RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATION- A STUDY

SUBMITTED BY:

3RD YEAR, 5TH SEMESTER

SUBJECT: PROPERTY LAW

FACULTY IN CHARGE:

DR. KASTURI GAKUL

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL ACADEMY, ASSAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….....1

1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………....3

1.2. RESEARCH SCOPE…………………………………………………………….….4

1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE…………………………………………………………..4

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS……………………………………………………….…4

2. SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ACCUMULATION ……………………………..5

3. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATION…………………...7

4. A RELATION OF SECTION 117 INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT, 1925 WITH

SECTION 17 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882. ………………..10

5. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………..…12

6. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………...............17

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………….…..18
 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW

SECTION 17: DIRECTION FOR ACCUMULATION

A direction of accumulation of income of any property means prohibiting the free enjoyment
of its incidental benefits such as rents, produces or profits. In other terms, this would imply
restricting the advantageous use of the property. The concept of income accumulation direction
refers to a specific approach aimed at limiting the use of property for personal pleasure.

According to section 11 of the Act, any condition that is in direct opposition to the interest that
was established or that places any kind of restriction on the enjoyment of property that was
transferred is null and invalid and has no legal standing. A condition that is adverse to the
interest that is established or that places limitations on the right to enjoyment in favor of the
transferee to whom the property is transferred absolutely is one in which the accumulation of
income takes a certain direction. A directive of accumulation of income may be put into effect
in certain circumstances if the Act's Section 17 is seen as being an exception to Section 11.
However, Section 11 is only relevant in situations where there is a transfer of absolute interest,
but Section 17 is applicable to transfers of any sort. Section 11 only applies to transfers of
absolute interest.

The direction in which earnings and profits of property are accumulated, as outlined in the Act,
entails the establishment of a distinct fund. This arrangement results in the deferral of the
transferee's entitlement to derive beneficial pleasure from the transferred property. The delay
of the transferee's right of beneficial enjoyment of property is discouraged under section 17
(direction against accumulation) of the Act, just as the postponement of the vesting of an
interest is discouraged under section 14 (law against perpetuity) of the Act.

Section 14 establishes the uppermost allowable threshold for deferring the commencement of
interest accrual, whereas section 17 stipulates the longest permitted duration for accumulating
revenue and profits derived from the transferred property. Section allows accumulation of
income during either of the two following periods:

1. The life of the transferor

2. Period of 18 years from the date of transfer (whichever is longer).

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As a result, any provision or instruction that allows for the accumulation of income over the
prescribed time frame will be null and invalid.

Validity of the Transfer not Effected

In situations where the duration of accumulation exceeds the prescribed term, but the transferee
is granted the authority to disregard it for the extra duration without invalidating the transfer,
Section 17 does not render the transfer null and void. When a temporal constraint is enforced
that deviates from the stipulations outlined in section 17, the uppermost allowable duration is
determined based on the actual occurrences subsequent to the transfer. The duration of the
transferor's life or a minimum of 18 years, whichever is greater, would be applicable. In the
event that the transferor passes away inside a span of 18 years subsequent to the transfer, it is
required that the income be gathered for a duration of 18 years, whichever time proves to be
lengthier.

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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

BOOKS USED:

➢ R.K. SINHA, THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, (21st Edition, 2021)

The Transfer of Property Act authored by R.K. Sinha has gained recognition as a renowned
scholarly resource on Property Law, establishing its status as a classic textbook since its
first publication in 1994. The text offers a comprehensive and well-structured examination
of the laws pertaining to the Transfer of Property by Act of Parties, presenting a thorough
analysis. The book elucidates the pertinent sections of the Transfer of Property Act,
therefore situating the legislation within a pragmatic framework. The book employs a
straightforward and clear writing style, facilitating a more comprehensive comprehension
of the rules outlined in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
➢ AVATAR SINGH & HARPEET KAUR, TEXTBOOK ON TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY LAW, LEXIS NEXIS, SIXTH EDITION.
This academic study by Avatar Singh and Harpeet Kaur presents an explanation that is both
straightforward and thorough of the Transfer of Property Act, which was passed in 1882.
One of the things that sets this book apart from others is the fact that it discusses each and
every principle of property law in an extremely in-depth and understandable manner using
a variety of court interpretations, case laws, and other resources.

ARTICLE USED:

➢ BHIMANAPATI DEEPTHI, SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ACCUMULATION

UNDER THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, LAWSISTO
This article helped the Researcher to learn and analyzed the Scope of the doctrine of
Accumulation under the Transfer of Property Act,1882. It also discussed the rights of
transferee and transferor. All the points are explained in a very lucid manner, providing a
detailed explanation on the nuances of the subject, and have played a major role in my clear
comprehension of the topic.

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1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this topic is

➢ To study the scope of the doctrine of Accumulation under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882.
➢ To study the exceptions to the rule against accumulation.
➢ To study the relation of Section 117 Indian Succession Act, 1925 with Section 17 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
➢ To analyze cases pertaining to the Direction of Accumulation.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

➢ What is the scope of the doctrine of Accumulation under Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
➢ What are the exceptions to the rule against Accumulation?
➢ What is the relation of section 117 Indian Succession Act, 1925 with Section 17 of the
Transfer of Property act, 1882?
➢ Analyse cases pertaining to Direction of Accumulation?

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study is largely based on doctrinal method. Two types of data – secondary and primary
sources – are used in this research. Primary sources of data which are case law arising out of
the decisions of courts and relevant statutes have been extensively used in writing this research.
On the other hand, the secondary sources of data used in this research include textbooks,
journals, magazines, newspapers and the Internet. This, it is strongly believed, will help for
scholarship and deep appreciation of the subject matter. In all, an analytical mode of writing
has been adopted followed by a descriptive style wherever necessary. Relevant data collected
from different sources are duly acknowledged and analysed at the foot of every page where
they appear, and adequate recommendations are made thereon.

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A uniform method of citation is followed, i.e., Bluebook - 20th Edition.

2. SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ACCUMULATION UNDER THE TRANSFER

OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

The doctrine of accumulation refers to a strategy used to limit the enjoyment of possessions.
According to Section 17(1) of the legislation, in cases where the conditions accompanying a
transfer of property result in the income generated from such property being accumulated
entirely or partially for a duration beyond the lifespan of the individual transferring the
property, or for a period of 18 years, the transfer is deemed invalid. These requirements do not
conflict with one another in any way, such as the transferor having to be at least 18 years old.
This provision provides restrictions for the accumulation direction, including a time period of
18 years and the transferor's lifespan as one of those constraints. This fundamental idea
originates from the case of Theluson v. Woodford. Nevertheless, in accordance with what is
stated in Section 17, the registration of papers is required.
The enactment of Sections 10 to 17 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was intended to
provide provisions that facilitate the unrestricted transfer and circulation of property. The act
of amassing gifts is not seen as inherently erroneous, although it is deemed a failure if it
contravenes a self-governing principle of Hindu Law.

In the context of religious endowments, the act of accumulating funds is not deemed unlawful
as long as it is not intended for the personal advantage of the individual establishing the
endowment or their relatives. Additionally, the goal of the endowment must be lawful and not
in conflict with public policy.
Section 17 is enacted on the conditions that are founded in English law, which are now
integrated in Sections 164-166 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which are re-enacted with
some revisions. These sections were re-enacted in the Law of Property Act in the United
Kingdom. The purpose of the clause that cannot be upheld is to render the accumulation null
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and void in the event that it exceeds two statutory limitations. However, only the portion of the
accumulation that occurred beyond the statute's time restriction has been rendered null and
invalid.
The provision for accumulation in Mahomedan Law assures that it is intended for the
advancement of charitable objectives and does not contravene the principle of perpetuities. The
act of presenting Fateha, which entails the allocation of funds is the purpose of wakf. In the
context of Wakf, the direction of income accumulation is seen as significant. Section 17 will
make this lawful for cases in which the time period required for the direct accumulation of
revenue is exceeded, while at the same time allowing the transferee to disregard the time period
without the transfer being invalidated in any way. If there are a few situations in which the time
period is different, the greatest length of time that may be granted will be decided by the facts.
The term of 18 years or the lifespan of the transferor, whichever is longer, is the one that is
used.
The exemptions outlined in Sections 14, 16, and 17 are not applicable in situations when
property is being transferred for the purpose of public benefit, including the promotion of
religion, education, commerce, healthcare, safety, or any other similar beneficiary. Similarly,
the principle of perpetuity would not be applicable. The ban is codified within the framework
of Hindu jurisprudence. The primary objective of this section is to provide a clear distinction
between personal transfers and business transfers.
Idols are not considered as movable property. An image that has legal and spiritual significance
would not be classified as a transferable asset. A gift that is given with the intention of
upholding one's moral duty, or dharma, lacks substance and cannot be relied upon. Legal
settlements for religious reasons, worship, or the establishment of wakf are permissible,
provided they do not contravene the ban on perpetuity. The provision of a playground for
children or gymnasiums with the intention of promoting health might be considered a public
purpose.
The restriction against perpetuity will not apply to property used for the promotion of hospitals,
care centers, or other establishments offering medical services. Consequently, the concept of
revenue accumulation will remain infeasible un these circumstances, since it is designed for
the collective welfare.

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 3. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATION

The general rule that establishes restrictions or directions for accumulations is subject to three
exemptions altogether.

EXCEPTION (I)- PAYMENT OF DEBTS:

In accordance with the rule against perpetuities, a transfer of assets that includes a provision
for the payment of debts that are not the responsibility of the transferor and that may arise
beyond the permitted time period would be illegal. Further, a transfer that is conditional on the
completion of specific responsibilities may not have occurred within the indefinite period of
time.

Nevertheless, instructions for the settlement of debts or the allocation of funds for the goal of
accumulating wealth, regardless of the duration, not only evade the statutory restriction on
accumulation but also do not contravene the rule against perpetuities. The exception from the
legislative limit on accumulation arises due to the inclusion of measures for the payment of
debts or the accumulation of income. Due to the potential for the creditor to request payment
at any given time, or for the debtor to fulfil the obligation at any point, the inclusion of such a
provision does not establish a permanent restriction on the transferability of property, hence
allowing for its permanent transfer.

A trust or instruction to fulfil an obligation is therefore seen, if feasible, as a commitment to

cover the costs associated with the debt, and the recipient is regarded as acquiring a vested
stake that is subject to the aforementioned commitment. Therefore, in the context of a lease
assignment lasting 99 years, the establishment of a trust with the purpose of accumulating
50% of the rent for the whole duration, in order to settle the obligations of the party
transferring the lease, would be deemed legally permissible since it effectively creates a
charge on the lessee's stake in the lease. The validity of a provision for the payment of debts
has been established, even when it is attached to and constitutes a component of a sequence
of restrictions, some or all of which violate the rule against perpetuities.

The debts in question may include present commitments, or alternatively, they may pertain to
contingent liabilities that are anticipated to mature at a later date. If the obligations are settled
using capital instead of income, the exemption will cease to apply, and the trust for
accumulating revenue to repay the capital will be valid for one of the specified time periods.

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The validity of the exemption clause is contingent upon its supply in good faith. Hence, the
inclusion of a provision for the accrual of income against a liability that is improbable to be
incurred as a debt, or the retention and allocation of revenue for the establishment of a reserve
fund to meet future business needs, are both contingent upon adherence to the prescribed
statutory timeframes. Furthermore, it is important to consider the inclusion of a provision for
the accrual of revenue in relation to a liability that has a low probability of transforming into a
debt.

To ensure that a provision fits within the exception, it is necessary for the provision to be one
that is not subject to the discretion of a third party about the payment of debts. Rather, it should
be a provision that is specifically designated for the purpose of debt payment and must be used
accordingly. The scope of the English exception is broad, since it encompasses the obligations
of several parties such as the grantor, settlor, testator, or any other individual. It has been
established that this other individual may be unrelated to the aforementioned parties.

EXCEPTION (II)- PROVISION OF PORTIONS:

The phrase "portion" often refers to a discrete section or subdivision that is removed from a
larger organization, with the aim of conferring advantages or benefits to certain persons,
notably children. The practice of increasing one's capital by providing income with the purpose
of enhancing the recipient's capital is not relevant within the present situation. The exception
only applies to rules that are essential for the procurement of components. The system lacks
the ability to maintain mandatory requirements for the allocation of parts, and it is also unable
to protect provisions that are contingent upon the decision of a third party about their
implementation for the allocation of portions.

EXCEPTION (III)- PRESERVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY:

Legitimate imposition of directives for income accumulation stemming from a property, or a

portion thereof, is feasible, on the condition that the preservation and upkeep of such property,
which is the focal point of the transfer, serves as the underlying rationale for the aforementioned
directives. Hence, if a directive is issued to accumulate funds for the aim of executing necessary
repairs to be transferred to the dwelling, such action would be deemed lawful.

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Similarly, party A transfers real estate that is currently tenanted to party B, under the condition
that one-fourth of the rental income is to be collected for a duration of one hundred years. This
requirement is intended to ensure the ongoing maintenance and preservation of the property,
as well as the preservation of its market value. This line of conduct would be deemed
appropriate. The legality of the directive for accumulation permitted under this exemption
would only be applicable if the accumulated funds are intended for the maintenance and
preservation of the specific property being transferred, rather than any other property, including
a third property.

Hence, in instances where a property transfer explicitly mandates the accumulation of income
for the purpose of benefiting an adopted son, covering the marriage expenses of future
generations, or providing for the welfare of a minor disciple until they attain the age of 30, such
a provision would be deemed legally enforceable. However, if the directive not only stipulates
that the accumulated income is to be employed for the benefit of children or other descendants,
but also aims to transfer the primary amount of the property, it would contravene the rule
against perpetuity and so be considered unconstitutional.

A clause that permits the distribution of surplus income towards the reimbursement of debts,
the welfare of a minor beneficiary, the marriage expenses of the testator's son, or the tuition
fees of four deserving students is deemed to be legally binding. Nevertheless, due to the
stipulation that once the accumulations reached a total of Rs 3 lakh, they were to be divided
equally among the sons and grandsons based on their respective proportions, it was concluded
that these accumulations formed an essential element of perpetuity and were considered legally
void. In a legal context concerning the transfer of a device to a minor protégé, on the condition
that the proceeds be accumulated until the protégé attains the age of 30, it has been ascertained
that the protégé is entitled to receive the whole of the collected funds upon attaining legal
majority.

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 4. A RELATION OF SECTION 117 INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT, 1925 WITH
SECTION 17 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

BACKGROUND

The Indian Succession Act of 1925 was formally enacted on September 30th, 1925. The
principal aim of enacting this Act was to set clear rules that would be applicable to those who
prepare a will before to their death, as well as those who do not. A will is a legally enforceable
document that serves as a testament to the testator's explicit wishes about the allocation and
administration of their possessions after their death. A comparable adjustment has also been
included in section 117 of the Indian Succession Act of 1925. The applicability of section 117
to Hindus has been established by virtue of section 14(4) of Act 21 of 1929.

HINDU LAW

As previously mentioned, the concept of accumulating assets for the advantage of the recipient
was deemed contradictory to the principle of an unconditional gift in Hindu law. The
aforementioned clause does not contradict any established principle of Hindu law, and its

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applicability to Hindus has been ensured via the revision of clause 2. Prior to the incorporation
of section 117 of the Indian Succession Act into the realm of Hindu wills, Sir Lawrence Jenkins
expressed the view that "the inclusion of a provision for accumulation alongside a gift of the
accumulated assets is not inherently flawed; its validity is contingent upon its compliance with
any separate principles of Hindu law." The validity of the directive remains intact unless the
restrictions imposed are deemed too harsh to the extent that they contravene public policy, or
if the direction is provided for an unlawful purpose, or if its outcome is incongruous with the
principles of Hindu Law. This section has a resemblance to Section 117 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925.

The permissible time for accumulation, as stipulated by the legislation, is determined by two
factors: the life of the transferor or a period of 18 years, whichever duration is longer. Any
condition that extends beyond this specified term is considered null and invalid, and so has no
legal effect. The allocation of funds might be designated for either the whole or a portion of
the revenue.

In KRISHNARAMANI V ANANDA KRISHNA1

A trust was established to accumulate excess income, with a provision that once the
accumulations reached a sum of three lakhs, they would be distributed to the sons and
descendants in accordance with their respective shares. According to Justice Macpherson, the
trust for accumulation does not include any transfer of the principal of the property. The validity
of a provision that allows for the accumulation of excess income for the purpose of benefiting
an adopted son, paying off debts, supporting a minor, or covering the marriage costs of the
testator's son has been established.

1
krishnaramani v ananda Krishna, 1872 4 beng LR 231 (India).

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In AMRITO LALL V. SURNOMOYE2, According to Jenkins (J.), the determination of the
time of accumulation under Hindu law should be based on the extent to which the testator may
command and control the path or devolution of property.

In GOSAVI SHIEGAR V. RIRETT CARNAC3, In the case where the bequest was made to
a young follower, with a provision that a part of the funds would be accumulated until the
individual reached the age of 30, it was determined that the individual had the right to receive
all of the collected income upon reaching adulthood. In the absence of explicit instructions to
the contrary, it is the established principle in Hindu law that income accumulations are
inseparable from the capital.

5. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS

1. NAME OF THE CASE: THIELLUSSON V. WOODFORD (1799)4, 4 Ves. 227

The principle of this section is based on an English case, Theluson v Woodford.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Peter Thellusson allocated the revenue generated from his assets, which included real estate
valued at approximately £5000 per year and personal estate exceeding £600,000, to be amassed
throughout the lifetimes of his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren who were alive

2
Amrito Lall v. Surnomoye (1897)24 Cal.589 (India).
3
Gosavi Shiegar v. Rirett Carnac (1889) 13 Bom. 463 (India).
4
Thiellusson V. Woodford (1799), 4 Ves. 227

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at the time of his demise, as well as the last surviving individual among them. The amassed
property, which is believed to have exceeded £14,000,000, was intended to be distributed
among the living descendants upon the death of the last surviving individual within the
specified period of accumulation.

The testator intends to bequeath his entire estate to trustees, with the condition that the income
generated from the estate is to be accumulated during the lifetimes of his sons A, B, and C, as
well as any of their descendants who are alive at the time of his death. Upon the passing of the
last surviving descendant, the entire estate will be held in trust and distributed equally among
the eldest male descendants of A, B, and C. Despite the fact that the money may amass to a
minimum amount of nineteen million pounds and no individual would be able to benefit from
it for a potential duration of 80 years, the trusts remain legally viable.

The Act of 1799, also referred to as the Thellusson Act due to its association with the
aforementioned case, prohibits the direction of accumulations for a duration beyond any one
of the subsequent periods.

i. Throughout the grantor's lifetime,

ii. For a period of 21 years following the grantor's or testator's death,
iii. During the minority of any individuals alive at the time of the grantor's or testator's
death,
iv. During the minority of any individuals who would have received the income had it not
been instructed to accumulate.

The last period under consideration may include those who constitute a minority and are no
longer alive at the time of the grantor's death.

WHAT WAS HELD?

The legal soundness of the gift was affirmed. In the year 1856, a protracted legal controversy
emerged about the identification of the authentic recipients. The ruling in favor of Lord
Rendlesham and Charles Sabine Augustus Thellusson was made by the House of Lords on
June 9, 1859. As a result of the substantial expenses incurred, the final amount obtained just
slightly exceeded the original endowment.

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2. NAME OF THE CASE: KOKILAMBAL & ORS VS. N. RAMAN [2005] Insc 270

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A family settlement deed existed, in which the settler created a limited interest (right to receive
the income form rents). Only after the settler died the property of the settler pass to the settler.

WHAT WAS HELD?

SC HELD- The family settlement does not confer a vested interest in favour of the beneficiary,
and the settlor is precluded from becoming the only proprietor of the property throughout their
lifetime. Consequently, at the demise of the settlor, the settler is precluded from receiving an
inheritance of the property.

3. NAME OF THE CASE: M KESAVA GOUNDER V DC RAJAN5

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The individual in question created a trust, transferred certain assets, and designated himself as
one of four trustees. The trust served dual objectives, namely, the commissioning of a
commemorative monument in honor of A's father, and the inclusion of a provision within the
trust deed to facilitate the financing of educational expenses for four students from the local
community. A strategic plan was established to guarantee the ongoing maintenance of the
monument and to celebrate the anniversary of his birth. The residual revenue generated by
these assets was intended to be distributed evenly among the four trustees. The designated male
successors were to inherit their allocated portions at the demise of the respective individuals,
and in the event of the lack of male successors, the female successors would assume the
inheritance. The Madras High Court determined that the trust in question contravened the rule
against perpetuity. This conclusion was reached based on the finding that the purported
dedication of the property was not genuine, but rather constituted a mechanism for establishing
a perpetual settlement of the property for the donor's descendants within specific lines.

5
M Kesava Gounder v. Dc Rajan, Air 1976 Mad 102 (India).

14
Additionally, it was observed that the income generated by the trust was consistently
distributed among the trustees throughout relevant periods.

WHAT WAS HELD?

The court determined that the trust, which aimed to fund the school expenses of four youngsters
from the community, was within the purview of section 18. Furthermore, the court recognized
this goal as commendable, therefore preserving the accumulation to the degree necessary.
Nevertheless, the installation of the paternal monument and the establishment of
commemorations for his birthday were not intended to serve the interests of the general
population.

4. NAME OF THE CASE: K. NARAYANASWAMY PILLAI VS SMT.

KANNAMMAL6

FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent/plaintiff initiated legal proceedings by filing a suit seeking a declaration of title
and the recovery of possession. According to the respondent's argument, the property in
question, known as the A-schedule property, was initially inherited by Rajagopal Pillai and
subsequently passed on to his son, Ramasamy Pillai, upon Rajagopal Pillai's demise. The
respondent asserts that Ramasamy Pillai, who passed away two years prior to the initiation of
the lawsuit, left behind his wife as the sole legal heir to the property.

Consequently, the individual being surveyed has the property classified as A-schedule. The
respondent argues that Rajagopal Pillai acquired the B-schedule property via a registered sale
deed on August 24, 1943, and asserts that they now have ownership of the land. On December
25, 1992, the individual in question unlawfully entered and occupied both A and B schedule
properties, using his elderly status as a means to do so. Consequently, the individual in question
initiated a legal action seeking a declaratory judgment in order to regain ownership of the assets
listed in schedules A and B.

WHAT WAS HELD?

The appellant has failed to provide any evidence to substantiate the alleged oral communication
in 1976, as rightly assessed by the court. The oral testimony provided by DW2 and DW5, which
was used to establish possession via an oral agreement, is deemed to be untrustworthy evidence

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K. Narayanaswamy Pillai Vs Smt.Kannammal

15
due to its inherent contradictions and lack of credibility, as correctly deliberated upon by the
lower courts. The appellant's legal representative presented a compelling argument, asserting
that the respondent has failed to provide sufficient evidence of possession over a period of 12
years before the lawsuit. Consequently, it is contended that the respondent does not have the
right to seek a declaration and recovery of possession. The lower courts unequivocally
determined that the appellant exclusively submitted papers commencing from February 25,
1981, and that the claim was initiated on February 16, 1993, which is significantly prior to the
expiration of the 12-year time limit. Moreover, the lower courts have taken into account the
stipulations outlined in Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 17 of the Transfer
of Property Act. Based on their analysis, they have determined that the purported agreement of
exchange documented above lacks legal validity. Consequently, the appellant does not possess
any rights under the aforementioned invalid document.

The counsel representing the appellant referred to a precedent set by the esteemed Supreme
Court in the case of Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported
in (1976) 3 SCC 119. They contended that the document Ex. B6, dated 25.02.1981, mentioned
above, is merely a family arrangement that serves to validate the parties' verbal agreement
made in 1976. Consequently, they argued that this family arrangement holds legal weight and
should be considered binding on the parties, thereby operating as an estoppel.

This court finds that both courts below correctly evaluated the authenticity and legality of the
purported Ex. B6 agreement of exchange deed dated 25.02.1981 and came to the conclusion
that the document is not legitimate since it is not registered. This belief is based on the
information that has been presented above. In addition, the lower courts properly analysed the
date of the agreement of exchange shown in Exhibit B6 as well as the date the action was first
filed, which led them to the conclusion that the complaint is not time-barred. As a consequence
of this, there is no need to interfere with the concurrent conclusions that were reached by the
two courts below, which decided all three significant legal problems in favour of the respondent
and against the appellant. This means that there is no need to overturn the findings that were
described above. As a direct consequence of this, the second appeal will most likely be rejected,
and it will be necessary to uphold the decisions reached by both of the lower courts.

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5. NAME OF THE CASE: FAZLUL RABBI PRADHAN VS. STATE OF WEST
BENGAL7

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The appellants were the respective mutawallis of two wakfs, in which either the ultimate benefit
to the charity was postponed till after the exhaustion of the wakif's family and descendants, or
the income from the wakf estate was applied for the maintenance of the family side by side
with expenditure for charitable or religious purposes.

WHAT WAS HELD?

The purposes outlined in the deeds were not included within the scope of the term "religious
purpose," and they did not just pertain to humanitarian endeavours. Interwoven within these
objectives were some secular aims, as well as significant family endowments. Since the family
provisions had not been ineffective due to the beneficiaries being exhausted, it cannot be argued
that the deeds, as they now stand, fall within the claimed exemption.

Indeed, it can be affirmed that subsequent to the enactment of the Mussalman Waqf Validating
Act of 1937, wakfs that were established with the primary intention of benefiting the families
of the wakifs, rather than serving charitable purposes in the conventional sense, were deemed
legally legitimate and enforceable. However, the primary objective was not to redefine the term
"Charity," which often refers to the act of providing assistance to those facing dire situations
and, in a legal context, denotes contributions made for the betterment of society. The act of
bestowing a personal present upon oneself or one's close relatives may be considered
commendable and devout, although it does not meet the legal criteria for being classified as a
charitable donation. In the context of Indian jurisprudence, courts have consistently declined
to recognize such gifts as falling within the realm of religious or charitable objectives, even
within the framework of Mahomedan Law.

7
Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of West Bengal, 1965 AIR 1722 1965 SCR (3) 307 (India)

17
 CONCLUSION

A direction for accumulation involves the segregation of income from property ownership with
the aim of establishing a separate fund or deferring the use of property benefits. The primary
purpose of the rule against perpetuities is to impose a temporal restriction on the duration for
which a property may be encumbered, hence prohibiting its total transferability. Before the
enactment of the legislation against perpetuities, it was permissible to direct the accumulation
of revenue for a duration that corresponded to the period during which the property might be
effectively restricted. The objective of this part is to propose a new regulation that imposes
further limitations on the duration during which revenue may be accumulated. One has the
ability to both explicitly state and indirectly suggest a direction of accumulation. The
instruction for accumulation may be rendered invalid in accordance with the perpetuity rule if
the specified duration of accumulation exceeds the permissible limit set out by such rule.

If the duration of accumulation exceeds the limit specified in the section, the excess amount is
considered invalid, and the income generated during the excess period, along with the interest
on the accumulated fund, should be allocated to individuals who would have been entitled to it
if there had been no instruction to accumulate.

A directive pertaining to the process of amassing resources or wealth might be seen as a

constraint on the experience of pleasure, as delineated in Section 11. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that Section 11 only pertains to transfers that result in the creation of an
absolute interest in the recipient, but Section 17 encompasses transfers of any kind without
distinction. In cases when a transfer has significant importance, the exclusions outlined in this
section also serve as an exception for the advantage of the recipient.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

CASES REFFERED

➢ Theluson v. Woodford 32 ER 1030 (HL) 32 ER 1030

➢ Ashwatthamma v. Ramakka, (2011) 1 AIR Kant R 829: (2011) 3 ICC 323 (India)

➢ Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashmantara Debi, AIR 1938 Cal 490 (496): 179 IC 847 (India)

➢ Pradyumna Kumar v. Pramatha Nath, AIR 1923 Cal 708(India)

➢ Runchordas v. Parvatibai, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 725(India)

➢ Prafulla v. Jogendra Nath, (1905) 9 Cal WN 528 (India)

➢ Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal, (1909) 37 Cal 128 (India)

➢ krishnaramani v Ananda Krishna, 1872 4 beng LR 231 (India).

➢ Amrito Lall v. Surnomoye (1897)24 Cal.589 (India).

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 ➢ Gosavi Shiegar v. Rirett Carnac (1889) 13 Bom. 463 (India)

➢ Kokilambal & Ors v. N. Raman [2005] Insc 270 (India).

➢ M Kesava Gounder v. Dc Rajan, Air 1976 Mad 102 (India)

➢ Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of West Bengal, 1965 AIR 1722 1965 SCR (3) 307
(India).

➢ Amrito Lall v. Surnomoye (1897) ILR 24 cal 589.

➢ Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1976) 3 SCC 119
(India).

BOOKS USED:

➢ R.K. SINHA, THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, (21st Edition, 2021).

➢ POONAM PRADHAN SAXENA, PROPERTY LAW, (3 rd Edition, 2020).

➢ AVATAR SINGH, THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, (6 th Edition, 2020).

ARTICLES USED:

➢ Bhimanapati deepthi, the scope of the doctrine of accumulation under the transfer of
propertyact,1882,lawsisto(Nov.06,2023),
https://www.lawsisto.com//legalnewsread/NTI1Nw==/Scope-Of-The-Doctrine-Of-
Accumulation-Under-The-Transfer-Of-Property-Act-1882

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