
entrance, while in a bureaucratic country such as Egypt, managing government relations
is the relative power of the Egyptian negotiator.
“In the context of negotiations, the nature of the dependence existing between the two
sides determines the relative power of one side vis-à-vis the other.” The more power the
negotiator’s company has, is more likely to adopt aggressive attitude. While, if the
interdependence is high between the two firms, the negotiators are likely to take more
cooperative stance.
ii. Levels of Conflict.
The levels of conflicts will influence negotiation process and outcomes. High conflict
situations, where conflicts are ethical, ideological, or religious conflicts are generally
more difficult to resolve. While in business negotiations, the more common ground the
negotiators share, the lower the conflict will be and “thus the more supportive of each
other their relationship will be. On the other hand, the more they disagree on the key
issues, the greater will be the conflict between them, resulting in a more hostile
relationship” (Phatak and Habib, 1996). Yet, conceptualizing or framing the negotiation
differently is very important to understand and resolve the conflicts. The way people
frame the negotiations “appears to vary across cultures, as do the ways in which

71
Yan, A., and Gray, B. (1994). Bargaining power, management control, and performance in US-Chine joint ventures: A
comparative case study. Academy of management journal. 37, 1478-1517.

99
 negotiators respond to conflict. For example, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) discuss
how conflicts in the Middle East were difficult to deal with for several years because the
different parties had such different ways of conceptualizing what the dispute is about”
(Lewicki et. al., 2001: 191).
iii. Relationship between Negotiators.
As Phatak and Habib suggest the relationships between the two parties before the actual
negotiations are very important and affective in the negotiation process and the outcome
of the negotiation. “The history of relations between the parties will influence the
current negotiation, just as the current negotiation will become part of any future
negotiations between the parties” (ibid.). As I have explained before Arabs think and act
in a circular way, they always go to a prior point, also they are past-oriented people, the
history of the relationship plays a major role in determining the current situation.
iv. Desired Outcomes of Negotiations.
Negotiations outcomes could be tangible or intangible. Tangible outcomes such as,
profit sharing, technology transfer, equity ownership, and other assets, that could be
valued. Intangible outcomes include generating goodwill between the two parties, the
desire to collaborate and compromise.
Danish negotiators as coming from short-term oriented culture tend to aim for tangible
outcomes. While the Arabic long-term oriented negotiators tend to compromise on
tangible outcomes in favor of intangible ones. This is simply means that “the strategies
and outcomes of negotiations will be conditioned by the short-term vs. long-term
relationship emphasized by the two sides” (Phatak and Habib, 1996).
v. Impact of Immediate stakeholders.
Those are: the negotiators themselves and the people they directly represents, such as
the companies’ managers, employees, and boards of directors. Their personalities,
skills, abilities, knowledge, experiences … etc., can have huge impact on negotiations.
In addition the personal motivation can influence negotiations and its outcomes.
“The negotiator’s cultural background has perhaps the most profound impact on the
negotiation process.” Generally cross-cultural negotiations are between individuals with
different cultural backgrounds. “And culture, which is amalgam of a set of values,
beliefs, and norms that have been internalized by people in a society, has a definite role
to play in how and why people behave the way they do, even in the context of
international business negotiations” (ibid.).

100
In general this model is a good approach to negotiation between Arabs and Danes, as Phatak
and Habib emphasize that negotiators have to apply this model from outside in, and try to
find out the impact of the environmental context over the immediate context and on the
negotiation process and outcomes. Then try to study the impact of the immediate context on
the negotiation process and its out come.

101
 Conclusion

As a result of my study I have to mention that Arabs, due to historical and religious
background, share a lot of cultural values and norms, which have shaped and gave them
their general identity, and I cant say their national identity. Yet, at the same time, they have
major differences in their cultural values. This differentiation is because of the geographical
dimension—Arabic countries occupy a huge area of land, ethnical, educational, and
urbanism factors. Arabic countries were under the occupation of many Western super
powers—England, France, Italy, and Spain, and other regional strong powers—Turkey and
Iran.
The area has become a favorable export target, with the possibility of investment boom in
the near future, due to the rapid technological and economical development and the
privatization of many economic sectors, the boom in oil prices, and the foregoing investing
in constructing modern infrastructure, all these reasons were accompanied with population
growth (see appendixes).
The study shows clearly, the cultural differences between Arabs and Danes, as it shows at
the same time, the intracultural differences within the Arabic world.
As collectivist cultures, Arabs hold different objects of collectivism, as I mentioned some
Arabs view their tribe as their main ingroup, while others view the extended family or the
political party as their main ingroup. It is clear that using general cultural dimensions is
insufficient to describe cultural differences. Using individualism and power distance
dimensions together with high vs. low-context culture dimensions observers could have
good insight to discover cultural differences and similarities.
Arabs differ in the degree of their collectivity, and at the power distance index. Generally,
they are governed by shame ‘the face concept’, yet they vary in their perception of the ‘face
concept. While Danes and other Scandinavian countries are governed by guilt, which is not
related to other people’s perceptions, and because of that they don’t vary too much in their
perception of guilt. The Danish negotiator has to be aware and very careful not to make his
Arabic counterpart to lose face.
Arabs are formal culture, they place too much emphasize on behavior, ethics, and etiquette.
For Arabic negotiator it is important to know where he would be seated on the negotiation
table? Although all Arabic countries are formal cultures, the degree of formality also differs

102
within Arabic societies. While Danish is informal culture, negotiators have casual behavior;
this could have very damaging consequences.
Arabs perception of time vary within Arab countries, yet, Arabs are polychronic people who
tend to do more than a thing at a time, they are past oriented and middle to long-term
oriented.
Arabs generally are high-context culture they tend to use many indirect massages, what is
not said is more important than what had been said. While Danes as low-context culture
normally use direct fast message, which could cause real difficulties in intercommunicating.
The other main value that differentiates the two cultures is the Danish pragmatism in the
face of Arabic fatalism.
As collectivist from high power culture, Arabs tend to use as I said high context messages to
save face, at the same time, it will result in relationship-focused culture. They try to
establish relations and build trust before they do business. A mediator will be god choice for
Danish firm to establish these relations, but they have to be aware that once the mediator is
positioned, he will be difficult to jump over.
For Danish negotiators it is difficult to cope with the Arabic culture unless they get some
intercultural support. Danish firms, which tries to establish business in the region needs to
get cultural support; this could be easy attended by using Danish expatriates or negotiators
with Arabic origins. Using translators is not suffice to negotiation.
The finding of this study is valid to other Scandinavian countries, because they share the
same cultural characteristics. As formal, punctual and low-context cultures they could face
the same problem in dealing and negotiating with Arabs, we need to dig deeper and do
further intercultural and intracultural research.
Recommendations:
When selecting negotiators, they should have the general bases of knowledge Arabic culture
and language. It is recommended that Danish firm recruit some of Arabic background
negotiators, or at least offer them an exclusive course on Arabic cultures. If translators are
necessary to use, they must be from the same country of the counterpart negotiators.
By using universal roles, it is easy to get the Arabic negotiator to step on your foot. It is easy
to approach him from this departure point.

103
 Appendix 1

% growth
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria
Real GDP growth S1 3.90 2.70 3.40 0.80 1.40 0.70
Belgium
Real GDP growth 2.10 3.20 3.70 0.70 0.70 1.10
Denmark
Real GDP growth 2.50 2.60 2.80 1.60 1.00 0.50
Finland
Real GDP growth 5.00 3.40 5.10 1.10 2.30 2.00
France
Real GDP growth 3.60 3.20 4.20 2.10 1.10 0.50
Germany
Real GDP growth 2.00 2.00 2.90 0.80 0.10 -0.10
Ireland
Real GDP growth 8.90 11.10 9.90 6.00 6.10 3.70
Italy
Real GDP growth 1.80 1.70 3.00 1.80 0.40 0.30
Luxembourg
Real GDP growth 6.90 7.80 9.00 1.30 1.70 2.10
Netherlands
Real GDP growth 4.30 4.00 3.50 1.40 0.60 -0.90
Norway
Real GDP growth 2.60 2.10 2.80 2.70 1.40 0.40
Portugal
Real GDP growth 4.60 3.80 3.40 1.60 0.40 -1.20
Spain
Real GDP growth 4.30 4.20 4.40 2.80 2.20 2.50
Sweden
Real GDP growth 3.60 4.60 4.30 0.90 2.10 1.60
Switzerland
Real GDP growth 2.80 1.30 3.70 1.00 0.20 -0.50
United Kingdom
Real GDP growth 3.10 2.90 3.90 2.30 1.80 2.20
Bahrain
Real GDP growth 4.80 4.30 5.30 4.50 5.10 5.70
Egypt
Real GDP growth 4.50 6.30 5.10 3.50 3.20 3.10
Iraq
Real GDP growth - 18.00 4.00 -6.00 13.00 -
Jordan
Real GDP growth 3.00 3.10 4.10 4.20 5.00 3.20
Kuwait
Real GDP growth 3.60 -1.70 1.90 0.60 -0.40 10.10
Lebanon
Real GDP growth 3.00 1.00 -0.50 2.00 2.00 3.00
Oman
Real GDP growth 2.70 -0.20 5.50 7.50 1.70 1.40
Qatar
Real GDP growth 11.70 4.50 9.10 4.50 7.30 3.30
Saudi Arabia
Real GDP growth 2.80 -0.70 4.90 0.50 0.10 7.20
Syria
Real GDP growth 6.80 -3.60 0.60 3.80 4.20 2.60
United Arab Emirates
Real GDP growth 1.40 4.40 12.30 3.50 1.90 7.00

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

% growth • growth index

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria
Real GDP growth S1 100.00 69.23 87.18 20.51 35.90 17.95
Belgium
Real GDP growth 100.00 152.38 176.19 33.33 33.33 52.38
Denmark
Real GDP growth 100.00 104.00 112.00 64.00 40.00 20.00
Finland
Real GDP growth 100.00 68.00 102.00 22.00 46.00 40.00
France
Real GDP growth 100.00 88.89 116.67 58.33 30.56 13.89
Germany
Real GDP growth 100.00 100.00 145.00 40.00 5.00 -5.00
Ireland
Real GDP growth 100.00 124.72 111.24 67.42 68.54 41.57
Italy
Real GDP growth 100.00 94.44 166.67 100.00 22.22 16.67
Luxembourg
Real GDP growth 100.00 113.04 130.43 18.84 24.64 30.43
Netherlands
Real GDP growth 100.00 93.02 81.40 32.56 13.95 -20.93
Norway
Real GDP growth 100.00 80.77 107.69 103.85 53.85 15.38
Portugal
Real GDP growth 100.00 82.61 73.91 34.78 8.70 -26.09
Spain
Real GDP growth 100.00 97.67 102.33 65.12 51.16 58.14
Sweden
Real GDP growth 100.00 127.78 119.44 25.00 58.33 44.44
Switzerland
Real GDP growth 100.00 46.43 132.14 35.71 7.14 -17.86
United Kingdom
Real GDP growth 100.00 93.55 125.81 74.19 58.06 70.97
Bahrain
Real GDP growth 100.00 89.58 110.42 93.75 106.25 118.75
Egypt
Real GDP growth 100.00 140.00 113.33 77.78 71.11 68.89
Iraq
Real GDP growth - - - - - -
Jordan
Real GDP growth 100.00 103.33 136.67 140.00 166.67 106.67
Kuwait
Real GDP growth 100.00 -47.22 52.78 16.67 -11.11 280.56
Lebanon
Real GDP growth 100.00 33.33 -16.67 66.67 66.67 100.00
Oman
Real GDP growth 100.00 -7.41 203.70 277.78 62.96 51.85
Qatar
Real GDP growth 100.00 38.46 77.78 38.46 62.39 28.21
Saudi Arabia
Real GDP growth 100.00 -25.00 175.00 17.86 3.57 257.14
Syria
Real GDP growth 100.00 -52.94 8.82 55.88 61.76 38.24
United Arab Emirates
Real GDP growth 100.00 314.29 878.57 250.00 135.71 500.00

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

Product definitions
Real GDP growth
Gross domestic product is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources. Real GDP: The number reached by valuing all the productive
activity within the country at a specific year's prices. When economic activity of two or more time
periods is valued at the same year's prices, the resulting figure allows comparison of purchasing
power over time, since the effects of inflation have been removed by maintaining constant prices.

Value = current
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Denmark
Total GDP S1 (DKr
1,155,410.00 1,207,750.00 1,278,960.00 1,325,510.00 1,360,710.00 1,398,330.00
mn)
GDP by origin S2 N1
1,157,247.00 1,195,337.00 1,253,417.70 1,317,796.80 1,350,819.91 1,404,161.10
(DKr mn)
GDP measured at
purchasing power
parity S3 139,720.00 145,466.00 152,823.00 158,668.00 163,787.00 168,240.00
(international $
mn)
Real GDP growth
S4 2.50 2.60 2.80 1.60 1.00 0.50
(% growth)

year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

GDP measured at purchasing

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
power parity S3 (international 139,720.00 145,466.00 152,823.00 158,668.00 163,787.00 168,240.00
$Denmark
mn)
S4
Real
TotalGDP
GDPgrowth
S1
(US$ mn)(% 172,427.89
2.50 173,123.34
2.60 158,225.64
2.80 159,262.13
1.60 172,357.19
1.00 212,264.73
0.50
growth)
GDP by origin S2 N1 (US$ mn) 172,702.04 171,344.02 155,065.69 158,335.37 171,104.44 213,149.89
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity S3 (international 139,720.00 145,466.00 152,823.00 158,668.00 163,787.00 168,240.00
$ mn)
Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bahrain
Total GDP S1 (US$ mn) 6,183.78 6,620.40 7,970.56 7,934.84 7,682.66 9,127.66
GDP by origin S2 (US$ mn) - - - - - -
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity S3 (international $ 9,281.00 9,819.00 10,558.00 11,326.00 11,930.00 12,608.00
mn)
Real GDP growth S4 (% growth) 4.80 4.30 5.30 4.50 5.10 5.70

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraq
Total GDP S1 (US$ mn) 296,032.32 329,482.92 - - - -
GDP by origin S2 (US$ mn) - - - - - -
GDP from wholesale and retail
trade, restaurants and hotels S3 - - - - - -
(US$ mn)
Real GDP growth S4 (% growth) - 18.00 4.00 -6.00 13.00 -

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Jordan
Total GDP S1 (US$ mn) 7,912.36 8,134.49 8,447.18 8,940.95 9,448.21 9,952.33
GDP by origin S2 (US$ mn) 7,306.06 7,573.43 7,809.00 8,068.18 8,668.20 9,215.13
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity S3 (international $ 17,099.00 17,875.00 19,020.00 20,297.00 21,527.00 22,500.00
mn)
Real GDP growth S4 (% growth) 3.00 3.10 4.10 4.20 5.00 3.20

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Syria

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
70,418.17 72,970.33 80,529.53 84,993.41 89,037.95 93,801.43
GDP by origin (US$ mn)
S2
- - - - - -
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $
S3
52,530.00 52,784.00 54,217.00 59,487.00 61,800.00 63,368.00
mn)
Real GDP growth (% growth) S4
6.80 -3.60 0.60 3.80 4.20 2.60

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Lebanon

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
16,250.98 16,543.53 16,398.67 16,660.03 17,292.21 18,042.45
GDP by origin (US$ mn) S2
- - - - - -
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $
S3
17,291.00 17,716.00 17,998.00 18,791.00 19,385.00 20,066.00
mn)
Real GDP growth (% growth) S4
3.00 1.00 -0.50 2.00 2.00 3.00

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Egypt

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
84,828.81 90,597.16 97,953.66 90,284.42 84,117.28 70,929.62
GDP by origin (US$ mn) S2
74,701.89 79,148.81 82,328.60 80,599.54 76,396.24 61,885.31
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $ 194,551.00 209,753.00 225,103.00 238,476.00 246,001.00 256,630.00
S3

mn)
Real GDP growth (% S4

4.50 6.30 5.10 3.50 3.20 3.10

growth)

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Kuwait

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
25,122.59 29,183.84 37,022.42 34,060.36 35,179.03 41,747.65
GDP by origin (US$ mn) S2
26,385.70 30,973.84 39,042.94 35,879.52 37,124.48 39,896.70
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $
S3
31,678.00 31,323.00 32,423.00 32,809.00 32,885.00 34,930.00
mn)
Real GDP growth (% growth) S4
3.60 -1.70 1.90 0.60 -0.40 10.10

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Qatar

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
10,255.49 12,393.13 17,759.89 17,741.48 17,881.32 19,458.24
GDP by origin (US$ mn) S2
- - - - - -
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $
S3
12,757.00 13,632.00 15,536.00 17,041.00 17,744.00 18,731.00
mn)
Real GDP growth (% growth) S4
11.70 4.50 9.10 4.50 7.30 3.30

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Saudi Arabia

Total GDP (US$ mn)

S1
145,967.42 161,171.70 188,693.46 183,256.61 188,802.94 214,748.20
GDP by origin (US$ mn) S2
128,377.30 139,206.41 164,185.08 160,707.11 162,587.44 169,934.44
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity (international $ 222,929.00 224,445.00 240,310.00 249,214.00 254,614.00 270,523.00
S3

mn)
Real GDP growth (% S4

2.80 -0.70 4.90 0.50 0.10 7.20

growth)

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

United Arab Emirates
Total GDP S1 (US$ mn) 46,471.34 55,193.46 70,249.42 69,546.09 71,711.10 80,425.05
GDP by origin S2 (US$ mn) 45,877.03 51,785.07 63,690.29 63,088.04 66,337.28 72,396.97
GDP measured at purchasing
power parity S3 (international $ 58,371.00 61,791.00 69,406.00 73,761.00 75,754.00 81,695.00
mn)
Real GDP growth S4 (% growth) 1.40 4.40 12.30 3.50 1.90 7.00

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Syria
Occupants per household at 4.90 4.92 5.00 4.97 4.98 4.91
January 1st S1 (number)
Households S2 ('000) 3,174.53 3,243.00 3,272.49 3,371.14 3,451.16 3,585.97
Birth rates S3 (per '000
30.21 30.07 29.92 29.74 29.56 29.35
inhabitants)
Fertility rates S4 (children born per 4.00 3.66 3.62 3.52 3.44 -
female)
Death rates S6 (per '000
4.25 4.20 4.14 4.07 4.00 3.96
inhabitants)
Land area per capita S8sqm per 11,809.44 11,516.94 11,235.10 10,963.42 10,701.24 10,448.27
capita
Mean age of population S9
21.81 22.05 22.29 22.53 22.77 23.02
(Years)
Mean age of male population S10
21.43 21.67 21.92 22.16 22.40 22.65
(Years)
Mean age of female population
S11 22.19 22.43 22.67 22.91 23.15 23.39
(Years)
Median age of population S12
18.05 18.40 18.75 19.11 19.49 19.86
Years
Median age of male population
S13 17.79 18.14 18.49 18.85 19.22 19.60
(Years)
Median age of female population
S14 18.34 18.68 19.03 19.39 19.76 20.14
(Years)
Male pensioners S16 ('000) 313.40 324.50 335.75 347.12 358.70 370.60
Female pensioners S17 ('000) 518.94 535.47 552.54 570.21 588.49 607.87
Population: national estimates at
15,562.13 15,957.36 16,357.67 16,763.01 17,173.70 17,589.51
January 1st S18 ('000)
Population aged 0-4: January 1st
S20 2,176.14 2,197.38 2,222.07 2,248.56 2,276.95 2,307.05
('000)
Population aged 5-9: January 1st
S26 2,193.44 2,169.81 2,152.72 2,146.49 2,151.63 2,166.47
('000)
Population aged 10-14: January
2,197.67 2,219.17 2,228.77 2,226.04 2,211.35 2,188.61
1st S32 ('000)
Population aged 15-19: January
1,917.36 1,991.82 2,057.88 2,113.12 2,157.49 2,190.88
1st S39 ('000)
Population aged 20-24: January
1,543.42 1,608.47 1,677.71 1,751.35 1,828.72 1,907.04
1st S45 ('000)
Population aged 25-29: January
1,253.17 1,303.23 1,356.36 1,412.48 1,471.23 1,532.76
1st S51 ('000)
Population aged 30-34: January
1,022.73 1,063.78 1,106.16 1,150.19 1,195.92 1,243.56
1st S57 ('000)
Population aged 35-39: January
810.27 851.19 892.32 932.95 973.22 1,013.61
1st S63 ('000)
Population aged 40-44: January
636.32 662.88 692.11 724.99 761.53 800.82
1st S69 ('000)
Population aged 45-49: January
481.23 513.00 543.97 572.85 599.62 625.30
1st S75 ('000)
Population aged 50-54: January
356.12 370.80 389.06 411.57 438.43 468.46
1st S81 ('000)
Population aged 55-59: January
293.54 301.25 309.76 319.17 329.51 341.34
1st S87 ('000)
Population aged 60-64: January
239.87 246.89 253.77 260.55 267.30 274.33
1st S93 ('000)
Population aged 65-69: January
184.20 189.95 195.84 201.98 208.33 214.87
1st S100 ('000)
Population aged 70-74: January
128.73 133.61 138.54 143.49 148.42 153.42
1st S106 ('000)
Population aged 75-79: January
77.50 80.76 84.17 87.70 91.37 95.13
1st S112 ('000)
Population aged 80+: January 1st
S118 50.42 53.37 56.46 59.53 62.68 65.86
('000)
Male population: January 1st S119
7,828.92 8,030.88 8,235.44 8,442.40 8,651.98 8,864.11
('000)
Male population aged 0-4:
1,113.12 1,124.26 1,137.05 1,150.68 1,165.18 1,180.47
January 1st S121 ('000)
Male population aged 5-9:
1,118.64 1,107.46 1,099.54 1,097.01 1,100.13 1,108.07
January 1st S127 ('000)
Male population aged 10-14:
1,117.58 1,128.86 1,134.22 1,133.43 1,126.69 1,115.95
January 1st S133 ('000)
Male population aged 15-19:
973.23 1,011.35 1,045.19 1,073.53 1,096.33 1,113.58
January 1st S140 ('000)
Male population aged 20-24:
781.39 814.56 849.86 887.43 926.93 966.94
January 1st S146 ('000)
Male population aged 25-29:
632.27 657.93 685.12 713.79 743.75 775.11
January 1st S152 ('000)
Male population aged 30-34:
513.00 534.29 556.20 578.92 602.46 626.92
January 1st S158 ('000)
Male population aged 35-39:
402.70 423.89 445.21 466.28 487.19 508.14
January 1st S164 ('000)
Male population aged 40-44:
311.71 325.74 341.18 358.39 377.40 397.75
January 1st S170 ('000)
Male population aged 45-49:
235.16 250.00 264.77 278.94 292.49 305.87
January 1st S176 ('000)
Male population aged 50-54:
174.80 182.18 191.10 201.79 214.31 228.23
January 1st S182 ('000)
Male population aged 55-59:
141.91 145.86 150.24 155.08 160.41 166.47
January 1st S188 ('000)
Male population aged 60-64:
114.16 117.52 120.86 124.19 127.54 131.07
January 1st S194 ('000)
Male population aged 65-69:
85.80 88.62 91.48 94.41 97.41 100.47
January 1st S201 ('000)
Male population aged 70-74:
58.31 60.52 62.79 65.09 67.41 69.78
January 1st S207 ('000)
Male population aged 75-79:
34.16 35.58 37.05 38.59 40.18 41.80
January 1st S213 ('000)
Male population aged 80+:
20.98 22.26 23.58 24.85 26.17 27.49
January 1st S219 ('000)
Female population: January 1st
S220 7,733.21 7,926.49 8,122.24 8,320.62 8,521.73 8,725.41
('000)
Female population aged 0-4:
1,063.02 1,073.12 1,085.02 1,097.88 1,111.77 1,126.58
January 1st S222 ('000)
Female population aged 5-9:
1,074.80 1,062.35 1,053.18 1,049.48 1,051.50 1,058.40
January 1st S228 ('000)
Female population aged 10-14:
1,080.09 1,090.31 1,094.55 1,092.61 1,084.66 1,072.66
January 1st S234 ('000)
Female population aged 15-19:
944.13 980.47 1,012.69 1,039.59 1,061.16 1,077.30
January 1st S241 ('000)
Female population aged 20-24:
762.03 793.91 827.85 863.92 901.79 940.10
January 1st S247 ('000)
Female population aged 25-29:
620.90 645.30 671.24 698.69 727.48 757.65
January 1st S253 ('000)
Female population aged 30-34:
509.73 529.49 549.96 571.27 593.46 616.64
January 1st S259 ('000)
Female population aged 35-39:
407.57 427.30 447.11 466.67 486.03 505.47
January 1st S265 ('000)
Female population aged 40-44:
324.61 337.14 350.93 366.60 384.13 403.07
January 1st S271 ('000)
Female population aged 45-49:
246.07 263.00 279.20 293.91 307.13 319.43
January 1st S277 ('000)
Female population aged 50-54:
181.32 188.62 197.96 209.78 224.12 240.23
January 1st S283 ('000)
Female population aged 55-59:
151.63 155.39 159.52 164.09 169.10 174.87
January 1st S289 ('000)
Female population aged 60-64:
125.71 129.37 132.91 136.36 139.76 143.26
January 1st S295 ('000)
Female population aged 65-69:
98.40 101.33 104.36 107.57 110.92 114.40
January 1st S302 ('000)
Female population aged 70-74:
70.42 73.09 75.75 78.40 81.01 83.64
January 1st S308 ('000)
Female population aged 75-79:
43.34 45.18 47.12 49.11 51.19 53.33
January 1st S314 ('000)
Female population aged 80+:
29.44 31.12 32.89 34.69 36.52 38.38
January 1st S320 ('000)
Urban population S323 ('000) 8,338.19 8,623.36 8,914.93 9,200.21 9,499.81 9,814.25
S324
Rural population ('000) 7,223.94 7,334.00 7,442.74 7,562.80 7,673.90 7,775.27
Population: national estimates at
15,759.75 16,157.52 16,560.34 16,968.36 17,381.61 17,799.84
mid-year S325 ('000)
Population density S326 (persons
84.68 86.83 89.01 91.21 93.45 95.71
per sq km)

1998 1999 2000 2001

Denmark
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
2.20 2.19 2.19 2.19
(number)
Land area per capita S2 (sq m per capita) 8,013.43 7,985.20 7,960.57 7,932.01

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

1998 1999 2000 2001

Denmark
Average age of women at childbirth S1 (years) 29.40 29.60 29.70 29.70
Birth rates S2 (per '000 inhabitants) 12.47 12.45 12.56 12.21
Death rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 11.02 11.12 10.86 10.89
Deaths (no.) S4 ('000) 58.45 59.16 57.99 58.34
Mean age of male population S4 (Years) 37.03 37.12 37.23 37.34
Mean age of female population S5 (Years) 39.45 39.52 39.57 39.62
Median age of male population S6 (Years) 36.73 36.91 37.13 37.37
Median age of female population S7 (Years) 39.14 39.25 39.37 39.50
Net migration S5 ('000) 11.00 9.37 10.10 12.03

1998 1999 2000 2001

Denmark
Male pensioners S1 285.22 285.55 285.72 286.50
Female pensioners S2 416.50 415.57 414.00 412.37
Population: national estimates at January
5,294.86 5,313.58 5,330.02 5,349.21
1st S3
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S4 346.29 344.69 340.59 337.59
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S5 325.32 333.79 341.80 348.06
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S6 280.58 289.17 298.75 308.87
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S7 297.46 287.57 281.33 278.97
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S8 357.92 350.08 339.79 326.41
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S9 384.40 382.64 383.40 384.92
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S10 429.90 424.27 414.20 402.35
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S11 383.55 392.46 403.24 413.18
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S12 373.14 372.86 373.59 376.26
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S13 372.81 368.57 366.87 366.11
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S14 403.81 407.24 400.78 391.00
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S15 299.85 314.67 335.05 356.62
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S16 248.37 255.11 260.22 267.06
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S17 219.18 217.09 218.50 219.97
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S18 200.04 198.07 194.80 193.07
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S19 165.82 166.56 168.27 165.22
Population aged 80+: January 1st S20 206.43 208.75 208.84 213.57
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S21 177.65 176.94 174.83 173.15
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S22 166.96 171.24 175.27 178.56
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st
S23 143.64 148.30 153.27 158.65

Male population aged 15-19: January 1st

S24 151.89 146.72 143.39 142.21

Male population aged 20-24: January 1st

S25 181.64 177.53 172.22 165.37

Male population aged 25-29: January 1st

S26 196.10 194.45 194.10 194.44

Male population aged 30-34: January 1st

S27 220.48 217.62 212.03 205.42

Male population aged 35-39: January 1st

S28 195.75 200.31 206.09 211.01

Male population aged 40-44: January 1st

S29 189.67 189.45 190.00 191.25

Male population aged 45-49: January 1st

S30 188.45 186.23 185.34 185.26
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st
S31 204.66 206.38 202.69 197.19

Male population aged 55-59: January 1st

S32 150.16 157.72 168.08 179.28

Male population aged 60-64: January 1st

S33 120.86 124.41 127.63 131.37

Male population aged 65-69: January 1st

S34 103.17 102.39 103.34 104.46

Male population aged 70-74: January 1st

S35 88.91 88.87 87.83 87.60

Male population aged 75-79: January 1st

S36 67.93 68.26 69.17 68.32

Male population aged 80+: January 1st S37 67.79 68.60 68.87 70.78
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st
S38 168.64 167.75 165.76 164.44

Female population aged 5-9: January 1st

S39 158.36 162.55 166.54 169.50

Female population aged 10-14: January 1st

S40 136.94 140.87 145.48 150.21

Female population aged 15-19: January 1st

S41 145.57 140.85 137.94 136.76

Female population aged 20-24: January 1st

S42 176.28 172.54 167.57 161.05

Female population aged 25-29: January 1st

S43 188.30 188.18 189.30 190.48

Female population aged 30-34: January 1st

S44 209.42 206.65 202.17 196.93

Female population aged 35-39: January 1st

S45 187.80 192.15 197.15 202.16

Female population aged 40-44: January 1st

S46 183.48 183.41 183.60 185.00

Female population aged 45-49: January 1st

S47 184.36 182.34 181.53 180.85

Female population aged 50-54: January 1st

S48 199.15 200.86 198.09 193.81

Female population aged 55-59: January 1st

S49 149.70 156.96 166.97 177.34

Female population aged 60-64: January 1st

S50 127.51 130.71 132.60 135.69

Female population aged 65-69: January 1st

S51 116.01 114.70 115.16 115.52

Female population aged 70-74: January 1st 111.13 109.19 106.97 105.47
 S52

Female population aged 75-79: January 1st

S53 97.89 98.30 99.10 96.90

Female population aged 80+: January 1st

S54 138.64 140.16 139.97 142.79

1998 1999 2000 2001

Denmark
Urban population S1 ('000) 4,512.28 4,530.36 4,567.83 4,585.56
Rural population S2 ('000) 782.58 783.22 762.19 763.65
Refugees and asylum seekers S3 (number) - - 76,235.00 73,284.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

Bahrain
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
4.09 4.00 4.12 4.03
(number)
Birth rates S2 (per '000 inhabitants) 18.48 17.88 17.22 16.49
Live births S3 ('000) 11.69 11.63 11.50 11.28
Death rates S4 (per '000 inhabitants) 3.53 3.56 3.60 3.64
Deaths (no.) S5 ('000) 2.23 2.32 2.40 2.49
Land area per capita S6 (sq m per capita) 1,122.41 1,091.78 1,063.39 1,037.57
Mean age of population S7 (Years) 25.98 26.19 26.42 26.67
Mean age of male population S8 (Years) 27.12 27.33 27.56 27.82
Mean age of female population S9 (Years) 24.42 24.63 24.86 25.11
Median age of population S10 (Years) 26.52 26.68 26.87 27.08
Median age of male population S11 (Years) 28.29 28.48 28.70 28.95
Median age of female population S12 (Years) 23.37 23.50 23.67 23.86
Male pensioners S13 ('000) 12.15 12.54 12.93 13.32
Female pensioners S14 ('000) 16.97 17.55 18.15 18.80
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S15 ('000) 71.91 71.85 71.69 71.45
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S16 ('000) 64.84 67.55 69.78 71.30
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S17 ('000) 55.23 56.35 57.85 59.84
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S18 ('000) 49.74 51.13 52.40 53.54
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S19 ('000) 54.53 55.99 57.25 58.20
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S20 ('000) 69.97 70.12 70.15 70.12
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S21 ('000) 72.00 73.49 74.64 75.27
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S22 ('000) 62.24 63.38 64.62 66.13
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S23 ('000) 49.22 51.61 53.84 55.80
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S24 ('000) 31.14 34.18 37.28 40.31
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S25 ('000) 16.69 18.44 20.54 22.99
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S26 ('000) 11.02 11.25 11.71 12.51
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S27 ('000) 8.78 9.14 9.43 9.65
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S28 ('000) 6.59 6.67 6.82 7.03
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S29 ('000) 4.52 4.82 5.06 5.27
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S30 ('000) 2.52 2.63 2.77 2.95
Population aged 80+: January 1st S31 ('000) 1.63 1.72 1.85 1.93
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S32
36.62 36.63 36.57 36.47
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S33
33.27 34.53 35.56 36.29
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S34
28.56 29.17 29.95 30.92
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S35
25.40 26.17 26.88 27.52
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S36
31.08 31.60 31.99 32.26
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S37
43.58 43.79 43.78 43.55
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S38
44.95 46.01 46.87 47.41
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S39
39.60 39.92 40.40 41.19
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S40
32.70 33.99 35.12 36.02
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S41
21.16 23.11 25.05 26.91
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S42
10.65 12.02 13.58 15.34
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S43
5.93 6.13 6.54 7.21
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S44
4.48 4.64 4.77 4.89
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S45
3.29 3.33 3.38 3.46
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S46
2.25 2.37 2.47 2.54
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S47
1.29 1.34 1.39 1.46
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S48
0.84 0.87 0.93 0.97
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S49
35.29 35.22 35.12 34.98
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S50
31.57 33.02 34.22 35.01
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S51 26.67 27.18 27.90 28.92
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S52 24.34 24.96 25.52 26.02
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S53 23.45 24.39 25.26 25.94
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S54 26.39 26.33 26.37 26.57
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S55 27.05 27.48 27.77 27.86
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S56 22.64 23.46 24.22 24.94
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S57 16.52 17.62 18.72 19.78
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S58 9.98 11.07 12.23 13.40
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S59 6.04 6.42 6.96 7.65
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S60 5.09 5.12 5.17 5.30
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S61 4.30 4.50 4.66 4.76
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S62 3.30 3.34 3.44 3.57
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S63 2.27 2.45 2.59 2.73
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S64 1.23 1.29 1.38 1.49
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S65
0.79 0.85 0.92 0.96
('000)
Urban population S66 ('000) 578.42 597.12 615.60 632.34
Rural population S67 ('000) 54.15 53.20 52.08 51.95

1998 1999 2000 2001

Egypt
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
4.56 4.54 4.52 4.49
(number)
Average age of women at childbirth S2 (years) 23.50 24.00 24.00 24.10
Birth rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 27.50 27.00 27.40 26.70
Live births S4 ('000) 1,688.95 1,690.85 1,749.76 1,736.17
Death rates S5 (per '000 inhabitants) 6.50 6.40 6.30 6.30
Deaths (no.) S6 ('000) 399.21 400.79 402.32 409.66
Land area per capita S7 (sq m per capita) 16,362.04 16,057.20 15,737.35 15,441.47 1
Mean age of population S8 (Years) 25.02 24.89 24.98 25.17
Mean age of male population S9 (Years) 24.51 24.64 24.88 25.07
Mean age of female population S10 (Years) 25.55 25.15 25.07 25.27
Median age of population S11 (Years) 21.53 20.82 20.94 21.15
Median age of male population S12 (Years) 21.16 20.43 20.65 20.85
Median age of female population S13 (Years) 21.93 21.28 21.28 21.50
Male pensioners S14 ('000) 1,984.25 2,043.50 2,102.11 2,159.46
Female pensioners S15 ('000) 2,325.92 2,394.49 2,461.12 2,524.83
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S16 ('000) 7,604.08 7,150.72 7,238.63 7,207.32
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S17 ('000) 7,793.13 7,757.62 7,725.67 7,740.29
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S18 ('000) 7,347.03 8,126.86 8,252.55 8,365.21
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S19 ('000) 6,076.58 7,047.88 7,304.86 7,505.48
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S20 ('000) 5,423.44 5,293.53 5,465.19 5,605.16
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S21 ('000) 4,916.78 4,634.43 4,733.91 4,848.50
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S22 ('000) 4,296.39 4,216.44 4,316.39 4,438.38
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S23 ('000) 3,757.02 4,077.14 4,162.01 4,262.17
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S24 ('000) 3,185.83 3,409.29 3,523.16 3,605.98
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S25 ('000) 2,581.34 2,798.45 2,913.51 3,021.08
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S26 ('000) 2,174.09 2,100.43 2,169.82 2,245.02
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S27 ('000) 1,771.16 1,602.48 1,631.28 1,663.66
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S28 ('000) 1,369.33 1,340.06 1,384.24 1,419.88
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S29 ('000) 1,129.52 1,064.77 1,046.39 1,077.38
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S30 ('000) 733.10 698.75 694.89 730.10
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S31 ('000) 398.98 383.37 388.68 416.88
Population aged 80+: January 1st S32 ('000) 281.19 291.80 302.83 313.52
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S33
3,908.59 3,678.50 3,709.87 3,695.41
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S34
4,008.94 4,021.17 3,989.44 3,998.21
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S35 3,781.75 4,228.07 4,278.87 4,338.50
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S36
3,136.37 3,685.20 3,803.62 3,909.28
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S37
2,800.64 2,753.78 2,831.45 2,904.90
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S38
2,535.68 2,262.07 2,300.56 2,356.54
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S39
2,206.50 2,117.29 2,158.70 2,220.04
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S40
1,923.20 2,036.52 2,074.42 2,125.24
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S41
1,628.87 1,739.92 1,796.79 1,828.11
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S42
1,313.86 1,459.94 1,513.79 1,570.00
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S43
1,090.72 1,046.25 1,076.28 1,114.24
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S44
870.19 839.53 849.70 867.01
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S45
650.48 693.35 717.63 736.50
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S46
485.24 522.68 562.66 580.70
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S47
304.84 333.89 366.70 385.09
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S48
164.65 181.29 202.56 216.87
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S49
116.57 120.57 124.20 128.37
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S50
3,695.49 3,472.22 3,528.76 3,511.92
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S51
3,784.19 3,736.45 3,736.23 3,742.08
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S52 3,565.28 3,898.79 3,973.67 4,026.71
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S53 2,940.22 3,362.68 3,501.24 3,596.20
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S54 2,622.80 2,539.75 2,633.74 2,700.26
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S55 2,381.10 2,372.36 2,433.35 2,491.96
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st 2,089.88 2,099.15 2,157.69 2,218.34
S56
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S57 1,833.82 2,040.61 2,087.59 2,136.93
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S58 1,556.96 1,669.37 1,726.37 1,777.88
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S59 1,267.48 1,338.51 1,399.71 1,451.08
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S60 1,083.36 1,054.19 1,093.54 1,130.79
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S61 900.97 762.95 781.59 796.65
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S62 718.85 646.71 666.62 683.38
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S63 644.28 542.09 483.73 496.68
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S64 428.27 364.86 328.20 345.01
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S65 234.34 202.08 186.13 200.01
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S66
164.62 171.23 178.64 185.15
('000)
Urban population S67 ('000) 27,304.54 27,922.10 29,033.59 29,662.09 3
Rural population S68 ('000) 33,534.46 34,071.90 34,220.41 34,803.90 3
Refugees and asylum seekers S69 (number) - - 18,019.00 22,885.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

Iraq
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
5.23 5.23 5.31 5.26
(number)
Birth rates S2 (per '000 inhabitants) 36.08 35.63 35.12 34.56
Live births S3 ('000) 782.81 794.36 804.63 813.56
Death rates S4 (per '000 inhabitants) 9.44 8.91 8.31 7.66
Deaths (no.) S5 ('000) 204.80 198.60 190.49 180.36
Land area per capita S6 (sq m per capita) 20,160.95 19,615.81 19,089.25 18,578.90 1
Mean age of population S7 (Years) 22.12 22.21 22.31 22.42
Mean age of male population S8 (Years) 21.92 22.02 22.12 22.22
Mean age of female population S9 (Years) 22.32 22.42 22.51 22.62
Median age of population S10 (Years) 18.30 18.41 18.53 18.66
Median age of male population S11 (Years) 18.19 18.30 18.41 18.55
Median age of female population S12 (Years) 18.43 18.53 18.65 18.77
Male pensioners S13 ('000) 458.12 473.86 490.36 507.62
Female pensioners S14 ('000) 756.31 781.99 808.94 837.22
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S15 ('000) 3,439.35 3,514.09 3,588.51 3,660.88
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S16 ('000) 3,086.32 3,124.41 3,168.64 3,223.65
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S17 ('000) 2,753.41 2,838.10 2,913.29 2,976.00
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S18 ('000) 2,315.29 2,391.40 2,471.77 2,556.14
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S19 ('000) 2,024.38 2,060.83 2,103.73 2,156.55
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S20 ('000) 1,731.94 1,801.02 1,863.24 1,915.96
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S21 ('000) 1,397.58 1,449.00 1,505.07 1,567.05
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S22 ('000) 1,150.27 1,191.26 1,234.06 1,278.61
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S23 ('000) 945.01 977.76 1,011.94 1,047.71
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S24 ('000) 772.31 798.89 826.48 855.25
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S25 ('000) 621.05 643.03 665.75 689.26
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S26 ('000) 488.08 504.98 522.65 541.25
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S27 ('000) 371.34 384.21 397.63 411.59
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S28 ('000) 267.56 276.47 285.86 295.77
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S29 ('000) 175.28 181.22 187.45 193.90
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S30 ('000) 98.44 101.56 104.90 108.48
Population aged 80+: January 1st S31 ('000) 56.31 58.58 60.88 63.17
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S32
1,750.18 1,788.43 1,826.63 1,863.84
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S33
1,574.10 1,591.91 1,613.14 1,640.31
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S34
1,407.98 1,451.27 1,489.33 1,520.53
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S35
1,183.88 1,222.46 1,263.29 1,306.32
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S36
1,033.82 1,052.66 1,074.68 1,101.61
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S37
881.66 917.16 949.19 976.37
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S38
711.36 737.11 765.34 796.77
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S39
586.09 606.95 628.64 651.07
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S40
480.56 497.15 514.49 532.68
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S41
391.22 404.65 418.60 433.13
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S42
312.69 323.52 334.75 346.43
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S43
242.57 251.16 260.05 269.31
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S44
180.82 187.11 193.70 200.62
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S45
127.56 131.80 136.27 140.96
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S46
81.23 84.08 87.05 90.08
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S47
44.24 45.61 47.08 48.69
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S48
24.27 25.26 26.27 27.28
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S49
1,689.17 1,725.66 1,761.88 1,797.04
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S50
1,512.22 1,532.50 1,555.50 1,583.34
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S51 1,345.43 1,386.83 1,423.96 1,455.47
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S52 1,131.41 1,168.94 1,208.48 1,249.82
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S53 990.56 1,008.17 1,029.05 1,054.94
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S54 850.28 883.86 914.05 939.59
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S55 686.22 711.89 739.73 770.28
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S56 564.18 584.31 605.42 627.54
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S57 464.45 480.61 497.45 515.03
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S58 381.09 394.24 407.88 422.12
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S59 308.36 319.51 331.00 342.83
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S60 245.51 253.82 262.60 271.94
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S61 190.52 197.10 203.93 210.97
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S62 140.00 144.67 149.59 154.81
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S63 94.05 97.14 100.40 103.82
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S64 54.20 55.95 57.82 59.79
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S65
32.03 33.31 34.61 35.89
('000)
Urban population S66 ('000) 16,461.34 17,021.38 17,596.30 18,151.22 1
Rural population S67 ('000) 5,232.57 5,275.42 5,315.55 5,390.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

Jordan
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
5.80 5.78 5.75 5.73
(number)
Average age of women at childbirth S2 (years) 28.30 28.90 29.60 30.00
Birth rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 27.99 27.72 27.38 26.90
Live births S4 ('000) 132.67 135.51 137.83 139.39
Death rates S5 (per '000 inhabitants) 3.82 3.97 4.26 4.54
Deaths (no.) S6 ('000) 18.13 19.41 21.45 23.50
Foreign citizens S7 ('000) 290.35 280.43 277.43 293.10
Land area per capita S8 (sq m per capita) 19,061.40 18,471.51 17,925.50 17,409.13 1
Mean age of population S9 (Years) 22.34 22.54 22.75 22.97
Mean age of male population S10 (Years) 22.45 22.66 22.87 23.09
Mean age of female population S11 (Years) 22.21 22.41 22.62 22.83
Median age of population S12 (Years) 19.42 19.68 19.94 20.20
Median age of male population S13 (Years) 19.83 20.09 20.35 20.62
Median age of female population S14 (Years) 18.98 19.24 19.50 19.77
Male pensioners S15 ('000) 102.45 108.51 114.88 121.40
Female pensioners S16 ('000) 148.39 156.04 163.97 172.09
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S17 ('000) 672.22 688.28 702.62 714.39
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S18 ('000) 617.35 631.05 644.78 658.69
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S19 ('000) 573.02 581.81 591.00 601.41
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S20 ('000) 529.91 539.72 548.94 558.07
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S21 ('000) 495.22 500.50 506.03 513.33
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S22 ('000) 449.11 466.20 480.16 491.23
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S23 ('000) 346.44 372.09 396.37 418.96
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S24 ('000) 238.78 258.62 279.91 302.76
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S25 ('000) 169.63 180.81 193.49 207.87
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S26 ('000) 138.75 141.68 145.83 151.73
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S27 ('000) 126.88 129.42 131.57 133.58
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S28 ('000) 106.84 111.08 114.89 118.24
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S29 ('000) 79.77 83.78 87.84 92.02
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S30 ('000) 52.64 57.12 61.48 65.48
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S31 ('000) 33.13 34.26 35.87 38.16
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S32 ('000) 17.93 20.19 22.24 23.72
Population aged 80+: January 1st S33 ('000) 17.83 17.83 18.07 18.60
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S34
344.26 352.47 359.80 365.78
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S35
316.35 323.61 330.83 338.01
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S36
293.16 297.59 302.30 307.74
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S37
272.70 277.19 281.48 285.80
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S38
262.05 263.07 264.31 266.70
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S39
246.71 254.87 261.04 265.38
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S40
190.24 206.07 220.58 233.36
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S41
125.92 137.06 149.38 163.03
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S42
87.98 93.74 100.42 108.15
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S43
69.93 72.06 74.71 78.07
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S44
65.24 65.28 65.46 66.10
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S45
57.28 59.69 61.53 62.71
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S46
41.54 43.68 45.90 48.28
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S47
27.82 29.79 31.76 33.64
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S48
16.56 17.69 18.91 20.24
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S49
8.21 8.96 9.79 10.57
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S50 8.33 8.40 8.52 8.68
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S51
327.96 335.81 342.82 348.61
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S52
301.00 307.44 313.95 320.68
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S53 279.86 284.22 288.70 293.67
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S54 257.21 262.53 267.46 272.27
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S55 233.17 237.43 241.72 246.63
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S56 202.40 211.33 219.12 225.85
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S57 156.20 166.02 175.79 185.60
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S58 112.86 121.56 130.53 139.73
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S59 81.65 87.07 93.07 99.72
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S60 68.82 69.62 71.12 73.66
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S61 61.64 64.14 66.11 67.48
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S62 49.56 51.39 53.36 55.53
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S63 38.23 40.10 41.94 43.74
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S64 24.82 27.33 29.72 31.84
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S65 16.57 16.57 16.96 17.92
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S66 9.72 11.23 12.45 13.15
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S67
9.50 9.43 9.55 9.92
('000)
Urban population S68 ('000) 3,409.51 3,545.35 3,661.28 3,791.95
Rural population S69 ('000) 1,255.94 1,269.09 1,299.81 1,316.29
Refugees and asylum seekers S70 (number) - - 8,945.00 6,364.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

Kuwait
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
7.59 7.51 6.91 6.62
(number)
Average age of women at childbirth S2 (years) 26.90 27.30 27.30 27.30
Birth rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 19.46 18.09 18.78 18.36
Live births S4 ('000) 41.42 41.14 41.84 41.19
Death rates S5 (per '000 inhabitants) 1.98 1.84 1.90 1.94
Deaths (no.) S6 ('000) 4.22 4.19 4.23 4.36
Foreign citizens S7 ('000) 1,218.40 1,293.30 1,364.90 1,276.98
Land area per capita S8 (sq m per capita) 8,369.42 7,837.38 7,996.91 7,944.43
Mean age of population S9 (Years) 27.18 27.52 27.48 27.67
Mean age of male population S10 (Years) 28.84 29.20 29.11 29.28
Mean age of female population S11 (Years) 24.63 24.88 24.95 25.21
Median age of population S12 (Years) 28.65 29.01 28.81 28.97
Median age of male population S13 (Years) 30.77 31.21 31.08 31.25
Median age of female population S14 (Years) 24.64 25.02 24.87 25.14
Male pensioners S15 ('000) 145.50 163.09 182.49 202.76
Female pensioners S16 ('000) 78.67 87.00 96.23 105.94
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S17 ('000) 201.09 209.33 208.29 205.07
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S18 ('000) 189.13 192.13 187.29 189.06
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S19 ('000) 173.47 181.04 180.59 179.73
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S20 ('000) 147.53 155.36 157.36 160.13
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S21 ('000) 171.21 181.98 180.47 183.04
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S22 ('000) 251.35 268.14 257.75 254.52
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S23 ('000) 282.75 303.94 290.15 285.18
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S24 ('000) 246.54 268.76 257.07 259.57
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S25 ('000) 180.72 199.91 196.60 200.94
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S26 ('000) 116.36 129.01 128.04 133.36
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S27 ('000) 70.10 77.25 77.20 80.29
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S28 ('000) 42.93 46.50 45.77 47.49
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S29 ('000) 26.08 28.76 28.84 29.57
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S30 ('000) 15.39 16.24 16.75 17.78
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S31 ('000) 7.63 8.04 8.38 8.96
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S32 ('000) 4.10 4.17 4.23 4.44
Population aged 80+: January 1st S33 ('000) 2.81 3.17 3.58 3.96
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S34
102.08 106.70 106.63 104.90
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S35
96.41 98.04 95.79 96.85
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S36
89.10 92.62 92.35 92.25
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S37
76.25 80.49 81.56 83.28
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S38
93.47 100.23 98.62 98.20
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S39
161.62 173.72 167.04 160.67
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S40
190.37 206.21 194.61 188.54
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S41
165.93 181.82 174.85 177.22
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S42
123.56 137.53 134.08 135.65
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S43
81.28 90.75 89.37 92.82
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S44
48.46 53.85 53.45 55.41
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S45
28.94 31.52 30.46 31.27
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S46
16.74 18.67 18.43 18.80
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S47
9.53 10.10 10.25 10.76
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S48
3.83 4.09 4.26 4.62
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S49
1.78 1.77 1.74 1.82
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S50
0.94 1.14 1.35 1.55
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S51
99.01 102.63 101.66 100.17
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S52
92.72 94.09 91.50 92.21
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S53 84.38 88.42 88.24 87.48
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S54 71.28 74.87 75.80 76.86
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S55 77.74 81.75 81.85 84.84
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S56 89.73 94.42 90.71 93.84
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S57 92.37 97.72 95.54 96.64
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S58 80.61 86.94 82.23 82.35
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S59 57.17 62.38 62.52 65.29
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S60 35.08 38.26 38.66 40.54
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S61 21.64 23.40 23.75 24.88
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S62 13.99 14.98 15.31 16.23
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S63 9.34 10.08 10.41 10.77
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S64 5.86 6.15 6.50 7.02
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S65 3.80 3.95 4.12 4.35
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S66 2.32 2.40 2.49 2.62
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S67
1.87 2.03 2.23 2.41
('000)
Urban population S68 ('000) 2,072.97 2,216.42 2,174.88 2,190.32
Rural population S69 ('000) 56.21 57.30 53.48 52.76
Refugees and asylum seekers S70 (number) - - 2,832.00 1,335.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

Lebanon
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
4.67 4.70 4.69 4.57
(number)
Birth rates S2 (per '000 inhabitants) 20.09 19.86 19.60 19.31
Live births S3 ('000) 66.87 67.29 67.57 67.73
Death rates S4 (per '000 inhabitants) 5.42 5.41 5.40 5.39
Deaths (no.) S5 ('000) 18.03 18.33 18.62 18.92
Land area per capita S6 (sq m per capita) 3,073.77 3,018.91 2,967.24 2,917.07
Mean age of population S7 (Years) 26.89 27.15 27.42 27.69
Mean age of male population S8 (Years) 26.04 26.30 26.56 26.81
Mean age of female population S9 (Years) 27.69 27.97 28.25 28.53
Median age of population S10 (Years) 24.26 24.66 25.05 25.41
Median age of male population S11 (Years) 23.31 23.68 24.06 24.41
Median age of female population S12 (Years) 25.23 25.64 26.03 26.41
Male pensioners S13 ('000) 89.54 92.60 95.40 97.87
Female pensioners S14 ('000) 152.42 156.20 159.74 163.14
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S15 ('000) 347.06 341.38 336.98 334.76
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S16 ('000) 369.55 368.79 366.36 362.48
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S17 ('000) 353.32 360.82 366.83 371.06
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S18 ('000) 320.71 327.02 334.02 341.52
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S19 ('000) 321.91 318.48 316.50 316.84
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S20 ('000) 331.99 333.98 334.05 332.48
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S21 ('000) 286.15 301.51 314.44 324.33
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S22 ('000) 216.69 228.93 242.26 256.83
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S23 ('000) 171.29 179.05 187.55 196.98
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S24 ('000) 134.35 142.05 149.69 157.14
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S25 ('000) 101.90 107.04 112.81 119.13
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S26 ('000) 89.35 89.44 90.35 92.41
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S27 ('000) 88.62 88.04 87.34 86.63
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S28 ('000) 80.59 81.44 81.87 81.98
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S29 ('000) 59.06 61.93 64.37 66.42
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S30 ('000) 30.37 33.65 36.91 39.92
Population aged 80+: January 1st S31 ('000) 25.25 25.09 25.32 26.03
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S32
177.24 174.41 172.21 171.11
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S33
188.34 188.01 186.82 184.91
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S34
179.31 183.33 186.58 188.87
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S35
161.62 165.00 168.75 172.77
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S36
162.00 160.17 159.13 159.30
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S37
168.29 168.99 168.69 167.61
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S38
140.92 150.40 158.26 164.09
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S39
94.60 103.08 112.20 121.83
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S40
71.69 73.74 76.95 81.69
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S41 61.85 64.52 66.87 68.80
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S42
47.10 49.85 52.72 55.54
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S43
40.81 40.47 40.70 41.70
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S44
41.92 41.34 40.66 39.95
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S45
38.23 38.54 38.62 38.50
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S46
27.33 28.69 29.83 30.77
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S47
13.50 14.97 16.45 17.81
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S48
10.48 10.40 10.50 10.79
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S49
169.82 166.97 164.77 163.65
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S50
181.21 180.78 179.54 177.57
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S51 174.01 177.49 180.25 182.19
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S52 159.09 162.02 165.27 168.75
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S53 159.91 158.31 157.37 157.54
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S54 163.70 164.99 165.36 164.87
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S55 145.23 151.11 156.18 160.24
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S56 122.09 125.85 130.06 135.00
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S57 99.60 105.31 110.60 115.29
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S58 72.50 77.53 82.82 88.34
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S59 54.80 57.19 60.09 63.59
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S60 48.54 48.97 49.65 50.71
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S61 46.70 46.70 46.68 46.68
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st 42.36 42.90 43.25 43.48
S62
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S63 31.73 33.24 34.54 35.65
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S64 16.87 18.68 20.46 22.11
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S65
14.76 14.68 14.81 15.23
('000)
Urban population S66 ('000) 2,956.07 3,024.70 3,092.54 3,154.14
Rural population S67 ('000) 372.09 363.94 355.11 352.80

1998 1999 2000 2001

Qatar
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
4.51 4.54 4.52 4.38
(number)
Birth rates S2 (per '000 inhabitants) 19.59 19.12 18.60 18.03
Live births S3 ('000) 10.80 10.77 10.69 10.56
Death rates S4 (per '000 inhabitants) 3.89 3.93 3.97 4.02
Deaths (no.) S5 ('000) 2.14 2.21 2.28 2.35
Land area per capita S6 (sq m per capita) 19,952.01 19,526.01 19,135.53 18,786.33 1
Mean age of population S7 (Years) 27.83 28.07 28.34 28.65
Mean age of male population S8 (Years) 29.93 30.25 30.59 30.96
Mean age of female population S9 (Years) 23.89 24.06 24.27 24.52
Median age of population S10 (Years) 29.95 30.42 30.90 31.33
Median age of male population S11 (Years) 32.00 32.61 33.19 33.76
Median age of female population S12 (Years) 22.98 22.71 22.54 22.51
Male pensioners S13 ('000) 8.60 9.10 9.72 10.55
Female pensioners S14 ('000) 7.51 8.07 8.70 9.41
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S15 ('000) 55.18 57.60 59.18 59.51
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S16 ('000) 47.87 48.38 49.32 50.89
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S17 ('000) 43.36 44.99 46.34 47.28
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S18 ('000) 34.95 37.00 38.99 40.83
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S19 ('000) 38.45 35.59 33.60 32.99
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S20 ('000) 56.44 52.87 49.22 45.78
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S21 ('000) 67.39 66.79 65.58 63.69
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S22 ('000) 68.06 69.13 69.89 70.24
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S23 ('000) 57.21 61.20 64.68 67.25
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S24 ('000) 36.55 40.43 44.45 48.45
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S25 ('000) 20.68 22.38 24.56 27.19
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S26 ('000) 12.07 13.08 14.18 15.37
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S27 ('000) 6.05 6.38 6.83 7.48
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S28 ('000) 3.38 3.56 3.76 3.99
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S29 ('000) 2.01 2.19 2.37 2.54
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S30 ('000) 0.95 1.05 1.11 1.23
Population aged 80+: January 1st S31 ('000) 0.72 0.73 0.79 0.82
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S32
28.19 29.42 30.22 30.38
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S33
24.55 24.76 25.19 25.96
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S34
22.25 23.10 23.81 24.28
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S35
18.20 19.15 20.10 21.00
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S36
25.28 21.82 19.12 17.70
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S37
42.14 39.26 36.11 32.83
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S38
47.72 48.54 48.70 47.93
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S39
47.36 47.69 48.13 48.69
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S40
42.26 44.77 46.83 48.14
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S41
27.69 30.57 33.45 36.22
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S42
15.64 16.79 18.33 20.26
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S43
9.06 9.81 10.61 11.46
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S44
4.16 4.36 4.67 5.15
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S45
2.18 2.30 2.42 2.56
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S46
1.28 1.40 1.52 1.62
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S47
0.58 0.64 0.68 0.76
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S48
0.40 0.40 0.43 0.47
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S49
26.99 28.18 28.96 29.13
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S50
23.32 23.62 24.13 24.93
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S51 21.11 21.89 22.53 23.00
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S52 16.75 17.85 18.89 19.83
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S53 13.17 13.77 14.48 15.29
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S54 14.30 13.61 13.11 12.95
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S55 19.67 18.25 16.88 15.76
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S56 20.70 21.44 21.76 21.55
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S57 14.95 16.43 17.85 19.11
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S58 8.86 9.86 11.00 12.23
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S59 5.04 5.59 6.23 6.93
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S60 3.01 3.27 3.57 3.91
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S61 1.89 2.02 2.16 2.33
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S62 1.20 1.26 1.34 1.43
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S63 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.92
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S64 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.47
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S65
0.32 0.33 0.36 0.36
('000)
Urban population S66 ('000) 507.55 519.86 531.73 542.37
Rural population S67 ('000) 43.78 43.49 43.11 43.17

1998 1999 2000 2001

Saudi Arabia
Occupants per household at January 1st S1 6.11 6.11 6.08 6.04
(number)
Average age of women at childbirth S2 (years) 22.70 22.80 22.90 23.00
Birth rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 34.90 34.60 34.40 34.01
Live births S4 ('000) 692.42 703.70 717.17 733.17
Death rates S5 (per '000 inhabitants) 5.70 5.70 5.24 4.75
Deaths (no.) S6 ('000) 113.09 115.95 109.15 102.45
Land area per capita S7 (sq m per capita) 108,338.36 105,696.03 103,118.04 99,727.30 9
Mean age of population S8 (Years) 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.02
Mean age of male population S9 (Years) 24.06 24.05 24.05 24.05
Mean age of female population S10 (Years) 21.82 21.81 21.81 21.81
Median age of population S11 (Years) 20.13 20.14 20.14 20.14
Median age of male population S12 (Years) 22.35 22.33 22.31 22.29
Median age of female population S13 (Years) 18.10 18.12 18.12 18.13
Male pensioners S14 ('000) 493.42 506.10 519.09 537.02
Female pensioners S15 ('000) 558.81 572.74 586.89 606.55
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S16 ('000) 2,881.13 2,958.61 3,036.96 3,142.64
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S17 ('000) 2,782.59 2,845.75 2,911.80 3,007.96
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S18 ('000) 2,329.49 2,389.99 2,450.75 2,533.33
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S19 ('000) 1,883.54 1,927.72 1,974.98 2,043.91
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S20 ('000) 1,633.42 1,680.91 1,727.42 1,787.54
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S21 ('000) 1,709.94 1,748.96 1,790.08 1,849.97
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S22 ('000) 1,723.82 1,764.95 1,806.71 1,865.37
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S23 ('000) 1,439.96 1,476.59 1,514.55 1,567.57
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S24 ('000) 1,053.68 1,079.68 1,106.54 1,144.31
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S25 ('000) 715.62 735.83 755.85 782.21
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S26 ('000) 486.76 497.11 508.58 526.14
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S27 ('000) 354.04 361.65 369.39 380.59
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S28 ('000) 253.68 261.68 269.38 279.06
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S29 ('000) 199.77 204.41 209.59 217.28
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S30 ('000) 169.02 172.94 176.86 182.37
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S31 ('000) 93.82 96.25 98.68 101.98
Population aged 80+: January 1st S32 ('000) 132.11 135.39 138.76 143.47
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S33
1,470.00 1,509.43 1,549.32 1,603.17
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S34
1,413.13 1,445.23 1,478.80 1,527.65
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S35
1,179.70 1,209.87 1,240.24 1,281.78
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S36 942.56 966.22 991.15 1,026.53
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S37
831.60 855.33 878.91 909.79
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S38
991.90 1,013.75 1,036.48 1,069.74
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S39
1,046.13 1,072.36 1,098.82 1,135.33
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S40
873.20 895.15 918.30 951.03
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S41
649.28 664.64 680.38 702.66
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S42
431.60 443.84 456.02 472.02
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S43
279.48 285.53 292.23 302.50
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S44
190.91 194.94 199.05 205.07
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S45
128.90 132.95 136.84 141.71
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S46
116.92 119.84 122.98 127.44
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S47
92.91 95.07 97.26 100.38
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S48
56.04 57.46 58.89 60.86
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S49
75.51 77.39 79.31 82.01
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S50
1,411.13 1,449.18 1,487.64 1,539.47
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S51
1,369.46 1,400.52 1,433.00 1,480.31
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S52 1,149.80 1,180.12 1,210.51 1,251.55
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S53 940.98 961.50 983.84 1,017.38
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S54 801.82 825.58 848.51 877.74
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S55 718.04 735.21 753.60 780.23
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S56 677.69 692.59 707.89 730.04
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st 566.76 581.44 596.25 616.54
S57
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S58 404.40 415.04 426.17 441.65
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S59 284.02 291.99 299.84 310.18
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S60 207.28 211.59 216.35 223.64
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S61 163.12 166.72 170.34 175.53
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S62 124.79 128.73 132.54 137.36
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S63 82.85 84.57 86.61 89.84
('000)
Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S64 76.12 77.88 79.60 81.99
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S65 37.78 38.79 39.78 41.11
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S66
56.60 58.01 59.45 61.47
('000)
Urban population S67 ('000) 16,774.74 17,312.06 17,782.39 18,469.77 1
Rural population S68 ('000) 3,067.63 3,026.36 3,064.49 3,085.91
Refugees and asylum seekers S69 (number) - - 5,480.00 245,502.00

1998 1999 2000 2001

United Arab Emirates
Occupants per household at January 1st S1
5.95 6.00 6.06 6.24
(number)
Average age of women at childbirth S2 (years) 22.90 23.00 22.90 23.00
Birth rates S3 (per '000 inhabitants) 16.99 16.37 16.53 16.09
Live births S4 ('000) 48.14 49.66 53.69 56.14
Death rates S5 (per '000 inhabitants) 1.78 1.71 1.66 1.66
Deaths (no.) S6 ('000) 5.03 5.19 5.40 5.78
Land area per capita S7 (sq m per capita) 29,499.02 27,563.59 25,746.80 23,967.90 2
Mean age of population S8 (Years) 26.29 26.35 26.42 26.66
Mean age of male population S9 (Years) 28.21 28.28 28.35 28.68
Mean age of female population S10 (Years) 22.38 22.40 22.41 22.43
Median age of population S11 (Years) 27.67 27.80 27.96 28.20
Median age of male population S12 (Years) 29.70 29.83 29.97 30.35
Median age of female population S13 (Years) 21.33 21.35 21.39 21.44
Male pensioners S14 ('000) 27.21 28.11 29.25 33.61
Female pensioners S15 ('000) 20.04 21.16 22.31 23.66
Population aged 0-4: January 1st S16 ('000) 251.99 268.02 285.07 303.30
Population aged 5-9: January 1st S17 ('000) 251.72 267.77 284.75 303.41
Population aged 10-14: January 1st S18 ('000) 224.51 239.97 256.44 276.18
Population aged 15-19: January 1st S19 ('000) 203.72 216.06 229.88 249.14
Population aged 20-24: January 1st S20 ('000) 285.06 299.60 314.22 328.12
Population aged 25-29: January 1st S21 ('000) 384.96 413.42 442.61 457.11
Population aged 30-34: January 1st S22 ('000) 379.00 411.22 446.60 473.75
Population aged 35-39: January 1st S23 ('000) 324.33 349.32 376.78 409.10
Population aged 40-44: January 1st S24 ('000) 232.16 251.09 271.62 300.82
Population aged 45-49: January 1st S25 ('000) 140.73 151.46 163.49 185.85
Population aged 50-54: January 1st S26 ('000) 73.64 78.85 84.60 97.64
Population aged 55-59: January 1st S27 ('000) 34.91 36.95 39.40 46.30
Population aged 60-64: January 1st S28 ('000) 18.81 19.53 20.40 23.24
Population aged 65-69: January 1st S29 ('000) 11.36 11.90 12.49 14.04
Population aged 70-74: January 1st S30 ('000) 7.70 7.96 8.24 8.88
Population aged 75-79: January 1st S31 ('000) 4.29 4.54 4.79 5.11
Population aged 80+: January 1st S32 ('000) 5.09 5.35 5.64 6.01
Male population aged 0-4: January 1st S33
131.68 140.02 149.20 158.42
('000)
Male population aged 5-9: January 1st S34
131.02 139.79 149.24 158.94
('000)
Male population aged 10-14: January 1st S35
114.45 122.92 132.35 143.98
('000)
Male population aged 15-19: January 1st S36
111.76 117.51 124.63 136.98
('000)
Male population aged 20-24: January 1st S37
193.42 202.19 210.65 217.39
('000)
Male population aged 25-29: January 1st S38
286.35 308.39 330.90 337.41
('000)
Male population aged 30-34: January 1st S39
285.64 311.27 339.84 359.33
('000)
Male population aged 35-39: January 1st S40
247.15 267.14 289.27 315.37
('000)
Male population aged 40-44: January 1st S41
180.57 195.83 212.61 237.65
('000)
Male population aged 45-49: January 1st S42
110.18 118.78 128.59 148.54
('000)
Male population aged 50-54: January 1st S43
56.51 60.63 65.25 77.00
('000)
Male population aged 55-59: January 1st S44
25.05 26.41 28.21 34.39
('000)
Male population aged 60-64: January 1st S45
12.07 12.46 12.95 15.33
('000)
Male population aged 65-69: January 1st S46
6.32 6.53 6.83 8.02
('000)
Male population aged 70-74: January 1st S47
4.20 4.28 4.36 4.77
('000)
Male population aged 75-79: January 1st S48
2.02 2.13 2.24 2.41
('000)
Male population aged 80+: January 1st S49
2.60 2.72 2.87 3.08
('000)
Female population aged 0-4: January 1st S50
120.31 128.00 135.87 144.87
('000)
Female population aged 5-9: January 1st S51
120.70 127.98 135.51 144.47
('000)
Female population aged 10-14: January 1st
S52 110.06 117.05 124.10 132.21
('000)
Female population aged 15-19: January 1st
S53 91.96 98.55 105.24 112.16
('000)
Female population aged 20-24: January 1st
S54 91.64 97.41 103.58 110.73
('000)
Female population aged 25-29: January 1st
S55 98.61 105.03 111.71 119.70
('000)
Female population aged 30-34: January 1st
S56 93.36 99.95 106.76 114.42
('000)
Female population aged 35-39: January 1st
S57 77.18 82.18 87.50 93.74
('000)
Female population aged 40-44: January 1st
S58 51.58 55.26 59.01 63.18
('000)
Female population aged 45-49: January 1st
S59 30.55 32.67 34.89 37.31
('000)
Female population aged 50-54: January 1st
S60 17.14 18.22 19.34 20.64
('000)
Female population aged 55-59: January 1st
S61 9.86 10.53 11.19 11.91
('000)
Female population aged 60-64: January 1st
S62 6.74 7.07 7.45 7.92
('000)
Female population aged 65-69: January 1st
S63 5.03 5.37 5.67 6.01
('000)
 Female population aged 70-74: January 1st
S64 3.51 3.69 3.87 4.11
('000)
Female population aged 75-79: January 1st
S65 2.27 2.41 2.55 2.70
('000)
Female population aged 80+: January 1st S66
2.49 2.63 2.78 2.93
('000)
Urban population S67 ('000) 2,410.59 2,592.60 2,779.44 2,995.21
Rural population S68 ('000) 423.40 440.39 467.57 492.78
Refugees and asylum seekers S69 (number) - - 897.00 917.00

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

Sources
1 Total GDP : Euromonitor from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics
2 GDP by origin : Euromonitor from national statistics
3 GDP measured at purchasing power parity : Euromonitor from IMF
4 Real GDP growth : Euromonitor from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial
Statistics and World Economic Outlook/UN/national statistics

Notes
1 Gross Value Added by Industry
(year-on-year ex rates) • Value =
current
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
United Arab Emirates
Annual rates of inflation S1 (%
2.00 2.10 1.40 2.80 3.10 2.80
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
24,774.68 23,844.79 23,260.72 24,073.52 24,888.50 26,528.35
mn)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S3 258.00 -985.00 -515.00 1,184.00 834.00 480.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
2,560.86 1,575.92 1,061.00 1,318.13 3,080.00 3,560.00
stocks S4 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
-30.00 115.00 2,094.00 441.00 442.00 992.00
outflows S5 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
44.22 159.50 2,253.00 2,694.62 3,136.00 4,129.00
stocks S6 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
77.00 655.00 2.00 4.00 10.00 62.00
purchases S7 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales S8
- 200.00 4.00 76.00 9.00 26.00
(US$ mn)

Note: Historical value data is shown at current prices

(year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Syria
Annual rates of inflation S1 (%
-0.80 -3.70 -3.85 3.00 0.97 5.00
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
48,318.40 51,302.09 51,025.48 56,290.90 59,490.44 60,992.37
mn)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S3 82.00 263.00 270.00 110.00 115.00 150.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
1,165.74 1,428.74 1,699.00 1,903.74 1,924.00 2,074.00
stocks S4 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales S5
- 3.00
(US$ mn)

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

United Arab Emirates
Annual rates of inflation S1 (% 2.00 2.10 1.40 2.80 3.10 2.80
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
24,774.68 23,844.79 23,260.72 24,073.52 24,888.50 26,528.35
mn)
Direct purchases abroad by
98.57 90.13 93.40 100.48 107.56 112.46
resident households S3 (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 186.52 170.73 176.45 189.79 203.68 212.93
S4
households (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
24,686.73 23,764.19 23,177.67 23,984.21 24,792.38 26,346.19
households S5 (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices S6 (1995
108.11 110.38 111.92 115.06 118.62 121.94
= 100)
Cost of butter S7 (US$ per 250g) - - - - - -
S8
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) - - - - - -
S9
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per
- - - - - -
kg)
Cost of instant coffee S10 (US$ per
- - - - - -
250g)
Cost of milk S11 (US$ per litre) - - - - - -
S12
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) - - - - - -
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
- - - - - -
orange) S13 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar S14 (US$ per kg) - - - - - -
S15
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) - - - - - -
Exchange rates against US dollar
S16 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67
(AED per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
S17 4.12 3.92 3.40 3.29 3.47 4.16
(AED per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor S18 (AED per 3.05 3.28 3.73 3.48 3.45 3.65
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S19 258.00 -985.00 -515.00 1,184.00 834.00 480.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
2,560.86 1,575.92 1,061.00 1,318.13 3,080.00 3,560.00
stocks S20 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
-30.00 115.00 2,094.00 441.00 442.00 992.00
outflows S21 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
44.22 159.50 2,253.00 2,694.62 3,136.00 4,129.00
stocks S22 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
77.00 655.00 2.00 4.00 10.00 62.00
purchases S23 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales S24 - 200.00 4.00 76.00 9.00 26.00
(US$ mn)

year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bahrain
Annual rates of inflation S1 (%
-0.22 -1.43 -0.70 0.24 1.22 0.60
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
3,530.85 3,665.96 3,754.87 3,891.43 3,558.43 3,535.83
mn)
Index of consumer prices S3 (1995
101.74 100.29 99.58 99.82 101.04 101.65
= 100)
Cost of butter S4 (US$ per 250g) 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.11
Cost of flour S5 (US$ per kg) 0.75 0.75 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.43
Cost of fresh chicken S6 (US$ per
2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.67
kg)
Cost of instant coffee S7 (US$ per
7.00 6.72 6.80 7.33 7.50 7.62
250g)
Cost of milk S8 (US$ per litre) 1.33 1.33 1.06 1.20 1.20 1.17
Cost of potatoes S9 (US$ per kg) 0.93 0.66 0.66 0.53 0.66 0.64
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
orange) S10 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar S11 (US$ per kg) 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.63 0.49 0.47
Cost of tea S12 (US$ per 100g) 1.75 1.75 1.78 1.75 1.78 1.78
Exchange rates against US dollar
S13 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
(BHD per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
S14 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.43
(BHD per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor S15 (BHD per 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S16 180.00 454.00 364.00 81.00 217.00 516.99
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
4,960.36 5,414.09 5,906.00 5,986.16 6,203.00 6,720.00
stocks S17 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
181.00 163.00 10.00 216.00 190.00 741.01
outflows S18 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
1,579.25 1,742.55 1,752.00 1,968.08 2,158.00 2,898.99
stocks S19 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: 45.00 563.00 79.00 274.00 646.00 431.99
S20
purchases
(US$ (US$ mn)
mn)& acquisitions:
Mergers sales S21
- 36.00 161.00 2.00 - 8.99
(US$ mn)
Egypt
Annual rates of inflation (%
3.87 3.08 2.68 2.27 2.74 4.51
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 65,304.01 70,112.95 77,609.48 71,677.57 69,065.29 57,169.03
Direct purchases abroad by
1,709.86 2,162.14 2,638.79 2,438.71 2,353.28 1,861.60
resident households S22 (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 2,563.16 3,112.88 3,605.36 3,340.55 3,138.01 2,430.58
households S23 (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
64,450.71 69,162.21 76,642.91 70,775.74 68,280.56 56,600.05
households S24 (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
116.49 120.08 123.30 126.10 129.55 135.05
100)
Cost of butter N1 (US$ per 250g) 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.82 0.78 0.63
N1
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.30 0.23
N1
Cost of milk (US$ per litre) 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.54 0.49 0.41
N1
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.26 0.20
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.20 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.14
orange) N1 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar N1 (US$ per kg) 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.41 0.39 0.30
N1
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.36 0.28
Exchange rates against US dollar
N2 3.39 3.40 3.47 3.97 4.50 5.85
(E£ per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
3.82 3.64 3.28 3.64 4.41 6.66
(E£ per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (E£ per 1.43 1.44 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.58
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
1,076.00 1,065.00 1,235.00 510.00 647.00 237.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
17,288.45 18,353.75 19,589.00 20,099.05 20,746.00 20,983.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
46.00 38.00 51.00 12.00 28.00 21.00
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
566.42 603.92 655.00 667.52 695.00 716.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
- 7.00 213.00 108.68 41.16 3.00
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
48.00 738.00 528.00 660.00 335.00 2,200.00
(US$ mn)
Iraq
Annual rates of inflation (%
- - 100.00 60.00 - -
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) - - - - - -
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
- - - - - -
100)
Exchange rates against US dollar
N2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 812.70
(IQD per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
0.35 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.29 1,019.26
(IQD per Euro/EUR)
Foreign direct investment inflows
7.00 -7.00 -3.00 -6.00 -2.00 -
(US$ mn)
Jordan
Annual rates of inflation (%
3.09 0.61 0.67 1.79 1.82 2.34
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 6,176.87 6,261.35 7,280.54 7,709.78 7,778.84 7,790.91
Direct purchases abroad by
427.36 444.29 516.22 547.26 552.89 567.00
resident households (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 806.77 829.34 966.15 1,021.18 1,029.62 1,036.67
households (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
5,797.46 5,876.30 6,830.61 7,235.86 7,302.12 7,321.23
households (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
113.13 113.82 114.57 116.62 118.75 121.53
100)
Cost of butter (US$ per 250g) 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.17 1.18 1.16
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) 0.28 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per
2.22 2.14 0.63 1.85 1.86 1.90
kg)
Cost of milk (US$ per litre) 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.68 0.66 0.68
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) 0.55 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.49
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.32
orange) (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar (US$ per kg) 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.42
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) 0.48 0.50 0.72 1.39 1.38 1.35
Exchange rates against US dollar
0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
(JOD per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
0.80 0.76 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.81
(JOD per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (JOD per 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
310.00 158.00 787.00 100.00 56.00 379.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
1,313.20 1,471.17 2,258.00 2,358.05 2,414.00 2,793.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
2.00 5.00 5.00 9.00 25.00 3.00
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
- - - - - -
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
- - 22.00 - - -
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
- - 567.00 20.00 594.50 990.00
(US$ mn)
Kuwait
Annual rates of inflation (%
0.15 2.99 1.81 1.66 1.40 0.99
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 12,080.85 12,815.69 13,248.86 14,612.73 16,534.63 16,979.72
Direct purchases abroad by
2,222.00 2,229.53 2,305.36 2,242.32 2,282.76 2,361.86
resident households (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 164.00 164.21 169.80 165.71 168.75 179.13
households (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
14,138.85 14,881.00 15,384.41 18,480.33 18,749.09 19,162.45
households (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
104.40 107.52 109.47 111.28 112.83 114.18
100)
Cost of butter (US$ per 250g) - - 0.87 0.95 0.95 1.02
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) - - 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per
- - 2.80 2.84 2.90 2.96
kg)
Cost of instant coffee (US$ per
- - 6.75 6.85 7.02 7.15
250g)
Cost of milk (US$ per litre) - - 1.23 1.26 1.29 1.32
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) - - 0.81 0.76 0.74 0.71
Cost of sugar (US$ per kg) - - 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.70
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) - - 1.82 1.79 1.83 1.89
Exchange rates against US dollar
0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30
(KWD per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
0.34 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.34
(KWD per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (KWD per 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.33
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
59.00 72.00 16.00 -147.00 7.00 67.01
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
438.27 510.54 608.00 380.11 468.00 535.01
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
-1,867.00 23.00 -303.00 365.00 -155.00 -4,988.99
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
1,707.63 1,730.63 1,427.00 1,792.65 1,635.00 1,602.99
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
- 119.00 32.00 105.00 114.00 440.99
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
- - - 163.00 - -
(US$ mn)
Lebanon
Annual rates of inflation (%
4.50 0.20 -0.40 -0.40 1.80 1.30
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 12,942.27 13,228.58 13,635.92 13,672.99 13,946.76 14,226.99
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
122.56 122.81 122.32 121.83 124.02 125.63
100)
Cost of butter N3 (US$ per 250g) 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.97
N3
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.67
N3
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per
2.48 1.89 2.14 1.73 1.52 1.40
kg)
Cost of instant coffee N3 (US$ per
4.74 4.81 4.87 5.17 5.23 5.37
250g)
Cost of milk N3 (US$ per litre) - - - - - -
N3
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) 0.55 0.46 0.66 0.55 0.56 0.58
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.45 0.45 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.63
orange) N3 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar N3 (US$ per kg) 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.58
N3
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) 0.45 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.34
Exchange rates against US dollar
1,516.13 1,507.84 1,507.50 1,507.50 1,507.50 1,507.50
(L£ per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
- 1,600.03 1,398.77 1,366.10 1,480.19 1,757.17
(L£ per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (L£ per 1,424.91 1,408.08 1,373.58 1,336.53 1,344.73 1,364.88
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
200.00 250.00 298.00 249.00 257.00 358.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
568.10 818.10 1,116.00 1,365.17 1,623.00 1,981.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
-1.00 5.00 125.00 92.00 74.00 97.00
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
118.00 123.20 248.00 339.66 414.00 510.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
- - - - - -
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
11.00 - 54.00 67.87 84.81 98.00
(US$ mn)
Qatar
Annual rates of inflation (%
2.60 2.16 1.68 1.44 0.24 2.27
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 2,596.15 2,616.76 2,704.12 4,009.61 4,515.13 4,790.18
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
113.26 115.71 117.65 119.34 119.63 122.34
100)
Cost of butter N4 (US$ per 250g) 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.10 1.11
Cost of flour N4 (US$ per kg) 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.68
Cost of fresh chicken N4 (US$ per
3.02 3.02 2.75 2.75 3.12 3.19
kg)
Cost of instant coffee N4 (US$ per
7.00 7.15 6.66 6.51 7.16 7.14
250g)
Cost of milk N4 (US$ per litre) 1.51 1.51 1.32 1.25 1.24 1.14
Cost of potatoes N4 (US$ per kg) 0.69 0.55 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.77
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
- - - - 0.26 -
orange) N4 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar N4 (US$ per kg) 0.87 1.03 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.80
Cost of tea N4 (US$ per 100g) 1.88 1.66 1.85 1.85 1.83 1.93
Exchange rates against US dollar
3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64
(QR per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
4.08 3.88 3.36 3.26 3.44 4.12
(QR per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (QR per 2.93 3.31 4.16 3.66 3.58 3.91
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
347.00 113.00 252.00 296.00 631.00 400.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
1,555.31 1,668.56 1,920.00 2,215.68 2,847.00 3,247.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
20.00 30.00 41.00 112.00 61.00 71.00
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
110.00 140.00 181.00 292.51 353.00 424.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
- - 2.00 - - 15.00
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
- - - - - -
(US$ mn)
Saudi Arabia
Annual rates of inflation (%
-0.36 -1.34 -1.13 -1.14 0.09 0.79
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 66,177.30 66,344.19 67,915.09 67,290.52 69,827.24 73,846.11
Direct purchases abroad by
2,467.29 2,595.46 2,656.07 2,626.70 2,734.05 2,920.43
resident households (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 1,510.28 1,591.99 1,645.66 1,617.09 1,528.17 1,631.24
households (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
67,134.31 67,347.66 68,925.50 68,300.13 71,033.11 75,135.29
households (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
100.92 99.56 98.44 97.33 97.57 98.16
100)
Cost of butter N5 (US$ per 250g) - - 1.56 1.60 1.52 1.39
N5
Cost of flour (US$ per kg) 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47
N5
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per
1.54 1.52 2.34 2.38 2.36 2.36
kg)
Cost of instant coffee N5 (US$ per
8.04 8.02 8.05 7.99 7.93 7.83
250g)
Cost of milk N5 (US$ per litre) 1.13 1.13 1.03 0.99 0.91 0.91
N5
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg) 0.85 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.75 0.69
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
orange) N5 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar N5 (US$ per kg) 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.56
N5
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g) 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64
Exchange rates against US dollar
3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
(SR per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
4.20 3.99 3.46 3.36 3.54 4.24
(SR per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (SR per 2.55 2.72 2.94 2.75 2.77 2.87
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
4,289.00 -780.00 -1,884.00 20.00 -615.00 208.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
28,627.05 27,847.07 25,963.00 25,983.25 25,368.00 25,576.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
74.00 50.00 155.00 -44.00 50.00 54.00
outflows (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
1,915.18 1,964.95 2,120.00 2,076.24 2,126.00 2,180.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
217.00 3.00 1,550.00 39.00 2,020.00 473.00
purchases (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
- - 2.00 - - -
(US$ mn)
Syria
Annual rates of inflation (%
-0.80 -3.70 -3.85 3.00 0.97 5.00
growth)
Consumer expenditure (US$ mn) 48,318.40 51,302.09 51,025.48 56,290.90 59,490.44 60,992.37
Index of consumer prices (1995 =
109.41 105.36 101.31 104.35 105.36 110.63
100)
Cost of butter (US$ per 250g ) - - - 4.01 4.01 4.00
Cost of flour (US$ per kg ) - - - 2.23 2.14 2.05
Cost of fresh chicken (US$ per kg
- - - 6.77 5.52 4.50
)
Cost of milk (US$ per litre ) - - - 1.78 1.78 1.76
Cost of potatoes (US$ per kg ) - - - 1.16 1.25 1.32
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
- - - 1.34 1.34 1.33
orange) (US$ per 33cl )
Cost of sugar (US$ per kg ) - - - 2.23 1.78 1.67
Cost of tea (US$ per 100g ) - - - 1.69 1.73 1.75
Exchange rates against US dollar
N2 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23
(SYP per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
12.58 11.97 10.37 10.06 10.62 55.20
(SYP per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor (SYP per 15.05 15.52 16.67 16.32 16.85 17.58
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
82.00 263.00 270.00 110.00 115.00 150.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
1,165.74 1,428.74 1,699.00 1,903.74 1,924.00 2,074.00
stocks (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales
- 3.00 - - - -
(US$ mn)

(year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Denmark
Annual rates of inflation S1 (%
1.85 2.48 2.92 2.35 2.43 2.09
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
85,285.85 84,554.14 74,466.98 74,035.72 80,073.37 98,954.11
mn)
Direct purchases abroad by
3,413.01 3,837.31 3,583.51 3,792.58 4,593.33 5,648.58
resident households S3 (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 3,313.47 3,836.02 3,748.17 4,073.74 4,813.60 5,895.41
households S4 (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
85,385.39 84,555.43 74,302.31 73,754.57 79,853.09 98,707.28
households S5 (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices S6 (1995
106.29 108.92 112.11 114.74 117.53 119.98
= 100)
Cost of butter S7 (US$ per 250g) 1.58 1.59 1.45 1.42 1.49 1.82
Cost of flour S8 (US$ per kg) 0.83 0.86 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.83
Cost of milk S9 (US$ per litre) 0.91 0.87 0.80 0.81 0.89 1.06
Cost of potatoes S10 (US$ per kg) 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.91 0.85 1.10
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.67 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.71 0.89
orange) S11 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar S12 (US$ per kg) 1.50 1.45 1.26 1.24 1.31 1.45
Cost of tea S13 (US$ per 100g) 1.99 1.97 1.79 1.70 1.73 2.15
Exchange rates against US dollar
S14 6.70 6.98 8.08 8.32 7.89 6.59
(DKr per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
S15 7.50 7.44 7.45 7.45 7.43 7.43
(DKr per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor S16 (DKr per 8.27 8.30 8.38 8.35 8.34 8.35
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S17 7,730.00 16,700.00 33,818.00 11,525.00 6,637.00 2,608.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
31,175.00 41,222.90 66,701.00 65,830.31 73,587.00 76,195.00
stocks S18 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
4,477.00 16,943.00 26,558.00 13,374.00 5,686.00 1,158.00
outflows S19 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
34,855.00 44,845.11 66,217.00 69,766.34 75,913.00 77,071.00
stocks S20 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
1,250.00 5,654.00 4,590.00 4,163.00 2,012.00 2,724.00
purchases S21 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales S22
3,802.00 4,615.00 9,122.00 2,461.00 2,014.00 1,384.00
(US$ mn)

(year-on-year ex rates) • Value = current

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Denmark
Annual rates of inflation S1 (%
1.85 2.48 2.92 2.35 2.43 2.09
growth)
Consumer expenditure S2 (US$
85,285.85 84,554.14 74,466.98 74,035.72 80,073.37 98,954.11
mn)
Direct purchases abroad by
3,413.01 3,837.31 3,583.51 3,792.58 4,593.33 5,648.58
resident households S3 (US$ mn)
Direct purchases in the domestic
market by non-resident 3,313.47 3,836.02 3,748.17 4,073.74 4,813.60 5,895.41
households S4 (US$ mn)
Consumer expenditure by resident
85,385.39 84,555.43 74,302.31 73,754.57 79,853.09 98,707.28
households S5 (US$ mn)
Index of consumer prices S6 (1995
106.29 108.92 112.11 114.74 117.53 119.98
= 100)
Cost of butter S7 (US$ per 250g) 1.58 1.59 1.45 1.42 1.49 1.82
Cost of flour S8 (US$ per kg) 0.83 0.86 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.83
Cost of milk S9 (US$ per litre) 0.91 0.87 0.80 0.81 0.89 1.06
Cost of potatoes S10 (US$ per kg) 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.91 0.85 1.10
Cost of soft drinks (cola or
0.67 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.71 0.89
orange) S11 (US$ per 33cl)
Cost of sugar S12 (US$ per kg) 1.50 1.45 1.26 1.24 1.31 1.45
Cost of tea S13 (US$ per 100g) 1.99 1.97 1.79 1.70 1.73 2.15
Exchange rates against US dollar
S14 6.70 6.98 8.08 8.32 7.89 6.59
(DKr per US$)
Exchange rates against ECU/Euro
S15 7.50 7.44 7.45 7.45 7.43 7.43
(DKr per Euro/EUR)
Purchasing power parity
conversion factor S16 (DKr per 8.27 8.30 8.38 8.35 8.34 8.35
international $)
Foreign direct investment inflows
S17 7,730.00 16,700.00 33,818.00 11,525.00 6,637.00 2,608.00
(US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment inward
31,175.00 41,222.90 66,701.00 65,830.31 73,587.00 76,195.00
stocks S18 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment
4,477.00 16,943.00 26,558.00 13,374.00 5,686.00 1,158.00
outflows S19 (US$ mn)
Foreign direct investment outward
34,855.00 44,845.11 66,217.00 69,766.34 75,913.00 77,071.00
stocks S20 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions:
1,250.00 5,654.00 4,590.00 4,163.00 2,012.00 2,724.00
purchases S21 (US$ mn)
Mergers & acquisitions: sales S22
3,802.00 4,615.00 9,122.00 2,461.00 2,014.00 1,384.00
(US$ mn)
 Appendix 3
Members of the League of Arab States:

North Africa
Algeria The Arab Peninsula
Djibouti Bahrain
Egypt Kuwait
Libya Oman
Mauritania Qatar
Morocco Saudi Arabia
Somalia United Arab Emirates
Sudan Yemen
Tunisia
The Fertile Crescent The Mozambique Channel
Iraq Comoros Islands
Jordan
Lebanon Source: The Middle East & North Africa
Palestine (1995, p. 232)
Syria