Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

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Research in Transportation Economics

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Overview of public transport policy developments in South Africa

Jackie Walters*
Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS (Africa)), Department of Transport and Supply Chain Management, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park,
Johannesburg 2006, South Africa

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Public transport in South Africa is one of the most burning issues in the transport sector. The government
Available online 6 July 2012 is faced with huge public pressure to improve public transport systems in the face of rising fuel costs, the
pending implementation of expensive urban toll road systems in the Gauteng province, and elsewhere in
Keywords: urban environments, public transport safety issues, public transport fleet renewal, especially the
Public transport developments in South commuter rail services, as well as limited resources to fund public transport. As a developing country, the
Africa
South African Government has pressing funding issues such as funds needed to improve housing for the
Public transport policy processes
poor to improve schooling and public health services. Government is also faced with a vocal minibus taxi
Taxi recapitalisation
BRT systems
industry that transports an estimated 65% of all commuters in the country that is also insisting on
PRASA subsidies for its services.
Many policies and strategies have been put in place to address the public transport system in the
country, some more successful than others. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the
latest policy and strategy developments, to highlight the latest modal developments and to build on
previous overviews in the Thredbo Conference series.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction In the light of these challenges, a large number of studies have

Public transport in South Africa has always been a burning issue.
Throughout the country’s history of separate development, millions
of people were artificially located long distances away from job
opportunities, places of recreation and daily chores such as shop-
ping centres, health facilities etc. Public transport, in particular the
rail and bus modes of transport, was used as an “instrument” of
policy to provide mobility at reduced costs (subsidised services) to
affected communities. The spatial engineering of the past unfor-
tunately continues today and in some ways are still perpetuated by
the development of major urban housing developments on rela-
tively cheap land (to make the houses more affordable), often at the
fringes of the long established townships. The challenge govern-
ment faces is how to provide (and balance) affordable, safe and
accessible public transport to these townships and the urban and
rural communities of SA in the face of high levels of urbanisation,
inward migration of millions of people from other African countries
to the urban areas of South Africa, and the financial demands placed
on the government for school and health services, provision of
housing for the poor, security, etc.
* Tel.: þ27 5592088.
E-mail address: jwalters@uj.ac.za.
been undertaken, with public transport strategy documents
developed and legislation enacted. Yet, the progress has been
relatively slow in transforming the public transport system in the
country. Many reasons are given for this lack of progress, for
example, a lack of funding for public transport policy imple-
mentation; organised labour opposition to a tender for contracts in
the commuter bus industry; cumbersome and complicated public
engagement processes e also involving the respective modes of
transport; a lack of skills to implement policy initiatives; compli-
cations involving three levels of government in public transport
decisions; a lack of integrated public transport plans, especially at
the metro levels of government to guide the implementation
process; and changes in political role players (and often senior
bureaucrats) at the national, provincial and local levels of govern-
ment following elections (loss of institutional capacity resulting in
a lack of continuity in policy direction and implementation).
This paper provides an overview of public transport develop-
ments in South Africa over recent years and will describe the major
events that have taken place over this period. As will be seen,
progress is not consistent across the modes of transport while in
some areas, such as commuter bus transport, policy implementa-
tion has been delayed for many years. In other areas, for example
the recent introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems and the
operationalization of Gautrain, progress is evident.

0739-8859/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.05.021
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
Public transport policy and its implementation can however be
seen as one of the most complex areas of transport policy in the
country due to its political implications, political linkages, funding
constraints, a major push to involve previously excluded businesses
in the subsidy system, and being faced with financial constraints
and a public outcry over the state of public transport in the country
(e.g., adequacy, public transport user costs, accessibility, safety
issues, affordability). In other areas of transport policy making and
implementation, substantial progress has been made with the
deregulated air and road transport industries, and the development
of the national road system.
1.1. How is the current public transport system performing?
Few formal studies are conducted to establish the current state
of public transport in South Africa. However, national travel surveys
are conducted from time to time, the last undertaken by the
Department of Transport (DoT) in 2003 (to be repeated in 2012).
An overview of the characteristics of public transport in South
Africa, based on a National Household Travel Survey (NHTS, 2003),
is given in Walters (2008). The following salient points regarding
the South African public transport system were highlighted:
 Only about 10.7% of households surveyed in South Africa had
a monthly income that exceeded R 6000 (about US$800 at an
exchange rate of R 7.50/US$). The majority of households
(83.1%) had a monthly household income of less than R 6000.
 Bus and taxi services are relatively more accessible than rail
services.
 The percentage of households that have access to a car is 26.1%
with an average of 0.40 cars per household. The highest
number of cars per household are to be found in the metro-
politan and urban areas.
 Almost half of the households surveyed said that their main
problem was that public transport was either not available or
was too far away.
 One third of households reported that safety from accidents
and bad driving behaviour was the most serious transport
problems they experienced.
 One fifth of households mentioned that the cost of public
transport was of concern.
 Respondents were also unhappy with security on trains (63%),
lack of facilities at bus stops (74%), crowding on buses (54%)
and 51% with the low off-peak frequencies of bus services.
 Minibus taxi users were most unhappy about safety from
accidents (67%), lack of facilities at taxi ranks (64%) and a lack of
vehicle road worthiness (60%).
Fig. 1. Policy framework for road-based public transport (bus and taxi).
35
This profile suggests that there is general discord with the level
and quality of public transport services being provided by public
transport operators in the country. Subsequent to the 2008 paper
by Walters (2008), as well as an update at the Thredbo 10 confer-
ence at Hamilton Island, Australia as well as at Thredbo 11
conference held in Delft, The Netherlands, progress with policy
implementation has been slow, although progress has been made
in a number of key areas. Government has recognised this and has
initiated a number of new strategies and policies to address the
issues of concern. Progress with policy implementation as well as
the strategies will be discussed in the following sections, followed
by specific reference to the progress made (or the lack thereof) for
the respective modes of public transport.
2. Policy framework: road-based public transport
The policy framework for road-based public transport (bus and
taxi) is depicted in Fig. 1:
2.1. The White Paper on National Transport Policy, 1996
In brief, the White Paper established the principle of competi-
tive tendering for subsidised services, and promoted the principle
of competition for the route in contrast to on the route. In future, all
operators would be required to tender for their subsidised services.
This would “open up the market” to new previously disadvantaged
operators that did not participate in subsidised public transport
service provision, as well as to potential international operators.
Following the White Paper, a number of tendered contracts were
concluded with operators in areas where existing operators indi-
cated that they wished to withdraw their services due to financial
constraints.
2.2. The conclusion of interim contracts, 1997
In 1997 the Department of Transport (DoT) concluded interim
contracts (ICs) with existing subsidised operators which, in
essence, put their existing services on a contractual footing. Prior to
this development, services were developed based on DoT approval
but not within the ambit of a formal contract or an agreed Inte-
grated Transport Plan (ITP). This situation gave the operators
perpetual rights in the operation of their services. The ICs were
originally intended to last between one and three years in order to
give the operators time to “get fit” for the tendering system by
reorganising their businesses in such a way that they would be able
to tender competitively for their existing services. Interim contracts
would also only come to an end when the services incorporated in
36 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
the ICs were put out to tender, and until such developments took
place would continue to remain valid.
2.3. The Moving South Africa Strategy, 1998
The Moving South Africa Strategy study was undertaken to
provide a multi-modal transport vision and strategy for the country
based on the White Paper of 1996s vision for transport in South
Africa. This extensive study made a number of strategic recom-
mendations regarding public transport, such as the establishment
of a corridor focus, the densification of such corridors, optimising
modal economics (by promoting the mode that offers the best cost/
service trade-off for a given corridor), and improving firm level
performance and productivity by creating, amongst other, compe-
tition within and between modes of transport through tendering/
concessioning of services to private operators (Moving South Africa,
1998, p. 135). This also laid the foundation for the formalisation of
the taxi industry (Moving South Africa, 1998, p. 156).
2.4. The Tripartite Heads of Agreement, 1999
During the period 1997 and 1999, a number of tendered
contracts were concluded with IC operators, even before it was first
legislated in 2000. Experiences with job losses and a reduction of
condition of service and benefits of labour led to two years of
discussions between the DoT, organised labour and the Southern
African Bus Operators Association (SABOA) (representing opera-
tors), and eventually resulted in the Tripartite Heads of Agreement
in 1999 (HOA). The main purpose of the agreement was to soften
the impact of competitive tendering on labour through job losses
and a reduction in wages. In particular, the agreement compelled
any operator to source at least 75% of the required workforce of the
contract service from the incumbent operator. It also made provi-
sion for a right of refusal of 10% where, should a service be put out
to tender, and the incumbent operator’s tender prices was within
10% of the most acceptable tender, the incumbent operator was
offered the contract at the tender price of the most acceptable
tender. This principle was agreed to with a view to giving the
incumbent operator the best chance of winning its services back,
thus lessening the impact on labour.
2.5. National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 (NLTTA)
In 2000, the National Land Transport Transition Act was enac-
ted. This act, for the first time, defined the functions of the
respective levels of government in managing public transport (a
concurrent function in terms of the RSA Constitution), established
the principle of transport authorities to manage public transport,
legislated arrangements around competitive tendering, and also
made provision for negotiated contracts under certain conditions,
for example for transformational and empowerment reasons (a
requirement that the negotiated service had to be majority black
owned within two years of such negotiated agreements). The act
also made provision for integrated public transport planning e
a condition for concluding contracts with operators. This condition
was later amended when an operator took government to court
(and won the case) when a provincial government tried to put its
services out to tender without the existence of an ITP.
Despite the conditions contained in the HOA to protect labour in
a tender situation, labour continued to voice its opposition to
competitive tendering. It remained, in principle, against competi-
tive tendering in public transport. This continued opposition and
the lack of finding common ground between labour, the DoT and
SABOA (the Southern African Bus Operators Association) eventually
led to the indefinite suspension of the competitive tendering
system in 2002. Other reasons cited for the suspension was the
unaffordability of the tendering system considering the govern-
ment’s financial constraints. In most cases the tendered contracts
proved to be more expensive than the services they were replacing
(Walters & Cloete, 2001). A number of negotiated contracts have
however been concluded since 2000. These negotiations involved
organised labour, the DoT and the operator reaching amicable
settlements in the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the
contract.
2.6. National land transport framework (NLTSF)
The establishment of the NLTSF is a legislative requirement in
terms of the NLTTA of 2000 and provides a five year forward-
looking view of public transport developments (2006e2011). In
terms of bus and taxi services the framework provided for all
provincial and municipal bus operators to be corporatized; all
subsidised services had to be provided in terms of tendered/
negotiated contracts that would be open to all road-based public
transport operators (Department of Transport, 2006, p. 5). In
support of the tendering system, it foresaw the gazetting of a model
tender document, the replacement of interim and tendered bus
contracts with new tendered or negotiated contracts, and the
issuing of tenders based on transport plans (where possible).
2.7. Taxi recapitalisation programme (2006)
Following many years of discussion and debate, agreement was
reached between the DoT and the South African National Taxi
Council (SANTACO) to begin a formal process of scrapping and
replacing old and unroadworthy taxi vehicles with new vehicles
that had to meet new national standards for the conveyance of
passengers. More information about this process is included in the
taxi modal overview section of this paper.
2.8. Public transport strategy documents, 2007
In March 2007 the DoT published two influential strategy
documents, The Public Transport Strategy, and The Public Transport
Action Plan, Phase 1 (2007e2010): Catalytic Integrated Rapid Public
Transport Network Projects. The purpose of these documents was
to give new direction to public transport management as well as to
make provision for the introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT)
systems. The Strategy document contains two key thrusts: accel-
erated modal upgrading (multi-modal) that included a consolida-
tion of the passenger rail sector; rolling out a National Rail Plan;
implementing the taxi recapitalisation programme, including
improved regulation and law enforcement; and transforming and
optimising current subsidised bus services. Secondly, it made
provision for Integrated Rapid Public Transport Networks (IRPTNs)
in the main metro areas of the country. The longer term vision until
2020 is to develop a system that places over 85% of a metropolitan
city’s population within one km of an IRPTN trunk or feeder
corridor. A further goal for metropolitan cities by 2020 is to achieve
a mode shift of 20% of car work trips to public transport networks.
These networks will consist of core road and rail trunk corridors
with feeder and distributor systems. The aim is also to achieve
maximum physical and fare integration in the core public transport
services.
The Public Transport Action Plan details the Public Transport
Strategy. It focuses on the six main metros and the public transport
systems of the six secondary cities. It planned for the scrapping and
replacement of 75 000 taxis by 2010, the refurbishment of 2000 rail
coaches used for commuter rail services, and the replacement of
30% of the current commuter bus fleet of 7500 to be tender
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
compliant by 2009/10. The Action Plan also established, amongst
other, more detail about the BRT system principles (such as how to
accommodate affected operators) and included new specifications
for buses on the trunk routes.
2.9. National Land Transport Act, 2009
This act replaced the NLTTA of 2000 and expanded on the
principle of the acceptance of negotiated contracts. Negotiated
contracts can now also follow a tendered contract, which was not
allowed under the 2000 act. It also spelled out clearly that public
transport should be devolved to the lowest effective level of
government e the metro and local government levels. In addition,
it created new institutional structures applicable to the licensing of
operators (permits), long distance passenger transport and
requirements for integrated public transport plans.
Progress with policy thrusts regarding commuter buses and
taxis will be highlighted later in a later section.
3. Policy framework: rail based commuter transport
Commuter rail services are operated by Metrorail (previously
within the Rail Commuter Corporation and today a division of
PRASA) in the Western Cape (Cape Town), Eastern Cape (Port
Elizabeth), KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg) and Gauteng
(the greater Johannesburg and Pretoria areas). A total of 2.2 million
passenger trips are operated daily Monday to Friday (PRASA & 2010,
p. 12) making it the third largest public transport operator in SA.
The policy framework for commuter rail services in the country
is depicted in Fig. 2:
3.1. The Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act
This act made provision for the establishment of the South
African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd, a company wherein the
state was the only shareholder and member of the company.
3.2. The White Paper on National Transport Policy
The White Paper confirmed that the national transport
authority (DoT) would own the commuter rail infrastructure, roll-
ing stock and land associated with rail reserves until the provincial
or metropolitan transport authorities (TAs) were in a position to
take over the responsibility. It was also foreseen that operating and
maintenance concessions would be awarded by the TAs, initially
nationally, and later at the provincial or metro levels of govern-
ment. It also foresaw the abolishment of the deficit form of
financing (deficit subsidies) and the replacement of it with
Fig. 2. Policy framework for rail commuter services.
37
a concessioning system for the operation of rail services on
a competitive basis. Provision for the concessioning of commuter
rail services was also made in the NLTTA. To date, concessioning has
not happened and it is doubtful as to whether it is still government
policy to concession services. However, at a recent investors’
conference held in Cape Town, mention was made of private sector
involvement in commuter rail services (van der Walt, 2011).
3.3. The Moving South Africa (MSA) Strategy
The main recommendation of the strategy pertaining to trans-
port in South Africa, and by definition commuter rail commuter
services, is that transport corridors should be densified; that there
should be an optimisation of modal economics and service mix e
best cost/service trade-offs for each corridor through encourage-
ment of differentiated public transport services; and, improving
firm level performance by creating competition within and
between modes through tendering/concessioning (e.g. rail) of
services to private sector operators (MSA, p. 136).
3.4. National Land Transport Transition Act
Similar to road-based public transport, the act makes provision
for the inclusion of rail services in the development of transport
plans. In contrast to the approval process of such plans for road-
based modes, the act stipulates that until the rail function is
devolved from the national to another level of government, the
plans had to be submitted to the Minister of Transport for approval
of the commuter rail components of the plan. To date the function
has not been devolved to a lower level of government, and
commuter rail remains a national government competency.
3.5. The National Railway Safety Regulator Act
Prior to the establishment of the act, safety issues were
managed by Transnet, the national rail operator, previously known
as South African Transport Services, as well as Metrorail as the
operator of commuter rail services. The act established an inde-
pendent Regulator to oversee safety in the railway transport
industry and to promote the use of rail as a mode of transportation
through improved safety performance of the industry. It was tasked
with drafting regulations in compliance with the act and to monitor
and ensure compliance with the act.
3.6. National land transport framework
This framework provides policy and strategy guidelines for a five
year forward-looking period (2006e2011). In terms of rail services,
38 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
the DoT envisaged significant rail capability enhancements in order
to better manage the rail function. It also foresaw the completion of
a National Rail Plan and for significant implementation of the plan
to occur over the five year period. This would require the identifi-
cation of priority rail corridors through a rail network classification
system, the upgrading of infrastructure and service levels on the
key corridors e.g. rolling stock, security and station improvements
and improved infrastructure condition. Measures would also be
taken to reduce levels of fare evasion on the priority corridors.
3.7. The National Rail Plan (NRP)
The principal objective of the National Rail Plan is to secure the
future of commuter rail in South Africa by applying a priority
corridor strategy to the rail network in each of the regions. Through
a series of regional rail plans (provinces where commuter rail is
offered), the NRP seeks to find clarity in the role that commuter rail
should play in the context of an integrated approach to public
transport service provision (South African Rail Commuter
Corporation/Metrorail. National Rail Plan: i). Emphasis is also put
on regions adjacent to metropolitan areas currently served by
commuter rail, as well as other urban areas and provinces such as
Limpopo and Mpumalanga where there are at present no
commuter rail services.
In each region, corridors were allocated A, B, C or D, based on the
level of service appropriate to the travel corridor of which rail is
a part. “A” represents corridors where much higher levels of service
than at present are warranted, and “D” corridors those where there
is no longer a case for providing commuter rail services.
3.8. Public transport strategy and the public transport strategy
action plan (2007)
The two key thrusts of these strategies (Department of
Transport, 2007a, 2007b) applicable to commuter rail pertains,
firstly, to accelerated modal upgrading; the consolidation of the
passenger rail sector; the roll-out of the National Rail Plan in the
short to medium term and, secondly, Integrated Rapid Public
Transport Networks (IRPTNs) with the aim to have a phased
operational implementation of these networks in place in twelve
cities and at least six rural districts by 2014. The latter thrust could
also be more widely interpreted as to investigate new rail possi-
bilities and even the establishment of rail services where the need
may arise.
In terms of the Public Transport Action Plan Phase 1: 2007e2010
(Department of Transport, 2007b, p. 19) the target to implement the
rail corridor strategy was to implement the Rail Priority Corridors A
and B in the applicable cities during the period 2007e2010. It was
also envisaged that by the end of 2010 the services had to be
improved in the following ways:
Table 1
Priority rail corridors.
Regions Corridor
A B
Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria area) 7 7
Western Cape (Cape Town) 3 3
KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg area 1 0
Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) 1 0
Total 12 10
% 33 28
% (A D B corridors) D C 61
Source: PRASA Corporate Plan 2009/10e2011/12:19.
 “Service levels to be improved with increased frequencies and
reliabilities
 Improved rail infrastructure, including the removal of capacity
limiting bottlenecks
 Improved signalling capacity
 Enhanced levels of security and accessibility associated with
the station precincts with the A and B corridors
 The refurbishing of 2000 rail coaches by 2010”
A summary of the rail priority corridors, where 61% of the A and
B corridors are supportive of public transport strategy, is set out in
Table 1.
It can be seen that 61% of the corridors identified (or 22 in
corridors in total) were grouped in the A and B categories and 39%
(or 14 corridors) in category D. In terms of the NRP the “D” corridors
no longer warrant commuter rail services.
3.9. Legal Succession to the SATS Amendment Act
One of the main purposes of the amendment of the act was to
rename the SARCC to the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
(PRASA) and to expand its mandate to also include long distance
passenger rail and bus services within, to, and from the RSA. The
long distance passenger and rail services had to be transferred to
PRASA from Transnet by the end of March 2009.
3.10. National Land Transport Act
In addition to the information supplied in the previous section
regarding the NLTA, the act makes provision for the rail function to
be devolved to the municipal level where such municipality would
plan for rail services on a corridor network basis in consultation
with PRASA. This function, although nationally planned at this
stage, can be requested by a municipality subject to an acceptable
Integrated Transport Plan. At this stage no municipality has
requested the function.
4. Current state of commuter rail in the country (services
managed by PRASA)
The commuter rail section of PRASA (Metrorail) owns 317
stations (but operates 468 stations) and provides rail services on
3180 of single km track. It has a fleet of 406 train sets of which 97.5%
were built between 1958 and 1985. The majority of the rail fleet
technology dates back to the 1950s (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 10).
Currently, 65e70% of the resources required to operate the rail
function come from Government in the form of deficit subsidies
while the balance comes from internally generated free operating
cash-flow (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 8).
Total % Total Corridor definitions
A&B
C % A Ideal corridor for rail, high quality service
6 20 56 70 B Important role for rail, 2000 service levels
2 8 22 75 C Role of rail uncertain, investigation required
5 6 17 17
1 2 5 50
14 36
39 100
39 100
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
During the period 2007e2010 government made available R 25b
(or about US$3.33b at R 7.50/US$) for the stabilisation of PRASA and
a turnaround strategy. This figure included an operational subsidy
to the value of R 9.9bn, capital investment of R 14.7bn for the
business, R 7bn for the refurbishment of 2000 rail coaches, R 1.4bn
for the procurement of new buses, infrastructure upgrades to the
value of R 2.6bn, and planned signalling upgrades at major stations
to the value of R 1.5bn (PRASA Leaflet: Our Positive Future).
At a recently organised (2011) DoT International Transport
Investors Conference held in Cape Town, where the DoT showcased
transportation infrastructure projects which may attract private
sector capital, PRASA highlighted the following potential projects
for financing: the Cape Town Airport Rail Link; the Moloto Rail
Corridor (north of Pretoria); the Bloemfontein e Botshabelo
Passenger Rail Corridor; the Bara Rail Link (Gauteng); The Moth-
erwell Rail Link (Port Elizabeth); the Daveyton Rail Extension
(Gauteng) and the re-introduction of the Hammanskraal Rail Link
north of Pretoria (van der Walt, 2011).
In terms of its ageing rolling stock, PRASA mentioned that it was
busy with a feasibility study to replace 8600 rail coaches with new
rolling stock over an 18 year time frame. A transaction adviser for
the project was appointed and it was estimated that the rolling
stock renewal programme would cost about R 86b over the 18 year
period. It was estimated that a Request For Proposals (RFPs) would
be issued by mid-2012 (van der Walt, 2011).
Some of the challenges faced by PRASA are detailed in its
Corporate Plan 2009/11e2011/12 (PRASA Corporate Plan, pp.
21e28):
 Consolidation/Turnaround/Restructuring processes.
 Change management e consolidation of five organisations into
a consolidated organisation (Metrorail (commuter rail); Auto-
pax (consisting of Translux and City to City long distance bus
services); Shosholoza Meyl (long distance passenger rail
services) and Intersite Property Services.
 Sustainable funding.
 Ageing rolling stock and infrastructure.
 Human capital development.
 Leadership and skills development e shortage of key skills as
well as a lack of depth in skills
 Rail technology development e “catch up” with new technology.
 Long term planning alignment e road, rail and land.
 Strategic partnerships e national alliances and strengthening
relationships (nationally and internationally).
 Modal integration e poses internal and external challenges.
5. The Gauteng high speed rail service (gautrain)
The need to establish a high speed rail service between the
metropolitan area of Tshwane (which includes Pretoria), Johan-
nesburg and Oliver Tambo International Airport (South Africa’s
main international air hub) has been a point of discussion for many
years. The project was meant to speed up the travel time between
Tshwane and Johannesburg, a notoriously congested freeway link,
thereby enticing car users to make use of the rail service instead.
As the airport is some 20 km from the CBD of Johannesburg and
about 40 km from Tshwane, a link to the airport was also built into
the project as it is expected that the airport would in future become
significantly busier. The system consists of 10 stations and 80 km of
railway lines (of which 15 km are underground) linking the three
nodes (see Fig. 3).
The Gautrain system interfaces with Metrorail commuter rail
services at Hatfield Station, Pretoria Station, Rhodesfield Station
and Johannesburg Park Station. The maximum speed of the system
is 160 km/h and operates on standard gauge.
39
Fig. 3. Gautrain route map. Source: van der Merwe (2011).
Currently there are 24 Electrostar train sets manufactured by
Bombardier. The train sets operating to the airport differs from the
normal commuter sets as provision is made for luggage capabilities
on the airport services. The current frequency is between 10 min
and 30 min with the latter mainly applying to weekend services.
The initial operating hours is from 05:30 to 20:30.
A significant bus feeder and distributor system supports the rail
service to and from stations. An example of the feeder system is
included in Fig. 4:
The feeder and distribution system is operated with 125 buses
operating 36 feeder and distribution routes spanning 420 km. The
Gautrain service operates every 12e30 min generating about 2200
bus trips per day and over 26 000 daily operating kilometres. The
service complements existing bus services in the various metro-
politan areas (Dachs, 2011).
The project is one of the largest PublicePrivate-Sector-
Partnership (PPP) concession projects of its kind in Africa. The
concession is for 20 years for the design, build, part-finance and
operation of the system. The Bombela Consortium1 manages the
client interface with the Gauteng Provincial Government and
provides an integrated solutions approach for the PPP (http://www.
gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/). The esti-
mated value of the project at completion was R 25.4bn or
US$3.39bn at an R 7.50/US$ exchange rate (Engineering News,
2009).
Gautrain has five sources of funding (van der Merwe, 2011):
 The Division of Revenue Act e which enables funds to flow
from Central Government via the Department of Transport
(44.2%) to the Gauteng Province.
 The Medium Term Expenditure Framework from the Gauteng
Provincial Government (26.1%).
 Private sector equity (1.8%).
 Private sector borrowing (9.5%), and
1
The Bombela Consortium Concession Company Shareholders consist of:  Murray
& Roberts Limited e a leading South African engineering, construction and con-
tracting services company.  Strategic Partners Group (SPG) e a 25% shareholder in
the Consortium.  Bombardier UK e a Canadian company and world leader in the
aerospace and rail transportation sectors.  Bouygues Travaux Publics e one of the
world’s top global “design and build” civil engineering and building contractors with
extensive experience in concession projects.  The J&J Group e an investment holding
company with more than 200 000 shareholders representing individuals and their
families.  ABSA Capital, a division of Absa Bank Ltd (subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC).
Source: http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/.
40 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
Fig. 4. Sandton Station: feeder and distribution routes (OCD 2). Source: http://www.iweek.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Gautrain-BusRoute.pdf.
 Provincial borrowing (18.4%).
The project has a patronage guarantee of R 360m per annum for
the concessionaire (Dachs, 2011).
In terms of the concession agreement, the concessionaire takes
all completion and integration risks, offers a fixed price for the
project, fixed specification and fixed time frame (turnkey contract).
The concessionaire is fully involved in the operation and mainte-
nance of the system for the entire concession period. At the end of
the concession the concessionaire has to hand over the system to
the client in a prescribed condition.
The Sandton/Airport link was operationalized just before the
Soccer World Cup event in SA in 2010, and the remainder of the
network opened in August 2011, excepting for a part of an under-
ground section between the Johannesburg Park and Rivonia
stations where water seepage and sub-surface water issues are
currently being addressed.
The project is not without criticism. Opponents were of the view
that the project is “elitist” as it was meant to relieve the congestion
on the highways around Gauteng (between Tshwane (Pretoria) and
Johannesburg and the airport). These users were considered to be
already “mobile” through the use of their cars and now had the
luxury of a choice of modes. Opponents were of the opinion that the
value of the project would have been much better spent, and
reached many more potential users, should the funds have been
spent on the existing commuter rail services in the country. These
services generate about 2.2 million passenger trips per day where it
was estimated that the Gautrain would generate about 120 000
passenger trips per day by 2010 (http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/
services/ridership-fare-structure/).
6. Commuter bus transport
An overview of the policies, strategies and legislation applicable
to the commuter bus industry was provided earlier in the paper.
This section considers the latest developments regarding policy
implementation, and also highlights some issues that the industry
is concerned about.
The government policy is, and remains, that subsidised
commuter transport, now and in future, should be put out to
competitive tender. As an interim measure, it will enter into
negotiated contracts with incumbent operators for a period of up to
12 years. Requirements to enter into such agreements may involve
set-asides for the taxi industry as well as small bus operators that
have not yet participated in the subsidy system. It is also
a requirement that such contracts should be entered into based on
approved Integrated Public Transport Plans.
As mentioned earlier, a major impasse has been reached
regarding competitive tenders mainly due to organised labour’s
opposition to the tendering system and concerns about the
potential costs of the system. At issue is the impact of competitive
tenders on employment levels, labour wages and benefits, and the
lack of continuity of employment. In this regard the last competi-
tively tendered contracts were concluded in 2002. Since then most
of these contracts have expired, and almost all operators are
operating on short term contracts e from month to month or
slightly longer. Since 2002 a few negotiated contracts were
concluded. Government has indicated that it would negotiate all
contracts in the next round of tenders to avoid the issues that
labour has with tendered contracts. This will probably allow suffi-
cient time to solve the remaining issues that labour has with the
tendering system.
All new contracts ought to be based on Integrated Transport
Plans (ITPs). ITPs involve all public transport modes erail, buses and
taxis. These plans are currently being updated, and once completed
should result in a wave of negotiated contracts being concluded.
Should negotiations with operators not be successful, services will
be put out to competitive tender for a period of seven years.
Table 2 sets out the current state of contracting in South Africa.
Some of the challenges faced by the commuter bus industry and
which impact policy implementation are the following:
 Lack of funds to adequately fund road-based public transport.
 Inadequate cost indexing in existing contracts e especially
problematic over longer term contracts.
 Organised labour opposition to competitive tenders.
 The slow progress with the development/revision of Integrated
Transport Plans.
 Lack of managerial and implementation skills/capacity at the
provincial and local levels of government.
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 41

Table 2
Contracts in place in South Africa.

Type of contract Number of buses Contract characteristics Duration

Interim contracts
Tendered contracts
Negotiated contracts
Sale of bus entity through
negotiation based on service
contract specification (form
of privatisation)
þ/ 3849 (68% of Foreseen as transition arrangement in 1997 1e3 Years originally.
sub budget) In practice some interim contracts are 15 years old
þ/1834 Based on standard contract document 5 Years originally.
(28% of subsidy Mostly “stand alone” services in rural/urban Contracts are being extended to 7 years
budget) operations New contracts to be 7 years.
Most contracts are currently on a month-to-month basis.
250 Mostly applicable to state-owned and operated 5 Years originally.
bus companies e form of privatisation New contracts to be 7 years.
Some contracts on a month-to-month basis
1050 Applicable to bus operations owned by local and Contracts are 5 years in duration.
provincial governments New contracts to be 7 years.
Implemented in the City of Durban (June 2003) and
North West Province (January 2004).

Source: Compiled by the author for the purpose of this paper (SABOA and DoT sources) (2006 data).

 Lack of properly capacitated institutional structures to imple-
ment PT policy.
 Institutional complexities between National, Provincial and
Local government (concurrent functions i.t.o. the RSA
Constitution).
 Complexities of integrating the minibus taxi industry and the
commuter bus industry in one service design.
7. Modal overview: bus rapid transit (BRT) systems
The introduction of BRT systems in the country was officially
sanctioned in the DoT Public Transport Strategy and the Public
Transport Strategy Action Plans of 2007. These documents spell out
government policy and strategy and provide guidelines for the
introduction of the systems in SA. Amongst other, guidelines are
spelled out on how to deal with existing operators on routes
affected by the introduction of BRT systems.
At present two systems are in operation e the Rea Vaya system
in Johannesburg and MyCiTi in Cape Town. A number of other
metro governments are planning systems, such as in Durban, Port
Elizabeth, Pretoria and Brits (west of Pretoria).
7.1. Rea Vaya: Johannesburg
Plans are to introduce 325 km of BRT routes and 30 interchange
nodes in the Johannesburg area. Phase one of the system consisting
of 122 km of routes was approved by the Johannesburg Metro
Council in 2006 (Seftel, 2011). The envisaged Rea Vaya BRT
network, when fully implemented is depicted in Fig. 5 and consists
of a number of phases.
The intention of the Johannesburg Metro (and supported by
government policy and strategies) was to incorporate the taxi
industry in the BRT, as the sole operator (there were no bus services
on the route) on the Phase 1A route. The Johannesburg Metro
therefore was one of the first Metros to engage the taxi industry in
a new business model that would manage the BRT route. Major
difficulties were however encountered to get the taxi industry to
“transform” from an informal business to a formal business. Taxi
owners and their drivers were (amongst other) concerned about
their future earnings, the loss of revenue as their taxi vehicles had
to be removed from the route, the potential job losses, the
complexities associated with a “formal” business etc. This led to
protracted negotiations and many acrimonious meetings.

Fig. 5. Long term network proposed for Rea Vaya BRT in the greater Johannesburg area. Source: Seftel, 2011.
42 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
The Metro was however under pressure to have the first phase
of the service up and running by a certain date (a financial
requirement) and services began operating before agreement could
be reached with the taxi industry to buy into and manage the BRT
system. In this regard the city initially signed a 12 year contract
with Clidet, an interim company owned by the BRT Systems Trust.
Clidet signed a management contract with Metrobus (the munici-
pally owned bus company) to manage the bus operating company
in the interim whilst negotiations were still on-going with the taxi
industry. After the Metro reached an agreement with the taxi
industry to take over and manage the BRT, Clidet passed a resolu-
tion on 31 January 2011 to transfer the Clidet shares to the new
shareholders of the bus operating company consisting of taxi
industry role players (Ndebele, 2011).
The service is operated on a 12 year contract by the bus oper-
ating company (valued at about R 184m per year) consisting of nine
Taxi Operator Investor Companies (TOICS) who are taxi operators
affected by Phase 1A (Ndebele, 2011). Over 300 taxi owners owning
about 550 taxi vehicles contributed R 54 000 equity derived from
the sale or scrapping of their minibus taxis in exchange for one
share in the bus operating company (Seftel, 2011). The BOC was
renamed PioTrans as from 1 February 2011 and operates in part-
nership with an experienced South American (Columbian) BRT
operator, Fanalca (Rea Vaya, 2011).
Phase 1A from Soweto, a large township south west of Johan-
nesburg, to Ellis Park on the north eastern side of the Johannesburg
CBD, has been operating since August 2009 and transports about
30 000 passengers per day over the 25.5 km of dedicated roadway,
33 stations and 146 Euro 4 buses (Seftel, 2011).
Fig. 6 shows the Phase 1A route.
Phase 1B construction is nearing completion and the expecta-
tion is that this phase will be operational during the first quarter of
2012. In contrast to the first phase, this phase impacts existing bus
operators that will have to be accommodated in the business model
to manage this section. These discussions have been very pro-
tracted. Major issues were encountered in determining market
shares of the respective modes (buses and taxis), the sharing of
financial risk versus market share, expertise to manage the system
etc.
One of the criticisms of the current Metro approach is that it
appears as if each new section will demand a new round of nego-
tiations. As the entire network is being rolled out section-by-
section, this could mean that a host of operating companies will
have to be established to manage the system, eventually leading to
operational, integration, systems efficiency and managerial issues.
It should be remembered that there are a host of taxi operators
operating sections of the route compared to only a few bus
Fig. 6. Phase 1A route of the Johannesburg BRT. Source: www.reavaya.org.za/images/stories/2010/transportfor2010/routes.
companies directly impacted by BRT route proposals. This could
prove to be unmanageable.
7.2. MyCiTi: Cape Town
The MyCiTi BRT in Cape Town (or Integrated Rapid Transit as it’s
referred to in Cape Town) is a 15 year project to establish BRT
systems in the city area. The inner-city distribution service linked
the World Cup stadium in Sea Point area (to the west of the Cape
Town CBD) during the World Cup in 2010. A shuttle service links
the Cape Town station to the Cape Town International Airport.
The most recent phase of the BRT was launched in May 2011 e
the West Coast corridor between Table View and the Cape Town
CBD. This service is shown in Fig. 7.
The entire service is supplemented with an extensive bicycle
route network and links existing bus, taxi and rail services. The
interim inner-city feeder route between Gardens, the Civic Centre
and the Cape Town Waterfront also began operating recently. The
business model included operators affected by the BRT. The market
share model was based on passenger trips, passenger km gener-
ated, fare revenue and profits. The outline of the business model is
depicted in Fig. 8 with the future systems plan in Fig. 9.
8. Modal overview: commuter taxi industry
In South Africa, the dominant public transport mode is the 16-
seater minibus taxi. These services had their origin after a 1985
White Paper on National Transport Policy where the services were
“legitimised”. This led to the rapid growth of the industry at the
expense of the formal commuter bus and rail industries. Today, it is
estimated that about 65% of all commuter trips take place in taxis,
although the figure varies depending on local circumstances (Arrive
Alive, 2011a). Table 3 provides a statistical overview of the taxi
operating sector:
The industry is regarded as a prime example of Black Economic
Empowerment in the country, in particular small black business.
The industry is largely unregulated, although route associations
control access to routes and the associated associations. This has,
especially in the past, led to major rivalry among operators, often
leading to bloody battles, deaths and injuries.
It is estimated that there are between 120 000 and 140 000 taxis
in the country with the largest concentrations in urban areas. There
is little effective governmental control over the industry by ways of
fares (the market and intensity of intra- and inter-modal compe-
tition determines fare levels), and the effective enforcement of road
traffic laws governing vehicle road worthiness, driving techniques.
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 43

Fig. 7. Map of the MyCiTi West Coast corridor route and picture of the route as seen from the Gardens area towards Cape Town. Map source: Fortune, 2011. Picture source: Fortune,
2011.

The industry is also criticised for its poor safety record e a point companies in the subsidy system (tenders), the BRT developments
that was mentioned in the National Household Travel Survey. in the country, and promises of taxi industry subsidies.
Government has been engaging with the taxi industry through
its representative structure SANTACO (South African National Taxi
8.1. The taxi recapitalisation programme
Council). This institution was formed by the DoT in 2001 to enable
government to engage with the taxi industry in a single national
The government’s aim is to formalise the taxi industry through
forum. This specific aim has largely been achieved although there
an R 7.7bn taxi recapitalisation programme (Arrive Alive, 2011a)to
are a number of large associations not affiliated with SANTACO. In
assist the industry to replace ageing and unroadworthy taxis, and,
addition, the DoT established a National Joint Working Group
eventually, to make it part of the overall public transport solution
(NJWG) to deal with matters such as the taxi recapitalisation pro-
through its envisaged involvement in ITPs. The governmental
gramme, taxi subsidies, legislation, regulation and enforcement. It
assistance is in the form of a once-off capital subsidy where, irre-
also deals with enterprise and skills development, communication,
spective of the condition of the vehicle, government will
stakeholder management, the BRT systems, and Integrated Public
compensate the operator R 57 400 to use as a deposit on a new
Transport Networks (South African Government Information,
2010).
In an effort to address the financial viability of the industry, and
to improve its service levels, a number of governmental interven-
tions have been identified, the most visible being the taxi recapi-
talisation programme that began in 2006 (Department of
Transport, 2006). Other initiatives include the involvement of taxi

Fig. 8. MyCiTi business management model. Source: Fortune, 2011. Fig. 9. MyCiTi development phases. Source: Fortune, 2011.
44 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
Table 3
Taxi operating statistics.
 Number of people using taxi services each day: 14 millionþ
 Number of officially registered minibus taxis on South African
roads: 120 000þ
 Average number of taxis per owner: 2
 Average number of hours taxi drivers spend daily on the road: 8.8
 Number of days each taxi driver works per week: 6.33
 Average monthly kilometres driven by a taxi: 8000
 Average number of passengers transported monthly per vehicle: 3161
 Average time spent daily in a taxi by a passenger: 65 min
 Average number of trips per passenger per day: 2.3
Source: http://www.ComutaNet.co.za as quoted by the Mercatus Policy Series.
Policy Comment No 3. Taxing Alternatives: Poverty Alleviation and the South
African Taxi/Minibus Industry. Author: K Boudreaux, Senior Fellow, Mercatus
Center, George Mason University, February 2006 page 6.
vehicle or to use the money to exit the industry (South African
Government Information, 2010). The vehicles that are traded in
(or handed in should the operator wish to exit the industry) are
physically destroyed to ensure that they do not re-enter the
industry. A special Taxi Scrapping Agency (the Taxi Scrapping
Administrator) was established by the DoT and has a presence in all
nine provinces. To date (May 2007) more than 42 000 taxis have
been scrapped and a total of R 2.13b paid out as compensation for
these vehicles (Department of Transport, 2011).
The aim of the recapitalisation programme is to improve the
safety and reliability of the industry through the replacement of
older vehicles with new, higher quality, purposefully specified
vehicles; to reduce the number of vehicles to about 85 000
(Walters, 2008); to ensure that the new vehicles meet the South
African Bureau of Standards safety requirements for instance, roll-
over protection, brakes, tyre ratings, seating arrangements, and
safety belts (Arrive Alive, 2011b); to replace existing 16-seater
vehicles with 18-seater as well as 18e35 seater vehicles; to
address the economic sustainability of the industry, and to effec-
tively regulate the industry.
In order to qualify for the recapitalisation programme:
 Taxi operators are required to convert their radius based
operating permits to route based operating licences (for
existing vehicles as well as for replacement/recapitalization
vehicles).
 To ensure that minimum wages are paid to drivers and other
employees working in the taxi sector.
 To regulate driving hours. Drivers are allowed to work at most
48 h per week and must have at least 12 h a day and 36
continuous hours of rest per week.
 To regulate leave conditions.
 To ensure that operators have adequate passenger liability
insurance.
 To ensure that operators pay their income taxes. A tax clear-
ance certificate is required before operators may participate in
the scrapping allowance as part of the recapitalisation pro-
gramme (Walters, 2007).
8.2. The involvement of the taxi industry in the public transport
tender and contracting system
Provision is made in the “model tender document”, a guideline
document developed by the DoT in consultation with provincial
departments of transport and the respective industries, for, among
other, the taxi industry to participate in the tender and contracting
system. Little progress has been recorded to date, but it is ex-
pected that once negotiated contracts are entered into, the taxi
industry, as well as the small bus operators that have not yet
participated in the subsidy system, will be accommodated through
the designs of such contracts, based on ITPs, to favour the “most
appropriate mode of transport” for given circumstances. In prac-
tice this would mean that on trunk and high density routes,
especially in the peaks, buses would be specified in the contract,
and on the less dense routes, during the off-peak and after hours/
late night services, lower capacity vehicles. The lower capacity
vehicles, i.e. taxis, would also be used as feeder and distributor
vehicles to the trunk routes. Taxi cooperatives/companies would
also be encouraged to tender, or be involved in, the negotiations
for traditional bus service contracts, and in doing so, exit the taxi
industry, and participate in traditional larger capacity public
transport service provision.
8.3. The involvement of the taxi industry in the formal public
transport system through BRTs
Two successful examples of the conversion from taxis to buses
are the BRT systems in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Taxi services
are predominantly short distance urban commuter services, mainly
concentrating on high density corridors. Many of these corridors
have been identified for BRT services. Based on the 2007 DoT
strategy documents discussed earlier (Department of Transport,
2007a, 2007b), it is evident that many taxi operators will be
encouraged to participate in these systems in future. The challenge
remains to find acceptable business models to accommodate both
existing bus and taxi industry service providers.
8.4. Taxi industry subsidies
The call to subsidise the taxi industry has come from various
quarters over many years. The most vocal of these have been
SANTACO. Philip Taaibosch, the General Secretary of SANTACO is
quoted as follows: “.government subsidised other modes of public
transport in the country, such as rail and bus transport, but the taxi
industry did not get any subsidy and was discriminated against
despite transporting between 68 percent and 70 percent of
commuters daily” (Taaibosch, 2011).
The DoT has indicated that it was investigating the subsidisation
of the industry but the funding constraints faced by government, as
well as the difficulty in managing such a system among thousands
of small operators, remain a challenge. Most of the effort in this
regard has been through developing enabling policy and strategy
documentation, especially the model tender documents, the BRT
systems and statements that provision will be made in ITPs for the
taxis to participate in the formal public transport system. There
have been calls for set-asides in the future contracts of up to 30% of
the vehicle kilometres for the taxi and small bus operators. This will
no doubt negatively affect the financial wellbeing of established
bus operators that will find it difficult to cut overheads in relation to
the proposed 30% cut in their services. It has however often been
stated by government that the intention was to expand the public
transport services to accommodate the taxi industry and the small
bus operators, and that it would not be at the expense of existing
operators. In reality, the lack of sustainable funding and the total
sum available for public transport subsidies will most likely dictate
the policy direction that the DoT will be following. In the urban
areas there are however significant rationalisation possibilities
among bus operators, Metrorail (where commuter rail services are
present) and the taxi industry. Most, if not all, of the present urban
transport system design emanates from the days before 1994 and
the transition to democracy. The envisaged ITPs will address these
inequities in favour of integrated and operationally optimised
public transport systems and should be ready for implementation
in some metros as from 2012.
 J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45
Some of the unintended consequences of a de facto deregulated
taxi industry include: infighting about routes; issues arising from
taxi associations controlling routes and taxi ranks; road safety
issues; lack of long term economic sustainability; maintenance and
capital renewal issues; driver behaviour etc.
9. Conclusions
The public transport sector in South Africa faces major chal-
lenges. There is no lack of a holistic vision as to the role that public
transport should play in the future of South Africa e this is evi-
denced in the many policy and strategy documents that have been
developed. The main problem is the lack of effective policy
implementation, mainly due to a lack of sustainable funding to
achieve the ambitious policy objectives; the huge financial
demands to replace ageing bus, rail and taxi fleets; a lack of skills to
effectively implement and monitor policy initiatives; the complex
political and policy relationship between the three levels of
government dealing with public transport; complex intra- and
inter-modal negotiation processes where many of the discussions
are, and will be centred on, how to involve the informal taxi
industry and the many small bus operators in the formal subsidised
public transport industry; significant migration to the cities from
the poorer parts of South Africa as well as countries to the north of
South Africa; the resultant spread of existing townships further and
further away from job opportunities and the concomitant compli-
cations of offering extended public transport services to serve these
communities; and complicated labour arrangements that oppose
certain policy thrusts such as the competitive tendering system.
There is also mounting public pressure to drastically improve
public transport access, availability and safety, especially in the face
of the imminent introduction of expensive urban tolls on the
freeways surrounding and supporting the cities of Pretoria,
Johannesburg and Cape Town, as well as persistently high fuel
costs. Opponents to the toll system argue that they have no choice
but to use their cars to commute to and from work as public
transport is not regarded as a viable alternative to the car.
On the positive side there are encouraging signs that issues are
being addressed and progress made: major funding has been made
available for the renewal of Metrorail rolling stock and infrastruc-
ture improvements; there are major investments in BRT systems e
two of which are already operating and many more being planned;
the development of a BRT business model in Cape Town that
involves both existing bus and taxi operators in the operation of the
BRT, and a business model that is emerging in the Rea Vaya Phase
1B involving established bus companies, small bus operators and
the taxi industry; the introduction of the Gautrain high speed rail
service; a firm decision to speed up the public transport contracting
system through the introduction of negotiated contracts of up to 12
years (thus by-passing the labour issues related to the competitive
tendering system), and the recapitalisation of the taxi industry
through the taxi recap programme e although behind schedule,
more than 42 000 taxis have been part of the programme.
The key to future urban transport in South Africa is to be found
in the implementation of ITPs that will, over time, integrate and
coordinate public transport service provision. This is however,
a medium term process, and full implementation is not expected
for many years to come.
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List of abbreviations
BOC: bus operating company
BRT: bus rapid transit
CBD: central business district
DoT: Department of Transport (National)
HOA: Heads of Agreement
IC/ICs: interim contract/s
IRPTN/s: Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network/s
IRT: Integrated Rapid Transit
ITP: Integrated Transport Plan
LTA: Land Transport Act, 2009
MSA: Moving South Africa
NHTS: National Household Travel Survey
NJWG: National Joint Working Group
NLTSF: National Land Transport Strategic Framework
NLTTA: National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000
NRP: National Rail Plan
PPP: PublicePrivate Partnership
PRASA: Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
RFP: request for proposal
RSA: Republic of South Africa
SA: South Africa
SABOA: Southern African Bus Operators Association
SANTACO: South African National Taxi Council
SPG: Strategic Partners Group
TA: transport authority
TOICS: Taxi Operator Investor Companies