Security Training for Seafarers with designated

Security Duties (STSDSD)

1. Introduction
Security for Seafarers came into focus because of three factors:

1. The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (notably the launch of counter-terrorist
operations at sea),
2. The occurrence of three high visibility terrorist acts against ships (USS Cole in
2001, French tanker Limburg in 2002 and Filipino passenger ship Super Ferry 14
in 2004), and
3. The rise of piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca at the beginning of the
century.

Following that, the surge of piracy at the Horn of Africa between 2007 and 2012 largely
contributed to generating debates on the legal, criminal, cultural, economic, military,
environmental and energy dimensions of piracy in particular and maritime security in
general. The maritime security geo-strategies in 2014 demonstrate that states’ and
international institutions’ maritime security objectives and interests are indirectly and
directly influenced by geographical and geopolitical considerations. The expression
‘maritime security’ is recent. Since the end of the 1990's and the beginning of the
2000's, maritime security was increasingly used to describe preventive measures set up
to respond to illegal activities at sea or from the sea (including the protection of shipping
and ports).

Terrorism (post 9/11) and piracy (especially after 2007 and the rise of attacks at the
Horn of Africa) attracted most of the media’s attention. However, arms and drug
trafficking, people smuggling, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and deliberate
pollution still represent the bulk of illegal and disruptive activities at sea.

The maritime domain is a space within which human actors operate, either to perform
illegal, disruptive and damaging activities or to police and secure the sea in order to fight
criminal actors. Maritime security refers to a geographical space, that is to say the sea,
which has different characteristics compared to the land. States’ maritime security
interests result in a practice consisting in projecting security beyond their external
boundary into the global maritime domain. Thus, zones of interests are defined, which
extend beyond one’s legal zone. In security narratives, those maritime zones are
represented as vital for one’s security, which justifies power projection activities.

The need to enhance maritime security came with the rise of piracy off the coast of
Somalia between 2008 and 2011. The dangers of piracy for international trade brought
the maritime dimension of security to the global consciousness and lifted it high on
policy agendas. Moreover, the inter-state tensions in regions, such as the Arctic, the
South China Sea, or the East China Sea and the significant investments in blue water
navies of emerging powers, such as India and China, have increased attention for the
oceans as a security space.

Safety concerns are core to maritime security given that it may involve environmental
and cultural interests. Marine safety has also been increasingly linked to maritime
security given that the maritime industry, shipping companies and their employees are
simultaneously potential targets (e.g. of pirates, terrorists, or criminals) as well as
potential perpetrators (by engaging in maritime crimes such as trafficking of persons,
illicit goods or weapons or in collaborating with violent actors).

Maritime security is also linked to economic development. Throughout history the oceans
were always of vital economic importance. The majority of trade is conducted via the sea
. Both global shipping and fisheries have developed into multi-billion industries. The
commercial value of the oceans has moreover been increasingly re-evaluated due to the
economic potential of offshore resources, centrally fossil energy but also seabed mining,
as well as the economic promises of coastal tourism. The concept of blue economy is
linked to maritime security since sustainable management strategies not only require the
enforcement and monitoring of laws and regulations, but a secure maritime environment
provides the precondition for managing marine resources.

The major concern and scope for this course is limited to marine safety, under the
regime of the IMO that oversees the interest of the shipping industry and the individual
interests of the seafarer.

For almost two decades, maritime security has largely been framed by the
implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which
focuses on detecting and preventing security threats against ports and ships. But due to
increasing concern for the safe and secure movement of cargo, as well as the maturity of
the implementation of the ISPS Code over the last 15 years, maritime security has
begun to focus on treating ports and ships as conduits within the supply chain—not just
targets.

This shift from port and vessel security to broader cargo and supply chain security is
driven by the evolution of both global trade and threats to the supply chain—issues that
the ISPS Code does not adequately address. While the code has well-established security
requirements for ports and ships, it views these assets as targets of nefarious activities—
specifically terrorism—and not as broader conduits of illicit activity or movement of
contraband or theft of cargo.

As global trade continues to increase at a rapid rate, there is more cargo in the system,
as well as an increasing reliance on just-in-time delivery, which makes cargo and supply
chain security more sensitive to disruption, with greater potential impacts. The
movement of cargo is also increasingly dependent on electronic data streams, which
increase the risks of converged cyber, physical, and operational security challenges.
Maritime security is no longer just about protecting vessels and ports—it goes hand-in-
hand with cargo and supply chain security. Updated codes, regulations, and best
practices should reflect this evolution of the industry. This shift should emphasize a
broader focus on maritime security as an integrated system of physical assets, cargo,
and data that needs to be secure and resilient, rather than simply a collection of ports
and ships that need to be protected.

1.1 Course overview

Course Objective

The course is designed to provide seafarers with the knowledge required to perform
designated security duties in connection with the Ship Security Plan (SSP). These duties
are as required as per Chapter XI -2 of SOLAS 74 and Section A-VI/6 of the STCW Code
as amended.
1.2 Competences to be achieved
Competences that will be achieved through completion of the course
After completing the course a trainee will be competent in the following matters related
to ship security

 Recognition of security risks and threats

 Will be able to undertake regular security inspections of the ship independently
 Will be able to use security equipment and systems properly

1.3 Current security threats and patterns

Piracy and armed attacks continue to occur on an increasingly frequent basis at sea.
Armed robbery occurs mostly in port areas, while piracy occurs at sea. Piracy occurs
outside the jurisdiction of the state. In this form of terrorism well armed pirates attack,
then board a ship and then hold the officers and crew on board for ransom money. This
type of attack is common in Somalia.

Terrorism usually involves violence, or the threat of violence, by extremist groups

seeking to gain political objectives by malicious means. The do this by using various
types of bombs, bomb threats or hijacking a ship. Increasingly, they are acting with
extremist religious sects that promote suicidal behaviour.

The Year 2018 Reports and trend - The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre has released its
global piracy report for 2018, and it warns that the maritime industry experienced a net
increase in attacks year-over-year. In particular, the agency recorded a "marked rise in
attacks against ships and crews around West Africa." Worldwide, the IMB recorded 201
incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery in 2018, up from 180 in 2017. The Gulf
of Guinea is particularly dangerous for seafarers: reports of attacks in waters between
the Ivory Coast and the Congo more than doubled in 2018, and these incidents
accounted for the overwhelming majority of serious acts of piracy worldwide. The Gulf of
Guinea accounted for all six hijackings, 13 of the 18 ships fired upon, 130 of the 141
hostages held, and 78 of 83 seafarers kidnapped for ransom worldwide.

In a worrisome trend, this violence accelerated in the last quarter of the year. 41
kidnappings were recorded off Nigeria between October and December, more than half
the annual total. Some of these attacks occurred up to 100 nm offshore, well outside of
the territorial waters of West African states.

There is an urgent need for increased cooperation and sharing of intelligence between
the Gulf of Guinea’s littoral states so that effective action can be taken against pirates,
both at sea and on shore where their operations originate and end.

In other regional developments, acts of piracy declined or remained at relatively low

levels off the shores of other historic hot spots like Somalia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Somali pirates fired upon three merchant vessels last year, but they
conducted no successful boardings. In Sabah, Malaysia, five crew members from two
fishing boats were kidnapped, and one tug came under attack - far less than the
outbreak of abductions seen in 2017. In Indonesia, six crew members were held hostage
and threatened in one incident, but the overwhelming majority of reports were for acts
of low-level theft.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is aware of the escalating level of this
criminal activity, and provides a free service to the seafarer by establishing the 24 hour
IMB Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The reporting center provides:

 A piracy map
 A live piracy report
 Piracy prone areas and warnings
 Piracy news
 A piracy report
 A contact point to report piracy incidents

Terrorism
Terrorism is covertly planned but dramatic action, by clandestinely organised, often
unrepresentative groups, to spread fear by extreme violence in order to coerce, or
provoke a government or populace to take a particular course of political action desired
by the terrorists.

Example of terrorists use of shipping - In October 2001 in the Italian port of Gioia Taurio
an Egyptian Al Qaeda suspect was found in a container bound for Nova Scotia.

The Container was fitted with bed and toilet and had a laptop, US airport maps, forged
security passes and Canadian passports.

Some of the terrorist incidents at sea include the following:

 The passenger vessel Achille Lauro was boarded and hijacked in 1985.
 Attack on the USS Cole in 2000.
 Attack on the French VLCC Limburg in 2002
 Transportation of terrorist weapons on the Karine A in 2002 and the Baltic Sky in
2003.

The Achille Lauro Incident

This hijacking incident happened on October 7, 1985, when the Italian
ship MS ‘Achille Lauro’ was hijacked by four men representing the
Palestine Liberation Front off the coast of Egypt, as she was sailing from
Alexandria to Ashdod, Israel. A 69-year-old Jewish American man in a
wheelchair, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered by the hijackers and thrown
overboard. The hijacking sparked the "Sigonella Crisis".

Sigonella in Italy is the airbase where the hijackers landed after being given safe
passage from Egypt, after freeing the vessel’s hostages and disembarking from the
vessel.

The ‘Sigonella’ incident is the standoff that occurred between US Navy Seals and Italian
defence forces. In the incident the Italians prevented the US Seals from arresting the
hijackers. The hijackers were finally arrested by the Italians and tried in Italy, for
hijacking and murder.

After the trial, they were sent to an Italian prison.

 Passenger Vessel Achille Lauro

The USS Cole incident

On the morning of Thursday, 12 October 2000, USS Cole, docked in Aden
harbour for a routine fuel stop. Cole completed mooring at 9:30 am; and
began refuelling at 10:30 am. Around 11am local time, a small fiberglass
boat carrying C4 explosives and two suicide bombers approached and hit
the port side of the destroyer and exploded, creating a 40-by-60-foot
gash in the ship’s port side.

Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 were injured in the blast.

The attack was organized and directed by the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.
 USS Cole

The VLCC Limburg Incident

The Double hull VLCC Limburg suffered an explosion on 6th October 2002 at an SBM off
Sanaa, Yemen. It was the terrorist attack like the Cole incident. A fast boat was seen
approaching the vessel and colliding with the ship and causing the explosion. A large
pool of burning oil spread out from the side of the ship.
 VLCC Limburg

Contraband Smuggling
Contraband smuggling is a criminal activity, that may result in huge financial loss to the
ship owner whose ship is used by smugglers. Often drugs may be smuggled. Drugs are
brought on board the vessel in a number of ways and are normally brought in through,
luggage, stores, in a person’s body or in electronic equipment. Weapons could also be
smuggled, and normally come on board through cargo containers.

Example – On August 6th 2018, Colombian authorities seized more than one ton of
cocaine that was discovered inside a container on a ship bound for Europe.

The drugs were found following raid of the Singapore-flagged ship Cap San Tainaro in
the waters off Barranquilla, Colombia shortly after the vessel departed Cartegena,
Colombia bound for Antwerp, Belgium.

During the raid, authorities found 1,144 packages containing 1 kilogram of cocaine
apiece, worth an estimated street value of about $66 million.

The drugs are believed to have been smuggled by an organised crime group known for
its drug trafficking activities to Europe.
 Drug routes

Hidden drugs on a vessel

Cargo Theft
Cargo theft is an age old problem, that results in great financial loss to
the ship owner. Prevention is the best method to prevent cargo theft.

Example - Note that containers offer little security even when locked/ sealed
Therefore, container storage areas must be marshalled and protected, an
interim solution as smart seals and containers (using radio-frequency
identification) could prevent container pilferage in the future.
 Break up of cargo theft

Stowaways and Refugees

Human trafficking is a security threat where human beings can be
smuggled through containers. There have been cases of stowaways
coming on board vessels from ports in Africa.

Example - A stowaway was discovered in the rudder trunk after a voyage from West
Africa to South America

Human trafficking

Stowaways seem to be an ever-present problem for the shipping industry, in particular

to those trading on the coast of West Africa, in Central America, Colombia, Venezuela
and on the Dominican Republic. In addition to vessels’ trade patterns, this problem is
also closely linked to vessel and/or cargo type, as well as to the security training and
awareness of the crew. The lion share of stowaways is found on board bulk,
container and general cargo vessels. Car carriers are also over-represented compared to
other vessel types. The costs involved in looking after and repatriating stowaways can be
substantial. If more than one stowaway gain access to the vessel, the costs have been
known to escalate to USD 100,000 or more, simply because repatriation is usually only
permitted with two security guards escorting each stowaway.
The UK P&I Club, GARD as well as North of England P&I club have issued stowaways
checklist to provide guidance and steps for preventing and dealing with stowaways.

According to the UK P&I club checklist, the following steps are recommended:

 Prior to and during a ship’s call at any port, it will be necessary to ensure all
relevant sections of the ISPS Code are implemented particularly regarding the
ship’s gangway and dock areas. All access points should be secured.
 Ensure there is always a member of the ship’s crew manning the gangway who is
closely monitoring all persons embarking and disembarking. Additional
precautions such as CCTV should also be used where available.
 On ro-ro vessels the ramp should be monitored at all times and any access points
on deck should be locked so that the vessel cannot be penetrated.
 Agents should obtain and provide the ship with a list from the stevedore company
that clearly identifies the number of stevedores working on the ship. It is
essential that stevedores only embark and disembark by the ship’s gangway and
their movements are constantly monitored whilst onboard.
 All visitors that are expected on the ship should be known to the ship’s master,
the crew member assigned to gangway watch duty and the agents, with their
expected time of arrival and clear details of their intended business onboard. All
visitors should be instructed to report to the crew member assigned to gangway
watch duties in the first instance.
 Be vigilant for any persons who may be trying to board the ship by mooring ropes
or small boats at the waters edge. This is particularly important when the ship is
berthed at night.
 It is essential that the ship is searched prior to departure, including all dark and
difficult to access areas. This should include areas that are thought to be
locked/secured. Empty bays on container vessels and empty holds on
bulk/general cargo vessels should be searched. In some circumstances it may be
prudent to engage an external search company to assist with a search prior to
the ship’s departure.

In case a stowaway is found onboard, The Club recommends briefly to take the following
measures:

 Once the presence of a stowaway has been detected it is important to inform the
owners and the port agents.
 It is the responsibility of the agent to advise the local authorities of the
stowaway’s presence
 It can be very useful to search the area where the stowaway was found
 Ensure that the stowaway’s clothing has been searched
 The stowaway must be photographed and interviewed
 Once the above information has been obtained, it should be reported to the Club
and/or the local correspondent
 While the stowaway remains onboard, he should be fed and allowed access to
basic items such as bed and toilet
 It will be necessary for the stowaway to be kept secure at all times

Please click here to see the stow away check list by UK P&I Club
Please click hereto see the stow away guidance by GARD

Maritime fraud, where seamen employed on board could have counterfeit passport and
other official documents.
Collateral Damage
Collateral damage occurs when a nearby fire, explosion, or attack results
in damage to a ship or facility.

Ships could be sabotaged by hoax calls of saying that a bomb is on board. In this regard
the 'Queen Mary' received a hoax call of a bomb on board.

Example – A deckhand was jailed for two years for setting fire to an offshore supply
vessel by pouring petrol onto her gangway as the crew slept on board, because he was
ordered off the ship after a drunken row with the captain.

Cyber crime
With the advent of IT in shipping there are possibilities of cyber-crime on
vessels.

Common forms of cyber-crime are:

 Phishing: using fake email messages to get personal information from internet
users;
 Misusing personal information (identity theft);
 Hacking: shutting down or misusing websites or computer networks;
 Spreading hate and inciting terrorism;
 Distributing child pornography;
 Cyber crime

1.4 Ship and port operations and conditions

Ports have to protect against a wide range of threats that can range from ship borne to
underwater based and from theft and vandalism to piracy. Not only do they have to
meet security regulations such as the International Ship and Port facility Security code
(ISPS) but they will have to meet the requirements of maritime regulations such as the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

In Transportation, the size of the industry leads to challenges in both the range of
vulnerabilities and the volume of passengers and freight to be protected, creating a need
for systems that can be scaled to meet requirements. Safety of passengers and the
protection of freight are paramount and the ability to create co-ordinate responses to
incidents is becoming increasingly critical.
In late June of 2017, AP Moeller-Maersk shut down its container operations at the Port of
Los Angeles. It was a cyber-attack. For the maritime industry and its extended supply
chains, the threat is real and looming. Ports are the economic engines of this country
and the world, meaning any downtime caused by a breach could have a catastrophic
impact on global supply chains.

Transportation infrastructure is often viewed as a target as it is a first line in disabling or

doing harm to a supply chain. The effects of such an attack may ripple throughout the
commerce that relies on it. Within transportation infrastructure though, maritime
operations are truly vulnerable. Not only is a cyber threat part of the problem, but so are
further acts of terror. The seaports with cruise terminals have some of the largest
gatherings of people anywhere, with thousands of people embarking and debarking
within a handful of hours inside a relatively small footprint.

New technology is likely to shape the risk equation for all links in transportation supply
chains. Investments in securing maritime operations are increasing in parallel to the
security vulnerabilities of the marine supply chain infrastructure.

In a marine environment , new visual technologies can be a boon to security efforts.

Security cameras are very sophisticated nowadays and can offer capabilities that go
beyond the archaic vigilance and surveillance we associate with them.

Access control can limit access to sensitive area and CCTV systems can help identify
suspicious activity. When linked together with other systems such as intrusion detection,
fire and public address systems the integrated solution can become a powerful command
and control application allowing users to detect, monitor and respond to events in the
most safe and effective way. Access control is an important part of the security
environment in the Port and Maritime sector and provides the ability to control and
monitor movement of staff in restricted areas. This helps the port authority to meet the
requirements of the ISPS Security code. The ability to run CCTV and access control
system over the IT infrastructure is particularly beneficial in a port where the
geographical area can be large and having to run cable for individual systems can
involve significant expense.

Thermal cameras for ports are a must-have technology for maritime security, especially
for perimeters. There are currently solutions available that can work with thermal
cameras to allow for the detection of moving objects and long ranges with only a couple
of pixels on targets needed. Intelligent software applications can take what is captured
by a thermal camera and optimize it by connecting with a neighboring Pan-Tilt-Zoom
(PTZ) color camera, which can automatically track the object detected by the thermal
camera.
Tools and technology as well as a dedicated task force to bolster security are crucial. The
message for proper cyber hygiene must be circulated over and over again to employees
at all levels within a company and protocols need to be enforced regarding the use of
external devices. As attacks - both physical and cyber - continue to rise, maritime
infrastructure must be riveted on reliable security measures.

Intermodal nature of transportation and Interfaces

The diagram shown below illustrates interaction of a vessel with other modes of
transport:

Intermodal transport involves the use of at least two different modes in a trip from an
origin to a destination through an intermodal transport chain, which permit the
integration of several transportation networks.

Examples of intermodal and multimodal operation:

In today’s market, a shipping agent acts like as an intermediary between the shipper
and the consignee.
Intermodality enhances the economic performance of a transport chain by using modes
in the most productive manner. Thus, the line-haul economies of rail may be exploited
for long distances, with the efficiency of trucks providing flexible local pick up and
deliveries.
The key is that the entire trip is seen as a whole, rather than as a series of legs, each
marked by an individual operation with separate sets of documentation and rates.

As the container is a common instrument used in the intermodal transport chain they
can be used in the illicit trade of counterfeit goods, drugs and weapons and for
terrorism.

Because of these concerns, all containers are electronically scanned at the port of
loading, prior to departure.
2. Maritime Security Policy
International conventions are treaties or agreements between states the primary actors
in international law.

An International Convention is enforced through state law after the State ratifies
(agrees) the Convention and enacts it as the law of the state through a bill introduced
and then passed in parliament.

A code is a set of standards set forth and enforced, through regular checks and
certification.

A recommendation in relation to security is advice or counsel which although presented

as such, the recipient is free to take or leave.

After the so-called 9/11 incident IMO worked vigorously to improve security at sea.

2.1 Familiarity with relevant international

conventions
Summarizes previous efforts of IMO toward maritime security, such as
MSC/Circ.443, SUA Act, etc.
IMO has passed several resolutions to help improve maritime security, and these include

 IMO Resolution A.545 (13) – measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships (1983)
 IMO Resolution A.545 (14) – measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten
the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews (1985)
 IMO MSC/Circ.443 – measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and
crews aboard ships (1986)
 IMO Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA) Convention – for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of
maritime navigation (in force 1992)
 IMO MSC/Circ.754 – Passenger ferry security (consideration primarily in respect
of passenger ferries operating on international routes and ports serving those
routes) (1996)

Though there were conventions, circulars and resolutions (as listed above) related to
maritime security at sea before September 11, 2001, none of them was mandatory.

Summarizes the rapidity with which IMO acted to enhance maritime security
following 9/11
After the ‘9/11’ incident IMO worked very swiftly to improve security on board ships, this
ultimately resulted in amendments to SOLAS to enhance maritime security and the
development of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).

The initiatives to develop the ISPS Code and to amend SOLAS were done as illustrated in
the flow chart below:

Flow Chart on work flow used to improve maritime security

Summarizes the amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI and the contents of the ISPS
Code
The ISPS Code was adopted by a resolution on 12 December 2002 by the conference of
Contracting Governments to the SOLAS convention.

Another resolution also includes the necessary amendments to Chapters V (Safety of

Navigation) and XI (Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety) of SOLAS of which
compliance with the ISPS Code became mandatory on 1 July 2004.

The existing Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) of SOLAS was
amended and re-identified as chapter XI–1 and a new chapter, XI-2 (Special measures
to enhance maritime security) was adopted.
Another problem for the maritime industry is piracy on the high seas.

What is the ISPS Code?

The ISPS Code is comprised of two parts, Part A and Part B:
Part A
Details the mandatory requirements regarding the provisions of chapter XI – 2 of
SOLAS, as amended.

Part B
Details guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS as amended, and
Part A.
 The ISPS Code

The objectives of the ISPS Code are to establish an international framework, involving
co-operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local
administrations and the shipping and port industries to:

 Detect/assess security threats; (surveillance, using ship security assessment,

port facility security assessment)
 Take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port
facilities used in international trade; (ship security plan, port facility security plan)
 Establish the respective roles and responsibilities of all these parties concerned;
and at the national and international level; (company, ship and port facility
security officers and other officers)
  To ensure maritime security; (various security levels (1,2,3), depending on the
impending threat)
 To ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security related
information; (several equipment are made mandatory on vessels , e.g. AIS, LRIT,
IMO no)
 To provide a methodology for security assessments in order to have in place
plans and procedures to react to changing levels of security; and (Ship security
plan and continuous improvements in plan)
 To ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security
measures are in place. (by providing adequate training and skills to all personnel
working on board vessels, and providing for adequate security measures on the
vessel)

In order to achieve its objectives, the ISPS Code embodies a number of functional
requirements. These include but are not limited to:

 Gathering and assessing information with respect to security threats and

exchanging such information with Contracting Governments;
 Requiring the maintenance of communication protocols for ships and port
facilities;
 Preventing unauthorized access to ships, port facilities and their restricted areas;
 Preventing the introduction of unauthorized weapons, incendiary devices or
explosives to ships or port facilities;
 Providing means of raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security
incidents;
 Requiring training, drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans
and procedures.

Mandatory requirements as per the SOLAS Convention to enhance ship security

These include:

 The provision of a ship identification number for all ships – the IMO number,
permanently marked on the vessel; (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)
 The maintenance of a continuous synopsis record (CSR), this records the history
of the ship; (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)
 The provision of a ship security alert system; (Chapter XI – II of SOLAS)
 Fitting of Automatic identification system (AIS) and Long Range Identification and
Tracking of ships (LRIT) on all vessels as per chapter V of SOLAS;
 Every company that operates a merchant vessel must be have a company and
registered owner identification number (C&ROIN). (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)
 Legal instruments on maritime security

The Port State must set security levels, the security level in place must be informed to
all visiting vessels, all flag state vessels must comply with the requirements of the ISPS
Code Part A.

It is important to note that security on vessels operates in tandem with port facility
security.

Summarizes the security-related provisions of the amendments to the STCW

Code
The STCW Code specifies mandatory minimum requirements for security training for
seafarers/persons employed/engaged on board ships.
The training requirements are as follows:

 All persons employed or engaged on a seagoing ship – Security related

familiarization training, before being assigned shipboard duties, training as per
the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS Code
 All Seafarers employed or engaged on board ships without designated security
duties – Security awareness training that complies with the provisions of table A-
VI/6-1 of the STCW Code
 Seafarers employed on ships with designated security duties – i.e – required to
perform security duties, anti – piracy and anti-armed-robbery-related will be
required to demonstrate competence to undertake the tasks, duties and
responsibilities as per table A-VI/6-2 of the STCW Code

Summarizes IMO guidance on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and

armed robbery against ships
IMO’s circular MSC.1 Circ/.1334 provides guidance on precautions to be taken to reduce
risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or
when underway through a coastal states territorial waters.
It outlines steps to be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to
them and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful to the
relevant authorities.

In addition to prevent terrorism in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden the Ship Security
Reporting System and a Best Management Practice guide have been implemented and
developed.

2.2 Familiarity with relevant government legislation

One must note that the ISPS Code and SOLAS applies to ships greater than 500 GT,
engaged on international voyages. However, Governments have to make all vessels and
port facilities secure whether they used by foreign going ships or not.

Making port, harbour craft and home trade vessels secure is done through flag state
legislation that are normally similar to measures prescribed by the ISPS Code.

Requirements of relevant national legislation and regulations

Several governments have passed legislation to tighten maritime security, some of them
are as follows:

European Union – Has made selected parts of the ISPS Code Part B, mandatory (for
ships engaged on home trade voyages)

The UK – Has the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, The Anti – Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act, mandated the EC regulation 725/2005 & 65/2005, and has regulations
that govern Ship and Port Facilities

The US – has the Maritime Transportation Act 2002 and the Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular 1996.

Several other countries have issued additional security requirements in relation to

maritime security.

2.3 Definitions
Ship (Vessel) Security Plan – A plan to ensure the application of measures on board
the ship, designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship’s
stores or the ship from the risk of a security incident.

Port Facility Security Plan – A plan to ensure the application of measures designed to
protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units and ship’s stores
within the port facility from the risks of a security incident.

Ship Security Assessment – An essential and integral part of the process of

developing and updating the ship security plan including, at least, identification of
existing security measures; procedures and operations; identification and evaluation of
key shipboard operations; identification of possible threats and weaknesses in the
infrastructure; policies and procedures.

Security incident – means any suspicious act or circumstance threatening the ship

Ship (Vessel) Security Officer – The person on board the ship who is accountable to
the master, and designated by the company as responsible for the security of the ship,
including implantation and maintenance of the ship security plan, and for liaison with the
company security officer and port facility security officers.

Ship - to - Ship Activity – means any activity not related to a port facility that involves
the transfer of goods or persons from one ship to another

Company Security officer – The person designated by the company for ensuring that a
ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted
for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained; and for liaison with port
facility security officers and ship security officer.

Port Facility Security Officer – The person designated as responsible for the
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security
plan, and for liaison with ship security officers and company security officers.

Ship/port interface – The interaction that occurs when a ship is directly and
immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or provisions
of port services to or from the ship.

Port Facility – The location, as determined by a Contracting Government or by the

Designated Authority, where the ship/port interface takes place. This includes areas such
as anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward as appropriate.

Designated authority – The organization or the administration identified within the

Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the implementation of the
provisions of SOLAS as amended and pertaining to port facility security and ship/port
interface, from the point of view of the port facility.

Recognised Security Organisation – An organization with appropriate expertise in

security matters and with appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations, which is
authorized to carry out an assessment, a verification, an approval or a certification
activity required by SOLAS as amended or by Part A of the ISPS Code.

Declaration of Security – An agreement reached between a ship and either a port

facility or another ship with which it interfaces, which specifies the security measures
that each will implement.
On-Scene Security Survey (OSSS) – An integral part of the ship security assessment
to examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and
operations.

Security Level 1 – Minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be

maintained at all times.

Security Level 2 – Appropriate additional protective security measures shall be

maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.

Security Level 3 – Further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for
a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent.

Some terms related to piracy – skiff – a small boat with an outboard motor through
which pirates board a merchant vessel, mother vessel – from where pirates launch their
skiffs

Definitions (Under BMP5)

The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are
reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent
identification of patterns and trends.

Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:

 Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat

thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
 Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

Attack An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an

aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.

Hijack A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship
against the crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed
robbery, cargo theft or kidnapping).

Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE
NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of
this is the citadel scenario.

Piracy Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to
provide clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and
consistent assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.

The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may
include but is not limited to:

 The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use
violence.
 Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates.
 An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
  Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
1. Ladders.
2. Grappling Hooks
3. Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.

Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed

suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):

 A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in

speed by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing
conditions.
 Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and
distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in
the area.
 Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.

2.4 Handling sensitive security-related

information
Defines security-sensitive information and the importance of keeping it
confidential

Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is a category of sensitive but unclassified

information under a government's information sharing and control rules. SSI is
information obtained in the conduct of security activities whose public disclosure would,
in the judgement of specified government agencies, harm transportation security, be an
unwarranted invasion of privacy, or reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information.

SSI was created to help share transportation-related information deemed too revealing
for public disclosure between Federal government agencies; State, local, tribal, and
foreign governments; and others.

SSI is not Top Secret, Secret or Confidential.

Examples of Security Sensitive Information:

 Ship Security Assessments and plans

 Security intelligence from the flag state
 Ship arrival and departure times
 Ship destinations/cargo information
 Travel arrangements
 Client agreements and contracts
 Company accounts and financial data
 Crews personal information
3. Security Responsibilities
Contracting governments have specific responsibilities with respect to SOLAS Chapter
XI-2 ,the ISPS Code and the STCW code.

The ISPS Code lists responsibilities of Contracting Governments in relation to maritime

security; applies to those governments that have ratified the Code.

Governments normally delegate security duties to governmental agencies.

To fulfill maritime security responsibilities as per the ISPS Code, Contracting

Governments administer security as a ‘Flag state’, ‘Coastal state’ and a ‘Port state’.

3.1 Contracting governments

The main responsibilities of the contracting Governments in relation to threats to ships
are as follows:

 Setting Security levels, and informing all concerned

 Providing a ‘point of contact’ through which ships can request advice or
assistance and to which such ships can report any security concerns about other
ships, movements or communications
 Administering maritime security

When a risk is identified, inform ships and their current administrations of:

 The current security level

 Any security level that has been put in place by the ships concerned to protect
themselves from attack, in accordance with provisions of Part A of the ISPS Code
 Security measures that he coastal state has decided to put in place as
appropriate Roles of Flag Administrations (Flag state, state of vessel registry)

Role of Flag State

 Mandatory operational functions, security maintained at all times on the vessel,

by controlling access both into and onto the vessel
 Providing a ‘point of contact’ – the Company Security Officer (CSO) and a
delegated officer of the state
 Optional operational functions – e.g. – stopping all cargo work when security level
is raised to ‘3’, allowing for armed guards on board if vessel is to sail in pirate
infested waters
 Approval of Ship Security Plan (SSP) and amendments – normally delegated to an
RSO
 Security verification functions – verifying the SSP, carrying out audits for
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) certification, and the security
assessment
 Issuing International Ship Security Certificates
 Issuing security guidelines as required
 Designating Recognised Security Organisations (RSOs, normally classification
societies)
 Providing the means for security communication
 Providing the means for reporting security incidents – using standard reporting
formats

Role of Port States – Port Security

 Role of Port State

 Determination of port facilities

 Mandatory operational functions, e.g. ensuring security is maintained at all times
in port facilities by controlling access into the port
 Approval of Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and its amendments
 Optional operational functions, e.g. increasing vigilance when security level is
raised
 Issuing security guidelines as required, informing vessels of security levels etc.
 Designating RSOs
 Providing the means for security communication
 Providing the means for reporting security incidents

Role of Coastal States

Role of Coastal State

  Mandatory operational functions – e.g. – patrolling territorial waters, 24X7
 Providing a ‘point of contact’

Contracting Governments may delegate a Recognised Security Organisation certain of

their security related duties with the exception of the following:

 Setting security levels and providing security-related information

 Issuing appropriate instructions when SL3 is set
 Determining which port facilities will be required to designate a Port Facility
Security Officer (PFSO) and approving Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA)
and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and subsequent amendments
 Exercising control and compliance measures according to Reg.XI-2/9
 Establishing the requirements of Declaration of Security (DOS)

Other responsibilities of Contracting Governments

 Flag State – Ensure implementation of the legal requirements for security on

board ships flying its flag – all seafarers on board are trained in security matters,
ship has a ISSC, and an SSP issued after conducting a ship security assessment.
 Port state – Ensure implementation of the legal requirements (ensuring port
facilities have a PFSO, a PFSP, etc.) for security in the port facilities within its
jurisdiction

Extending Security Measures

Contracting Governments can legislate security measures for the following ships/craft as
the ISPS Code does not apply to them.

 Passenger and cargo ships solely engaged on domestic voyages (coastal vessels)
 Vessels involved in domestic voyages with significant distances to overseas
territories (e.g. US flagged vessel sailing from US to say Hawaii, domestic voyage
is not required to comply to ISPS requirement, US flag state security
requirements will apply)
 Harbour craft and other craft that interact with ship-to-ship activities with ships
covered by maritime security measures
 Offshore and supply support vessels

Communication of information by Contracting Governments as per SOLAS

Chapter XI-2
IMO has developed a Global Integrated Shipping Information System’ (GISIS) database.
In this database contracting Govts must upload the following maritime security
information, as required by Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS:

 Who is responsible for the ship and port facility security

 Who has been designated for receiving at all times communication concerning
ships control measures
 Who has been designated to provide advice or assistance to and to whom ships
can report
 Names and contact details of any RSOs authorized to act on their behalf and the
condition of authority
 Locations within their territory covered by the approved PFSPs
 Alternative - bilateral or multilateral agreements, between states, for short
international voyages on fixed routes, e.g. Dover to Calais ferry
 Equivalent – for a group of ships or for a group of port facilities, normally private
berths have their own security arrangements
Note: The ‘Global Integrated Shipping Information System’ (GISIS) developed by IMO
provides access to maritime security information and other matters concerning shipping
to all end users. Access is through a user ID and password.

GISIS

3.2 Recognized Security Organizations

Recognized Security Organizations - surveys the role of the Recognized Security
Organization

An RSOs role is as below:

Vessel related

 Develop Ship Security Plan

 Approve Ship Security Plan
 Issue ISPS Certificates

Port Facility related

 Port facility security surveys

 Port facility security assessments
 Develop Port facility security plan

Functions related to maritime security

 Train ship security officers

 Train company security officers
 Train Port facility security officers
 Provide assistance to companies or port facilities
 Audit port facility security plans
 Audit ship security plans

Note: An RSO cannot approve or certify their own work products

3.3 The company
The responsibilities of the company are with respect to:
A Shipping companies role is to ensure security of their vessels is as per
the requirements of Chapter XI -2 of SOLAS and Part A of the ISPS Code,
taking into account guidance given in Part B of the Code.

These responsibilities are as below:

 Ensuring that the master has documents on board relating to the crewing of the
ship and its employment, crew screened before being appointed
 Ensuring that the Ship Security Plan contains a clear statement emphasizing the
master’s authority
 Designating a Company Security Officer (CSO) and a Ship Security Officer (SSO)
and ensuring that they are given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and
responsibilities

The company must ensure (can be put as a Security procedure in the ships safety
management manual) that the ship complies with the requirements of the Ship Security
Plan as per the security level set.

The company must ensure that the Master has on board the following information in
writing:

 Who is responsible for appointing crew members

 Who is responsible for deciding employment of the ship
 Who are the parties to the charter parties

The company must provide for Master’s discretion in relation to actions to preserve ship
safety and security (safety overrides security).

The Master has the authority to deny access to any person on board, and reject cargo of
suspicious nature.
 Company responsibilities

3.4 The Ship

The vessel shall comply with the requirements of the Ship Security Plan as per
the security level set

The ship must do as follows to ensure her security:

 Whenever security level 2 or 3 is set by the Administration, the ship shall

acknowledge receipt of instructions on change of security level
 Prior to entering port or whilst in port, the ship shall, at SL 2 and 3, confirm the
implementation of the appropriate measures according to the SSP to the PFSO
 At SL 2 and 3 the ship shall report to the PFSO any difficulties in implementation
and must arrange appropriate actions
 If the ship is required by the Administration to set, or is already at a higher SL
than the ports it intends to enter, the ship shall advise the Designated Authority
and PFSO
 In such cases the SSO shall liaise with the FPSO and co-ordinate appropriate
actions, if necessary.

3.5 The port facility

Contracting Governments must ensure that their port facilities comply with Chapter XI –
2 of SOLAS and Part A of the ISPS Code taking into account guidance given in Part B of
the Code.
This is done by ensuring that Port Facility Security Assessments are carried out,
reviewed and approved and Port Facility Security Plans are developed, reviewed and
approved.

A Port facility is required to act upon the security levels set by its Government within
whose territory it is located.

3.6 Ship Security Officer

The company shall designate a Ship Security Officer for each vessel

The company is responsible for designating a Ship Security Officer on each of its vessels.
The duties of a SSO are of an operational nature and is as below:

These include but are not limited to the following:

 Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate

security measures are maintained;
 Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan,
including any amendments to the plan;
 Co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with
other shipboard personnel and with the relevant port facility security officers;
 Proposing modifications to the ship security plan;
 Reporting to the company security officer any deficiencies and non-conformities
identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and
verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
 Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;
 Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as
appropriate;
  Reporting all security incidents;
 Co-ordinating the implementation of the ship security plan with the company
security officer and relevant port facility security officer; and
 Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and
maintained if any.

3.7 Company Security Officer

The company is responsible for designating a Company Security Officer, CSOs can be
nominated for one or several ships, provided it is clearly identified for which ship he or
she is responsible. The duties of a CSO are managerial in nature and are as below:

 Advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using

appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;
 Ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out
 Ensuring the development, submission for approval, and thereafter the
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan;
 Ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct
deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;
 Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;
 Arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the
Administration or the recognized security organization;
 Ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits,
periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly
addressed and dealt with;
 Enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
 Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship;
 Ensuring effective communication and co-operation between the ship security
officer and the relevant port facility security officer;
 Ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
 Ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plans for each
ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and
 Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a
particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.
3.8 Port Facility Security Officer
Is a person designated as responsible for the development, implementation, revision and
maintenance of the port facility security plan, and for liaison with ship security officers
and company security officers.

It should be noted that there is a PFSO for each facility; however a PFSO can be in
charge of several Port Facilities if required.

Other personnel
It is important to note that the following also have a role to play in the
enhancement of security, as ensuring a ship’s security is everyone’s
business:

 Ship and Port Facility personnel

 Persons Other than Ship and Port Facility personnel
 Military, industry and intergovernmental organizations
4. Ship Security Assessment
During a verification of the SSP, the inspector will witness a drill to ensure that the SSO
is conducting a drill that tests the training of the crew, that the measures outlined in the
SSP are executed correctly, and that these measures adequately address security
threat.

A drill, in order to be successful, might include the following:

 The measures contained in the SSP are fully implemented.

 Correct actions are taken by the crew and others on board.
 The SSO demonstrates effective control and communication.
 The situation reaches a positive resolution.

The inspector should critique the drill with the SSO and discuss corrective action if
necessary to address any deficiencies noted. Any deficiencies with the SSP detected
during the drill may be corrected by directing the owner in writing to submit an
amendment per the regulations. Such a requirement should be allowed at least 60
days.

Purpose of Carrying out an Assessment at the end of each Drill

A post-security drill assessment is done to evaluate the effectiveness of the security
contingency plan that is used parallel with the Ship Security Plan (SSP).

A de-brief after the drill, conducted by the Master and / or the SSO must highlight:

 Whether the objectives of the drill were achieved, stating what was performed
well
 Whether the communication between the team members was proper and
effective
 Whether there was synergy and co-operation between the crew members
 Whether the resources were adequate
 Whether the response to the emergency was proper and as per the SSP and
agreed procedures
 What was clarified by the drill
 What take-away of significant value was derived
 What should have been done differently

Note: Crew members participating in the de-brief must be allowed to give constructive
comments for the good of ship security.

Each conduct of a drill should be followed up by a report. Depending on the organization

culture, the report may be verbal or it may be written, but it is recommended that a
written report be submitted to company management as it serves as a record of the
event and the lessons learnt there from.

The report can cover the following:

 Title and objectives of the drill

 Date, time and duration
 Controllers and participants
 Significant events
 Lessons learnt
 Overall attainment of the Aim, Objectives and Required Attainments
  Recommendations and Follow-up action

4.1 Assessment tools

The ship security assessment (SSA) is an essential part of the process of developing a
ship security plan. SSA is carried out by persons who are competent in this matter.
When doing an SSA assessment it is recommended that they follow the guidance notes
given in part B of the ISPS Code.

RSOs carry out Ship Security Assessments by:

 Identifying key shipboard operations that are a threat to ship security (e.g.
access control, cargo operations, embarking passengers on passenger ships)
 Identifying existing shipboard security measures and procedures (e.g. methods of
access control, identifying restricted areas for controlled access, etc.)
 Identifying potential security threat scenarios (e.g. piracy in W Africa, drug
smuggling in S America, etc.)
 Performing an on-scene security survey, this is done to check if ship personnel
are doing their security duties properly when controlling access and during cargo
loading & stores handling operations, etc.
 Identifying weakness in both the infrastructure and in ship security procedures
(so that new security measures can be implemented, to plug a presumed
weakness)

Use of checklists in conducting security assessments

"Risk-based decision-making" check lists are used to conduct an SSA to determine
appropriate security measures for a vessel.

"Risk-based decision-making" check lists can:

 Provide a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a

security breach will endanger an asset, individual, or function;
 Help identify actions to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate the consequences of
a security breach.

Risk-based decision-making checklists will rate the criticality of the security risk, and will
indicate if steps taken to mitigate the security risk are satisfactory.

It allows comments to make on security weaknesses if any, and actions required to plug
them.

An example of a ‘risk based decision making’ checklist for key shipboard operations is as
below:
 ‘Risk based decision making’ check list

4.2 On-scene security surveys

To prepare for an on-scene survey one must identify:

 Key shipboard operations, that are a security risk

 Existing security measures and procedures
 Areas of the world where there are potential security threats for vessels

Operations to be evaluated
During the on-scene security survey the following should be considered and evaluated:

 The existing duties and responsibilities of all shipboard personnel, the designation
of additional security duties and its affect to the safe operation of the vessel;
 The existing procedures or safeguards for communications and measures
necessary to maintain continuous communications at all times in the case of a
security threat;
 The existing procedures for the assessment of safety procedures and equipment
and systems and additional procedures needed to assess the continuing
effectiveness of security procedures and any security and surveillance equipment
and systems, including procedures for identifying and responding to equipment or
systems failure or malfunction;
  Additional procedures and practices required to protect security sensitive
information held in paper or electronic format;
 Any additional and maintenance requirements, or inclusion of security and
surveillance equipment and systems, if any, into the existing maintenance
programs;
 Existing procedures to ensure the timely submission, and assessment, of reports
relating to possible breaches of or security concerns;
 Procedures required to establish, maintain and up-date an inventory of any
dangerous goods or hazardous substances carried on board, including their
location.

Security aspects of ship layout

When conducting an SSA one must have a general idea of the ships layout with
reference to:

 The location where ships stores and essential maintenance equipment is stored,
so that they can be protected from unauthorised access.
 The number of ships personnel, any existing security measures and any existing
training
 The location and the capabilities of existing security and safety equipment for the
protection of passengers and ship’s personnel, to ensure they can be protected
from unauthorised access
 The general layout of cargo spaces and stowage arrangements
 The location and availability of emergency and stand-by equipment available to
maintain essential services, to ensure protection from unauthorised access
 The location of escape and evacuation routes, assembly stations which have to be
maintained to ensure the orderly and safe evacuation of the ship
 All access points to the ship, these will include, access ladders, ramps,
sidescuttles (port holes just below the freeboard deck), etc., as they must be
monitored or must have measures to prevent unauthorised access, e.g. lift all
overboard ladders etc. if not required

Survey Sections
The security of a vessel can be divided into

 Physical security
 Structural security
 Personnel protection systems
 Procedural policies
 Radio and Telecommunication systems
 Other areas

4.3 Physical security aboard ships

Importance and elements of physical security aboard ships
Physical security is the protection of personnel, hardware, software, networks and data
from physical actions and events that could cause serious loss or damage to an
enterprise, agency or institution. This includes protection from burglary, theft, vandalism
and terrorism.

On vessels physical security ensures personnel coming on board are not armed and
dangerous, it also ensures that no arms and other dangerous devices come on board the
vessel through other means e.g. – cargo or stores.
This is done by access control both onto and into the vessel and by monitoring cargo
loading operations and the delivery of stores.

Physical security:

 Deters potential intruders (e.g. warning signs and perimeter markings);

 Distinguishes authorized from unauthorized people (e.g. using keycards/access
badges )
 Delays, frustrate and ideally prevent intrusion attempts (e.g. strong walls, door
locks and safes);
 Detects intrusions and monitors/records intruders

Physical security also prevents unauthorised access to the ships computer. Prevent
unauthorised computer access by having secure passwords, changing passwords
regularly and using firewalls for the vessel’s computer network, among others.

4.4 Use of communication systems

The use of information technology and communications systems in ship operations and
in maintaining security

SOLAS Convention vessels have several mandatory communication equipment for both
safety and security related communications.

Mandatory communication systems on SOLAS Convention vessels are:

 LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) - In this this system the
vessel’s satellite terminal is configured to sending ship information (voyage,
position etc.) transparent to the user to a database, that is accessed by coastal,
port and national administrations for actions to be taken to help in safety and
security incidents.
 AIS (Automatic Identification System), a Very High frequency
communication system where a vessel sends both static (Vessels name and call
sign etc.) and dynamic information (speed, course etc.), that is received by other
AIS equipped ships and shore authorities (Vessel Traffic Information System
(VTIS)) – helps track and monitor vessels
 SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) – a communication system that alerts the
flag state and the CSO immediately when the vessel is involved in a security
incident, is a button on the vessel that is activated by the Master.

There are other communication methods used for getting information or alerting, some
of these are given below:

Before transiting Somali pirate invested waters BMP5 recommends that vessels register
with United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). Vessels transiting these
waters are recommended to check Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa’s (MSCHOA)
website for updates and advice.

BMP5 provides useful contact details in Annex A, use these to communicate directly for
help in a pirate attack.
5. Security Equipment and Systems

Security Layers

Security equipment and systems will depend upon the type of ships, its sea passage
routes and potential threat that it faces and the regulatory items that all ships must have
to abide by the international and local laws. The equipment listing may include, as a
minimal, the following:

 AIS
 Ship Security Alert System
 Locks
 Lighting
 Handheld radios
 GMDSS equipment
 Closed Circuit Televisions
 Automatic Intrusion Detection Device (Burglar Alarm)
 Metal detectors
 Explosive detectors
 Baggage screening equipment
 Container X-ray devices
 General Alarm

Various types of security equipment and systems that can be used aboard
vessels and in facilities

There are several equipment that are used to strengthen security on a vessel, they are
as below:

Alarms – provide 24 hour cover in all weathers, requires human intervention,

movement sensors alarms raise alert(s) by detecting movement.
 Alarms

Closed circuit television

CCTVs – Can be used to cover vulnerable and restricted areas on a vessel, the
positioning of the camera is important, camera to be positioned in such a way so that all
blind spots are covered.

Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have
gained access to the ship. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of
the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies can monitor
and record the CCTV from ashore,
which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered:

 CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and
bridge.
 CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
 CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be
retained.
 CCTV Camera

CCTVs can monitor access points. They provide 24 hour cover irrespective of weather,
information is recorded and can be retrieved if required.

CCTVs require good monitoring, therefore do not have too many viewing screens as then
monitoring becomes difficult.

CCTVs

Lighting – is a deterrent for unauthorised access as it helps monitor approaches to the

vessel at berth, and therefore can help detect intruders. However, it is only effective
with good monitoring.
Lighting is helpful in identifying persons boarding at night. Use a separate circuit for
over-side lighting.

Lighting is important and the following is recommended:

 Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting
on the poop deck to demonstrate awareness.
 If fitted, search lights ready for immediate use.
 Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting,
if fitted, should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s
crew to see them.
 At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited.
 Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of
international regulations and the risk of collision is higher than that of being
attacked.
 At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to
attack.
 The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from
entering or disorientate those who may already have entered.

Lighting

Locks and locking equipment may not prevent entry but they delay entry. Doors and
their locking mechanisms must afford the same protection.

Use combination locks, normal locks if used to have a spare set of keys. Tag key sets for
identification.
 Locks

Access control – Allow only authorised persons to board the vessel. All visitors to board
through the gangway. Gangway to be monitored 24X7 while in port. Provide visitors with
an ID card, and record all visitor entries in a logbook.

Persons on gangway watch and on patrol to be equipped with communication

equipment.

Search visitors and their belongings on entry and escort them into the vessel.
 Access Control

Search – Depending on the security level, searching, visitors may be required. Trained
staff to carry out searches. Preserve human dignity when searching. Do not search
public authority officers (e.g. Port State Control Inspectors). Use hand held scanners for
body searches.
 Hand held scanners

Search, cargo, baggage and stores. The port facility does the cargo search. Use baggage
scanning equipment for stores and baggage (passenger vessels).

Ensure containers seals are intact when loaded. All cargo loaded to be according to the
manifest.

Check stores coming on board against the manifest. Store away quickly after receiving
them.

Do not load unaccompanied baggage if possible; deal with them as per the Ship Security
Plan (SSP). Isolate suspicious baggage; do make an effort to find the owner.

Baggage scanners
 Using Gloves for Physical Checks

Search equipment

Security equipment and systems that may be used to prevent and suppress
attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Some navigational watch precautions to be taken when entering a high risk piracy area
are as below:

 Provide additional lookouts for each Watch. Brief the additional lookouts.
 Consider a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximise alertness of
the lookouts.
 Ensure that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team,
preferably anti-glare.
 Consider the use of night vision optics.
 Maintain a careful Radar Watch.

Other measures to prevent/deter pirate attacks are:

 The use of dummies at strategic locations to give pirates an impression of overt

vigilance
 Enhance bridge protection by equipping persons on watch with bullet proof
jackets and helmets, protect the bridge from RPG attacks using sandbags and re-
enforcing bridge windows, among others
  Control access to bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces by securing all
doors, note: exits should not be blocked
 Use physical barriers, like razor wires and electrified fences on the ships side and
the removal of ladders that provide access to bridge and accommodation
 The use of water spray and foam monitors to deliver jets of water on an attacking
skiff can deter pirate boarding
 Use alarms to inform crew of a pirate attack
 Practice ship manoeuvres designed to prevent pirate boarding, prior entering a
high risk area
 Use searchlights and night vision optics to detect pirate vessels
 Use CCTVs to monitor pirate boarding
 The use of armed guards, to deter pirate boarding
 Get the ship’s citadel ready, citadel to accommodate all crew in the event of
pirate boarding, note citadel is effective if all crew are accommodated, practice
citadel entry during security drills

ANTI-PIRACY ‘HARDENING’
With ever increasing piracy threat from Gulf of Eden, Red Sea, North Arabian Sea and
near the coastline of India it has become important to fortify the vessels for passive
purpose (deterrence) and for active purpose (defence).

Each vessel has its own vulnerabilities, which pirates will aim to exploit in the event of
an attack, including areas of low freeboard and areas where grapples, ladders and other
tools can be attached to allow access.

Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached
and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway.
Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to
vessels by increasing the height.

Physical barriers can be put in place which will physically bar the pirates from boarding
the vessel, gaining access to the vital areas within the vessel such as the bridge, engine
room, and crew quarters. If their access is barred and their attempts to control the ship
are hampered, then many pirates will simply abandon their attempt.

Razor Wire

Also known as barbed wire. It creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured.
The quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less
effective. The following is recommended:

 Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730 mm or 980
mm. This is difficult to cut with hand tools.
 Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place a single high-quality roll outboard
of the ship’s structure.
 Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent attackers pulling the wire off.
For example, attach at least every third wire ring to ship’s railings and rig a steel
cable through its core.
 Use personal protective equipment and wire hooks to move and install razor wire.
 Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10 m, so that it is easier and safer to
move.
 Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when at terminals so that it does not
interfere with mooring operations.
Razor wire creates an effective barrier but only when it is carefully deployed. The barbs
on the wire are designed to have a piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken
when selecting appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs)
and type will vary considerably.

Concertina razor wire (linked spirals), available in approx. 750 mm or 950 mm each coil
of 15 meter as the linked spirals make it the most effective barrier.

When deploying razor wire personal safety and protective measures are required. Using
razor wire is effective when constructed on ship structure, deployed double or treble roll
of wire, and secured the razor wire with a wire rope through the razor wire to prevent it
being dislodged.

Some measures used to harden the vessels structure against unauthorised boarding
and/or pirate attacks are:

 Barbed wire fences or electric fences on the ships side

 Sand bags on bridge front bulkhead to mitigate Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
attack

Barbed wire fence

 Electric fence

Operation of Various Types of Security Equipment and Systems on Board

The method of operating security equipment and systems are as below:
The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board
and utilize the bridge equipment as detailed here-under:

 Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.

 Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.
 Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximize alertness of the
lookouts.
 Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
 Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide
a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
 Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
 Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship
to give the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
 Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search
lights can deter approaches from the stern.
 Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.

Operation and process of application of Security Equipment under a security

threat

Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the ship’s crew that an attack is underway and warn the
attacker that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the
ship’s whistle may distract the attackers. It is important that:

 The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.

 Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack
and indicating ‘all clear’.
 All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck
PA system, where fitted.
  Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship.
 The drill will confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of
safety.

Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain
access to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb for those trying to illegally board.
When planning the placement of barriers special consideration should be given to ships
with sunken poop decks.

Other physical barriers

Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging swinging obstacles over the gunnels
to specifically designed overhanging protection that prevents illegal boarding by climbing
over the ship’s rails.

Water spray and foam monitors

 The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is effective in deterring or delaying
any attempt to illegally board a ship. The use of water can make it difficult for an
unauthorized boat to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult to
climb aboard.
 It is recommended hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) are fixed in
position to cover likely access routes and are remotely operated.
Manual activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an
exposed position.
 Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and
using baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
 Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part
of the hull.
 Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger
areas.
 Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship’s standard fire fighting
equipment stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery.
 The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure
all defences operate efficiently.
 Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems
should be ready for immediate use.
 Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides
effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment

Securing onboard Tools and Equipment

It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the
ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure
location.

Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck

 Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas

cylinders or containers of flammable liquids.
 Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed
prior to transit.

Enhanced bridge protection

The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct
their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If
pirates board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control.

The following enhancements may be considered:

 Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast resistant film.
 Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear bridge windows
and the bridge wing door windows, which can be quickly secured in place in the
event of an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
 Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
 Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be
regularly checked to ensure that they have not degraded.

Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces

It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces.

 Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the event of an emergency.

 Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned
compartment, it is essential it can be opened from the inside. Where the door or
hatch is locked it is essential a means of opening the door from the inside is
available.
 Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery
spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened from the
outside.
 Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used
for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors or hatches should
be controlled by the Officer of the Watch.
 Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent
use and to restrict external access to the bridge.
 Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully
dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing
mechanisms, such as wire strops, may be used.
 Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship
does not need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
 Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The
fitting of steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
 Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store
rooms should be briefed to the crew.
 The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.

Safe muster points and/or citadels

The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.

Safe muster points

A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection
to the crew and will be identified during the planning process.
If the threat assessment identifies risks that may result in a breach of hull on or below
the waterline then a safe muster point above the waterline must be identified. In many
ships, the central stairway may provide a safe location as it is protected by the
accommodation block and is above the waterline. To minimize the effect of an explosion,
consideration should be given to the likely path of the blast. The safe muster point
should be selected with this in mind.
Other measures

Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)

Armed Guard

Use of PMSCs onboard merchant ships is a decision taken by individual ship operators
where permitted by the ship’s Flag State and any littoral states. However, the use of
experienced and competent unarmed PMSCs can be a valuable protective measure,
particularly where there may be the requirement to interface and coordinate with local
law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast guards. Any decision to engage the
services of a PMSC should consider:

 The current threat and risk environment.

 The output of the company risk assessment.
 Voyage plan requirements.
 Ship speed.
 Freeboard.
 Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
 Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.

Master’s overriding authority

If private security contractors are embarked, there must be a clear understanding of the
overriding authority of the Master. The Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the
PCASP operate must be acceptable to the Flag State and the company.

The Master and PCASP should:

  Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF as outlined in the contract.
 Have documentation authorizing the carriage of weapons and ammunition.
 Ensure all incidents involving the use of weapons and armed force are reported at
the earliest instance to the Flag State and the Chief Security Officer (CSO).

Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel

Any decision to engage the services of PCASP should consider the guidance above for
PMSC as well as the following.

BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PCASP onboard merchant ships;
this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag
State and any littoral states.

Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PCASP or PMSC. Some Flag States
provide military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) instead of PCASP. A VPD may be
provided by another State, subject to Flag State approval. In some cases, the
deployment of either PCASP or VPDs must be reported and acknowledged by the Flag
State and reported when entering the designated risk area.VRA

The PCASP must:

Act in accordance with the agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated,
reasonable, proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of
force in defence of crew on the ship.

Limitations of individual items of equipment and security systems

Some of the operational limitations of equipment and security systems used on board is
as below:

 Alarms – requires human intervention

 CCTVs – when installing ensure there are no blind spots, requires good
monitoring, do not have to many monitoring screens
 Locks and locking equipment – may not prevent entry, they deter entry and they
must afford the same protection as the doors they are placed on
 Search’s – do not embarrass, be polite, have a witness when conducting the
search, use trained personal to conduct physical body searches
 Ship Maneuvers – do not use large alterations as speed reduces, small alterations
preferred.
 Lighting – Bright lights can reduce one’s visibility.

Risks and benefits of security equipment and systems that may be used to
prevent and suppress attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Risks and benefits of security equipment to deter pirates is as below:

 Dummies deter pirates but maintain a proper lookout for pirates in high-risk
areas.
 When constructing any physical barriers identify areas that are vulnerable to a
pirate attack, to protect them. Physical barriers deter and prevent pirate
boarding.
 The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship’s staff alone,
and may well require external technical advice and support. All crew must be
inside the citadel, when pirates board. This will provide vessel with time to get
help.

Testing Calibration and Maintenance of Security Equipment and Systems

Security Systems and Equipment Maintenance
Inspectors will review records related to inspection, testing and calibration of security
equipment as well as the frequency of related actions to ensure that these are being
conducted. Records available for review and consultation should include, but are not
limited to, manufacturers maintenance recommendations, system plans or schematics,
test records/logs, and deficiencies/system failures with repair and/or RSO repair
documentation. Inspectors can ask the SSO questions related to inspection, testing,
calibration, and maintenance of security equipment. Inspectors may also question the
SSO and other personnel with security duties on how the system (and subsystems)
works, including a demonstration of system functionality and any appropriate
tests/alarms.

Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS) are a SOLAS XI-2 requirement, and ISPS
requires that the SSP include a description of the system. Due to the sensitive security
nature of the information, ISPS allows the owner to keep the SSAS information separate
from the other parts of the SSP. This information is essential in order for the inspector to
complete the verification. ISPS also requires the equipment to be installed after the first
“survey” of the radio equipment following the deadline. Survey in this case means either
the periodical or renewal survey, whichever occurs next after the
deadline for compliance. New vessels must have the equipment installed at the initial
survey.

Specifics details will be contained in the SSP describing test procedures for the SSAS.
The inspector should follow the test procedures indicated. If the test reveals a problem
with either the test procedure or the SSAS itself, the inspector should immediately
inform the SSO. The failure of the SSAS represents a serious security deficiency and
must be addressed as soon as possible.

The SSAS shall:

 Initiate and transmit ship-to-shore alert to a competent Authority.

 Not send the ship security alert to other ships.
 Not raise any alarm on board the ship.
 Continue the ship security alert until deactivated and/or reset.
 Be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and at least one other
location.
 Conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.
 Activation points shall be designed so as to prevent inadvertent initiation.

Maintenance Requirements of Security Equipment and Systems

Typical equipment related questions during ship security audits:

 Specialized Security Equipment available/in use?

 Are the communication equipment working and testing of calibration recorded?
 Additional security lighting available/rigged? (360 degree)
 Declaration of Security (DOS) available for the Port?
 Is the current level of security posted?
 Security Fire Hose rigging plan available?
 All water cannons are in good working order and can be exhibited for operation?
 Ship's emergency fire pump is in operation and duly surveyed?
 All watertight doors are operational and under certification?
 Security emergency signals agreed between vessel and port?
 Records maintained in a file (Continuous Synopsis Record) plus deck logbook
entries?
  Procedures in place for verifying integrity of cargo including containers & CTU’s?
 Procedures in place for the verification of ships stores and spares against
manifest?

It is important to note the following in relation to security equipment and systems:

 Crew should be familiar with the equipment and procedures, this can be done
with the required training, and reading user manuals
 Equipment must be calibrated and tested before use
 Specialized equipment must only be used by trained personnel
 Usage of all security related equipment must be supervised and controlled

Include the maintenance schedule of all security equipment in the vessels

Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

In this regard, the SSO must develop checklists/procedures/policies for:

 Testing the equipment – to be done regularly – say weekly

 Calibrating the equipment
 Equipment familiarization
 Drills for using of the equipment
 Equipment maintenance
 The VSP must include procedures for identifying and responding to security
system and equipment failures or malfunctions.

Since there are just too many equipment and some of the equipment are part of the
LSA/FFA list of equipment e.g., fire pump, water hoses, water tight doors etc., the VSO
can use those schedule as part of his way to maintain the security equipment; the rest of
the security equipment then can be checked at scheduled intervals, while conducting
security drills and be part of a weekly checks as normally practiced on board most deep
sea vessels.

The risks and benefits of security equipment and systems that may be used to
prevent and suppress attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Risks and benefits of security equipment to deter pirates is as below:

 Dummies deter pirates but maintain a proper lookout for pirates in high-risk
areas.
 When constructing any physical barriers identify areas that are vulnerable to a
pirate attack, to protect them. Physical barriers deter and prevent pirate
boarding.
 The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship’s staff alone,
and may well require external technical advice and support. All crew must be
inside the citadel, when pirates board. This will provide vessel with time to get
help.

Testing, calibration and maintenance requirements for the above security

equipment and systems
It is important to note the following in relation to security equipment and systems:

 Crew should be familiar with the equipment and procedures, this can be done
with the required training, and reading user manuals
 Equipment must be calibrated and tested before use
 Specialised equipment must only be used by trained personnel
 Usage of all security related equipment must be supervised and controlled
 Include the maintenance schedule of all security equipment in the vessels
Planned Maintenance System (PMS)