Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3-Abu Dhabi Safety & Security Planning Manual (SSPM)
3-Abu Dhabi Safety & Security Planning Manual (SSPM)
(DP-305)
Abu Dhabi Safety and
Security Planning Manual
Version 01
His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan
President of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Abu Dhabi
His Highness General Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces
and Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
1. Introduction 5
Contents
- Mandate of the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council Planning Toolkit Appendix 1:
- The Manual Vision
- Executive Summary
4 A1 Risk Management
6
- P2 Structure and Spatial Layout 40
- P3 Ownership 44
- P4 Surveillance 48
- P5 Activity 54
- P6 Physical Security 58
- P7 Public Image 62 - Al Bandar 210
- P8 Adaptability 66 - Emirates Palace Hotel 216
- Wasat Madinat Abu Dhabi (Sector E4-01) 224
- Saadiyat Island Cultural District 230
- Introduction 74
- Stage 1: Pre-planning 78
- Stage 2: Planning 81
- Stage 3: Design 87
- Stage 4: Construction, Commissioning 91
and Operations
- Getting the Right Advice 93
1. Introduction 7
Mandate of the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council
The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
Council (UPC) was created by Council’s primary purpose is to
Law No. 23 of 2007 and is deliver upon the vision of His
the agency responsible for the Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin
future of Abu Dhabi’s urban Zayed Al Nahyan, President of
and regional environments, and the United Arab Emirates and
the expert authority behind Ruler of Abu Dhabi, for the
the visionary Abu Dhabi 2030 continued fulfillment of the
Urban Structure Framework grand design envisaged by the
Plan published September late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al
2007. Chaired by His Highness Nahyan, Father of the Nation,
General Sheikh Mohamed bin and the ongoing evolution of
Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. By
of Abu Dhabi, Deputy Supreme drawing on urban planning
Commander of the UAE Armed expertise from local Emiratis,
Forces and Chairman of the throughout the Arab States of
Abu Dhabi Executive Council, the Gulf, and around the world,
the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
Council defines the shape of Council strives to be a global
human settlements in the authority on the future of urban
Emirate, ensuring factors such planning and design.
as sustainability, infrastructure
capacity, community planning Building on the success of the
and quality of life, by overseeing Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Vision
development in the cities and in 2030, the Abu Dhabi Urban
the Emirate as a whole. The Abu Planning Council is pleased to
Dhabi Urban Planning Council issue the Safety and Security
ensures best practice in planning Planning Manual (SSPM) for the
for both new and existing Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
settlements.
1. Introduction 9
The Manual Vision:
To ensure the creation
of safe and secure
communities that
enhance quality of life
and reflect the Emirate’s
unique identity
10 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 11
Executive Summary
The Abu Dhabi Safety and Work on the initiative that
Security Planning Manual produced the Manual included
(SSPM) was commissioned by a series of workshops over
the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning a nine month period with
Council (UPC) to guide the senior representatives of
development of safe and secure Federal Ministries, Abu Dhabi
communities. Government departments,
representatives of the private
Reassuringly, Abu Dhabi is a sector and Higher Education
safe and secure place for its UAE institutions. The initiative
Nationals, residents and visitors. included a major benchmarking
The purpose of the Manual is to study, that for the first time,
ensure that Abu Dhabi remains examined both community
safe, secure and welcoming as safety and protective security
it continues to grow and attract practices at an international,
a range of diverse activities, regional and domestic scale.
people and opportunities. Where good practices were
observed, these have been
Good planning and design of the amended to take into account
built environment are central to the following Abu Dhabi factors:
community safety and protective Culture & Religion, Climate, Pace
security, yet crime and security of Development and Built Form.
issues rarely receive sufficient
attention early in the development Eight Principles are presented in
process. The purpose of the the Manual (Chapter 2):
Manual is to ensure that safety • P1 Access and Connectivity
and security are embedded in
development proposals and • P2 Structure and Spatial Layout
this is best achieved using an • P3 Ownership
Integrated Development Process.
This process will be used to • P4 Surveillance
implement safety and security • P5 Activity
planning and design principles
that are bespoke to Abu Dhabi • P6 Physical Security
Emirate. It will ensure that neither
• P7 Public Image
the development community,
nor those tasked with safety and • P8 Adaptability
security enforcement, lose sight
of the Vision 2030 overarching They are universal, regardless
principles. The vision for the of the type, size or location of
Manual is to ensure the creation development. However, they
of safe and secure communities need to be applied differently
that enhance quality of life according to context.
and reflect the Emirate’s
unique identity.
1. Introduction 13
Guided by the Principles, specific and Building Permit process place to another and that the Whether this Manual is being
policies have been developed will need to demonstrate solutions that work in one place used during the early stages
under the following topics: the implementation of the might not work in another. There of the development process,
Principles. The Manual does not is a need to take into account or to make improvements
• Planning Culture introduce any new deliverables the local situation and for all at existing buildings, it is
for these types of projects. those involved in developing, intended to inspire innovative
• Risk Assessment High Priority Projects, which managing and maintaining the and aspirational solutions that
will typically be larger in built environment, to work are in-keeping with the local
• Balancing Act
size or include land uses that collaboratively and holistically to context. The Manual does not
• Working Together attract particular security risks, address safety and security risks. provide detailed guidance, as
will be required to submit it is a starting point, covering
• Owner Pays
additional deliverables as part The constraints present in a large geographic area and a
of the municipal planning the existing built environment wide range of projects with
The Integrated Development and Building Permit process. justify the Manual’s focus on the varying safety and security
Process presented in Chapter The recommendation is that planning stage of development. requirements. With further
3 of the Manual will ensure these are completed by However, even though Vision advances and by working
that the Principles are applied specialists, working as part 2030 is ambitious and involves together to implement its
early in the development of the multidiscipline project significant development, much of Principles, it will create a solid
process. This will allow team, who are best placed to Abu Dhabi is existing and there foundation for safe, secure
professionals to use their skills balance competing development is an equal need for community and sustainable communities.
and imagination to incorporate objectives. In these instances, a safety and protective security
unobtrusive measures into Government safety and security in existing areas. As such, the
the built environment. This is advisor will work together with Planning and Design Toolkits
certainly more cost effective the project team to provide present a wide range of options
than retrofitting and will ensure advice and support during the that will be useful for owners of
design quality. planning and design stages existing buildings.
of development. They will be
The Manual is supplemented present at workshops and will An implementation programme
by an online Decision Support review the proposals submitted coordinated and funded by
Tool, that is both simple and to the UPC or relevant the Government will be used
user friendly. It may be used Municipality. to identify any improvements
during the pre-planning stage of needed at existing buildings
a project to gain an appreciation The Manual contains a toolkit of for national security reasons.
of how much influence safety planning and design guidance Owners will be contacted
& security will have on the that may be used to address if their building is deemed
development proposals. There safety and security risks. ‘High Priority’ and if
are only two outcomes from the Decisions relating to which tools improvements are required,
Decision Support Tool. Projects to adopt and to what extent an action plan will be agreed.
will either be identified as they are applied are to be
‘Low Priority’ projects or ‘High made as part of the Integrated
Priority’ projects. Development Process. Neither
the Planning Toolkit (Chapter 4)
It is anticipated that the majority or the Design Toolkit (Chapter
of projects will be identified 5) prescribe any particular
as Low Priority Projects and solutions. Best practice and
applications submitted as experience shows that safety
part of the municipal planning & security risks differ from one
1
Introduction
Secure communities
Introduction
The Abu Dhabi The Abu Dhabi Safety and
Security Planning Manual will
be updated regularly as new
Safety and Security data and experience with best
This Manual is part of the UPC’s practices become available.
Planning Manual development regulations and is Please check the UPC’s website
for the latest version before
approved by the Emirate of Abu
was commissioned Dhabi Executive Council for use
across Abu Dhabi Emirate.
using this Manual.
1. Introduction 19
When discussed within this The 2030 Plans regulate the Safety and Security Terrorism
document, safety and security pattern of urban expansion Context As is the case across the world,
refers to the following: to balance economic, social, the United Arab Emirates
cultural and environmental faces a real, evolving and
Community Safety - comprises priorities in a sustainable Reassuringly, Abu Dhabi is a safe increasingly complex threat
strategies and measures that manner. The Plans seek to and secure place in which to from international extremism.
seek to reduce the risk of crimes establish a planning culture live. The purpose of the Manual To this day, there has not
occurring and their potential and introduce best practice is to ensure that the Emirate been a successful terrorist
harmful effects on individuals principles for both new and remains safe and secure as it attack within the United Arab
and society, including fear existing development. continues to grow rapidly and Emirates, although terrorist
of crime, by intervening to A series of overarching to attract a range of new and activity both globally and
influence their multiple causes. principles within the Plans are diverse activities, people and regionally is significant and its
supported by specific policies to opportunities. impact extensive.
Protective Security - is an guide implementation.
organised system of protective The development of the Given the need for national
Crime
measures implemented to Abu Dhabi Safety and Security security and the target-rich
An extensive benchmarking
achieve and maintain security. Planning Manual (SSPM) is environment that will be created
effort conducted in the
It combines the three disciplines informed specifically by Urban as a product of the ambitious
preparation of the Manual
of personnel, information and Design Policy VII - U23 Crime development plans set out in
concluded that crime is very low
physical security in a manner to Prevention, which states: Vision 2030, the Emirate of
in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,
create ‘defence in depth’, where Abu Dhabi has established a
but rising at a rate exceeding
multiple layers work together to “Complete a set of guidelines Higher Committee for Crises
the population growth rate.
deter, delay, detect and deny for crime prevention through and Terrorist Acts Management
an attack. building and landscape design (HCCTAM). The HCCTAM leads
Crime statistics supplied by
and henceforth manage the Emirate’s efforts to counter
Abu Dhabi Police GHQ show
development to facilitate the terrorism and is the owner of
that while personal crime is
Planning Context safety of environments and
higher as a proportion of total
the Counter Terrorism Strategy.
maintain Abu Dhabi’s excellent This Strategy is organised around
recorded crime than in the
record on crime.” a series of work streams, one
benchmark countries, there is
of which is ‘Protection’, which
an exceptionally low level of
Central to the planning efforts The preparation of this seeks to increase the resilience
property crime. As such, the
in Abu Dhabi are the 2030 Plans Manual has also been of the UAE against an attack.
primary focus for the Manual
which establish a vision for guided by subsequent UPC
is to reduce crimes against the
the future development of the planning regulations, policy Terrorism is a crime, and
person through changes to the
Emirate. The 2030 Plans include: and guidelines that have with the agreement of the
built environment. Essentially,
been prepared to ensure HCCTAM, the Manual presents
this includes all crimes apart
• Plan Capital 2030: Urban the continued sustainable planning and design guidance
from those that occur within
Structure Framework Plan development of the Emirate. that will embed counter-
private properties.
terrorism protective security
• Plan Al Ain City 2030: Urban in our built environment,
Structure Framework Plan reducing vulnerabilities and
• Plan Al Gharbia 2030: Regional increasing the resilience
Structure Framework Plan of our communities.
20 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 21
Implementation Policy Policy Statement 1 Implementation Process For projects defined as
‘High Priority Projects’, safety
‘Planning Culture’
and security is likely to influence
spatial use, spatial layouts and
Community safety and
spatial design and Government
The Manual outlines eight protective security shall be a New Development
safety and security advisors will
Principles that are guided by core planning consideration in
be involved in decision making
a vision for safe and secure all new development. Following the release of the
for each project. The developer
communities: Manual, all new development shall
is also advised to appoint a
implement the Abu Dhabi Safety
Policy Statement 2 competent safety and security
P1: Access and Connectivity and Security Planning and Design
specialist to assist them in the
P2: Structure and Spatial Layout ‘Risk Assessment’ Principles (Chapter 2). Chapter 3
preparation of safety and security
P3: Ownership of the Manual illustrates a simple
deliverables required as part of
P4: Surveillance Community safety and Integrated Development Process
planning and Building Permit
P5: Activity protective security (IDP) that describes how safety
Submissions. These deliverables
P6: Physical Security arrangements, in new and and security is to be integrated
are discussed in more detail in
P7: Public Image existing developments, must be in a project. It highlights who
Chapter 3, which includes
P8: Adaptability fit-for-purpose, appropriate and will be involved, when they will
a section on ‘Getting the
proportionate to the risks. be involved and their roles and
Right Advice’.
The Principles need to be applied responsibilities.
carefully as there is no such
Policy Statement 3 Projects within this category
thing as a universal planning A simple, user-friendly Decision
will also be referred to the
and design solution. This ‘Balancing Act’ Support Tool (DST) has also been
Planning Toolkit (Chapter 4) and
explains why the Manual has prepared for use by developers
Design Toolkit (Chapter 5) to
a strong focus on the process Decisions relating to community during pre-planning.
assist developers implement the
of implementing the Principles, safety and protective security
Principles.
rather than outlining a set of must be balanced with other The DST can be used to gain
prescriptive standards that may development objectives. an appreciation of how much
The Government acknowledge
never fulfill the vision. influence safety and security may
that ‘designing-out crime, and
have during planning and design.
Policy Statement 4 designing-in safety’ will be new
Best practice and experience For the majority of projects,
show that safety and security ‘Working Together’ to many developers, planners,
which are likely to be defined
risks differ from one place to designers and operators. As such,
as ‘Low Priority Projects’, this
another and that the solutions Appropriate advice, information the development community will
will mean that, whilst safety and
that work in addressing these sharing, transparency and rigour have access to specialist advice
security is important, it is unlikely
risks in one place, might not must be present to support from Government community
to have significant influence on
work in another. There is a need community safety and protective safety and protective security
development proposals. There will
to take into account the local security decision-making. advisors during the development
be no safety and security specific
situation and for all those involved review process.
deliverables required in planning
in developing, managing and Policy Statement 5 and Building Permit Submissions
maintaining our built environment Before seeking advice, the project
made to the Abu Dhabi Urban
to work collaboratively and ‘Owner pays’ team should read Chapter 3
Planning Council or the relevant
holistically to address safety and (Process) of the Manual and
Municipality. However, the
security challenges. The following Costs associated with complete the Decision Support
content of the normal submissions
policies support and guide the community safety and Tool (DST). Using project-specific
will be expected to demonstrate
decision-making process and will protective security fall where information, the DST will assign
the application of the Manual’s
be adopted to ensure positive responsibility for safety and the development a Low Priority
Principles.
implementation outcomes. security lies: with the owner. or High Priority classification.
22 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 23
Those projects assigned as High Government safety and security Crowded Places The guidance contained in the Manual should
Priority Projects should consult advisors will be initiating a be used to reduce vulnerabilities at crowded
with an advisor. Contact details programme of site vulnerability There will be a focus on places in Abu Dhabi. A Government safety
are available from the UPC and assessments across the Emirate, crowded places during the early and security advisor will assess safety and
the relevant Municipality Town although these will be restricted stages of the implementation of security at crowded places in one of the
Planning department. to ‘High Priority’ sites. A this Manual. following categories:
notification will be received
if the site is to be subject to A crowded place is a location to 1. Restaurants and cafes
Existing Development
an assessment. In the spirit which members of the public
of transparency and fairness can gain access and, by virtue 2. Hotels and resorts
In the existing built environment,
required by Policy Statement 4 of its crowd density and known
certain constraints will reduce 3. Shopping malls, markets and traditional souk
‘Working Together’, the advisors terrorist attack methodology,
opportunities for owners
will explain why the site has may be considered potentially 4. Health establishments
to make community safety
been selected and will share liable to terrorist attack. They
and protective security 5. Recreation and leisure clubs
the results with the owner. The may be buildings or open air
enhancements. This explains
cost of any protective security public spaces and they may be 6. Exhibition, commercial and media centres
why the Government is focusing
improvements will be the permanent or temporary.
on ensuring that developers 7. Visitor and tourist attractions
responsibility of the owner.
integrate safety and security
Whilst there have been attacks 8. Sports and entertainment stadia
early in the development
against well-protected targets
process. However, the Principles 9. Special events
around the world, the trend is
outlined in the Manual are
for terrorists to attack these 10. Religious sites and places of worship
universally applicable and the
crowded public places, where
Design Toolkit (Chapter 5) will
crowd density and the difficulty 11. Transport stations and hubs
be useful to owners wishing to
in controlling access make
install retrofit measures. The 12. Cinemas and theatres
them both attractive and
Toolkit will help them achieve
vulnerable targets. 13. Education establishments
design quality and fit-for-
purpose solutions. 14. Celebration halls
Previous attacks on crowded
places include the bombings on
the London Underground (UK),
at hotels and restaurants in
Egypt and armed assaults
in Mumbai (India).
24 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 25
2
Abu Dhabi Safety and Security
Planning and Design Principles
Secure communities
Introduction
This approach is sometimes referred to as
This Manual is based on eight Abu The Principles are universal – they
are relevant everywhere, regardless of
The Role of Planning and Design
in Safety and Security Crime Prevention through Environmental
development type, size or location. They are Design (CPTED).
Dhabi Safety and Security Planning however, to be applied differently, according
to context. Adopting such an approach has been very
and Design Principles (each with Applying these Principles will help to ensure
A well-planned and designed built
environment can do much to reduce the successfully demonstrated elsewhere alongside
other objectives of planning and design, such
sub principles). All development in that Abu Dhabi residents and visitors can
continue to enjoy a high quality of life in a
likelihood of an incident occurring or its impact
if it does. This can be expressed in a number as sustainability, attractive environments and
economic success.
of ways, such as:
Abu Dhabi will now be expected low crime environment. The Principles will
not just help to keep the Emirate safe and Indeed, it enhances sustainability by making
to follow these Principles. secure; they represent the best of good
planning and design and they will be central
• Reducing opportunities for crime and terrorism
by controlling access to vulnerable places;
a place more popular, better used and with
good community cohesion. These measures
to the implementation of Vision 2030. • Empowering people to contribute to the safety form the basis of the Principles introduced
and security of their communities by providing in this chapter.
This chapter sets the context for the welcoming places to visit that encourage use
Principles by introducing how good planning and promote a sense of ownership; The Manual is part of the Abu Dhabi Vision
and design contributes to safety and security, 2030 suite of documents and its Principles sit
before explaining how the Principles have • Increasing natural surveillance so that alongside those in the existing documents.
been generated. It concludes by presenting offenders are discouraged from wrong-
the eight Principles one by one. doing due to the increased perception of These Principles were considered alongside
being observed; the most common principles from guidance
• Providing clues to how people are expected and practice uncovered in international
to behave in an area or building; benchmarking. This involved a review of more
than 50 documents from around the world,
Principles
• Constructing buildings and other elements of with a particular emphasis on reviewing
the built environment so that they are less guidance from those countries which share
susceptible to crime or terrorism; characteristics with Abu Dhabi. Whilst most
P1: Access and Connectivity
P2: Structure and Spatial Layout formal planning for safety and security
• Arranging buildings and facilities so that
P3: Ownership guidance is found in the UK, USA, Australia,
adjacent uses do not lead to conflicts; and
P4: Surveillance New Zealand and the Netherlands, information
P5: Activity • Allowing the emergency services to was also sourced from countries such as
P6: Physical Security respond quickly and effectively in the Egypt, Pakistan, Singapore and Turkey.
P7: Public Image event of an incident.
P8: Adaptability Finally, to ensure that the Principles are
bespoke to Abu Dhabi, a set of issues that
set the Emirate apart from the benchmark
The Manual uses a legend to demonstrate the Principles or guidance presented
nations were identified. These Abu Dhabi
Factors can be summarised into culture
and religion, climate, pace of development
A positive illustration of the An illustration of an environment and built form. These are presented in the
Principle or guidance presented that will benefit from the
Principle or guidance presented
following pages.
28 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 29
Abu Dhabi Factor 1: Abu Dhabi Factor 3:
Culture and Religion Pace of Development
The importance of privacy means that The current pace of development presents
surveillance, overlooking and screening need an opportunity to address macro safety and
to be handled carefully so that residents do security needs using planning and design
not feel uncomfortable. solutions early on in Abu Dhabi’s advancement
towards Vision 2030.
The importance of family and notions
of ‘homeliness’ mean that the focus of The scale of development means that safety
management and maintenance can be more on and security principles can be applied as part
the upkeep of the home than the public realm. of a master plan, rather than being restricted to
individual plots.
The gifting of plots can result in plots that
remain vacant for a period of time.
The scale and pace of the development allows safety and security to be addressed earlier
To ensure privacy UAE Nationals’ homes are typically surrounded by a high boundary wall and on a wider scale
The climate of the region means that: The layout and design of many urban and
rural settings introduces long, narrow and
• Public areas such as parks and plazas are uninhabited spaces that can be unsafe
quiet during summer time; and vulnerable to misuse. Whilst there are
many landmark buildings, the uniform grid
• People are more likely to drive rather than structure of Abu Dhabi City can make it
walk during the summer months; difficult to orientate oneself.
• Streets are often aligned with prevailing winds
to gain cooling breezes; and Cities have been designed around the
needs of the car user, rather than those of
• Buildings are aligned and narrow paths created pedestrians. Plot sizes are small, particularly
for increased shading. in urban areas, making it more difficult to
introduce stand-off or secure perimeters.
A sikka offers shading to protect people from the summer sun and extreme heat The built form in Abu Dhabi can present particular challenges to safety and security
30 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 31
Following discussions at the SSPM The remainder of this chapter introduces each
preparation workshops, the eight Abu Dhabi of the Principles in more detail, including
Safety and Security Planning and Design the rationale behind them. This is achieved
Principles were agreed. by presenting a list of features that can
compromise safety and security and extracts
Before they are introduced, it is important of evidence from benchmarking that can be
to make the following points about these published publicly. Each Principle concludes
Principles: with a useful checklist to help users of the
Manual to apply the Principles.
• They equate with good planning and design
in a general sense. The Principles should To Summarise:
be applied to all development in Abu Dhabi,
regardless of type, scale or perceived safety The Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning
and security risk; and and Design Principles were generated through
these three steps:
• The Principles relate to planning and design
outcomes in the built environment. They
do not cover the process of achieving these 1. Examining the existing Vision 2030 principles.
outcomes. There are some assumptions 2. Exploring the principles that stem from
underlying how the Principles will be applied. international best practice in planning for
For example, responses will be: different safety and security.
according to context; proportionate to risk;
based on the sharing of information; and part 3. Amending the international principles
of a holistic strategy. This process is explained so as to take account of the unique
in Chapter 3. Abu Dhabi factors.
Benchmarking
principles
Plan 2030
principles + = SSPM
Principles
Abu Dhabi
Factors
32 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 33
P4
The Surveillance P5
Principles
Activity
P1
P7 P6
Access and Connectivity
Physical
Public Image
Security
P2
Structure and
Spatial Layout P3 P8
Adaptability
Ownership
34 2.
2. The
Abu Abu
Dhabi
Dhabi
Safety
Safety
and and
Security
Security
Planning
Planning
and Principles
Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi
2. The
Safety
Abuand
Dhabi
Security
SafetyPlanning
and Security
and Design
Planning
Principles
Principles 35
P1 Access and Connectivity
Safe and secure places balance the
need for access control with P1A Connectivity is to be
encouraged in Abu Dhabi
connectivity and circulation unless it would result in
inappropriate safety
Safety and security can be and security risks
compromised if:
• Pedestrian routes are poorly lit, Maximising connectivity will be the aim
indirect and segregated from traffic; in most situations, but vulnerable sites will
need to be protected where the risks of
• There is easy, anonymous access to crime and terrorism are high. Restricting
targets, buildings and plots; access, either by foot or vehicle, will
• There is no means of controlling sometimes be needed. The Planning Toolkit
who can enter a development; in Chapter 4 covers this in more detail.
Temporary pedestrian routes are commonly Unplanned residual space can be mistakenly
• There are several uncontrolled unsafe places used as a pedestrian route
escape routes from an area; and
• There is inadequate access for
Well connected neighbourhoods with convenient access to local facilities are full of life and
emergency vehicles.
frequented by members of the community
Caption
Poorly littoand
be inserted
segregated pedestrian routes can be unsafe and misused Well designed parks are welcoming and make it easier for people to orient themselves
36 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 37
P1C Pedestrian-only routes
need to be planned,
P1D Vehicle access and
circulation routes need to
designed and managed be planned, designed and
with care managed with care
It is important that pedestrian routes have Vehicle access and circulation routes need
a defined purpose as an integral part of a to be planned, designed and managed with
movement network to avoid them being care. Criminals may use a vehicle as a
abandoned by the community for whom means of forcing entry into a site, causing
they were intended. vandalism or even facilitating a terrorist
attack. Vehicle-borne attacks can be
sophisticated, involve high speeds and offer
the criminal manoeuvrability even when
delivering or removing large payloads.
Pedestrian routes need to be planned and designed to aid public image and proper use
Checklist:
• Has a coherent movement framework
been set out?
• Are all routes necessary?
• Where safety and security risks are high,
has access been controlled for vehicles and
pedestrians?
• Are routes for different users segregated
when they could be integrated?
• Do all sikkak or alleyways lead directly
to a defined destination?
• Are sikkak clear of obstacles, straight
and well lit?
• Does the planning and design of streets
comply with the Abu Dhabi Urban Street
Carefully planned and designed sikkak are safe and support community use Design Manual? The movement framework should consider safety and security alongside other planning objectives
38 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 39
P2 Structure and Spatial Layout
Safe and secure places are
structured in a way that manages
P2A Spaces should have a
designated purpose
risk and conflict
A lack of stand-off contributed to the large number of fatalities and injuries in the The same space is transformed by programming of space and public
Caption to be inserted
Alfred. P. Murrah Federal Building, (Oklahoma City, USA) realm design improvements
40 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 41
Active and visible frontages encourage users to visit a space and observe the public realm, which contributes to community safety and security
Checklist:
• Does every space have a clear purpose?
• Are all spaces fit for their designated
purpose?
Poor spatial planning can present areas of concealment and entrapment Stand-off can be achieved using attractive and creative landscaping
42 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 43
P3 Ownership
Safe and secure places are those over
which occupants and users have a
P3A The ownership of space
should be clearly defined
sense of ownership and responsibility
Safety and security can be The built environment consists of spaces over
compromised if: which different users have varying degrees
of access rights and ownership. What is
deemed acceptable behaviour in one space
• It is unclear whether space is public
may be deemed unacceptable in another. It is
or private;
very important that there is clear definition
• Private space is open to the public; of space so users know who owns a space,
where they can go, when they can go there
• There is limited communal interest and the permitted use of the space.
or supervision over a space; and
• Offenders are not afraid of being seen Ownership and responsibility can be
or reported. Public space being used as private space Poor public image facilitated by making it clear where
public space ends and where semi-private
From the evidence base: or private space begins.
Caption to be inserted
Clear evidence of the absence of communal interest Physical barriers can be used to define a change in ownership
44 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 45
P3B Instil a sense of
ownership over space
Well designed parks encourage use A lack of ownership or communal interest over a space increases the likelihood of crime and misuse
Checklist:
• Is public and private space clearly defined?
• Is the means of defining space appropriate to
context and other planning objectives?
• Is the space welcoming and encouraging
of positive behaviour?
• Will the development have an identity
of its own that will encourage community
development?
Well designed parks are welcoming A sense of ownership over space helps to bring activity to the public realm
46 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 47
P4 Ownership
Surveillance
Safe and secure places have
appropriate levels of surveillance P4A Balance the need for
surveillance with the
need for privacy
Caption to be areas
Underground inserted
can lack natural surveillance Shading and natural surveillance are carefully balanced at the Abu Dhabi Corniche
48 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 49
P4C Adopt natural surveillance
before relying on active
systems such as CCTV
Good landscape design enables people to see what is happening around them and
empowers them as observers over space
Natural surveillance can be enhanced by the placement of doors, windows and balconies to overlook the public realm
50 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 51
P4D Concentrate active
surveillance systems in
P4F Support natural and
active surveillance with
areas that are more prone appropriate lighting
to crime and misuse
Lighting may be provided to aid in the
In addition to deterring the misuse of space and detection of intruders, to deter intruders, or in
criminal acts, active surveillance systems some cases simply to increase the feeling of
can afford a number of additional benefits to safety. A holistic approach is required to ensure
management and enforcing authorities. These lighting supports effective surveillance.
include incident monitoring and investigation. To ensure lighting elements are fit-for-purpose,
their design and specification should include
An operational requirement should support anti-vandalism and anti-tamper features.
the use of active systems and this can be
developed following a safety and security
Good lighting supports natural surveillance
risk assessment.
Checklist:
• Has a balance been struck between the
needs for surveillance and privacy?
This service area would benefit from the application of video surveillance technology
• Does the approach to surveillance take
account of local context?
The open and attractive design of this space optimises natural surveillance and therefore Good lighting makes it easier for people to see what is happening around them while
active surveillance is not required also aiding wayfinding
52 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 53
P5 Ownership
Activity
Safe and secure places are active and
welcoming to legitimate users P5A Plan for a rich mix of
compatible uses
From the evidence base: A mix of uses brings life and ‘capable guardians’ onto the street so it becomes,
to an extent, self-policing
“There is a growing body of research
on activity support and mixed use
neighbourhoods where it is found that P5B Provide the right type
of facilities to support
opportunities for crime are reduced by
increasing the range of activities in the local community
public spaces.”
Western Australian Planning Commission Providing facilities that match the needs of
(2006) “Designing Out Crime Planning the community will generally increase the
Guidelines” level of activity in a community.
54 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 55
P5C Ensure that opportunities
exist for safe and
P5D Pay particular attention to
safety and security risks at
comfortable walking crowded places
and cycling
Abu Dhabi is developing a range of
The Abu Dhabi Public Realm Design Manual tourist attractions, transport facilities and
and Abu Dhabi Urban Street Design Manual commercial centres as part of Vision 2030. In
both provide very useful information on addition, particularly in the winter months in
how to develop environments that support all regions of the Emirate, there is a range of
pedestrians special events and exhibitions.
and cyclists.
These crowded places are accessible to
members of the public and are associated
with high crowd densities. This level of
activity represents an attractive target
for criminals and terrorists. If poorly
planned, crime is hard to detect or may
go unchallenged. Innovation is required
to address safety and security risks at
crowded places.
The planning of crowded places should address safety and security needs
Checklist:
• Is there an appropriate mix of
complementary uses?
• Will public places have legitimate activity
throughout the day and evening?
• Is the community supported by the
facilities it needs?
• Are people encouraged to walk and cycle?
• Is there a safety and security plan for
crowded places?
Cyclists and pedestrians are a sign of successful, safe streets and spaces The planning and design of this Abu Dhabi bus station promotes natural surveillance
56 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 57
P6 Ownership
Physical Security
Safe and secure places are appropriately
and proportionately protected
P6A Use risk assessment to
identify and justify
physical security needs
58 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 59
P6C Physical security must
be part of a balanced
security programme
60 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 61
P7 Ownership
Public Image
Safe and secure places are well
maintained and managed, and promote
P7A Promote a sense of
place and the legitimate
a positive public image use of space
A neglected space receives little attention and detracts from a sense of place
Unattractive and neglected spaces present a poor public image
62 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 63
P7B Plan and design with
management and
P7C Hold owners responsible
for managing and
maintenance in mind maintaining their plots
Decisions taken during the planning and Due to the pace of development in Abu
design stages to create quality spaces that Dhabi, both the Government and plot owners
are easy to manage and maintain will have shall work together to ensure appropriate
a positive impact on safety and security development phasing and plot allocations.
and lead to sustainable communities.
Management and maintenance of vacant
plots, construction and demolition sites offers
Environmental, Health & Safety benefits as well
as a reduction in crime and inappropriate use
of space.
Checklist:
• Does the development have its own sense
of identity?
• Can design quality be demonstrated?
• Is it easy to maintain high standards
of upkeep?
• Are non-occupied plots well maintained
and secure?
• Does a phasing strategy avoid vacant plots
that may become problematic?
64 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 65
P8 Ownership
Adaptability
Safe and secure places are
adaptable to change
P8A Plan for changes in
owner, occupiers
and users
Effective adaptable measures to control access of vehicles (Downing Street, London, UK)
66 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 67
P8C Plan for special events
Safety and security responses should be ‘scalable’ Increased level of security during a special event
68 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 69
P8E Plan for incident
management as well
as normal operations
Checklist:
• Have changes in use or users been
considered during planning and design?
• Have attempts been made to anticipate and
plan for changing threats?
• Can the development accommodate special
events?
• Does the safety and security plan respond to
changing levels and types of activity?
• Is there space, facilities and infrastructure for
use in an emergency situation?
70 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 2. Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and Design Principles 71
3
Safety and Security within an
Integrated Development Process
Secure communities
Introduction
This Chapter outlines:
The purpose of this Chapter
is to describe how the • How safety and security fits into the existing
development process; and
Manual will be integrated and • Who will be involved, when they will be
involved and their roles and responsibilities.
implemented within the existing The Integrated Development Process (IDP)
planning and design framework aims to ensure that the right people are
involved in projects at the right time. This
of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. will facilitate:
74 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 75
Overview
SSPM Decision
Occupation Certificate
SSPM Planning Toolkit SSPM Design Toolkit
Support Tool (DST)
Planning Approval
Building Permit
Planning
Construction,
Pre-Planning Planning Design Commissioning Design
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 and Operations
Stage 4
Planning
Design
76 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 77
Stage 1: Pre-Planning
This tool is not intended to be a substitute for
This stage focuses on setting up a development specific safety and security
Pre-Planning Summary Sheet
risk assessment undertaken by a specialist,
the project and identifying the but its output will help to determine whether
High Priority and Low Priority Projects
safety and security should be a high or low
right people for the project team. priority for the project team. Input
stage that the expertise should be during later planning and design approvals
to demonstrate that the Manual’s Principles
identified and sourced. have been implemented. The project team
will not be expected to have appointed a
Task
The Manual should be read and understood Projects identified as ‘High Priority’ must
and in particular, the function and application undertake a comprehensive, development
of the Decision Support Tool (DST). specific safety and security risk assessment.
Projects identified as having business or
organisation specific risks may also want Checklist
to undertake a development specific risk 1. Do you understand the SSPM Principles?
assessment (which will be much more 2. Have you used the Decision Support Tool?
comprehensive than the output of the DST).
3. Do you need a specialist as part of your project team?
The Government is only concerned with 4. Do you know what you have to submit for safety and security
protecting the public interest and it may be as part of the Planning Submission?
necessary to consider corporate level safety
and security risks. The DST cannot take
this into account and if unsure, always seek
advice and consult the project owner.
SSPM Decision Support Tool
78 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 79
Stage 2: Planning
Initially, a project will be assessed by the
Within the context of Abu Dhabi, whole project team, whereby various
disciplines seek to analyse the existing site
‘Planning’ covers all those and its context. The project team will identify,
explore and evaluate a number of planning
aspects of planning and design options to ensure that the right concept is
selected for further development. The
that lead the project towards Planning Toolkit (Chapter 4) outlines a series
of planning tools that can be used in Abu
a detailed planning approval. After Dhabi to reduce safety and security risks.
planning approval, the project From the selection of the preferred concept,
the project team moves forward to detailed
will be developed to obtain a planning, which requires a holistic approach
to realising the project’s safety and security
building permit. objectives.
80 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 81
High Priority Projects At this point the brief will be in place and Risks associated with concept plans
the safety and security specialist, as an
Deliverable 1:
For the safety and security specialist, this integrated member of the project team, Risk Summary Graphic
is perhaps the most important stage in will participate and lead workshops (as 1
influencing the strategic outcome of the necessary), to find innovative and appropriate Risk 1:
project. Good communication and information planning solutions. Invariably, this will involve vehicle-borne explosive attack on building
sharing will remain of paramount importance compromise between the needs of safety
throughout. and security and other planning objectives. • No hostile vehicle mitigation treatment –
vehicles can drive up to the building on all sides
It is at this stage that the specialist will Once planning objectives have been balanced, • No stand-off distance between building and
interface for the first time formally, with a set of Safety and Security Plans should be vehicular circulation areas
3
Government safety and security advisors as produced to demonstrate how safety and • Uncontrolled/unscreened access
part of the development review process. Initial security will be achieved for the project. 1 • Parking and deliveries under the building
discussions will focus on the project-specific The deliverables for the Planning • U-shaped building would worsen impact
safety and security risk assessment. The Submission include: of a blast
risk assessment, discussed in more detail in
Appendix 1, should result in a Risk Summary Deliverable 1:
Graphic that identifies the key risks to the Risk Summary Graphic 1 2
project. A typical example is shown (opposite), Risk 2:
and consists of marked up plans identifying Deliverable 2: 2 person-borne explosive attack
vulnerabilities, site constraints Access and Circulation Zoning Plan on building
and critical areas. 4 3 1 • Free, unscreened access to site and building
Deliverable 3:
Following the consultation, the project safety Safety and Security Plan
and security brief can be developed and 3
recorded. This document sets out safety and An illustrative set of deliverables are shown Risk 3:
security priorities to be addressed during on the following pages. crime against person in public realm
3 4
the remainder of the project development • No features to encourage activity for natural
process. This should include any regulatory Elements shown in the Safety and Security surveillance
requirements, best practice (local, regional Plans must be fully integrated with the • Poor private / public space definition
and international) and any requirement remainder of the Planning Submission. For
stemming from the owners project brief. It example, elements relating to access and
is important for this stakeholder group to connectivity should be captured within the
4
reach consensus on the focus for safety and associated transportation plans, while urban Risk 4:
security and appropriate levels of protection. design and Estidama proposals should be inappropriate behaviour and damage
How well the project team address these consistent with the Safety and Security Plans. Catastrophic Risk1 • No distinction between public
priorities through planning and design will If this is not clearly evidenced in the Planning Major Risk2 and private space
be evaluated using the safety and security Submission, the Government safety and • No features to encourage activity for natural
Moderate
Consequence
components of the Planning Submission and security advisor may request IDP records and surveillance
the Building Permit Submission. to see the project safety and security brief. Minor Risk3 Risk4 • No sense of identity
Insignificant
Likelihood
82 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 83
Deliverable 2: Deliverable 3: Planning tools used to reduce risks
Access and Circulation Zoning Plan Safety and Security Plans •1 Building located at centre of site to increase
stand-off and reduce impact of security
Submitted as part of the Planning Submission for measures in public zone
High Priority Projects.
•2 Secure perimeter treatment
VC 9
•8 Pedestrian access control, just two entry points
7
6 8
•9 Direct route funnels users to single building
VS+V entrance
11 10 8
Consequence
13
Minor Risk3
• Pedestrian access control and screening to
14
Insignificant Risk4 building entrance
Rare Unlikely Credible Likely Certain
• Clear sight lines to aid surveillance
15
Restricted zone VACP = Vehicle Access Control Point Likelihood
Private zone PACP = Pedestrian Access Control Point • Infrastructure (e.g. HVAC) placed away from
16
Semi-private zone V Auth = Vehicles (Authorised) This risk matrix identifies residual risks following the application possible interference
Public zone V S+V = Staff and visitors of planning tools outlined in Chapter 4 of the Manual.
VC = Vehicles (Commercial) • Back-of-house delivery area and screening,
17
maintained)
84 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 85
Stage 3: Design
The Building Permit process is led by the
Planning Summary Sheet Following detailed planning Municipality: Abu Dhabi, Al Ain or Western
Region. Safety and security review by
Input
approval, the project enters Government advisors (High Priority Projects
only) will be captured as part of the existing
• Project brief the Design Stage, which will review process.
•
•
Planning policy and guidance documents (including SSPM)
Site context culminate in a Building Permit During design development, the project
moves towards increased design detail with
• External stakeholders (including Government safety and security advisors for High Priority Projects)
that allows construction work to safety and security elements captured in
architectural design, urban design and system
High Priority Projects Low Priority Projects
commence on the development design solutions. The Design Toolkit (Chapter
5) includes a range of safety and security
Task Task
site. The first design task in any tools that can be considered for use in Abu
Dhabi.
Implement the SSPM Principles
• Multi-disciplinary workshops
Implement the SSPM Principles
project is to ensure that the Low Priority Projects
• External stakeholder meetings detailed planning approval is As with the planning review for Low Priority
• Conduct a project safety and security risk assessment
• Preparation of a project safety and security brief read and understood, so that any Projects, there is no safety and security
specific submission within the Building
• Development of deliverables 1-3, using the Planning Toolkit
• Maintain IDP records of meetings and decisions conditions are addressed during Permit Submission. However, the project
team should be able to demonstrate that
the project design implements the SSPM
Output/ Deliverables Output/ Deliverables design development. Principles alongside other design objectives.
If a project goes through a value engineering exercise The project team will continue in consultation
Checklist Checklist during design, safety and security objectives must still be with Government safety and security
1. Have you appointed your safety and security specialist? 1. Have you implemented the achieved. It is an opportunity to reassess design decisions, advisors. An advisor will provide the project
2. Has the consultant led a series of safety and security focused workshops? SSPM Principles? but this should be done in line with the safety and safety and security specialist with inputs,
3. Do you know the key security risks to be addressed by the project? security risks and objectives. offer advice and conduct a review of the
2. Does your submission show evidence of this?
4. Has the team consulted with a Government safety and security advisor? Building Permit Submission.
5. Does the planning application demonstrate that safety and security risks
have been addressed appropriately?
6. Have safety and security been balanced with other planning objectives?
7. Has the safety and security plan been integrated throughout the
submission application?
86 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 87
The project safety and security specialist The design effort will culminate in a Safety
will need to participate and lead a series of and Security Strategy Report which outlines
workshops to ensure safety and security Operations the balance between physical, systems
design proposals are coordinated with other and operational elements that need to be
project team disciplines. incorporated to meet the project safety and
security design objectives. This report will need
The safety and security specialist will to demonstrate that the key concept of defence
employ a range of design tools from the in depth has been achieved and that the design
Design Toolkit in order to achieve the project solutions are appropriate and commensurate
objectives. They will work holistically with with the project risks. On this basis, the project
other design disciplines to find innovative Physical Systems risk assessment should be updated to identify
solutions. They are likely to provide marked- residual risks following integration of planning and
up drawings and design notes throughout design solutions. The design stage concludes with
Strategy
design development. a Building Permit Submission incorporating those
outputs listed in the Design Summary Sheet.
Strategy Physical
Systems Operations
88 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 89
Stage 4: Construction, Commissioning and Operations
Design Summary Sheet Low Priority Projects
•
•
Develop the design to address any planning conditions
Multi-disciplinary workshops
• Develop the design to address any planning
conditions may compromise the safety As in all other stages of the IDP, regular
workshops with the contractor and project
•
•
External stakeholder meetings
Develop the design referencing the SSPM Design Toolkit
• Design with the SSPM Principles in mind
and security strategy. team will improve design quality and
implementation of the design.
• Prepare the safety and security element of the Building Permit Submission
Upon completion of the project, there
will be a need to commission safety and
Output/ Deliverables Output/ Deliverables security systems to check that they are
fit-for-purpose. The operator will need to
Building Permit Submission demonstrating implementation Building Permit Submission demonstrating receive all as-built drawings, Operations and
of the SSPM Principles, including: implementation of the SSPM Principles
Information Handover Maintenance (O&M) Manuals and introductory
training to ensure effective operation.
• Risk Summary Report
After significant time and effort has been
• Safety and Security Strategy Report (Concept and detailed design) carried out in planning and designing the
• Design drawings and specifications (Construction documentation) project with safety and security in mind, it is
• IDP Records important that the operator is made aware of:
90 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 91
Getting the Right Advice
Construction, Commissioning and Operations Summary Sheet
High Priority Projects Low Priority
It is now necessary for all Seasoned, multidisciplinary expertise
is critical for fostering innovation. Well
informed project teams develop strategies
Input Input
developers to consider safety that successfully integrate safety and
security with planning, architectural and site
and security as part of the design and work well with operations and
• Building Permit (with construction drawings • Building Permit (with construction drawings maintenance programmes. Team members
and Specifications) and Specifications) development process and for who are aware of the latest techniques can
take advantage of opportunities during the
• Safety and Security Strategy Report
• Risk Summary Report (updated) some projects, this will require early planning and design stages to innovate
and explore new concepts.
the appointment of specialists. Project managers should expect and require
Task Task
that specialists and stakeholders actively
“The best collaboration occurs contribute to planning and design workshops/
• Ensure ‘as-built’ condition conforms to Building Permit • Ensure ‘as built’ conforms to Building Permit meetings and provide deliverables that
• Check any on-site led deviations do not diminish safety and security • Check any on-site led deviations do not early in the project, when facilitate decision making as early as possible
objectives diminish safety and security objectives
• Commission systems • Commission systems
planners, designers and safety in the IDP.
• Prepare O&M manuals for ‘as built’ • Prepare O&M manuals for ‘as built’ and security specialists sit Safety and security specialists within a
• Prepare update Risk Summary Report (if required) down together to consider project team must collaborate with planners
• Prepare update Safety and Security Strategy Report (if required) and other design disciplines in order to:
the problem”
Output/ Deliverables Output/ Deliverables • Identify and determine which safety and
security risks should be addressed;
• ‘As-Built’ drawings • ‘As-Built’ drawings
• O&M manuals • O&Ms manuals • Develop strategies to manage those risks; and
• Commissioning certificates • Commissioning certificates • Create an effective planning and design
• Updated Risk Summary Report (if required) solution that balances safety and security with
• Updated Safety and Security Strategy Report (if required) project budget and client vision.
Checklist
1. Does the contractor have a copy of the safety and security information included in the Building Permit approval?
2. Does the contractor understand the safety and security requirements?
3. Has the construction deviated from the Building Permit design?
4. Has the project safety and security brief been achieved?
5. Has evidence of installation been provided to the future operator?
6. Are the safety and security measures ‘fit-for-purpose’?
7. Are the safety and security systems managed, operated and maintained appropriately?
92 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 93
Roles and Responsibilities Selection of Safety and
Security Specialists
94 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 95
In general, most safety and security A Government safety and security advisor
Specific Safety and Security
specialists are likely to be sourced from can provide further guidance if required.
Roles and Responsibilities consultancy practices with relevant
experience of the development process and Institute Memberships & Vocational
Responsibilities
the built environment. Qualifications
Roles
These split into the following general Selecting specialists that are registered with
IDP Stage Tasks Outputs / Deliverables categories: independent institutions or professional
associations will provide confidence that
Conduct a safety and security Risk Summary Graphic • Specific safety and security risk the consultant is involved in continuous
Risk Analyst Planning
risk assessment consultancy practices; professional development activities and
up-to-date with developments and advances
• Management consultancy practices with an in safety and security.
in-house safety and security capability; and
Design Update the safety and security Risk Summary Report
• Architectural and engineering consultancy
risk assessment practices with an in-house safety and security
capability or appreciation.
Safety and Planning Formally captures any Safety and Security Plans In the future, Abu Dhabi will be considering
Security Strategist stakeholder requirements the introduction of a system that will enable
(including Government agencies) Access and Circulation developers to better source and guarantee
Zoning Plan the level of service provided by consultancy
Conducts benchmarking research companies working in the safety and security
Project safety and industry. This will involve benchmarking
Develops a project safety and
security brief against systems employed internationally
security brief
and regionally to determine what is most
Application of the Planning Toolkit IDP records appropriate for Abu Dhabi. However until
that system is developed, project managers
Explore a range of solutions should look at the knowledge, expertise,
which meet the brief qualifications and relevant experience of
potential candidates to ensure that they are
Develop the Safety and capable of fulfilling the role required.
Security Plans
It is recommended that anyone requiring
safety and security specialist services obtains
Design Application of the Design Toolkit Safety and Security
to develop a holistic strategy Strategy Report the Curriculum Vitae for each specialist to
ascertain their relevant level of expertise and
IDP records competency; this should be verified against
references where possible.
Construction documentation
96 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 3. Safety and Security within an Integrated Development Process 97
4
Planning Toolkit
Secure communities
Introduction
Chapter 4 presents a Private and Public Navigating the Planning Toolkit There are ten planning tools provided in the Planning Toolkit. They are:
Ownership
series of planning tools
that may be used to Planners designate space for different uses.
These spaces within the built environment
implement Community are either public, such as parks and streets,
or private land which is defined by a
PT1 Site Selection
Facade Plot Boundary Facade Plot Boundary Restricted Restricted areas are private areas that contain Examples: Data centres, IT rooms, security command
critical, essential or sensitive assets or are areas centres, bank interiors and essential and critical
Only two layers of defence are afforded at the building facade Here it has been possible to implement access control at the reserved for very exclusive groups (VIP). Access infrastructure facilities.
and asset level development boundary, again at the building facade and again is usually limited to a very small group of people
at the asset within an organisation. Access control measures to
these areas may include biometrics, access token,
etc. Guests are allowed entry but are always screened
and escorted.
The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council has top floor alongside residential apartments. This may be more
developed Urban and Regional Structure appropriately located on the ground or first floor, enabling the
b
Framework Plans for each of the three upper floors to remain private. Clu
municipal regions of the Emirate. These ol
ho
Plans, along with supplementary planning Sc
policy and guidance, are used to determine
permitted land use for development plots.
There are many land use dimensions that are
considered in this decision-making process,
including transportation needs, growth
The Abu Dhabi Urban Street Design Manual (USDM) • Less chance of opportunistic crime
should be used when designing streets in the Emirate • Activity is directed towards certain routes
of Abu Dhabi. The findings of the SSPM Benchmarking and spaces
Report support its guidance for designing pedestrian
orientated streets, where pedestrians and vehicles share • Fewer escape routes for criminals
streets, rather than isolating pedestrians.
Where risks are higher, permeability may be curtailed by incorporating • Easier to monitor potential offenders
no-through-routes
Subway
The use of subways are a last resort where other planning objectives cannot be met with at-grade crossings
As a result of ongoing
The General Directorate of Abu Dhabi
construction and phased
Civil Defence, in cooperation with the
occupation of a master planned
Municipalities, regulates and enforces
community, emergency access
minimum standards for emergency access.
and circulation routes for Civil
Defence would change on a
These access and circulation standards are
regular basis. Civil Defence were
often more onerous than those for other
called on numerous occasions
vehicles, due to the need for large vehicles
and their response was delayed
to gain access to buildings. Developers are
due to changes in access points,
responsible for addressing these access
new road layouts and a lack of
needs within the project movement
wayfinding signage.
framework plan.
A vehicle borne improvised explosive device created a large crater at the only entrance to this
embassy compound. This hampered emergency response vehicles attending the incident
Criminals may use a vehicle to force entry Vehicles may attack a target using one or a From a security perspective, the best way to
into a site, cause malicious damage or as an combination of the following tactics: deal with vehicle attack threats is to exclude
aid in a terrorist attack. These attacks can be vehicles from a site altogether. However, at
sophisticated and past incidents indicate that 1. Parking underneath or next to a building most buildings, especially crowded places,
vehicles are a preferred means for delivering other planning objectives such as access
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) due to 2. Encroachment into a site by bypassing and parking requirements will require
the speeds, manoeuvrability and payloads or breaching access control measures compromise.
offered by vehicles. without force
3. Penetration - using the vehicle to forcibly Total vehicle exclusion is more likely to be
Vehicle access control is used to prevent appropriate and proportionate where the risk
breach access control measures, the site
unauthorised vehicle access and to reduce of a vehicle attack is high. It may be neither
perimeter, or building facade Vehicle exclusion
vulnerabilities to attacks involving vehicles. possible nor necessary to adopt this approach
This section of the Planning Toolkit provides at low risk sites.
guidance for implementing vehicle access Attackers may also resort to the following
control where justified by risk assessment. tactics where access control measures are
Where vehicle inclusion is adopted, access
It highlights a full range of access control installed:
for authorised vehicles, such as the
options, ranging from high to low security. emergency services and approved delivery
It offers innovative ideas for constrained 4. Duress - such as forcing the driver vehicles, will need to be controlled at Vehicle
developments and outlines the additional of a legitimate vehicle to carry an explosive, Access Control Points. Even where the very
benefits of introducing the most aspirational or a guard to grant access, through a vehicle best operational security regime is in place,
form of vehicle access control;‘Total Vehicle access control point a project adopting vehicle inclusion will
Exclusion’. remain vulnerable to attacks using Duress and
5. Deception - such as the use of a Trojan
(disguised) vehicle or cloned ID Deception tactics.
Vehicle inclusion
‘Stand-off’ is the distance between a Four vehicle access control planning options
structure and a physical barrier designed to are presented here. They range from an
protect it. If a risk assessment concludes that aspirational vehicle exclusion scheme,
there is a high risk associated with a Vehicle through to a scheme that affords no access
Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) control. The latter would leave a project
attack, then it is important to use stand-off vulnerable to any form of vehicle attack.
to reduce the impact of an attack. This is best
achieved at the planning stage of a project. It is important to remember that even if a HVM
Asset
risk assessment identifies a low risk for this
In new developments, if the right site has type of attack at present, changes in threat,
Maximum protection from
been selected, it should be possible to occupiers, and special events may warrant
vehicle-borne attack and can
introduce adequate blast stand-off distance protection in the future. Planners should Stand-off
make for welcoming pedestrian
or enhance the structural design of a building consider future adaptability.
environment. A good example is
to make it more resilient to blast loading Plot boundary
the Washington Monument (USA)
(See Chapter 5 – Design Toolkit). Whichever of the options is adopted, there
pictured above
is a need to integrate emergency access
and circulation routes in accordance with
minimum standards.
Option 2: + Security –
Asset vehicle exclusion
HVM
Parking
Continuous Stand-off
10m 20m 30m 40m HVM Line
Plot boundary
Stand off
Excellent protection from
vehicle-borne attack, and other
forms of attack
122 4. Planning Toolkit 4. Planning Toolkit 123
Option 3: + Security –
Vehicle inclusion
Asset Parking
HVM
Plot boundary
This existing building is set-back from the street. It would be relatively simple to introduce stand-off if deemed necessary
Option 4: + Security –
Vehicle inclusion,
no secure HVM perimeter
Asset Parking
No VACP
No HVM
Plot boundary
These existing buildings are constrained and if stand-off is required, it will be a significant challenge to implement
Masdar City is an emerging global hub for renewable energy and clean technologies. This modern Arabian city is car-free.
High-tech driverless pods transport users into the city. This introduces major security advantages for the city, even though
Pedestrian-only public realm (Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, Abu Dhabi)
this was not the principal planning objective
At the Al Forsan Club (Abu Dhabi), vehicle access to the club is controlled, with only VIPs and club members able to utilise
on-site parking. Visitors park outside the site boundary and gain access on a courtesy bus. Although this access control
is primarily for exclusivity, it benefits security and access could be controlled further or excluded altogether if there Public realm spaces within a vehicle exclusion area can be used to create public plazas, outdoor souks, a park,
was an increase in threat (adaptability) or similar uses that contribute to the community
This section of the Planning Toolkit outlines Whichever option is adopted, there is a need
a series of planning options for pedestrian to integrate pedestrian access control with
access control, along with advice for the vehicle access control and service access
developers and owners of constrained control strategies.
development plots. Design guidance for Option 2: + Security –
pedestrian access control is presented Building extremity
in the Design Toolkit (Chapter 5). pedestrian access control
Good practice often
Access is controlled at the building seen in US Federal
facade in a dedicated lobby. Plot boundary not secured buildings
The remainder of the facade is
Asset Building Plot District
secured to prevent circumvention Pedestrian searching
Lobby
Asset
Parking
If a plot has a number of different user groups A combination of planning interventions may
Pedestrian searching Secondary entry with different access rights and privileges, be adopted to improve access control without
secured compromising connectivity:
this will result in different access control
regimes and may even change the number 1. Establish a well-defined movement framework
of entry points to allow for user group and minimise the number of access points
separation. around the building.
Checklist
Where screening is required in addition 2. Use topographic features, landscaping and
to access control checks, there will be an urban design to celebrate ‘main entrances’,
increased spatial requirement at access define transition from public to privately • Is access control needed
control points due to longer processing owned space and improve wayfinding. or will monitoring of
times and additional security equipment. 3. Optimise sight lines surrounding the building access be sufficient?
Option 4: to increase awareness of misuse and
+ Security – • Is it appropriate to
Limited access control and crime and to detect hostile reconnaissance. implement access
temporary searching control at the plot
boundary or at the
Often seen
Facilities for access control and locally at special
building?
Plot boundary not secured
screening are deployed on a events when
• How many access
temporary basis, typically in security needs
Temporary are heightened control points are
a main reception area required and where will
pedestrian searching
they be located?
Primary
entry • How much space is
Asset
required for access
Lobby
control points?
Secondary • Can vehicle and
entry pedestrian access
control points be
integrated?
This entrance is used for staff access only A well defined movement framework helps channel
people through designated access points
Service access, loading bays and mailrooms Project planners should assess how a project
Five planning options are presented for service
are required for receipt and dispatch of goods will be serviced and allocate appropriate
access control. They range from an aspirational
and mail, including replenishment of on- space in the development plan for service
high security plan where deliveries are Facade Plot Boundary
site consumables. These areas are typically access and facilities. This will ensure there
received and processed off-site, to the lowest
kept out of sight in ‘back of house’ areas for is a location and adequate space for secure
level of security where there is no provision of
aesthetic reasons. Service areas are often storage of valuable goods / mail and will
space for security.
targeted by criminals due to the value of allow a service access control strategy
goods they contain. Also, because there is a to be developed.
It is important to remember that even if
need to allow large service vehicles to access a project is assessed as being low risk at
these areas, they may introduce vulnerability The amount of space required will not
present, changes in threat, the occupiers of
to vehicle borne attack. Given that these areas only depend on the anticipated volume of
the development or special events may
are the location where unsecure deliveries are incoming and outgoing goods, but whether
warrant additional protection in the future. It is
received, they are also the location where an there is a need to screen deliveries before
often difficult to allocate additional space post
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or Chemical, allowing internal dispatch.
construction and therefore planners should be
Biological or Radiological (CBR) agent is most considering adaptability.
likely to be discovered.
Whichever option is adopted, there is a need
The guidance contained in this section of the to integrate the service access control strategy
Planning Toolkit should be used to reduce with the vehicle access control strategy and
vulnerabilities associated with service access. the pedestrian access control strategy.
It highlights the importance of planning for
service access and deliveries to prevent mail
and deliveries entering a building unchecked.
VACP Asset
Parking
Secondary entry
secured
On-site
logistics Primary Service access Primary
facility entry entry
VACP
Asset Asset
Checklist
An important consideration in site planning In many countries, car parks can become Much can be done to reduce car crime
is the allocation of adequate and appropriate crime ‘hotspots’. Often poorly designed, dark, through the use of Situational Crime
space for vehicle parking. There are many inactive and lacking in natural surveillance, Prevention measures, such as designing cars
competing objectives which influence criminals target people and vehicles in these to make them less vulnerable e.g. the fitting
whether to adopt on or off street surface vulnerable areas. Crime rates for assault, of steering locks, secure door locks and car
parking, a dedicated parking structure or theft of vehicles and theft from vehicles are alarms. The public should also be encouraged
parking within a building. Underground often high along with users fear of crime. to remove attractive items from sight where
parking within buildings is common in Abu In addition, terrorists have used underground possible. However such as, planners and
Dhabi, particularly in dense urban areas car parks as a means to attack target designers also play a role in reducing car crime
where plot sizes are limited and demand for buildings. For example, in February 1993, through the placement and design
parking spaces is high. The use of basements terrorists detonated a large truck bomb in the of car parks.
is often seen as the most economic option car park below the North Tower of the World
and there may be other benefits of this Trade Center in New York City, USA, resulting There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to World Trade Center Bombing, February 1993, New York City, USA
approach, such as the removal of cars from in six fatalities and over 1,000 casualties. parking placement when it comes to safety
the public realm. and security. Firstly, every project is different
Fortunately crime in Abu Dhabi is low and and will need to balance any safety and
The guidance contained in this section of terrorist attacks have not occurred. However, security requirements with other planning
the Planning Toolkit, will assist a project it is still necessary for the project team to objectives. Secondly, solutions that may
team in determining which approach is most assess the risks and ensure that car parks are address low level crime concerns may not
appropriate given the safety and security appropriately located and well-designed to be the most appropriate for buildings at risk
risks identified for their project. minimise such risks. from hostile vehicle attack. Different security
solutions are required to mitigate different
security risks and in some cases, mitigation
advice can be contradictory. The risk
assessment should help to determine which
solution is most appropriate.
Less favourable
Favourable
3. Access Control
Maximum stand off distance can Long distance to walk from vehicles to 1. Spatial Planning
be achieved buildings. This may not be practical for A more operationally focused solution is to
Consider off-setting the underground parking so
certain uses or comfortable due to the incorporate screening and an access control regime.
Activity in public realm and that parking is not located directly below critical
hot climate Screening should be applied prior to entering the
surrounding buildings affords natural structural elements, functions or crowded
surveillance basement car park. However this may be difficult
places.
to achieve in buildings with large peak flow
Premises owners do not take
rates, such as shopping malls. This approach also
responsibility for the vehicles left 2. Hardening
unattended requires additional space. Access control offering
Surface - On street Within the car park, the stand-off distance from
higher levels of trust to certain user groups is a
vehicles to critical structural elements should
viable consideration, but it must be remembered
Users have reduced distance between Vehicle inclusion to the site means reduced be maximised. This can be achieved through
that operations are prone to human error and are
their car and their destination stand-off against vehicle borne attack the placement of non-essential plant or other
reactive rather than preventative.
building functions immediately surrounding
Users’ vehicles can be parked within A degree of access control, traffic
access controlled private spaces management and enforcement will be columns.
required on site
Natural surveillance can be achieved
from surrounding uses More difficult to detect illegitimate users
as there is less open space
Checklist
Surface –Off street
Crime Prevention
Counter Terrorism
VIP
The walk from the vehicle to the A degree of access control, traffic Crowded place • Is the type and placement of parking
users’ destination can be within access management and enforcement will be
controlled space required on site
influenced by safety and security
requirements?
Users vehicles can be parked within Natural surveillance from surrounding Underground
access controlled space uses may be difficult to implement. Car park • Is parking planned to take account of
This may increase reliance on CCTV counter- terrorism or general crime
prevention needs?
Dedicated Structure
• If terrorism is a concern, can parking be
accommodated outside of the building?
Users’ vehicles can be parked within Increased requirements for access
controlled private space control are likely, along with traffic • If underground parking is necessary,
management and enforcement
The walk from the vehicle to the
VIP
has it been offset from critical areas?
users destination can be within Natural surveillance is not available from
access controlled space. This might be other uses. This may require active Crowded place • If underground parking is necessary,
particularly important for VIPs surveillance solutions to be introduced has vehicle access control and screening
Underground
Less favourable
Car park
layouts may be constrained, especially the
placement of crowded places and critical
functions. If vehicle borne attack is likely,
then significant design changes may be
Within a Building (Basement parking) required
The infrastructure plan on the right places the above ground electrical connection and substation within
the plot boundary
Restricted
Restricted area
area
Sewerage system for rain water Sewerage system for rain water
Plot
Plot
The infrastructure plan on the right avoids routing the rainwater collection within restricted space. This removes all openings
from the restricted space
Utilities
Asset Building Plot District VACP
VACP
Utilities
The infrastructure plan on the right places the utility connection away from the Vehicle Access Control Point
Facade Plot Boundary
Control room
Appropriate allowances should be made
within plans for command and control
infrastructure and operational support Roof
facilities. This includes, but not limited to,
command and control rooms, storage facilities HVAC
and rest facilities for on-duty personnel. and
Exact spatial requirements will be project- ventilation
Space should be allocated within a building or master plan for
specific and determined in consultation with command and control facilities
the project owner and stakeholders.
Access to roof mounted HVAC systems can be controlled and unauthorised
access easily detected for efficient response
Restricted area
Infrastructure Hazards - Underground
fuel tank
Infrastructure Placement VIP
HVAC
and
Roof ventilation Checklist
Place hazardous installations within access
controlled space to deter, delay, detect and
deny unauthorised access as required. Restricted area • Does the type, quantity and
placement of infrastructure
Where plot constraints allow, crowded take account of safety and
places, critical infrastructure and other assets security risks?
should be placed remotely from hazardous
The fuel tank supplying this facility is underground,
infrastructure installations. This includes within the access controlled plot boundary and remote
• Will systems still function in
During the planning stage of this Government building,
on-site infrastructure and off-site hazards from the main building CBR attack risk was identified and HVAC openings were an emergency?
such as pipelines. relocated to the building roof
This section of the Planning Toolkit describes Natural surveillance, where clear sight Topographic features can be used to hide a A simple change in grade, a berm, ditch
how topography and topographic features lines are optimised to provide viewing building from public view where privacy is or water body can be used to define the
can be used to influence surveillance, define opportunities, plays an important role in both required. Such features also shield sensitive use transition between public and private space
space, support access control and mitigate the community safety and protective security. or users from view, reducing opportunities where access control is not required.
impact of different types of malicious attack. This is particularly important where there are for hostile reconnaissance or a malicious attack.
public realm spaces such as parks and surface
The topography of a plot describes its grade parking surrounding a development.
and natural and/or built topographic features,
such as banks, hollows and bodies of water.
These features will have a significant impact
Clear sight lines
on development proposals, construction costs
and ‘buildability’. There will be trade-offs
between safety and security objectives and
those of other disciplines. For example, while
a step change in grade may offer benefits in
preventing vehicle borne attack, it might also
reduce pedestrian accessibility. Planners must
compromise to reach an appropriate solution,
rather than dismissing one objective in order
to meet another.
Landscape Water feature
A ridge maintains privacy for this high security building, Topographic features used to demarcate spaces
allowing a high-rise building on the neighbouring plot and deter unauthorisead access
0.6m This Government building was located in a hollow for privacy reasons,
>
Street
this left it vulnerable to CBR attack involving heavier than air agents.
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi A change in grade used to deny vehicle access
Checklist
Taking time during the planning stage to Natural surveillance, where clear sight
consider how building orientation and shape lines are optimised to provide viewing
opportunities, plays an important role in both Facade Plot Boundary
may reduce safety and security risks will
often reduce vulnerabilities and the need for community safety and protective security.
physical security. On projects where there are community
safety concerns, building shape and
The guidance outlined in this part of the orientation should be used to create a
Planning Toolkit can be used to influence building that is seen to ‘open up’ to its
surveillance, avoid the creation of spaces Clear line of sight surroundings, rather than turn its back. This
and features that can be used by criminals will not only enhance surveillance but make a
and reduce the impact of an attack building more inviting to legitimate users.
involving explosives.
The creation of active frontages and the Building
The climate of the Emirate means that building use of glazed facades for regularly occupied
shape and orientation plays an important role spaces, provides ‘eyes on the street’. This is
in reducing solar heat gains, in channeling particularly important where there are public
cool breezes and providing shade of the public realm spaces such as parks and surface
Building
realm. On each project it will be necessary to parking surrounding a development.
balance these competing planning objectives.
Using building orientation and shape to
optimise natural surveillance around a
Recess creates an entrapment area out of sight
building perimeter is important for projects
that need to address security risks, Buildings have been located very close together, limiting
particularly on constrained sites where the natural surveillance
Option 3
facade is the first line of defence. Introducing
clear sight lines will improve:
VIP
• Detection of suspicious activity such as hostile
reconnaissance; and
Original Option 1 Option 2
• Effectiveness of active surveillance systems.
Changes of shape and building orientation, along with spatial planning, have been used to improve privacy and protection for the VIP area
Checklist
The pace and scale of development associated The creation of complete communities SSPM Principle 7 (Public Image) highlights that Although the Planning Submission for a
with Vision 2030 is considerable. This often should be promoted through appropriate plot owners and developers are responsible project will primarily focus on the final build
means that project delivery is phased, with development phasing. Phasing that clusters for the management and maintenance of their out of a project; the safety and security
partial occupation of early phases to fund occupied plots rather than dispersing them plots. This is true even during construction ‘end state’, development phasing should not
ongoing development. will ensure that occupants of early phases do and sites should be made safe and secure to undermine the Safety and Security Plan.
not spend the early years of the project stop misuse, theft of property and access to
If physical security elements intended to
This also means that projects are often living in a construction site. hazardous materials and areas.
protect occupied buildings are not in place as
incomplete for prolonged periods. Therefore, planned, as a result of being delivered in later
it is very important that development delivery The Municipality has powers under the
development phases, occupants may be left
is considered at the planning stage of a project Emirate of Abu Dhabi Environment,
vulnerable to security threats.
to ensure community safety and protective Health & Safety Management System (EHSMS)
security is implemented not only for the to monitor and enforce good practice. This is particularly relevant where security
end state of a project, but during phased planners are looking to use innovative
occupation. solutions such as natural barriers and
topography to create continuous HVM
This section of the Planning Toolkit provides barriers, and ‘collective solutions’ that
guidance intended to ensure vulnerabilities are provide a security zone to protect several
not introduced when formulating development plots or a district.
delivery plans.
Plot under
construction
construction
Plot under
Phase 2
Checklist
The impact of phasing on emergency cover
Secure communities
Introduction
For ease of use, the Design Toolkit is presented in three sections,
Chapter 5 presents a series of design tools that may be Navigating the Design Toolkit
each highlighting how members of the project team who are working
on different design aspects can contribute to safety and security.
used to implement Community Safety and Protective
Security in a development project. The guidance contained
here will assist developers and owners to implement DT1: Landscape & Urban Design
the Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning and This section deals with exterior design
elements at the plot level, plot boundary and
Design Principles presented in Chapter 2. within the surrounding district.
DT3: Systems Design
Existing Buildings
Asset Building Plot District
Use of the Design Toolkit is not restricted
to new development projects. Owners
of existing buildings will find the Design
Toolkit useful for assessing options for Facade Plot Boundary
retrofitting safety and security measures.
implement a vision for outdoor spaces. They connect Asset Building Plot District
A security specialist will look to create and embed the • Control plot access; Design Factors
concept of ‘defence in depth’ into a holistic security plan.
• Provide maximum distance between
The plot boundary is normally the outermost layer of Design must start with an evaluation of the
potential threats and assets to be
defence in higher risk developments. Using the plot boundary project context including:
protected; and
maximises the distance between the first layer of security
• Adjacent properties and neighbours;
and the building or asset to be protected. This may be • Provide opportunities to assess and
difficult to achieve in the urban environment, which may respond to intrusion. • Existing building codes and design guidelines;
inform other design elements, such as the strength of the
facade and its openings. • Surrounding street network, entry points and
parking requirements;
A secure perimeter is used to create a ‘controlled zone’. Man Made Boundary Treatments
• Extent of vehicle and pedestrian access;
It defines the physical boundaries of a space and helps to
restrict, channel or impede access. The degree of access Man-made boundaries such as walls and fences are common • Level of protection required;
control will vary considerably from project to project; it may means of establishing a secure boundary. Fences can provide
high levels of security, and can be constructed in a range of • Aesthetics;
be achieved through territorial reinforcement, by operational
or electronic means, or through the deployment of materials and styles to suit the project security requirements. • Cost;
a physical barrier. They should be used only in high security environments
where individual intruders, rather than vehicles are a threat. • Topography and vegetation;
Some plots are designed so that their security is obvious and A bright, colourful and effective boundary treatment Walls offer a greater opportunity for compatibility with the • Sight lines and visibility;
imposing, others employ a more subtle approach that blends defines the play area, keeps children safe and architectural context; they may also provide higher levels of
in better with the urban environment.
maintains natural surveillance privacy and if designed appropriately, enhanced protection • Material selection and construction techniques;
against ballistics and blast.
• Finish and durability;
Ultimately, boundary treatments provide definition and
deterrence, and offer differing levels of delay and denial. • Height, length and alignment; and
The choice of boundary treatment should be based on the • Infrastructure e.g. power, alarms, lighting
risk assessment and which of these characteristics are and CCTV.
required. For low risk sites, low levels of deterrence are
sufficient. As risk levels increase, boundaries will need to
incorporate increasing levels of delay while for some,
denial may be a requirement.
In high security environments, sensors can 6. Painting fence fabric and structures can
be applied to a boundary treatment to detect minimise visual impact. Different types and
unauthorised entry. If someone attempts to heights minimise their presence and prevent
cross the terrain, or attempts to climb, cut monotonous, negative visual perspectives.
through, or dig under the treatment, an alarm 7. If increased deterrence and delay is required,
is triggered. With a fully integrated system, topping can be placed on a fence or wall.
this can automatically trigger monitoring and
recording by a CCTV system. 8. Clear zones should be maintained on both
sides of a high security barrier to provide
an unobstructed view of the barrier and the
High risk ground adjacent to it.
In low risk environments, breakwaters and harbours will not Maritime security can be achieved operationally through the deployment of
require additional measures law enforcement maritime patrols
In high risk environments, such as critical national infrastructure, maritime security measures may be necessary
Where maritime protection is required without impacting the architectural vision for a project, innovation is required. In this example, water piles have
been designed to deny access to maritime craft but allow access to sea life and enable natural flushing, preventing stagnation
Transport locations
Government buildings
security function
Vehicle Denial
Traffic Management
Typical local examples of traffic management measures Typical examples of vehicle access control points for higher risk environments
A well-designed system of signage and markings will increase legitimate and Innovative architectural design can transform otherwise mundane control Incorporation of a turntable can provide access through a HVM line and allow greater use of public art and other street design elements
consensual drivers’ awareness when approaching VACPs. However, they will and search locations into visually appealing site design elements
not prevent or even influence a determined vehicle borne attacker
Design Factors
Typical examples of low control pedestrian access points Typical examples of pedestrian access control points that offer Typical examples of pedestrian access control points
medium levels of control offering high levels of control
184 5. Design Toolkit 5. Design Toolkit 185
DT 1.5: Material Selection and Planting elements used should be designed for the intended use The design specification of all elements
and be appropriate, given the context. Certain attributes should take into account the impact Asset Building Plot District
can be used to serve a specific safety and security
function. Designers should note that in many cases .of local environmental conditions
Landscape and urban designers can draw on a palette of
planting may not reach maturity for many years and will The impact of dust, sand, humidity
require ongoing management and maintenance.
materials and plants when designing outdoor spaces. The and salinity need to be considered
Facade Plot Boundary
.when designing in Abu Dhabi
Robust materials used in an area subject Elements selected exhibit design quality, The designers choice of glazing could Trees act as a climbing aid for intruders This boundary wall offers both natural Elements selected are attractive to users
to constant use attract users and instil ownership over result in secondary fragmentation risk in surveillance and is shatter resistant, so
the space a crowded place avoids secondary fragmentation
Transparent materials used to improve natural Planting creates clear sight lines for Perimeter sight lines have been maintained Transparent materials can be used to Ongoing maintenance is required due A simple change of material is used to
surveillance pedestrians and avoids the creation of around this residence through the use of improve community safety to poor design integration between demonstrate change of use
hiding places ornamental fencing active surveillance and landscaping
Abu Dhabi Bus Station Planting along the pedestrian walkway in this plaza allows users to be aware of their surroundings
Facade Openings
Openings in facades are a popular point of unauthorised entry to a building. Access may be gained either
by breaking through a door, window or other aperture; or simply gaining access where the aperture
has been left open. A range of protection options are presented below.
Windows
Openable windows Glazed curtain wall Window grilles
Design for privacy Design for natural surveillance
Innovation
Doors
The mashrabiya is used in this case to delay
unauthorised access through this window. It is Glass door Steel door Blast doors
aesthetically pleasing and was specifically designed
by the architectural team to meet the minimum specified
criteria set by the project owner.
Other openings
Unsecured air intake High level air intake Roof mounted HVAC
1 3
Use non-glazed Place glazing
facade systems closer to
if blast is a the floor to Special Applications
concern. This will reduce the
reduce secondary distance that
fragmentation glass shards
will fly within
Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, Abu Dhabi
perimeter
rooms
2 4
Limit the size and Use laminated
number of glazed glazing,
elements Glass appropriately VIP Area Guard post featuring ballistic rated glazing
anchored to its
PVB film
frame, as its PVB
interlayer will Innovation
Glass reduce secondary
fragmentation The security function of these shutters
Masdar, Abu Dhabi is only required at night when the Museum
is closed.
Design Factors
1. The number of entrances should be minimised having
regard for fire safety requirements.
2. Highlight the main building entrances so that visitors
and staff use appropriate entrances.
3. Determine whether it is necessary to control access,
such as in an office, or if monitoring access only is
appropriate e.g. in a shopping mall.
4. If there is a need to control access, it is likely that more
space will be required to avoid increased entry time
delays for users.
5. If there is a need to control access, there may be a
need to separate user groups as certain groups will be
more trusted than others e.g. staff vs. visitors.
6. Access control starts with determining if a user is
legitimate and should be allowed access. This typically
requires reception facilities for visitors. Low control measures are primarily intended to deter Low height turnstiles usually used in industrial or back of house areas Searching and screening equipment will be required where banned items
unauthorised users and welcome or direct legitimate users help to prevent tailgating but can be easily vaulted need to be detected such as at stadia or secure Government facilities
7. A manual or automated system may be used to
deter, delay, detect and deny attempted
unauthorised access.
8. Search & screen capability may be required as part
of the regular entry procedure for all pedestrians or
limited to certain user groups.
9. Search & screen capability may be required only
temporarily e.g. special events or increased threat.
It is important to design for adaptability.
As well as providing environmental protection, doors also Speedgates are less industrial and help to prevent tailgating Full height turnstiles do not allow passage until the user has
196 5. Design Toolkit offer deterrence and delay unauthorised access when locked been verified. The risk of tailgating is reduced considerably 5. Design Toolkit 197
DT 2.3: Structural Design instructed to do so following a risk assessment and a
decision by a client or stakeholders to enhance protection.
Prevent Disproportionate Collapse
Asset Building Plot District
This situation arises where the local failure of primary elements of
Structural design plays an important role in protecting
structure leads to progressive failures of elements more remote from
buildings against blast loading, particularly where a
Whereas it is standard practice in Abu Dhabi for a the initial cause. This leads to damage that is disproportionate to the
building benefits from limited stand-off. Structural
structural engineer to design for wind and seismic loading, original cause. Regardless of how well a building needs to be protected
hardening is expensive and should be considered after the
it is unlikely that they will have designed a structure to meet the client and stakeholders objectives, the most important job Facade Plot Boundary
basic design guidance provided here has been incorporated
to resist blast loading. That is unless they have been of the structural engineer is to prevent disproportionate collapse.
to make the structure more resilient.
A resilient structure will exhibit the following attributes to reduce the
likelihood of disproportionate collapse.
Explosive Blast Loading
Specialist Advice
An explosive blast is associated with extreme Redundancy Multiple load paths to accommodate
Structural design for blast loading can be complex and requires but very short duration loading of a structure. abnormal loads Start with the Basics
specialist advice, particularly for innovative structural forms that The pressure acting on the structure can be
are commonly seen in new signature developments in Abu Dhabi. orders of magnitude above wind loading but The guidance below may conflict with other
is experienced for a much shorter duration. design objectives so it is imperative that
Unfortunately, history shows us that building Load Primary and secondary elements and the design team work collaboratively and
damage can range from glazing failure through reversal connections that can accommodate reversal holistically.
• Blast wave breaks windows to disproportionate or complete collapse. of loads 1. Concentrate on the most important
• Exterior walls are blown in elements first
• Columns may be damaged Ductility The ability of elements to deform without 2. Avoid large floor to floor heights,
collapse. Cast-in-place reinforced concrete while complying with minimum building
exhibits this attribute and sees widespread code standards
use in Abu Dhabi.
3. Avoid direct exposure of primary structural
Shear load Elements have sufficient strength and ductility elements e.g. architectural shroud
capacity not to fail in shear. 4. Design with regular, limited structural spans
• Blast wave forces
floors upward
Glazing failure resulting from a large VBIED, Canary
Wharf, London, UK
1 2 3 Concrete column
• Blast wave 4
surrounds the
structure Non-load
Primary Secondary
bearing
• Downward structure structure
elements
pressure on
the roof
• Inward pressure Metal shroud to
provide stand-off
on all sides
requirements
200 5. Design Toolkit 5. Design Toolkit 201
DT 3.1: Utilities and Infrastructure security installations and support life safety and site
security functions.
Asset Building Plot District
Utility and infrastructure protection requirements are ‘Utilities and infrastructure can be
project-specific and should be assessed as part of the
The Planning Toolkit highlighted how appropriate vulnerable to attack within the district,
Integrated Development Process. It is important that
infrastructure placement can reduce loss of supply and
designers follow applicable Regulations and guidance of at the plot boundary, within the plot and
unauthorised access vulnerabilities at a site. ‘Designing- Facade Plot Boundary
utility providers. Any proposed deviations for safety and
in’ protection of utilities and infrastructure will improve
security reasons shall be subject to a utility provider’s at building entry points’
business continuity, prevent circumvention of physical
‘No Objection Certificate’.
Case Study -
Start with the Basics Case Study -
Manufacturing Plant (Abu Dhabi) Virtual National Bank Data Centre
1. As part of the risk assessment process, determine
what infrastructure is critical to normal, life safety The proposed vehicle access control point for a This data centre handles all debit and credit
and security operations. manufacturing plant was located adjacent to the only card transactions for Virtual National Bank and
electrical substation and all feeds to the site were routed business continuity was identified as a key
2. Minimise access openings to infrastructure. along the same service road. This created a single point of component of the safety and security brief. The
Where possible bury infrastructure or hide it. failure. The utility feeds were fixed by the utility provider, 3 design of utilities and infrastructure included:
and the options for reducing the supply vulnerability
3. Where access is required to meet utility provider
were constrained to: 1.
1 Utility connections – Located within the plot
or system installation standards, incorporate 5 2
appropriate access control and intruder detection secure boundary and accessible under
where justified by risk assessment. • Removing the entry road; 24 hours a day supervision.
6
4. Minimise or close infrastructure openings to • Re-planning the site entrance; 2.
2 Vehicle access control point - Located
prevent unauthorised access to the site or remotely from utility lines.
• Repositioning the electrical substation; and
building (security circumvention) using utility and 7 3.
3 Roof mounted HVAC and chillers – Decreasing
infrastructure routes. • Hardening the utilities.
the vulnerability of operations to tampering
5. Harden critical infrastructure from malicious 4 and intake of hazardous materials.
attack where resilience is not afforded by
4.
4 Remote energy centre – Located within the
dispersed, redundant supplies i.e. there remains
1 plot secure perimeter, the energy centre
a risk of simultaneous failure of primary and
houses generator sets for back-up power
back-up supply.
supplies and life safety systems.
6 5.
5 Sewerage and drainage pipes features lockable
Manufacturing
Plant
manholes and grilles.
6.
6 Redundant and diverse ICT fibre infrastructure.
7.
7 Site-wide fire fighting standpipe system
in addition to automatic sprinkler and gas
suppression systems.
VACP
Substation
Secure communities
To Dubai
SITE PLAN
Al Bandar
Public
In the example to the right, changes in The decision taken during the planning and
paving and signage have been used to design stages to create high-quality spaces
define ownership of space. Where physical throughout the development (that are easy
barriers have been used, they are attractively to manage and maintain) has had a positive
designed, blending in with the streetscape. It impact on safety and security. In addition,
is clear to different users where Semi-Public the open spaces offer opportunities to
and Semi-Private areas begin and end; in enhance natural surveillance and are also
this case the space beyond the gate is for adaptable and can be utilised to support
residents’ use only. emergency response and special events.
Caption to be inserted
Activity
Surveillance
The Emirates Palace Hotel benefits from a large The development has a well-defined
open site. The size and layout of the development movement framework plan for vehicles and
helps manage the risk of VBIED attack by pedestrians that benefits access control,
providing sufficient stand-off between the hotel wayfinding and traffic calming. Traffic is
and plot boundary. funnelled into the development through
separated entry points that serve different
functions and user groups.
Topography
All deliveries for the development are
The topography of the development contributes processed through a dedicated on-site
to HVM by offsetting approaches to the hotel delivery reception area, located away from
and to naturally reduce the speed of advancing the hotel. The location provides sufficient
vehicles. It also contributes to crime prevention stand-off between the facility and the hotel
by enhancing natural surveillance. to help manage the risk of VBIED attack via a
service vehicle.
On-site delivering
reception area
Vehicles and people are funnelled into the A wrought iron ornamental fence, designed
development through designated entry for HVM, is applied around the development’s
points which are actively monitored and boundary, with exception to the northern
controlled using a combination of physical boundary. On this boundary, the maritime
and operational measures. domain acts as a natural barrier while
patrolling by CNIA vessels controls access to
the marina.
Lowered operation
Heightened operation
Public Image
Ownership
The master plan will be constructed over the Visually permeable fencing will
course of many years. replace existing walls around the
Key elements of the project vision that are cemeteries and school; improving
integrated into the master plan include: “Quick wins”will be employed today to help natural surveillance. The plan also
improve areas that experience more crime and 3 proposes to redevelop the school
• A public realm that expresses traditional to include shared facilities with the
misuse. This will help establish a foundation 1 2
Arab culture while serving the diverse, 3 3
community; this will help activate
for development as delivery continues in
multicultural population; the area around the school and
the future.
• A broad array of community facilities southern cemetery, and promote
within walking distance of most residents Quick win suggestions include: 4 ownership.
and businesses; • Additional tamper proof lighting; and
• Access to public transport options; and
2 Community Facilities
• Replacement of cemetery and school
boundary walls.
• Efficient vehicular access and parking facilities 3 Parks and leisure areas are provided
3
3
for the local community.
The master plan contributes to safety and
security by: 3 Public Realm
• Introducing the right types of community
facilities in the right places to balance 4 Existing space with no apparent
activity across the development; purpose will, in many cases, be
programmed as a series of new
• Establishing a well defined movement
open spaces (i.e. linear parks,
framework that offers convenient
community parks, family parks,
movement between places while 4
Meyadeen parks).
discouraging use of more private places; 1
Context architecture.
Louvre
The LAD design team achieved maritime A shared remote logistics system is to be Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi
access control through the development of a incorporated into the design for the Museum
concept based on Venetian piles. The piles of Park between the LAD & GAD museums.
different heights and sizes were reinforced This below grade facility will provide secure,
to security specifications, and deployed in dedicated delivery to the two museums, as
an apparently random pattern of layers to well as providing below-grade public parking. Logistics Centre
prevent an unappealing ‘stockade perimeter’. This design greatly increases the level of
deterrence and protection afforded to the
Louvre Abu Dhabi ‘Venetian pile design’ museums, enabling vehicle exclusion zones to
Museum Park
be maintained on each site.
For the LAD, the screening locations were Several options for adapting the vehicle
pushed to the extremities of the development movement framework for the ZNM were
area on the pedestrian approach bridges. considered, each offering differing levels
These are located a considerable distance of access control from vehicle inclusion
from the museum gallery and public spaces through to exclusion schemes. An inclusion
and independent of the main structures of scheme was taken forward and the design
the museum buildings. team elected to close the approach road with
access limited to a small number of invited
Screening
users only.
Locations
Option 1:
The GAD project team have created a security Re-route traffic along the
control point for pedestrian screening that existing roads which run
achieves a high level of protection without parallel to the garden
impacting on the aesthetics of the museum
entrance. During design the screening Option 2:
location was moved away from its initial Flip the “U”shaped entry
location at the heart of the museum to its pathway to the south and
new position below grade, independent of divert the road around it
the main structure. Option 3:
Screening Drop the road below grade
GAD screening location Locations
level as it passes the front of
the museum
Secure communities
Risk Management
Introduction • HB436 (2004) Risk Management Guidelines; Applying this approach within the safety and Often balancing risks is difficult as they
Companion to AS/NZS 4360: 2004; and security discipline helps to move the focus of share causal relationships and dependencies.
thinking away from threat alone to a wider Striking this balance is a challenge and
• FEMA Risk Management Series.
consideration of safety and security risk. requires a continual thought and decision
This section of the Manual is not designed to making process. Within that context, different
The various stages of the risk management The need to manage risk systematically people all have different perceptions of, and
be a definitive guide to safety and security
process detailed below should be applies to all organisations and individuals attitudes towards risk. Some people actively
risk management; there are many excellent
incorporated into the wider Integrated and to all functions and activities within seek adventure and take greater risks in their
standards and best practice documents
Development Process; it should form part an organisation. The alternative to risk lives – participating in adventurous sports
that serve that purpose. Its purpose is to
of the main decision making process at management is risky management, or such as skydiving and mountaineering, where
outline the fundamental elements of the
each stage of the project. Ultimately, the making reckless decisions, or decisions that the chances of injury or even fatality are
risk management process and to set an
identification, analysis and evaluation of risk are not based on a careful consideration higher. Equally, others prefer to lead a more
expectation for the decision making process
will form the foundation for the treatment of the facts. This is unlikely to result in a sedentary lifestyle, choosing not to take any
within a project. One of the key weaknesses
options, which will be developed in planning desired outcome. The need for sound and more risks than absolutely necessary.
in the safety and security development
and design. systematic risk management applies to the The challenges of balancing risk and differing
review process to date has been the quality
development process as much as any other risk appetites are two of the key elements in
of risk assessment documentation supporting
What is risk and risk management? business or industry. project decision making.
planning applications. Therefore this section
Risk is widely defined as the potential for a
aims to inform planners and designers of
course of action or activity to result in an Certain land uses, adjacencies and Internationally, attitudes have changed
what to expect from their consultants.
undesirable consequence (or a loss). Risk occupancies can result in the creation of significantly in recent times, with a major
is inherent in everything we do, whether safety and security risks. Equally, the type focus on, and acceptance of the need for, an
The Manual will be supported by a Decision
it be riding a bicycle, managing a project, of business activity of a particular owner/ increased attention to safety and security.
Support Tool (DST) that will broadly
dealing with clients, taking decisions about tenant, or the people that work or visit that In some instances this can be driven by
determine if projects are Low Priority or
the future or deciding not to take any site, can result in additional risk. These misinformed perception, fuelled by an overly
High Priority. If assessed to be low priority,
action at all. We manage risks continuously, risks can greatly impact on our daily quality dramatic media. The result is that security
additional risk assessments will not be
sometimes consciously and sometimes of life. This fact is acknowledged in the investment may be misdirected to where
necessary as part of planning and design
without realizing it – deciding what to do UPC’s vision to plan Abu Dhabi as a safe and the ‘noise’ is, not where it is really required.
approvals process. Project teams will only
and when to make sure life continues as secure environment that promotes quality of This not only applies in terms of risk but also
be required to adhere to the Principles of
smoothly as possible with as few unpleasant life, preserves local values and culture and in relation to ‘favoured’ treatments, such
the Manual. If assessed to be high priority,
surprises as possible. contributes to economic sustainability and as a heavy reliance on the deployment of
projects will be directed to complete a risk
the overall welfare of the Emirate. CCTV cameras. Therefore the project risk
assessment. This should be conducted by a
In a business context, risk should be directly management process must assess and review
competent specialist and should follow the
linked to its impact on business objectives. Many developers and users feel that crime information for its relevancy, accuracy
guidance given in this section. No specific
This is an important definition because it and terrorism risks are the responsibility and credibility to ensure that the process
methodology is mandated, however process
exposes the increasing maturity in thinking of others e.g. Governments, police. Many identifies the relevant risks and results in
and documentation must conform to an
about risk that has occurred over recent years. believe they cannot be controlled or treated the implementation of the most effective
international recognised risk management
by an individual. This is not always the solutions; in short it must enable appropriate
standard, such as:
case and it is incumbent on every project decision making.
development, however large or small, to
• ISO 31000 (2009) Risk Management – consider these risks, how they impact on
Principles and Guidelines; people and their quality of life, and to ensure
• BS 31100 (2008) Risk Management – that they are appropriately addressed.
Code of Practice;
• HB 167 (2006) Security Risk Management
240 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 241
Safety and Security Risk Management Process
“Risk management is a more realistic term All risk methodologies require a systematic
and rigorous process with clear stages, Organisational
Strategic Context
than safety. It implies that hazards are responsibilities and outcomes or deliverables.
context
Identify Risks
Assess the Risks
Likeihood Consequence
Risk Assessment
Analyse Risks
Evaluate the Risks
Tolerance Acceptability
Evaluate Risks
Avoid Accept
Exploit
Treat Risks
Share Reduce
242 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 243
Communicate and consult
Communicate and consult with internal and
Analyse risks
Identify and evaluate existing controls if Fundamentally, safety and The process of mitigating risk is part of a
continuous and ongoing process throughout
external stakeholders as appropriate appropriate. Determining the consequence the lifecycle of the planning, design,
at each stage of the risk management process should the risk be realised and the likelihood security risk management construction, commissioning, occupation
and concerning the process as a whole. of such a risk with that consequence and operation of the building. Planners
Identify risks
tolerance to identified risks. Enable decisions
to be made about the extent and nature of
as a thorough understanding of for the process are
244 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 245
Communication and Consultation Stage 1 – Establishing the Context
Like the wider development process, Establishing the context is the principal Internal Context
risk management also requires effective activity in developing the scope for safety The focus of developing the internal context
communication and consultation throughout. and security risk management. This includes is to create an agreed understanding of the
Effective internal and external communication establishing both the internal and external organisation’s internal environment and
is important to ensure that those responsible context of the development as well as the issues that may influence the nature of the
for implementing risk management, and safety and security risk management context safety and security risk exposures. The key
those with a vested interest, understand the (objectives, structure, processes, structure, elements of the internal context and areas
basis on which decisions are made and why stakeholders). around which questions should be posed in
particular actions are required. its establishment include:
External Context • The organisation’s objectives, plans and
Effective communication and consultation The term ‘external context’ refers to gaining strategies;
will improve participants’ understanding an understanding of the external environment
of risks, ensure that the varied views of in which the organisation is operating or may • Key business functions and processes;
stakeholders are considered and ensure be operating in the future.
• The type, extent and interaction of operations;
that all participants are aware of their roles
and responsibilities. It is vital in ‘getting The key objective is to identify factors in the • Historical crisis, disruption, disaster,
buy-in’ from stakeholders and should begin external environment that are going to have emergency, safety and security incidents and
at the earliest stages of the security risk an effect on the organisation, the manner in trend information;
management process. which it does business and ultimately, those
• Locations of business sites, accommodation,
factors that will have safety and security
Communication and consultation should and other operations;
risk implications for the organisation. It is
focus on engagement, participation, necessary to place some boundaries on the • Internal hazard locations (e.g. dangerous
information transfer between parties, the exercise to ensure that it remains relevant goods storage); and
perceptions of individual parties involved, to the risk management objectives for the
comprehensiveness and clarity of information planning and design process. • Presence of ‘sensitive targets’ (e.g. high profile
for making decisions and agreement individuals, sensitive information, attractive
between the parties involved on the assets, business critical assets and cash).
expected deliverables.
246 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 247
Stage 2 – Risk Identification The full identification of safety and security The criticality assessment should focus on
risks normally involves separate processes: those assets that are of most importance to
• The Criticality Assessment – ‘what’ and the development, community or individual.
‘where’ answers;
Threat
Risk identification is concerned with creating In undertaking risk identification, a list of
• The Threat Assessment – ‘who’, ‘why’ and The aim of the threat assessment is to
a well thought out and comprehensive risks should be developed by considering the
‘when’ answers; and clearly identify the range of potential
determination of the sources of risks and following questions :
• The Vulnerability Assessment – ‘how’ threats arising from the external and internal
potential events that will have an impact
answers. security environments, and their relevance
upon the individual’s, organisation’s, or • How it could happen (a source of risk – for to the development. The threat assessment
community’s objectives. In the safety example a potential threat)? is concerned with identifying those events,
and security context, identification of risk Information to support these processes
• Why it could happen (a cause: actions, aggressors or adversaries that can cause
normally involves the consideration of can be gained from a wide range of
incidents or other underlying factors that losses to the development, organisational,
threat, asset criticality and vulnerability sources including:
create the source of risk)? or individual assets (as identified in the
assessment as primary inputs into the
criticality assessment above).
identification process.
• What could happen (a potential event or • Organisational loss and incident data;
incident, where the source of risk interacts Intentional threats, which are based on the
The words ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ are often • Local incident/crime data;
with some aspect of the entity with an notion of an attacker or adversary, include an
used interchangeably. However, risk is
associated consequence)? • Industry/Sector loss and incident data; assessment of the intent and capability of an
not a synonym of threat, although closely
• Where it could happen (the physical individual or group to undertake actions that
related, the two are significantly different. In • Open source information: media, internet,
locations and assets where the event could will result in harm or the expectation of harm
many circumstances a ‘threat’ will provide public reports;
occur or where the consequences may be to another individual, group, organisation or
a source for one or more risks. It is the
experienced)? • Intelligence assessments (from national community.
interaction between the threat and someone
or something, at a particular instance or over security agencies, industry associations etc);
• When it could happen (specific times or time and This includes:
a period of time that will create the risk.
periods when the event is most likely to occur • identifying the range of potential threats to an
Threats may exist, but not pose a risk. For • Comparative analysis with other organisations
or the consequences realized) individual, organisation or community;
example, a protestor/activist may present or developments that may have similarities in
a threat. However, the risk only emerges • Who could be involved (individuals or groups size, character, operations and locations. • examining the possible ways in which these
if there is some chance (no matter how that may be associated with the threat or may threats may interact with the critical asset,
small) that the threat will interact with impacted by the risk)?
Asset and Criticality either directly or indirectly, and understanding
something (structure, person, etc) to cause
The criticality assessment (or ‘asset the specific impacts that could arise; and
an event resulting in certain consequences Identifying risk is therefore about
(unauthorised entry, assault, criminal assessment’), involves the identification • determining how likely these threats are to
understanding the nature of the threat of the critical assets (people, property,
damage, vandalism). (the source of the risk), interacting with occur within a defined time frame or locality.
information and the processes that support
important elements such as the community, them) that may be exposed to, or harmed
development assets, etc (with importance by the threat. The criticality assessment
expressed through criticality) and in what is a vital step in the identification of risk
manner the nature of these elements will as it provides the starting point for a
THREAT is a function of Capability and Intent facilitate or inhibit this interaction (expressed consideration of the pertinent threats,
through vulnerability). and the development’s or individual user’s
vulnerability to those threats. In many
circumstances it would be difficult and costly
RISK is a function of Threat and Vulnerability to conduct a thorough risk assessment for all
assets, locations and people.
248 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 249
Intent and Capability Threat assessments can range from quite Assessing Vulnerability This vulnerability model is of less value
general to very specific, depending on the in the early planning stages of the IDP,
level of information available. Within the The first step in the vulnerability analysis when security controls have yet to be
Threat is often expressed as a function of
development context, where information is considers how each of the credible threats considered. Therefore vulnerability is more
intent and capability. Intent is represented
limited, particularly during the earlier stages, can be realised against each of the critical likely to consider ‘generic’ vulnerabilities
by the expressed aims, objectives, desires,
assessments are more likely to veer towards assets. This involves determining associated with certain land uses and building
or directions of the threat and includes the
the general scale, providing general threat two elements: types. However this model is useful when
motivational factors for such individuals or
levels against types of land use, industries • How a successful ‘attack’ against the asset considering the treatment of risks in order to
groups. Capability considers factors such
or tenants. could be carried out (based on the DBTs); and determine how many layers of defence are
as skills, experience, resources, numbers
required and what should be in each layer.
of attackers, supporting networks and their • The effectiveness of each of the layers of
If possible, the threat assessment should Best practice would dictate that the higher
overall ability to conduct criminal or terrorist defence in preventing this event
culminate in the development of a range the risk, the more layers are required and the
operations. As assessment of intent considers from happening.
of credible threat scenarios or Design more robust each layer should be.
the question “will they attack” while
Basis Threats (DBT’S). These express more Many safety and security controls will exist in
capability considers the question of ‘how
specifically how the threat is likely to a ‘layered’ or ‘defence in depth’ structure. No Summary
effective will they be if they do attack”.
manifest. For example while assessments matter how many layers are in place or how For the identification of risks, it is necessary
may identify a general threat from terrorism, well constructed they are, they cannot be one for all of the above elements to be combined.
it is more helpful, particularly in the planning hundred percent effective for one hundred
and design process, for a range of DBTs to percent of the time. Borrowing a safety model Threat
be considered e.g. a large Vehicle Borne developed by James Reason, each of the layers Who or what will potentially cause harm
Improvised Explosive Device, a Person of security controls or countermeasures) will (informed by the threat assessment).
Borne Improvised Explosive Device and a resemble a slice of Swiss cheese, with holes
Coordinated Small Arms Attack. This helps of varying number and size through it. Under Asset
project teams to better understand how the normal circumstances the holes are covered by What site, area, person, entity, process, or
threat may apply to the development and subsequent layers of controls. However, under other assets will be affected (informed by the
what the vulnerabilities are; this in turn can certain circumstances the holes in all layers will criticality assessment).
be used to inform a more specific treatment line up and all defences can be penetrated. The
plan. These scenarios should be based on aim of the vulnerability analysis must not only Vulnerability
historical trend data, previous incidents, be to identify and characterise holes in each of What controls or other operational parameters
intelligence (from local police crime the layers; it must also consider the potential could be exploited (informed by the
advice/intelligence). for these holes to align. vulnerability assessment).
Event
In what manner or circumstances will the
harm be realized (informed by considering
threat, asset and vulnerability).
Hotels Abu Dhabi UAE UK, USA, France Tourists
250 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 251
Stage 3 – Risk Analysis Likelihood and Consequence Risk analysis requires a careful consideration
of both likelihood and consequence.
The likelihood refers to the chance or
Catastrophic >350,000,000.00
A sensible approach
Extreme negative coverage causing public outcry Serious process breakdown that prevents the
appearing consistently over weeks achievement of mission official objectives
Majority of stakeholders severely disadvantaged (months) Multiple severe injuries, including fatalities
Major >20,000,000.00 Negative significant coverage, appearing Serious process breakdown that substantially impedes
<350,000,000.00
A security consultancy working for a major developer delivered an ‘all hazard’ risk consistently over weeks
Multiple stakeholders severely disadvantaged (weeks-months)
the achievement of a core objective
Multiple severe injuries, or a single fatality
analysis that applied all threats to a full range of assets. The formulaic approach Moderate >200,000.00 Negative coverage lasting for several days, and/or frequent Process breakdown that impedes the achievement of an
allocated a numerical value for threat, vulnerability and consequence with additional <20,000,000.00 occurrence for several weeks
Multiple stakeholders experience significant disadvantage
important objective or causes extensive inefficiencies in
key processes
weighting factors to create overall numerical risk values. The process resulted in (weeks) Multiple casualties requiring hospital attention
Minor >8,000.00
2350 individual risk scenarios of largely irrelevant or inappropriate analysis – such <200,000.00
Minor negative coverage, limited circulation for one day
Minority stakeholders experience disadvantage (days-weeks)
Process breakdown that impedes the achievement of one
or more objectives or some inefficiencies in key processes
as the ‘risk of storm surge to a cash point’ and ‘solar radiation against a road’. The Minor injuries requiring hospital attention
complicated and long-winded process failed in its primary objective – which was to Minimal <8,000.00 Isolated brief coverage, single media outlet
Stakeholders experience minimal disadvantage (days)
Process breakdown or inefficiencies that have a
limited impact on the achievement of an objective
inform the development process and facilitate security decision making. Minor injury requiring first aid only
252 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 253
Challenge - Low Likelihood, Most Credible Worst Case Scenario
High Consequence Risks
254 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 255
Overall Risk Rating Stage 4 – Risk Evaluation Transfer
Share, outsource or insure the risk, e.g.
The overall level of risk or ‘risk rating’ request that a Government agency deals
is determined through combining the The 4 Ts: with the risk, especially during high profile,
consequence and likelihood estimations. Terminate The crux of risk management is this forth international events. In reality only part of
The example table right, provides one
example of a matrix approach for estimating
Example Table Transfer stage in the process, the decision making the responsibility for managing the risk can
be transferred, some responsibility and all
related to the identified and analysed
a risk rating. Risk rating in this manner Treat accountability for the risk remains with the
Consequence
risks. The aim of risk planning is to select
allows the risks to be prioritised in order of Tolerate and implement measures to minimise first party.
decreasing relative risk level from ‘Extreme’ Minimal Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
the expected loss by either reducing the
to ‘Low’. It also provides an aid to decision Almost Certain Medium Significant High Extreme Extreme
likelihood, impact or both. However some Treat
making regarding the tolerability of risk Likely Medium Medium Significant High Extreme
risk will always remain, especially with Mitigate the risk, e.g. install protective
which is determined during risk evaluation. security measures such as HVM barriers (this
Likelihood
Possible Low Medium Significant High High
intentional risks such as terrorism, which
Unlikely Low Low Medium Significant High
cannot be totally eliminated. This is a critical is the main focus of the Safety and Security
Scales and formula Rare Low Low Medium Significant Significant message to consider during the development Planning and Design Toolkit).
A cautionary note on the use of scales in the of the built environment, in particular for
measurement of risk: developments such as hotels and tourist Tolerate
A number of methodologies attempt to destinations, where the standard ‘defence in Accept and plan for risk occurring e.g. allow
perform feats of quantitative analysis that depth’ model with multiple layers of robust vehicles into a development but ensure that
are mathematically unsound, because of the security cannot be adopted. emergency vehicles can respond effectively
very nature of the rating scales that they are to any incident. If this option is chosen then
trying to use. There are certain mathematical stakeholder agreement needs to be sought
things that you just cannot do with certain “Remember, there are just some The 4 Ts
and the level of residual risk (the remaining
It is widely accepted in the risk management
types of scales. For example, ordinal scales, things you cannot do with some discipline that there are four ‘options’ risk that has not been treated) carried over
where data is sorted into comparative into later stages of the project must be
scales (‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ or where types of scales, If you do, the available for reducing identified risks,
clearly articulated.
sometimes referred to as the 4 Ts:
numbers – 1,2, 3,4,5 etc – are assigned for products could be nothing short
relativity but not magnitude) mathematical Security risk decision making will depend on
treatment is likely to be arbitrary in the of nonsense”. the project evaluation criteria, which may
Terminate
absence of zero points. With the interval HB 167 (2006) Security Risk Management Eliminate, withdraw from or not become vary depending upon a range of
scale, where there is a constant interval involved in an activity associated with the factors including:
between numbers (but where the zero point risk e.g. prevention of personal safety risk by • Prevailing political, stakeholder or community
may be arbitrary) for example the Fahrenheit not undertaking overseas travel to a specific sensitivities and expectations;
temperature scale: numbers can be added location at that time. In a development
and subtracted but cannot be multiplied/ • The nature or types of the incident involved;
context this is rarely achievable, although
divided: e.g. 20°F is not twice as hot as 10°F. relocation should be considered if the risks • Existing or emerging incident trends;
are assessed to be very high and treatment
• Strategic or business priorities;
makes the project less financially viable.
• Resource availability for treatment and other
project planning and design constraints; and
• The ability of the organisation, community or
individual to absorb losses.
256 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 257
Intolerable
Decisions on the tolerability of risk can Stage 5 – Risk Treatment Safety and security can be an emotive subject
be based upon straightforward decision as invariably parts of a development or some
criteria that divide risks that require buildings will not receive as much treatment
treatment (intolerable) from those that do Immediately as others. It is not possible to protect all
not (tolerable) e.g. any risk with potential assets against all plausible threats. They must
Where a security risk has been determined as
safety or reputational consequences above Treat Near future Incapacity therefore be prioritised to maintain a
to manage
intolerable (during the risk evaluation stage),
‘Moderate’ is intolerable. In reality, tolerance balance between competing planning and
some form of treatment will be required to
is more likely to be exhibited as a gradient, Longer term design objectives.
manage the risk. It will never be possible to
where the risk may become increasingly
completely remove risk. The aim is to manage
less tolerable as the risk level is elevated Monitor Risk treatment is the main focus of
the level of risk to a tolerable level. Such
and where a range of other contextual Tolerable the Manual, in particular reducing the
treatment will usually involve some form of
factors, such as a decreasing capacity to Increasing Risk vulnerabilities within the project plan and
improvements to controls already in place, or
manage the risk will influence the decision design. The Planning Toolkit and Design
the introduction of new controls.
on risk tolerance. This degree of flexibility Toolkit include a suite of guidance to reduce
is particularly relevant to development these vulnerabilities and consequences.
Cost In the safety and security environment, risk
projects, where the application of additional The approach of reducing the risk will
treatment often results in an unhealthy focus
layers of defense may inhibit other design vary depending on project opportunities,
on one particular mitigation to the exclusion
opportunities, which may be unacceptable constraints and level of risks, however the
of other types of control measure e.g. an
for lower risks. Safety focus should be on the innovative use of
+ over reliance on technology such as CCTV,
planning to minimise safety and security
Security or conversely, an over reliance on purely
Therefore the decision may focus not so Intervention risks. Throughout the design process, projects
physical measures. As part of the IDP, it will
much on whether to treat/not treat but should also seek innovative solutions, such
Benefit be necessary to offer a balanced and holistic
rather it will focus on how much safety and as landscaping, street furniture, and public,
solution, applying the most appropriate
security to put in and at what stage of the art before resorting to standard security
and effective package of measures at the
project cycle. Time treatment options.
most appropriate stage of the project life
cycle. Also, projects should be able to show
The decision making will certainly require
a direct link between the measures being
consultation and agreement with all relevant While reducing risks later through proposed and the vulnerabilities that are
stakeholders. In early planning this decision
is particularly difficult as information is operations is a sensible option, being addressed to lower the level of risk. As
the development process is iterative, it would
incomplete. However developers should developers should avoid the easy be appropriate for projects to discuss options
look to reduce the risk through planning and
design where possible; treatment measures and cheaper option of passing the for the treatment of these key vulnerabilities,
which should be accompanied by an
should be proportionate and appropriate. responsibility for risk treatment to later assessment of safety and security and cost
These decisions should be captured in the
project safety and security brief, which in the project life cycle - risks should be benefit, as well as the impact of introducing
the measure on other project disciplines.
should identify the priority risks to be treated as early as possible and where
treated, the overall approach to deciding
how those risks are to be treated, as well the measures can be most appropriate
as highlighting those risks that are to be and effective. “Rarely it is possible to
tolerated.
protect all assets against all
plausible threats.”
“There is no such thing
as zero risk”
258 A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management A1. Appendix 1: Risk Management 259
Stage 6 – Monitoring and Review
Secure communities
Glossary
Accessibility: The ability Building Facade: The separation Community Safety: Strategies Decision Support Tool:
for people to move round between the interior and the and measures that seek to A web based ‘on-line’ facility
an area and to reach desired exterior environments of a reduce the risk of crimes to be used by developers at
destinations, including ‘mobility building. It serves as the outer occurring and their potential the pre-planning stage to gain
impaired individuals’ (elderly, shell to protect the indoor harmful effects on individuals an appreciation of how much
disabled people, those with environment as well as to and society, including fear influence safety and security
small children or encumbered facilitate its climate control. of crime, by intervening to may have during planning
with luggage or shopping). Building envelope design is a influence their multiple causes. and design. At the end of the
specialised area of architectural process there will be only two
Access Control: The control of and engineering practice that (UN Economic and Social outcomes, High Priority or Low
persons, vehicles, and materials draws from all areas of building Council, resolution 2002/13 of Priority.
through the implementation science and indoor climate 24 July 2002, Annex)
of security measures for a control. Defence in Depth: The strategy
protected area. Crime: An action or omission of forming layers of protection
Chemical, Biological, which constitutes an offence for an asset (see assets).
Active frontage: An active Radiological and Nuclear and is punishable by law.
frontage is an area where (CBRN): CBRN materials can be Deter, delay, detect and deny:
frequent use or adjacency to used in terrorist attacks. There Crime Prevention Through Key prevention principles in
have so far only been a few
windows, mezzanines etc. Environmental Design designing out the opportunities
examples of terrorists using CBR
provides a high degree of natural (CPTED): A theory that when for crime:
materials, most notably a sarin
surveillance. a development is appropriately
gas attack on the Tokyo subway
designed it can reduce the Deter – This constitutes a
mass transit system and anthrax
Alarm System: Combination likelihood of crimes being visible deterrent to dissuade
letters in the United States.
of sensors, controls, and committed. By introducing such the opportunist; measures may
annunciators (devices that measures it is anticipated that include physical obstructions
Closed-Circuit Television
announce an alarm via sound, (CCTV): See video surveillance this will assist in minimising such as doors, the presence of
light, or other means) arranged system. the incidence of crime and security personnel and technical
to detect and report an intrusion contribute to perceptions of security systems e.g. CCTV.
or other emergency. Collapse - Progressive: increased public safety.
A building undergoes Delay – Measures designed to
Asset: Any tangible or intangible progressive collapse when a Crime Reduction: Any action provide an adequate delay to an
value (people, property, primary structural element to reduce the frequency and intruder for other measures to
information) to the organisation. fails, resulting in the failure of seriousness of criminal events. respond.
adjoining structural elements,
Barrier: A natural or man-made which in turn causes further Crowded Place: A Crowded Detect – Having delayed the
obstacle to the movement/ structural failure. Place is a location to which intruder, measures must be
direction of persons, animals, members of the public can sited to detect and identify
vehicles, or materials. Collapse - Disproportionate: gain access and by virtue of the incident. These measures
The structural collapse of a its crowd density and known can either be covert or overt
Boundary Treatment: building, disproportionate to the terrorist attack methodology depending on the response
Safeguarding of a boundary or cause; it is often, though not may be considered potentially available. The longer the
limit of responsibility. always, progressive. A building liable to terrorist attack. They delay the more successful the
should be constructed so that may be buildings or open air detection layer will function.
in the event of an accident or public spaces and they may be
intentional attack, it will not permanent or temporary.
suffer collapse to an extent
disproportionate to the cause.
Secure communities
Further Reading
Abu Dhabi Public Realm Design CPTED Essentials: Crime Engineering Security: Protective RIBA Guidance on designing for
Manual: Commissioned by the Prevention Through Design for High Risk Buildings: Counter Terrorism: (UK)
UPC to guide the development Environmental Design: New York City Police Department
of a world-class public realm Participant Workbook (Australia) (USA) Safer Design Guidelines for
(Abu Dhabi) Victoria: Principles facilitating
Crime Prevention Through FEMA 426: Reference Manual the planning of safer urban
Abu Dhabi Urban Street Design Environmental Design: to Mitigate Potential Terrorist environments, Department of
Manual: Commissioned by the Applications of Architectural Attacks Against Buildings, Federal Sustainability and Environment
UPC to address the needs of Design and Space Management Emergency Management Agency (Australia)
a growing population and a Concepts, National Crime (USA)
desire to create more walkable Prevention Institute (USA) Safer Places: Planning System
communities (Abu Dhabi) FEMA 430: Site and Urban Design and Crime Prevention, Office of
Crime Prevention Through for Security: Guidance Against the Deputy Prime Minister (UK)
Estidama (Pearl Rating System): Environmental Design: Potential Terrorist Attacks Against
Creating a new sustainability Guidelines for Queensland, Buildings, Federal Emergency Safer Places: Counter Terrorism
framework that will help Queensland Government Management Agency (USA) Supplement, Office of the
preserve and enrich Abu Dhabi’s (Australia) Deputy Prime Minister (UK)
physical and cultural identity, Guidelines for Human Settlement
improve the quality of life Crime Prevention Through Planning and Design Volume 1: Safety Toolbox: Working
for residents and reduce the Environmental Design Compiled under the patronage of Together to Build Safer
Emirates’s carbon footprint by Guidebook: National Crime the Department of Housing, by Communities, Winnipeg
encouraging developers to adopt Prevention Council (Singapore) CSIR Building and Construction Committee for Safety (Canada)
a more sustainable approach to Technology (South Africa)
construction (Abu Dhabi) Crowded Places: the Planning Secured by Design: New Homes
System and Counter Terrorism, Integrated Security: a Public 2010 (UK)
Plan Capital 2030; Plan Al Ain Department for Communities Realm Design Guide for Hostile
City 2030; Plan Al Gharbia and Local Government / Home Vehicle Mitigation, Centre The Site Security Design
2030; Structure framework plans Office (UK) for the Protection of National Guide: US General Services
to guide the Emirate’s urban and Infrastructure (UK) Administration (USA)
regional development, planning Department of Defence
strategies (Abu Dhabi) Minimum Anti-terrorism National Guidelines for Think Thief: A Designer’s
Standards for Buildings: Crime Prevention Through Guide to Designing Out Crime,
ACT Crime Prevention and Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) Environmental Design in New Design Council Guide funded
Urban Design Resource Manual: system for application of Zealand Part 1: Seven Qualities through the Home Office Crime
Australian Capital Territory, anti-terrorism standards and of Safer Places (New Zealand) Reduction Programme (UK)
Advisory document to assist in recommendations (USA)
incorporating crime prevention Planning and Designing Urban Working Together to Protect
through environmental design Designing Safer Places: A Space, Community and Crime Crowded Places: Home Office
principles into planning and manual for crime prevention Prevention: The Case of Arab (UK)
development activities (Australia) through planning and design Countries - Policy Brief Series No
(South Africa) 16, Dina Shehayeb (Egypt)
Contest: The United Kingdom’s
Strategy for Counter Terrorism Does Regulation of Built- Protecting Crowded Places:
(UK) in Security Reduce Crime: Design and Technical Issues,
Evidence from a Natural Home Office (UK)
Experiment, Ben Vollard and Jan
C van Ours (Holland)
274 A3. Appendix 3: Further Reading A3. Appendix 3: Further Reading 275
A4
Appendix 4:
Acknowledgements
Secure communities
Acknowledgements
Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Steering Committee Technical Advisory Committee Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Council European Affairs Department
• Col Salem Al Zaabi • Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
• H.E. Falah Mohammed Al Ahbabi Council The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
Office of the Deputy
Council extends special thanks
General Manager, Abu Dhabi Supreme Commander of the • Department of Municipal Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign
Urban Planning Council UAE Forces
• Abu Dhabi City Municipality Affairs for their support during
the development of the Manual.
• Amer Al Hammadi, • Col Saif Hamdan Al Kaabi • Al Ain City Municipality
Director, Planning and Engineering Projects UAE Embassy to the
• Western Region Municipality
Infrastructure Adminstration United Kingdom
Abu Dhabi Police GHQ • Abu Dhabi Police GHQ
• Hasan Al Mehairi The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
• Department of Transport, Council extends its special
Manager, Safety & Security • Jasem Al Darmaki Abu Dhabi thanks to the Embassy and
Department of Municipal H.E. Ambassador Abdulrahman
• Critical National Infrastructure
• Gavin W Jones Affairs Ghanem Al Mutaiwee
Authority
Safety and Security Specialist
• Abdulla Al Shamsi • National Crisis & Emergency
(SSPM Project Manager) HM Government, United
Management Authority
Abu Dhabi City Municipality Kingdom of Great Britain &
• Stuart Williams • Ministry of Interior Northern Ireland
• Abdulla Al Amiri (State Security)
Safety and Security Specialist
Al Ain City Municipality The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning
Council extends special
• Hunter Burkall Technical Advisory Committee thanks to the UK Foreign and
Safety and Security Specialist • Mubarak Al Hajeri Sounding Board Commonwealth Office, National
Western Region Municipality Counter Terrorism Security
• Tourism Development and Office (NaCTSO) and the Centre
Higher Committee for Crises
• Captain Mansour Al Dhaheri Investment Company (TDIC) for the Protection of National
and Terrorist Acts Management
Infrastructure (CPNI) for
UAE Armed Forces • Aldar Properties PJSC
The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning participation in workshops and
Council extends special thanks • Abu Dhabi National Exhibition hosting benchmarking visits to
Implementation Working Group
to the Chairman and members Centre (ADNEC) the United Kingdom.
of the Higher Committee, who • Abu Dhabi Urban Planning • Musanada Abu Dhabi
have provided wise leadership Council General Services
throughout the development
of the Manual. • Abu Dhabi City Municipality • Khalifa University of Science &
Technology
• Al Ain City Municipality
• CBRn Advisor, Higher Committee
• Western Region Municipality for Crises and Terrorist Acts
• Abu Dhabi Police GHQ Management