CHAPTER 6

Resource Dependence Theory

Rafael Biermann and Michael Harsch

International and transnational organizations require resources for goal attain-

ment, autonomy, and survival. These resources are supplied, inter alia, by other
public and private organizations. For example, the World Health Organization
depends on the medical and logistical resources of Médecins Sans Frontières in the
fight against Ebola; the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner on Refugees
needs comprehensive and timely information about the capacities and intentions
of its many partner organizations in the Syrian refugee crises; and more than 1,200
organizations from over 60 countries aggregated their legitimacy and expertise in
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which culminated in the Mine Ban
Treaty of 1997. Resource dependence is an essential part of organizational life.
Inter-organizational bargaining and cooperation are crucial to acquire exter-
nal resources. Formal and informal agreements between organizations help
secure reliable resource flows. Yet such cooperation also reduces organiza-
tional autonomy: the ability to act without yielding to the demands of others.
The question of how to access outside resources, while minimizing the risk of
becoming overly dependent on partner organizations, has intrigued researchers
and practitioners since the late 1950s (Emerson 1962; Blau 1964; Oliver 1991;
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Katila et al. 2008).
It is this strategic dilemma and its practical relevance for a wide range of
organizations which has made resource dependence theory (RDT) ‘one of the
most influential approaches in interorganizational analysis’ (Mizruchi and Yoo
2002, p. 600). When the research program on inter-organizational relations

R. Biermann ( )
Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany
M. Harsch
New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

© The Author(s) 2017 135

R. Biermann, J.A. Koops (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational
Relations in World Politics, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36039-7_6
136 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

took off in the 1960s, RDT stood at its center (Etzioni 1960). In 1978, Jeffrey
Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik published the seminal work on RDT: The
External Control of Organizations.1 Pfeffer and Salancik’s book became one
of the most influential works in the study of organizations (Davis and Cobb
2010). Increasing numbers of scholars began to use resource dependence to
explain inter-organizational relations, yet theory development stagnated from
the mid-1980s to the early 2000s (Drees and Heugens 2013).
The recent revival of RDT coincides with the ‘organizational turn’ in inter-
national organizations research (Ellis 2010). International Relations (IR)
scholars have begun to study organization theory in order to identify con-
cepts and methods to analyze interactions among international and transna-
tional organizations. This organizational turn has produced a ‘considerable
convergence’ between organizational sociology and IR theory (Brechin and
Ness 2013, p. 32; see also Ness and Brechin 1988; Dingwerth et al. 2009).
The resource dependence framework seems particularly well suited for explain-
ing relations among international organizations and has consequently drawn
the attention of theoretically informed IR scholars.
This chapter aims to make RDT more accessible for scholars of international
organizations. The first part outlines RDT’s origins and evolution, introduces
its core assumptions, and highlights the approach’s shortcomings. The second
part discusses the explanatory power of RDT for inter-organizational relations
in global affairs. The transferability of RDT to international organizations is
explored and core works which employ a resource dependence perspective to
explain relations among these organizations are introduced. The chapter ends
with recommendations for future research directions.

1 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE WITHIN ORGANIZATION THEORY

1.1 A Brief History of RDT

The evolution of research on resource dependence in organization theory can
be divided into four phases: (1) the formation phase of the 1950s and 1960s;
(2) the heydays of the 1970s and early 1980s; (3) a subsequent phase of stag-
nation from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s; and (4) the current phase of
theory revival, refinement, and interdisciplinary application.
During the formation phase in the late 1950s and 1960s, scholars strug-
gled with the conceptual foundations of RDT, especially the determinants
of varying degrees of dependence in resource exchange relations. RDT has
its intellectual roots in sociology,2 social psychology and social anthropol-
ogy as well as in the management literature, all of which cross-fertilized.
The first important intellectual pillar of RDT was social exchange theory.
This approach was developed by Levine and White (1961), Emerson (1962,
1964, 1972a, b), and Blau (1964) in the early 1960s and focused on how
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 137

reciprocity shapes social interactions among individuals and small groups.3

Mizruchi and Yoo (2002, p. 616) call RDT ‘a macro-level version of social
exchange theory’. The second pillar of RDT was management literature
which had its own roots in Selznick’s (1949) classic study on the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). This strand of research culminated in Thompson’s
(1967) book Organizations in Action which argues that modern, complex
organizations operate in a highly uncertain environment; their internal struc-
ture is shaped by internal and external interdependencies, which the organi-
zations cannot fully control.
In The External Control, Pfeffer and Salancik consolidated and expanded
findings from both social exchange theory and management approaches.
The book appeared during the 1970s when academic journals were ‘filled
with papers containing the words environment or interorganizational in their
titles’ (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976, p. 80). Three trends became apparent: first,
RDT scholars started to study the relevance of external resource acquisition
for the power of subunits within organizations (Levine and White 1961;
Salancik and Pfeffer 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik 1974; Salancik et al. 1978).
These scholars could build on the growing literature on intra-organizational
power and dependence (for a review see Brass 2002). Their research on
subunit power also triggered work on the role of boundary-spanning units
within and across organizations.4 Second, following Emerson’s (1962,
p. 41) proposal, scholars started to investigate resource exchange not only
between organizational dyads but also within organizational networks. The
main argument was that network structures and activities feed back into
exchange partnerships (Benson 1975; Aldrich 1976; Cook 1977; Aldrich
and Whetten 1981). Whereas Pfeffer and Salancik did link the intra- and
inter-organizational levels of analysis, they paid little systematic attention to
the network level.5 Third, proponents of population ecology attempted to
synthesize their perspective with RDT and discussed the relative merits of
both theories (Jacobs 1974; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Aldrich 1976, 1979;
also Ulrich and Barney 1984).
The publication of Pfeffer and Salancik’s core work was followed by a
period of unquestioned acceptance. While scholars frequently cited The
External Control, few tried to refine the concept (but see Oliver 1991).
From the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 2000s, theory development
stagnated. Introducing the second edition of the book (Pfeffer and Salancik
2003, pp. xvi and xxvi), Pfeffer deplored a tendency to treat the core ideas
of RDT as a ‘metaphorical statement’, rather than rigorously exploring and
testing them.
Pfeffer’s call did not go unheeded and triggered a renaissance of RDT
(Katila et al. 2008, p. 295). Recent publications attempt to test RDT empiri-
cally. In the process, they have refined and clarified some of the tenets of RDT
and have updated it to a profoundly transformed international economy. Yet
138 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

overall, the empirical tests ‘corroborate […] the original codification of RDT
by Pfeffer and Salancik’ (Drees and Heugens 2013, p. 22). In the next section,
we will examine RDT’s underlying assumptions more closely.

1.2 Core Assumptions

RDT starts from the premise that organizations are embedded in their environ-
ments and depend on external resources to operate and survive. An organiza-
tion’s environment includes all structures, actors, and events that influence
an organization’s dependence on external resources. RDT thus conceptualizes
organizations as open systems (Hatch 1997, pp. 76–88).6 The open systems
perspective emphasizes the relational character of organizations (Scott 2003,
p. 101): resources acquired from or delivered to the environment are essential
for system functioning. The open systems approach contrasts with the view
that organizations are closed, self-contained entities, which prevailed in man-
agement studies up to the late 1950s.
An organization’s environment creates opportunities for acquiring tangible
resources such as raw materials, employees, capital, facilities, and equipment
(Barney 1991, p. 101). Exchange partners can be suppliers, customers, com-
petitors, unions, regulatory agencies, and interest groups.
Many other resources are intangible. Social exchange theory put an early
focus on intangible resources: it observed that the gradual expansion of
mutual support is accompanied by a parallel growth of trust, gratitude, and
personal obligation (Blau 1964, p. 94).7 In addition, it highlighted the impor-
tance of respect, reputation, and especially status in interpersonal and inter-
organizational relations (Blau 1964, pp. 125–140; Emerson 1962, p. 39).
Organizational scientists revisited the importance of intangible resources in
inter-organizational relations when institutionalist and constructivist think-
ing entered RDT (Hatch 1997, p. 85; Podolny 1993; Barney 1991, p. 115).
Research now emphasizes that organizational interactions produce different
forms of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005) and
highlights legitimacy as a vital resource that organizations can acquire via
cooperation with partner organizations (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Pfeffer
and Salancik 2003, pp. 193–202; Drees and Heugens 2013).8 The distinction
between material (tangible) and symbolic (intangible) resources matters in this
context because their exchange has different implications for organizations:
exchanging material resources tends to be mutually beneficial; exchanging sym-
bolic resources such as legitimacy can be a zero-sum game if one organization
damages its symbolic resources by cooperating with the other (Harsch 2015).
According to RDT, organizations are capable of changing the environment
in order to influence their resource dependence. They are assumed to have
considerable choice and discretion (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976).9 Yet organiza-
tions are never fully in control of their environment and, with it, the conditions
needed to secure their own effectiveness and survival (Pfeffer and Salancik
2003, pp. 40–43). RDT primarily investigates how organizations manage or
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 139

adapt to external constraints. Pfeffer and Salancik frequently refer to infringe-

ments on organizational autonomy to denote the flip side of dependence.
Uncertainty about environmental demands and organizational autonomy are
key organizational concerns (see also Oliver 1991; Biermann 2008 and 2014;
Harsch 2015). Consequently, considerable energy is devoted to the strategic
management of resource dependencies.

1.3 Key Findings

In this chapter, we present the main insights of research on inter-organizational
resource dependence by focusing on three aspects: (1) specialization and coop-
eration, (2) determinants of power and dependence, and (3) balancing strate-
gies to manage dependencies.

1.3.1 Specialization and Cooperation

While resource dependence scholars often portray organizations as ‘resource-
getting systems’ (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967), organizations carefully select
which external resources they attempt to acquire. Some resources are needed
by virtually all organizations, in particular information, personnel, authority,
legitimacy, and finances (see also Benson 1975, p. 232). Yet many resource
requirements vary according to the domain, that is, the organization’s sector of
specialization (Levine and White 1961, p. 597; Thompson 1967, pp. 25–29).
Thus, health organizations need, inter alia, referrals of cases and patients,
whereas universities require students and external grants. The more external
resources are needed, the stronger the stimulus to establish partnerships (Katila
et al. 2008, p. 301).
Organizational specialization has important implications for inter-
organizational cooperation. The greater the domain similarity among organi-
zations, that is, their functional overlap, the more rewarding is an exchange of
resources (Biermann 2008). However, ‘similar domains also increase potential
for territorial disputes and competition’ (Van de Ven 1976, p. 32; see also Van
de Ven and Walker 1984, p. 601). Domain conflict arises when organizations
encroach the domain of others, often via duplication of output, provoking
domain-protecting measures, or turf battles (Benson 1975). In contrast,
achieving domain consensus, that is, agreeing formally or informally on a divi-
sion of labor to avoid competition and duplication, is supposed to facilitate
cooperation (Levine and White 1961).
The amount of cooperation and conflict in resource dependence relations is
controversial (Galaskiewicz 1985, p. 282). Whereas Pfeffer and Salancik (2003,
p. 42, also Aldrich 1976, p. 448; Oliver 1991, p. 958) expect organizations to
increase coordination in order to reduce uncertainty, others stress the competi-
tion for scarce resources (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967; Khandwalla 1981) or
find a mixture of both (Katila et al. 2008). Whether domain conflict or consen-
sus arises, arguably depends on the type of organizations at hand. Companies
that produce private goods constantly compete over market shares within and
140 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

across domains; in most jurisdictions, ‘domain consensus’ among firms would

be judged as an attempt to form a cartel and therefore be illegal. In contrast,
domain consensus among international organizations is seen as appropriate
and beneficial because it avoids duplication and waste in the production of
global public goods (Heisbourg 2000, pp. 45–55). Such global public goods
range from suppressing and eradicating infectious diseases to international
peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies (Barrett 2007; Paris 2009). Thus,
firms and non-profit organizations face different expectations and demands
from societies and stakeholders, which are likely to increase or reduce domain
conflicts. Overall, organizational relations oscillate between cooperation and
competition. Yet given organizations’ autonomy concerns, the default behav-
ior tends to be non-cooperation as long as access to external resources is not
deemed necessary for organizational functioning and survival.

1.3.2 Determinants of Dependence

RDT posits that the dependence on the resources of others imposes an external
constraint on organizational autonomy. According to Emerson’s (1962) path-
breaking conceptualization, the potential power (or control) of A over B equals
the dependence of B upon A, whether among people, groups, or organiza-
tions. However, identifying the major variables explaining relative dependence
(or vulnerability) proved most controversial. Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003,
p. 44) contradictory statements about the number of crucial factors condition-
ing dependence demonstrated a need for further refinement.10
More recent contributions to RDT highlight that it is necessary to ana-
lyze the level and balance of dependence. The level of resource dependence
is mainly determined by two factors. The first determinant is the perceived
importance of external resources. Emerson (1962, pp. 32–33) argued that
the dependence of actor A upon actor B is proportional to A’s ‘motivational
investment’ in goals for whose attainment A requires B’s resources. Emerson’s
example is the dependence of a home builder upon a loan agency, which varies
with the builder’s desire for the home. Jacobs (1974, p. 50) introduced a sim-
pler concept for gauging the importance of resources: essentiality. A resource is
essential if an organization cannot function without it.11
The second determinant of the level of two organizations’ resource
dependence is the availability of alternative suppliers (Levine and White
1961; Emerson 1962; Blau 1964; Jacobs 1974). Pfeffer and Salancik
(2003, p. 50) called this the ‘concentration of resource control’, or the
extent to which resources are monopolized. The more alternative sources
of supply exist, the easier it is to substitute a supplier. This, of course,
depends on relative scarcity, a factor frequently mentioned but not system-
atically conceptualized in RDT. As Blau (1964, p. 119, also Barney 1991,
p. 111) recognized, substitutability of resources is determined not only by
the existence of the same resources but also by the availability of ‘equally
preferable’ resources. Jacobs ( 1974 ) suggested that essentiality and sub-
stitutability interact. Dependencies are relatively easy to manage when
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 141

there are multiple suppliers for an essential resource. By contrast, the

level of resource dependence will be very high when ‘an essential good
is sold by a monopolist’ (Jacobs 1974 , p. 51).
In addition to the level of resource dependence, the balance of dependence
shapes inter-organizational relations. Blau (1964, p. 118) argued that the
resources offered in exchange should be taken into account to assess the degree
of each organization’s dependence. Thus, if a partner organization can offer
attractive resources in return, reciprocity is established and autonomy loss is
more acceptable for both partners (Oliver 1991, p. 937). Pfeffer and Salancik
(2003, p. 53) spoke in this context of ‘countervailing resources’.
Finally, organizations’ embeddedness in networks influences the level and
balance of resource dependence. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 155) sug-
gested that the concentration of actors in an organizational network deter-
mines what kind of inter-organizational relations are feasible. The degree of
concentration in an industry or policy field can range from a small number
of significant players (high concentration) to a large number of organiza-
tions of relatively equal size (low concentration). The authors argued that
the higher the concentration of actors, the more formal and hierarchical
inter-organizational arrangements are required to manage resource depen-
dence.12 Individual network positions, especially the location and the degree
of centrality, determine access to alternative suppliers and shape the bargain-
ing power of each organization (Benson 1975; Cook 1977; Gargiulo 1993).
Furthermore, Provan et al. (1980) demonstrated that organizations with
external network links, which provide outside funding or visibility, are less
dependent on exchange partners.
These determinants of dependence all have a strong perceptional dimension
(Emerson 1962, p. 41; Aldrich 1976, p. 449; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976, p. 92).
Organizational assessments vary as to which resources are deemed essential,
how resources provided in return are valued, and how to judge network posi-
tions. Dependence, control, and power are not objective. Levels of tolerance
for dependence on others varies over time.

1.3.3 Strategies for Managing Dependence

RDT assumes that organizations have different ‘bargaining positions’
(Yuchtman and Seashore 1967) in their quest to secure access to essential
resources. Interacting organizations can differ in size, such as large car pro-
ducers and their suppliers. They can supply resources not equally important
to one another. Alternatively one, but not the other, can offer resources not
available elsewhere. Such settings of imbalanced interdependence offer the
advantaged organizations the opportunity to yield control and exert power
over the disadvantaged organizations, heightening the latter’s autonomy
concerns. Imbalanced interdependence thus weakens the incentive for coop-
eration that resource needs typically generate (Oliver 1990). As a result, inter-
organizational relationships based on imbalanced interdependence tend to be
unstable (Emerson 1962; see also Cook 1977, p. 67; Katila et al. 2008, p. 306).
142 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

Early RDT research identifies multiple strategies for dealing with resource
dependence. In his study of the TVA, Selznick (1949) observed that the
TVA bureaucracy employed a strategy of cooptation, namely inviting pow-
erful local elites into the corporation’s decision-making process in order to
reduce dependence on external stakeholders. Emerson (1962, pp. 35–40)
distinguished multiple strategies for disadvantaged organizations in settings
of asymmetrical exchange, in particular disengagement from the partnership,
establishing new relationships to gain access to alternative sources of supply,
forming coalitions with other weaker parties, and granting status recognition
to the stronger organization to increase its motivational investment in the part-
nership. Blau (1964, p. 121), by contrast, looked at strategies of the more
powerful to exert control, such as signaling indifference to the benefits offered
in return, barring access to alternative suppliers, and spreading social values
that motivate resource needs.
Building on this research, The External Control’s main contribution was
to advance the discussion of strategies organizations can employ to man-
age dependencies.13 The authors largely follow Emerson, but focus on what
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005, p. 179) call ‘power restructuring operations’,
which aim to alter power-dependence relations. Multiple earlier studies of
Pfeffer and Salancik, which re-appear in The External Control, paved the way
and lent empirical support to their proposed set of strategies.14 Again, Pfeffer
and Salancik’s classification needs some ordering. We can distinguish five major
groups of strategies.15 Most of them require at least limited cooperation with
other organizations.
The first group, controlling the source of dependence, is a growth strategy
inspiring mergers and acquisitions (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, pp. 113–142).
Organizations may merge horizontally with a competitor (such as Exxon and
Mobil in the oil sector) or vertically by acquiring firms forward or backward in
the production chain (the internet provider AOL purchased the media content
firm Time Warner), or they may diversify by acquiring firms in other domains
and create conglomerates (Procter & Gamble and Gillette for consumer
goods). Whereas horizontal mergers completely and vertical mergers partly
absorb sources of dependence, diversification buffers an organization against
the potential effects of dependence on other organizations.
Stabilizing transactions through coordination implies forming various types
of negotiated inter-organizational linkage via voluntary agreements to man-
age resource exchange jointly (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, pp. 143–187).
Coordination accepts dependence as a given. It requires consensus and com-
mitment. It inspires the flow of resources, tends to legitimize partners, and
stimulates convergence of organizational preferences. Coordination can be
formal or informal. Formalization enhances the predictability of resource
flows and thus reduces uncertainty. In contrast, informal ad hoc collabora-
tion retains flexibility and maximizes autonomy. To foster coordination, part-
ners can create jointly owned and controlled entities (such as joint ventures),
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 143

co-opt influential representatives of other organizations (board interlocks),

or create more centralized systems of authority and information flow when a
larger group of organizations needs to be coordinated (trade associations and
cartels). In these collective structures, organizations are willing to bear the
additional costs of compromising autonomy for the benefits of predictable and
substantial resource exchange.
Altering the social environment according to organizational interests con-
stitutes the third group of strategies for managing interdependence (Pfeffer
and Salancik 2003, pp. 188–224). Here, organizations actively create a favor-
able environment serving their own needs by influencing the normative and
legal–regulatory framework in which they operate. Most organizations invest
significant resources in lobbying and public relations, often as part of business
associations or interest groups.
Managing or avoiding the formation of demands, a quite heterogeneous
group of strategies, intends to evade external control based on what we
might today call discursive and structural power (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003,
pp. 97–106). Potential evasion strategies include not or selectively disclosing
information to complicate monitoring, advocating ambiguous rules, and play-
ing off competing demands.
Finally, in- and outsourcing are unilateral measures to improve an organiza-
tion’s ability to operate without external resources. Pfeffer and Salancik did not
discuss these strategies in greater depth in their book, but since then scholars
have identified in- and outsourcing as an important instrument to decrease
dependence on others. Specifically, organizations can build an in-house capabil-
ity to acquire needed resources autonomously or shift a task to others to reduce
dependence (Drees and Heugens 2013, p. 7; Hillman et al. 2009, p. 1419).
While our knowledge of organizational strategies has significantly grown over
the past decades, questions such as which strategy is selected for what reason,
how strategies interact, and how they are employed simultaneously still require
further investigation.

1.4 Shortcomings of RDT

The core arguments of RDT quickly assumed ‘near axiom-like status’ in orga-
nization theory (Hillman et al. 2009, p. 1405). Most critics limited their con-
cerns to fundamentally questioning the validity of RDT. Only recently efforts
surfaced to refine the theory itself. Three shortcomings are highlighted in the
literature:
First, scholars have criticized Pfeffer and Salacnik for conflating the level and
balance of resource dependence into one vague concept of interdependence.
As mentioned earlier, scholarship today distinguishes between situations of bal-
anced dependencies and imbalanced ones, in addition to paying attention to
the level of dependence. This clarified distinction between the level and balance
of dependencies has become widely accepted among RDT scholars.
144 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

Second, RDT basically remains a functionalist theory of rational actors

following a utility maximizing calculus. In contrast to institutionalism
(Hatch 1997, pp. 63–88), attention is focused on the material part of the envi-
ronment, thus downplaying environmental demands arising from values and
norms within the society organizations are embedded in. RDT also ‘assumes a
highly agential perspective’ in which organizations do not only adapt to envi-
ronmental constraints but also actively manage and transform their environ-
ments (Huxham and Beech 2010, p. 557). Organizations appear as ‘shapers
of their own destiny’ (Katila et al. 2008, p. 326). RDT thus downplays the
importance of the macrostructure (Granovetter 1985). A stronger network ori-
entation, as proposed by the system resource perspective (Yuchtman and Seashore
1967; see also Mizruchi and Yoo 2002, p. 617; Benson 1975), may generate
additional insights; thus, calls for ‘a new generation [of] multilevel dependency
research’ seem justified (Hillman et al. 2009, p. 1418).
Third, many scholars (see for example Mizruchi and Yoo 2002, p. 607)
diagnose an ‘underemphasis on the exercise of interorganizational power’
in contemporary RDT research. Stimulated by Selznick’s (1949) early
focus on cooptation, RDT assumes ‘more collaborative’ relations among
organizations than theories of intra-organizational dynamics (Huxham
and Beech 2010, p. 560; also Katila et al. 2008, p. 296; but see Casciaro
and Piskorski 2005). Disruptive or opportunistic strategies are hardly dis-
cussed in the research on inter-organizational relations (Benson 1975;
Katila et al. 2008).
As far as Pfeffer and Salancik discuss the exercise of power, they highlight
the motivations and strategies of the less powerful actor to escape control
(Casciaro and Piskorski 2005, p. 178). The focus is on organizational behavior
‘minimiz[ing] self-dependence’ rather than ‘maximiz[ing] other-dependence’
(Ulrich and Barney 1984, p. 472). Furthermore, RDT scholarship rarely inves-
tigated those impersonal, hidden, and even unintentional power dynamics that
go beyond coercion (Jacobs 1974, p. 48). Yet these dimensions of power are
most relevant for the disadvantaged organization.
Power research has progressed considerably since The External Control was
published (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Today scholars are in a better position
to systematically investigate the use of various types of power in organizational
interactions.16 For example, Katila et al. (2008) started from a less benign view
of resource exchange, suggesting that competing firms fearing opportunistic
behavior cooperate only when effective defensive mechanisms are available to
fend off misappropriation. Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) suggest that mergers,
in contrast to the other inter-organizational arrangements discussed by Pfeffer
and Salancik, undermine the power advantage of the more powerful organiza-
tion and thus meet its resistance.
Overall, the literature highlights that RDT should pay more attention to the
operational environment and networks as well as inter-organizational power
dynamics, while employing a clearer conception of resource dependence.
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 145

2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AMONG INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS
Even though RDT offers a promising tool for analyzing relations among inter-
national governmental organizations (IGOs), exchange between IR scholars
and organizational scientists has remained limited. Organizational science
has produced a vast literature on inter-organizational relations but has largely
refrained from investigating international organizations. In contrast, IR theo-
rists have thoroughly examined the design, function, and impact of interna-
tional organizations, but the study of the relations among IGOs has only lately
received attention by IR scholars (for a review, see the introduction to this
Handbook; Biermann 2011; Brosig 2011).
The recent rapprochement between organizational science and IR theory
means that both disciplines are coming full circle in their approaches to inter-
organizational relations. In the 1970s, resource dependence theorists and
IR scholars working on international interdependence already used similar
approaches. Resource dependence theorists frequently stressed that their find-
ings should be generalizable and applicable across a wide range of organiza-
tions (Cook 1977, p. 63; Jacobs 1974, p. 49). Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye published their seminal study Power and Interdependence in 1977, which
argued that growing complex interdependencies among states increased the
probability of international cooperation. Keohane and Nye’s discussion of
states’ vulnerabilities, especially in asymmetric partnerships, had close affinities
to RDT (Keohane and Nye 1977). Yet neither side acknowledged each other’s
work at this point.
A new generation of scholars has begun to use and carefully adapt RDT to
relations among international organizations. The exchange across disciplinary
boundaries has the potential to lead to the creation of a more comprehensive
and robust theory of inter-organizational cooperation.

2.1 Transferability of RDT to IGOs

Can RDT significantly improve our understanding of cooperation among
IGOs? In a nutshell, we believe that RDT’s value for IR scholars by far out-
weighs the approach’s limitations. And we share the assertion of Michael
Lipson (this Handbook) about RDT that ‘nothing in its core logic regarding
managerial pursuit of autonomy and control is unique to the private sector or
for-profit organizations’.
There are indeed compelling arguments to use RDT for explaining coop-
eration among IGOs. In today’s international system, a large number of IGOs
perform a growing number of complex tasks. They provide safeguards against
the military use of nuclear technology, convict war criminals, assist develop-
ing countries with loans, and deliver food to starving populations. In order to
cope with these tasks, IGOs are dependent on external resources. Like other
146 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

organizations, they employ varying strategies to manage the resulting depen-

dencies. For example, IGOs cooperate with other organizations to secure their
access to important resource but also use ‘in-sourcing’ strategies to reduce
their dependence on partner organizations.
Cooperation among IGOs nevertheless differs from cooperation among
firms in several respects. Most fundamentally, IGOs differ from other organi-
zations because they are founded by states and have states as members; their
multinational staff is in part autonomously hired by the organizations but also
partly seconded or selected by the member states. Winning coalitions of mem-
ber states and bureaucratic preferences thus shape IGO decisions and actions.
In contrast to organization theorists who typically consider firms as autono-
mous actors in their own right, there is an ongoing debate among IR scholars
about the nature and extent of IGOs’ agency independent from their member
states (Mayntz 2009; Ellis 2010).17
One largely undisputed difference between IGOs and firms is that mem-
ber states and international bureaucracies use IGOs to foster their interests at
the international stage and produce global public goods rather than to make
profits. As a result, IGOs typically refrain from certain corporate strategies to
manage dependence and maximize profits, such as forming cartels or pursuing
mergers and acquisitions.18 Empirical evidence also suggests that IGOs have a
clear preference for independent actions when a trade-off exists between orga-
nizational autonomy and access to resources through cooperation. Member
states’ concerns about organizational autonomy typically prevent close forms
of inter-organizational cooperation. However, if an IGO is unable to fulfill its
mission due to a dearth of capacity, concerns about autonomy might be muted
in the interest of cooperation (Harsch 2015).
Despite the distinct composition IGOs and their particular concerns about
autonomy, a growing number of studies suggest that RDT is broadly applicable
to international organizations. The next section will examine the emerging IR
research program on resource dependence among IGOs.

2.2 RDT and IGOs: An Emerging Research Program

Careful readers of the empirical literature on inter-organizational relations can
find abundant evidence of the impact of resource dependence on IGO partner-
ships. Yet only few IR scholars have systematically scrutinized the accuracy of
RDT’s assumptions with regard to IGOs and their interaction.
Among these studies, several focus on strategies for managing resource
dependence. Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman’s (2005) study on organiza-
tional change at Interpol employs RDT to highlight that IGOs, like other
organizations, face a trade-off between acquiring resources and maintaining
organizational autonomy. This trade-off led Interpol staff to adopt various
strategies to deal with external pressures, including acquiescence, compromise,
avoidance, and defiance. Michael Lipson (2011; see also his contribution in this
Handbook) suggests that organizations specialized in peace operations may
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 147

attempt to reduce dependence on other organizations by cultivating alternative

sources of needed resources, formalizing partnerships for greater predictability
and stability, diversifying activities and expanding organizational domains, and
developing greater internal capacities.
IGO strategies depend on the resources involved and how these resources
are subjectively valued by a given international organization. Malte Brosig
(2011; 2015) highlights that organizational culture may lead organizations to
attach different values to the same resource. For example, in addition to starkly
different levels of material capabilities, the African Union’s and the UN’s dis-
tinct norms of conflict resolution determine each organization’s resource needs
and inter-organizational dependence in conflict zones. In a study on relations
between multiple IGOs in the anti-corruption realm, Nathaniel Gest and
Alexandru Grigorescu (2010) find moreover that organizations prefer to pool
the same resource rather than to exchange different resources. The authors
suggest that this strategy preserves organizational autonomy, as the formalized
exchange of resources would create strong interdependencies.
Another group of scholars explores the compatibility of RDT and other
approaches. Andrea Liese (2009) studies the varying openness of three UN
agencies (World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization and
International Labor Organization) to cooperate with non-state actors and in a
further contribution (2010), focuses on the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
willingness to cooperate with civil society groups, business associations, and
international firms in standard setting and program implementation. She finds
that explanations based on resource dependence are powerful but should be
complemented by other theoretical perspectives, in particular organizational
culture arguments. Marco Schäferhoff (2009) examines the willingness of
IGOs to form public–private partnerships, specifically the World Health
Organization’s openness to cooperate in the Roll Back Malaria Partnership
and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. While his empirical
findings demonstrate how resource conflicts severely impact the effectiveness
of inter-organizational cooperation, his analysis points to the advantages of
combining RDT with bureaucratic politics, organizational culture, and leader-
ship approaches.
Finally, there is a trend towards longitudinal studies of IGOs’ resource
dependence, which highlight variation in cooperation patterns over time. Rafael
Biermann (2008) investigates the relevance of autonomy concerns and asym-
metry in shaping their relations in the post-Cold War era. His study points
to resource dependence as a major factor explaining the life cycle of inter-
organizational relationships among Euro-Atlantic security institutions in the
post-Cold War era. Biermann demonstrates that resource needs are a criti-
cal incentive to start cooperation. Thus, resource pooling among the security
institutions started in the early 1990s due to a dire need for burden sharing
in the Balkan wars. However, the European Union (EU) subsequently pur-
sued a strategy of in-sourcing to reestablish its autonomy vis-à-vis the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and
148 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). By successively building up its own military

capabilities and assets, it has become much less dependent on NATO at least
for smaller operations; and by adding a strong civilian component to its crisis
management capacities, it has overcome its reliance on OSCE resource provi-
sion. Such a process of ‘autonomization’—substituting partner resources with
self-generated resources—effectively amounts to a duplication of organiza-
tional capabilities (see also Koch 2006). In order to fend off criticism, the EU
officially argues that it is avoiding ‘unnecessary’ duplication while developing
independent capacities for managing political instability and armed conflicts.
In a more recent contribution, Biermann (2014) explicitly tests core
hypotheses of RDT, explaining varying degrees of cooperation and conflict in
NATO’s relations with the UN and the OSCE over time. In particular, he finds
that mutual resource needs, both tangible and intangible, were a driving factor
to initiate cooperation, whereas asymmetry and autonomy concerns, including
quarrels about primacy and subordination, were major factors undermining
the density of cooperation. Similar to Schäferhoff and Liese, Biermann argues
that resource dependence arguments should be augmented by culturalist and
psychological explanations.
Michael Harsch (2015) combines many of these theoretical building blocks
into a broader resource dependence approach (RDA) to IGO cooperation.
The RDA posits that two IGOs will undertake strong efforts at cooperation if
a winning member-state coalition in each organization perceives high resource
dependence upon the relevant organizational partner. Resource dependence is
high if the winning coalition regards external resources as necessary for attain-
ing goals pertaining to organizational survival (essentiality) and lacks feasible
alternatives to cooperation for obtaining the required resources (nonsubstitut-
ability). In contrast, organizations will undertake low-to-zero efforts to coop-
erate if a sufficient number of members in each organization perceive either
that the partner organization’s resources are inessential or that feasible alter-
natives to cooperation exist. In addition, it takes two to tango: cooperative
structures rarely work effectively when resource dependence is imbalanced.
Changes in two IGOs’ level and balance of resource dependence are likely to
alter the level of inter-organizational cooperation. Harsch uses the approach to
explain NATO and the UN’s varying efforts at cooperation in crisis manage-
ment operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. While other arguments
such as US interest, organizational culture, and interpersonal trust offer help-
ful supplementary explanations for organizational behavior, these case studies
suggest that resource dependence chiefly determines NATO-UN cooperation.
In sum, there are compelling arguments and increasing empirical evidence
that RDT has the potential to improve our understanding of cooperation
among international organizations. Yet most IR studies that use the approach
still have an exploratory character. Open questions remain about RDT’s scope
and its compatibility with other organizational and IR theories. The conclud-
ing section highlights the gaps in our knowledge and maps future avenues for
research.
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 149

3 CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH

In his introduction to the second edition of The External Control, Pfeffer urged
organizational scientists to examine the scope conditions of resource depen-
dence (2003, pp. xxiv–xxv). He did not anticipate that IR scholars would take
on his advice and explore a new frontier of RDT research: relations among
international organizations. Future studies on this subject should continue to
transfer and test insights from RDT. Five avenues for research seem particularly
promising: (1) IGO strategies for managing dependence, (2) complementarity
to other theoretical approaches, (3) IGO cooperation in different issue areas,
(4) resource dependence in inter-organizational networks, and (5) RDT’s
applicability to NGOs.
First, whereas organization theory has long focused on strategies (such as
diversification and substitution) and instruments (such as mergers and joint
ventures) to determine how organizations deal with resource dependence, IR
scholars have mainly concentrated on detecting patterns of resource depen-
dence among international organizations and assessing the motivations for
cooperation and non-cooperation. Future studies should examine whether
strategies and instruments employed in business are also prevalent in inter-
national politics and to what extent they need to be complemented by IGO-
specific approaches.19 Learning from the deficits in RDT research, IR scholars
should analyze the strategies of both the less and the more powerful organiza-
tion. Furthermore, scholars should take into account that actors often employ
multiple, interacting strategies (Hillman et al. 2009, p. 1416). A more dynamic,
process-oriented analysis of IGO relations can advance our understanding of
how organizations react and adapt to resource dependence.
Second, studies on inter-organizational relations suggest employing a multi-
theoretical approach to explain interaction among international organizations.
Hillman et al. (2009, p. 1416) argue that in none of the major areas of orga-
nizational research RDT is sufficient on its own; instead, ‘research in RDT has
a long history of integration with other theoretical perspectives’, such as insti-
tutionalism, population ecology, network theory or transaction cost theory.
This Handbook suggests that in particular leadership approaches, theories of
bureaucracies and organizational culture, and the preferences of member states
can contribute to a more nuanced explanation of inter-organizational affairs.
The third promising avenue for future research is to examine how resource
dependence affects inter-organizational relations across different issue areas.
IGOs require external resources in most international policy areas, including
environmental regulation, global health policy, and economic development.
However, we do not know whether IGO interaction significantly varies across
policy fields. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 155) suggested that organizational
fields with a moderate number of significant organizations are most suitable for
meaningful cooperation because in this scenario, coordination will not require
rigid, hierarchical structures. While this claim points to issue-area variance, it
has not been systematically tested. A related question is if the formalization of
150 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

inter-organizational relations through memoranda of understanding, steering

committees, and staff meetings across policy fields will lead to relationships that
are largely immune to shifts in resource dependence. Scholars should examine
whether international organizations can internalize cooperation as the appro-
priate logic of action in producing global public goods.
Fourth, scholars should further investigate cooperation in organizational
networks of three or more IGOs (Ries as well as Schulze and Ries, this
Handbook). International organizations today operate in a densely populated
institutional space: they frequently interact with NGOs, international compa-
nies, and other IGOs. How does the high number of potential partners affect
incentives for close cooperation? On the one hand, networks might decrease
autonomy concerns and facilitate cooperation. On the other hand, they create
opportunities for organizations to frequently shift partners within the network
to minimize external dependence. In addition, self-sustaining networks will
reduce incentives for close cooperation with outside partners. RDAs thus offer
a promising tool for improving our understanding of how inter-organizational
networks influence dependencies.
Finally, organization theorists have applied RDT to non-profit organizations,
yet without systematically evaluating potential differences to for-profit organi-
zations (e.g., Aldrich 1976; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). Similarly, IR scholars
have started to apply RDT to partnerships of IGOs and non-governmental
organizations without pondering particularities. Resource dependence surely is
a major challenge for NGOs, which are typically strongly dependent on public
or private donors. NGOs also operate within transnational advocacy networks,
which pool resources to promote policy change within their domain (see the
contributions of Härtel and Wendler to this Handbook). Resource dependence
patterns among NGOs therefore merit careful investigation.
Transferring RDT to international organizations is an interdisciplinary under-
taking. Engaging organization theory scholars in joint studies of IGOs would not
only expose IR scholars to cutting-edge RDT research but faciliate cross-fertiliza-
tion among the disciplines. To what extent the two disciplines will converge on
RDT depends on the added value IGO scholars can offer. Some remain skeptical
of the prospect for interdisciplinary theory development. For instance, Renate
Mayntz expects ‘a theoretical co-evolution rather than an integration’ (2009,
p. 11, translation of the authors). Yet it is clear that scholarship on international
organizations has finally begun to narrow the infamous gap between organiza-
tional science and IGO research. It should continue to do so in the future.

NOTES
1. The chapter will subsequently quote from the 2003 edition.
2. On RDT’s sociological roots see the contribution by Franke and Koch,
this Handbook.
3. Social exchange theory focused on personal interaction at the micro-
level and framed social exchange as an exchange of ‘favors’. Giving
 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 151

advice, gifts or assistance to friends, neighbors, or colleagues creates

unspecified, non-negotiable obligations to reciprocate and serves to
establish bonds of friendship and status differences (Blau 1964,
pp. 88–114). The methodological challenges and the limits of transfer-
ability to economics are discussed in March (1966).
4. On boundary-spanning see the contribution by Biermann on interna-
tional bureaucracies, this Handbook.
5. On social network theory see the contribution by Schulze and Ries, this
Handbook.
6. On the open system approach to inter-organizational relations see also
Franke and Koch, this Handbook.
7. On trust among organizations see Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten,
this Handbook.
8. For further references on legitimacy see Biermann, this Handbook.
9. In contrast, population ecology and institutionalism both privilege the
environment as the main level of analysis. Whereas the former explains
the selection and survival of organizations based on dynamics within
entire populations of organizations, the latter investigates how societal
factors impact organizations. Thus, both explain organizational struc-
ture and behavior from an outside-in perspective; intra-organizational
affairs are of much less interest. Environment–organization relations are
more deterministic (see also Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, pp. xiv–xvi).
10. Compare p. 45 (three critical factors), p. 51 (two) and p. 52 (four, add-
ing countervailing power).
11. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 46) preferred the term resource impor-
tance. They distinguished two dimensions: the relative magnitude of
the exchange compared to the total input or output of an organization;
and the criticality of the resource provided, arguing that a resource may
be critical though it comprises only a small proportion of the input or
output. Whereas the magnitude of the exchange may or may not mat-
ter, criticality is close to essentiality.
12. On concentration and coordination among organizations see also
Lipson, this Handbook.
13. Empirical management research has henceforth focused on testing
these strategies. For a review of the literature discussing the explanatory
power of RDT for mergers, joint ventures, board interlocks, political
action and executive succession see Hilman et al. (2009), also Drees
and Heugens (2013).
14. We abstain from discussing those texts or listing them in our references;
please see Pfeffer and Salancik (2003).
15. For a complementary treatment see Aldrich (1979, pp. 292–322).
16. On power in inter-organizational relations see Ojanen, this Handbook.
17. For a more comprehensive treatment of IGO composition see
Biermann’s contribution in International Bureaucracies in this
Handbook.
152 R. BIERMANN AND M. HARSCH

18. One of the rare examples for the merger of two international organiza-
tions is the Western European Union’s (WEU) merging with the
European Union in 2011. Since most of the WEU’s tasks were trans-
ferred to the EU, the process could even be seen as an acquisition.
However, it is important to note that the WEU never played the role in
European defense that NATO plays. Thus, while member states may
agree to merge a largely obsolete organization into a more relevant
organization, the empirical evidence suggests that states do not allow
mergers among IGOs that still have the potential to promote their
interests.
19. As a starting point see Biermann (2008, p. 168).

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