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Perrin Objections To Memo
Perrin Objections To Memo
MARLENE WILKINSON )
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Plaintiffs, )
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v. DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
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TO MEMORANDUM AND
HENDERSON COUNTY )
RECOMMENDATION
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Defendants. )
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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any
To bring a Title VII hostile work environment claim based upon race, Plaintiff
(1) unwelcome; (2) based on race; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) imputable
to defendant. E.E.O.C. v. Central Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir.
2009) The Memorandum and Recommendation erred when it found that Plaintiff
sufficient facts plausibly demonstrating that the workplace was “permeated with
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct.
367, 370 (1993) (internal citations omitted). When considering whether a plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to state a Title VII hostile work environment claim, the
Court will consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the ‘frequency of
with an employee’s work performance.’” Okoli v. City of Baltimore., 648 F.3d 216,
220 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). The standard for proving a hostile
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attacking the ‘ordinary tribulations of the workplace such as the sporadic use of
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2284. (1998) (internal citations
omitted)). As a result, “[P]laintiffs must clear a high bar in order to satisfy the
severe or pervasive test.” EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc, 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th
Cir. 2008). Plaintiff must also show that based upon a “reasonable person”
erred in finding that Plaintiff stated a claim for hostile work environment based
upon race because the allegations in her Amended Complaint do not meet the
conduct- occurring over a six year time period- to demonstrate that she was
stated that Plaintiff was not qualified to be a supervisor and played the “race card,”
language,” the word “urban”, and that the County Manager told DSS Administrator
Sandy Morgan to “[g]et [Plaintiff] out of here. We don’t want a person like her
working for the County, ” id. at ¶¶ 12, 15; 3) unspecified times where Plaintiff was
Plaintiff’s hair and skin, id. at ¶ 20; and 5) Plaintiff was not given a window
office. Id. at ¶ 22. These allegations do not rise to the level of “severe and
pervasive harassment” because Plaintiff does not allege acts that are sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive
harassment. From February 2015 until she resigned in 2021, Plaintiff can only
identity two specific incidents- the 2015 comments made by her subordinates and
during that time period. The fact that these alleged events span six years indicates
that the alleged discrimination was not widespread and pervasive. See Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir.1996), abrogated on other
grounds by Bostock v. Clayton County, - U.S.-, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (“the
with gaps between incidents as great as a year. That alone suggests the absence of
work environment claim in part because “the alleged events are temporally diffuse,
together ... from discrete acts of alleged discrimination against her that are neither
pervasive” conduct. While Plaintiff contends that these complaints were “racially
motivated,” id, she does not allege who made these comments, how the comments
were racially motivated, or even that they were racial in nature. “While legal
statements are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
in her Amended Complaint concerning this meeting were that she was a “token”
and “played the race card to get the position.” [Document 6, ¶ 7]. As the Fourth
Circuit stated, “Title VII does not create a ‘general civility code in the workplace’”
personality conflict with [one’s] supervisor, are not actionable.” Sunbelt Rentals,
After receiving these complaints, Morgan did not ignore them. [Document
6, ¶¶ 8-9]. Rather, she investigated it and asked Plaintiff to identify who made
comments about her. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the results of
Morgan’s investigation, id., does not change the fact that an investigation was
Chenette v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc, 345 Fed. Appx. 615 at * 4 (2nd Cir.
negates hostile work environment claim because employer “rather than tolerating a
Plaintiff’s subordinates were rude to her, and not punished for it, “[w]orkplaces
are not always harmonious locales, and even incidents that would objectively give
One year after Plaintiff’s subordinates made comments about her, Plaintiff
alleges that she was investigated in 2016 for “reverse racism” and for using
“threatening body language,” the word “urban”, and then escorted out of the office
against her because of her race. Moreover, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how her
use of the word “urban” demonstrates the racial bias of people- any of Defendant’s
employees- who didn’t use that word. In addition, Plaintiff was cleared of any
wrongdoing within one day of the investigation being started. Id. at ¶ 13. With
respect to Plaintiff’s allegations that she was escorted out of the office by Morgan,
transgender woman who claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment for, among other things, being escorted from work for a perceived
not support a hostile work environment claim because “Plaintiff merely alleges that
she was escorted out of the work premises by security, albeit that this escorting
occurred through the main hallway of the work building and in view of other
made” [Document 6, ¶¶ 19] does not rise to the “severe and pervasive” level.
Plaintiff does not identify the specific comments which were “[r]acially derogatory,”
who made them, when they were made, or what “frequently made” means. Was it
every day, every week, or every month? Presumably, if her work environment was
permeated with these comments, Plaintiff could specifically identify the “racially
derogatory” comments, who made them, and when. Simply saying that “racially
derogatory” comments were made, without any factual support, does not make it so.
2013), the district court held that comments such as “you people” and “y’all blacks
are sneaky people and always trying to get around the rules” was “insensitive and
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necessary to alter the terms and conditions of employment.” See also Webster v.
Town of Warsaw, 66 F.Supp.3d 706, 709 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (use of the term “boy,” to
refer to African American police chief was offensive but did not create a hostile
work environment based upon race); Murphy v. Danzig, 64 F.Supp.2d. 519, 522
(E.D.N.C. 1999) (defendant’s comment to plaintiff that “’you’re black’ and that ‘you
people’ are used to being targeted” was “a mere offensive utterance that occurred
once and did not unreasonably interfere with [plaintiff’s] ability to work.” ).
comments, Plaintiff does not state what Morgan said about her hair and skin, but
only that Morgan made comments about both. [Document 6, ¶ 20]. While
Morgan’s questioning Plaintiff about her hair was undoubtedly not professional, it
Plaintiff about wearing her “hair naturally and in a fro” and requests to touch
Plaintiff’s hair not severe and pervasive harassment.). See also Perches v. Elcom,
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (occasional comments about the
plaintiff’s hair and lips, including asking whether her hair was real, though
employer used the word “thug” to describe a Plaintiff, “[w]hether or not it would
While Plaintiff points to the fact that she was not assigned an office with a
allege any facts to support such a claim. Finding that a work environment is altered
2-3 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (unpublished) (dismissing hostile work environment claim
based, in part, upon allegations that Plaintiff was asked to move her office to a
basement office).
Plaintiff’s promotions and achievements undercut her claim that her work
environment was hostile. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that she was
thirty one income maintenance workers, id. at ¶ 21, and was the only black
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with Plaintiff’s work performance. Okoli v. City of Baltimore., 648 F.3d 216, 220
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). These allegations are the antithesis of
Courts have dismissed hostile work environment claims on motions to dismiss. For
2015), Plaintiff’s supervisor asked her if she was intimidated by white people,
accused her of using a wrong methodology with her patients which Plaintiff
attributed to racism, and made unspecified “racial bias comments.” Id. at 401. In
addition, like Plaintiff’s claim here that she was promoted due to “playing the race
card,” Covington alleged that her supervisor made her feel that “colorism” played a
role in her position. Id. at 401. The Court held that these allegations did not
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differently than white employees by accusing her of not working and snapping her
fingers because “that is the only way ‘you people will listen’”, disciplined her for
using the phone for personal calls, and stated that she had to watch Plaintiff “because
y’all blacks are sneaky people’ and always trying to get around the rules.” The
district court held that while the comments and actions were rude and insensitive,
Plaintiff did not plausibly allege a hostile work environment claim. Id.
Operations, Freidberg, was rude to her at meetings, hated her according to her co-
workers, failed to respond to emails from her but did to males, and terminated her
for a mistake that males made. The district court held that “Title VII does not create
a general civility code in the workplace,” and dismissed the hostile work
environment claim because Plaintiff’s allegations “do not rise the level of ‘severe
and pervasive’ harassment that altered the conditions of Jones’ employment.” Id. at
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against a recent Fourth Circuit case which reversed the district court’s granting of
from a co-worker, Adams, that “blacks cannot speak properly” and Adams “cannot
understand them”, id. at 207; 2) Adams “erupted in anger and said “this is NATO,
referred to her as “you people,” abruptly stood up causing her chair to crash into the
wall, and then screamed at Plaintiff and stormed out of the room, id. at 208; 6)
Plaintiff’s direct supervisor Khalifeh announced his belief that Black male athletes
“excel” in sports “because the slave masters had bred the strongest slaves together,”
id. at 211; and 7) Plaintiff was not selected for a vacant position after her supervisor
and the director of human resources allegedly colluded against her. Id. at 209. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the hostile work environment
behaviors that Title VII serves to root out—repeated invectives of an overtly racial
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rejected for a new position, Plaintiff was promoted twice and was the highest ranking
II. CONCLUSION
comments about her skin and hair, and her failure to obtain an office with a
coworkers, and superiors, and not the severe and pervasive conduct required for a
hostile work environment claim. For these reasons, this Court should reject the
race claim.
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/s/Sean F. Perrin
N.C. State Bar. No. 22253
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
301 South College Street, Suite 3500
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202-6037
Telephone: 704-331-4992
Facsimile: 704-338-7814
Sean.Perrin@wbd-us.com
Attorney for Defendant
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