'States' of Scarcity: Water, Space, and Identity Politics in Israel, 1948 59

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2008, volume 26, pages 959 ^ 982
doi:10.1068/d1106
`States' of scarcity: water, space, and identity politics in Israel,

1948 ^ 59
Samer Alatout
Department of Rural Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 336A Agricultural Hall,
1450 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA; e-mail: snalatout@wisc.edu
Received 27 September 2006; in revised form 27 July 2008
Abstract. Between 1948 and 1959, perceptions of Israeli water resources changed dramatically from
a strong belief in water abundance in the prestate period to an equally strong and unequivocal belief
in water scarcity after 1959. This paper tells the story of how the water resources of Israel came to be
constructed as scarce. On the substantive level, the paper tells the story of the dismantling of a
network of water abundance and the emergence, instead, of a network of water scarcity and
centralization, which helped to construct all of the following: water resource scarcity as `fact';
centralized policy-making institutions as most èfficient'; centralized technologies as àppropriate';
the national space as the only source of identity; the national scale of water management as
`necessary'; a strong and centralized state as `legitimate'; legal precedents for the use of state
apparatus for surveillance, discipline, and control over water resources; and, consequently, a form
of citizenship that is seen as at once heroic and disciplined. On the theoretical level, in this paper
I argue that the ontological distinction often assumed between scientific (eg water scarcity) and
political (eg centralized nation-state) fields of practice is exaggerated, especially in literature on
water politics in Israel. I further demonstrate that technoscientific debates about water availability,
efficient technologies for its utilization, and appropriate institutions for its management are con-
stitutive of relations of power and government and are themselves implicated in the construction of
an Israeli style of government.
``Simcha Blass was of the old school. Before statehood. The main characteristic of
these people is that they thought reality will abide to their will, not the opposite.
And they were disappointed in a way ... that generation was impressed by the fact
that they wanted to have a state and they had it. They used to think that anything
you like to accomplish will come true.'' (1)
``Mr. Wiener was not only realistic. He was pessimistic by nature and character.
He had a personal fear of that one day when we'll be out of water.'' (2)
``Water scarcity? What is that? There is so much water. You can have all the water
in the sea. Water is not scarce at all.'' (3)
1 Introduction
In the past few decades since the early 1950s academics, policy makers, and the public
at large have been fascinated by the story of water in historic Palestine and/or Israel
(1) Elisha Kally on Simcha Blass's belief in water abundance (interview, 11 September 1997).
Mardechi Virschubski also insisted that Blass came from what he called the `òld generation who
argued ìf we look for water, if we search for water, we will find much more than you can imagine' ''
(interview, 11 September 1997).
(2) Kally on Aaron Wiener's belief in water scarcity (interview, 11 September 1997). Virschubski
offered a similar comment on Wiener's perception of scarcity: ``Wiener was very obsessed by the
idea of the lack of water'' (interview, 11 September 1997).
(3) Hillel Shuval (interview, 30 July 1997). It is quite ironic that Shuval (1982) himself edited a
volume that was titled Water Quality Management Under Conditions of Scarcity: Israel as a Case
Study.
960 S Alatout
and in the Middle East more generally.(4) How, from the `scarcity' of water resources
that most actors take for granted to the `heroic' greening of the desert, the Israelis
supposedly turned the land into a living space bustling with agricultural activity after
centuries of neglect and destruction under Arab political and cultural regimes.(5) These
narratives, especially that on the scarcity of water, are by no means rare. They provide
the starting point of almost every paper, book, and news article that is written about the
subject, especially from Western and Israeli perspectives.(6) Water scarcity is so domi-
nant a view that scholars often ignore the need to provide evidence and persistently
regard it as common sense. Intellectual engagement, academic scholarship, and policy
making start from and build on that premise and never question it (eg Amery and Wolf,
2000; Elmusa, 1997; Falkenmark, 1989; Gleick, 1992; Guren, 1991; Lowi, 1993; Naff and
Matson, 1984; Shuval, 1982; Starr and Stoll, 1988; Wolf, 1995).
In a recent paper (Alatout, forthcoming), I demonstrate that the perception of
water as a scarce resource in historic Palestine has not always been as dominant. As
a matter of fact, most Zionist water and political experts believed water to be abundant
from the mid-1930s through the mid-1950s to late-1950s when a total reversal took place.
Prior to the establishment of the state, abundance was at once a scientific and a
political discourse that justified the Zionist project of the ìngathering' of world Jewry
in Palestine and allowed experts to argue that Jewish immigration would not pose an
economic threat to the original inhabitants of Palestine. Abundance was not necessa-
rily an obvious fact, of course; nor was it a foregone conclusion. It was carefully
constructed by what I call a ``Zionist network of abundance, immigration, and colo-
nization'' that included scientists (geologists and geophysicists), political organizations
(the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the Histadrut), Jewish settlers and
immigrants, and a Judeo-Christian, biblical narrative on Palestine that was taken as a
true representation of Palestine's history and politics (Alatout, forthcoming).
In this paper I provide a history of water scarcity and the displacement, along the
way, of the discourse of water abundance. How and under what circumstance did that
happen? Who were the actors, individuals, and institutions? And how did the discourse
on water scarcity link new apparatuses of water management with new apparatuses of
government? In other words, I tell the story of the emergence and consolidation of an
Israeli network of water scarcity that, in the process of its construction and stabilization,
had wide-ranging technical and political effects on the Israeli style of government and on
the water resources of the state and their management. When investigated, the success of
this network of scarcity is astonishing: it constructed water resource scarcity as `fact';
(4) Since the precise territoriality of Palestine and Israel has shifted a number of times throughout
the past six decades, the terminology is often challenging and hotly contested. In this paper I will
be consistent throughout. Whenever I am speaking of the period before 1948 (ie before the
establishment of the state of Israel) I will talk about historic Palestineöthe area under British
Mandate between 1918 (more precisely 1922) and 1948. I refer to Israel as the state that was
established after 1948 under the partition plan of 1947 included in the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 181. I also refer to Palestine as the Arab state under that resolution. De facto
changes in boundaries had not been recognized by the international community. Hence, the partition
plan in Resolution 181 will continue to be my point of reference.
(5) A great early example this perspectiveöfocusing on Arab neglect of the desert's encroachment
into settled communities and the promise that Jewish immigration into historic Palestine/Israel
holds for the reclamation of the desertö can be found in Walter Lowdermilk (1944).
(6) Although I risk overgeneralizing, most Palestinian and Arab perspectives are quite different
from their Western and Israeli counterparts. They see the success of Zionist adventures in Palestine
as the immediate result of a pernicious colonialism. Despite the different interpretations of Zionist
successes in Palestine, the scarcity of water resources is almost never challenged by either party.
Nor is there an attempt at linking the dominant discourse on water scarcity to the very success of
the Zionist project of building the Israeli state, which is at the heart of the argument of this paper.
Water, space, and identity politics in Israel, 1948 ^ 59 961
justified the centralization of the technical apparatus of water resource management as

more èfficient'; legitimized the abrogation of private rights in water and its appropria-
tion by the state; made unavoidable the construction of the National Water Carrier,
a technopolitical apparatus that spanned the territory of the state north to south;
legitimized a strong and a comprehensive legal system that centralized water policy
making and management in state institutions; deployed new legal instruments for
determining, managing, and disciplining the population's use of water; and, in the
end, underscored the importance of the unity of national space as a source of iden-
tityöin the process dismantling subnational spatial ^ political ^ linguistic identities
dominant during British rule before the establishment of the state.(7)
However, it is important to remember that each of these results was hard won, from
water scarcity to the various political effects it helped produceöspecifically the
construction of the national space as the ònly' space that matters and the statist
framework for political identity as a hegemonic one öand each was an accomplish-
ment in the social-scientific sense. Contestation was intense throughout and there were
always a number of alternatives that were either not taken, sidelined, or defeated in the
process. In a way, this makes sense. After all, almost all Zionist experts before the estab-
lishment of the state in 1948 believed water to have been abundant. Just on the face
of it, after building careers, methodologies, practices, and institutions of abundance,
it would have been difficult if not outright impossible to convert all of those to institu-
tions of scarcity without resistance.(8) Moreover, as will become increasingly obvious,
the effects of the water scarcity network were transformative in every possible way.
They changed the very core of what it means to be a Jewish subject in historic Palestine
and Israel from an immigrant settler to a citizen of the modern nation-state.
Before presenting an outline, I would like to underscore one more point. Despite
the fact that the actors in my story make retelling the narrative somewhat challenging
because of the complexity of the story itself, they also make it enjoyable and easy in
other ways. Within a few years of the establishment of the state, as one can read in the
three quotes in the epigraph, water experts and policy makers divided along two lines
of thought over the water potential of the state: one of abundance öestimating the
water potential at 3000 million cubic meters per year (mcmy), and another of
scarcity ö gradually decreasing estimates to less than 1850 mcmy. This controversy
over water estimates had its initial phase within the Water Department in the
Ministry of Agriculture, but was soon taken up by two of the most influential experts
in Zionist and Israeli water policy making in prestate and poststate periods. Blass,
one of the most important consultants of the Zionist water company Mekorot,
established in 1936, and the first director of the Israeli Water Department in the
Ministry of Agriculture since 1950, represented the abundance thesis while Wiener,
the Chief engineer of Mekorot in the late 1940s before the establishment of the state,
and the chief architect of water policy in Israel until 1977, represented the scarcity
(7) Many scholars of Israel and the Middle East often assume that since the state was a Zionist
project it must be an expression of a fulfilled Zionist identity. As will become obvious in this paper,
I prefer rethinking Jewish subjectivity under state structures as a layered project that expresses the
very tensions between a Zionist framework and a statist one.
(8) Only one self-proclaimed Zionist working for the British Mandate Water Department, Martin
Goldschmidt, towed the official line of the British Mandate and was an advocate of water scarcity
prior to the establishment of the state. He was, however, by all accounts, a lone figure in that
assertion. He was often ridiculed and described as ànti-Jewish' and ànti-Zionist' by other Zionist
experts. He was exonerated later on in life when the whole water apparatus of the state functioned
according to the scarcity thesis starting from the mid-1950s. Descriptions of Goldschmidt and his
story were conveyed in a number of interviews including those of Wiener (6 September 1998),
Menachem Kantor (6 September 1998), and Shuval (30 July 1997).
962 S Alatout
thesis.(9) Moreover, the division between the two groups of experts, let us call them
the òld' and the `new' schools of thought, manifested itself in all aspects of water
policy making. These included what kinds of projects would be important, what level
of centralization was to be established, which institutions should represent the state
in water policymaking, what kind of economic order Israel should build, what kind of
relationship between the state and civil society would be legitimate, and what kind
of Jewish subjectivity was to be developed and underscored.
These issues were not resolved in rhetorical debates over policy making only,
although that was one venue. They metamorphosed into a host of questions about
concrete, technical, often mundane, daily situationsöfor example, should water extrac-
tion and distribution be centralized within one water network? If so, what was the
main source of water to be, the Jordan River or groundwater aquifers? If the Jordan
River were to be diverted to the south of the country, in which direction should the
project be constructed, starting in the south and heading north or vice versa? Where was
the point of diversion of the Jordan River to be constructed, near Jisr Banat Yaakob or at
Lake Tiberias (figure 1)? (10) What considerations should determine that decision? Which of
the reservoirs along the way should be used as the main instrument to regulate water flow:
Lake Tiberias, Beit Nattaufa reservoir (figure 2) or a multitude of smaller reservoirs?
Answers to these technical questions proved essential to the emerging framework
of government and its spatial politics; they underwrote the technical and political
transformation in Jewish life in what became Israel.
My argument is that the scarcity thesis with its attendant technologies and spatial
politics, emphasizing the national rather than the local and regional scales, was a statist
thesis. It helped to reconfigure water into an element in building a strong, centralized
nation-state and in constructing the Jewish subject as citizen. The abundance thesis was a
threat to these. It constructed a multiscalar perception of Israel in which water could be
used and governed on a number of scales. In this case, the national scale would be limited
to the ingathering of Jewish immigrants, their dispersal, and their water needs in the
process. Other scalesöthe municipality, the city, or the regionöhad their own access to
groundwater aquifers and they were to decide their own water policies.
Literature on Israeli water policy making, for the most part, ignores this significant
shift from a conception of water abundance to one of scarcity, as well as the link between
such a shift and the construction of a strong, centralized nation-state. Given the domi-
nance of positivist attitudes towards science, this might not be surprising. Science and
politics are seen as ontologically and practically separate and distinct fields of practice.
Any links between the two, if acknowledged at all, are recognized as exogenous
relations that do not affect the internal workings of either science or politics. The shift
from water abundance to water scarcity is often seen as the result of better scientific
methods, equipment, and theories. Political shifts in favor of a centralized state, on the
other hand, are seen as the result of ideology, electoral politics, and group interests.
Literature on Israeli water policy making, despite its richness, fails to acknowledge the
fact that water scarcity and the strong centralized state were produced in the same
technopolitical process.
(9) I would not like to caricature the actors mentioned in this context. Wiener, for example, was
hard won to the scarcity thesis. Nothing should be read as cynical in that process. He built his
understanding of water availability on what he considered sound scientific methodsöemploying
empirical methodologies and rejecting theoretical and deductivist accounts.
(10) The original Arabic translation of Jisr Banat Yaakob is used throughout. In Hebrew, it is
known as Gesher B'not Yaakov. The English translation is `The Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob'.
On the other hand, the English term `Lake Tiberias', because of its familiarity, will be used
throughout. `Lake Tiberias' translates as Buhairat Tabaria in Arabic and Eshed Kinneret in
Hebrew.
Demilitarized zones
Canals
International boundary
0 5 miles
Figure 1. The demilitarized zones and Jisr Banat Yaakob.

964 S Alatout
Figure 2. The Israeli National Water Carrier (map is not to scale).
On the conceptual level, in this paper I argue that the process of constructing water
scarcity as a `fact' is also the process which constructed: first, a new form of govern-
ment as legitimate (that of the strong, centralized nation-state and its institutions);
second, a new spatial framework as appropriate (that of the contiguous national space);
and, third, a new form of subjectivity as essential (that of the citizen of the modern
nation-state).(11) Along the way, water scarcity became the articulatory principle for,
(11)
For different earlier perspectives on the social construction of scientific `facts' and their socio-
political effects see Barnes and Edge (1982), Bloor (1976), Callon (1986), Collins (1985), Collins
and Pinch (1982), Collins and Yearly (1992), Knorr-Cetina (1982), Latour (1993), Latour and
Woolgar (1979), Pinch (1986), Sismondo (1993). For early work on the construction of space see
Lefebvre (1991), Smith (1984). For debates on the construction of scale and its relevance to political
and the basis of, a network of forces that constructed the central and strong Israeli
state as necessary; placed the state at the center of the production of the new Jewish
subjectivity; introduced a set of centralized water policy-making institutions as repre-
senting the state; built a legal structure that codified scarcity, but also legalized and
legitimized centralization; and, in the end, created a new subject, the citizen of the
modern nation-state, subject to surveillance, control, and discipline.(12) Thus, this net-
work of relations constructed the national space as both a legitimate and an appropriate
framework.
To tell the story of the emergence of an Israeli network of scarcity and centralization,
I provide five sections and a conclusion. In section 2 I give a brief historical context
that explains the importance of water in Zionist and Israeli politics. In section 3
I provide a textual reading of water scarcity as it gradually became the dominant
technical and political discourse between 1950 and 1957. I do this through a careful
reading of seven interim and master water development plans. I also provide a taste of
the institutional and personal struggles that took place in the process. Sections 4, 5,
and 6 juxtapose a number of concrete technical choices dictated by different notions of
scarcity and abundance and the political and social ramification of those choices. I then
conclude in section 7 with a few remarks on the relationship between technoscience
and politics in this case.
2 A brief historical context: water in Zionist and Israeli politics

In this section I contextualize the emergence of water scarcity as a dominant concep-
tion of the water resources of Israel during the 1950s. Rather than accepting water
scarcity as a biophysical scientific fact that is given to us in the nature of things, I see it
as a technopolitical achievement, a negotiated framework that was settled not only in
the field of science, but also in politics.
In addition to water abundance, by 1948 there was a fairly strong consensus among
Israeli policy makers that the main challenges facing the new governing institutions
were the ingathering, dispersal, and absorption of Jewish exiles-turned-immigrants.(13)
This, of course, continued prestate politics. After all, the British Mandate's official
strategy in Palestine, based on the Balfour Declaration of 1916, focused on the estab-
lishment of a `Jewish National Home'. The Zionist Organization and its executive in
Palestine, the Jewish Agency, did everything in their power to open Palestine to
unlimited Jewish immigration in order to achieve a Jewish majority in the country.
Despite the fact that the precise meaning of a `Jewish National Home' was strongly
contested until the late 1930s, since then it increasingly came to mean a Jewish state on
part of historic Palestine.
(11) continued
organization see Agnew (1997), Brenner (1997; 2001), Delaney and Leitner (1997), Marston (2000),
Marston and Smith (2001), Smith (1990; 1992). For work on the political construction of space and
scale in the Zionist and/or Israeli context see Forman and Kedar (2004), Khamaisi (1995),
Kimmerling (1983), Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003). For a more recent body of work that specifically
links constructions of scientific `facts' and those of space see Abu El-haj (2002), Alatout (2007a;
2007b; forthcoming).
(12) On the concept of articulation as used in this context, see Mouffe, 1979a; 1979b. On the concept
of network, see Latour (1987; 1988; 1993); Law (1994); Law and Hassard (2005).
(13) Èxiles', ìngathering', and other framings of the Zionist and Israeli colonization project in
historic Palestine are terms used by the actors themselves and do not depict my own thinking.
For example, I do not for a moment think of the Jewish communities living around the world as
exiled despite Zionist framing of their experiences as such. In the political culture of the time,
the ingathering of exiles was, indeed, perceived to be the raison d'ëtat itself. Among the many
articles and books demonstrating this see Kimmerling and Migdal (1993), Medding (1989), Tessler
(1994), and Troen and Lucas (1995).
966 S Alatout
Debates over the precise level of Jewish immigration and the effects of that
immigration on Palestinian life and aspirations were often technicized through debates
on the àbsorptive capacity of Palestine' and, consequently, on Palestine's water poten-
tial (Alatout, forthcoming). Water abundance became the favorite discursive strategy of
the Zionist movement by implying that Palestine's absorptive capacity can be extended
through irrigation works to allow for an open policy of Jewish immigration and that
such a policy would not harm the original inhabitants of Palestine.(14)
The trend of articulating the fate of immigration with water policy continued after
the establishment of the state, albeit involving different sets of actors, tensions, and
issues.(15) In particular, it was the diversion of the Jordan River to the Negev Desert
that was deemed of highest importance (figure 2).(16) Lowdermilk's work (1944) on a
diversion scheme for the Jordan River, which was the basis of James Hays's TVA on
the Jordan, in 1948, was the first plan to entertain the project as a practical possibility.
The Lowdermilk ^ Hays plan, as it came to be known in later years, became the basis
for the Israeli Master National Plan for the management of water resources (see Hays,
1948; Lowdermilk, 1944).(17)
In order to translate the Lowdermilk ^ Hays plan into a practical project, seven interim
plans and one master plan were produced between 1950 and the end of 1955 (table 1).
In 1957 a new updated 10-Year Master Plan (Tahal, 1957) was also produced. The
institutional context within which these plans were published is important for our story
at hand. The first three interim plans were produced by the Water Department in the
Ministry of Agriculture in 1950 and 1951; four interim and two master plans were
produced by Tahal Water Planning of Israel. This reflected the institutional arrange-
ments of the time (Alatout, 2007a; 2007b). Various stages of the project were completed
at different times. The final stage, however, which was completed by early 1964, conveyed
the promised Jordan waters to the Negev Desert.
A careful reading of the interim plans, along with a number of interviews with key
actors who were personally involved in drafting those plans, offers a unique perspective
Table 1. Israeli water plans between 1950 and 1957.
Plan Year Institution
First Plan 1950 Ministry of Agriculture

Second Interim Plan 1950 Ministry of Agriculture
Third Interim Plan 1951 Ministry of Agriculture
Fourth Interim Plan 1953 Tahal
Fifth Interim Plan 1954 Tahal
Sixth Interim Plan 1955 Tahal
Seventh Interim Plan 1955 Tahal
Master Plan 1955 Tahal
Updated 10-year Master Plan 1957 Tahal
(14) Zionist experts went even further to argue that Jewish immigration to Palestine, made possible
by an abundance of water, would as a matter of fact benefit Palestine's original inhabitants (see
Tessler, 1994).
(15) Kally says, `Àfter defense, one could say water was the most important priority on a national
level'' (interview, 11 September 1997). For similar stress on the link between water, immigration,
and settlement see Virschubski, interview (11 September 1997), Wiener (interview, 6 September
1998), and Shuval (interview, 30 July 1997).
(16) The importance of this project for agricultural settlement of refugees was explicitly mentioned
in the many interim plans as well as master plans for the management of Israeli water resources.
See, in particular, Blass, 1952.
(17) For more on the Lowdermilk ^ Hays Plan see Alatout (forthcoming).
on, and an opportunity to identify, four important technical shifts that occurred between
the early and late 1950s. These shifts are critical in trying to piece together and under-
stand different scientific attempts at knowing the water resources of the state and how,
in the process, competing institutional, spatial, and, ultimately, political constructs
came into play. Each shift represented a struggle between the òld' and the `new'
generations of water experts.(18) Before delving into the details of those shifts, a word
of caution about my use of the terms òld' and `new' is necessary. I use the two broadly
construed schools of thought as a heuristic device, the ends of a continuum that
probably never materialized in reality. In fact, I believe that most of the technical
and political decisions were negotiated outcomes and for that reason never reflected
pure positions in either direction. Despite this qualification, my research supports the
fact that the two ends of the continuum (abundance and scarcity) reflected true
positions of water experts. Most Zionist experts by 1948 believed water was abundant,
while only a few who worked for the Water Department under the Mandate, like
Goldschmidt, believed water was extremely scarce. In addition, I believe that an expert's
Table 2. Old versus new schools of water engineers.
Issue The old school The new school
Annual water Abundance Scarcity

potential More than 3000 mcmya Less than 1800 mcmy
Ultimately 1500 mcym
Centralization Yes Yes
mechanism Through state apparatusÐmain Through private actionÐmain issue
issue is economic efficiency is efficiency of water
Institutional Cabinet position Private or semiprivate organization
expression
Rationale Serving state interests Efficient management of water
Main problems Finding more supply sources Water scarcity
Better distribution for immigration Efficiency
and settlement
Constructing water works
Direction of South ± north (from the Negev to North ± south (from point of
water project point of diversion) diversion to the Negev)
north ± south or
south ± north
Immediate Local and regional projects Main conduit of the Jordan ± Negev
importance project
Point of diversion Jisr Banat Yaakob North shore of Lake Tiberias
for Jordan ± Seen as the only option, even if this Anxious to start work on main
Negev conduit delays work on the main conduit conduit even if it encouraged a
and the for regional concerns dovish posture
geopolitics of the Encouraged a hawkish posture vis-a©-vis Syria
project vis-a©-vis Syria
Relative Focus on agricultural development Focus on urban development
importance of and settlement Connection to land is seen as
agriculture and Priority is in changing the overexaggerated
industrial relationship of the Jew to the land
development
a mcmyÐmillion cubic meters per year.
(18) It is worth repeating Kally's revealing comment that competition between the two groups of
experts ``took the shape of arguments regarding specific projects'' (interview, 11 September 1997).
968 S Alatout
position on the issue of water availability had implications for his or her position on a
number of technical challenges.(19)
Each of these shifts during the 1950s is described in the points below and summarized
in table 2.
(1) Annual water potential was gradually reduced from a perception of abundance,
more than 3000 mcmy, to a perception of scarcity, less than 1500 mcmy.
(2) In the early plans, the construction of the Jordan ^ Negev project was imagined to
be in a south to north direction, starting construction from the northern-most point in
the Negev and working its way north to the Jordan River. This was changed to a north
to south direction, starting from a point of diversion on the Jordan River and working
its way south to the Negev.
(3) Instead of a focus on local and regional plans for water resources, as was the case
in the first planning stages, the focus shifted to a national dimension with the Jordan ^
Negev conduit as the main scheme.
(4) The point of diversion of the river was shifted from a northern point, at Jisr Banat
Yaakob, to a point further south, on the northwestern shore of Lake Tiberias (figure 1).
In the end, it is the gradual displacement of the òld school' of water experts in
favor of the `new school' that made these shifts in water policy possible. It was a
cultural, ideological, and practical shift that favored a certain understanding of water
conditions and, in the process, underscored a new framework of government for the
ingathering and settlement of new immigrants.
3 From abundance to scarcity: a technical construct of a new Israeli identity

One great quote from an interview with Virschubski, a lawyer credited with writing
the Israeli Water Law of 1959 and passing it through the legislative process, reflects the
hegemonic character of the discourse on water scarcity:
``From the beginning of the state, or even from the beginning of the Jewish settle-
ment in Palestine, it was always felt that water is in scarcity, that it's a commodity
that is limited and that it inhibits the development of the country ... . [The country]
is very dry.'' (20)
But this is obviously untrue.(21) Even during the 1950s, with which Virschubski's
quote is concerned, water potential was not as predetermined as the quote implies;
nor was it so easily settled. In fact, scarcity became the general conception of water
potential only after a long technopolitical struggle over a number of questions, includ-
ing what methods of knowing were legitimate, what perception of water potential was
scientific, and how accurate it would be to use the historical and biblical narratives of
the past in making water policy for the present.
Within a few years of independence there were two parties in the water policy
community with different visions of water availability. Blass, along with Lowdermilk,
deployed a biblico-theoretical discourse on Palestine as the land of abundance (Blass,
1952; Lowdermilk, 1944). Indeed, this articulation of Palestine with abundance is,
(19) My thanks go to one of the reviewers of Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
for rightfully pointing out that without qualification this presentation of pro-abundance and
pro-scarcity groups might seem too simplistic and might ignore the richness and complexity of
individual positions. That is certainly not my intention.
(20) Virschubski (interview, 11 September 1997).
(21) Virschubski is not alone in this misconception. Some water experts who worked in the water
apparatus at later times did not even know about any controversy over the water potential of Israel.
For example, when asked about this, Jacobo Sack, a senior engineer working at Mekorot since 1965
insisted ``This is the first time that I hear about this. I'm not familiar with these figures'' (interview,
22 July 1997).
in part, what made the Zionist project one of promise and salvation. Blass worked with
the Zionist Organization as a consultant water engineer and was especially involved
with regional and local projects of irrigation öan interest that will come to define his
water politics during the statehood period.(22) Along with Lowdermilk, Blass believed
the annual water potential of Israel was more than 3000 mcmy.(23) His methods for
arriving at this number are unclear, but evidence points to the possibility that he rested
his assessment on two sources: a biblico-historical notion of Palestine as the land of
abundance (with enough water to support millions of inhabitants); and a theoretical
notion of the rate of percolationöthat is, the percentage of rainfall to percolate to
accessible groundwater aquifers (more than 30% of rainfall).
Blass was appointed the first director of the Water Department in the Ministry of
Agriculture. Thus he inherited a cadre of engineers who had worked in the Water
Department during the Mandate era. Those engineers were, in part, responsible for
the British estimates of meager water potential for Palestine. Chief among those
engineers was the famous hydrologist Goldschmidt, who was a major force behind
the British notion that Palestine suffered an extreme water scarcity, estimated at 1200
mcmy, during the Mandate period.
The troubles over water potential estimates started in 1950 when an interministerial
committee was assembled with the mandate of translating the Lowdermilk ^ Hays plan
into an actual project, a National Water Carrier. Although everybody agreed on the
significance of the project, they agreed on little else. From the beginning, an accurate
estimate of the annual water potential was deemed necessary, for it was to determine
the technical details of the project (eg conduit size, construction of storage reservoirs,
type of diversion, type of materials). Most important was the committee's failure to
come to an agreement on the water potential of Israel. The only significant resolution
was to conduct more research and sink new exploratory wells in order to provide
accurate estimates of groundwater potential.
By the end of 1951, the Water Department of the Ministry of Agriculture had
produced three interim plans. Neither the first nor the second plan included estimates
of water potential. However, starting with the Third Interim Plan (Cotton and Hays,
1951) a detailed water balance was provided. While the Third Interim Plan concluded
that the water potential of Israel was àt least' 2805 mcmy, awaiting the excavation of
more water resources, it aroused many objections from other water policy institutions,
such as Mekorot.
The chief engineer of Mekorot was none other than Wiener. He was on all the com-
mittees that were looking into constructing the National Water Carrier. However, Wiener
was won over to a new empirical framework for estimating the water potential of the
country. Basically, like the British Mandate before him, he believed ``the water you can
access is the water you have''. He completely rejected the historical and theoretical
framework of Blass.
Turf problems between Mekorot and the Water Department of the Ministry of
Agriculture were not limited to estimates of the water potential. Since Mekorot itself
was a quasi-official institution (owned by the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National
Fund, and the state), turf problems understandably extended to the issue of mandates:
(22) This was mentioned to me many times by Wiener. Wiener thought of Blass's work on local and
regional projects in the prestate era as a constraint on Blass's vision. Blass was not able, according
to Wiener, to replace his local and regional vision of waterworks by a national one (Wiener,
interviews, 25 August 1997 and 6 September 1998).
(23) This view, perhaps besides the fact that Blass was a `large, stubborn' man, was the best known
and most widely repeated among experts interviewed for this project. However, Blass himself left a
record of his beliefs in Blass (1952).
970 S Alatout
who is to do what in water management? Who is to build the carrier? Who is to do

research? Who is to be the representative of the state? And so on.
In 1952, and as a result of these turf problems, an interministerial committee
reorganized the water policy institutions. The main result of that reorganization was
the establishment of Tahal Water Planning for Israel. This company was entrusted with
planning for the whole state.
Since its creation, Tahal has been responsible for the production of interim plans as well
as master plans. Tahal was an uneasy compromise, however. It was a negotiated outcome
in which Blass became the director of the company, and Wiener became his deputy. It was
a negotiated settlement between the voices of scarcity and those of abundance.
In the Fourth Interim Plan, produced by Tahal in 1952 (Cotton, 1952), tension was
not yet very obvious. The water potential dropped in this report to 2691 mcmy. It was
a different report on Israeli water resources, however, that made the tensions public.
In this report, Blass (1952) stressed the differences among water experts. He went on
to say, `Ì feel obliged to note that I do not consider [even] the number 3000 mcmy an
upper limit, if we use all means at hand, assuming that, of course, the population will
increase so much that we will need more water.''
At the end of 1953, Blass resigned his post as the Director of Tahal. The main
reason according to many experts was his disagreement with the water estimates.(24)
In particular, he rejected the decrease in water estimates for the Fifth Interim Report
which was to be published towards the end of the year. The publication of the report
was delayed because of these disagreements and, in February 1954, the Fifth Interim
Report decreased the estimates to 2415 mcmy.
Blass's defeat as an authoritative figure among water experts cannot be seen in
isolation. Many experts, typical of the Israeli public at large at the time, were political
to some degree. Their affiliation with the political establishment determined, in part,
their positions on water policy and whatever politics surrounded it. It is significant that
1953 witnessed the resignation of Ben-Gurion as the Prime Minister.(25) The political
shift in favor of the new Prime Minister, Levi Eshkolöwho, along with the Finance
Minister, Pinhas Sapir, established Mekorot in 1936öhelped to strengthen Wiener and
the Mekorot cadre.(26)
For Wiener, estimate reduction was a step in the right direction, towards a
practical, empirical notion of the `scientification' of water policymaking. He com-
mented often on the fact that water policymaking during Blass's reign was anything
but scientific.(27) In the Fifth Interim Report, Wiener and his group tried not only to
(24) Along with that, Kantor stated that the reason for Blass's resignation was a bit broader. It had
to do with the fact that ``the government did not accept his approach'', in which the state, through
Tahal, was to control all water policy-making decisions (interview, 9 August 1997).
(25) For a period of three years, 1953 ^ 55, Ben-Gurion resigned his governmental posts and retired
to the Negev in order to set an example of `pioneering'. By many accounts, he was the main
support for Blass. Ben-Gurion's support of the abundance thesis comes across in one of his
remarks (Ben-Gurion, 1954) when he claimed that if a water expert tries to find water in an area
and comes back to him (ie Ben-Gurion) saying he could not find any, he would send him back and
tell him to look harder.
(26) I have to make a point in this regard. Wiener's framework of scarcity and centralization was,
as a matter of fact, supportive of Ben-Gurion's framework of Mamlakhtiyut, which places the state
at the center of Jewish identity and tends to favor centralization. However, Ben-Gurion was
also `visionary', to use the language of Wiener. See footnote 25 for how that would shape his
understanding of water research and potential. Because of the lack of space, I cannot discuss
Mamlakhtiyut and its relation to water politics and policy fully in this paper. For a more extensive
treatment of Mamlakhtiyut and its implications for water policy and politics see Alatout (2008).
(27) This is a typical boundary work on the part of Wiener. Boundary work (see Gieryn, 1983;
1999; Jasanoff, 1990) is, in part, a rhetorical strategy that is often followed by scientists involved
justify the new conception of water potential, but also to provide a positive and
progressive explanation for such a change. ``The planning of such a great scheme
resolves to a series of successive approximations, each approximation being more
[sic] closer to reality than previous ones'' (Cotton, 1954, page 1).
The report also deployed a scientific rationale for future reductions in water
estimates. After asserting the `fact' that knowledge about groundwater resources was
not scientifically based, the plan was to conduct a major study of groundwater aquifers.
However, the report reversed previous expectations of finding more water:
`Ìt is not likely that many wells will be drilled in the near future; in fact, it is likely
that some wells in some regions may be shut down temporarily to prevent salt
water intrusion and to prevent excessively low water tables. The well development
program is small. It is planned, however, to drill some wells to the Cenomanian ^
Turonian formation. It would appear that the limit of use of underground resources
is rapidly being approached'' (page 33).
This is a far cry from the Third Interim Report's optimistic note which declared that
the expectation was to discover more, not fewer, groundwater resources (Cotton and
Hays, 1951).(28)
When asked about these discrepancies in water estimates, contemporary water
expertsöthose who did not work during the 1950södo not even recall such differences.
For them, water was always known as a scarce resource. However, in a masterful piece
of boundary work, older water experts, such as Wiener and Kally, claimed that what
was informing the òptimistic' estimates was a background of Zionist politics. People
like Blass were, according to Wiener, ``visionaries, yet not scientific in their approach to
water resources.''(29) Ironically, what used to be the main charge against Mandate
experts, that they ignored theoretical approaches to water potential and strongly
depended on empirically established limits, became the point of departure for the
new group of engineers. In order to provide an accurate water estimate, you need an
empirical test of some sort, such as exploratory wells. Overreliance on theoretical and
historical assumptions of water potential became a critique leveled against Blass
and his supporters. Water potential is what you can empirically excavate. This became
the new `scientific' rationale.
Local controversies over what it meant to have a scientifically-based management
of water resources, especially what constituted a scientific assessment of water poten-
tial, had implications at a number of scales, some local (within Israel itself ) and some
regional (shaping interstate politics, especially over sharing the Jordan River). Thus,
controversies of this sort became doubly important, since their ramifications shaped
regional politics and competition over shared water resources, which became increas-
ingly violent after 1950. The water potential of each state had become a regional matter
that would potentially determine that state's share of the Jordan waters. That is to
say that Israeli water potential, especially with the escalations of October 1953, became
an international issue. The greater Israel's water potential, it seemed, the less the Israeli
share of the Jordan River would be.
(27) continued
in a controversy. The goal is to draw a boundary around what constitutes good and bad science.
The goal is to delegitimize those on the other side of a controversy as nonscientific or as pandering
to politics.
(28) Kantor argued that, ``To confess, we didn't have any real study of hydrology at the time. I would
say that the guess of three billion [cubic meters per year] was a rough estimate worked out from
rainfall, evaporation, runoff, and so on. This was not hydrology as you know. But it was as good as
any estimates'' (interview, 6 September 1998).
(29) Wiener (interview, 25 August 1997).
972 S Alatout
An even further reduction of water potential estimates was announced in the

Master Plan of December 1955. These now stood at 2200 mcmy, of which 1500 would
be used for agriculture. Even here, Blass's imprint is still obvious. After all, he was
heavily involved in all the studies and reports produced at the time. In 1956, when the
7-year Master Plan was modified for a 10-year Master Plan, ending in 1963, water
potential was estimated at an all-too-low 1500 mcmy (see Tahal, 1957).(30)
In past plans, water was deemed scarce in the south and abundant in the north.
All that seemed to be needed was to convey water from the abundant north southward.
However, with the 10-Year Master Plan, and more so later on, scarcity took on a
national dimension. The distinction that was made in the past between a wet north
and an arid south was displaced in favor of a nationwide perception of scarcityöin
other words, the construction of a homogeneous national space. Perhaps one of the
most direct expressions of this condition was articulated in Wiener and Wolman (1962):
``The land and water resources of Israel are extremely scarce.''
The same experts saw water scarcity as the main obstacle facing economic devel-
opment, `Ìsrael [sic] economy will continue to grow ... except that water scarcity will
limit agricultural development'' (page 257). As a matter of fact, this notion of scarcity
became the justification par excellence for a centralized national water policy. Accord-
ing to Wiener and Wolman (1962, page 258), `Ìt is not surprising that Israel has been
one of the first countries to adopt and implement a comprehensive water policy based
on a nationwide master plan. This policyöalthough severely restricting the freedom of
action of the individual water user öhas gained the support of the public.''
It is important to understand that water scarcity was a deliberate construction that
depended on many scientific and technical arguments. However, it is also important to
note that the scarcity of water made possible, or at the least justified, the shift in
the political emphasis from agricultural settlement to urban development. Water scar-
city was the `natural' alibi and lent its legitimizing power to a group of Israelis who
were in favor of defining an Israeli identity in non-Zionist terms, in industrial rather
than agricultural terms, and in favor of urban development rather than agricultural
development.(31)
On one occasion Wiener and Wolman (1962, page 260) articulated this group's
policy in the following terms:
`Òn deciding whether to give water to industry or agriculture, the choice rests upon
the value of the product per unit of water. It was found that the contribution of the
gross national product of a unit of water consumed in industry will, on the average,
be 25 times greater than that of a unit consumed in agriculture. A comparative
analysis of employment opportunities created by a unit of water used in industry or
agriculture shows ratios even more favorable to industrial uses. Therefore, priority is,
(30) This estimate has become widespread and, since then, has become a very well-known number.
The argument, however, is that, including water from sewage treatment plants and some return
flow from agricultural use, the number might reach between 1850 and 2200 mcmy. However,
Wiener insisted that, even including those resources, water would not exceed 1800 mcmy (interview,
25 August 1997).
(31) The relationship between industrial development and the Zionist ethos is conflicting at best. In
the Mandate era, it was obvious that Zionists focused attention on working the land, `productiviza-
tion' as it was called then. There were a few industries of course. However, focus on industrial
production started in earnest only in the poststate era, during the 1950s. I think the debate between
agricultural development relying on water abundance and industrial development relying on water
scarcity represented the tensions in identity politics between framing Jewish subjectivity in the
language of settlement and return to the land or in the language of citizenship of the modern
nation-state. These tensions were apparent from my interviews with Kally (11 September 1997),
Wiener (25 August 1997), and Shuval (30 July 1997). The agricultural lobby, according to Kally,
pushed very hard for Blass's interpretation of the water potential of Israel.
in general, given to industry. Allocation to agriculture consists of that portion of the

available resources which remains after all municipal and industrial requirements
have been met.''
Even within agriculture, they noted, ``priority will be given to high value export crops
such as citrus and to those food and fiber crops that are difficult to ship (vegetables
and milk) or too expensive to import (some fruits, certain dairy products, cotton).''
Water scarcity was made possible only by a political desire to free Israel, in part,
from its Zionist connection. It was made possible by a political desire to create a new
Israeli identity. The question of whether or not water scarcity reflected reality or
constructed it is not the issue here. What matters most is that if it were not for the
desire to redefine Jewish identity away from its Zionist connection water availability
might have looked different.(32)
Let us now turn to concrete technical examples that had ramifications for the
construction of space, scale, and Israeli subjectivity öall legitimized through reference
to water scarcity as fact.
4 Northward ^ southward? Constructing national priorities through the National Water

Carrier
Towards the final years of the Mandate, and more strongly during the first few years
after the establishment of the state of Israel, the importance of the Negev was master-
fully constructed in both symbolic and practical senses. From the early 1950s, the
Negev became the desert par excellence, the one desert that would prove the progres-
sive abilities of a progressive nation at rehabilitating nature and subjecting it to state
control. The Negev became a symbol for the strength of the Jewish nation embodied
in the establishment of an Israeli state.
However, the Negev was also an important strategic construct. Greening the
desert, at the time, also meant settlement of new immigrants. An even more significant
issue was the security threat an empty desert might pose to the new state. Since the
early 1930s and especially after the Palestinian revolt of 1936, a new culture emerged
among Zionist settlers in which the security and defense of the land were linked to
its settlement (see Ben-Guriön, 1954; Kimmerling, 1983). According to many Israeli
analysts, a land is never secure enough unless settled. Not only was this Ben-Gurion's
attitude towards the Negev, but also it was repeatedly mentioned as a primary reason
for the feverish settlement of this desert.(33)
Security was not the only concern over the Negev. By 1952 Israel also had to deal
with the settlement of more than one million immigrants who arrived within four years
of independence. The official state policy of settlement was one of dispersal. New
immigrants were given tremendous incentives to settle in the Negev and in develop-
ment towns that were being built on the borders with Arab states. Settlement in both
was perceived as strategic. It was also symbolic, part and parcel of declaring, defending,
and confirming the territoriality of the state.(34)
(32) When asked whether or not, and if so then why, political operatives did favor Wiener's scarcity
story, Virschubski insisted that scarcity was a better suited narrative for the 1950s political culture:
``Most probably in those years, in the fifties, when you said you have to save, you have to ration
and you have to cut down, it was more accepted than to go in the other direction'' (interview,
11 September 1997).
(33) Without any qualifiers, every Israeli expert I interviewed during my research expressed similar
sentiments. The link between settling the Negev and the security of the state is an amazing one that
was never questioned and that warrants unpacking in its own right.
(34) On the territoriality of state and its official settlement policies in the early years see Kark
(1989), Kellerman (1993), and Kimmerling (1983).

974 S Alatout
Despite consensus on the symbolic and strategic importance of the Negev, there
was great disagreement on how to turn it into the desired national space: (1) a place
that would be hospitable to immigrants and where new immigrants could learn to
connect to the land; and (2) a place that was not only populated and secured, but
also the national food basket. Water policy was deemed central to this project. The
technical controversies faced by water experts and policy makers, and the resolution
of those controversies, all played a major role in the unfolding of the Negev, the state,
and Jewish identity in the next few years.
One of the main issues the national water plan had to address was whether to start
construction of the National Water Carrier from the Negev in a northern direction
towards the Jordan River, from the Jordan southerly towards the Negev, or in all
places at once. Most experts agreed from the outset that the scarcity of financial
resources demanded prioritization of the different stages of the project. This is why
the idea of constructing the whole of the National Water Carrier as a single project
was rejected from the start. Analysts of Israeli water policy paid little attention, if any,
to the different priorities. Indeed, many analysts did not even pay attention to the fact
that there were groups of experts who had different ideas of which technical priorities
should be addressed first.
The same pattern of controversy witnessed in estimating the water potential of the
state repeated itself here with the same actors taking opposing positions that had
implications for the way the water policy was institutionalized and managed, for the
way the national space was constructed, and for the way government was framed.
Blass argued that it was important to start constructing waterworks in the south of
the country, the Negev, and to go in a northward direction. He assumed that ground-
water aquifers along the way would be tapped and connected to the conduit. The
sources of legitimacy of such prioritization were political or/and technical. First, in
order for this scheme to work, it was important to believe that there was an abundance
of groundwater aquifers along the way that could be accessed. Second, Blass's scheme,
starting construction from the Negev, prioritized agricultural development in the south
over urban undertakings in the north. Third, this scheme also diverted resources to the
project of settling the Negev and elevated its importance, a politically strategic choice
(for security and settlement). Fourth, it also made it possible for experts allied with
Blass to stay committed to the point of diversion of the Jordan River (within the
demilitarized zone) and wait for a change in the regional context that resulted in
halting the project. Blass's group took this stance precisely because it thought diverting
the Jordan River would not become a priority for a few years (figure 1).
Another group, led by Wiener, argued that a northern starting point would be more
appropriate. From this standpoint, groundwater aquifers were not as abundant as main-
tained by Blass and thus water was needed soon for the expansion and development of the
Negev. Water resources were also urgently needed to satisfy the developmental needs of
industrial and urban centers and development towns on the northern borders. Finally, a
different regional strategy was deemed legitimateöin the process, shifting the diversion
point from the demilitarized zone to another location, Eshed Kinneret, which was
completely within the state of Israel on the northern shore of Lake Tiberias (figure 2).
Tensions inherent in these technopolitical positions vis-a©-vis water policy in general
and the diversion project in particular were apparent from 1950 when the first and
second Israeli plans were devised. However, conflict became even clearer between 1951
and Blass's resignation towards the end of 1953, finding its way into different interim
reports. For example, the Third Interim Report argued that building a conduit 400
kilometers long would take many years during which there would be no economic
benefit from the project. Its framers stated, `Èven if this long conduit were built
in time, many years would elapse before it was utilized to its design capacity, thus
creating heavy monetary losses due to excessive interest, depreciation, operation and
maintenance charges'' (Cotton and Hays, 1951, page 9).
The Third Interim Report thus provided an alternative, stating that `ìt is possible
to obtain increments of new water supply for use temporarily without constructing the
entire main conduit northward from the Negev, say 10 ^ 15 km per year, and feeding
water to it from adjacent wells or wadis'' (page 9). And, although the report admitted
that the quantity of water which would be available along the way was unknown, the
assumption was that this water would be abundant and would not change the report's
main conclusions.
Some of the issues that Wiener and his engineers were concerned with and that led
them to insist on starting the project from the north as soon as possible relied on their
strong belief that water was scarce. The urgent need for water from the north, given the
scarcity of water, legitimized constructing the National Water Carrier from a north to
south direction. Wiener's group went even further, stating that there was no sense in
locking horns with the United Nations Security Council over the diversion point at
Jisr Banat Yaakob and arguing in favor of changing the point of diversion to be on the
north shore of Lake Tiberias.
As we can see, technical disagreements among water experts, whether on the water
potential of the state or on the direction of the diversion project, shaped political
disagreements about the best course of development. Should the focus be on agricul-
tural or industrial projects? Which foreign policy battles are worth fighting? Finally,
what does it mean to be an Israeli, concerned with economic health of the state in
general, as opposed to a Zionist settler who is concerned with agricultural development
and the symbolic connection to the land. More importantly, however, these technical
disagreements over water availability and the direction of the construction of the
National Water Carrier meant different spatial politics for the two groups and for
Israel more generally. The construction of the national space, materially linking north
to south as soon as possible, was without a doubt one of the strong arguments of the
proponents of scarcity. The material linkage between north and south, despite its
theoretical importance, was not as urgent for the proponents of abundance. While, in
the first case, water was badly needed and played a role in the security of the state,
in the second case, water was already available and priorities should be given to other
policiesösettlement of immigrants, education, saving money for the treasury, and so
on. Technoscientific disagreements were essential in imagining the national space and
its governance.
5 Local, regional, and national: how the technical and political were inseparable
The Zionist settlement of Palestine focused, in part, on local and regional settlement,
so many waterworks were of that nature in the prestate period (Alatout, forthcoming).
Immediately after the establishment of the state, local and regional works were seen as
legitimateöstate ownership of water resources had yet to work itself into a water law
(Alatout, 2008). However, the Israeli project of ingathering, dispersal of immigrants,
and settlement created an increased stress on available resources, including water.
All experts agreed on the fact that local and regional plans for water would not be
sufficient to take care of such an enormous task as was envisioned by the state
apparatus. In other words, experts agreed that some level of centralization and
state intervention was needed in order to supplement private efforts. The same experts,
however, disagreed on the limits of centralization and the place of the state in water
policy. Each group mustered a host of technical arguments to defend its views.
976 S Alatout
Blass was of the opinion that local and regional waterworks should continue,
utilizing whatever water resources were available. However, he took the Jordan ^ Negev
scheme to be one of national character and to be the responsibility of a state admin-
istration. It was for this reason that he advocated the establishment of a cabinet-level
water apparatus. It might seem counterintuitive that Blass would advocate the
establishment of a state apparatus for water policy while at the same time advocating
the rights of local and regional forces to manage their own water resources. This,
however, is not a genuine contradiction. Blass was merely walking the fine line
between identity and its expression in water projects all over again. He was faithful
to the priorities set by Ben-Gurionöstrong state structures, strong identification with
the state, and a strong settlement ethic. On the one hand, the establishment of a
cabinet-level bureaucracy would emphasize the importance of a strong centralized
state, with its priorities oriented toward settling the Negev and security in the southern
zone. On the other hand, allowing local and regional water management would keep
the spirit of pioneering and settlement alive. However, this dualistic view was legiti-
mized by continuous references to the abundance of water resources above and beyond
the need of the state for many years to come.
From Mekorot's perspective, and more specifically that of Wiener, local and
regional management of water resources was perceived as wasteful at a time when
water was conceptualized as scarce. These experts advocated centralization, albeit
within an efficient semiprivate bureaucracy that was insulated from political maneuv-
ering.(35) Their camp held that centralization should take place within the private
sector in order to be efficient and in order to scientifically manage the meager water
resources. Further, they argued, having the state involved in water policy would place it
under the political pressures of different lobbies, especially agriculture.
Tahal was a negotiated settlement, just like many arrangements in Israeli water
policy making.(36) Centralization won the day through a negotiated settlement between
the Ministry of Agriculture and Mekorot. After Blass's resignation in 1953, and espe-
cially after the view that water was a scarce resource took hold, one can witness a shift
in water policies toward stronger centralization through Tahal. Now, no more local and
regional management of water resources was permissible. The National Water Carrier
was to become the technical expression of political centralization. All the water
resources were to be directed towards the National Water Carrier and all water would
be distributed through that system and through it alone.
6 Technical position and regional politics: the point of diversion of the Jordan River
The diversion of the Jordan River to the Negev provoked many regional concerns that
related to its international context.(37) The regional dimension of sharing the Jordan
River is treated in detail in Alatout (2006) and Lowi (1993), but it is important in the
present context to shed light on how a seemingly apolitical technical detailönamely,
deciding the point of diversion for the projectöbecame an important site for negotiat-
ing local as well as regional struggles. On the local level, debates on the location of
the point of diversion typified the struggle between the two groups of experts over the
legitimacy of technical as well as political categories. On the regional level, the point
of diversion generated different political postures of the Israeli state advocated by
competing political groups (hawkish versus dovish) vis-a©-vis other states in the region.
(35) Wiener (interview, 25 August 1997).
(36) Wiener argues that Tahal was established only to appease Blass (Wiener, interview, 25 August
1997). I would add, however, that this move was also to appease the statist forces within the
political establishment.
(37) Again, the riparians to the Jordan River, of course, are Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.
It was decided early on that the most feasible point of diversion was a site called
Jisr Banat Yaakob (figure 1). The site was preferred because it was at a higher elevation
and provided a way to convey water using the force of gravity, thus avoiding expensive
pumping. Because of the long head of the site, more than 300 m, it was also deemed
appropriate for power generation. Jisr Banat Yaakob, however, was located in the
demilitarized zone between Syria and Israelöthat is, in an area of contested sover-
eignty. Note that the technical argument for the site as the point of diversion legitimized
an extension of Israeli sovereignty over the demilitarized zone. When the project
started construction at Jisr Banat Yaakob in September of 1953, the Syrians brought
it to a halt by objecting to the Security Council of the United Nations. This started
a diplomatic effort by the United States to negotiate a water sharing regime for the
Jordan River.(38)
Immediately after halting the project, many Israeli water experts, including Wiener,
argued for an alternative point of diversion located on the northwest shore of Lake
Tiberias. This alternative was not realized for three years, but, after a long wait, it was
the path followed. This progression of events makes us wonder why, if this alternative
was immediately thought of and if it was the one followed after a three-year delay
anyway, was it not chosen at an earlier time? Or, at least, why was it not followed
immediately after halting construction on Jisr Banat Yaakob?
The answer lies in a web of reasoning that spans politics and water expertise. Two
technopolitical coalitions formed and battled each other. First, there was a group of
experts, led by Blass himself, who argued that the project would be best served by
diverting the Jordan waters from Jisr Banat Yaakob because most of the diversion
would be taken care of by the force of gravity and thus be cost effective. At the same
time, this group of experts argued that the natural reservoir of Beit Nattaufa (see
figure 2) was the largest and best regulatory reservoir in the country. They suggested
that this reservoir should be used to regulate the flow of water from north to south,
from rainy to dry years, and from rainy to dry seasons.
This technical reasoning was linked to another similarly technical explanation.
The argument that the Beit Nattaufa reservoir might have a substantial leak did not
help change these experts' opinions, as most of them believed that water resources were
abundant. For that reason, efficiency for them held only one meaning: saving energy
resources by avoiding water pumping whenever possible.
On the other hand, the group of experts led by Wiener argued that the Beit Nattaufa
reservoir leaked in a substantial way and that it could not be used efficiently. Rather than
using the Beit Nattaufa reservoir, they suggested using Lake Tiberias as the main regu-
latory reservoir of the country. The fact that water would have to be pumped for more
than 300 m, using expensive energy sources, was not a deterrent for this group because it
consisted mainly of experts who believed that the water resources of Israel were scarce.
Efficiency for this group of experts was about water availability, not about energy cost.
It is important to recognize that these two divergent technical views of the diver-
sion scheme helped to legitimize, to give substance to, and to reaffirm two divergent
political strategiesöthe hawkish international policy advocated by Ben-Gurion himself,(39)
(38) The US diplomatic effort lasted from the October 1953 until the spring of 1956. The results of
the negotiations were a mixed bag. In the end the diplomatic effort gave everybody a reason to
celebrate even though no agreement was officially signed. This episode is one of the most crucial
in the diplomatic history of the area.
(39) It is important to point to the fact that, although Ben-Gurion resigned his post as prime
minister in 1953 (returning in 1955), he was often consulted on important matters of foreign and
domestic policy. It is a known fact that Ben-Gurion's residence in the Beer Sheva in the Negev was
bustling with political activity.
978 S Alatout
and a dovish international policy that sought to avoid heightened political conflict,
advocated by the foreign minister, Moshe Sharett.(40) Both groups looked at the Syrian
intervention in the project as political posturing and perceived the demilitarized zone as
Israeli territory that should have been fully under Israeli sovereignty. However, it was the
Armistice Agreement of 1949 that established the area as a demilitarized zone, the final
status of which was to be determined in future negotiations. This was the only way to
convince Syria to withdraw from the area. To add to the complexity, it was decided that the
area would be under Israeli civil authority. This is precisely why the construction started
there.
The argument that there was an abundance of water and that the more efficient
plan was to divert the Jordan River from Jisr Banat Yaakob found a willing ear in the
hawkish group in the Labor camp. These arguments supported a defiant posture on
the international level and ended up causing a delay in the project. The dovish group,
on the other hand, relied on the story of water scarcity as well as on the Beit Nattaufa
reservoir leakage in order to legitimize the alternative plan of diversion using Lake
Tiberias. Water scarcity became the force behind an intense sense of urgency for the
project to continue. This was convenient for the dovish group, for it meant relying on
technical reasoning to avoid international conflict over the demilitarized zone.
By 1956, the pro-scarcity experts and the dovish political forces won the day.
The point of diversion was moved to the northwestern shore of Lake Tiberias and the
southward diversion soon started without international intervention.(41)
7 Conclusion
Water scarcity has a history, even in arid and semiarid regions, and that history is
nothing less than the history of government. Its hegemonic character, the fact that
there is both a scientific and a political consensus around it, often leads academics and
other commentators to take for granted not only water scarcity but also its supposed
political effects. These include the centralization of water management and its technical
apparatus, as well as the abrogation of customary rights in water and entrusting these
rights to the state and its institutions. But if one is to adhere to Gramsci's (1971)
warning, as I do here, that common sense (which is probably nothing more than an
entrenched consensus) often implies the ultimate victory of ideology then one is
especially wary of agreed upon narratives. This paper unpacks the history of water
scarcity and demonstrates that there was nothing predetermined about the way things
unfolded. As a matter of fact, on their way to becoming victorious, the forces of
scarcity had to wage war against water abundance at every location where such
abundance was produced, deployed, or rearticulated. That meant constructing a new
hegemonic orientation that delegitimized theoretical and historical approaches to water
research, attacked inefficient, decentralized, and fragmented styles of management, and
delegitimized the Jewish subject as owner of the water resources.
(40) Sharett became temporary prime minister when Ben-Gurion resigned his post between 1953
and 1955.
(41) Kantor goes even further; he rewrites history in a way. He insists that it is good for the country
not to divert water directly from the Jordan River at Jisr Banat Yaakob because it would have been
a mistake. He argues that taking water from Lake Tiberias was a better technical solution: ``You
cannot take drinking water from the Jordan River directly. You must know that the Kinneret is
God's gift to treat water. It stays there for one to four years open to the sun and that's an excellent
treatment for the water'' (interview, 6 September 1998). The same was also mentioned by Meir Ben
Meir (former Water Commissioner of Israel): ``Thank God the Syrians prevented the direct
diversion of the upper Jordan to the southern part of Israel'' (interview, 14 August 1997).
This, in other words, is nothing less than telling a history of the Israeli style of
government through water. How and why were the water resources organized in a
centralized fashion? How did that relate to the political framework of statism or, to
use Ben-Gurion's own language to Mamlakhtiyut? And how did that facilitate and
underwrite the construction of Jewish subjectivity along the lines of citizenship of
the modern nation-state? In a word, this paper relates the history through which
water scarcity became an articulatory principle for a network of forces that invested
in the construction of a specific technopolitical order featuring scarcity, central-
ization, and the nation-state as the most important elements in the Israeli style of
government.
It is important to remember that the very hegemonic character of scarcity is
reproduced in the daily practices that take it for granted, in utterances that do not
put it into question. Moreover, the very relations of power and government that
scarcity ushered in are being reproduced in these instances. Retelling its history of
emergence denaturalizes the notion of scarcity and sheds light on those very relations
of power that made it possible while being shaped by it.
Yet, the hegemonic victory of the forces of scarcity, especially the passage of the
Water Law of 1959 (Alatout, 2008), did not kill all voices of dissent. Resistance lurks in
the background waging its own war of attrition. One example of this resistance is Arie
Issar, a professor of hydrology at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev and a student of
the world-famous Leo Picard of the Hebrew University. Issar argues, for example, that
huge fossil aquifers under the Negev contain billions of cubic meters that would be
enough to supply the state with its water requirements for hundreds of years. Not only
are there fossil aquifers, he argues that water in the desert percolates at a greater rate
than currently believed by the scientific community in Israel, which means that there
may be active aquifers under the sand. (42) And he argues that the important thing is to
get the state to commit the funds needed for research.(43) However, when asked about
Issar's position, the Water Commissioner of Israel at that time, Ben-Meir, who, ironi-
cally, met with me for an interview just after meeting with Issar himself, said that
Issar's position does not make sense and that the Negev's water would be too expensive
to extract if it even existed.(44)
This story is significant for contemporary politics because it underscores the fact
that water scarcity is not a fixed object, nor are relations of power that sustain it. Both
are in constant flux. At present, for example, the notion of water scarcity is deployed in
order to justify a hawkish foreign policy, especially in relation to sharing water
resources with the Palestinians. Issar's position disturbs the very foundation on which
new hawkish foreign policies are constructed even if unwittingly,
To conclude, I would like to emphasize one theoretical implication. I have argued
that the ontological distinctions made or assumed between science and politics or
between scientific and political fields of practice are often exaggerated and should
be revisited. In the case at hand, I demonstrate how technical discussions over
water availability, appropriate water technical apparatuses, and legitimate water
styles of management are the very elements of which frameworks of government
are constituted.
(42) Issar acknowledges the fact that there are different degrees to the problems of salinity in fossil
aquifers. However, he seems to imply that those are not serious enough, especially in times when
the water table is high. In addition, he seems to imply that the problem of salinity is less important
in active aquifers that are constantly replenished with fresh water (Issar, interview, 17 August 1997).
(43) Issar (interview, 17 August 1997).
(44) Ben-Meir (interview, 14 August 1997).
980 S Alatout
References
Abu El-Haj N, 2002 Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-fashioning
in Israeli Society (Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL)
Agnew J, 1997, ``The dramaturgy of horizons: geographical scale in the `reconstruction of Italy'
by the new Italian political parties, 1992 ^ 1995'' Political Geography 16 99 ^ 121
Alatout S, 2006, ``Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: territory, population, and
environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel'' Political Geography 25 601 ^ 621
Alatout S, 2007a, ``State-ing natural resources through law: the codification and articulation of
water scarcity and citizenship in Israel'' Arab World Geographer 10(1) 16 ^ 37
Alatout S, 2007b, ``From water abundance to water scarcity (1936 ^ 1956): a `fluid' history of Jewish
subjectivity in historic Palestine'', in Reapproaching the Border: New Perspectives on the Study of
Palestine/Israel Eds M LeVine, S Sufian (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD) pp 199 ^ 219
Alatout S, 2008, ``Locating the fragments of the state and their limits: water policymaking in Israel
during the 1950s'' Israel Studies Forum 23(1) 40 ^ 65
Alatout S, forthcoming, ``Bringing abundance into environmental politics: constructing a Zionist
network of water abundance, immigration, and colonization, 1918 ^ 1948'' Social Studies of
Science
Amery H, Wolf, A, 2000 Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace (University of Texas
Press, Austin, TX)
Barnes B, Edge D, 1982 Science in Context: Reading in the Sociology of Science (MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA)
Ben-Gurion D, 1954 Rebirth and Destiny in Israel (Philosophical Library, New York)
Blass S, 1952 Ha-Mayim BiMdinet Yisrael: Skira [Water in the state of Israel: a survey], Central
Zionist Archives 5594/4707/Gimel (in Hebrew)
Bloor D, 1976 Knowledge and Social Imagery (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL)
Brenner N, 1997, ``State territorial restructuring and the production of spatial scale: urban and
regional planning in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1960 ^ 1990'' Political Geography
16 273 ^ 306
Brenner N, 2001, ``The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration'' Progress
in Human Geography 25 591 ^ 614
Callon M, 1986, ``Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and
the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay'', in Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge
Ed. J Law (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York) pp 196 ^ 223
Callon M, Latour B, 1992, ``Don't throw the baby out with the Bath School! A reply to Collins
and Yearly'', in Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL)
pp 343 ^ 369
Collins H, 1985 Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Sage, London)
Collins H, Pinch T, 1982 Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
Collins H, Yearly S, 1992, `Èpistemological chicken'', in Science as Practice and Culture
Ed. A Pickering (Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL) pp 343 ^ 369
Cotton J, 1952 Fourth Interim Report on Master Plan for Development of Irrigation and Hydroelectric
Power in State of Israel (Israel Government Printer, Jerusalem)
Cotton J, 1954 Fifth Interim Report on Master Plan for Development of Irrigation and Hydroelectric
Power in State of Israel (Israel Government Printer, Jerusalem)
Cotton J, Hays J, 1951 Third Interim Report on Master Plan for Development of Irrigation and
Hydroelectric Power in State of Israel Water Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Jerusalem
Delaney D, Leitner H, 1997, ``The political construction of scale'' Political Geography 16 93 ^ 97
Elmusa S, 1997 Water Conflict: Economics, Politics, Law and Palestinian ^ Israeli Water Resources
(Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, DC)
Falkenmark M, 1989, ``Middle East hydropolitics: water scarcity and conflict in the Middle East''
Ambio 18(6) 350 ^ 352
Forman G, Kedar A S, 2004, ``From Arab land to Ìsrael Lands': the legal dispossession of the
Palestinians displaced by Israel in the wake of 1948'' Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 22 809 ^ 830
Gieryn T, 1983, ``Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and
interests in professional ideologies of scientists'' American Sociological Review 48 781 ^ 795
Gieryn T, 1999 Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago University Press,
Chicago, IL)
Gleick P, 1992, ``Reducing the risks of conflict over fresh water resources in the Middle East'',
in Water and Peace in the Middle East: The First Israeli ^ Palestinian International Academic
Conference on Water (Elsevier, Zurich) pp 41 ^ 54
Gramsci A, 1971 Prison Notebooks (International Publishers, New York)
Guren G, 1991 The Water Crisis: The Next Middle East Crisis (Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles,
CA)
Hays J, 1948 TVA on the Jordan: Proposals for Irrigation and Hydroelectric Development in Palestine
(Commission on Palestine Surveys, Washington, DC)
Jasanoff S, 1990 The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA)
Kark R (Ed.), 1989 Land that Became Israel: Studies in Historical Geographies (Yale University
Press, New Haven, CT)
Kellerman A, 1993 Society and Settlement: Jewish Land in Israel in the Twentieth Century (State
University of New York Press, Albany, NY)
Khamaisi R, 1995, ``Land ownership as a determinate in the formation of residential areas in Arab
localities in Israel'' Geoforum 26 211 ^ 224
Kimmerling B, 1983 Zionism and Territory: The Socio-territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics
(Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA)
Kimmerling B, Migdal, J, 1993 Palestinians: the Making of a People (The Free Press, New York)
Knorr-Cetina K, 1982 The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual
Nature of Science (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
Latour B, 1987 Science in Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA)
Latour B, 1988 The Pasteurization of France (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA)
Latour B, 1993 We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA)
Latour B, Woolgar, S, 1979 Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ)
Law J, 1994 Oraanizina Modernity (Blackwell, Oxford)
Law J, Hassard J, 2005 Actor-network Theory and After (Blackwell, Oxford)
Lefebvre H, 1991 The Production of Space (Blackwell, Malden, MA)
Lowdermilk W, 1944 Palestine: The Land of Promise (Harpers and Brothers Publishers, New York)
Lowi M, 1993 Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
Marston S, 2000, ``The social construction of scale'' Progress in Human Geography 24 219 ^ 242
Marston S, Smith N, 2001, ``States, scales, and households: limits to scale thinking? A response
to Brenner'' Progress in Human Geography 25 615 ^ 619
Medding P (Ed.), 1989 Israel: State and Society, 1948 ^ 1988 (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
Mouffe C, 1979 Gramsci and Marxist Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
Naff T, Matson, R, 1984 Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation (Westview Press,
Boulder, CO)
Pinch T, 1986 Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Solar Neutrino Detection (Reidel, Dordrecht)
Shuval H (Ed.), 1982 Water Quality Management Under Conditions of Scarcity: Israel as a Case
Study (Academic Press, New York)
Sismondo S, 1993, ``Some social constructions'' Social Studies of Science 23 515 ^ 553
Smith N, 1984 Uneven Development (Blackwell, Malden, MA)
Smith N, 1990 Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space (Blackwell, Oxford)
Smith N, 1992, ``Contours of spatialized politics: homeless vehicles and the production of
geographical scale'' Social Text 33 55 ^ 81
Starr J, Stoll D (Eds), 1988 The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East (Westview Press,
Boulder, CO)
Tahal, 1955 Master Plan for Development of Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power in the State of
Israel (Government Printer, Jerusalem)
Tahal, 1957 Ten-Year Plan for Development of Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power in the State of
Israel (Government Printer, Jerusalem)
Tahal, 1957 The Master Plan for the Utilization of Water Resources in Israel (Israel Government
Printer, Jerusalem)
Tessler M, 1994 A History of the Israeli ^ Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University Press, Bloomington,
IN)
Troen I, Lucas, N (Eds), 1995 Israel: The First Decade of Independence (State University of New
York Press, Albany, NY)
982 S Alatout
Wiener A,Wolman A, 1962,``Formulation of national water policy in Israel'' Journal of the American
Water Works Association 273 257 ^ 263
Wolf A, 1995 Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River: The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the
Arab Israeli Conflict (United Nations University Press, Tokyo)
Yiftachel O, Yacobi H, 2003, `Ùrban ethnocracy: ethnicization and the production of space in
an Israeli `mixed city' '' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 673 ^ 693
ß 2008 Pion Ltd and its Licensors

Conditions of use. This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research
by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other
online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.

'States' of Scarcity: Water, Space, and Identity Politics in Israel, 1948 59

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

'States' of Scarcity: Water, Space, and Identity Politics in Israel, 1948 59

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2008, volume 26, pages 959 ^ 982

`States' of scarcity: water, space, and identity politics in Israel,

justified the centralization of the technical apparatus of water resource management as

Figure 1. The demilitarized zones and Jisr Banat Yaakob.

Figure 2. The Israeli National Water Carrier (map is not to scale).

2 A brief historical context: water in Zionist and Israeli politics

Plan Year Institution

First Plan 1950 Ministry of Agriculture

Issue The old school The new school

Annual water Abundance Scarcity

3 From abundance to scarcity: a technical construct of a new Israeli identity

who is to do what in water management? Who is to build the carrier? Who is to do

An even further reduction of water potential estimates was announced in the

in general, given to industry. Allocation to agriculture consists of that portion of the

4 Northward ^ southward? Constructing national priorities through the National Water

(1989), Kellerman (1993), and Kimmerling (1983).

ß 2008 Pion Ltd and its Licensors

You might also like