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ESSAY WATER CONFLICT AND COOPERATION - SLowe
ESSAY WATER CONFLICT AND COOPERATION - SLowe
ESSAY WATER CONFLICT AND COOPERATION - SLowe
INTRODUCTION
Institutional Corporation has solidified its place as one of the proven remedies for conflict
prevention and mechanism for fostering cooperation in shared river basins while facilitating
opportunities for management of shared resources in a manner that is beneficial for countries
involved. This is believed so much so that the last 50 years, we have seen the signing of 157
treaties to have been negotiated(Wolf et al.). In most cases, this takes the form of
establishment of a river basin that will serve to solidify that commitment officially among
institutional corporation is in a basin context, why is this needed for corporation important or
as some may argue, even necessary? Societies are growing and evolving everyday which
means that there are increasing needs and demands made by the population while countries
and governments face the pressures of ensuring that those needs are met. One undisputed
need is water, however while there is a growing demand for water as a necessity conversely
there is a growing depletion for water resources globally. This has resulted due to many
reasons including climate change, poor water quality, scarcity, lack of infrastructure to access
respective countries lye in this conundrum, the demand remains and if not sustainably
managed can result in chaos and in some cases conflict and violence. It has been widely
studied and promulgated that the conflict is intensified as the rate of change within a basin
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exceeds the institutional ability to absorb that impact. Therefore, with the natural progression
of societal demands for water resources can for example see an increase in dam construction
which can be considered a large developmental and in this case a high rate of change. The
occurrence of such development in the absence of institutional capacity ie. Where there is no
treaty of formal agreement per se to govern and manage such a process or when relations
among countries are tenuous increases conflict (Wolf et al.). As such, institutional corporation
evidently becomes more critical as societies develop to not only decrease the likelihood of
conflict but in many regards foster cooperation as well. A prime example of this is depicted
in the case of the Senegal river basin authority where despite a tumultuous past between
Senegal and Mauritania countries have moved to forge regional cooperation as opposed to
unilateral development of their shared water resources which further served as a tool for
irradiation of poverty. Countries within the basin recognized that it may be much more
beneficial to acquire or benefit more from the basin through cooperation and moreover
understood its feasibility to consider taking this direction as opposed to a unilateral approach.
It is to this end that reaffirm that institutionalized cooperation is a progressive tool for
cooperation of shared water resources citing the Senegal river basin as a blueprint for the
Institutional arrangements have continuously emerged over time in an aim to remedy issues
on water utilization among riparian states however, it is equally important to underscore the
genesis and drivers of these arrangements that ultimately provide conditions for the creation
of a River Basin Organization. It is therefore necessary to define an RBO for the purposes of
cooperation that are bound by international agreements, governing a specific geographic area
of a river, lake or basin characterized by rules, laws and governance mechanisms. (Schmeier
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et al. 2015, p. 4). River Basin Organizations primarily serve the purpose of overseeing the
development and management of water resources allowing them to function at both the
domestic and transboundary level. Their roles can but are not limited to, encouraging
Partnership, 2023). While adoption of river basin organizations has been considered
normative for many countries, this has not been the case in every country, and as such begs to
(Schmeier 2013, p.14) posits that there are two primary factors attributing to the
establishment of RBOs, the first being “The nature of the problem at stake and the
constellation of actors in the respective basins”. It appears that based on the nature of the
issue facing riparian states that the responses may vary. Some issues might see easy
compliance and cooperation where there is a direct benefit to cooperation or that the
agreement lends itself to obvious tangible benefits, however this can become complicated in
situation where zero-sum instances present itself resulting in losses rather than gains while
some benefits are more equally distributed. (Global Water Partnership, 2023)he
Constellation of riparian states on the other hand plays a major role in whether riparian states
regional cooperation and the absence of a hegemon are deemed to be the most suitable
environment for the development of an RBO. This was further depicted by Schmeir where
there were comparisons between the European Basins that depicted good trade relations and a
history of cooperation and in the Euphrates Tigris River Basin who shows a stark contrast
with regional instability and low levels of cooperation. However, while understandably the
researcher has used these two examples, there are many additional factors and reasons
historically that may have attributed to the current situation within the Tigris river basin that
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cannot simply be explained through judging their trade relations and history of cooperation.
In the African Region however, the first RBOs were established in the 1960s and 1970s with
the intent to fast track economic development by improving water resource infrastructure and
distribution collectively. These RBOs include the Autorite du Bassin du Niger (ABN), The
Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) all of which served to exploit resources for economic
development of the riparian nations. The second wave occurred during the 1990s and 2000s
period and were largely driven by the common understanding of regional cooperation such as
Commission (LIMCOM).
The year 1972 saw the creation of the OMVs as a response to years of intense drought and as
such served as a response to address technical issues among riparian states within the Senegal
river basin. In 1972 Mali, Mauritania and Senegal established the Organisation pour la Mise
en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), also known as l’espace OMVS or a space within
which countries could cooperate. Decisions are based on the Clé de répartition which
espouses the principles of equity, or the countries’ needs, and solidarity, or mutual support in
sharing development costsOMVs is particularly unique since its stake in cooperation over
shared river resources dates back to the year 1802. The current membership of the OMVs
include Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea who joined later in 2005. By making this step,
the countries have been able to increase their electricity and water availability. As a result,
they have been able to support economic growth by reducing the risk of investment and
poverty reduction through income generation activities. The success of the basin is not only
one of a political nature but one that saw the improvement of access to basic services as well
reducing poverty while fostering regional cooperation. By choosing to develop the Senegal
River jointly, the three countries focused on generating the services they needed and then
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sharing them equitably. Referred to as the “principle of benefit sharing,” this approach
focuses on sharing benefits rather than allocating the water itself. The Manantali dam which
is jointly owned became functional in 2002 and has been working in full capacity since 2003.
This in addition to the Dima Dam offered brought a reliable and consistent source of water to
fuel the agricultural sectors and municipal uses. Electricity on the other hand though which is
still insufficient has improved overtime and has thus aided in the transformation of the
economy. The decision of the three countries to cooperate and develop the Senegal river
basin collectively allowed for the generation of services the needed and the sharing of that
The mandate of the OMVs were created to be flexible in nature, thus maintaining a broad
mandate to allow countries to maneuver and adapt to changes which is well apt for regional
economic growth and development within the basin (Smith & Winterman, 2022). Even
though both Senegal and Mauritania has a fragmented past regarding border disputes and
matters resource utilization and migration, it has rarely affected the ability of the two
countries to make progressive decisions that are mutually beneficial for its development. This
therefore serves as a testament that even with previous and existing differences between
countries that it still is very possible to cooperate where it benefits both countries. The OMVs
have developed a Permanent Water Commission to support a council of ministers who serve
governments for final approval and the Head of state level also. This is particularly useful and
effective since it mitigates the issue of lack of state level commitment (Smith & Winterman,
2022). Decisions within the OMVs are made based on consensus thereby mitigating conflict
between the riparian states. Countries within the basin also have a fairly similar amount of
power and capabilities which requires little need for capacity building, unlike other basins.
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These benefits while may be viewd in some cases as minor provides a strong basis for trust
building between riparian countries as seen in this case of the Senegal river basin.
Shared rivers globally has always been readily viewed with some degree of contention among
countries with which they are shared. It is important to recognise that the consequences of
this conflict, and the cooperative responses they evoke reaches even beyond the river. These
tensions have been compounded by many factors deepen sensitive to each respective country
and manifest in the form of history, culture, environment and economic relations dating back
to centuries. Given these complex dynamics, rivers can be a catalyst for conflict or
cooperation. It has been seen previously that it is impossible to remove water issues from
these situations and address it in isolation from the other complexities of the riparian nations.
Water inherently has rarely been the source of any war, in the similar way that we believe
that it is hardly ever likely that wars emerge as a result of one specific issue. Management of
shared water resources can be propelled for peace or war but ultimately political intentions
tend to determine which direction will be chosen conflict or cooperation. For cooperation to
be considered, there must be some tangible of intangible benefits present that encourage or
drive this spirit. As such those benefits will be explored providing relevant and useful
considerations(Grey & Sadoff, 2003). Grey et. Al have posited those benefits in four
categories, being that cooperation enables improved management of the ecosystem thereby
providing benefits to the river underscoring all other benefits that can be derived, Secondly,
rivers can yield major economic benefits if managed such as providing support to food and
energy production thereby deriving benefits from the river. Rivers have always held political
significance, however where non-cooperation exists tentions among states will be present and
will ultimately generate cost. This therefore asserts that tension is costly making it costly to
not cooperate. Therefore, benefits can be derived just by choosing to cooperate which will
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yield the benefit of reducing costs arising because of the river which was highlighted in the
case of the Sengal river basin. Rivers could serve as catalytic agents that foster cooperation
among riparian states allowing for economic integration resulting in benefits beyond the
changes among riparian states, to offer viable solutions towards the existing challenges that
governance of water-related collective action issues in a river basin context. Countries reflect
their goals in the mandates assigned to EBOs and their objectives in underlying legal
documents. In other RBOs, the state entrusts RBOs with the responsibility to foster economic
development which goes far beyond a river basin mandate on water and into an economic
realm taking the functionality beyond water resources. However, even though these
differences of their functionality vary from country to country accomplishments of their goals
laid out within their mandate can be a measure of assessing the effectiveness of river basin
organizations. As such, it becomes increasingly important that RBOs create clearly defined
goals and established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track their progression of
their efforts in fulfilment of the mandate. It must however be acknowledged that while goal
attainment is a good indicator to measure effectiveness this on its own may be an insufficient
measure to determine effectiveness since not all progress is easily quantifiable or an be easily
measured(Person et al., 2017). Furthermore, given the dynamic nature of society and its
everchanging economic and social changes those previously defined goals will have to be
changed constantly to keep up with those changing demands and may not hold overtime. In
the case of the Senegal River basin, the stringent pursuit of attaining the mandate has resulted
in harsh environmental impacts and social effects and neglected to prioritize environmental
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protection as it was not a prominent focus of their mandate which can deem their holistic
very complex and factors many moving parts that are at times difficult to measure. Generally,
factors that point to the external reason for establishing of an RBO and the RBO itself. he
One crucial common impediment to effective water governance is the constellation of actors.
the RBO to derive unilateral benefits makes achieving the goal of the RBO difficult.
However, in instances such as the case of the OMVs there were favourable constellation of
actors that saw an equal distribution of power, mutual interests and economic investment
RBOs, RBOs can also play a major role in realizing its success. RBOs that are carefully
adept and able to address the challenges of a basin thus increasing their effectiveness.
- River Basin Committees or Councils, which are generally characterised by little formality.
They act as advisory bodies only and do not have bodies for implementation.
- River Basin Commissions have a certain degree of independence from their member states
- River Basin Authorities have broad mandates covering implementation and management
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of joint infrastructure. They are relatively autonomous and independent in relation to the
riparian governments.
As such, one of the primary features of a RBO is the ability to determine decision making
capacities on the basis of reliable information, consideration for International Law principles
through its governance and procedures that are instituted to mitigate and mediate disputes
among riparian nations. RBOs that promote collective decision making in a systematic
manner specifically through effective and consistent meetings among countries allow for
increased discussions between states within that basin. This also ensures that the result of that
credible information that can inform sound decision making. When RBOs facilitate data
collection from respective countries within a basin overtime through reporting and
monitoring mechanisms it can serve as a very valuable tool for understanding the issues that
exist within that basin and possibly how those existing issues can be addressed while also
Determining the effectiveness of the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal
OMVS in the Senegal river basin factoring endogeneous factors, exogeneous factors and
Institutional design.
Regarding the membership structure of the OMVs, all riparian states have been signatories to
the OMVs serving as collective contributors to the development of the basin and equitably
derive its benefits as well with a well distributed power dynamic. However, within this
institutional set up, the OMVs were designed to initially remedy their water resource
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utilization form an economic position ton alleviate poverty among the countries. However, in
pursuit of this goal, over time the environment became degrades as a result of the
implementation of developmental work that did not factor in the environment as part of its
developmental strategy. Since the recognition of this flaw, the functional scope has since
changed to include the integration of socio-economic and environmental aspects to curb the
impacts of their work on both the environment and society. When considering the legal
foundations, the OMVs charter incorporated water law principles such as prior notification,
equitable use of the water resources, and obligations that include the balanced management of
the water resource, preservation of nature and mediation of arising conflict. In the realm of
the Legalisation and institutionalisation component, in 1962 the Senegal River was declared
an International River which infers that the rule of absolute sovereignty of the basin
management became null. This is also presented in their recent legislation that makes
environmental, social and infrastructural concerns. The organizational structure of the OMVs
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As depicted above, the OMVs is governed by the Conference of Heads Of State and
Government. A president is typically elected from its member states on a rotational basis and
is changed biennially. The council serves as the legal representative and overseeing body that
delegates tasks to the high commissioner who is the executive body of the OMVs and serves
in a renewable term of four years. The office of the High Commissioner operates as an
implementation body that actualizes council directives and also serves as an organizing and
coordinating mechanism. The Permanent water commission in the other hand defines the
modus operandi of the water within the basin between member states and across various
sectors. Financing of the OMVs prescribes that the cost attributed to the operationalization of
the secretariat is distributed equally across members states. However, the implementation
budget differs ever so slightly where the sharing of the costs for the implementation of
developmental projects considers the extent to which the respective countries benefits and
allocates those costs accordingly. With the recent environmental focus on the continued
development of the basin, this garnered the interest of funders to support the recurring
budget. The current financing partners are The World Bank, AFDB, France, Germany Saudi
Arabia.
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In understanding the Governance Mechanisms, it was discovered that when it comes to
decision making it is done based on the consensus in both the Conference of Heads of States
and the Council Of Ministers. While this process can sometimes result in a slow result or
decision, it in many ways ensures the commitment of parties to see the implementation of the
said decisions. In the case of Management of Information while the OMVS are dedicated to
data collection, research and data sharing within the basin, gaps still exist in the area of upper
basin management of Guinea, however, such data can sometimes be difficult to manage in
these circumstances due to lack of trust and transparency. Regarding the monitoring and
compliance of the basin, unfortunately the OMVs have not yet instituted a system for
mechanism, based on 1992 convention a progressive step toward conflict resolution between
countries is through bi-lateral agreements. From that point, unresolved issues could then be
heard through the OAU arbitrage tribunal. However, no such body exists today thereby
institutionalised manner. The OMVs have recently made great strides in facilitating the
inclusion of civil society representation thereby creating an opportunity for external actors to
discuss their position on issues such as socio-economic impacts and larger projects. (Gunilla
& Nilsson, 2015) has thus utilized this combined approach to attribute a subjective ranking
system to essentially measure the effectiveness of the OMVs based on their performance in
In assessing the effectiveness level in the dimensions of level, scope and range, the OMVs
should be considered a success in the ability to create a shift in member states to develop a
willingness to cooperate in joint projects for the development of the river basin. However,
regarding their ability to address the impact aspect, it has been relatively unsuccessful since
the absence of the inclusion of environmental and social dimensions has hampered those
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areas significantly. However, it is noteworthy that the OMVs eventually recognized how this
impact affects their ability to function sustainably and has taken measures to incorporate this
missing component. The OMVs member states still struggle with implementations given the
Political Stability: The initial intention for the three fold plan instituted by the OMVs was
aimed at flood cessation. Traditional patterns of supervision fo use of water resources were
ceased causing both groups to compete for land and water resources in ways that elicited
violence. Two existing challenges are the interests between regional and international and
national and local actors that favour recessional agricultural practises and the state’s interest
specifically in the environmental and social dimension. Despite existing differences within
the basin it has been reported that the significant benefits of the OMVs take precedence over
the occasional conflicts that may arise form time to time. Another critical challenge that
exists not only in the OMVs but in many other basins is the lack of awareness of political
perception and value of the water resource. Many persons ascribe to technical backgrounds
and area rarely cognisant of this and tend to approach issues from a technical perspective
perspective can impair the effectiveness of management and governance of water related
issues.
In the area of environmental sustainability unsurprisingly the OMVs would rank weakly in
this regard given the sever consequences inherited form the isolated focus on economic
growth. This saw the creation of numerous water borne diseases that attributed to a public
health issue, lowered water levels in aquifers, reduced grazing land, increased soil salinity,
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river erosion, eco-system imbalance and pollution. The creation of the PAISE has assisted in
reducing some of the aforementioned challenges but there still remains a lot to be desired to
compensate for the impacts created form the inception of the projects.
On the front of economic growth, the OMVs launched two critical projects, those being e the
Diama and Manantali Dams. They were created with the intent to prevent salt water intrusion
and to also generate hydropower, water for irrigation and stabilizing the rivers flow. The
implementation of the hydropower dam saw a ten year delay and is yet to operate at the
disruption in the distribution of electricity among member states and disproportionately so,
where the urban centres are seen to have benefited more from the availability of these
resources while the rural communities remain underserved. This delay in power production
has resulted in the stalling of other developmental projects across sectors. As a result, Neither
While irrigation has now allowed for year round production, only a third of the lands
promised for irrigation has been made available thereby rendering the goal of rice production
of 12 tons/ha/year to have been unattainable. Unfortunately, riparian states within the Senegal
river basin still import the larger percentage of food for their populations and as such the
The OMVs are still behind on their commitments and have not been successful with regard to
the fulfilment of the three scope dimension of effectiveness particularly with the
magnanimity of their goals initially set out and lack of conflict resolution mechanisms to
navigate their issues. Even though the OMVs are clearly not without flaws, riparians still
praise the progress and work of the OMVs for its role in accelerating ecnomic growth within
the basin. Albeit they indeed have quite an ambitious mandate, there is still time readjust and
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realize those targets. Luckily, the OMVs have managed to amend their mandate in the past to
incorporate environmental and social components, this shows the flexibility of the design of
the OMVs to have introspection and to continuously adjust over time. Rome was not built in
a day, however, the OMVs have valuable lessons to be learned over the years from its poor
management. This provides an excellent opportunity to refocus, strategize and optimize the
functionality of the OMVs to realize their promise to the people. Ultimately, understanding
the complexities of determining effectiveness makes this task quite arduous to offer a black
and white answer of whether the OMVs have been effective based on the indicators
established. It is crucial to recognize that RBOs are multifaceted and complex, they vary from
the sized, governance, political and social relations, climate and the environment, and more
specifically differentiated mandates. Given this there may never be a one size fits all
parameters of this hypothesis, that being the debate of whether “Institutionalized cooperation
is an effective tool for cooperation and management of water resources within the Senegal
river basin.” The answer for the most part would be yes. In many regards the OMVs have
managed to bring the riparian nations together and has fostered the spirit of cooperation and
while many flaws exist at the management level for water resources, they have an
opportunity to address those issues collectively to secure a sustainable future for the
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