Public Money & Management

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The effect of board gender diversity on financial

and non-financial performance: evidence from
Italian public universities

Natalia Aversano, Giuseppe Nicolò, Diana Ferullo & Paolo Tartaglia Polcini

To cite this article: Natalia Aversano, Giuseppe Nicolò, Diana Ferullo & Paolo Tartaglia
Polcini (2023): The effect of board gender diversity on financial and non-financial
performance: evidence from Italian public universities, Public Money & Management, DOI:
10.1080/09540962.2023.2243389

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2023.2243389

Published online: 21 Aug 2023.

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PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2023.2243389

The effect of board gender diversity on financial and non-financial performance:

evidence from Italian public universities
Natalia Aversano , Giuseppe Nicolò , Diana Ferullo and Paolo Tartaglia Polcini
Management and Innovation Systems Department, University of Salerno, Italy

IMPACT KEYWORDS
This article focuses on the value of board diversity in the university context, demonstrating the Boards of directors;
importance of ensuring that women are represented in top management teams and boards to corporate governance;
promote good governance and superior financial performance. The findings should be used to gender diversity; higher
promote gender equality and balance at all political and economic decision-making levels and to education; university
performance
stimulate the debate on the reasons for female under-representation. Universities should be
mandating a gender quota for their boards to improve overall performance.

ABSTRACT
This article uses a multi-theoretical framework to explore the link between board gender diversity and
overall university performance. Results evidence that higher levels of board gender diversity are
conducive to better financial performance in the Italian university context. However, female
directors must reach a critical mass. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study
that delves deep into the impact of board gender diversity on universities’ financial and non-
financial performance.

Introduction
In recent decades, European institutions and policy-makers
have made considerable efforts to promote gender equality
in management and strategic leadership positions, both in
the political and economic fields (EC, 2011, 2020, 2023).
Mandatory laws and voluntary recommendations have put
considerable pressure on organizations to improve gender
diversity on their boards (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017;
Brahma et al., 2021).
Boardroom gender diversity is of considerable interest to
academics. Adopting different theoretical approaches,
scholars have examined the role of women in improving
the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and, in
turn, in enhancing both the financial and non-financial
performance of organizations (for example Kılıç & Kuzey,
2016; Brahma et al., 2021). However, a number of scholars
has underlined how both financial and non-financial
benefits stemming from having female directors on boards
depends a critical mass being reached (Kanter, 1977; Low
et al., 2015; Yarram & Adapa, 2021).
Despite the progress made towards understanding the
impact of gender diversity on organizational performance,
previous studies mainly addressed the context of private
sector entities. Little is known about the effect women in
top governance and management positions can exert on
the performance of public sector entities, such as
universities. In recent decades, as part of the global New
Public Management (NPM) movement, inspired by a
neoliberalist ideology, universities have undergone a
transformation process in terms of their management,
cultural and governance dimensions (Donina et al., 2015;
Ntim et al., 2017). Given these changes, the presence of
women in top management and governance roles of
universities would be desirable for implementing strategic
change processes that foster the growth and development
of these entities and society (Mazzotta et al., 2020). The
dynamic and inclusive leadership and the diversity of
knowledge and skills resulting from a higher presence of
women on universities’ governing boards has been shown
to lead to more impartial control over the use of financial
resources, stimulating investments that preserve the overall
university financial and non-financial sustainability
(Manfredi, 2017; Ntim et al., 2017; Mazzotta et al., 2020).
This article aims to extend our knowledge of the role that
gender diversity in university governance mechanisms plays
in driving both financial and non-financial performance.
Based on a multi-theoretical framework, this article
estimates several multiple linear regression models to test
the association between different measures of board
gender diversity and the financial and non-financial
performance in the context of Italian public universities in
2020. In addition to analysing the impact of board gender
diversity at an aggregate level, the article also examines the
impact of the presence of critical mass.
Italy was identified as a relevant case study because the
Italian higher education system has been affected by
several NPM-based reforms that have resulted in a re-
design of the internal governance mechanisms of public
universities, promoting the board of directors as a crucial
actor in universities’ decision-making system (Donina et al.,
2015). Moreover, with the introduction of Law 120/2011,
also known as the gender quota law (the ‘Legge sulle quote
rosa’), Italy was one of the few countries which mandated a
gender quota for the board of directors and the board of
auditors of listed and state-owned companies (Nicolò et al.,
2022; Provasi & Harasheh, 2021).
This article contributes to the academic literature in the
following ways. First, it extends the existing academic
literature on corporate governance, providing empirical
insight into the beneficial effects of board diversity in an

© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

2 N. AVERSANO ET AL
unexplored context such as higher education. Second, unlike
previous research, which focused on a single dimension of
performance (financial or non-financial), this study adopts a
combined perspective testing the effects of board gender
diversity on financial and non-financial performance. Third,
this article also generates additional insight from a token
and critical mass theory’s perspective—highlighting how
having just one or two women on boards is insufficient to
experience concrete financial beneficial effects.
Theoretical background
Women on boards: towards breaking the glass ceiling
in the Italian HEI
With its Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025, the European
Commission (EC) has highlighted the need to ensure
equality between men and women in politics and the
decision-making positions of private and public sector
entities (EC, 2020). This strategy represents the European
Union’s (EU) contribution towards the achievement of the
wider United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goal
(SDG) 5 to: ‘Achieve gender quality and empower all
women and girls’ (EC, 2023), envisaging, in particular,
women’s full access to all levels of decision-making in
public, political and economic life.
As observed by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2014, 2019), gender
equality in the public sector is generally considered to be a
crucial step towards a more inclusive, innovative and
creative workforce that will improve the quality and
efficiency of the public sector entities’ services. Therefore,
many national governments are taking measures to close
gender-representation gaps in the public sector (for
example Austria, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Japan,
Australia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland) (OECD, 2014, 2019).
Nowadays, women have higher educational attainment
than men (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Reguera-Alvarado et al.,
2017) and are willing to take on leadership roles; however,
they remain significantly under-represented in corporate
decision-making. This can be explained by systemic entry
barriers into corporate boards and leadership positions,
known as the ‘glass ceiling’ (UN, 2015).
Increasing the representation of women in governing/
leadership has gradually become a priority in the higher
education sector (Jarboe, 2018; Manfredi, 2017; Menter,
2022). Universities are crucial actors in the economy and
society generally, for example by shaping future business
leaders, and as catalysts of social, environmental and
technological innovations (Trencher et al., 2014; Larrán
et al., 2019). The success of modern entrepreneurial
universities depends on an inclusive and diverse leadership
that enables the creation of innovative and sustainable
products and technological solutions in line with emerging
societal expectations. Aware of this, action plans and
gender equality policies have been introduced to increase
women’s presence in Higher Education Institutions’ (HEI)s
leadership positions in different countries (for example
Austria, Spain, UK and Australia) (Jarboe, 2018). However,
sociocultural barriers are still preventing women from
accessing universities’ leadership positions (UNESCO, 2020).
The She Figures 2021 report (EC, 2021) shows that in 2018
women represented over 40% of academic staff in
universities at the European level. However, in the upper
rungs of the academic ladder, only 26.2% of grade A
positions (such as full professorship positions) are held by
women. Moreover, focusing the attention on decision-
making and leadership positions, in 2019 under 25% of
heads of institutions in the higher education sector were
women. The Italian university context reflects the European
average. The Global Gender Gap Report 2021 places Italy
63rd out of 156 countries analysed on the path towards
overcoming the gender gap (World Economic Forum, 2021,
p. 10). As mentioned, the Italian university system is an
interesting case study because it has been affected by a
long-standing reform process inspired by the neo-liberal
NPM agenda that has reshaped universities’ culture, as well
as managerial, accounting and governance mechanisms
(Donina et al., 2015). Particular attention has been devoted
to revising public universities’ internal governance
mechanisms. Specifically, Law 240/2010 required Italian
public university governance to have dual collegial bodies
—a board of directors and an academic senate. In doing so,
it has empowered the board of directors as the key actor in
decision-making: the board is mainly in charge of defining
plans and strategies at a central level, ensuring the overall
financial sustainability and performance levels of a
university’s activities (Donina et al., 2015). Moreover, Law
240/2010 has fixed a maximum number of 11 board
members, including the rector who typically chairs the
board, student representatives and a number of directors
selected or elected according to their professional, scientific
and cultural experience. Among these, at least two
members (if the board has fewer than 11 seats) or three (if
the board has precisely 11) must be external to the
university (Nicolò et al., 2023). Law 240/2010 (the so-called
‘Gelmini reform’) has mandated the principle of equal
opportunities, first introduced in the Italian university
context in 2009. Specifically, the decree 150/2009, which
refers to the performance measurement process of public
administrations, defined the need to measure public sector
entities’ performance in terms of the degree of
achievement of the objectives of promoting equal
opportunities (articles 8 and 14). Law 240/2010 reaffirmed
this, although it did not mandate gender quotas in
university governance or leadership positions.
More recently, Directive 2/2019 introduced new
requirements to promote gender equality in Italian public
sector organizations. For example Italian public sector
organizations have to implement measures ensuring a
gender balance in leadership positions. However, gender
quotas in Italian universities are still not mandatory.
Theoretical framework
Scholars generally agree that, due to the multidisciplinary
nature of the topic, no single theoretical framework can
entirely explain the impact that board gender diversity
exerts on organizational performance (for example Isidro &
Sobral, 2015; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017; Brahma et al.,
2021; Issa & Zaid, 2021).
Accordingly, this article takes a multi-theoretical approach
taking insights from agency, stakeholder and Kanter theories
(token and critical mass) to explain the relationship between
board gender diversity and both financial and non-financial
performance of universities.

Agency theory is the primary theoretical approach
underlying the concept that increased gender diversity in
leadership positions improves financial performance
(Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017; Brahma et al., 2021). Agency
theory relies on the fundamental assumption that
incomplete contracts and information asymmetries cause a
conflict of interest between owners (the principal) and
managers (the agent) that gives rise to costs (agency costs)
that owners sustain to prevent managers’ harmful and
opportunistic conduct (Jensen & Mecklin, 1976). This is
because the board of directors has a crucial role in
overseeing management’s strategic activities and, in turn,
reducing its potentially misguided or self-interested
initiatives that can erode organizational value (Jensen &
Mecklin, 1976; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). However, the
board’s effectiveness in fulfilling its task strictly depends on
its composition. In particular, several scholars highlight how
an increase in gender diversity enhances the board’s
monitoring and controlling function, as women are more
prone to ask questions that male directors would not
request and bring a bundle of backgrounds, opinions and
perspectives which do not necessarily coincide with those
of the other directors (Brahma et al., 2021). These
circumstances create a more impartial and independent
board environment that puts more pressure on managers
to align their behaviours to the principal’s interests, leading,
in turn, to a reduction of agency costs and potential
misallocation of funds (Isidro & Sobral, 2015). Agency
theory’s arguments can be extended to the university
context, where the agency relationship involves the
government and society at large (the principal) and the
university (the agent) (Kivistö, 2007). According to Kivistö
(2007), several possible opportunistic behaviours can divert
universities from pursuing their primary duty to properly
employ government financial resources in delivering high-
quality services to society in terms of teaching, research
and third mission activities. Therefore, according to agency
theory, a higher presence of female directors on university
boards may be desirable to balance male directors’
opinions and perspectives and ensure a more rigorous and
impartial control over managers’ conduct. Thus, more
gender-diverse boards may help universities to maintain
their focus on their public missions and preserve sound
management of financial resources (Ntim et al., 2017).
In recent years, unprecedented social and environmental
challenges have generated a backdrop against which public
sector organizations have been called to be responsive
(Trencher et al., 2014; Larrán Jorge et al., 2019; Andrades
et al., 2021). This entails shifting from a focus on short-term
financial return to a focus on long-term sustainable value
creation based on a broader macro-societal approach that
takes into account the health of the planet, the welfare of
its people, and the interests of all stakeholders (Nicolò
et al., 2022, 2023). Drawing on this, stakeholder theory’s
arguments may complement agency theory’s prescriptions
to recognize a broader mission for the board of directors
(Nadeem et al., 2020). According to stakeholder theory,
each organization’s survival and long-term success depend
on its ability to balance and meet the expectations of the
different stakeholder groups that control its strategic
resources (Issa & Zaid, 2021). Stakeholders have different
orientations and concerns beyond financial returns,
including how organizations manage their impact on social
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 3
and environmental issues (Issa & Zaid, 2021; Orazalin &
Mahmood, 2021).
This implies that the board of directors has to ensure that,
within the organization’s strategic agenda, financial
objectives are adequately balanced with a sustainable focus
to avoid losing stakeholders’ support and, in turn, the
organization’s chance to rely on community resources to
produce its outputs (Issa & Zaid, 2021; Orazalin & Mahmood,
2021). According to stakeholder theory, female directors can
help the board fulfil these broader tasks, as women are
considered more sensitive than men towards social, ethical
and environmental issues (Nadeem et al., 2020; Orazalin &
Mahmood, 2021). In particular, women are more likely to
have more philanthropic and relational characteristics than
their male counterparts, who are more agentic and bottom-
line oriented (Nadeem et al., 2020). Also, they generally have
a more participative leadership style and higher ethical and
moral standards (Nadeem et al., 2020). Considering female
directors’ prominent stakeholder-oriented vocation and
critical role in responding to emerging social and
environmental challenges (Trencher et al., 2014; Larrán Jorge
et al., 2019; Andrades et al., 2021), board gender diversity
may play a pivotal role in improving universities’ non-
financial performance (Manfredi, 2017; Mazzotta et al., 2020).
Along with their teaching, research, and knowledge
transfer missions, universities support government, industry
and communities in advancing local and national socio-
economic growth, thus directly impacting society (Trencher
et al., 2014; Menter, 2022). Accordingly, increasing the
presence of women in university leadership positions may
lead to more creative and collaborative environments
(Jarboe, 2018; Menter, 2022). As Manfredi (2017, p. 69)
contends, universities need to dismantle the ‘invisible
barriers’ that stop women being placed in senior roles.
Both agency and stakeholder theories propose arguments
in favour of appointing more women directors on boards to
enhance financial and non-financial performance and avoid
sub-optimal behaviours. However, they do not specify if,
and to what extent, a female presence on a board should
be a certain size to significantly impact an organization’s
performance. Thus, many academics rely on Kanter’s (1977)
theoretical arguments to explain how the influence of
women directors on a board’s decisions depends upon their
number. Specifically, when female directors only represent
a small portion of boards, they can be easily marginalized
and considered just as ‘tokens’ for responding to legal and
social pressures (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011; Cambrea
et al., 2023). In such instances, women face significant
difficulties expressing their thoughts and influencing board
decisions (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011).
However, when the number of female directors reaches a
certain threshold (critical mass), gender no longer represents
a barrier, so women’s opinions and perspectives will likely be
taken more seriously (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). When
a ‘critical mass’ is reached (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011;
Usman et al., 2019) board gender diversity becomes an
essential resource as the female directors are valued for
their individual competencies and experiences, and they are
able to stimulate cooperation from the majority groups in
fulfilling shared tasks (Yarram & Adapa, 2021). Accordingly,
women’s ability to influence the board’s strategic posture
and, in turn, both financial and non-financial performance
increases (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). Therefore,
4 N. AVERSANO ET AL
although agency and stakeholder theories predict a positive
association between board gender diversity and
organizations’ performance, according to Low et al. (2015,
p. 385) ‘critical mass is essential before any material
difference in performance can be observed’.
Hypotheses development
Board gender diversity and university financial
performance
Generally a positive relationship between women’s presence
on boards or top management teams and firms’ economic or
market performance has been found in various, international
studies (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Isidro & Sobral,
2015; Low et al., 2015; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017).
However, a minority of studies failed to find a significant
association between board gender diversity and corporate
financial outcomes (for example Provasi & Harasheh, 2021)
and some even observed a negative relationship (for
example Wellalage & Stuart, 2013). Some studies found that
the number of female directors needs to reach a critical
threshold to affect firms’ financial performance significantly.
In particular, Liu et al. (2014) and Brahma et al. (2021)
highlighted that boards with three or more female directors
substantially influence firms’ financial performance more
than boards with one or two female directors.
The relationship between gender diversity and
performance has been investigated in the public sector but
not as widely as in the private sector.
Some studies observed how increased gender diversity in
top management positions is conducive to better financial
performance in publicly-run hospitals (Tartaglia Polcini et al.,
2021; Naciti et al., 2022). In addition, for Danish municipalities,
Opstrup and Villadsen (2015) demonstrated that gender
diversity in top management teams positively affects financial
performance only if a decentralized management structure
facilitates sharing responsibilities. Also, in China, Usman et al.
(2019) observed that an increased presence of female
directors on boards reduced the cost of debt for government-
owned firms. By increasing boards’ monitoring effectiveness,
women directors reduce managers’ opportunistic behaviours
and information asymmetry, taking creditors’ confidence in
organizational financial viability (Usman et al., 2019). These
effects are more robust when at least three female board
directors are appointed.
The importance of ensuring gender balance in leadership
and governance positions has also been evidenced in the
higher education sector. Some scholars (for example
Manfredi, 2017; Mazzotta et al., 2020; Menter, 2022) have
questioned the underrepresentation of women in prominent
positions, claiming that it remains a crucial challenge in
higher education since policy-makers still pay little attention
to gender issues. Only one study (Mendelsohn & Perry, 2016)
has examined the impact of faculty gender diversity on the
financial performance of a sample of colleges and universities
in the USA, finding a negative association.
However, based on the broader theoretical support and
prevalent empirical evidence from private sector studies
(Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Reguera-Alvarado
et al., 2017), it is reasonable to assume that board gender
diversity may positively influence university financial
performance. Also, a critical mass of at least three female
directors is expected to be conducive to higher university
financial performance (Liu et al., 2014; Brahma et al., 2021).
Hence the following hypotheses:
H1: Board gender diversity positively affects university financial
performance.
H1a: A critical mass of female directors positively affects university
financial performance.
Board gender diversity and university non-financial
performance
From an empirical perspective, several scholars have detected
a positive impact of board gender diversity on different
dimensions of corporate non-financial performance,
including corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Yarram &
Adapa, 2021); environmental (for example Issa & Zaid, 2021;
Orazalin & Mahmood, 2021); sustainability (Provasi &
Harasheh, 2021); both environmental and social (Nadeem
et al., 2020; Islam et al., 2022); and environmental, social
and governance (ESG) performance (Cambrea et al., 2023).
Some studies have examined the importance of appointing
a minimum number of female directors to have an impact
on non-financial performance. In particular, Yarram and
Adapa (2021) observed that a critical mass of at least three
female directors positively influenced ESG performance.
Similarly, Cambrea et al. (2023) noted how a critical mass of
at least three female directors was necessary to improve
CSR performance. Conversely, other studies do not support
the theory of critical mass (Schwartz-Ziv, 2017; Birindelli
et al., 2019). Birindelli et al. (2019) suggest that an
increasing presence of female directors does not necessarily
positively impact CSR performance after reaching it.
The relationship between board gender diversity and non-
financial performance has received less attention in the public
sector context. However, Uyar et al. (2021) found that board
gender diversity positively affects healthcare organizations’
financial and CSR performance, and Garcia-Lacalle et al.
(2023) demonstrated that having a woman chairing a board
leads to better service quality in UK autonomous public
sector entities. Similarly, An and Lee (2022) observed that
female directors are likely to increase South Korean local
government-owned enterprises’ non-financial performance.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no study has
investigated the impact of board gender diversity on public
universities’ non-financial performance. However, based
previous empirical evidence mainly from private sector
studies, it is assumed that board gender diversity may
positively influence university non-financial performance.
Also, a critical mass of at least three female directors is
expected to be conducive to higher university financial
performance (Yarram & Adapa, 2021; Cambrea et al., 2023).
Therefore we hypothesized as follows:
H2: Board gender diversity positively affects university non-
financial performance.
H2a: A critical mass of female directors positively affects university
non-financial performance.
Research methodology and sample composition
Research context and sampling process
We looked at the whole set of Italian public universities (67)
officially recognized by the Italian Ministry of Education,
 PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 5

University and Research (MIUR) for 2020. The year 2020 was
selected as a reference as it was the most recent year for
which it was possible to obtain the maximum number of
observations in terms of financial and non-financial data. In
line with suggestions from Donina et al. (2015) and
Mazzotta et al. (2020), seven public universities were
excluded from our sample as they are focused on doctoral
courses and have different management and internal
governance mechanisms. Four universities were eliminated
due to a lack of governance data, while 16 were excluded
because of missing financial data. So our sample consisted
of 40 universities.
Variables definitions and regression models
specification
Table 1 summarises all the variables used in conducting the
empirical analyses. To test our hypotheses, three main types
of variables were operationalized.
The dependent variables of this study are university
financial and non-financial performance. University financial
performance (UFP) was measured with the economic and
financial sustainability ratio (ISEF—Indicatore di Sostenibilità
Economico-Finanziaria). Prior research focused on private
sector entities mainly adopted traditional economic
profitability indices—return on investment or return on
assets—to evaluate the effects of board gender diversity on
corporate performance. However, in the higher education
context, such indices have limited significance considering
the social function of universities and their not prevalent
orientation to profit maximization. So, we used the most
critical indicator prescribed by Italian law to monitor
universities’ financial sustainability: the ISEF. This ratio is
defined by MIUR and was introduced with the legislative
decree 49/2012. It is calculated as the ratio between A and
B, where A equals 82% of the sum of some net income
items (these include the FFO—‘Fondo di Finanziamento
ordinario’—the main funding annually provided by the
central government to universities, the three-year planning
public funding, and taxes collected from students net of
rents payable). B is the sum of salary expenses and
depreciation charges. According to legislative decree 49/
2012, this ratio should be higher than 1; this implies that
universities’ net income successfully covers all salary
expenses and depreciation charges. This ratio was taken
from the 2020 financial statements.
University non-financial performance (UNFP) was
measured using the CENSIS (Centro Studi Investimenti
Sociali) ranking score. Although aware of the existence of
recognized international rankings such as Times Higher
Education rankings (THE) or the QS World University
Rankings, the number of Italian universities listed in THE or
QS is very limited. So, we relied on a national ranking to
capture a higher number of observations. CENSIS publishes
an annual ranking of Italian universities based on quality of
services provided to students; scholarships and other social
interventions for students; quality and impact of teaching
and research facilities; quality of communication and
digitalization; international engagement; and employability
of students. For each university, a score ranging from 0 to
110 is provided for each of the six categories, as well as an
average score that resumes the global performance
achieved (Nicolò et al., 2021). This last score was directly
extracted from the CENSIS website for 2020 and used as a
dependent variable in our analysis.
The main independent variable was board gender
diversity (BGD). In line with previous studies (for example
Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Brahma et al.,
2021), BGD was computed by the ratio of female directors
sitting on the board and the total number of board
members. According to scholars (Isidro & Sobral, 2015;
Brahma et al., 2021; Usman et al., 2019; Mazzotta et al.,
2020), considering that the potential effects of appointing
female directors are not likely to occur immediately, we
calculated board gender diversity with a one year lag (t - 1).
Data on the number of university women directors was
retrieved from universities’ official websites for 2019. This
reduced endogeneity issues (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Issa &
Zaid, 2021). In addition, following extant studies (for
example Amorelli & García-Sánchez, 2020; Mazzotta et al.,
2020; Yarram & Adapa, 2021), the levels of female
representation on boards were examined based on the
critical mass theory. Prior studies have used different
dummies to investigate the effects of having different
minorities of women directors (one woman, two women
and at least three women) on firm financial or non-financial
performance (for example Liu et al., 2014; Brahma et al.,
2021; Cambrea et al., 2023). However, considering that this
study focuses on Italian public universities, a narrow
sample, consistent with Mazzotta et al. (2020), only one
dummy variable was tested, C_MASS, which had a value of
1 if there were at least three female directors on the board
(critical mass) and 0 otherwise.
Several control variables identified in the mainstream
literature as relevant performance drivers were then added
to limit possible omitted variable bias (Gujarati, 2003).
These controls include other corporate governance
variables: external board members (B_EXT) and board size
(B_SIZE); financial variables: leverage (LEV); and dimensional
variables: size (SIZE) and age (AGE).

Table 1. Variable definition, measurement and sources.

Variable Definition Source
UFP University performance measured with the ISEF Financial statement
UNFP University non-financial performance measured as the CENSIS average score ranging from a minimum of 0 to CENSIS
a maximum of 100
BGD University board gender diversity measured as the percentage of women directors on the board Website
C_MASS A dummy variable that equals 1 if there are three or more female directors on the board, and 0 otherwise Website
B_EXT The proportion of directors not belonging to university, measured as the ratio between the number of Website
external directors to board members
B_SIZE University board size proxied by the total number of board directors Website
LEV University leverage measured as total debt/total assets ratio Financial statement
SIZE University size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of students MIUR database
AGE University age proxied by the natural logarithm of the number of years since its foundation Website
6 N. AVERSANO ET AL

B_EXT was calculated as the number of external directors Findings

out of the total board members, whereas B_SIZE was proxied
by the number of university board members (Isidro & Sobral,
2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Mazzotta et al., 2020). Both variables
were operationalized using governance data retrieved from
official websites.
LEV was computed by the ratio between total debt and
total assets (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017). It was
constructed manually by using data extracted from the
university financial statements. SIZE was proxied by the
natural logarithm of students’ number obtained from the
MIUR official database, while AGE was computed as the
natural logarithm of the number of years since the
university was opened (Ntim et al., 2017; Mazzotta et al.,
2020; Nicolò et al., 2021), retrieved from institutional
websites.
Multiple linear regression models were estimated to test
our hypotheses (Larrán Jorge et al., 2019; Mazzotta et al.,
2020; Andrades et al., 2021). In line with prior studies (for
example Brahma et al., 2021; Yarram & Adapa, 2021;
Cambrea et al., 2023), the independent variables BGD and
C_MASS were tested to avoid multicollinearity problems
and consider their effects separately. Models 1 and 2 tested
the effects of board gender diversity and female directors’
critical mass on university financial performance, whereas
models 3 and 4 tested the effects of the same independent
variables on university non-financial performance:
Models (1 and 2)
University financial performance = β0 + β1 (BGD or C_MASS)
+ β2 (B_EXT) + β3 (B_SIZE) + β4 (LEV) + β5 (SIZE) + β6 (AGE) +
εi;
Models (3 and 4)
University non-financial performance = β0 + β1 (BGD or
C_MASS) + β2 (B_EXT) + β3 (B_SIZE) + β4 (LEV) + β5 (SIZE) +
β6 (AGE) + εi
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for both the
dependent and independent variables. UFP, represented by
the Economic and Financial Viability Ratio, shows a mean
value of 1.21. UNFP, proxied by the CENSIS scores, varies
from a minimum of 75.5 to a maximum of 98.2, with an
average score of about 85.26. Women, on average,
represent about 33% of the board directors’ members, and
their presence ranges from 10% to a maximum of 71% of
university boards. The majority (31 universities) reached the
critical mass of at least three female directors on their
board. Board size (B_SIZE) was, on average, 10.375
members (with a minimum of seven and a maximum of 11).
At the same time, in line with Law 240/2010, external
directors represented, on average, about 23% of the
university boards. Last, SIZE absolute values ranged from a
minimum of about 944 students to a maximum of 100.155;
the oldest university was set up around 1,057 years ago
while the youngest was 21. Table 2 reports the absolute
values of size and age. However, to perform the regression
analysis we used the natural logarithms.
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the
dependent and independent variables. Only the
relationships between BGD and C_MASS had high
correlation coefficients. However, this was not an issue, as
these variables are used alternately in the regression
models as dependent variables. The remaining correlations
did not exceed the critical threshold of 0.8 showing the
absence of multicollinearity problems.
Multivariate regression results
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the linear regression
models estimated to test the hypotheses. Table 4 relates to
hypotheses H1 and H1a and Table 5 outlines the results for
hypotheses H2 and H2a. All the models evidenced fair
goodness-of-fit test statistics, as the R2 and adjusted R2

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Continuous variables N Min. Max. Mean SD
UFP 40 1.03 1.66 1.21 0.142
UNFP 40 75.5 98.2 85.259 5.206
BGD 40 10% 71.4% 32.9% 0.136
B_EXT 40 11% 33% 23.6% 0.043
B_SIZE 40 7.0 14.00 10.375 1.462
LEV 40 0.010 0.699 0.113 0.131
SIZE 40 944 100,155 26,622 0.974
AGE 40 21 1,057 358 1,3611
Dummy variables Y/N %
C_MASS 31/40 77.5%/22.5%

Table 3. Correlation matrix.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. UFP 1 -.215 .169 .138 .054 -.147 -.144 -.270 -.407**
2. UNFP 1 -.023 .053 .278 -.173 .096 .143 .340*
3. BGD 1 .710** .124 .039 .334* .058 .036
4. C_MASS 1 .297 .347* .242 .333* -.036
5. B_IND 1 -.004 .056 .155 -.098
6. B_EXT 1 -.073 .550** .149
7. LEV 1 -.245 -.093
8. SIZE 1 .345*
9. AGE 1
 PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 7

Table 4. OLS regression model results and tests. Dependent variable: UFP. The effect of some control variables on financial and non-
Independent and control financial performance was interesting. In particular, B_SIZE
variables Model 1 Model 2 negatively affected university non-financial performance,
BGD 0.0032**(0.031) while B_EXT had a positive influence. Moreover, both LEV
C_MASS 0.0011**(0.039)
B_EXT 0.0013(0.749) -0.000(0.946) and AGE negatively affected university financial
B_SIZE 0.0000(0.935) -0.000(0.727) performance, while positively influencing non-financial
LEV -0.0037***(0.002) -0.0036**(0.030) performance. Last, SIZE had a significant and negative
SIZE -0.0003*(0.098) -0.0004*(0.070)
AGE -0.0003**(0.039) -0.0003*(0.056) effect on university financial performance. This implies that
const 0.0167***(0.000) 0.0187***(0.000) younger and less complex universities perform better in
N 40 40 terms of financial performance than older and larger ones.
R2 0.32 0.32
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19
Normality test χ2(2):2.99(0.22) χ2(2):2.063(0.36)
White test χ2(11) > 14.056) = χ2(26) > 28.135) = Discussion
0.22 0.35
Jarque–Bera test T-stat: 2.461(0.29) T-stat: 1.247(0.54) Our findings show that appointing more women to the board
Max VIF Size (1.817) Size (1.920) of directors stimulates higher levels of financial performance
Notes: p values in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. in public universities. This evidence strongly supports agency
theory’s arguments (Jensen & Mecklin, 1976; Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017) and we have confirmed that, in the
Table 5. OLS regression model results and tests. Dependent variable: UNFP. university context, board gender diversity may represent a
Independent and control fundamental resource to creating a good governance
variables Model 3 Model 4 structure and sound management of financial resources
BGD -5.1931(0.434) (Ntim et al., 2017; Mazzotta et al., 2020). Italian public
C_MASS 0.0062(0.997) universities generally have to cope with managing public
B_EXT 35.6478*(0.083) 34.1879(0.107)
B_SIZE -1.1613**(0.049) -1.1579*(0.061) financial resources transferred from the government while
LEV 7.5010*(0.092) 5.5313(0.305) increasing their own revenues from teaching and research
SIZE 1.0881(0.359) 0.9967(0.395) activities, respecting financial constraints imposed by the
AGE 1.4472**(0.015) 1.4282**(0.010)
const 71.2043***(0.000) 71.0202***(0.000) central government (for example the Economic and
N 40 40 Financial Viability Ratio). Failing to respect such constraints
R2 0.30 0.29 would significantly reduce universities’ possibility of
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.17
Normality test χ2(2):0.081(0.96) χ2(2):0.386(0.82) implementing adequate recruitment policies and planning
White test χ (27) > 26.110) =
2
χ (26) > 22.603) =
2
the long-term investments necessary for their growth. So,
0.51 0.65 the positive association between BGD and UFP highlight
Jarque–Bera test T-stat: 0.357(0.83) T-stat: 0.597(0.74)
Max VIF Size (1.817) Size (1.920) the critical role that female directors now have in
Notes: p values in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. supporting university boards to oversee the conduct of
central managers and executives—such as heads of
departments—to avoid the use of financial resources in
projects or activities that are not financially sustainable or
values indicate. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the assumptions not in the public interest.
underlying the regression models were tested for Regression results from model 2 provide further insights
multicollinearity: variance influence factor (VIF); that align with token and critical mass theory’s arguments
heteroscedasticity (White test); and both errors and residual (Kanter, 1977). In particular, a critical mass of female
normality issues (OLS model normality test and Jarque–Bera directors is required to harness their potential to increase
test). The maximum VIF was 1.920 (SIZE in models 2 and 4), the board’s heterogeneity and monitoring function, in order
indicating no multicollinearity problems. White’s to have a positive impact on financial performance. When
heteroscedasticity tests yielded insignificant p values, the threshold of three women is reached, they probably
suggesting that the models’ errors had constant variance. cease to be marginalized and their voice on the board
Also, the normality of residuals and the Jarque-Bera tests acquires substance and weight. In these circumstances,
indicated that the residuals behave normally and that the they can put their ideas and opinions at the apex of the
errors have a normal distribution. board’s agenda, supporting a more constructive and
Model 1 reveals a significant positive association between impartial dialogue among directors. This is crucial in
BGD and UFP. This confirms the H1 and extends the results of universities to create a less centralized and more impartial
prior studies conducted in the private sector context (for environment that discourages central managers and other
example Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Reguera-Alvarado et al., executives from assuming behaviours that damage overall
2017). In addition, model 2 highlights that it is necessary to financial sustainability objectives or harm long-term growth.
reach a critical mass of three female directors on the board In contrast, the second strand of the study’s findings
to experience a positive effect on financial performance. reveals that board gender diversity does not affect
This result aligns with hypothesis H1a and validates prior universities’ non-financial performance; the same was found
studies’ evidence obtained in the private sector context (for for a critical mass of female directors.
example Liu et al., 2014; Brahma et al., 2021). These findings can be discussed in light of some previous
On the other hand, the second group of models (3 and 4) studies. As evidenced by Islam et al. (2022), the number of
reveals an insignificant association between both BGD and women on boards is a crucial factor influencing the
C_MASS and UNFP, in contrast with our initial expectations. relationship between gender diversity and CSR. Thus, the
So hypotheses H2 and H2a were rejected. results of model 3 can be explained by the fact that, due to
8 N. AVERSANO ET AL
their small presence (1 or 2), the women may be intimidated
in a board dominated by male directors because their voices
are often unheard.
The results of model 4 can be read in light of Birindelli et al.
(2019), who did not support the critical mass theory.
According to the study, when women’s presence reaches
the threshold of three, it could cause a ‘dual critical mass’
(Schwartz-Ziv, 2017) leading to a negligible impact on CSR
performance.
Conclusions
This study adds to the debate about the gender composition
of boards of directors and its impact on overall organizational
performance. In doing so, it broadens the scope of the
existing academic literature, which has mainly focused on
private sector entities by examining the impact of board
gender diversity on both financial and non-financial
performance of Italian public universities. Italian universities
are a good case study due to the massive reorganizations
they have undergone in recent decades, inspired by the
neoliberalist ideology of the NPM. This process has radically
transformed university management, governance, and
accountability systems, imposing business-like models and
cultural mindsets oriented towards performance and value
for money. Particular attention has been devoted to
revising internal governance mechanisms by giving the
board of directors a crucial role in determining universities’
strategic posture and ensuring the sustainability of activities.
Therefore this article contributes to extending our
knowledge of the potential value of board diversity in the
university context. In line with agency theory, this article
provides empirical evidence suggesting that appointing
more women to the board of directors positively affects
universities’ financial performance while not influencing
non-financial ones. Empirical support is also provided for
the idea that reaching a critical mass of at least three
women on boards is vital for women directors to have an
impact.
Limitations
The article has a few limitations. First, due to the difficulties in
obtaining data for a reasonable sample over more extended
periods, the study focused on just one year. Future research
may deepen efforts to gather more data and extend such a
study over a multi-year period. Second, the study was on
the Italian context; cross-national studies in the future
would usefully capture differences and similarities between
different States. Third, this study used the ISEF and CENSIS
scores as financial and non-financial performance proxies. In
the future, it would be interesting to expand this article’s
analysis considering international rankings (for example THE
or QS).
Lessons for universities and policy-makers
This article has important practical implications for policy-
makers, regulators and academics. The study’s findings
should convince universities to take the necessary actions
to structure their boards to enhance their financial
performance in an environment that is becoming very
competitive. Specifically, our results suggest paying
particular attention to mandating a gender quota for
university boards of directors. It is important to abandon
any tokenism and reach a critical mass of female directors if
organizations want to gain benefits from board gender
diversity. Our results speak directly not only to policy-
makers and regulators but also to universities’ rectors and
other governors, underlying the need to ensure an
adequate presence of women on boards and other top
management positions as a vehicle of good governance
and superior financial performance. From this perspective,
academics may enrich this debate by providing more
insights into the nomination process of board members
and the reasons that have led, in some cases, to an under-
representation of females on these boards.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Natalia Aversano http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5676-6908
Giuseppe Nicolò http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3333-909X
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10 N. AVERSANO ET AL
Natalia Aversano is an Associate Professor in Accounting and
Financial Reporting at the Department of Management and
Innovation Systems of the University of Salerno, Italy, where
she teaches financial accounting, management accounting,
and non-financial reporting. Her research interests are IPSASs,
public sector accounting, heritage assets, university
performance measurement systems, intellectual capital, non-
financial disclosure, gender diversity, and accounting
education. She is a member of the Italian Society of
Accounting and Business Economics Professors (SIDREA), the
Italian Academy of Business Administration and Management
(AIDEA), the European Academy of Management (EURAM),
and the European Accounting Association (EAA).
Giuseppe Nicolò is a Senior Lecturer of Accounting at the
Department of Management and Innovation Systems of the
University of Salerno, Italy, where he teaches financial
accounting, business administration and scientific article
writing. His research mainly focuses on ESG disclosure,
integrated reporting, intellectual capital, corporate governance,
state owned-enterprises and university accountability.
Giuseppe is a corresponding member of the Italian Society of
Ragioneria and Economia Aziendale (SIDREA) and the
European Accounting Association (EAA).
Diana Ferullo is a PhD student in big data management in the
Department of Management and Innovation Systems at the
University of Salerno, Italy. Her research interests are mainly
focused on public sector accounting, performance
measurement in healthcare, intellectual capital and non-
financial reporting.
Paolo Tartaglia Polcini is Full Professor of Accounting at the
University of Salerno, Italy, where he teaches accounting
and management accounting. His research interests are
university performance measurement, fair value, business
combination, intellectual capital and international
accounting standards in both the private and public
sectors. He is a member of the Italian Society of Accounting
and Business Economics Professors (SIDREA) and the Italian
Academy of Business Administration and Management
(AIDEA).