Nationalities Papers

The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity

ISSN: 0090-5992 (Print) 1465-3923 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnap20

Perception vs. Reality: Slovak Views of the

Hungarian Minority in Slovakia

Ellen L. Paul

To cite this article: Ellen L. Paul (2003) Perception vs. Reality: Slovak Views of the Hungarian
Minority in Slovakia, Nationalities Papers, 31:4, 485-493, DOI: 10.1080/0090599032000152951

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599032000152951

Published online: 03 Jun 2010.

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 Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2003

Perception vs. Reality: Slovak Views of the Hungarian

Minority in Slovakia

Ellen L. Paul

After Slovakia and the Czech lands separated in 1993, concerns arose regarding
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Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarian, or Magyar, minority. There were concerns about the
Slovak government’s attitude toward its considerable Magyar population as well as
worries about the Hungarian government’s stance regarding Magyars in Slovakia and
the Slovak–Hungarian border. Frequently over the past decade, the topic of the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia has been manipulated by politicians. In both
Slovakia and Hungary, Slovak and Hungarian politicians alike have tried to expose
“injustices” or “excesses” for political gain. Indeed, the maneuvering of national
politicians might lead one to perceive that the reality of contemporary Slovak–
Magyar relations was tenuous and acrimonious. But politics aside, what does
the average Slovak think of the Magyar minority and Magyar–Slovak relations
generally? To what extent do the political debates encompass their actual concerns
and deeply held views?
In June 2002, I visited Slovakia and pursued these questions in a series of informal
interviews with an ad hoc sample of natives, aged 28 to 78.1 Among them were
bankers, administrators, educators, small business owners, doctors, tour guides, taxi
drivers, accountants, and one retiree. My quest to find out what ordinary Slovak
citizens think about Slovak–Hungarian relations explored both long-held perceptions
and present-day thinking. Very often I discovered a marked divergence between
perception and reality where the Hungarian minority was concerned.
Slovakia is home to a variety of non-Slovak cultures and languages, including
Czech, Ukrainian/Ruthenian, and Romany (gypsy). But the largest cultural and
linguistic minority are the c. 600,000 Hungarians, who comprise 11% of the popula-
tion overall and up to 87% in certain towns and villages in southern Slovakia.2 For
example, a 1994 report by the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG) lists
the southwestern Slovak towns of Dunajska Streda and Komarno as 87.26% and
72.27% Hungarian, respectively.

[Despite these figures from the 1991 Czechoslovak census], the Hungarians … do not
have territorial exclusivity in this region. While some towns have a majority
of Hungarians … other centers of population are mixed and there are also villages

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/03/040485-09 © 2003 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/0090599032000152951
 E. PAUL

populated exclusively by Slovaks. Added to which, there has, naturally, been much
intermarriage.3

The legacies of history surfaced frequently in my discussions and help explain

present-day tension between Slovaks and Magyars. For nearly a thousand years
Slovaks were under Hungarian rule, as historical maps of the region show clearly.4

The Slovaks … passed under Hungarian rule soon after the Hungarian conquest of the
plains at the beginning of the tenth century. The plains of southern Slovakia were
settled by Hungarians and their inhabitants were Magyarized, and, if the Slovaks did
retain some trace of independence in the mountains, this was at the price of isolation
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and cultural stagnation.5

From 1001 to 1918, Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 6 For
reasons of history, therefore, the idea of Hungarians in Slovakia, or Czechoslovakia,
from 1918–1939 and 1945–1993, “is a notion and reality of the twentieth century.”7
From its inception, Czechoslovakia was home to a considerable number of
Hungarians. In late 1918, Czechoslovakia was formed out of the ruins of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, which had been negotiated in the Ausgleich, or Compromise,
of 1867. In 1920, the border between Hungary and Slovakia was defined in the
Treaty of Trianon, and, according to the first Czechoslovak census in 1921, 745,431
Magyars found themselves, along with their ancestral homesteads and farmlands,
located within the new Czechoslovakia. In 1921, Hungarians comprised roughly 38%
of Slovakia’s population of 1,941,942.8 Understandably, the Hungarian state resented
losing Magyars to the Czechoslovak state. That resentment persists into the twenty-
first century and concerns more than just the losses to Czechoslovakia. After all, the
treaty

decisively influenced the fate of Hungary during subsequent decades. … At the

Trianon conference table the Hungarian nation suffered a blow whose severity can only
be compared to the disaster of Mohacs in 1526, when the Ottoman army annihilated the
Hungarian noble troops, leading to 150 years of Ottoman occupation of the center of
the country. … [Among other punishments, the Treaty of Trianon] dismembered
Hungary, taking away about two-thirds of its territory and population.9

The issue of the Magyar minority was always a factor in twentieth-century Czecho-
slovak politics, even if downplayed in the communist era, 1948–1989. Therefore,
when Slovakia became independent in 1993 many concerns arose including the role
Hungarians would play in the new state, the amount of funding the state would
provide for the maintenance of Magyar cultural and educational institutions, and the
extent of legal protection legislated for the Magyars as an ethnic and linguistic
minority in Slovakia.
During my interviews, I was frequently reminded of regional history and the
difficulty of forgetting the injustices of the past. The legacy of Hungarian rule left
indelible impressions on the collective mentality of Slovaks. A recent Hungarian

486
 PERCEPTION VS. REALITY

prime minister commented that because Slovakia was “an integral part of Hungary
for 1,000 years … [the Slovaks remain] sensitive to any comments reflecting on its
sovereignty or international standing with respect to Hungary.”10 Many older Slovaks
remember hearing about harsh Hungarian rule before the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy at the end of World War I, when, for example, they or their
parents were punished if they spoke Slovak in school. Slovak accounts of this period
frequently emphasize the coercive nature of Magyarization in the Hungarian
Monarchy. Not so surprisingly, a contemporary Slovak website defines Magyariza-
tion as “Hungarian ethnic cleansing.” It continues on to say that this “abominable
practice” became the official policy of the Hungarian Monarchy between 1867 and
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1918. Furthermore, the site maintains that this “official law” (to Magyarize) spurred
Slovak emigration abroad and turned “countless other Slovaks” into

so-called “Hungarians of Slovak descent,” only barely cognizant of who their ancestors
were. Whole villages became Magyarized, unable to communicate in their original
language and forbidden to learn about their history.11

Truly, history has had an indelible impact on the region. One respondent noted that
“Hungarians used to be rich, and many Slovaks remember this.” In the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, many Slovak peasants worked for rich Hungarian land-
lords. “Some people still have [resentment] inside of them.” The same Slovak
reported that her father had been sent to the Eastern Front in World War II because
Hungarians were in charge and he was a Slovak. After hearing that story, the other
Slovak at the interview added her own anecdote to show that the Hungarians did not
always rule with an iron fist during the war. She knew of a Slovak who was sent to
work in a work camp in Denmark during the war because the Hungarians did not
trust him enough to let him fight. He survived the experience and had not been
subjected to any especially hard labor.
From Hungarian human rights reports about Czechoslovakia in the twentieth
century, it is clear that the Magyars there survived not only neglect by the state (in
terms of funding for cultural and educational opportunities to keep the Hungarian
culture and language alive), but also state-sponsored attempts at assimilation or
resettlement (to Hungary). Whether it be malignant neglect or blatant assimilation
policies, the authors conclude that both the interwar Czechoslovak democracy and
the postwar communist Czechoslovak governments were certainly guilty of varying
degrees of forced assimilation of their Hungarian minority.12
Discussions of politics seemed to rouse the most passion among the people I
interviewed. One Slovak commented that Hungarian politicians have tried to “play
the Hungarian card, but Hungarians are not so simple or so easily misled.” By the
same token, “some Slovak politicians (such as the Slovak National Party, SNS) do
not like Hungarians and fight for Slovaks or Slovakia, but they do it stupidly.”
Nevertheless, “Slovak politicians have found very fertile ground in southern regions
of Slovakia and they play on Slovak fears of increased Hungarian autonomy within

487
 E. PAUL

Slovakia.” In fact, in the 1990s Hungarian politicians began to request greater local
self-government in the Magyar-dominated towns and villages of southern Slovakia,
although the central Slovak government has been slow to implement changes in local
government policy.
In my travels through Bratislava, Komarno, and Kosice, many of the Slovaks and
nearly all the Hungarians I met flatly dismissed politicians of every stripe. To them,
politicians are the ones who stir up the problems. To be sure, politicians in Slovakia
seem to have earned the disrespect, even disgust, of the majority of the population,
especially in the 1990s. In 1994, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group reported
that local politicians in the Slovak town of Sturovo were obsessed “with the minutiae
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of language use in the region” even though there were many more pressing problems
such as passing the budget or rebuilding the bridge over the Danube connecting
Sturovo with Esztergom on the Hungarian side.13 In addition to the anxiety caused by
political squabbling over minority issues, the Hungarian problem was exacerbated by
the media.

Journalists, both Slovak and foreign, also contributed to the growing unease about
Slovakia’s relations with the ethnic Hungarian minority by portraying the region as
unstable and likely to erupt into violence. One [journalist] predicted that war would
break out between Hungary and Slovakia before the next parliamentary elections [in
autumn 1994].14

For many in Slovakia, the political hullabaloo seems unconnected to everyday living.
One middle-aged Slovak commented that people who live all their lives with
Hungarians have no problems—it is the people who do not meet Hungarians all their
lives who have the biggest problem with the Hungarian minority. “Basically, the
Hungarian minority is a political problem, and the nationalists make political capital
from this.” This sentiment is supported by a 1990–1991 study conducted by the
Socio-Analytical Institute of Komensky University in Bratislava, which queried
Slovaks around the country about whether or not they favored the deportation of the
Magyars. “Fifty-six percent of Slovaks living in areas inhabited only by Slovaks
gave an affirmative response, whereas only sixteen percent of those Slovaks who
coexist with Hungarians responded affirmatively.”15
In the 1990s some of the Slovak nationalist politicians suggested that Hungarians
had too many rights in Slovakia. From my interviews, I found that at least a few
Slovaks agree with this argument. A 78-year-old Slovak retiree I interviewed told me
matter-of-factly that if the Hungarians did not have their own party in Slovakia, there
would be no need for Slovak nationalist parties. In a conversation with this same
woman decade earlier she had summed up her views of the people who had
oppressed her Slovak parents: “Hungarians? They are not like us. They are Asians!”
Some of the seemingly racist sentiments of my Slovak respondents boiled down to
economics and property. A middle-aged Slovak stated the belief that Hungarians who
move from the villages to the towns fear that they will lose their houses to Slovaks

488
 PERCEPTION VS. REALITY

buying them for weekend cottages. Presumably, they fear that the newcomers will
not respect the ethnic traditions of the neighborhood. For the same reason, she added,
“Slovaks fear Hungarians will buy up Slovak fields.”
Surely the antagonistic relations between the press and the Meciar government in
the 1990s affected opinions and perceptions of Hungarian–Slovak tension within
Slovakia because the press reports of minority issues have an impact on how the
problem is perceived in the country. For instance, in the early 1990s, the reality of
the government’s stance and action toward the Hungarian minority did not always
match what was reported in the press, suggesting that the press made more out of
Meciar’s bark than his bite warranted. Despite the serious, although sometimes
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dubious, reports in the press of Meciar’s confrontational remarks regarding the

Magyars, the Council of Europe found that “no action of a serious nature was taken
against the Hungarian community.” By 1994, the Council had admitted Slovakia to
membership, having revealed no “serious breaches of human rights” in Slovakia.16 A
2002 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) may indicate further improvement in
the situation. In an HRW online publication, the Slovak Helsinki Committee stated
that initial findings from early 2001 “were encouraging, with more than 75 percent of
news reporting on Roma (gypsy) and ethnic Hungarians assessed as neutral.”17
A recent cause of tension between Hungarians and Slovaks is the Hungarian Status
Law. The law, passed by the Hungarian parliament in 2001 without any consultation
with the neighboring countries affected by it, offers a variety of economic and
cultural benefits to ethnic Magyars living outside of Hungary but within East Central
Europe, such as three-month work permits in Hungary that include medical care and
pension benefits, free or drastically reduced rates on public transportation within
Hungary, scholarships and free teacher training in Hungary, and annual subsidies for
families with children attending Hungarian language schools. Reactions to the law
took several months to develop.
When asked about the impact of the Status Law, one middle-aged Slovak I spoke
with suggested that it could create bad blood in Slovakia. Slovakia has high
unemployment. Imagine the jealousy and animosity stirred up when unemployed
Slovaks watch their Hungarian neighbors cross the border to work in Hungary for
three months a year. I was told that there is currently a labor shortage in Hungary.
Another Slovak was altogether skeptical about the effectiveness of the employment
clause in the Status Law, because, like young Slovaks, young Hungarians prefer to
look for work in Western Europe.
The use of languages and interpersonal relations between the Slovaks and the
Magyars are another bone of contention. Some Slovaks believe that Hungarians tend
to be “aggressive” in the villages and small towns where they live. Several Slovaks
informed me that they had heard about Hungarian shopkeepers who claim not to
understand the Slovak language and who generally treat Slovaks badly. Although I
met very few Slovaks who personally claimed to have had a bad experience with the
Hungarian minority, the majority of them seemed to believe that many Hungarians in

489
 E. PAUL

Slovakia do not want to learn Slovak, or that they refuse to try, even though the
ability to speak Slovak can greatly impact employment. I was repeatedly told “if
Hungarians want to live and work here, they must learn Slovak. And, when greeting
the public in offices and shops they ought to speak Slovak first.” In addition, I heard
the following sentiment from a variety of Slovaks: “Can you imagine to live in a
country and not learn the national language?” This was impressed upon me when,
despite my broken and grammatically stunted Slovak, I was told more than once that
I spoke “better Slovak than some of them!”
To the Slovaks I spoke to who live as a minority among Magyars in Slovakia, the
paradox is that although they perceive that the Hungarians among them neither want
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to learn Slovak nor speak it in public places, the Hungarians do not want to go to
Hungary to live. This is despite the perception among Slovaks that the standard of
living is higher across the border. Indeed, one Komarno Slovak lamented, “I don’t
understand … if somebody wants to be Hungarian, why doesn’t he just go to
Hungary?!”
In an article about how the Hungarians have spiced up the town of Komarno, a
writer for the Slovak Spectator proclaims the following:

Allegations that the country’s Hungarians can’t speak Slovak are simply false, at least
in Komarno. Almost everyone speaks Slovak fluently, and those who don’t can at least
give directions in Slovak. For foreigners learning the language, conversing with locals
has an advantage: no one in Komarno is irritated by beginner Slovak.18

Indeed, in Slovak towns with large Magyar populations, bilingualism is the

norm.19 “Young people in Komarno speak both languages as a matter of course,” a
Hungarian taxi driver and father of two teenagers explained. The problem is that
Slovaks recognize the difficulties of learning the Hungarian language, and if they are
not of Hungarian lineage they sorely resent having to learn this “impossible”
language in order to fit in or find employment in their “own” country. In such places,
those Slovaks who do not speak Hungarian can feel discriminated against in the job
market. I was told that private companies tend to hire bilingual workers who can
speak to both the Hungarian and Slovak clients in their preferred language. Hence, a
worker who speaks only Slovak is at a disadvantage, especially in being hired for
jobs that deal with the public.
Two Slovaks I interviewed had relocated to Komarno in 1998 and their opinions of
the town’s inhabitants, who are 72% Hungarian, were the strongest I encountered
during my two weeks of interviews. Their arguments seemed in line with some of the
nationalist parties’ arguments. In contrast to most of the other Slovaks I spoke with,
these two intimated to me their belief that the Hungarian minority had too many
rights and schools. They were not content with the fact that Komarno has several
secondary schools but only one in which Slovak is the main language of instruction.
The reality is that Slovakia currently has fewer Hungarian schools than half a
century ago. Today there are reportedly more than 250 Hungarian minority schools,

490
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reduced from 565 schools in 1955. In 1991–1992, “36.4 percent of school-age

Magyars were unable to attend Hungarian-language schools,” up from 17% in 1960
and 19% in 1970.20 Moreover, Hungarian-language vocational and technical training
is lacking and there is no Hungarian university in Slovakia at all.21 Several Slovaks
told me that one problem with the Hungarian minority schools is that many young
Magyars do not learn proper Slovak, which, of course, can cause problems if a
Hungarian wants to attend university in Slovakia.
One of the Komarno Slovaks complained, “Hungarians think they are better. They
think that this is their town.” Despite these harsh sentiments, I was taken into cafes
and pubs, seemingly without regard for who owned them. Although this may have
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been because Slovak ownership of restaurants and cafes was limited, I did not get the
feeling that my Slovak host was avoiding certain establishments because they were
Hungarian. My experience in Komarno was that menus and servers were bilingual, as
were all signs and tourist information.
In contrast to the many places, including the United States and Western Europe,
where there is a perceived connection between minorities and crime, this is not the
case with the Magyars in Slovakia. Indeed, crime is not viewed as related to the
Hungarian problem there. One Slovak claimed that it was mostly those with money,
like Slovak former communists, who committed the majority of white-collar crimes
of evading taxes or trading illegally.
In 1994, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG) traveled from
Kosice to the densely populated Hungarian areas in southern Slovakia and saw “no
evidence of tension between the Slovak and Hungarian populations [and reported
that] any evidence that does exist is political.” Moreover, according to their findings
“all Hungarians speak Slovak and (unlike in Romania) do not mind doing so.” The
BHHRG also found no evidence to suggest any merit to the politicians’ complaints
about the educational system in Slovakia. The Hungarians with whom they had
spoken expressed no dissatisfaction with the educational opportunities. In addition,
arguments about the lack of Hungarian-language programs on Slovak television
seemed irrelevant, since “most Hungarians are able to watch Budapest TV anyway
and seem to be happy to do so.” The BHHRG noted that it is a clear fact that
“minority rights in Slovakia [are] better protected than in many other parts of
Europe.”22
The BHHRG reported that changes in the government in Budapest in recent years
had helped reduce tensions between Slovaks and Hungarians. Still, we cannot forget
the issue of history and the Hungarian outlook as reported by the BHHRG in 1994.
The writers of the report noted the following:

Many Hungarians … see the eventual restoration of their [pre-1918] kingdom as a

natural development. While not actively promoting such a confrontational policy they
regard certain EU initiatives, e.g. increased regionalism, as a way to reincorporate these
areas. Their approach to countries like Romania and Slovakia is one of barely
concealed contempt—that of a former seat of empire to its colonies. Much of this is

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ignored in the West where Hungarians can expect to receive a good press due partly to
their large and active diasporas and the high profile achieved by such Hungarians as
George Soros.23

The BHHRG suggests that Slovak views of the Magyar situation in Slovakia are
only one side of the coin and that Magyar politicians do not always help matters.
“Many Hungarians seem to be imbued with their own superiority. Duray [leader of
Egyutteles, the Hungarian party Co-Existence, in Slovakia] has said that Hungarians
are the only real democrats in Slovakia.”24
Despite the obvious differences in perceptions of relations between Slovaks and
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Magyars in Slovakia, the reality most likely lies somewhere in between the extremes.
In my interviews I talked with a small handful of people who denied the existence of
any problems between Hungarians and Slovaks. Often, these moderate opinions
came from people who were the product of a mixed Slovak—Hungarian
marriage, were in a mixed marriage themselves, or were Hungarians. Of the five or
six Hungarians with whom I spoke, none had negative words about Slovakia or the
Slovaks, and all of them downplayed the importance of nationality and language
differences. “People everywhere are the same,” I was told by an elegant, white-
haired Magyar tour guide at the Bratislava castle. “Besides,” she continued,
“Slovaks, Hungarians, and Austrians have been living together on this territory for
centuries. Surely, we are all of mixed ethnic heritage by now.”

NOTES

1. I am grateful to the Fulbright-Hays Group Project Abroad program for the generous
funding and extraordinary opportunities for research. The views recorded here are purely
anecdotal and intentionally anonymous, taken from 20 Slovaks and Magyars living in
Bratislava, the capital, Komarno, a town on the Slovak–Hungarian border south of
Bratislava, and Kosice, located in southeast Slovakia.
2. In the ninth century, Magyar tribes arrived in Central Europe from Asia. Their language is
unrelated to those of their neighbors. The closest European relative to Hungarian is
Finnish.
3. See “Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” <http://www.bhhrg.org/slovakia/slovakia1994/
hung-minority.htm>.
4. “Following the destruction of the Greater Moravian Empire by the Magyars in 906, the
West Slavic Slovaks were eventually to come under the control of Hungary.” See Paul R.
Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Vol. 1 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1993), p. 13.
5. Norman J. G. Pounds, Eastern Europe (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 394.
6. Ibid. In contrast, the Czech lands and Moravia enjoyed a degree of independence before
1620. After the Habsburg victory at the Battle of White Mountain, the Czechs were
subjects of the Habsburg monarch who ruled as Austrian Emperor and King of Bohemia
until 1918. The Austro-Hungarian Emperor had the title of “King of Bohemia,” but was
never crowned in Prague. He was, however, crowned King of Hungary in Budapest, in
1867. After 1867 in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Hungary was virtually self-
governing (except for common ministries for foreign policy, military, and finances), while

492
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the Czech lands were governed from Vienna, though there were regional diets in Bohemia
and Moravia.
7. Miklos Duray, “The Hungarian Nationality in Slovakia,” website of Co-Existence,
<http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/A-MERANO.HTM>. Duray is the leader of Egyutteles or
Co-Existence, a Hungarian party in Slovakia.
8. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 158.
9. Joseph Held, The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 166–168. The population, including three
million ethnic Hungarians, and territories were distributed between the three new states
created in the surrounding lands (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia).
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10. Jolyon Naegele, “Central Europe: Slovakia and Hungary Spar over Orban’s Remarks,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/
15022002095549.asp>. Viktor Orban is Prime Minister of Hungary.
11. <http://www.slovakia.org/history-magyarization.htm>.
12. “Hungarians in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia (1918–1992): From Minority Status to
Partnership,” <http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/AD-PARTN.HTM>. For information about
Czechoslovak and Slovak actions and legislation that eroded or limited Hungarian rights
see also Duray, ibid.
13. The reconstructed bridge, which had been destroyed in World War II, was reopened in
October 2001. See “Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” <http://www.bhhrg.org/slovakia/
slovakia1994/hung-minority.htm>.
14. Ibid. There was no war. To a certain degree, this scare tactic was related to the hostile
climate between the press and the Meciar government. The leader of the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Vladimir Meciar, prime minister on and off from 1992 to
1999, was famous for his undemocratic ways, including the suppression of any opposition
and his tolerance of white-collar crime. After his removal from office, relations with
Hungary and the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia improved dramatically.
15. “Hungarians in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia (1918–1992): From Minority Status to
Partnership,” <http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/AD-PARTN.HTM>.
16. See “Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” <http://www.bhhrg.org/slovakia/slovakia1994/
hung-minority.htm>.
17. Human Rights Watch “World Report 2002: Europe and Central Asia: Slovakia”,
<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe17.html>.
18. Matthew J. Reynolds, Slovak Spectator, 11 June 2001, <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/
clanok?cl=604>.
19. See “Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” <http://www.bhhrg.org/slovakia/slovakia1994/
hung-minority.htm>.
20. “Hungarians in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia (1918–1992): From Minority Status to
Partnership,” <http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/AD-PARTN.HTM>.
21. Ibid. “The situation is even more grave by the lack of Hungarian [basic school] teachers:
according to present estimations by [the year 2000] the lack will grow to 2,000 teachers!”
22. See “Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” <http://www.bhhrg.org/slovakia/slovakia1994/
hung-minority.htm>.
23. Ibid. The BHHRG notes that although Soros contributes admirably to high-level academic
and media groups in the two countries, “no funds have been directed towards bettering the
condition of the ground [base?] of the Hungarian minority.” George Soros is founder of
the Open Society Foundation.
24. Ibid.

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