European Jrournal of Social Psychology, Vol.

26, 299-313 (1996)

Social value orientations and

negotiator outcomes

MARA OLEKALNS
Department of Management and Industrial Relations,
University of Melbourne, Australia

PHILIP L. SMITH
Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne,
Australia

and

RACHAEL KIBBY
University of Otago, New Zealand

Abstract

Social value orientations (SVOs) are known to influence individual behaviour in

outcome interdependent settings. By extending these findings to negotiation, this
research investigates the relationship between own and partners’ SVOs, negotiator
strategies and outcomes. Results showed that cooperators, competitors and individu-
alists could be distinguished in terms of initial demands and concessions. Competitors
made higher initial demands and larger concessions than individualists or cooperators,
suggesting that their ability to maximize outcome differences rests on whether
structural features are congruent with this goal. The principal finding of this research
was the demonstration that own and partners’ SVO interact to determine outcomes.
Results showed that the three SVO groups differed in terms of context sensitivity:
competitor outcomes were invariant across partners; individualists achieved poor
outcomes in negotiations with cooperators and, reciprocally, cooperators attained high
outcomes in negotiations with individualists. Additionally, individualist outcomes

Addressee for correspondence: Mara Olekalns, Department of Management and Industrial Relations,
University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3064, Australia,
email: m.olekalns@ecomfac.unimelb.edu.au.
The research reported in this paper was presented at the 22nd Annual Meeting of Australian Social
Psychologists (1992) and was conducted while the first author was at the University of Otago. We would
like to thank Michael Platow and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this
Paper.

CCC 0046-2772/96/020299-15 Received 2 September 1993

0 1 9 9 6 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 10 February 1995
300 M . Olekalns, P . L . Smith and R. Kibby

worsened in their last negotiation, while those of cooperators differed as a function of

role and partner’s SVO. These results suggest that although the information used by
individualists and cooperators differs, f o r both groups the cognitive representation of
negotiations is a further factor influencing their outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

The cooperative or competitive orientation adopted by individuals represents a

fundamental dichotomy in negotiation (e.g. Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1991). Typically,
research investigating such differences in motivational orientation has examined
how instructions that induce either a cooperative orientation (encouraging
individuals to maximize joint gain) or an individualistic orientation (encouraging
individuals to maximize own gain) affect negotiation outcomes. Such research has
demonstrated that the motivational orientation created by varying instructions
directly influences negotiation outcomes (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart, Bennett
& Brett, 1993), moderates the relationship between other situational factors (such
as negotiator frame) and negotiation outcomes (Olekalns, 1994a,b) and also affects
the tactics used by negotiators (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schulz & Pruitt, 1978;
Weingart et al., 1993). Cooperatively-oriented individuals achieve higher joint
outcomes, outperform negatively-framed negotiators when they are positively-
framed, and engage in greater information exchange and more systematic
concessions.
An alternative means for examining the relationship between differences in motiva-
tional orientation and negotiator outcomes is through an examination of differences
in individual social value orientations (SVOs). Analysis of individual choices in
outcome interdependent settings such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game (PDG) has
demonstrated clear differences in the preferences that individuals show for the
distribution of outcomes to themselves and others (e.g. Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975;
Liebrand & van Run, 1985; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Messick & McClintock,
1968), as well as in their ability to accurately perceive and respond to opponents’
strategies and choices (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a,b; Maki & McClintock, 1983;
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). These differences are attributable to differences in
the underlying social value orientations of individuals, with three dominant orienta-
tions emerging: cooperation, emphasizing joint gain; competition, emphasizing the
maximization of relative gain; and individualism, emphasizing the maximization of
own gains.
Negotiation researchers, highlighting the differences between these settings, have
argued against generalizing from the PDG to negotiation settings (see Thompson,
1990a). However, three points of overlap between the PDG and negotiation suggest
that SVOs will also influence negotiator behaviour and outcomes: both settings
require decisions about resource allocation, both are characterized by outcome
interdependence, and outcomes in both may be influenced by perceptual (or
judgemental) errors. Furthermore, the impact of SVOs has been shown to generalize
beyond prisoner and social dilemmas (e.g. McClintock & Allison, 1989), and
specifically to negotiation settings (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1993).
 Social values in negotiation 301

Any consideration of SVOs in a negotiation setting must, however, acknowledge

the more interactive nature of that setting: unlike players in Prisoners’ Dilemma
Games, negotiators are engaged in a series of offers and counter-offers before
reaching agreement and settlement. This suggests that opponents’ SVOs, and
consequently their strategies, will be a potent mediator of the relationship between
negotiator SVOs and their outcomes. Indeed, De Dreu and Van Lange (1993), who
examined the impact of SVOs when negotiators were faced with a pre-programmed
series of offers make precisely this point, arguing for the need to consider how
opponents’ SVOs shape negotiation processes and outcomes.
The research reported here addresses this issue: in addition to considering how
three SVOs (cooperation, competition, and individualism) affect negotiation
strategies and outomes, it aims to extend De Dreu and Van Lange’s (1993) findings
by acknowledging the interactive nature of the negotiation setting and examining
how opponents’ SVOs moderate individual strategies and outcomes.

Dominant negotiating style

Individual negotiators will differ in their perceptions of the negotiation setting as

cooperative or competitive and in the relative weight that they assign to achieving
their own and opponents’ goals. Negotiations that are characterized by a
collaborative, problem-solving orientation are associated with an overall emphasis
on similarities (Deutsch, 1973), have as their aim the identification of common goals
(Lewicki & Litterer, 1985), and are employed when individuals place a high priority
on achieving both their partner’s and their own goals (Pruitt, 1983a,b). They are
characterized by lower opening bids, more systematic concessions and higher joint
gain (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Conversely, negotiations characterized by competitive
strategies emphasize differences, thereby establishing coercive processes (Deutsch,
1973) aimed at influencing opponents’ resistance points to maximize own gain (Lax
& Sebenius, 1987; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). Such strategies are employed when
individuals place high priority on achieving own outcomes (Pruitt, 1983a) and are
characterized by high opening bids, low concessions and lower gain (Pruitt & Lewis,
1975).
Clearly, the goals of cooperatively- and competitively-motivated individuals are
congruent with those of collaborative and coercive orientations, respectively. Given
the finding that, in the absence of information about an opponent’s behaviour, both
cooperators and competitors choose value-consistent strategies (McClintock &
Liebrand, 1988) it is reasonable to expect that at the outset of negotiations
cooperators and competitors will, respectively, display collaborative and coercive
strategies. Individualists, who are frequently classified ‘pro-self‘ along with
competitors, are also most likely to adopt a competitive strategy at the outset: in
the absence of information about their partners, competition is also the most
rational strategy for this group (Maki & McClintock, 1983). The strongest evidence
for differences in SVOs at the start of negotiations should come from the value of
initial demands made of opponents. This demand can be viewed as a claim for the
individual’s share of the resources, and research has demonstrated not only that pro-
self individuals take a greater share of the resources at the outset of social dilemmas
(Kramer, McClintock & Messick, 1986), but more importantly that they show a
302 M . Olekalns, P . L. Smith and R . Kibby

higher level of demand than cooperators in negotiations (De Dreu & Van Lange,
1993). A second source of evidence for differences in negotiation strategy should be
visible in concession levels: consistent with differences in overall negotiating style
cooperators should make larger concessions than either competitors or individual-
ists, a pattern also demonstrated by De Dreu and Van Lange (1993).
How such strategies impact on negotiation outcomes is somewhat more
problematic. Although it is clear that a pattern of low initial demands and high
concessions disadvantages negotiators (cf. Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), the effects of a
hard strategy are less predictable: although high initial demands and low concession
rates have been shown to elicit greater concessions from opponents (Bateman, 1980;
MacMurray & Lawler, 1986; Smith, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982), they have also been
shown to decrease an opponent’s profits (Liebert, Smith, Hill & Kieffer, 1968), and
either increase (Hamner & Harnett, 1975; Thompson, 1990a) or decrease (Carnevale
& Pruitt, 1992) an individual’s profits. This seeming contradiction can be resolved by
arguing that own outcome is contingent on both own and others’ strategy: if a tough
strategy is matched by an opponent, outcomes will be poor; if it is mismatched and
an opponent yields it will be enhanced (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale &
Pruitt, 1992). This points to the moderating influence of partners’ strategy on
negotiation outcomes and is considered in the next section.

Moderating effects of partners’ SVO

Neither of the broad strategies available to negotiators is without associated costs.

Negotiators who adopt a coercive style risk escalating conflict and stalemating (Ben-
Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt, 1981, 1983a). Negotiators adopting a collaborative style
risk poor outcomes if one of two conditions is present. Both yielding and problem-
solving are classed as cooperative strategies (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). If yielding
dominates, negotiators achieve poor outcomes as a consequence of lowered or
abandoned aspirations (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), and the adoption of a satisficing
decision rule (Weingart et al., 1993); further, should such a concessionary strategy be
unreciprocated by an opponent negotiators will engage in unilateral concessions and
obtain poor outcomes. Therefore, a necessary component of problem-solving is
resistance to yielding; however, whether such resistance results in problem-solving or
contending remains dependent on contextual factors (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984).
Overall, research suggests that (i) when a contentious strategy is paired with a collab-
orative strategy, the contentious negotiator will be advantaged, (ii) when both
negotiators adopt a collaborative strategy outcomes will depend on the extent to
which the negotiation context fosters resistance to yielding: when it is low, outcomes
will be poor, improving as resistance to yielding increases; and, (iii) when both
negotiators translate resistance to yielding into contentious tactics, either stalemate
or compromise will result.
This more general model of how the strategies of two negotiators affect outcomes
can be applied to the current research. It has been argued that, in general,
cooperators will display elements of a collaborative negotiating style while pro-self
individuals will display elements of a coercive negotiating style. Furthermore,
negotiation settings create a competitive context (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984).
Although contentiousness can facilitate problem-solving, it also limits information
 Social values in negotiation 303

exchange (Schulz & Pruitt, 1978); when information exchange is restricted, fixed-sum
assumptions are unchallenged (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) and further encourage a
distributive view of negotiations. Overall, this implies that the negotiation setting
should enhance the strategic differences outlined above. Given these considerations,
it is expected that when both negotiators in a dyad are pro-self their more
competitive style will at best result in compromise agreements. When the dyad is
composed of pro-social negotiators, they may either yield or problem-solve. Past
evidence would, however, suggest that in the absence of contextual cues inducing some
level of resistance to yielding (e.g. Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984;Olekalns, 1994b;Weingart
et al., 1993), such dyads will fail to optimize outcomes. Although the above model
would also lead us to predict that cooperators paired with pro-self negotiators would
increase their yielding to the benefit of pro-self negotiators, such a prediction ignores
the behavioural assimilation displayed by cooperators (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a,b).
Research has shown both competitors and individualists to be less sensitive to strategy
differences (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a,b; Maki & McClintock, 1983) with neither
group adjusting their strategy in response to that of an opponent (Kelley & Stahelski,
1970a,b;Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976); this pattern of perceptual differencesoccurs in
social dilemmas (Kramer et al., 1986) and holds across a number of different game
structures (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Behavioural assimilation implies that
whereas pro-self negotiators will perceive these strategies as competitive, pro-social
negotiators will be better able to detect and respond to strategic differences across
partners. Thus, when pro-social individuals bargain with pro-self individuals, their
level of contentiousness will increase. To the extent that, as a result, pro-socials move
from yielding to problem-solving, their outcomes should improve. Conversely, for pro-
selfs, this implies stable strategies irrespective of partners’ orientation.
On this basis, the more general predictions made earlier are modified in several ways.
The performance of competitors depends on their ability to increase yielding in their
opponents. To the extent that they frame the situation competitively, obtain limited
information and are unable to detect strategic differences across pro-social and pro-self
negotiators, they will adopt a uniformly contentious strategy. In particular, they will
not apply additional pressure to pro-social negotiators and therefore their outcomes
are likely to be stable across partners. Although individualists are in most ways similar
to competitors, they differ in that they may be more motivated to adopt a cooperative
strategy if it is in their interests to do so (see De Dreu & Van Lange, 1993). This raises
two possibilities: (a) in order to facilitate agreement in pro-self dyads, they are more
likely to increase yielding, and (b) when opponents are pro-social, they will be better
able to take advantage of pro-socials’ collaborative strategy. Consequently,
individualists are expected to perform better in negotiations with pro-socials than in
negotiations with pro-selfindividuals. Finally, because in pro-social dyads thereis little
resistance to yielding such dyads are expected to perform poorly. However, when pro-
self individuals, as a result of their higher contentiousness, elicit greater resistance to
yielding (behavioural assimilation), pro-social negotiator performance will improve.
(This improvement may occur while opponents outcomes remain stable; Olekalns,
1994.) One final qualification is that the relationship between motivational orientation
and outcomes has also been shown to differ as a function of reward structure (i.e.
whether payoffs are zero- or nonzero-sum; e.g. Bottom & Studt, 1993; Olekalns,
1994a,b) suggesting that this variable will also moderate the relationship between
individual SVOs and negotiation outcomes.
304 M . Olekalns, P . L. Smith and R. Kibby

METHOD
Subjects
Thirty-six undergraduate psychology students at the University of Otago partici-
pated in one of two experimental sessions. Subjects were drawn from a sample of 884
individuals who had previously been classified as belonging to a particular social
value Orientation. In order to assess social value orientations, subjects completed a
set of nine decomposed games (Messick & McClintock, 1968). In each game, subjects
chose between three pairs of outcomes, each representing one of the social value
orientations. For subjects to be classified as cooperative, competitive or individua-
listic, they had to make six value consistent choices in this set of nine decomposed
games. In the larger group, 339 individuals were classified cooperators, 61
competitors and 171 individualists. The remainder were unclassifiable.

Design
The experiment was conducted as a 4-way role (buyer or seller) x negotiator’s social
value orientation (cooperative, competitive or individualistic) x partner’s social value
orientation (cooperative, competitive or individualistic) x issue type (integrative,
distributive or compatible), with partner’s social value orientation and issue type as
within-subject variables. Each subject negotiated once with an opponent of each social
value orientation and had to reach agreement on two integrative, two distributive and
one compatible issue. Since all subjects correctly identified the compatible issue,
apparently as a consequence of their high initial demands, this issue was excluded from
all analyses reported in this paper. It is noted that no negotiations ended in stalemate.

Procedure
Payoff matrices
Negotiators received one of four payoff matrices, shown in Tables 1 and 2. In each
negotiation, two issues were integrative, two were distributive and one was compatible.
However the two issues allowing trade-offs and those that were opposed varied from

Table 1 . Profit schedules for sellers

Financing Warranty Delivery date Price Colour

Payoff schedule A
10% (2400) 6 mths (2400) 5 wks (4000) $1 2 000 (4000) Yellow (1600)
8% (1800) 12 mths (1800) 4 wks (3000) $1 1 500 (3000) Green (1200)
6% (1200) 18 mths (1200) 3 wks (2000) $1 1 000 (2000) Blue (800)
4% (600) 24 mths (600) 2 wks (1000) $10 500 (1000) Red (400)
2% (00) 30 mths (00) 1 wks (00) $10000 (00) Black (00)
Payoff schedule B
10% (4000) 6 mths (4000) 5 wks (2400) $12 000 (2400) Yellow (1600)
8% (3000) 12 mths (3000) 4 wks (1800) $11 500 (1800) Green (1200)
6% (2000) 18 mths (2000) 3 wks (1200) $1 1 000 (1200) Blue (800)
4% (1000) 24 mths (1000) 2 wks (600) $10500 (600) Red (400)
2% (00) 30 mths (00) 1 wks (00) $10000 (00) Black (00)
 Social values in negotiation 305

Table 2. Profit schedules for buyers

Financing Warranty Delivery date Price Colour

Payoff schedule C
10% (00) 6 mths (00) 5 wks (00) $12000 (00) Black (00)
8% (600) 12 mths (1000) 4 wks (600) $11 500 (1000) Red (400)
6% (1200) 18 mths (2000) 3 wks (1200) $1 1000 (2000) Blue (800)
4% (1800) 24 mths (3000) 2 wks (1800) $10 500 (3000) Green (1200)
2 % (2400) 30 mths (4000) 1 wks (2400) $10000 (4000) Yellow (1600)
Payoff schedule D
10% (00) 6 mths (00) 5 wks (00) $12000 (00) Black (00)
8 % (1000) 12 mths (600) 4 wks (1000) $1 1 500 (600) Red (400)
6% (2000) 18 mths (1200) 3 wks (2000) $11 000 (1200) Blue (800)
4% (3000) 24 mths (1800) 2 wks (3000) $10 500 (1800) Green (1200)
2% (4000) 30 mths (2400) 1 wks (4000) $10000 (2400) Yellow (1 600)

negotiation to negotiation depending on an opponent's payoff schedule. For example,

if an individual used Payoff Schedule A, then in negotiations with individuals using
Payoff Schedule C, warranty and delivery date allowed trade-offs, whereas in
negotiations with an opponent using Payoff Schedule D, financing and price allowed
trade-offs. Opponents' payoff schedules varied randomly throughout the negotiation
session, with an equal probability that either would be encountered. Payoff schedules
were structured in this way to avoid the bias that may occur when the same payoff
schedule is used repeatedly, resulting in the spread of integrative solutions through a
market (Thompson, 1990a).
It will also be noted that the payoffs were constructed so that two issues had identical
values. This was done to equalize the utilities of issues that could potentially be either
integrative or distributive, thereby eliminating the possibility that negotiators would
take a harder stance on high value issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue.

Order of negotiations
Each individual negotiated once with an opponent representing each of the social
value orientations. The order in which this occurred was randomized according to a
Latin square design. Two different, orthogonal, Latin squares were used (Winer,
Brown & Michels, 1991, p. 674), one for each session thereby allowing estimation of
the complete SVO x order effect.' As well as permitting tests of the effects of order,
'Latin square designs with one repeated-measure factor are typically used to evaluate and control for the
effects of treatment order. In such designs, the rows of the square represent subjects, the columns represent
levels of a within-subjects treatment factor, and the individual cells represent the order in which the
treatments were administered. When the design involves a single 3 x 3 square, only partial
treatments x order interaction information can be estimated, because two of the four interaction degrees
of freedom are confounded with between-subjects effects (Winer, Brown & Michels, 1991, p. 703). By using
a pair of orthogonal Latin squares, within-subjects estimation of the entire treatments x order interaction
effect is possible, because different components of the interaction are confounded with between-subjects
effects in each square. A consequence of estimating one component of the interaction in each square is
that, unavoidably, the efficiency factor for the effect as a whole is reduced. The analysis of the design
employed here was similar to that described by Kirk (1982, pp. 602410), except that the rows of the
square represented subjects within levels of the role x SVO interaction.
306 M . Olekalns, P. L. Smith and R. Kibby

this procedure ensured that in any negotiating dyad, both individuals had completed
the same number of negotiations, thereby eliminating experience differences as a
source of bias in negotiator outcomes (Thompson, 1990b).

Simula t ion
The negotiations were conducted in the context of buying and selling a car. On arrival,
negotiators were given instructions that allocated them to either a buyer or a seller role,
described the task, gave them their payoff schedule and three contracts. Each contract
required subjects to record both their initial demand as well as their final settlement. In
addition subjects were given an ‘appointment card’, which specified their negotiating
partners and the order in which contracts had to be completed with these partners.
After reading through the instructions, subjects completed a short quiz to test their
understanding of the payoff schedule. Instructions were then repeated verbally.
Subjects were further told that each negotiation would last for eight minutes and that a
warning bell would be sounded after six minutes. In the event of a stalemate, each
individual would be awarded a profit of $0000. Subjects completed three negotiations,
one with a partner of each social value orientation.

RESULTS

Three sets of analyses were performed, with negotiators’ initial demands, concession
level2 and final outcomes being the dependent variables. Because, at the outset of
negotiations, individuals would not know which issues were integrative and which
were distributive, payoff type was not included in the analysis of initial demands.
However, this was included as an additional independent variable in the analysis of
concession levels and final outcomes for two reasons: (a) past research has shown
that it moderates the relationship between negotiator characteristics and negotia-
tions outcomes (Bottom & Studt, 1993; Olekalns, 1994a,b); (b) the statistical
relationship between pairs of outcomes differs for distributive and integrative issues,
and must be dealt with in data analysis. This issue is further discussed below.

Initial demands
Negotiators’ initial demands were analysed in a 3-factor role (buyer or seller)
x negotiator’s SVO (cooperative, competitive, individualistic) x order design.

’Because concessions can be deduced from initial demands and final outcomes, they are not reported in the
Results section. Concession level was defined as the difference between negotiators’ initial demands and
their final outcome. Although this measure is clearly related to the demands of negotiators, it does enable a
more detailed analysis of how specific outcomes are reached and was therefore analysed in a 4-way role
(buyer or seller) x negotiator’s social value orientation (cooperative, competitive, individualistic) x
partner’s social value orientation (cooperative, competitive, individualistic) x issue type (integrative or
distributive) design, with repeated measures on the last two variables. Results showed a significant main
effect for negotiator’s social value orientation, F(2,32) = 7.48, p < 0.05, such that competitive negotiators
($2011) made larger concessions their individualistic ($1417) or cooperative ($1064) negotiators.
 Social values in negotiation 307

Partners’ SVO was excluded from this analysis as, at the outset of negotiations,
individuals have no information about an opponent; initial demands should
therefore be unaffected by opponent’s SVO. Both role, F(1,14)= 13.16, p = O . O O l ,
and SVO, F(2,14)=4.13, p<0.05, influenced initial demands. Sellers ($10 610) made
higher initial demands than buyers ($8300), and competitors ($10 710) made higher
initial demands than individualists ($9080) or cooperators ($8570).

Individual profits

Two separate 4-factor analyses, one for integrative and one for distributive issues,
were conducted. This was done because the nature of the interdependence between
the outcomes of negotiators varies with payoff type. For distributive issues, there is a
perfect negative correlation between the profits of opposing negotiators. Conse-
quently, the results for buyers only were analysed. This showed that neither social
value orientation nor partners’ social value orientation influenced outcomes. All
subsequent discussions therefore refer only to analyses of integrative issues.
For integrative issues, there is a correlation between the outcomes of opposing
negotiators, such that the analysis of variance assumption of independence is
violated. To deal with this problem, a Monte Carlo simulation of 10000 complete
replications of the experimental design was used to provide an empirical estimate of
the sampling distributions of the F-statistics for all experimental effects. Observa-
tions for the simulation were sampled from a bivariate normal distribution with
p = - 0.790, this being the average intramarket correlation between opposing
negotiators’ profits. The effect of this correlation was to increase the critical F-
statistics for effects related to role by a factor of 1.85, and its interaction with social
value orientation and partner’s social value orientation by a factor of 1.56; the
critical Fs for all other effects remained virtually unchanged. Significance levels for
all analyses of individual profits that are reported in this section (integrative issues)
refer to sampling distributions that have been empirically determined in this way.

Integrative issues

Results showed a significant role effect, F( 1,107)= 14.66, p < 0.01, with buyers
($3537) outperforming sellers ($2974). Partner’s SVO, F(2,107) = 3.98, p < 0.05, also
affected performance, so that negotiators’ outcomes were highest when partners
were individualists ($3467), decreasing when partners were either competitors
($3206) or cooperators ($3094). These main effects were qualified by an interaction
between partner’s SVO and role, F(2,107)= 3.97 p<0.05, such that buyers
performed poorly when partners were cooperative while sellers performed poorly
when partners were competitive (Table 3). Two interactions with negotiator’s SVO
were also observed: this variable interacted with partner’s SVO, F(4,107) = 8.18,
p <0.001 and order, F(4,107) = 3.25, p <0.05. To further examine these interactions,
results were decomposed into a series of simple effects, based on negotiator’s SVO.
Results showed that for competitors, profit was unaffected by role, order, or
partner’s SVO (or any interaction between these variables). For individualists, profit
varied as a function of partner’s SVO, F(2,35)=6.38, p<0.05, and order,
308 M . Olekalns, P . L . Smith and R. Kibby

Table 3. Average individual profit as a function of role and partner’s social value orientation

Partner’s SVO
Role Competitor Cooperator Individualist

Buyer
Mean $3600 $3156 $3856
S.D. $840 $922 $828
Seller
Mean $281 1 $3033 $3078
S.D. $727 $105 $978

Table 4. Cooperators: average individual profit as a function of role and partner’s social
value orientation

Partner’s SVO
Role Competitor Cooperator Individualist

Buyer
Mean $3333 $2833 $4500
S.D. $826 $625 $1136
Seller
Mean $2733 $3467 $3633
S.D. $561 $900 $1 189

F(2,35) = 6.85, p <0.05. Post hoc comparisons (Neuman Keuls) showed that
individualists attained significantly lower outcomes in negotiations with cooperators
($2567) than in negotiations with either competitors ($3267) or individualists
($33 17). They also attained significantly lower outcomes in their third negotiation
($2250) than in either their first ($3333) or second ($3267) negotiation. Finally, for
cooperators, outcomes differed significantly across partners, F(2,35) = 1 1.64, p < 0.05:
post hoc comparisons showed cooperators to earn substantially higher profits in
negotiations with individualists ($4067) than in negotiations with either competitors
($3033) or individualists ($3150). The role x partner’s SVO interaction was localized
to this group, F(2,35) = 5.82, ~ ~ 0 . 0Post
5 . hoc comparisons showed that cooperative
buyers earned significantly higher profits in negotiations with individualistic than
cooperative partners, and also outperformed cooperative sellers negotiating with
competitors (Table 4).

DISCUSSION

Past research, using Prisoners’ Dilemma Games, has demonstrated that social value
orientations affect individual preferences for resource distribution as well as the
strategies used in such games. Extending these findings to negotiation, De Dreu and
Van Lange (1993) have demonstrated that, in negotiations with pre-programmed
computer strategies, social value orientations affect negotiator initial and final
demands, as well as their concession rates. This research sought to determine
 Social values in negotiation 309

whether such findings could be extended to negotiations allowing for unrestricted

interaction between individuals, and the extent to which the relationship between
negotiator social value orientations, strategies and outcomes was moderated by a
partner’s social value orientation.
Considering, first, the relationship between social value orientation and strategy,
this variable was found to significantly influence both initial demands and
concession rates. Consistent with predictions, competitors made higher initial
demands than individualists, who in turn made higher initial demands than
cooperators. Although social value orientation also influenced concession rates, the
pattern was unexpected with competitors making larger concessions than either
cooperators or individualists. Several factors may have contributed to this finding:
(a) in negotiation simulations, there is considerable pressure to settle (Pinkley, Neale
& Bennett, 1994), (b) compromise is an obvious settlement point in the absence of
strong reasons to deviate from this point, and (c) the overall competitive context
encourages greater contentiousness in all negotiators (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984).
Given the finding that competitors’ outcomes are around the compromise point,
their higher concessions reflect the greater distance between their initial demands and
final outcomes, relative to those of individualists and cooperators. An implication of
this result is that competitors may be unable to realize their goal of maximizing
outcome differences unless structural conditions (e.g. power differences, instruction-
ally-induced motivational differences) support that goal. This argument is an
extension of the ‘might versus morality’ argument (Liebrand, Jamsen, Rijken &
Suhre, 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991) and implies that structural features have the
potential to either enhance or attenuate the goals held by different social value
orientations. This clearly identifies a further line of research: the examination of how
situational features interact with social value orientations to shape negotiation
strategies and outcomes.
The major contribution of this research was to test whether, when negotiations
allowed for information exchange, partner’s social value orientation would moderate
the relationship between own social value orientation and outcomes. An interaction
of own and partners’ SVO showed this to be the case. Subsequent analysis of simple
effects showed considerable support for the hypotheses outlined earlier: consistent
with predictions, competitor outcomes remained constant across all partners, while
those of cooperators increased in negotiations with individualists (but not with
competitors). This finding was qualified by an interaction between role and partner’s
SVO, such that cooperative buyers’ outcomes improved in negotiations with
individualists relative to those with cooperators and also relative to the performance
of sellers when partners were competitive. Finally, although individualist outcomes
differed depending on whether partners were pro-self or cooperative, contrary to
predictions individualists performed significantly more poorly in negotiations with
cooperative partners. Furthermore, their outcomes were affected by order,
decreasing in negotiations with their final partner.
In considering the outcomes of individualists and cooperators, we argued that in
contexts where cooperation and competition are balanced (i.e. when negotiating with
each other), improved outcomes should be facilitated. Clearly, this was not the case
for individualists. The higher outcomes of cooperators were obtained at the expense
of individualist outcomes, suggesting that cooperators were able to decrease
resistance to yielding in negotiations with individualists. Negotiators had two cues
310 M . Olekalns, P . L . Smith and R. Kibby

about opponent’s strategy available: initial demands and concession rates.

Cooperators presented low initial demands and low concession rates. However,
neither cooperator initial demands nor concession rates varied as a function of
partner, and outcomes in previous negotiations were not predictive of either
subsequent initial demands or outcomes. Thls suggests that what varied was not
cooperator behaviour in response to different partners, but their partners’
interpretations of those cues. In particular, it suggests that, in comparison to
competitor behaviour, individualists interpreted cooperator behaviour as represent-
ing a hard strategy, implying that their assessment of this strategy was determined
principally by concession rates. Given their goal of maximizing own outcomes
(which in a contentious setting might translate to avoiding stalemate), this
apparently tougher style elicited a different pattern of concessions, and one that
disadvantaged individualists.
Results suggest that cooperators and individualists show greater sensitivity to the
negotiating context than do competitors. Both groups may be influenced by several
sources of information in the setting: the negotiating context, in its own right;
elements of partners’ strategy; own values and goals; and, role-related information.
Pinkley et al. (1994) have argued that when negotiators are faced with multiple cues,
one may emerge as dominant. We will argue that individualists and cooperators
differ in terms of the dominant cues affecting their choice of strategy and outcomes.
Individualists outcomes were significantly poorer in their final negotiation. This
finding is surprising given the consistent evidence that, with increasing experience,
negotiators are better able to identify the integrative potential of the task (e.g.
Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 1985; Neale & Northcraft, 1986; Olekalns, 1991); it
implies that over the series of negotiations individualists’ ability to identify the task’s
integrative potential worsens. Recalling that all negotiators showed some elements of
contentiousness in their behaviour, these results suggest that these contentious
behaviours, which reinforce the individualists’ more competitive goals, emerge as the
dominant cue. Not only has this aspect of strategy reinforced their fixed-pie
perspective of negotiations, it has precluded a problem-solving strategy. Faced with
multiple cues, individualists’ behaviour is guided by those that are value consistent
(paralleling the argument presented by Sattler & Kerr, 1991). We would argue that,
as a result, the transaction costs associated with maximizing own outcomes increase
over the series of negotiations; the consequence is a strategic shift at the end of
negotiations.
A different pattern emerges for cooperators. For this group, outcomes are
determined by an interaction between negotiators’ role and partner’s SVO. This
finding suggests that cooperators display greater context sensitivity and more
variable behaviour than either competitors or individualists. It is consistent with
research demonstrating that when cooperation is situationally-induced (instruction
sets, negotiators frames) behaviour is highly variable and outcomes depend on
negotiator representations of the situation (Olekalns, 1994b; Weingart et al., 1993).
We would argue that this variability increases cooperator dependence on
information to define the situation and determine appropriate strategies; this
information may be derived implicitly from roles or explicitly from opponents’
strategies. Briefly considering the impact of roles, research has consistently
demonstrated a buyer’s advantage (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1985; Neale & Northcraft,
1986; Neale et al., 1987; Olekalns, 1991), which has been attributed to both
 Social values in negotiation 31 1

role-induced framing effects (Neale 8c Northcraft, 1986; Neale et al., 1987), and
power imbalances (Bazerman et al., 1985; Olekalns, 1991). Either argument
implies that buyers (negatively-framed, high power) will behave more
contentiously than sellers (positively-framed, low power). The influence of role
and SVO may, therefore result in strategies that vary in their level of
congruence; this implies, for example, greater strategic incongruence for
cooperative buyers, greater congruence for cooperative sellers. Our results
suggest that unlike individualists, cooperators are not focused on value-
consistent cues; rather they respond differently to specific combinations of
implicit and explicit cues, with outcomes showing an inverted-U pattern: when
partners present consistently cooperative or competitive strategies that are
incongruent with negotiators’ own strategic orientation, cooperators perform
badly; when partners present a combination of competitive and cooperative
cues that match negotiators’ strategic orientation, negotiator performance
improves. Although the underlying mechanism for this pattern is unclear, it
highlights the greater context sensitivity of cooperators, as well as their greater
strategic variability.
In summary, results supported the hypothesis that the relationship between social
value orientations and negotiator outcomes would be moderated by partners’ social
value orientation. The research reported here shows that the negotiating styles and
outcomes of competitors, individualists and cooperators can be placed along a
dimension of context sensitivity: competitors define one end of this dimension
showing, through their unresponsiveness to partner strategy, context insensitivity;
individualists, who respond to some but not all differences in partner strategy, show
moderate levels of context sensitivity, while cooperators define the other end point of
this continuum, reacting not only to partners’ strategy but to more global features of
the negotiating context. Several of the explanations offered for the findings are
speculative, and clearly identify directions for future research: (a) the extent to which
congruence between situational features and negotiator goals (as defined by social
value orientations) enhances or attenuates goal attainment; (b) the argument that
competitors, individualists and cooperators differ in their sensitivity to contextual
cues; and, (c) the relationship, for cooperators and individualists, between
negotiation outcomes, cognitive representations of the negotiation, and the impact
of this on strategy selection all open new avenues for research.

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