Forms of Patronage in Local Leader’s Elections in

Dharmasraya, Pasaman, and Solok districts in 2015

Andri Rusta

Abstract
Based on this research paper, authors found that the patronage pattern of
prospective regent and deputy regent pairs using the concept of patronage.
Patronage and its own forms were not commonly used in previous regional
elections in any region and level in Indonesia. The rise of the use of networks to
become campaign machines has caused people to become entangled in promises
and a feeling of compulsion to reciprocate by voting for candidates who have
given them assistance. Besides, with the fulfillment of momentary desires, the
community can also make dependence on the government in the future greater
while the ability of developing districts is still in doubt about its stability. The
type of research is qualitative with a case study type.
Data collection techniques that used in this research are include open-ended
interviews, documentation, and secondary data from related institutions. Then
the data is analyzed according to Aspinall and Auyero concepts and
perspectives that are used based on conformity with the data found. The
research data were analyzed using data triangulation. The result of the study
was that the form of patronage consisted of successful teams, volunteer teams,
and social networks, The conclusion of this research is that the forms of
patronage and the work of network machines, Political Parties and Teams have
succeeded mainly by utilizing kinship relationships in three locations that are the
object of research with patronage designs that reach socio-cultural aspects and
government-derived institutions such as nagari and Niniak Mamak to provide
support in accordance with the resources they have.

Keywords: Pattern of patronage, Forms of Patronage, Actors that involved

Introduction
The patron-client relationship has been widely studied over the past few
decades by various anthropologists and sociologists and has given great
interest to other scholars to date. The topics studied are diverse enough to
focus on one topic, all related to basic theoretical and controversial problems in

1
the social sciences. Scholars who study patronage mostly view patronage as a
useful concept for understanding social organizations, just as the concept of
social class in traditional societies. Studies of patron-client relationships show
that there is a change in the type of relationship with economic growth or
political organization. For example, in the beginning of the study of patronage,
the patron-client relationship was not necessarily related to economic growth
or political modernization. In contrast to contemporary patronage studies that
tend to be related to economic growth (Blunt, 2012) and modernization of the
state in the political field.

But it is undeniable that patronage studies will always produce different

conclusions because influenced by the principle equality in politics, relations
between democracy and clientelism arise in various countries with different
geographical position, economic condition, and social-culture. Studies from
various angles of the world show that clientelism appears to color democratic
competition and participation, especially when one of the competing parties
has access to patronage. In Indonesia, for example, the issue of patronage
began to emerge when democracy began in the reformation era, it was
inseparable from the emergence of decentralization in the political system in
Indonesia after the destruction of the new order. Decentralization allows for
every local political player to have the opportunity to hope to be a winner due
to the dominant pattern of inclusivity and nepotism (Aspinall, 2010).
Decentralization provides political and financial power by transferring some
control of state finances to the regions, giving local political elites the
opportunity to seize political power at the local level.

Until now, Indonesia adheres to an electoral system with an open list. Where
in this an open list. Where in this election patronage runs by making
candidates as patrons and successful teams that are formed or form
themselves as brokers. One region in Indonesia that has interesting
characteristics to be studied further regarding the application of the patronage
pattern carried out is West Sumatera Province. The region has held direct local

2
elections three times. The local leader’s election was conducted to elect 13
regents and mayors and governors. Several incumbents are vying for political
office for a second time, and there are also some new faces filling the contest. It
was noted that in six regions that incumbent candidates fell against other
candidates, namely Dharmasraya Regency, Pasaman Regency, Solok Regency,
South Pesisir Regency, 50 Kota Regency, and Bukittinggi City. In some areas,
the victory of the non-incumbent candidates was quite convincing and
positioned the incumbent below those candidates.

Based on existing facts from several local leader’s election in West Sumatera,
several candidate pairs use clientelism networks to win local leader’s election.
One of the examples is the Dharmasraya Regency election contestant, Suka-
Aman, they use the traditional network of the Koto Besar Kingdom and
assisted by Javanese ethnicity. Meanwhile in Pasaman, Yusuf-Atos, used
Niniak Mamak to enter the Minangkabau community, as well as the Gusmal-
Yulfadri candidate who were supported by the Niniak Mamak in seeking
support from the community. The main function of this network is
understandable as a negative consequence of direct local elections. However,
there is an interesting phenomenon in which Niniak Mamak is used as a
broker. In the Minangkabau community the traditional ruler is the leader in
his tribe. Based on the election results of the three regions that became the
locus in this research which are Dharmasraya, Pasaman, and Solok, all
incumbents in the local leader’s election lost. The three winners of the local
leader’s election were able to defeat the incumbent regents (Dharmasraya),
regents and deputy regents (Pasaman), dan deputy regents (Solok). The victory
of these three pairs of candidates is also quite interesting if we pay attention to
the movements that were made by their political opponents in the last regional
election.

Furthermore, the author is interested in conducting research on this subject

because most research on patronage and collective actions of clients while
researchers argue that political patronage is a dynamic process that often gives

3
rise to balanced reciprocal relationships. Here, patronage and collective action
not only understood as distinct networks but as interrelated political
phenomena. This study criticized Aspinall for considering patronage only as
part of economic issues and strengthened Auyero perspectives who saw
patronage politics as a regular, daily political act to overcome the problems
they faced. Political clientelism is a way of giving between patrons and brokers
that is part of their way of showing love and service between them.

This research on patronage democracy in direct election of regional heads in

three regions in West Sumatera uses a qualitative approach with a case study
research type. Case studies are used to see the phenomenon analytically and
holistically. In order for the author’s analysis richer in data and interpretation,
next the researcher will explain several things in this study which are as
follows: first, explain the dynamics and implementation of patronage politics at
each research locus; second, explain the role and function of Niniak Mamak
and other traditional leaders as brokers in local leaders election; third, explain
the role and dynamics of civil society in fighting the incumbent; and fourth,
explain the forms of patron-client relationship patterns that emerged in local
leaders election in West Sumatera.

Patronage in Dharmasraya District

Data findings that have been analyzed and arranged chronologically can
explain the forms of profit sharing in networks or patronage networks carried
out by the main subject of the study. The description of the analysis of the
finding data is then summarized in tables and schemes to facilitate the
explanation of the form and network of networks that have been used by pairs
of prospective field findings.

Dharmasraya Regency is a new autonomous region district. Dharmasraya

Regency is an area located in the southeastern region of West Sumatra
Province and is directly adjacent to Jambi Province. In its democratic process,

4
Dharmasraya has until now run three generations of regional leaders with the
2nd regent election held on December 9, 2015. Based on the findings of
research through existing data, researchers can classify patronage in
Dharmasraya Regency in several networks as follows: first, the network of
political machines. Second, the team is successful. Third, political parties. This
is divided into several parts, which are the issue of the four kingdoms that still
exist in Dharmasraya Regency, the organizational structure of the nagari
government, successful teams that utilize sociological factors, to coaching
carried out by political parties. All of them are carried out in accordance with
the blueprint design, strategy, plan, and utilization of the candidate's
resources. Below is an explanation of the broker network scheme of the Regent
and Vice Regent pair Sutan Riska and Amrizal in the 2015 Dharmasraya
Regency local leader’s elections.

Picture 1. Patronage Network of Suka-Aman Regent and Vice Regent

Spouses in the 2015 Dharmasraya Regency Local Leader’s Election

5
 Source: Processed by authors, 2023

Based on that schematic picture, it can be understood that the entire

network used by the Sutan Riska and Amrizal Success Team to gain votes was
used to help channel the various forms of patronage described in the previous
section. Through this scheme, it is understood that the actor's work system is
carried out based on naming the nomenclature mentioned is slightly mixed /
ambiguous in its name, for example registering as a volunteer, as a supporting
figure and so on, but what is certain is that all interviewees stated that they
did support Suka-Aman. The actor works according to his abilities or roles that
vary according to his field.

Further, based on data findings and analysis, it is known that the patronage
network happens in Sutan Riska and Amrizal case during the local leader’s
election of Dharmasraya Regency in 2017, based on research results the
patronage network does not only include the political aspect which are political

6
parties and campaign teams, but also influenced by sociological aspects, such
as socio-cultural elements in running networking. The network machines have
been built in the form of relationships with the kingdom. By the presence of
socio-cultural elements or socio-culture that arises according to the inherent
habits of society who still recognizes the existence of the king’s descendants
and the reasons for the voter.

The construction of the socio-cultural Patronage Network occurred in the

prospective regent of Sutan Riska with royal power has become an added value
to build relationships with the brokers, which is the descendant of the
Siguntur Kingdom. The existence of the descendants of the royal family can
mobilize the royal generation to become part of the government. This royal
network certainly does not work alone, but assisted by brokers which are
mostly indigenous leaders in the nigari sphere.

The patronage network also involved indigenous figures who joined as

pioneers of the campaign team. The role of political parties in this team tends
to be subtle. Thus, campaigns by political party figures from parties in nagari
or jorng are indeed in accordance with the agenda or systematics formed
massively by the Sutan Riska-Amrizal campaign team. Besides the support
from political parties, Sutan Riska-Amrizal also received support from district
leaders who participated in mobilizing the masses by scheduling Sutan Riska-
Amrizal in the agenda of the join visit.

All patronage networks above play a role in distributing forms of patronage

or can be said to act as brokers. The impact of the formation of networks and
the distribution of these forms of patronage is to make voters decide their
choices without using rational references, but rather basing their choices on
the propaganda of public figures which are supporting candidates, which is
Sutan Riska – Amrizal. This also ultimately affects the government structure of
Sutan Riska – Amrizal because there are political promises to traditional nagari
figures which will ultimatelyg affect the vision and mission of Sutan Riska –

7
Amrizal government which tends to lead to conditions where Sutan Riska –
Amrizal prioritizes brokers and supporting figures, rather than the citizen.

The next thing that is also separated from the monitoring of the successful
team of Sutan Riska – Amrizal is the ability or readiness of the district to
realize political promises. Especially because political promises can backfire
because of the guarantees of some professions and the workforce. Thus, the
government tends to face not the needs of the people, but the interests and
desires of the actors driving its network machine who have succeeded in its
victory which has become part of the government structure.

Clientelism in Pasaman Regency

Clientelism involves mutually beneficial, asymmetric relationships between

individuals or groups of unequal socioeconomic or political standing. This
makes clientelism more effective in winning votes in large informal contexts,
because clientelism relationships are based on patterns of interaction or
attitudes that more personnel in direct interaction gain voter support. Support
in the form of patron-clients is usually used in societies that have economic
needs, and primordial things that are still attached. The grassroots structure
that allows direct contact (delivery of concrete material benefits) to voters
remains effective and thus clientelism is an efficient method. The politics of
clientelism will emerge under natural conditions, so the practice of clientelism
is relatively important in countries with technology that tends to lag and high
inequality.

Aspinall argued that patronage exercised by candidates is shown by

distributing material or other benefits to voters by going directly to the public.
For the sake of time efficiency and effectiveness of campaign activities in
getting good political support, candidates do not really do it to all circles or all
regions in the election, but only to certain circles and regions. Identification of
this is done by candidates who see patronage goals. The candidate will choose

8
a target that is loyal to the candidate or whose base is a mass base that has
close ties to the candidate, or the goal of patronage is a floating mass that has
not made a choice or has not been so close to other candidates. So that the
patronage strategy that is carried out can run well and the hope of getting
political support can be achieved to the maximum.

The political practice of clientelism in Pasaman Regency is a phenomenon

that occurs regularly and becomes part of people's daily lives. This happens
because there is a relationship that goes beyond the exchange between patron
and client. The political practice of clientelism in Pasaman Regency is not only
related to giving between patrons and clients, but also as an effort to solve
problems and overcome deadlocks. Besides the authors also found that
cultural factors of the community became one of the causes of the emergence
of clientelism politics in Pasaman Regency. The political practice of clientelism
in Pasaman Regency occurs because of the culture of mutual help and support
between community members, so that patron-client relationships are
considered a form of friendship or kinship.

In the context of the election in Pasaman, it needs to be recognized that

building an identity network is an important capital that is one of the main
attractions by the community. Therefore, ethnic factors are sequentially central
and can influence voter tendencies. This is classified as identity politics related
to the ownership and/or membership of individuals in groups (belonging)
based on similarities with several people and what distinguishes one person
from another. Hand in hand with strengthening identity, the activity of aiding
is also carried out with implicit meaning to gain political support. This
phenomenon makes the author understand that the meaning of candidates in
aiding the community is not just because of social alone, the author's
assessment can be because at the same time, long before the regional elections
take place, candidates have carried out political consolidation to advance in the
regional elections of that period. Therefore, the author sees that these aids
provided by candidates strengthen political capital to face the regional

9
elections, and these aids are a way to get votes by vote buying. Those favors
can entice voters who will vote and invite others to vote for their spouse in the
election.

This condition makes the author analyze that related to the distribution of
assistance to the community from candidates to voters is carried out in two
ways, namely candidates who are directly involved in the community and
through intermediaries. However, the author considers that the main way is
direct distribution to areas that are the mass base. This is what Aspinall said
about how candidates use social networks to get votes. Candidates also often
gain support from influential public figures. The hope is that these community
leaders can direct their social networks to provide political support to
candidates.

Based on phenomena that occurred in West Pasaman, the Yusuf Lubis

couple, who are the highest patrons, have people who have good strategic skills
and experience to become coordinators in each network owned who are clients
of the Yusuf Lubis couple. Each of these coordinators who is a client of the
candidate at the same time also becomes a patron for the people under him
who are tasked with connecting the candidate with voters. The presence of this
clear structure researchers conclude that it has had a great influence on the
votes owned. The networks used do have a special position that is viewed by
the community. So that the political support given by the network to
candidates also binds the public to vote for the couple.

Clientelism in Solok Regency

Solok Regency is one of the areas in the province of West Sumatra which has
a strategic location because it is at the intersection of inter-provincial and
inter-district / city routes. The strategic location of Solok Regency makes this
area very attractive to the political elite. This makes the political conditions in
Solok Regency interesting to see the pattern of relations. On the other hand,

10
the people of Solok Regency still have a very close attachment to culture. It is
undeniable that Minangkabau is an area that has diverse customs and cultural
cultures that are different in each region. Although there is still one common
thread that connects all cultures and cultures, namely both have an
indigenous leader named Ninik Mamak. This traditional leadership is located
throughout the Minangkabau area, and even has Ninik Mamak association
organizations throughout West Sumatra.

Based on the background of political conditions, namely the victory of the

number 1 pair Gusmal – Yulfadri Nurdin in the five jorong in Solok Regency in
the simultaneous regional election contestation in 2015, there is a condition
that deserves further scrutiny, namely Gusmal himself is a former convict who
has been involved in corruption cases, but ventured to run for Regional Head
and finally elected by getting the most votes, even to the point of winning votes
in each jorong. Furthermore, it becomes interesting to note that Gusmal's
victory was strongly influenced by the support of the grass root community so
that the patronage pattern established in Solok Regency became more
interesting for further research.

The pattern of client patron relations in the Solok Regency local leader’s
election can be traced in 2015-2020 where at that time the Regent elected
based on the recapitulation by general elections commision of the Solok
Regency was Gusmal, one of five other regional head candidates who held the
status of a former convict of corruption cases, able to win the voter vote with
46.32% of the votes. Gusmal managed to win in eleven sub-districts out of a
total of fourteen sub-districts in Solok Regency.

Gusmal is an incumbent whose first term in office from 2005 to 2010 was
not so bad. The achievements presented by Gusmal government amid the
community still be a reference for the community in making choices in the
2015 Solok Regency local leader’s election. Analyzing the strategy used by
Gusmal where he uses the 5000 volunteers were mostly volunteers come from

11
the community to support Gusmal-Yulfadri winning the local leader’s election.
So that it can defeat the incumbent candidate Desra Ediwan Anantanur who
previously served as Vice Regent in the 2005-2010 period. The volunteer, who
conducted socialization to the community, conveyed Gusmal's excellence when
leading in the 2005-2010 period.

The thing that makes this local leader’s election unique is because the
corruption case that once ensnared Gusmal did not affect his votes. The proof
is that they got more than 60 thousand votes and won the Solok Regency
Regional Election. Gusmal's status as a former corruption convict is not a
problem for the community. The reason was the community considers
Gusmal's leadership as a regional head to produce many achievements.

The mapping of the patron relationship of Gusmal clients with the

community is inseparable from the background of the gusmal figure. Gusmal
comes from a humble family, with a family of peasant backgrounds. Gusmal
wanted to devote himself to his hometown and do something for the country
where he was born and raised. Gusmal's vision was realized after Gusmal was
elected as Regent of Solok for the 2005-2010 period. Gusmal succeeded in
building Solok Regency with a three-pillar development program as evidenced
by obtaining an award from the central government. Awards obtained by the
Gusmal’s government were Citra Bhakti Abdi Negara, Satya Badge Wirakarya,
and Duty-Free Birth Certificate Bylaws. This achievement is also the basic
basis for Gusmal to strengthen his cultural network in the community as a
leader who is known to be close to the community.

Through these conditions, the capital for the formation of clientelism

political practice relations applied by Gusmal prioritizes good relations or
maintained relationships with all levels of society, without any strings attached
or the lure of money. Instead of doing money politics, what Gusmal did was to
maintain good relations by applying a pattern of greeting when visiting,

12
visiting, or visiting people's homes, so that the community's response was
always to accept his arrival, even long before he became the regional head.

Based on research findings known that Gusmal is one of the officials who is
not financially considered to have much financial capital in every election
contestation, building good relations with the community by money politics
activities was not a model of Gusmal's approach in maintaining and developing
networks to every level of society, especially in maintaining client patron
relationships as defined. Along the way, it should be admitted that Gusmal's
position and position as patron had a direct impact on the formation of his
personal relationship with society. This statement was reinforced when Gusmal
became the head of the development section who had the most contact with the
village head, wali nagari, the head of Korong dusun, even with community
leaders, niniak mamak in building good relationships with all elements of
society.

Practically, Gusmal never uses the pattern of campaign rallies with open
fields that bring in large crowds, because it is considered to require large costs
for technical and supporting purposes such as consumption and
transportation, this pattern is considered inefficient, so it uses the door-to-door
campaign method. In one day, the campaign with the door-to-door method can
reach up to 10 locations with the intensity of each meeting reaching 10 to 20
people which runs effectively establishing an emotional connection between
patron and client. Based on this pattern, the patron pattern of maintaining this
relationship is maintained while still occupying the position of regional head,
still giving a pattern of greeting, and vice versa, after not taking office, the
relationship will still be maintained properly between patron-client.

13
 Picture 2. Gusmal's Clientalism Scheme

Source: Processed by authors, 2023

If you look at Gusmal's context, the fact that Gusmal can survive with his
local leadership is inseparable from Gusmal's relationship with the community
whose relationship pattern can be described as a pattern of reciprocal
relations. The relationship is undergoing a shift from what used to be an
instrumental friendship to a professional technical relationship and now a
relationship without feedback. Gusmal's relationship with the community in
the context of regional elections is Gusmal's pragmatic impact so far in
maintaining strong relationships between elements of society. As a finding that
the relationship between Gusmal and cultural leadership is mutually beneficial
(symbiotic mutualism) and kinship is well maintained by Gusmal so that his
existence and political influence can be accommodated, moreover Gusmal as a
patron is also a cultural figure for his community and people. The author
further analyzes that the thing about the obligation to repay patrons is to

14
provide access to information to clients. In this case, the patron chooses a
known partner to work with. Facilitating the work of close relationships is the
way used by patrons. An example, the phenomenon that Gusmal played an
active role in development programs since his leadership was initially
appointed as a state civil apparatus to the highest peak of his bureaucratic
karis as Regional Secretary of Solok Regency, is the main capital that Gusmal
has in implementing clientalism patronage relations.

In the case of clientelism in Solok Regency, the ability to build networks by

strengthening the basis of relationships with the community. The network
formed by Gusmal entered the realm of custom, culture and economy. Social
networks are described as a relationship that seems to be a path or channel
that connects individuals through which something can be channeled in the
form of goods, services, and information. A social network is a special type of
network in which the bonds connected from one point to another are social
relationships. The network of cooperation between two people raises the
expectations of each party to provide mutual benefits to each other. Social
networks are considered important because they affect the relationships
between interacting actors. The wider the network, the greater the chance to
realize interest.

The description of the results shows that the patron-client pattern used by
Gusmal is a pattern that occurs because of the exchange of trust caused by the
closeness between the two has been established for a long time, as well as
protection and hope as Scott statement. But there is one exchange of
resources, personal resources that Scott does not explain but mentions by
Stoke in his distributive politics, which is that the pattern of patron-client
relationships is not only based on instrumental friendships as Scott says but
there are other elements such as emotional closeness due to ethnicity and
religion.

15
 Based on the theory that the author used in this study, it becomes a truth
that what matters is not what you know, but who you know, and what is
beneficial to you. This means that if the people you know have a good impact
on you, and if the people you know can have a reciprocal relationship with you
then all the difficult affairs will feel easier. The wealth of capital owned by
Gusmal as a patron, opens the potential to attract the support and sympathy
of clients so that clients use all networks owned to provide the best dedication
and support to Gusmal to finally win the contestation of the Solok Regency
regional elections in 2015.

Conclusion
Based on the results of the research described in the previous section and
associated with the theory of political patronage that the author uses, namely
from Aspinall, there are five (5) forms of patronage. As for the three research
locations that the author uses, namely Dharmasraya Regency, Pasaman
Regency, and Solok Regency, the author finds that in the implementation of
political patronage applied in each district has more or less the same pattern,
by carrying out five forms of patronage, namely through the use of political
parties and successful teams, utilizing patronage-clientelism networks, and
patronage to the community. However, the authors conclude that the form of
patronage that has the most significant role is the construction of patronage
networks that are socio-cultural in nature. This is because the three areas are
still inhabited by people who maintain customs so thickly. The existence of
indigenous groups in the three districts is still very calculated to win the
contestation of regional elections in the three regions.

Further concluded, the patronage structure formed based on the three

regions as follows:

1. Team Success. It is a team formed by the carrying party. However, this

team does not fully have a significant impact on the candidate's victory

16
 because in the end it has political interests that must be realized when
victory is obtained.
2. Volunteer Team. This element is strongly believed to be a major
influence in winning candidates for regional head candidates because
the formation of the volunteer element is based on a strong desire to
win with sincerity.
3. Social Networks. The social networks formed in each region are related
to the approach taken by candidates using socio-cultural instruments.
This will form a patron-client network, where candidates who act as
patrons will provide maximum resources.

An interesting thing to analyze from this finding is that amid the life of ethnically
diverse communities and diverse interests in a multi-ethnic community in a district
that tends to be far from the hustle and bustle of the capital, there are still rational
considerations such as retrospectives or evaluations of the performance of previous
governments are still strong underlying community choices in some areas. However, it
should be acknowledged that the pattern of patronage cannot be eliminated from the
democratic culture of Indonesian society, but this does not eliminate the hope that
Indonesia is able to realize the concept of democracy which in substance is a means of
community sovereignty to determine for themselves their qualified regional leaders and
oriented to the interests and welfare of the entire community.

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