Arrighi - Desarrollo Capitalismo en Un Ambiente Hostil

Research Foundation of SUNY
Capitalist Development in Hostile Environments: Feuds, Class Struggles, and Migrations in a

Peripheral Region of Southern Italy
Author(s): Giovanni Arrighi and Fortunata Piselli
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring, 1987), pp. 649-751
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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Review,X, 4, Spring1987,649-751
CapitalistDevelopmentin
HostileEnvironments:
Feuds, Class Struggles,and
Migrationsin a PeripheralRegion
of SouthernItaly
GiovanniArrighi
FortunataPiselli
The mainpurposeofthisarticleis to analyzetheformation

of a wage-labor force in a peripheralenvironment.The
peripheralenvironmenton which we have conducted our
research1is one of the poorest regions of southernItaly
1. This articleis based on the findingsof a researchprojectcoordinatedby
Giovanni Arrighiand fundedby the Istitutoper to Sviluppo délie Attivitàe delle
RicercheScientifiche in Calabria on behalfoftheCassa peril Mezzogiorno.Research
startedin 1974, and initiallyfocused on labor migrationfromCalabria. Soon,
however,thefocusshifted to thedifferentpatternsofsocial conflict/
cohesionthathad
characterizedCalabria in itsrecentpast. The workinghypothesesof thegroupwere
elaborated,on thebasis ofsecondaryresearch,in variousunpublishedpapersbythe
coordinatorand othermembersofthegroup(Laura Ammannati,Pino Arlacchi,Vito
Barresi,GiancarloCarioti,PieroFantozzi,LuigiLuini,MartaPetrusewicz, Antonello
Pucci, FortunataPiselli,Franco Santopolo, Daniela Versace).Arlacchi(1983) made
extensiveuse of thisunpublishedmaterial.Most of thefieldwork (archivalresearch
and participantobservationin threevillages- one foreach of thezones discussedin
© 1987ResearchFoundationof SUNY
649

650 Giovanni
Arrighi Piselli
& Fortunata
(Calabria).Fromthepointofviewofourobjectofanalysis, the
significanceofCalabrialiesinitslonganddiversified historyof
labor-market formation. As earlyas 1450,peoplein Calabria
werefreeto moveaboutand to selltheirlaborpowerwhere
theywishedorwheretheybestcould(Galasso,1967).Yet,as
Aymard(1982: 133) has pointedout,"[the]freedom of the
individual tomovewasnotsufficient tocreatea labormarket."
For overfivecenturies, theterritorialmobility of laborhas
beenassociatedwiththe successiveappearanceand disap-
pearanceof a wholevarietyof relationsof production and
exchange.
In thefirsthalfofthenineteenth century, a system ofland
tenure knownas thelatifondo contadino (peasantlatifundium)
hadcometo predominate throughout theregion.Thesystem
wasnotthesameeverywhere. Arrangements between peasants
andlandlords showedgreatvariations fromplacetoplace,but
allthesearrangements hadonecharacteristic incommon: large
landedestateswerepartlyfarmedby the landowner, pre-
dominantly withwagelabor,andpartly subdivided intoplots
andfarmed bypeasantswhopaidrentincashor kind.In the
secondhalfofthenineteenth century (roughly fromthe1860's
up totheFirst World the
War), latifondo contadino tendedto
disappear,givingrisenotto one butto threedistinct social
formations.
IntheCrotonese (seeFigure1),thepeasantlatifundium was
transformed ina waythatresembled Lenin's( 1936)"Junker or
Prussianroad":thelandedestates were transformed intolarge
capitalistenterprises(knownin theliterature on Calabriaas
latifondi runbythelandlords
capitalistici) (directlyorthrough
oneoftheiremployees) whoemployed wagelabor,produced
forthemarket, andaimedat a maximum Thetenants
profit.
wereevictedandeither lefttheestatesforgoodorcontinued to
resideon themas wageworkers.
thetext)was carriedout byFortunataPisellibetween1975and 1984.The mainresults
ofthisinvestigationwerepublishedin Piselli(1981) and Piselli& Arrighi(1985). The
presentarticleis based on the publishedand unpublishedfindingsof the research
group,and was writtenin thisformafterwe had read the articleby Carol Smith
reprintedin thisissue of Review. We would like to thankPiero Bevilacqua, John
Casparis, Camillo Daneo, TerenceK. Hopkins,Marta Petrusewicz,and BeverlyJ.
Silverforusefulcommentsand criticismsat variousstagesofpreparationofthearticle.

CapitalistDevelopmentin HostileEnvironments 651
Figure1: Map of Calabriaand the Three Areas Analyzedin the Article
In the Plain of Gioia Tauro, in contrast,the peasant

latifundium
evolvedina waythatresembled Lenin's"farmeror
American road":thepeasantsbecamefarmers producingfor
themarket- someturning whoemployed
intosmallcapitalists
wagelabortosupplement familylabor,andothers into
turning
whohiredoutpartofthefamily's
semiproletarians laborto
supplementtheincomesderivedfromthesale ofproduce.In
thisinstance,
thelandlords soldpartoftheirlandto
generally

652 GiovanniArrighi& FortunataPiselli
themorewell-to-dopeasant-farmers, continuedto collectrent

on anotherpart,and became medium-sizedcapitalistentre-
preneurson yetanotherpart.
In theCosentino,thepeasantlatifundium evolvedinneither
oftheabove twodirections.Here,itevolvedtowarda systemof
peasant holdingsthatemployedfamilylabor, producedpre-
dominantlyfordirectconsumption,and sold in the market
both theirsurplus produce (subsistenceproduce over and
above the consumptionrequirements of the household)and,
above all, theirsurpluslabor (labor power that could not
effectively be used within the technical and institutional
arrangementsof subsistenceproduction).The key charac-
teristicof this transformation was that a good part of the
income,derivedfromthesale of labor powerin distantlabor
markets,was saved and eventuallyinvestedin thepurchaseof
land and other means of production.As a resultof this
tendency,the burden of renton the directproducerswas
progressively reduced(and thelandlordseliminatedfromthe
social and economicscene), and the viabilityof subsistence
productionwas reproducedor evenenhanced.We shall label
thistransformation the"migrant-peasant or Swiss road."2
The three transformations are schematicallyshown in
Figure 2. In thefirst
partofthis weshallshowthat,while
article
all threetransformations were associated with the further
developmentof a wage-laborforce,theygenerateddifferent
2. The idea ofdesignating thispathas the"Swiss road" has occurredto us froma
readingofCasparis( 1982; 1985). As JohnCasparishas pointedoutto us,Switzerland
itselfwas characterizedby threedifferent agriculturalregions.The regionthatmost
closelyparallelsthe Cosentinowas thatof the alpine pastoralistswho lived at the
highestaltitudes,derivedtheirsubsistencefrommeatand dairyproduction(part of
whichwas exchangedforgrainand salt),and had engagedin long-distance migration
sincethesixteenth century(e.g., throughthemercenary system).However,migration
playeda rolealso intheothertworegions.In theregionofdispersedhomesteadofthe
midlands,subsistencefroma mixedagriculture was supplementedby wage labor in
cottageindustry(e.g., watchesin the west,textilesin theeast), and therewas some
long-distance migrationto exploitativesituationssuchas coffeeplantationsin Brazil.
In theregionofvillagesofthefertile lowlands,theshiftoutofgrainintomeatand dairy
productionin the nineteenthcenturywas accompanied by migrationto the U.S.
midwest.It should be noticedthatLenin's Prussianand Americanroads werealso
ideal typesthatresembledcloselyonlydevelopments in certainregionsof Prussiaand
of theUnitedStates,respectively.

Figure2: The ThreeTransformations

of the PeasantLatifundium
socialstructures.IntheCrotonese, theJunker roadproduceda

landedbourgeoisie witha tightmonopolyoverthemeansof
production anda landlessproletariat withaccessto meansof
subsistence onlythroughthe sale of labor powerand the
of
purchase commodified means of subsistence withthe
proceeds. In this case, the sale of labor powerwas the
of of the
expression fullproletarianization formerly peasant
household. In thePlainofGioia,thefarmer roadproduceda
stratified
rather thana polarizedstructure: Thefull-bourgeois
andthefull-proletarian poles were farlessimportantthanin
theCrotonese, and theweightand numberof intermediate

654 Giovanni & Fortunata
Arrighi Piselli
stratawerefargreater.Almosteverybody had accessto the

meansofproducing anincome, butonlya minority hadaccess
to meanssufficient to producea full-subsistence income,let
aloneto save and accumulate. In thiscase,thesale oflabor
the
powerfora wagewas expression ofsemiproletarianization:
the conditionof pettyproducerswho could eke out a
subsistence onlybysupplementing thesaleofproducewiththe
sale of laborpower.Finallyin theCosentino,themigrant-
peasantroad producedneither a stratificationnora polar-
ization,buta leveling ofthesocialstructure. Mostestablished
householdscame to have access to meansof production
sufficientto providefullyfortheirsubsistence (or nearlyso).
The sale of householdlabor power,therefore, was only
secondarily or notall theexpression ofproletarianization or
semiproletarianization. Rather, it was the expression of a
of
process pettyaccumulation, in theform ofan initial
fund
withwhichto establisha newhouseholdand occasionally in
theformof an increasein theproductive and unproductive
wealthofestablished households.
Thesedifferences in socialstructure had important impli-
cations for the welfare of the peoplesinvolvedand forthe
patterns ofsocialconflict andcohesionthatbecamedominant
in thethreesituations. Thus,in theCrotonese, theextreme
polarization of the social structure was associated withan
extreme of the
impoverishment majority ofthe population and
withan endemicstateofclassstruggle overcultivation and
property rights between the landed bourgeoisie and the
landlessproletariat. In thePlainofGioia,thestratification of
the social structure was associatedwithless widespread
poverty and morediffuse wealththanin theCrotoneseand
withendemicstruggles amongrivalpatronagegroupsthat
weremoreakintofeudsthantoclassstruggles. inthe
Finally,
Cosentino, long-distance/ long-term migration contributed to
theformation of
andconsolidation relatively prosperous rural
communities in whichsocialconflict tendedto declineboth
horizontally (i.e.,amongkinshipgroups)and vertically (i.e.,
between landlords andpeasants).

Thistripartitepatternofdevelopment posessomeinteresting
questions,whichweshalltryto answerinthesecondpartofthe
article.In thefirstplace, systemsofproductionthatare often
construedas successivestagesinthedevelopment ofcapitalism
(subsistenceproduction,small-scalecommodityproduction,
and large-scalecommodityproduction)developedin Calabria
nextto each otherand at aboutthesamehistoricaltime.A first
problem,therefore, is to explain how and whyin thesecond
halfof the nineteenth centurya singlesystemof land tenure
gave rise,withinthesame region,to threedistinctpatternsof
social change.
In thesecondplace,ifnoneofthethreeroadsto wagelabor
can be construedas successivestagesofcapitalistdevelopment,
neithercan any of thembe construedas a featureof core
positionsor as a featureofperipheral positions.The verylabels
we have used to designatethem(Prussian,American,Swiss)
underscorethe fact that elsewherethese paths have been
associated witheconomicdevelopment/ ascent to core posi-
tion.Yet, in Calabria theywereall associatedwitheconomic
underdevelopment/peripheralization. As we shall see, the
of
forms peripheralization were differentinthethreeinstances,
butinall instancessocialandeconomicactorswereincreasingly
confinedto the performanceof subordinateroles in the
competitive struggles of theworld-economy.
This is a majordifference betweenour accountof regional
differentiation in Calabria and Carol Smith's account of
regional differentiation in westernGuatemala. The two re-
are
gionalconfigurations strikingly similar,but,whileinCarol
Smith's account there is an on a priorigroundsof
identification
"capitalistagriculture" witha core position,of "trade"witha
semiperipheral position, and of "peasant agriculture" witha
peripheralposition, in our account theidentificationofspecific
relationsofproductionwithspecificstructural positionsofthe
world-economy is done on empiricalgrounds.As itturnsout,
all threesystemsof productionseem to performperipheral
roles (see "Patternsof Peripheralization"below). A second
problem,therefore, is to explainhow and whypathsofsocial

656 Giovanni Piselli
& Fortunata
Arrighi
changethatelsewhere havebeenassociatedwithcoredevelop-
ment,inCalabriawereassociatedwithperipheralization.
Finally,as showninFigure2, aftertheSecondWorldWar
theinternal differentiation
of Calabriabecameincreasingly
blurred as thethreeroadstowagelabormerged intoa system
ofproduction inwhich,one,a largeproportionofpreviously
cultivatedlandwasnolongerputtoagricultural use,and,two,
thelandthatdidremain undercultivationcametobeexploited
throughout Calabriabya combination ofvertically
integrated
agrobusinesses, full-lifetime
farmers usingcapital-and skill-
intensivemethodsof production, and part-lifetime
wage
workers whointegrated theirwageincomeswithagricultural
production forsaleand/ordirectconsumption.Thetaskofthe
thirdandlastpartofthearticle istoexplainhowandwhy,after
a centuryofdivergence, thethreeroadstowagelaborsuddenly
(inhistoricaltime)begantoconverge towarda singlepattern.
A briefconcluding section
willthensum upthemainresults of
theanalysisandpointoutitstheoretical implications.
Part I: ThreeRoads to Wage Labor
Peasant(Swiss)Road
L TheMigrant-
Themigrant-peasant roadas itdevelopedintheCosentino
hadthreemainfeatures.3First,itwassubsistence The
oriented.
directproducersownedor had controlovertheuse of the
meansofproduction (land,livestock,tools,andso on).Market
a
exchangeplayed marginal role in the disposal of the
households'productsand in the procurement of inputs,
butnotexclusively
particularly currentinputs.Thebulkofthe
meansofsubsistence andofproduction wereeither produced
withinthehouseholdor obtainedthrough
directly formsof
barterand ceremonial exchange, which oftenincluded ex-
changeoflaborservicesamongkinand neighbors. Cooper-
ationaimedatself-sufficiency
wastheorganizing that
principle
3. Evidencefortheaccountofthemigrant-peasant road givenin thissectioncan
be foundin Piselli(1981) and Piselli& Arrighi(1985: 379-92,424-28).

in HostileEnvironments
Development
Capitalist 657
dominatedsocial and economicaction,and was enforced

through interlocking networks ofkinship, coparenthood, and
neighborhood.
Secondly,themigrant-peasant roadwas strictly regulated
by customary rules.Particularly significant forour present
purposes werethecustomary norms thatregulated inheritance
andmarriage. Variousformsofprimogeniture prevented the
of
fragmentationproductive units,and, combined with norms
thatrestricted theright tomarry, theygenerated an abundant
supply of subordinate domestic labor over and above the
requirements of the household. This surplus of labor wasnot
allowedto overburden thehousehold's resources. Tradition-
ally,itwasabsorbed unproductively bytheChurch orthestate,
butintheperiodunderconsideration itcametobe mobilized
productively through long-distance migration.
This bringsus to thethirdmainfeatureof themigrant-
peasantroad.As underscored byitsverydesignation, itrelied
heavilyon migration. Threetypesof migration, eachcorre-
sponding to a different kind of labor surplus,mustbe
distinguished. The first typewas seasonal and short-distance.
It consistedofindividuals or,more often, groupsofkinand
neighbors whotookadvantage oftheterritorial differences in
of
regimes agricultural production to selllabor power outside
theirterritorywithin Calabriaorneighboring regions. Through
thistypeofmigration, established peasanthouseholds trans-
formedthesurplusof labor associatedwith seasonal fluc-
tuations inagricultural intocommand
activities overmonetary
means, which could be used for purchases and payments
outside the subsistence economy.
The secondkindof migration was permanent emigration
and was largelytowardurbanratherthanruralareas of
Calabriaand neighboring regions.In contrastto seasonal
migration, it was individual in character, and it involved
almostexclusively the lower strataand the deviant members of
thepeasantcommunity. More specifically, those who emi-
gratedpermanently were impoverished peasants, illegitimate
children(identified in thelocal cultureas proietti, literally
"outcasts") who were excluded by birth from familyand

kinshiprights,and otherindividuals(illegitimate or not) who

could notbringthemselves to respectthestrictcustomaryrules
and obligations- rulesthatdeniedto manytherightto marry
and starta householdof hisor herown. Throughthiskindof
permanent migration, overpopulation wasdrasticallyreduced,
devianceexpelled,and thestructures and rulesof subsistence
productioncorrespondingly strengthened.4
The thirdtypeofmigration, and themostimportant forthe
development of the migrant-peasant road, was long-term/
long-distance migration.In contrastto permanent emigration,
long-distance migration was notpredominantly undertaken by
impoverishedpeasants, outcasts, and deviant individuals.
Rather,itwas undertaken byindividualsofintermediate social
status(intermediate, thatis, betweenlandlordsand impover-
ishedpeasants)whofullyacceptedtherulesand obligationsof
the communitiesfromwhichtheycame and to whichthey
intendedto return.Being long term,this kind of migration
involvedlong periodsof absencefromthecommunity (10-20
years),and,beinglongdistance,itinvolvedcostsand risksthat
made it a real"enterprise." As a consequence,onlythosewho
belonged to cohesiveand extended kin-groups, and accepted
the rules and obligationsthat regulated such groups,could
mobilizethematerialand moralresourcesnecessaryto under-
take the enterprise:to pay the expenses of the journey,to
ensurethesurvival/ adjustmentofthemigrantin thelocales of
immigration,and to ensure the survival of the migrant's
nuclearfamilywhich,as a rule,was leftbehindfora good part
of,or fortheentireperiodof absence.5
4. The most relevantphenomenonof deviance,both on the quantitativeand
qualitativelevel,was withoutdoubt thefigliproietti(i.e., illegitimate
children).The
customofprimogeniture, therigidfamily/social hierarchy, and thesubordinationof
childrento thepriorities
ofthefamily,suffocated theaspirationsofmanyindividuals.
As a result,the communityproduced an extremelyhigh numberof illegitimate
children.In the communityof Altopiano (a fictitiousname forthe village of the
CosentinowhereFortunataPisellidid fieldwork), forexample,fromthelate 1880*s
untiltheearly1950'sthepercentageoflegitimate childrenoscillatedbetween70% and
80% ofthoseborn.The other20%-30%werecomposedofthosegivento wetnurses,
those put in foundlinghospitals,and childrenof overseasemigrantswhose fathers
wereabsentformanyyearsand to whom,therefore, physiologicalpaternity could not
be attributed.
5. Whileoverseasemigration was generallyoflongdurationand concludedwith
the returnof the migrantin about 80% of the cases, fora small percentageof the

Development
Capitalist 659
In thisconnection it shouldbe noticedthatlong-distance

migration becamethemain,ifnottheonlywayinwhichthe
malemembers ofthecommunities inquestioncouldsolvethe
contradictionthatinevitably arosebetween adherenceto the
customary rulesofthecommunity and the"natural"desire,
upon reaching adulthood, to escapea subordinatepositionin
the household.The contradiction was solvedthroughthe
widespreadcustomof gettingmarriedon the eve of the
departureandofleavingthewifebehind(inhisorherfamily's
household)untilthe migranthad accumulatedsufficient
savingsto forma newviableunitofsubsistence production.6
Thisarrangement hadtwoimmediate effects, of
irrespective
whether themigrant actuallyreturned ornot:One,itstrength-
ened social networks of kinshipand neighborhood in the
localesofemigration,andtwo,itprojected suchnetworks into
thelocalesofimmigration, thereby further
facilitating rounds
of migration.7In thelongerrun,if and whenthemigrants
actuallyreturned withenoughsavingsto setthemselves up as
independent householders (as manydid), the structuresof
independent subsistence productionwould be further
consoli-
datedand expandedvia thepurchaseoflandfromabsentee
emigrantsit became a permanentphenomenon.Those who rejectedthe prescribed
modelofbehavior(forexample,youngersonswhowantedto marryagainstthewillof
theirparents)or thosewho wantedto escape theirsituationof materialand social
marginalization (forexample,illegitimate children)showeda greaterpredisposition
bothto emigrateand to consideritas a definitebreakwiththecommunity oforigin.
6. Not everyonemadea fortuneor managedto accumulatethemoneynecessary
to returnto thevillageand initiatea newproductiveactivity.Above all, ofthosewho
emigratedto South America(where money-making possibilitieswere,in general,
scarcerthanin NorthAmerica)manydid notreturn.For thisreason,South America
was knownin popular parlanceas "l'Americae d'u scuordu" (i.e., the Americaof
oblivion).In thiscontext,thephenomenonofthe"whitewidows"emerged,thatis,the
wivesofthoseemigrants who neitherreturned norsentnewsaboutthemselves. These
weremarriedwomenwithouthusbands,de factowidowswithoutthe possibilityof
contractinga new marriageand thus obliged to sufferthe constrictionsof both
marriageand widowhood.Emigrationcould also be a particularformof "divorce
" thewomanthatfamilyexigencieshad
Italian-style.Some youngmen,aftermarrying
imposedon themfortherestoftheirlives,emigratedto Americaneversendingnewsas
to theirwhereaboutsagain.
7. Thusoriginated thephenomenon oftheso-calledcatenedi richiamo(migration
chains),whichwereprogressively strengthenedand enlarged.An emigrant "called" kin
and neighborsin thearea of immigration, and thesein turn"called" others.

landownersand investment in land improvements and better

meansof production.
It followsthatlong-term/ long-distancemigrationfromthe
Cosentinonot onlyreduceddemographicpressureand social
tensions(as did permanentemigration)whileincreasingthe
commandof subsistenceproducersovermonetarymeans(as
did seasonal migration).It was also a powerfulfactorof
continuityand generationalexpansion of the local social
networksin whichsubsistenceproductionwas embeddedand
throughwhichit was carriedon. These networks,in turn,
providedan increasingly solid base fromwhichto "raid" the
world-economy in search ofthemostrewarding opportunities
to transform a surplusoflaborintoa commandovermonetary
means.8The wage labor produced by the migrant-peasant
road, therefore,was only in small part the wage labor of
proletarianssellinglabor powerin orderto procuremeansof
subsistence.Thiswas thecase forpermanentmigrantsbutnot
for long-termand seasonal migrants,who were in fact
protoentrepreneurs sellinglaborpowerinorderto accumulate.
One ofthemostimportant consequencesofthedevelopment
ofthepeasant-migrant roadwas thedemiseofsocialconflictin
all itstraditionalforms.Historically, theCosentinohad been
even less "peaceful"thantheCrotoneseor the Plain of Gioia
(see II. I). Social conflicthad takenthreemain forms:brig-
andage, periodicalseizures of lands to reaffirm customary
arrangements on theuse ofcommonland(usi civici),and feuds
among kin-groupsand territorialcommunities.With the
developmentoflong-distance migration,however,theseforms
of conflicteitherdeclined(brigandage)or acquired a ritual
characterthatemptiedthemof most or all of theirviolent
components(occupation of lands and feuds). To be sure,
repressive stateactionplayeda majorroleinthedetermination
of bothtendencies.Equally important, however,was thefact
that, as landlords were "bought out" withthe proceeds of
long-distancemigration,thescope forclass strugglebetween
peasants and landlordswas increasinglynarrowed.And as
in otherperipheralcontexts,see
8. On migrationas a factorofsocial continuity
Watson(1958) and Van Velsen(1960).

absolutescarcityand social tensionswerelessenedbyall three

typesof migration,occasions forsustainedfeudingbecame
fewer.9Brigandage,being a compositeformof conflictthat
combined elementsof the feud and of the class struggle,
declinedcorrespondingly.
Thisdoes notmeanthatothertypesofconflictdid notarise.
Apartfromtheconflicts thatarosein thesitesofimmigration,
to whichwe shall turnin part III, the peasant-migrant road
entailed,and continuouslyreproduced,a highlyoppressive
and repressiveformofpatriarchalism. The particularconflicts
generatedby this endemic oppressionwereeithermade moot
or
by migration played out withina straineddomesticsphere
thatcommunity normsconstrained to stayintact.In anyevent,
when we speak of the demise of social conflictand of the
evolution of a peaceful and cohesive society,we do so
comparatively-in comparison,specifically, to whathad pre-
viouslybeen in theCosentinoitselfand to thedevelopmental
tendenciesevidentintheothertwolocalesunderinvestigation.
2. The Junker(Prussian)Road
Developments in the Crotonese, along what resembles
Lenin'sJunkeror Prussianroad,offerthesharpestcontrastto
themigrant-peasant road oftheCosentino.10None ofthethree
main featuresof the latterwas in evidence.There was little
subsistenceproductionby peasantsand fewsociallyenforced
customaryrules and obligations.Massive emigrationhad
accompanied the eviction of the peasantry(i.e., so-called
primitiveaccumulationinclassicform),and thedisintegration
of communitythatthisonce-and-for-all depopulationof the
countrysideentailed,leftthe growthof the new institutions
unshaped by virtuallyany of the once-customary relational
or
rights obligations.
The typicaland all-encompassing unitofproductionwas the
so-calledcapitalistlatifundium{latifondocapitalistico),which
see Black-Michaud
9. On theconnectionbetweenfeudingand absolutescarcity,
(1975).
10. EvidencefortheaccountoftheJunkerroad giveninthissectioncan be found
in Piselli& Arrighi(1985: 405-14,420-24).

employedwage labor and producedforprofitby sale in the

market.Productionswitchedback and forthbetweenarable
and pasturageaccordingto thepricesofgrainversusthosefor
wool and cheeseon theone hand and (giventhegreaterlabor
intensity ofgrainproduction)theavailabilityofcheaplaboron
theother.
Paradoxically,theclosera unitwas to rationality in market
terms, the more "primitive" (i.e., land and labor intensive)its
agriculture. As Rossi Doria (1948: 7-9) has pointedout, in
order to switchquicklyfromherdingto sowinggrain,the
enterprisehad to be kept as simple as possible. Fixed
investment was avoidedbecauseitimpededrapidswitching of
capital from one sort of rural land-use to the other. When
assessed against the standard of the ideotypicalcapitalist
enterprise, therefore, thecapitalistlatifundium was only"half-
capitalist."It was capitalistin the formal sense of beingmarket
and profitorientedinitschoicesofinputsand outputswithina
given productionfunction.It was not capitalist(or very
partiallyso) inthesubstantive historicalsenseofcontinuously
revolutionizing productionfunction
the itself(see Schumpeter,
1961).
The surpluscommandedbythelatifondisti (a combination
ofrentand profit)as wellas theirentrepreneurial energieswere
mobilized,not to dominatemarketconditionsimpersonally
and indirectly via revolutionsin productionfunctions, butto
dominatesuchconditionspersonallyand directly via political
mechanisms.At the national level, the most conspicuous
resultsofthisstrategy weretheprotectionist measurestakenby
Italian governmentsfrom the late 1880's up throughthe
Second World War (see "Developmentof Regional Differ-
entiation"and "Peripheralization and theCrisisofCommodity
Production"below). At the local level, however,the most
conspicuous and most consequentialmeasureswere in the
sphereof labor relations.
The staticnatureoftheproductionfunctionand therelated
strategy ofkeepingtheuse ofland as flexibleas possiblecalled
forth, a necessarycomplement,
as a strategy aimedat keeping
wages low (because of the labor of
intensity grainproduction)

and, simultaneously, at preventing humansettlement on the

lands of the latifundium.In part,thisdouble objectivehad
been attainedthroughthe originalevictionof tenants,the
processthatat theoutsettransformed thelatifondocontadino
intothelatifondocapitalistico.The expropriation, throughthe
unilateraleliminationof long-term leases,clearedtheland of
mostpeasantsettlements and transformed theinhabitantsof
thosethatremainedintoruralproletarians whocouldnotpiece
togethereventhemostmeagerofsubsistenceswithoutselling
theirlabor powerto theestateson a continuousbasis.11
This fullproletarianization, however,had two broad neg-
ative effectsso far as the developmentof the estates and
capitalistenterpriseswas concerned.First,the depeasanti-
zation of the latifundium curtailedand "flattened"the local
supply of labor.It curtailedthelaborsupplybecauseitinduced
a largewave ofoncz-anA-{or-d\\ permanentemigration, which
depopulatedthe countrysideand produceda structural defi-
ciencyoflaborinthewholearea.12In addition,thelocal supply
of labor also became"flatter," thatis, devoidof seasonal and
skilledcomponents.Whenpartof the latifundium was culti-
vated by tenant-peasants, the landlordcould draw fromthe
stock of skillsthatpeasantsdevelopedas producerson their
subsistenceplots,and hecouldtakeadvantageofdifferences in
theregimesofproductionofthetwopartsofthelatifundium to
obtain an abundantlabor supplyduringseasonal peaks. As
peasants were turned into full proletarians,the seasonal
variabilityoftheirlaborsupplywas immediately lost,and after
a generationortwothewidearrayofagricultural skillswas lost
as well. The flexibility
gained in the use of land resourcesby
expropriationwas lost in the narrowedcapacities,and full-
timedependenceof thelabor supplytherebyformed.
11. On theprocessofformationofthecapitalistlatifundium intheCrotonese,see
theimportantcase studyanalyzedby Petrusewicz(1979).
12. At the turnof the centurythe Crotonesegeneratedlong-distancemigration
flows,which were quite large, althoughnot as large as those originatingin the
Cosentino(see AppendixI). Our findingscontradictArlacchi'scontention(based on
an inadequateanalysisofinsufficientofficialstatistics)thatthemigratory
flowsfrom
the Crotonesewereinsubstantialin comparisonwiththe strength of the migration
fromtheCosentino(1983: 173ff).

Secondly,thedepeasantizationof thelatifundium workers

transformed thelatter'ssurlycompliancein thelord-peasant
relationinto the straightforward antagonismof the capital-
labor relation,withnegativeeffectson disciplinedworkand
respect for land and property.A regime of agricultural
productionthatprosperedby deprivinglabor of cultivation
rights(in orderto preserveflexibilityintheuse ofland) and by
grantingwagesgrossly insufficient
to guaranteea full-lifetime
physical subsistenceto itswork forcecould neverbecome,and
neverdid become,legitimatein the eyes of workers.On the
contrary, itfeda deep resentment that,whenevertheoccasion
arose,was translatedintowidespreadtheft,damage to prop-
erty,infringement of therulesdenyingcultivationrights,and
pervasively poor work performance.
These contradictionsof fullproletarianization werenever
resolved.Theywere,however,keptincheck,fromthepointof
view of capital, by two relateddevelopments.One was the
developmentof a symbioticrelationbetweenthe capitalist
latifundium and theagricultural regimesthatwereemerging in
neighboring territories
suchas theCosentinoand thePlain of
Gioia. Under these other regimesthe structuresof rural
productionwerebeingstrengthened butin either
or stratified,
case preserved.The latifondistiof theCrotonesecould there-
forefillthe local deficiencyof seasonal and skilledlabor by
drawingfromthelabor surplusoftheotherareas. As a matter
of fact,theydevelopedthe practiceof recruiting morelabor
thanwas strictly necessaryto fillthelocal deficiencyso as to
keep up thepressureof competitionon thelocal proletariat.
This pressurewas particularly intenseowingto thefactthat
thepeasantswho sold labor powerto thecapitalistlatifundia
notonlycommandedskillsthattheproletarianized workersof
the Crotonesewere losing or had lost; theyalso expecteda
wage levelsufficientonlyto supplement,or to complement, a
subsistenceproducedor earnedelsewhere.In a sense,manyof
them could be said to have been practicing a form of
"dumping"throughwhichtheirlabor surpluswas sold under
costinthelabormarketoftheCrotonese.As a consequenceof
this intensecompetitivepressure,the local ruralproletariat

Capitalist in HostileEnvironments
Development 665
was forcedto sell itslaborpowerat wagesbelowthelevel

necessaryforit to pay evenforthefoodstuffs neededfor
subsistence.13
Thiswasonlya partialandshort-term solutiontothelabor
problemsof the capitalistlatifundium. For one thing,by
keepingthe rural proletariatbelow the levelofphysiological
subsistence,it tended to degrade and further depletethe
latifundium'sinternallabor supplies. In the long run,this
tendencywouldincrease thedependence ofthelatifondisti on
external
supplies and, therefore,theirvulnerability to compe-
forthepeasants'
tition laborsurplus.Moreover, thestrategyto
intensify
competitive pressureson therural proletariatthrough
heavyrecruitment ofnon-and semiproletarianized outsiders
providedonlya verylimitedsolutionto theotherproblem
posedbyfullproletarianization - thatis, keepingtheantag-
onismoftheruralproletariat undercontrol.
To someextent, ofcompetition,
theintensification combined
withthesegmentation ofthelaborforceintogroupsdrawn
fromdifferentcommunities andclasssituations, didprovidea
to
solution this problem bypreventing the coalescence ofclass
13. In Campolungo (a fictitiousname for the village of the Crotonesewhere

Fortunata Piselli did fieldwork)there were on average 600-700 local workers
(includingsome childrenunder14 yearsof age), and duringthehighlabor-demand
season (harvest,thrashing, etc.) another300-400workersarrivedfromoutside.Given
thegreatercompetitiveness of theexternallabor forcethispolicyof the latifondisti
maintained,evenduringtheseason ofhighagriculturallabor demand,conditionsof
unemployment amongthelocal proletariat thatfedmobilityand internalcompetition.
The local workersonlyworkedfora fewmonthsa yearand livedin uncertainty as to
whethertheywouldevenbe able to securethesemonths.Theywereforcedto complete
various successivesteps to ensure theiremployment,includingthe activationof
clientelistic
networks.
Not onlydid theworkersoftheCrotoneseworkforjust a fewmonthsperyear,but
theirwages were also among the lowestin all of Calabria: at the beginningof the
twentieth centuryin Campolungoa workerearned 1 lira and 25 cents,whilein other
areasofCalabria a workerearned2-3lire,orevenas muchas 4 lire.In Olivara(oursite
offieldworkin thePlain ofGioia) thewage ofa workerrangedfroma minimumof 1
liraand 75 centsto 3 lire(see InchiestaParlamentare,1909:276, 280).
The miserablelivingconditionsofthelaboringpopulationoftheCrotonesehad a
devastatingeffecton theirphysicalhealth.This was evidentabove all in comparison
withthemorerobustand healthypopulationof theCosentino,who had at leastthe
meansto producetheirphysicalsubsistence(see Arlacchi,1983: 177ff).

solidarity.14However,the strategyof keepingclass antag-

onisms in check throughcompetitivepressurealone was
ineffectiveinsofaras noncooperationand indisciplinewere
concernedand,moreover,was unpredictable in itscapacityto
forestallcollectiveaction:"Explosivesocial material"tended
to accumulateand at a favorableconjuncturewould easily
detonate.15As a matterof fact,the latifondistineverrelied
exclusively(or even principally)on the intensification of
intralaborcompetitionto disciplinetheworkforceand keep
class antagonismin check. Rather, the developmentof a
symbioticrelation betweenthe capitalistlatifundiaof the
Crotoneseand thepeasantcommunitiesof neighboring terri-
torieswas paralleledand sustainedby thedevelopmentof an
internalrepressiveapparatus, which made the latifundia
assume the twofoldcharacterof capitalistenterprisesand
quasimilitary organizations.
14. In Campolungo,forexample,the shepherdsall came fromcertainvillages
(fromCastel Silano, Caccuri,Cerenzia,San Giovanniin Fiore,Carlopoli); likewise,
the cattle-drivers
tendedto come fromcertainvillages;the day-laborerscame from
Reggio Calabria and thevillagesof theCosentino.Certainresidentialcommunities
wereintegrated otherslater;somewerestablelatifundioworkers(cattle-keepers,
first,
shepherds),othersweremobileand seasonal(agricultural workers).Shepherds,cattle-
keepers,and day-laborersformedso manyresidentialsubgroupsof theagricultural
workforce.Theyconstituted separategroups,distinctintheirdialect,intheircustoms,
intheirkinshipand neighbornetworks, and intheiroccupationsand relationswiththe
boss.
Competitionbetweentheworkforces(local or seasonal) was a consequenceofthe
generalscarcityof resources:scarcityof work,of food, of land. The conditionof
scarcityrestrictedthe developmentof the sphere of generalizedand balanced
reciprocitywhileenlargingthe sphereof negativereciprocity. Each one could find
himselfinthecircumstances ofmaximizinghisowninterests and ofdefending hisown
subsistenceand security
at theexpenseofanother.The mostfriendly formwas thatofa
game of chance,thefamous"tirarea tocco" conductedby commonagreement;the
agriculturalworkerspooled togetherall of theirfood rations,whichthemostexpert
dividedintounequal parts(fromthe mostabundantto one thatreceivednone),and
thentheydrewlots.The winnerhad therightto satiatehimselfat theexpenseofthe
others.In otherinstances,themethodsused formaximizingone's owninterests were
even moredirectand explicit,such as robberyand the denouncingof co-workers.
Thus,forexample,theday-laborers wereobligedto keepthebreadon theirbeltso that
theirfellow-workerscould notstealit.Likewise,iftheyweredrivento stealbyhunger,
theycould expectto be denouncedbya companion,readyto do anythingin orderto
protecthimselfagainsttheaccusationsof othersand to puthimselfin a good lightin
theeyesof thelandlord.
15. I he metaphoris borrowedIrom Hobsbawm(1964).

inHostileEnvironments
Development
Capitalist 667
Many of the wage workersemployedon a stablebasis

{salariatifissi) becamearmedguardswho performed the
doublerole of privatepoliceand supervisors of thelabor
process.Theyimposedthe ordersof theirmasterson the
laborerswhowereemployedon a daily,weekly, or at most
monthly basis.Theythreatened (andwhennecessary executed)
harshsanctionsagainsttransgressors, and theyassuredthe
security of personsand property on theestates.The repro-
ductionof thelandowners' monopolyovertheuse of land
resources thuswenthandin handwiththeenforcement ofa
territorial
monopoly over theuse of violence.
Thisdoublemonopolycouldof courseonlybe exercised
withtheconnivance and ultimate backingofagenciesofthe
state.Consciousofthisdependence, thelandowners pursued
anactivepolicyofmonopolization oflocaladministrative and
judicial power either or
directly through kin and clients.
Normally, thisrepressive apparatus(complemented by the
intensecompetitive pressures discussedabove) managedto
keeptheantagonism of theruralproletariat undercontrol.
Whenstatepowerwasdisorganized, however, ortheorganic
linksthatconnectedagrariancapitalto thestateweredis-
rupted,whichwastrueat theendoftheFirstWorldWarand
againattheendoftheSecondWorldWar,theCrotonese was
shakenby suddenexplosionsof class struggle thathad no
parallelin otherpartsofCalabria.
On theseoccasions,occupations oflandhadnothing ofthe
ritualand peacefulcharacterof the periodicoccupations
typicalof theCosentino.Theywereaccompaniedby street
demonstrations, seizuresof publicbuildings, violentclashes
the
withboththeprivatepoliceof landowners andthestate's
militaryandpoliceforces.Thesestruggles temporarily under-
minedtheterritorial monopoly over theuse of violence on
whichtheeconomy ofthecapitalist latifundium rested,and,as
we shallsee,theyeventually precipitated itsdemise (see the
sectionon peripheralization and the crisisof commodity
production, see II. 3, below).
Fromthepointofviewoftheevolutionofsocialconflict,
therefore, theJunkerroad producedquitedifferent results

fromthemigrant-peasant road. Far fromleadingto a demise

of the class struggle,it made class contradictionsmore
explosive.Withthe transformation of the peasantlatifundia
intocapitalistlatifundia,theactors,objectives,and formsof
strugglechanged:The confrontation betweenlandlordsand
peasantswas displacedbytheconfrontation betweena landed
bourgeoisie and a ruralproletariat; objectoftheconfron-
the
tation was no longer confinedto cultivationrightsand
propertyrightsbut came to include also the rightto a
subsistenceand to decentworkingconditions;and thestruggle
took on a morepoliticalcharacteras theorganiclinksbetween
thenationalstateand the"internalstate"ofthelatifundiawere
implicitlyor explicitlychallenged. Notwithstanding these
changes,theconflict retainedthecharacterofa "classstruggle,"
and a comparisonof the wave of conflictthatfollowedthe
Second WorldWar withall previouswaves suggeststhatthe
Junkerroad not only reproducedbut even intensifiedand
enlargedclass conflict(see II. 3).
The difference withtheCosentinois broughtout starklyby
the fact that the intensification of the class strugglewas
accompaniedby a declineof long-distancemigration.At the
turn of the centurythe Crotonese had almost as much
experience in long-distanceemigrationas the Cosentino.
Migratoryflowslargelyoriginatedin the interiorwherethe
expandingcapitalistlatifundium clashedwiththestructures of
subsistencepeasant production.We may suppose,therefore,
thatlong-distancemigrationfromthe Crotonesewas analo-
gous to that fromthe Cosentino. What scantyevidenceis
available seems in fact to supportthe hypothesisthat the
subjectsof thisemigrationcould relyon the same individual
and group resourcesas the long-distancemigrantsof the
Cosentino.
The analogy,however,did not go muchfurther thanthis.
Particularlysignificant werethedifferences in theimmediate
causes and temporalpatternsof migrationoriginatingin the
twoareas. In theCrotonesethepushto emigratedid notcome
so muchfromthe customarynormsthatrestricted rightsto
inheritand marryas fromthegrowingdifficulties ofpreserving

Development
Capitalist 669
one'sproductive andreproductive capabilitiesinthefaceofthe

landlords'centralizingtendencies.The difference wasreflected
in thefactthatlong-distance migration from the Crotonese
tendedtobepermanent, ratherthanlong-term (10-20years)as
in theCosentino.Moreover, in theCrotonese, long-distance
migration did not have any of the positivefeedbacks on the
autonomy and socialcohesion of peasanthouseholds ithadin
theCosentino. the
On contrary, emigration was oftenthe final
blowforcommunity andkinship networks, whichhadalready
beenweakened the
by ongoingprocess of forced proletarian-
ization.
Assoonas theprocessofproletarianization wascompleted,
long-distancemigration fellsharply(see AppendixI). The
ruralproletariat of the Crotonesedid not commandthe
individualandcollective resources necessary toundertake the
costsand of
risks this of
type migration. As a matter of fact,the
moraland materialimpoverishment of theruralproletariat
weresuchthatevenitsabilityto competeeffectively in the
regionallabor markets was undermined. And as thescopeof
"exit"narrowed, "voice"becametheonlyoptionopento the
ruralproletariatto escapetheexploitation andoppression of
thelandedbourgeoisie anditsrepressive apparatus.
Road
3. TheFarmer(American)
Thefarmer road,as itdevelopedinthePlainofGioia,had
sometraitsincommonwithboththeJunker andthemigrant-
peasantroad.16However,thesetraitsand othersthatwere
absentin theothertworoadswerecombinedin a distinctive
way.AsintheJunker road,outputsweresoldandinputswere
boughtin markets, but,as in themigrant-peasantroad,the
direct
producersgenerallyhadsomecontrol overtheuseofthe
meansof production. neither
It was regulated bythevisible
handofthelandlords andthestate(as wasthe Junker road)
norbycustomary rulesand obligation(as was themigrant-
16. Evidencefortheaccountofthefarmerroad givenin thissectioncan be found
in Piselli& Arrighi(1985: 393-404,415-20).

peasant road), but by a combinationof marketcompetition

and powerstrugglesamongrivalpatronagegroups.
It generatedneitherthepolarizedsocial structure typicalof
theJunkerroad northehomogeneoussocial structure typical
of the migrant-peasant road. Instead, it produced a highly
stratifiedsocialstructure,whichincluded:(1) an upperstratum
oflandownersturnedintomedium-sized capitalists,whowere
also part-rentiers sincetheyleased land to farmersand other
capitalists;(2) an upper-middlestratumoffarmers turnedinto
small-to-medium-sized capitalists,who systematically accu-
mulatedin excess of what was necessaryto reproducetheir
households'capacityto generatea subsistenceincome;(3) a
middle stratumof independentfarmers,who accumulated
moreor less whatwas necessaryto reproduceovertimetheir
households'capacityto generatea subsistenceincome;(4) a
lower-middle stratumofsemiproletarianized farmers, whodid
not accumulateenoughto reproduceover timetheirhouse-
holds' capacityto generatea subsistenceincome;(5) a lower
stratumoffullyproletarianized laborers.17
17. The muchgreatersocial stratificationin the Plain of Gioia can also be seen
fromthedistribution oflandinthethreeareas. For example,landownership was more
fragmented in Olivara (a fictitiousname forthe village of the Plain of Gioia were
FortunataPisellidid fieldwork)thanin Altopianoand farmorefragmented thanin
Campolungo. Accordingto the 1947 INEA surveyon the distributionof landed
propertyin Italy,32.5% of the agriculturalland in Olivara was concentratedin the
handsof largelandowners(6 landownersoccupied 1,682hectares);21.9% was in the
handsofmedium-sized farmers (10 landownersoccupied619 hectaresand 15occupied
513 hectares);whilethe remaining45.6% was fragmented intosmall and verysmall
property (69 landownersoccupied751 hectares;170occupied516 hectares;and 2,265
occupied 1,092hectares).
In Altopiano53% oftheagriculturalland was concentratedin thehandsof large
landowners(22 landownersoccupied 6,383 hectares); 12% was divided among
medium-sized producers(28 landownerspossessed1,392hectares),and theremaining
35% was fragmented into small and verysmall plots: 169 peasantspossessed 1,631
hectareswhile3,802possessed2,563 hectares.
Finallyin Campolungo,whereland concentration was thegreatest,76.7% of the
agriculturalland was concentratedin thehandsofonly3 landowners(who possessed
9,505hectares);another19.2%ofthelandwas concentrated inthehandsofotherlarge
landowners(2 occupied 1,531 hectaresand 4 occupied854); and onlytheremaining
4. 1% ofthelandwas dividedamongmedium,small,and verysmallproperties (INEA,
1947).

Development
Capitalist 671
In addition,thefarmer roadwascharacterized bya much

greaterdifferentiation of economicactivities thantheother
tworoadssincethedevelopment ofmarket exchanges within
the Plain and betweenthe Plain and core marketswas
sustained by,andgaveriseto,a wholevariety oftrading and
manufacturing activities.The householdsinvolvedin these
activitieswerestratified moreor lessin thesamewayas the
households involved inagricultural activities.Thelowerstrata
ofthisdiversified structure (corresponding tostrata4 and5 in
theaboveranking) continuously generated a supplyof,andthe
upper strata a demand for, wage labor. As a consequence,
something closerto a competitive labor market thananything
thathadeverexisted inthe Cosentino orinthe Crotonese came
intoexistence inthePlainofGioia.
Thislabormarket hadimportant directandindirect linkages
withtheeconomiesofneighboring territories as wellas with
coreregions. Themaindeterminant ofconditions inthelabor
market ofthePlainwereconditions inthemarkets ofitsmain
crops (olives and citrus When
fruit). conditions in theexport
markets werebooming,so was thedemandforlaborin the
Plain,notonlybecausecapitalist landlords andfarmers would
be keenon expandingagricultural output,butalso because
someofthem,orentrepreneurs fromoutsidethePlain,would
beinducedtodevelopforward andbackward linkages between
agricultural and other activities.18
Atthesametime,however, thesupplyoflaborfromlocal
sources, farfrom expanding tomatchdemand, wouldstagnate
or evencontract becausethesemiproletarianized households
thatwerethemainsourceof suchsupplycould meettheir
18. In Olivara, forexample,thanksto the impetusfroma nucleusof "foreign"
capitalistentrepreneurs,at thebeginningofthetwentieth
century,a largenumberof
smalland medium-sized firmsemerged,not onlyin export-oriented but
agriculture,
also in commerceand manufacture. One oftheseentrepreneurswas Marco Pontillo,
who at theage of20 movedto OlivarafromAtraniand setup a successfulcommercial
enterprise,whichprosperedand rapidlyexpanded. In 1904 he constructed,in the
vicinityof thetrainstation,"a complexof warehousesforfood and colonial goods,
accordingto thebesttechnicaland
includingabundantolive oil cisternsconstructed
hygenicnorms"(Délibéra delta Giunta,September14, 1912). The success of his
initiativeencouragedtheemergenceofnewfirmswhichsetthemselves up bythefreight
yardof Olivara.

subsistencerequirements by sellingproduce as easily as (or

moreeasilythan)by sellinglabor power.An oppositeimbal-
ance wouldoccurwhenexportmarketsweredepressed:While
profit-orientedproductionand investment wouldbe cutdown
bothinagricultural and complementary leadingto a
activities,
contractionof labor demand, labor supply would expand
owingto the difficultiesencounteredby semiproletarianized
householdsin procuringthemeansof subsistencevia thesale
of produce.
In additionto theseworld-market inducedfluctuations, the
labor marketof the Plain of Gioia would experienceother
fluctuationsconnectedto the productioncyclesof its main
crops(seasonal fluctuations, two-yearcyclesin thefertility of
olive trees,pluriannualcyclesin labor-intensive investment
necessaryto restorefertilityofland and plantations,etc.) and
to the vagaries of climaticand ecological conditions.The
overlappingof all thesefluctuationscontinuouslyproduced
excess demand or excess supplyin the local labor market,
which generatedpartiallycountervailingmigratorymove-
ments:Excess demand would generateinbound flows,and
excesssupplyoutboundflows.
Both inbound and outbound flows were of two kinds:
seasonal and long-term. Seasonal flowsweresimilarto those
already discussedin connectionwiththemigrant-peasant and
the Junkerroads, withone importantdifference. While the
formergeneratedexclusivelyoutboundflowsand the latter
predominantly inboundflows,thefarmerroad in thePlain of
Gioia generatedboth inbound and outbound flows. In the
monthsof slack activityin the Plain and peak activitiesin
neighboringareas of small- or large-scalecommoditypro-
duction,membersofthelowerstrata(and to someextenteven
oftheintermediate stratumofindependent farmers)wouldgo
to selllabor powerin thelatterareas in competition withlocal
ruralproletarians and withmigrant-peasants fromtheinterior.
In themonthsof peak activityin the Plain, migrant-peasants
fromthe interiorand rural proletariansfromcoastal areas
would come and competein thePlain's labor marketwiththe
local labor force.

Development
Capitalist 673
This combination of inflowsand outflowscould also be

detected in longer-term migratory movements. In periodsof
expansion, the Plain ofGioia turned intoa siteof immigration,
notonlyfortheimpoverished peasantsand outcastsof the
interior,butalso fora stratum of mediumand smallentre-
preneurs from other Italianregions,whoplayedan important
rolein thespreadof marketnetworks withinthePlainand
between thePlainandcoremarkets. periodsofcontraction,
In
theimmigration fromotherItalianregions wouldsubside,and
long-distance migration from the Plain would experience a
sharpupturn (seeAppendixI).
On average,however,long-distance migration fromthe
PlainofGioiaremained wellbelowthelevelsattainedinthe
Cosentino.In thelatterzone,solid kinshipstructures and
relatedcustomary normsprovidedindividualsfrominter-
mediatesocialstratabothwiththeincentives and withthe
meansto undertake long-distance migration. In thePlainof
Gioia,incontrast, theloosenessofkinship structures andthe
pervasive influence of market competition generally meant
thatthosewhohad the means did nothave the incentiveto
emigrate, and thosewhohad theincentive did nothavethe
means.Thus,thevaststratum ofsemiproletarianized house-
holdstypical ofthePlain(as wellas thelessnumerous butstill
largestratum offully proletarianizedhouseholds) undoubtedly
had a strongincentive to emigrate.Generally, however, they
could neither counton sufficient meansof theirown,nor
mobilizeamongrelativesand neighbors the resourcesand
assistancenecessary to cover the costs and risksof long-
distanceemigration. Theirposition wassomewhat better
than,
butsimilarto,thatoftheruralproletariat oftheCrotonese.
As a consequence, theywouldcontinueto sell theirlabor
power in the local and regionallabor marketevenunder
relativelyunfavorable conditions.
As forhouseholdsofthemiddleand upper-middle strata
theyundoubtedly had the means but normally had no incentive
toundertake long-distance emigration.To be sure,inperiods
ofunfavorable conditions fortheactivitiestheywereinvolved
in,theincentive wouldincrease, anditwasquitecommonfor

them to sell land and other assets to financeemigration.

However,these departureswere always partiallyor wholly
balancedbyincomingsettlerswhoboughtthelandfromthose
leaving, either to start with new lines or techniques of
production,or to continuewiththesame linesand techniques
but withlowerexpectations.19
This account of migrationto and fromthe Plain of Gioia
underscoresthefactthatit was a factorand an expressionof
marketregulation.The pervasiveness ofmarketregulation was
indeedthedifferentia specificaof thefarmerroad as distinct
from the migrant-peasantand the Junkerroad. Market
regulation,however,did nottakeplace ina social and political
void. On the contrary,it took place and was embeddedin a
contextofstruggle/ dominationamongrivalpatronagegroups.
In the Plain of Gioia, as in otherpartsof the Italian south
where the peasant latifundiumwas transformedalong the
farmerroad, thedevelopmentof marketcompetitiondid not
lead to thewithering awayofthefeudbutto itstransformation.
Kinship groups were progressively displaced by patronage
groups as the main actors of the feud,and the feud became
interwovenwithmarketcompetition.Notwithstanding these
changes,however,the strugglescontinuedto be carriedout
withmeans,andto be legitimated byvalues,ofthe"traditional"
type.
19. The emigrantsfromOlivara werecontinuouslyreplacedby immigrants from
nearbyinternalzones. The emigrationof peasants and proprietorsfollowingthe
viniculturecrisisat theend ofthe 1880's,forexample,was morethancompensatedby
the immigration of peasantsfromSerre,fromMonte Poro, etc. This replacement
mechanismreacheditsheightat timesof land redistribution, as in thesecond halfof
thenineteenth century and aftertheSecond WorldWar.The landgrantees,inorderto
financeemigration, sold theirplotsof land to peasantsdescendingtowardthecoast
fromthe internalregions. In Olivara, for example, in the decade followingthe
occupationsinitiatedin 1946,almosttwo-thirds oftheplotschangedownership, many
even before the definitiveassignmenthad been made. "Renouncing occupants"
(artisans,employees,etc.) and indebtedpeasantsprofitedfromtheinflationof land
pricesthat accompaniedthe arrivalof new immigrants; theyceded theirland and
emigratedto Franceor Liguria.Above all, fromMelicucco and fromPolistenanew
peasantscame who possessedsome savingsand descendedto the plain in orderto
bettertheirposition.These new arrivals,togetherwiththe peasantsof Olivara and
returningemigrants, carriedoutthefirstprojectsofdeforestationand landreclamation
of theoccupiedland.

Development
Capitalist 675
Eachroundofopenstruggle endedwiththeformation ofan

authority ofthe mafia typeholding a territorialquasimonopoly
over the use of violence.Once established, thisauthority
tendedto exerciseinformal governmental functions: itguar-
anteedorder;mediated conflicts;ensuredreciprocity intrans-
actionsand therespectofcontractual obligations;regulated
competition byoccupying keynodesinthelocalramifications
of commodity chains;set limitsto profit-making and the
exploitation oflabor;andprotected localinterests againstthe
powersofthelandlords andthestate.
Bothphasesofthestruggle/ domination cycle,whichcon-
tinuously reproduced themafia-type authority, derivedtheir
legitimacy froma widelyshared"code of honor."Whatever
theactualoriginsof this"code,"thesocialconsensuscom-
mandedbythemafia-type authority can be tracedto thefact
thatitprotected localsociety from thedisruption ofunfettered
market competition on the onehand and from the abusesofan
absenteecentralstateon theother.By partially transfering
competition froma strictly economicterrain to personalized
strugglesforstatusandpower;bysubmitting "outsiders" toits
ownrulesof thecompetitive game;by hampering a strictly
capitalistutilizationofthesurplus; bydisplacing theauthority
of the central state- in these and other the
ways mafia-type
authority heldincheckthepolarizing tendencies ofcapitalist
production, thereby contributing to the preservation ofinter-
mediatesocialstrata.
The feudand thereproduction of a mafia-type authority
werethusintegral aspectsofthefarmer roadas itdeveloped in
the Plain of Gioia. In thisrespect,the contrastwiththe
declining significance ofthefeudintheCosentino is striking.
of
Withthedevelopment long-term/ long-distance migration,
theexpansion andconsolidation ofpeasantownership, andthe
consequent reliefofthe situationof absolute scarcity,the feud
intheCosentino becamemoreandmorea factorofsolidarity
rather thanan instrument ofcompetition forscarceresources.
In its activephase,thefeudtendedto strengthen loyalties
within thecounterposed factions.Whenitended,itsresolution
generally involvedthemarriageor coparenthood (compar-

aggio) amongmembersofopposed factions.The development

of long-term/ long-distancemigrationand the levelingof the
social structurethuscreateda social environmentfavorableto
thepeacefulresolution,and eventuallythedemise,ofboththe
feudand theclass struggle.
In the Plain of Gioia, the conditionsfor this kind of
evolution were missing.The intensification of competitive
pressures associated with the developmentof commodity
production, andtherelatedweakeningofkinshipand neighbor-
hood structures, meantthatoccasionsforfeudingmultiplied,
and thatthe resolutionof the feudcontinuedto be predom-
inantlyif not exclusivelybased on the overpoweringof the
weakerfactions.20 As a consequence,farfromdeepeningand
wideningsolidarityamongkinand neighbors,thefeudin the
social contextof the Plain fosteredresentments that were
bound to generatenew rounds of open conflictas soon as
relationships of forcesamongold and newfactionschanged.
The evolutionofsocial conflictinthePlain ofGioia was also
quite differentfrom that experienced by the Crotonese.
Noi withstandingsome similaritiesof form,the territorial
quasimonopolyof the mafia-typeauthorityover the use of
violencediffered substantively fromtheterritorial
monopoly
ofthelatifondisti. The formermonopolywas undera constant
threatfromactualand potentialcompetitors, and in thissense
it was a quasimonoyoXy . The competitors,however,did not
questiontherulesofthegame- thatis, thatthereshouldbe a
mafia-typeauthorityand that this authorityshould be the
outcomeoffeuding.Theyplayedthegamebyitsrules,and, as
suggestedearlier on, by so doing they contributedto the
stabilityof the social structureof small-scalecommodity
production.
The territorialmonopolyovertheuse ofviolenceenjoyedby
the latifondisti,in contrast,was not undera competitiveas
muchas a subversivethreat- thethreat,thatis,thattherural
20. The mafia phenomenondeveloped in symbiosiswithmarketactivities.In
Olivara,forexample,thefirstofficialtestimony on thephenomenonappears in the
activitiesofthezone had
Délibèredel Consigliocomunalein 19 10, whenthemercantile
reachedtheirhighpointof expansion.

Development
Capitalist 677
wouldnotplaybytherulesofa gameaccording
proletariat to
whichtheterritorial monopoly ofviolence was a conditionof
the reproduction of a monopolyover the use of land.
Outbreaks ofclassstruggle intheCrotonese werethememento
moriofthecapitalist latifundium: Theytemporarily revealed
theimpossibilityofthelatifundium's survivalifthelandowners
losttheirmonopoly overtheuseofviolence.
In otherwords,whilethemonopoly overtheuseofviolence
ofthelatifondisti was essentialto, and so an expression of,
domination of one class overtheotherclass (and theclass
strugglewas a challengeto such domination), the quasi-
monopoly over theuse ofviolence of themafiosi essential
was
to andso an expression ofthepartialtransfer ofcompetition
fromtheterrain ofpeacefulmarket exchange onto theterrain
of violentstruggleamongpatronagegroups that cutacross
classdivisions.Far fromusingtheirquasimonopoly overthe
use of violenceto createor supportclass domination, the
mafiosicould legitimateand consolidatetheir powerpositions
onlybyprotecting local societyfromthedisintegrating ten-
denciesofunfettered market competition ontheonehandand
fromthecentralizing tendencies of stateand capitalon the
otherhand.
Part II: RegionalDifferentiation

and Peripheralization
Havingshownthatthe threeroads to wage labor were

embeddedin,and reproduced, distinctsocialstructuresand
patternsof social we
conflict, shall now advance some
hypothesesconcerningtheirhistorical
development: howthey
cameintobeing,howtheyunfolded, and how theycame toan
end.In orderto understandthisdevelopment ourfocusmust
shiftfromthe innerdynamicsof the threeroads to their
withthedynamicsof theworld-economy
interrelationships
and ofthenation-stateofwhichtheywereintegral parts.We
shallbeginbybriefly
discussingthehistorical
conjuncture that
in thesecondhalfof thenineteenth century sustainedtheir
We shallthenshowinwhichwayeachofthethree
"takeoff."
roadswasassociatedwith"peripheralization"withinthewider

contextof theworld-economy. Finally,we shall discusshow

had a different
peripheralization impacton thethreeroadsand
prepared the ground for their convergenceinto a single
regionalpatternafterthe Second World War.
1. The Developmentof Regional Differentiation
The differentiation of Calabria along the three roads

in
analyzed part I became evidentintheparticularconjuncture
ofthe 1860'scharacterized bya boom ofagricultural priceson
theworld-market and bytheincorporation of Calabria in the
newlyformedItalian state. The differentiation was consol-
idatedinthesubsequent50 years,whichwerecharacterized by
a long depressionand then recoveryof agriculturalworld
prices,and bygrowingmarketexchangeswithintheterritory
ofthenew Italian state.Undertheimpactofthe 1860'sboom
in agriculturalprices,capitalistand would-becapitalistpro-
ducersin Calabria greatlyexpanded productionand sales of
traditionalstaplesofregionalagriculture,suchas grain,olive
oil, and wine,as wellas ofwhathad previouslybeenmarginal
crops(citrusfruitand, fora shortperiod,cotton).21
The boom ofthe 1860'swas shortlived,tiedas itwas to the
interruptionsofNorthAmericansuppliesofprimary products
to the European marketsduring the Civil War. But the
subsequentlongdepression,whichbecameacuteinthe1880's,
did not reversethe trendtoward an increasedcommercial-
izationof Calabria's agriculture.Indigenousentrepreneurs of
the most diverseextractions(includingmany landowners),
supplementedby tradersfromotherItalian regions,beganto
innovateand to rationalizeproductionoperationsand mar-
ketingpracticesto takeadvantageofthebenefits offeredbythe
creationof new routes and means of transportand by the
eliminationof other obstacles to exchange withinthe new
nationaleconomicspace and acrossitsboundaries.In addition,
the transformation of relationsof productionin agriculture
was inducedand sustainedby the greatermobilityof labor
21. On Calabrian agricultural
exportsbeforethenineteenth see Chorley
century,
(1965).

Development
Capitalist 679
associatedwithmoresecure,faster, and cheapertransports,

and bya growing demandformigrant laborwithin Calabria
and immigrant laboroverseas(Northand SouthAmerica).
Whendemandforagricultural products intheworldmarkets
pickedup againin the1890's,and expandedup through the
FirstWorldWar,thedifferentiation ofCalabriaintodistinct
paths of development was well entrenched, and the new
favorableconjuncture simplymadethethreepathsdiverge
further.
These conjunctures in the development of the world-
economy and of theItalian stateareessentialto an explanation
ofwhythethreepathsofdevelopment unfolded whentheydid.
Theycannot,however, explainwhythreelocaleswithroughly
thesamebeginning socialstructure andgeopolitical location
shouldhavedevelopedalongdivergent paths. Robert Brenner
(1977),in hispolemicagainstwhathe labeled"neo-Smithian
Marxism,"has counterposed an explanationof divergent
of
paths development based on geography andecology(which
he attributes to Wallerstein and Frank)to an explanation
based on historyand sociology.Translatedinto our own
terminology, the essenceof his argument seemsto be as
follows.According to the"neo-Smithians," thedevelopment
oftheworld-market createsopportunities forprofitable pro-
ductionthatvaryamongdifferent placesaccordingto their
geographical position, physical environment, andtherelation
ofhumangroupsto suchan environment. Profit-maximizers
seizetheseopportunities and by so doingproducedifferent
pathsofdevelopment, thatis, different socialstructuresand
differenthistories. this
Against position, Brenner (1977)main-
tainsthatsocial structures and theirhistoriesare not the
dependent the
but independent variable,so tospeak.Relations
amongsocial groupsand the outcomeof theirstruggles
determine whereprofitmaximizersand opportunities of
profitableproduction arise or do not arise.The action of
profit-maximizers, in turn,reshapes economic geography and
ecology.
It is not our purposehereto assesstheadequacyof this
accountor the relativemeritsof the two positionswith

reference to thewiderissuesof thetransitionfromfeudalism

to capitalismand of contemporary processesof development
and underdevelopment in the world-economyas a whole.
Nevertheless,the experienceof Calabria shows that, when
dealingwithagrarianenvironments, itmaymakelittlesenseto
counterposesociologyto ecologyand geographyto history.
The inappropriateness of such counterpositions can be illus-
tratedwithreference to boththeprehistory and thehistoryof
thethreepathsof developmentoutlinedin partI.
On theeve ofthetransformation ofthepeasantlatifundium
alongdivergent paths,social lifein Calabria was dominatedby
threecircumstances: theuninhabitability ofmanycoastalareas
in thesummerbecause of malaria;the physicaldifficulties of
traveling inthemountainousinterior inthewinterowingto the
factthathardlyany roads werepassable; and thedangersof
movingalmostanywherein winteror in summerbecause of
brigandage,whichin Calabria took theformof "an endemic
social criminality"(Bevilacqua, 1985:120).SinceCalabria had
been one of themostprosperouscoloniesof ancient Greece,
thissituationcan hardlybe describedas an "originalstate."
Rather,it was the outcomeof a long history,stretching over
two millennia,ofsociologicaland ecological"degradation"in
whichthegeographicalpositionof Calabria made itscoastal
areas vulnerableto piracyand thethreatof piracydrovethe
populationtowardtheinterior. The shiftofpopulationcreated
theconditionson theone handforthespreadofmalariainthe
coastal areas and on theotherhandforthedevelopmentinthe
inhospitableinteriorofan ecologicalenvironment inwhichan
agricultural surplus was difficult to if
produceand, produced,
difficultto alienatefromthedirectproducers.Givena physical
andsocialenvironment conducivetoguerrilla warfare,attempts
to extracta surplusfromthedirectproducerssimplyresulted
inan endemicstateofsocialcriminality. Thissituation,inturn,
seriouslyhamperedmovementsofgoods and personsoutside
the narrowconfinesof isolatedvillages,therebycontributing
to thereproduction ofabsolutescarcity.In thistwo-millennia-
longpathfromprosperity to absolutescarcity, geographyand
history,ecology and sociology,are interwovenin a vicious

Development
Capitalist 681
circlethathasproducedboththephysical andhumanunruli-
nessoftheenvironment.
Thesameinterpénétration ofsociologyandecologycanbe
observed intheprocessofinternal differentiation ofCalabria
thatfullymaterialized inthelate-nineteenth century andearly-
twentiethcentury. As already mentioned, when the particular
conjuncture ofthemid-nineteenth century creatednewprofit
in
opportunitiesagriculture, landowners (as wellas individuals
ofbourgeois, proletarian, andpeasantextraction) showedno
reluctance in seizingsuchopportunities or in widening them
through innovations. In all instances, however, they had to
the and
overcome sociological ecological obstacles to profit-
orientedactivities posed by malariain thecoastalareas,a
harshphysicalenvironment in theinterior, and brigandage
everywhere. The Junker road, the farmer road, and the
migrant-peasant road represented different outcomes of the
struggleof capitalists and would-becapitalists (particularly
landowners) to overcome these obstacles.
The prospectsof overcoming theseobstaclesweremost
hopelessinthemountainous oftheinterior,
areas suchas the
Cosentino, whereecologyandsociology militated againstany
easysolution of theproblems of enforcinglaw and order andof
establishing a viable of
system transport and communi-
cations.22Anyattempt to reorganize relations ofproduction,
exchange, anddistribution tothedisadvantage ofthepeasantry
was boundto be selfdefeating, becauseit heightened the
endemicstateofclasswarfare thatwas a keycomponent of
brigandage. Here,thepeasantswon.They won informally, to
besure,buttheywonnonetheless. Theyretained control overa
good share of theirlabor surplus, organized its sale in nearby
anddistant markets, increased theircommand overresources,
and further freedthemselves the
from exploitative hold of
absenteelandowners.
22. The lack of securityforpersonsand propertyin the interiorwas such as to
discourage,not only transportand trade,but also the plantingof treesand crops
anywhereexcept in the immediatevicinityof villages. The concentrationof the
populationin villageswas itselfthe productof thisstate of extremeinsecurity
(see
Bevilacqua, 1985: 118-21).

The situationforthewould-becapitalistlandlordswas more

favorablealong the coastal areas wheretransportof com-
moditiescould be moreeasily organized(at firstby sea and
laterbyrailway)and wherethesparseand transitory character
-
of human settlements owing to piracyearlierand malaria
later- made it easierto controlland tenure.However,it was
notequallyfavorableeverywhere. It was mostfavorableinthe
Crotonesewherethesoil and climateweresuchthatlarge-scale
commodityproductioncould be organizedwithoutanymajor
fixedinvestment in land and infrastructure. A centralization
and rationalizationof the previouslyexistingsystemof the
transumanza, wherebyproductionswitchedfrompasturageto
arable accordingto theseason,was all thatwas required.23
Rationalizationconsistedingearingtheproductioncycleas
closelyas possibleto marketfluctuations inprices- an adjust-
mentthatgenerallymeantrelaxinghumanconstraints on the
use ofland. It therefore requiredcentralization ofcontrolover
theactivitiesand resourcesoftheestatesinorderto preventthe
formationof permanentsettlements or to eradicateexisting
ones- an objectivethat, as we have seen, was attainedby
creatinga powerfulrepressiveapparatus(see sectionI. 2). In
buildingthis repressiveapparatus the landlownersdid not
shun the cooptationof the social bandits of the interioras
overseersof the capitalistlatifundiumin formation.In this
way,theykilledtwo birdswithone stone: They pacifiedthe
countrysideand createdan instrument of centralizedcontrol
overproduction.Here,thelandlordsqua capitalistsobviously
won, and the road was open for large-scalecommodity
production.
The situationwas not so favorablein othercoastal areas
such as the Plain of Gioia. Soil and climate were not as
conduciveto large-scalecommodityproductionon thebasisof
existingtechniquesand productmix as in theCrotonese.At
the same time,theywereconduciveto even moreprofitable
production(per unitofland), providedthatthetechniquesof
23. On transhumance withspecificreference
to Calabria, see Rossi Doria (1948: 7
ff) and Bevilacqua (1980: 191 ff). On transhumancein the Mediterraneanmore
generally,see Braudel(1972, 1, 85-102).

Development
Capitalist 683
production and theproductmixwereradically transformed

through heavy investment inland andinfrastructure (including
landreclamation). Morespecifically, inthecaseofthePlainof
Gioia,a strong competitive advantagecouldbe developedin
the production of oliveoil (traditionally a secondary cash
product), wine (traditionally a secondary cash and noncash
product),and citrusfruit(traditionally a marginalnoncash
crop).Land reclamation was a prerequisite of all thesepro-
ductions.In addition,theyrequiredheavylabor-intensive
investment in land improvements and plantingof trees,
expertise inthe selectionand improvement ofvarieties,skilled
of
manuallaborin manystages production, processingand
andmarketing facilities.
It is immediately obviousthatthiskind of production
processposed far more complexproblemsof laborcontrol
thantherelatively simpleonesoftheCrotonese.In theearly
stagesofdevelopment ofplantations, largeandlabor-intensive
initialinvestments meantthatrelatively permanent settlements
hadtobeinduced, rather thandiscouraged, as wasdoneinthe
Crotonese.Whilethesupplyoflaborfromtheinterior on a
seasonalbasiswas relatively abundant, thesupplyon a year-
roundbasis in theunhealthy environment of thecoastwas
extremely scarce.This meant thatextraordinary inducements
(suchas muchhigher wagesora piece land) tobeoffered
of had
to attractthenecessary laborpower.24
Apart from this,land hadto be giventotheworkforcefor
24. Recruitment oflaborthroughvariousspecialincentives was typicalofthezone
fromthefirstyearsofitsdevelopment.The firstfamouscase was thatoftheMarquis
N. who is 1818,withtheauthorizationof the Bourbongovernment, undertookland
reclamationforthe Comune of Olivara, obtainingin exchangefromthe Comune,
whentheworkwas done,three-quarters ofthereclaimedland. Giventhefactthatthe
villagewas stillunderpopulatedas a resultofmalaria,theMarquisN. was facedwitha
problemof labor supply.To deal with this problemhe took the firstimportant
demographicinitiative.Withpublicannouncements advantageousconditions
offering
he attracted"new" menfromwherevertheycould be found:teamsof workersfrom
nearbyvillagesand teamsofConsentinediggerswhospecializedindiggingditchesand
draininglands; peasantswho could not earn a subsistenceincomein themountains;
youthwhowantedto avoid military service;convictswhohad expiateda thirdoftheir
sentence;poor artisans;trampsand vagabondswho livedfromhand to mouth;and
finallypeasantsand laborersofsurrounding nobleswho,out ofdeference,offeredthe
servicesof anyexcessworkersto Marquis N. (Piselli & Arrighi,1985:395).

two other reasons. In the firstplace, the requirementsof

unskilledlabor in the later stages of developmentof the
plantationswere high but largelyseasonal so that a good
proportioncould be metbyrecruiting labor fromtheinterior.
In these laterstages,however,the demand for skilledagri-
cultural labor also increased.The only way to ensure the
reproduction overtimeofa pool ofskillslargeenoughto cover
therequirements oftheplantationswas to makeconcessionsto
labor concerningcultivationrights.That is to say, it was
necessaryto allowpettycommodity productiontodevelopside
by side withlarger-scalecommodityproduction.25
In the second place, the far greatervalue investedin the
crops of the Plain (compared withthose of the Crotonese)
made theirownerscorrespondingly more vulnerableto the
stateofsocial criminalityendemicinCalabria at thetime.This
meantthatagrariancapitalistsin thePlain could ill-afford the
levelof class antagonismassociatedwiththefullproletarian-
izationof thelabor force.Whilesheerrepressionwould have
beentoo costlyand uncertaininitsresults,thereproduction of
intermediate strataofpettycommodityproducersensuredthe
dilutionofclass antagonismsand producedthelesssubversive
formsof social conflictdiscussedearlier(sectionI. 3).
It goes withoutsayingthatthestratified social structureof
the Plain (and therelatedpatternof social conflict/ cohesion)
was not theoutcomeof some capitalist"masterplan" but the
cumulativeresultof daily confrontations among the various
social personificationsoflabor and capitalthatpopulatedthe
Plain of Gioia at different stages of its development.This
outcomerepresented neithera victoryof thepeasantry(as in
the Cosentino) nor a victoryof the landlords (as in the
25. Transoceanic emigrationfacilitatedthe expansion of investmentand the
restructuringof landholdingand enlargedthe area devotedto "rich"productsfor
exportation.In Olivara,forexample,the medium-sizedand smallfarmerswho had
invested their modest earnings in vineyards,lacking capital for reconversion,
abandonedtheiruncultivated fieldsand emigrated.Whentheyreturned fromAmerica
theyreplantedtheirfieldswithvines or convertedtheminto olive grovesor citrus
orchards;theyfoundedand developedan agriculturalagency;theyboughtunculti-
vated land, and theycultivatedit; theyincreasedthe total area of fieldsthat they
possessedand transformedthemintoolivegrovesand citrusorchards;ortheyinitiated
a commercialor artisanalbusiness.

Development
Capitalist 685
Crotonese). Itrepresented,so to speak,a "draw"thatopened

thewayforthefarmer roadinitspeculiarCalabrianform.
It would appear,therefore, that the emergencewithin
Calabriaofthreedistinct roadsofsocialchangeinthesecond
half of the nineteenth centurywas due to the different
outcomesof thestruggle of landowners and othersurplus
appropriators or would-be appropriators to establishlarge-
scalecommodity production in response to a particular
stage
ofdevelopment andto a particular conjuncture oftheworld-
economyon theonehandandto theformation oftheItalian
nation-state ontheotherhand.As wehaveseen,theoutcome
ofthisstruggle wascloselyrelatedtothesocialecologyofthe
terrain on whichitwasfought. Thethreeoutcomes, however,
werenotindependent ofeachother.Itshouldbeclearfromour
accountof thestructure and genesisofthethreeroadsthat
theirviabilitywasdependent on theflowsoflaborthatlinked
them.
Theseflowsare schematically summedup in Figure3, in
whichthewidthofthearrowsismeanttoconveysomesenseof
thesize(interms ofnumbers involved) oftheflows.Themost
important linksare thelargeseasonalsuppliesofnonprole-
tarianized laborgenerated bythemigrant-peasant road and
absorbedbytheJunker road and,to a lesserextent,bythe
farmer road. The chartalso emphasizestherelianceof the
Junkerroad and of the farmerroad on "external"labor
supplies,andtherelianceofthemigrant-peasant roadon the
othertwo roads in the procurement of monetarymeans
(through theseasonalsaleoflaborpower)andintheexpulsion
of overpopulation and deviance(throughthe permanent
of
emigration impoverished peasants, proietti,anddeviants).
It is plausibleto assumethatwithouttheselinkagesthe
"takeoff" alongthethreeroadswouldhave beenfarmore
problematic thanit actuallywas. It is hardto conceive,for
example, how the landlordsof the Crotonesecould have
established theirtwofold monopoly overtheuseoflandandof
violencewithout thestrongcompetitive pressures broughtto
bear on the local ruralproletariat by the seasonal labor
suppliesof semiproletarians and nonproletarians fromthe

Figure3: Short-and Long-distanceMigrationFlows
neighboringareas. Nor is it easy to imaginehow small-scale

commodityproductioncould have taken offin the Plain of
Gioia withoutthe initialinflowof permanentimmigration
fromtheareas oftheinterior.And thepeasant-migrantroadin

Development 687
theCosentino probablywouldnothavetakenshapeso rapidly

and firmlywithout, one,theinitialrelieffromdemographic
pressuresbrought aboutbythepermanent emigrationofthe
poorestpeasants, anddeviants
proietti, to theareasofsmall-
scalecommodity and,two,theeasyopportunities
production,
forprocuring monetary meansthrough thesale of seasonal
laborsurplusesin neighboringareasofsmall-scale andlarge-
scalecommodity production.
Theseinterconnectionsfurtherclarifywhythreedivergent
roadstowagelaborandsocialchangedevelopedat aboutthe
sametimeinthree areas.Inourview,however,
neighboring the
factthattheCrotonesewas an importer oflaborpower,the
Cosentinoan exporter,and the Plain of Gioia both an
importerandanexporter doesnotwarrant their as
designation
theregional and - a
core,periphery, semiperipherydesignation
thatwouldparallelCarolSmith'shierarchical orderingofthe
threeareasofwestern Guatemala.As alreadysuggested, inthe
Calabriancontextall threeroads were roads to periph-
eventhoughthenatureofperipheralization
eralization, was
inthethreecases.
different
2. Patternsof Peripheralization
By "peripheralization"we understand a processwhereby

someactorsorlocales,thatparticipatedirectly in
orindirectly
theworlddivisionoflabor,areprogressively deprivedofthe
benefits totheadvantage
ofsuchparticipation, ofotheractors
ofbenefits
Thisredistribution
or locales.26 can takedifferent
forms,and each of our threeroadsto wagelabor- as they
a specificformof periph-
unfoldedin Calabria- illustrates
ofsurplus,
transfer
eralization: unequalexchange, anddirect
surplusappropriation.
26. The main reason for assumingthisunequal distributionof benefitsis that
profit-orientedinnovationscontinuouslyisolatea minority of activities,actors,and
locales fromthe competitivepressuresof the world-economy, and simultaneously
intensifythose pressureson all otheractivities,actors,and locales. (See Arrighi&
Drangel,1986).

By"transfer ofsurplus"we referto a situationcharacterized

by two conditions.The firstconditionis that the benefits
derivedbya givenlocale fromitsinhabitants'participationin
the world division of labor take the formof a surplus of
revenuesovercostsofproduction,and thesecondconditionis
thatcommandoverthissurplusis routinelytransferred from
the hands of residentsof thatlocale to thehands of nonresi-
dents.Bothconditionswereclearlypresentin theCrotonese.
The combinationofhighrevenuepricesrelativeto unitlabor
costsand lowcapitalrequirements ofthelaborprocessresulted
in a largesurplusoverand above whatwas necessaryto keep
the capitalistlatifundiain businessas profitableenterprises.
Given the high concentrationof productiontypicalof the
capitalistlatifundia,only a small part of this surpluswas
absorbed by the consumptionof the landownersto whomit
accrued.27
Command overmostof thesurpluswas transferred out of
theCrotoneseintheformoftaxesand,above all,intheformof
fundsplaced by the latifondisti in nationaland international
financialmarkets.Once transferred, thiscommandover re-
sourceshad little,ifany,positivefeedbackon theeconomyof
the Crotonese.Its mainfunctionwas to expand marketsand
productivefacilitiesinnorthern Italy,thereby further
widening
the developmentalgap betweencore regionsand peripheral
locales such as theCrotonese(Meyriat,1961: 117-124).
As oftenemphasizedin theliteratureon the Mezzogiorno,
this transferof surplus was part of a political exchange
mediated by the state between southern latifondistiand
northern The surpluswas itselftheoutcomeof a
capitalists.28
double protectiongrantedby thestateto thelatifondisti: the
protection of national cerealproduction from thecompetitive
pressuresof the world-market, and the protectionof large-
27. Even thatpartof thesurplusthatwas consumedby thelatifondisti was not
principallyconsumedin theCrotonesesincethelatifondisti spenta good partof the
yearin themetropolitan centersof thecenter-south (principallyRome and Naples).
Thereare numeroustestimoniesto thiseffect.See, forexample,Meyriat(1961: 145).
28. For a criticalanalysisof the phenomenon(the so-calledblocco storico)see
Salvadori(1976), Sereni(1968), Rossi Doria(1982), and Villari(1976), whocoverall
thevicissitudesof thebloc.

Development
Capitalist 689
scalelandownership from thesubversive threatsofa rebellious

ruralproletariat. Thisdoubleprotection raisedlaborcoststo
northern industrial capitalbecausethelatifundia absorbed
largeandcompetitive laborsuppliesand,aboveall,becausea
keysubsistence good(grain)wasoverpriced relativetoworld-
marketprices.However,thetransfer of thesurpluscreated
profitable businessopportunities forfinancialintermediaries
andreduced realinterestratesforprivate andpublicinvestment
in industry and infrastructure. Whatnorthern industrialists
lostin termsof higherlaborcosts,theyprobablygainedin
termsofinfrastructure, lowerinterest rates,andeasiercredit;
financialintermediaries, of course,had nothing to lose and
everything to gainfromthisarrangement.
Thispoliticalexchangefurthered thereproduction of the
regime of low wages and low requirements
fixed-capital typical
ofthecapitalist latifundium. Thisregime, inturn,restrained
thegrowth ofthelocalmarket, discouraged innovative differ-
entiations oftheeconomic structureoftheCrotonese, andthus
contributed to theprogressive peripheralizationoftheterri-
tory.Nevertheless, it mustbe emphasizedthatneitherthe
specificrelationsof productionof the Crotonesenor the
politicalexchangesbetweenlatifondisti and northern capi-
talistsweresufficient or necessary conditions of peripheral-
ization.
They werenot sufficient conditionsbecauseelsewhere,
in
namely Prussia, similar relationsofproduction anda similar
politicalexchange between Junkers and nonagrarian capitalists
producedthatmarriage of"ryeand iron,"whichwas instru-
mentalincounteracting peripheralizingtendencies. Andthey
werenotnecessary conditions becauseperipheralization occur-
red in Calabria under relations of and
production exchange
thatwereradicallydifferent fromthose obtainingin the
Crotonese.
Thus, in the case of the Plain of Gioia therewas no
significant transferofsurplusotherthanthrough taxation.29
29. Owingto the commercialization of agricultureand the highyieldof land in

value terms,thetaxable yieldper hectarecultivatedwas muchhigherin the Plain of
Gioia (556 lire per hectare)than in the Crotonese(229 lire per hectare)or in the
Cosentino(178 lireperhectare).See Arlacchi(1983: 71).

Unit returnsto land were significantly higherthan in the

Crotonese,but wages and unitlabor costs werealso higher.
Labor processesrequiredheavyinvestments in land improve-
mentsand processingfacilities,and, giventhe relativesmall
size of estatesand holdings,the revenuesthatdid not go to
cover costs of productionwereconsumedlocally by a large
crowdof smalland medium-sized capitalistproducers.
In this case, peripheralizationtook the form,not of a
transferof surplus,but of unequal exchange. By "periph-
eralization throughunequal exchange" we understanda
situationinwhichthebenefits oftheworlddivisionoflaborare
transferred fromsome locales to otherlocales throughthe
termsat whichcommoditiesare exchanged.Generallyspeak-
ing,peripheralization throughunequal exchangeoccurswhen
competitivepressureson the sale prices of a given locale
increase fasterthan competitivepressureson its purchase
prices.30
The experienceof the Plain of Gioia providesa verygood
illustrationof the process in question. As happens oftenin
instancesof peripheralization throughunequal exchange,the
process went throughstages. The firststage(fromthe 1860's
the
through 1880's)was characterizedby rapid expansionof
productivecapacityforexportand byfavorabletermsoftrade.
Relatively simpleinnovationsand heavylabor-intensive invest-
mentin land gave thePlain a strongcompetitiveadvantagein
theproductionof olive oil, low-qualitywine{vino da taglio),
and high-quality citrusfruit.In at least one of theselinesof
production(oranges),thisstrongcompetitiveadvantageput
the Plain of Gioia in a temporarymonopolisticpositionon
world-markets, whichallowed the Plain's producersto reap
significant benefitsfromparticipationin theworlddivisionof
labor. Since in this period freetrade enforcedcompetitive
pricingin mostoftheactivitiesthatsuppliedthePlain withits
30. In thecase oftheCrotonese,itmakeslittlesenseto speakofunequalexchange

for the simple reason that the capitalist latifundiumattained its high point of
developmentin a regimeofstateprotection,whichkeptthepriceof itsmainproduct
well above the supplyprice of otherregionsof the world-economy, core regions
included.

Development 691
meansofsubsistence and production, wecan assumethatat

thisstagetherewas no unequalexchangebetween thePlain
andotherregions.
The secondstagewentfromthelate 1880'sto theearly
1920's.This was the periodof most rapid expansionof
production forexport(as opposedtoproductive and
capacity),
of greatestdevelopment withinthe Plain of backwardand
forwardlinkages between agricultural andotheractivities.The
prosperity associated with thisexpansion and diversification
ofactivitiesinduced,andwasfurther sustained by,a boomof
immigration in the area. In thissame period,however, the
basesofthePlain'sprosperity werealreadybeingundermined.
For one thing,thetemporary monopolistic positionof the
Plaininsomeexport markets waseliminated bytheappearance
of strongcompetitors (mainlySpanish and U.S. producers)
thatenforcedan increasingly competitive pricingof citrus
Inaddition,
fruit. accesstoimportant andremunerative export
markets as was
(such France) being closed or bythe
restricted
waveofprotectionism thatsweptEuropeinthisperiod.Atthe
same time,thegrowingprotection of the nationalmarket
restrictedthefreedom topurchase suppliesfromthecheapest
sources,and led to themonopolistic pricingof manyofthe
commodities purchasedby the Plain. As a consequence, a
patternofunequalexchange between thePlainanditstrading
partnersbeganto develop.
In the secondstage,therefore, prosperity was based on
advantages that were beingprogressively eroded both by
normalprocesses ofcapitalist competition (suchas theemer-
genceofnewcompetitors), andbya particular conjunctureof
theworld-economy (thecrisisof freetrade).In thethirdstage,
whichwentfromthemiddle1920'sup to theSecondWorld
War,prosperity itselfdisappearedas thenegative of
effects
unequalexchangewerecompounded bythefinalbreakdown
oftheworldmarket.31 Whena system ofmultilateralexchanges
3 1. In themiddleand late 1930's,productionand traderecoveredon thebasis of
bilateralexchangesbetweenItalyand otherEuropeanstates.Thissystemoftradegave
greatersecurityto theproducersof the Plain but,insofaras we can tell,broughtno
improvement to theirtermsof tradewiththerestof theworld.

was reestablishedafterthe Second World War, competitive

pressureson the activitiesthat supplied the Plain with its
meansof subsistenceand productionincreasedagain,but,as
we shall see in greaterdetailin partIII, competitivepressures
on theproducersofthePlain increasedevenmore.As a matter
offact,theybecameso intenseas to provokea longcrisis,and
eventuallythedemise,ofsmall-scalecommodity productionin
thearea. This periodofcrisisrepresented thefourthand final
stageof theprocessof peripheralization of the Plain.
If transferof surplus was the specificform taken by
peripheralization in theCrotonese,and unequal exchangethe
specific form in the Plain of Gioia, directsurplusextraction
was the formin the Cosentino. In this case, therewas no
surplusto be transferred because what was producedin the
area was eitherconsumed or investedlocally by the direct
producers.Nor was theremuchroom forunequal exchange
because littlewas boughtor (except for the fictitiouscom-
modity"labor power")sold outsidethearea. Nonetheless,the
substantialmigratoryflows that linked the Cosentino to
nearbyand distantlabormarketsweredefinitely theexpression
ofparticipationin theworlddivisionoflabor. Moreover,this
participationwas peripheralin thesensethatthelabor power
sold innearbyordistantmarketsfetchedpricesthatlefta large
surplusin the hands of the buyers.In thiscase, therefore, a
surplus was not transferredafterit had been produced in the
peripherallocale (as in thecase of theCrotonese).Instead,it
was produced and directlyappropriatedin core locales by
purchasinglabor powerfroma peripherallocale.
If we ignorethefictitious characterofthecommoditylabor
-
power emphasizedin different ways by Marx (1959) and
Polanyi (1957)- our case of "directsurplusextraction"be-
comes a special case of "unequal exchange." In so doing,
however,we would forgo a distinctionbetween different
mechanismsof peripheralizationthat has importantsocial
implications - a distinction,thatis, betweenperipheralization
through the mobility capital (or transferof surplus),
of
peripheralization throughthe mobilityof goods (or unequal

exchange),and peripheralization throughthemobilityoflabor

(or direct surplus extraction). It should be noticed that
Emmanuel's(1972) classic definitionof unequal exchangeis
also based on theassumptionoftheimmobility oflaborpower
acrosspoliticalboundaries.
As we haverepeatedly emphasized,thereasonwhymigrant-
peasants could sell theirlabor power"belowcost"is thatcosts
ofreproduction werelargelyor whollycoveredbysubsistence-
orientedactivities.The predominantfunctionof the sale of
laborpowerwasto transform a largesurplusintoaccumulation
ofunproductiveand productivewealth.Paradoxically,there-
fore, the "superexploitation"of the migrant-peasants was
based on a nonproletarian condition.It was theexpression,not
ofproletarianization, butofextremeperipheralization. Thatis
to say,therewas nothing(otherthanlabor power)thatcould
be producedin theCosentinoeconomically(i.e., thatcould be
sold competitively in the worldmarket),let alone profitably
(i.e., that could be sold competitively and also allow foran
entrepreneurial income). As a consequence,the only way in
which the peasants of the Cosentino could partake of the
benefitsof the worlddivisionof labor was to "export"their
surplus labor power at prices that involved an extremely
unequal distribution ofthosebenefitsbetweenthemselves and
the"importers"of theirlabor power.
The peculiarrelationsof productionand exchangeof the
Cosentinoand thedemandformigrantlabor thatdeveloped
bothin nearbyand distantmarketswerenecessaryconditions
for peripheralizationto take the specificformit did. Once
again, however,they were neithernecessarynor sufficient
conditions for peripheralizationto occur. They were not
necessarybecause,as we have argued,peripheralization could
and in neighboring territories did occurunderquite different
conditions.Theywerenotsufficient becausetheyonlyexplain
why labor power could be sold at ultracompetitive prices,but
theydo notexplainwhy it continued to be sold at such prices
overa longperiodoftime.It is perfectly conceivablethat,once
the demographicpressureon the land and the exploitative
pressureofthelandownerson thepeasantshad been relaxed,

the peasants mighthave enteredthe labor and the produce

marketsfrom a position of strength,and that, through
innovations,theymighteven have been able to counteract
peripheralization. The experiencesof Switzerlandin earlier
periods(and possiblyofSwedeninthesameperiod)showthat
this was not just a theoreticalpossibilitybut an historical
possibilityas well.
In sum,Calabria providesa good illustration ofthefactthat
peripheralization mayoccurunderthe mostdiverserelations
of production,and that the same kind of relationsof pro-
ductionmaybe associatedin one place withperipheralization
and in another place with ascent to core position. This
conclusionshouldnot surpriseus sinceperipheralization and
its obverseare macroprocessesof theworld-economy, which
have onlyindirectand partlyindeterminate connectionswith
the microstructures of productionand reproduction.As a
macroprocess,peripheralization is determinedprimarilyby
the relationsin time and space among microstructures and
only secondarilyby the nature of the microstructures them-
selves.
Spatial relationsamongmicrostructures matterat different
levels.The mostimportant is undoubtedly theleveldefinedby
theterritorialjurisdictionsofstates.Thesejurisdictions define
theextentto whichcommodities, factorsofproduction,means
of payments,and informationare spatiallymobile. By de-
creasingmobility insomedirectionsand increasingitinothers,
statejurisdictionsdampenor intensify competitivepressures,
weakenorstrengthen complementarities, sustainorundermine
hierarchies ofcommand.The levelofthestate,however,is not
theonlyone and sometimesnoteventhemostimportant. The
particularway in which microstructures of productionand
reproduction are combined territorially at the substatallevel
(for example, in a regionlike Calabria) may matterjust as
muchin determining whethera givenmicrostructure experi-
encesperipheralization or not. And ofcoursethesame is true
of the geopolitical position of the state withinwhich the
microstructures are located.

Development
Capitalist 695
Ananalysis oftheprocesses ofperipheralization experienced

by our three areas of Calabria in terms of their regional,
national, and supranational aggregations beyondthe
falls
scope ofthe present article.However, a simplethought experi-
mentgrounded in thehistorical experience oftheCrotonese
canillustratethepoint.Takeforexampletheperipheralization
ofthecapitalistlatifundium. Veryearlyinitsdevelopment, the
landowners oftheCrotonese experimented withvarious forms
of mechanization thatmighthavecounteracted peripherali-
zation.Themainreasonwhytheexperiments failed,andwere
abandoneduntilitwastoolatetorescuethelatifundium from
a peripheral position, was that the services for
required the
maintenance and repairof agricultural machinery weretoo
and
costly unpredictable (Bevilacqua, 1985:227).We mayvery
well conceiveof a regionalsituationin whichthe socio-
ecologicalterrain forthedevelopment ofcapitalistlatifundia
was vasterthanit actuallywas in Calabria,or of a regional
situationinwhichmechanical industries (evenofan artisanal
kind)were more than
developed theyactually wereinCalabria.
All otherthingsbeingequal, these two relatively small
differencesintheregionalmixofactivities might havemeant
morereliableand cheapermaintenance and repairof agri-
culturalmachinery, greater mechanization ofactivitiesat the
righttime, and effective resistance againstperipheralizing
tendencies.
Thoughtexperiments of thissortcan be easilyconceived
withreference totheotherlevelsofaggregation (nationaland
world-regional) and to theother two types ofmicrostructures
(small-scalecommodity production and subsistence-oriented
production). The pointwouldremainthesame:Thechances
thata givenrelation ofproduction willexperience peripherali-
zationisnotprimarily determined bythenatureoftherelation
butbytheregional,
itself national, andworld-regional context
inwhichitis located.As emphasized throughout thissection,
microstructures ofproduction andreproduction do determine
theformsofperipheralization. Butperipheralization itselfis
theoutcomeoftheinterrelationships amongmicrostructures
thatconstitute theworld-economy.

In thisconnection,relationsacrosstimeare as important as
relations across space. The key to counteractingperiph-
eralization is the capability of a given actor or locale to
participatein as widea divisionoflaboras possibleand stillbe
able to isolateitselftemporarilyfromthecompetitive pressures
of the world-economy.This implies a capability to shift
promptlyfrom one set of activitiesand of relations of
productionto anotherset, not only in responseto, but in
anticipationof, world-economiccycles and trends.By so
doing,an actor/activity/ localecan selloutputsat monopolistic
prices and purchase inputs (be they real commoditiesor
fictitiouscommoditiessuch as land, labor, and money) at
competitive prices,and thereby appropriatea disproportionate
shareof thebenefitsof thedivisionof labor.
It should be evidentfrom our previousdiscussion that
shifting fromone setofactivitiesand relationsofproductionto
anotherset is notan easy undertaking. Actors,activities,and
locales are shaped by historyand geography,ecology and
sociology,in complexways and, once a locale has entereda
givenpath of development,thedirectionof change,ifnot its
speed, is prettymuch set for long periods of time. Heavy
investments withlonggestationlags have beenmade(as in the
Plain of Gioia); a complex repressiveapparatus has been
created(as intheCrotonese); networksofrecruitment for,and
assistance to, migrationhave been developed (as in the
Cosentino)- theseand otherdevelopmentsdefinethe direc-
tions along which opportunitiesof gainfulemploymentof
labor, land, and moneyare soughtand exploited.That is to
say,economicactivitiesbecomeembeddedin social relations
thatforma culturaltotalityand can onlychangeas a totality.
This is of course also true of economic activitiesin core
locales. However,it is plausible to assume that the greater
commandover world-economicresourcesof the actorsthat
operate in and fromcore regionsendows themwithbetter
possibilitiesto do twothings:one,to establishnewactivitiesin
additionto,or insubstitution for,existingactivities;and,two,
to overcomesocialconstraints and resistanceto innovations.If
we accept this assumption,peripheralization seems to con-

Development 697
sist- to borrowMyrdal's(1959)expression-ofa processof

"circularand cumulative causation."Actorsin corelocales
findit easierthanactorsin peripheral localesto generatea
streamofinnovations thattemporarily, whentakenas single
events,butcontinually, whentakenas a stream, isolateactors
in corelocalesfromcompetitive and
pressures intensify such
pressures on actors in peripheral locales (see Arrighi&
Drangel,1986).
Theconsequent inabilityofperipheral localestoreapmore
thanmarginal benefitsfromtheirparticipation in theworld
of
division labor has important implications theirsocial
for
evolution. Wehavebeenarguing thatrelations ofproduction
in Calabrianagriculture developedalongpathsthatwerenot
inherently"peripheral" inthesensethattheycouldhavebeen,
and indifferent historicalinstances actuallywere,associated
withascentto core position.This argument shouldnot be
understood to implythata givenpathofdevelopment is not
affected by itsassociation with coreness or peripherality. On
thecontrary, theexperience to
ofCalabriaseems suggest that
thechancesofsurvival ina peripheral environment arenotthe
sameforall relations ofproduction andexchangeandthat,in
anyevent, peripherality leavesitsmarkonallsuchrelations. In
orderto realizethis,letus look at the way in which thethree
roadstowagelaborattained theirhistoricallimits inCalabria.
and the
3. Peripheralization
Crisisof Commodity Production
In theworldpoliticalandeconomiccontextdetermined by
theoutcomeoftheSecondWorldWarourthreeroadstowage
laborbegantoconverge towarda commonpattern. Thepath
ofdevelopment thatprovedto be theleaststablein thenew
situationwastheJunker road,whichcameto an abruptand
complete end.
latifundium
The capitalist had reacheditshighest pointof
development on the eve of the Second WorldWar. Under
fascism,theorganiclinksbetween andthestate
thelatifondisti

had been greatlystrengthened. The protectionand active

encouragement ofnationalgrainproductionon thepartofthe
statehad attainedunprecedented levels.At thesame time,the
landowners'hand vis-à-vislabor had been strengthened both
by the repressiveantilaborstance of the regimeand by the
imposedon migrationwithinand across national
restrictions
boundaries.32
As a resultof thisdouble protection(in productand labor
markets),the capitalistlatifundiaexperienceda period of
relativeprosperity,particularlyafterthe worstof the great
depression of theearly1930'swas over.Nevertheless, serious
problems were lurkingbelow the surface of this relative
prosperity.The capitalistlatifundiawere becomingincreas-
inglydependenton state protectionand, therefore,on the
particularnationaland worldpolitical-economic conjuncture
thatfavoredprotectionistand labor-repressive policies.Atthe
sametime,thesqueeze on laborincomestendedto accumulate
explosivesocialmaterialreadyto detonateatthefirstfavorable
conjuncture.
Both tendenciescame to a head withthe collapse of the
Fascist regime and the subsequent establishmentof new
hegemoniesat thenationaland interstate levels.As soon as the
AlliedarmedforcesoccupiedCalabria in 1943,a waveofacute
and widespreadsocial conflictswept the region.33In the
Crotonesethe wave of conflictwas more intenseand lasted
longer than anywhereelse. It took its usual form of a
confrontation betweenlandownersand ruralproletarians over
propertyand cultivationrights.This time, however,the
confrontation acquireda newpoliticalconnotationbecause it
32. Migrationswithinnationalboundarieswererestricted by theso-calledLeggi
controIVrbanesimo(Laws againstthe movementinto thecities)introducedin the
1930'sand repealedonly in 1961. Migrationabroad was discouragedby the fascist
regime,butrestrictions imposedbyrecipient countriesintheinterwaryearswerebyfar
the most importantobstacle (see Trêves, 1976). While restrictions on migration
buttressedthelatifondisti'soligopsonisticpoweroverthe regionalsuppliesof labor,
the repressivestance of the regimevis-a-vislabor unrestgave a new edge to the
latifondisti's
privaterepressiveapparatus.
33. For an overallviewofthelandoccupationstruggles intheCrotoneseand all of
Calabria see Alcaro& Paparazzo (1976), Cinanni(1977), and Bevilacqua (1980). On
theactivitiesand roleof theCommunistpartysee Tarrow(1972).

Development 699
becamepartand parcelofthepostwarstruggle fornational

hegemony between theCommunist and Socialistpartiesonthe
oneside,andtheChristian Democratic partyand itsallieson
theother.
TheCommunist andSocialistpartiessawinthestruggles of
the landlesspeasantsan excellentopportunity to make a
politicalandorganizational breakthrough inthetraditionally
conservative south.Theysupported fromthestartthedemand
forlandoftheruralproletariat, andthrough thispolicythey
didinfactsucceedindeveloping closeideologicalandorgani-
zationallinkswithitsranks.34 Sincea powerful movement of
protestdevelopedataboutthesametimeinthefactories ofthe
north,alsounderCommunist/ Socialisthegemony, theLeninist
(orforthatmatter Gramscian) scenarioofan alliancebetween
industrialworkersand landlesspeasantsmediatedby the
leadershipof the workers'partyseemedto materialize in
almostideotypical fashion.Thisallianceposeda seriousthreat
to theChristian Democraticpartyand otherpoliticalforces
thatweretrying to anchortheItalianstatefirmly within the
U.S. sphereofinfluence. The threatwas perceived bythese
forcesto be seriousenoughto inducethemto yieldto the
pressures fora landreform.
34. The coalition governmentof Badoglio, which contained communistand
socialistministers,
did notrespondwiththetraditionalrepressivepoliciesto theland
occupation movement,whichspread spontaneouslythroughthe latifundiaof the
Crotonesefromthemorrowof September8, 1943.Insteadoftheusual defenseofthe
largelandowners,thegovernment respondedwitha seriesofdecreesformulated bythe
CommunistMinisterGullo which,among otherthings,conceded uncultivatedor
badlycultivatedlandto peasantsorganizedincooperatives.Fausto Gullo,a Calabrian
and theMinisterofAgriculture and Forestry,issuedDecree no. 279 on October1944.
This decree,"in view of the requirementsof national production,"conceded for
cultivation"to peasantassociations,regularly constitutedintocooperativesor other
entities,"the"landsofprivateownersand publicfirms, whichare notbeingcultivated
or are insufficiently
cultivated."
The Gullo Decree gave a powerfulstimulusto the land occupationstruggles.It
provided an incentivefor the organizationof workersin cooperativesand their
enrollment inthosepartiesand unionsthatmostactivelysupportedthemovementfor
theredistributionoftheland. In Campolungo,forexample,on December2, 1944,the
firstconcessionoflandgave riseto thefirstcooperative:the"Agricultural Proletariat
Cooperative," managed by the PCI. A second cooperative,named "Red Star,"
emergedin 1945in a fractionof Campolungo.On the measurestakenin the Fausto
Gullo period,see Rossi Doria (1983), and Barresi(1983).

The implementation ofthereform beganin 1950,and within

a fewyearstheredistribution of land brokeup thelatifundia,
largelyattainingthepoliticalobjectiveofcontainingand then
rollingback Communistinfluenceover the peasantry.35 We
shall laterdiscusstheparticularsocial structure thatemerged
out oftheland reform.For now,all we needto noteis thatthe
capitalistlatifundium disappearedveryrapidlyand leftlittle
traceof itsonce powerfulorganizationalstructures.
The Plain ofGioia, and to a lesserextenttheCosentino,also
experienceda waveofsocial conflictfollowingthedownfallof
theFascistregime.Notwithstanding someformalsimilarities,
however, the substance and outcome ofthewave ofconflictin
these other areas were quite differentfrom those of the
Crotonese. Far fromchallengingexistingsocial structures,
protestmovementsin thePlain ofGioia and in theCosentino
were reactionsagainstthe hindrancescreatedby the fascist
regimeto the reproductionof such structures.Implicitlyor
explicitlytheyaimed not at subvertingbut at strengthening
existingsocial structuresthrougha restorationof the status
quo ante,36
35. The expropriationsand land assignmentsprovokedthe dissolutionof the
"red" cooperatives,whichwereformedduringthe 1940's.Withthe land reform, the
functionof the cooperatives-to forcethe expropriationof uncultivatedlands-
progressively decreased,signalingthe declineof the hegemonyof the leftpolitical
forcesovertheruralproletariat.The effects oftheclientelistic
policyoftheChristian
Democrats(D.C.), to be discussedinthenextsection,wereevidentfromthefirstyears
oftheagrarianreform. In Campolungo,forexample,intheelectionsforthemunicipal
councilin 1946,theSocialist-Communist listalone received1,180votesout of 1,565
valid votes(thatis 75.4%) and 14 membersof council out of 20. In contrast,by the
municipalelectionsof 1952,thePCI obtained1,185votesout of2,101(thatis 56.4%)
whiletheD.C. obtained9 16 (thatis,43.6%). Finally,inthe1956 municipalelection,of
3,138 votesthe PCI obtainedonly 1,384(44.1%), whilethe D.C. obtained 1,754(or
55.9%). For thefirsttimetherewas a ChristianDemocraticCouncil(Piselli& Arrighi,
1985: 434-36; for a comprehensiveappraisal of the phenomenonin the south,see
Tarrow,1972.
36. In the Cosentino,the restorationof thestatusquo ante meantabove all the
eliminationof the restrictions on long-distancemigrationthathad been introduced
underthefascistregime.As we shallsee,thiseliminationwas all thatwas requiredfor
thenewChristianDemocraticregimeto establishitshegemonyin thearea (III.l). In
theCosentinotherewereoccupationsofland rightafterthewar,buttheywerefarless
extensiveand violentthanin theCrotonese.
In the Plain of Gioia, the restorationof thestatusquo ante meantabove all the
eliminationof the restrictionsenforcedby thefascistregimeon thestrugglesamong

Development
Capitalist 701
As a consequence, therewas no immediate crisisofsmall-

scalecommodity productionor of subsistence production to
matchthe crisisand disappearanceof the capitalistlati-
fundium. On thecontrary, in theimmediate postwaryears
small-scalecommodity production enjoyeda shortperiodof
prosperityas theacuteshortagesofagriculturalsuppliesonthe
nationalmarketsgreatlyinflated thepricesof someof the
Plain'sproducts.The crisisof small-scalecommodity pro-
ductioncame laterwhenthe reactivation of nationaland
international theliberalization
transport, oftrade,theexpan-
sion of supply,and theemergence of newcompetitors with
lowercostsofproduction increasedcompetitive pressuresand
squeezedmanyproducers outofthemarket (seeSectionIII. 1).
rival patronagegroups and on the exerciseof mafia-typeauthority.Here, social

conflictexplodedrightafterthewarin formsas acuteas in theCrotonese.Therewere
occupations of land, demonstrations,seizures of public buildings,red flags and
revolutionary songs,violentclashes among opposed factionsand betweendemon-
stratorsand thepolice. At firstsight,theredoes not seemto be thatbig a difference
betweenthe wave of conflictthat shook the Plain and otherareas of small-scale
commodityproductionand thewave thatshook theCrotonese.
A closerlook, however,revealsimportant For one thing,occupations
differences.
of land werenot alwayspresent,and, whenpresent,theywerenot as centralto the
struggles as intheCrotonese.For example,inone ofthemostconspicuousepisodesof
conflict(theestablishment "RepublicofCaulonia" in a cash-cropping
ofa short-lived
area with a social structuresimilarto that of the Plain of Gioia), therewas no
occupationoflandbutjust a takeoverofgovernmental functions
(includingjustice)by
the "people." "Fascists" were broughtto trial,and one or two wereexecuted(see
Alcaro & Paparazzo, 1976). Even wherethe occupationof land was centralto the
struggles, as in Olivara,thelands werenotprivatelyownedestates.Theywerepublic
domainsthathad beenclosed offto privateuse duringthefascistperiod.Last butnot
least,thefactionsopposed inthestruggles had almostthesamesocial composition,in
sharp contrastto the confrontationsof the Crotonese,whichinvariablyhad the
landlesspeasantson one side, and the hirelingsof the latifondisti on the other(see
Piselli& Arrighi,1985:442-44).
One cannot avoid the impressionthatwhatwas actuallyhappeningbehindthe
trappingsof a class strugglewas a revivalofthefeudsamongrivalpatronagegroups
that had been typicalof the area. The fascistregimehad, so to speak, frozenthe
recurrent strugglesformafiapowerin a centrallyenforcedorder,fromwhichsome
factionsbenefitedand otherslost.The collapseoftheregimebecametheoccasion,not
onlyforthesettlement ofscores,butfora generalrevivalofthecompetitivestruggle
formafiapower.It also becametheoccasionforthebeginningofa phenomenon(the
"politicizationof the feud") that soon turnedinto a major characteristic of social
conflictin the Plain (see III. 1 below).

The crisisof subsistenceproductionin theCosentinocame

even later. The movementsof protestof the 1940's further
strengthened thehold of thepeasantryon theland and other
meansofproduction,and theintensification ofcompetition in
for
themarkets agricultural commodities could not and did not
affectproducersthatsold verylittleon thosemarkets.At the
same time,the reopeningof the channels of long-distance
migration, whichhad beenclosedor narrowly restricted during
the war and theinterwaryears,injectednew vitalityintothe
structures of subsistenceproduction.Whenthecrisiscame in
themiddle1960's,itwas theresultofthesuccessratherthanthe
failureof migrant-peasants in copingwiththenewconjucture
at thenationaland worldlevel(see III. 2 below).
These developmentsare thesubjectmatterofthethirdpart
of thearticle.The onlyreasonformentioning themhereis to
emphasize the much greaterstability of the migrant-peasant
road, in comparisonto thefarmerroad and evenmoreto the
Junkerroad, in a peripheralregionsuch as Calabria. This is
tantamount to sayingthat,ina peripheral context,subsistence-
orientedproductionhas betterchancesofsurvivalthansmall-
scale commodityproduction,and far betterchances than
large-scalecommodityproduction.
This is hardlysurprising sinceperipheralization, as defined
intheprevioussection,impliesaggregatereturns foreconomic
activitiesonly marginallyhigherthan what the factorsof
productioninvolvedin the activitieswould fetchoutsidethe
worlddivisionof labor. As a consequence,withinperipheral-
ized activitiesthereis littleroomforsurplusappropriation -
particularly in theformofprofit.If byanychancemicro-level
capitalistrelations ofproduction actuallydevelopina peripheral
context- as theydid in Calabria and as theydo all thetimein
otherperipherallocales- theyare subject to extremecom-
petitiveand or subversivepressuresthat underminetheir
viability.It is nottheabsenceofmicro-level capitalistrelations
of productionthatproducesperipherality; it is peripherality
that makes the developmentof such capitalistrelationsof
productionproblematic.
To retaintheirviability, capitalistrelationsofproductionin
a peripheralcontextmusteitherdevelop a symbioticrelation

Development
Capitalist 703
withsubsistence orsupplement
activities, theinvisible
handof
themarket withthevisiblehandsofrepressive or
apparatuses,
both. Even then,however,theycannotdevelopveryfar
ofrepressive
becausetheeffectiveness systemsoflaborcontrol
decreaseswithincreasesinthesophisticationoftechnology.37
As a consequence, relations
capitalist ofproductioninperiph-
eral regionstendto reproducethemselves as enclavesthat
nevermanageto displace(and alwaysruntheriskof being
displacedby)small-scalecommodity production and subsis-
activities.
tence-oriented
Part III: Proletarianization

and
Redistributive Struggles
In theforegoing accountof regionaldifferentiation, the
world-economy and theItalianstatedefined thewider polit-
ical-economiccontextwithin whichsocialactorsin Calabria
shapedand playedout theircooperative, competitive,and
antagonisticroles.
But theinstitutionsofthe world-economy
and of theItalianstatedid not playanydirectrolein the
shapingofthesocialstructures of Calabria.Theirinfluence
wasindirectandmediated bylocalactors.Evenifsomeofthese
actorswereimmigrants fromotherregions,and manywere
who
migrants spentlongperiodsoftheir livesoutsideCalabria,
thestoryof regionaldifferentiation couldbe toldwithlittle
referenceto the backgroundof the immigrants or to the
of
experiences the migrants outside Calabria.
To someextent, thisfocuson localactorsas theyrelatedto
each otherwithinCalabriawas simplyan analytical device
meanttoemphasize theimportance ofthesocialecologyofthe
37. The hypothesisthatthe effectiveness of repressivesystemsof labor control
decreaseswiththe increasein the sophisticationof technologygoes back to Smith
(1961) and Marx (1959). It underliesour explicationof the establishmentin the
Crotoneseofa morerepressive systemoflaborcontrolthaninthePlainofGioia where
a more sophisticatedagriculturaltechnologywas developed. It will be formulated
moreexplicitly lateron to accountfortheincreaseinthebargainingpowerofsouthern
migrantsas theycame to monopolizesemiskilledjobs in technologically advanced
industries
(III. 3). For an analysisoftherelationbetweentechnologicalchangeand the
bargainingpoweroflaborin world-historical see Arrighi& Silver( 1984).
perspective,

704 & FortunataPiselli
GiovanniArrighi
regionin determining territorial

differentiation. To a large
extent,however,the focus was justifiedby an effective
autonomy oflocalactorsfromthewidercontext withinwhich
theyoperated. The of
extent thisautonomy can be gaugedby
comparing developments beforetheSecondWorldWarwith
developments aftertheWar,whenorgansof thestateand
politicalparties becamemajorsocialactorsdirectly involvedin
shapingeveryday lifewithinCalabria itself.
Moreover, as weapproachandthenenterthe1960's,labor
migrationand urbanizationbecome the centralfactsof
everyday lifethroughout Calabria.Theirsignificance is no
longer restricted to locales
specific and social strata.They
becomemassphenomena thatshiftthelocusof socialcon-
flict/cohesion fromrural-agriculturalsettings tourban-indus-
trial settingsoutsideCalabria and to urban-bureaucratic
settingswithinCalabria. In orderto understand the new
patterns ofsocialconflict/cohesion,thesituations inwhichthe
migrantsfoundthemselves in the places of immigration
becomeas relevant asthesituations
from which they emigrated.38
Theanalysisthatfollowsis premised on a pointthatwillbe
madeexplicitonlyat theendofpartIII, butwhichshouldbe
borneinmindall along:thepositionoftheItalianstateinthe
world-economy. Eversinceitsincorporation as a nation-state,
Italyhas oscillatedbetween thelower reaches ofthecorezone
anckheupperreachesofthesemiperipheral zone(seeArrighi,
1985).This ratheranomalousposition,whichprobablyno
otherstatehasoccupiedforsucha longperiod,hascreateda
politicalterrain fortheredistributive
struggles ofthepeoplesof
Calabria thatfew otherperipheralregionsof the world-
economyhaveenjoyed.
1. TheStateas SocialActor
ThelandreformintheCrotonesewascarriedoutbya public
institution dellaSila,henceforth
(Operaperla Valorizzazione
in Calabria since the
38. Evidence for the account of social transformations
Second WorldWar givenin thispartof the articlecan be foundin Piselli& Arrighi
(1985:428-92).

Development 705
OVS). Plots of land weregrantedto most,if not all, the

individuals whoappliedforland,butthemajority oftheplots
couldnotsupport a family.Eventhough theformer landowners
wereleftwithlargequantities ofthemorefertile land,theloss
ofthemarginal landsprevented themfrom continuing withthe
of
practice large-scale shifting agriculture based on low fixed
investments and a changingcombinationof grazingand
extensive cerealcultivation. For thisreason,thelandreform
dealta deathblowtotheeconomy ofthecapitalist latifundium.
In ordertoturna smaller quantity ofland to profitable use,the
former latifondistihad to introduce new product-mixes and
newtechniques of production thatgenerally requiredheavy
investments inlandimprovements and meansofproduction.
Thatistosay,theyhadtobecomefull-fledged capitalists rather
than the "half-capitalists" they had previously been (see
SectionI. 2).
Faced withthischallenge, a fewoftheformer latifondisti
actually used the generous indemnities received from theOVS
fortheexpropriated lands to turn their estates into modern
agrobusinesses. Othersdidnotstanduptothechallenge: They
leased or sold the remaining land (oftento theirformer
administrators, overseers,hirelings, etc.)andplacedtherents
ortheproceedings the
from sales, as well as theindemnities, in
financialandurbanspeculative investments. Ineither case,the
latifondistias such disappeared from thesocial scene, andthe
socialstructure oftheCrotonese becameas stratified as thatof
thePlainofGioia.
Thetopofthenewagrarianhierarchy wasoccupiedbythe
smallstratumof landowners who had becomefull-fledged
agricultural Next,camean upper-middle
capitalists. stratum
ofsmall-to-medium-sized capitalist farmers whohadobtained
from theOVS orhadpurchased/ extorted from thelandowners
and fromthenewlycreatedpeasantry moreland thanwas
necessary to support theirfamilies. After a middlestratum of
independent farmers, whohadjustenoughlandto supporta
family,camea largestratum ofsemiproletarianized peasants,
whohadnotobtained enough land to a
supportfamily. And,at
theverybottom,therewas a smallstratumof full-fledged

706 GiovanniArrighi
& Fortunata
Piselli
proletarians, whoeither hadreceived no landfromthereform

or hadsoldorlostwhattheyhadreceived.39
It is interesting to noticethat,as thepolarizedstructureof
the capitalistlatifundium was replacedby this stratified
structure, notonlyprevious forms ofclassstruggle/
solidarity
withered away,butforms ofconflict analogoustothosetypical
of thePlain of Gioia developedalso in theCrotonese.The
individuals whohad staffed therepressive apparatusof the
latifundia beganto use violenceon their own account.The
latifondistïs monopolyoverthe use of violencewas thus
a
replacedby competitive use of violenceby theirformer
and
hirelings bynewly formed patronagegroups.
Thestruggles amongthesepatronage groupsresembled the
feudstypicalof the Plain of Gioia withtwo important
differences. Inthefirst place,theuseofviolencewasaimedfar
lessatattaining positionsofauthority ofthemafiatypethanat
attaining economicpower. was It not an expressionof the
self-protection ofsocietyagainstthedisintegratingtendencies
ofthemarket andthecentralizing tendenciesofthestate(see
Section1.3);rather, itwasa meansthrough whichindividuals
andtheirkinandclients enriched themselvesattheexpenseof
otherindividuals andsocialgroups.
39. The OVS operatedin 114 municipalitiesin Calabria and was in controlof
about 573,000 hectares,or 38% of the regionalland. Of about 38,000 requests
examinedand of 25,080 familiesselectedas havingthe necessaryprerequisitesfor
participatinginthereform on December3 1, 1957,theOVS assigned76,011 hectaresin
smallholdingsto 18,902families(another1,362hectareswereassignedto institutions).
Thus, the assignmentscoveredonly49.7% of the 38,000 requests.In Campolungo,
however,all therequestsweresatisfied,and, furthermore, plotswerealso assignedto
peasantswhowereresidentinothermunicipalities. Likewise,thelandallotmentswere
extendedto includegroupsnot strictly tiedto theland,such as artisans.
The lands weregivenby the OVS to theassigneeas individualprivateproperty,
conditionalon fullpaymentofthesumowed to theOVS forthepriceoftheland and
anyimprovement workscarriedout. Paymentwas to be made in annualinstallments
overa 30-yearperiod,duringwhichtimedominionwas reservedbytheOVS thatcould
evictthedefaulting assigneeat anytime(e.g., fornotcultivating theland,forfalling
behindon theinstallments,foremigrating, etc.).A largepartofthecostsofthereform
fellon theassigneeswho werefroma social class thatwas almostcompletelywithout
capital. Thus, the beneficiariesof the reformfound themselvesin a situationof
continuousindebtednessto the OVS, and thereforewiththe permanentthreatof
evictionhangingovertheirheads (see Pezzino, 1977:66 ff).

Development
Capitalist 707
In thesecondplace,in thePlain of Gioia themafia-type

authority and the struggles to attainit had developedin
relationto a centralizing, exploitative, and absenteecentral
state.In the Crotonese after the Second WorldWar, in
contrast, thestatebecamean increasingly powerful presence
engaged(mainly the
through OVS) in activities ofproduction,
administration, andredistribution. Theredistribution ofland
wasonlythefirst stepin a processofgrowing involvement in
therestructuring ofsocialandeconomicrelations. The OVS
alsoprovided thenewsystem oflandtenure withthenecessary
infrastructure (roads,irrigation, ruraldwellings, electricity,
and so on); it suppliedtechnicalassistanceand creditfor
investments inlandimprovements, livestock, tools,andother
meansof production; it set up processingand marketing
anddevelopedmanyotherauxiliary
facilities activities.
In the process,the OVS grewintoa hugebureaucratic
apparatuswithunparalleled powerintheeveryday lifeofthe
Crotoneseand neighboring areas.This growthwas chiefly
motivated bytheneedofthepoliticalpartiesin government
(firstandforemost theChristian Democratic party)to break
thehegemony thatoppositionpartieshad established in the
area duringthe phase of acute class confrontation - the
hegemony, thatis,ofCommunists andSocialistsovertherural
proletariatand of monarchists and neo-fascists over the
latifondistiandtheirhirelings.
In orderto extricate themselves fromthissituation, which
leftlittleroomfor the legitimacy and electoralgrowthof
governing parties, theChristian Democratsfollowed a three-
prongedstrategy: They established a firm control over the
OVS; they transformed the social structure throughthe
redistribution ofland;andthey resorted to widespread patron-
agetowinvotesandlegitimacy. Littleorno political discrimi-
nationoccurredin theassignment oftheexpropriated land,
but, as soon as the land had been the
assigned, provision of
infrastructure, technical
assistance, credit, subsidies,
marketing
etc.,becameconditional
facilities, onpolitical allegiancetothe
Christian Democrats. Thus, whereas the redistributionof land
undermined the structural roots of the hegemony of Com-

munists and Socialists on the peasantry,the subsequent

activitiesoftheOVS builtnetworksofpoliticalpatronagethat
tiedthepeasantryto therulingparty.
In buildingnetworksofpoliticalpatronage,thebureaucrats
of the OVS came to relyheavilyon formermembersof the
repressive apparatusesofthecapitalistlatifundia.Partlyoutof
fear,partlyout of convenience,the bureaucratsof the OVS
favoredthesepeople in morethanone way: More and better
land was grantedto themthanto thelandlesspeasants;their
encroachmentson the propertyof other granteesthrough
violenceand intimidation weretolerated;manywererecruited
as guardiansof OVS property,as watchmen,and as body-
guards.An organicrelationthusdevelopedbetweentheOVS
and a new class of "primitive"accumulatorswherebythe
politicalclientelesof the OVS and theeconomicclientelesof
this new class interlockedin complex configurationsof
reciprocalinstrumentality.
The activitiesof theOVS also contributedto a rapproche-
mentbetweentherulingpartyand theformerlatifondisti. As
alreadymentioned, thetrauma of expropriationwas softened
by generousindemnities.In addition,the formerlatifondisti
who had turnedintofull-fledged agriculturalcapitalistsbene-
fitedmore than anyone else fromthe heavy investments in
infrastructure and fromthe technicalassistanceof the OVS.
And thosewho sold theirland and had turnedintoreal-estate
speculatorsbenefited bothfromtheincreaseinlandvaluethat
accompanied changein land tenure,and fromthesupport
the
of the OVS and otherstateinstitutions forreal-estatespecu-
lationin urbanand touristareas.
In sum,theland reformtransformed thesocial structureof
theCrotoneseintosomethingsimilarto thesocial structure of
thePlain of Gioia withtheimportantdifference thatthestate
ratherthan the markethad the largestinfluenceon social
relations.As a consequence,theupperstrataoftheCrotonese
came to includenotonlycapitalistsofvariouskindsbutstate
bureaucratsand partybossesas well.Accesstotheupperstrata
was regulatedby violentconflicts,whichformallyresembled
thestruggles formafia-type authority.Substantively,however,

Development
Capitalist 709
theobjectofthesestruggles wasnotmafia-type authority - an

informal institution thatderived itsstrengthandfunction from
theweaknessof,and opposition to, formal state institutions.
Rather,the objectof the struggles was political-economic
commandwithin(or in symbiosis with)formalstateinstitu-
tions.
Thisall-pervading influence ofthestatedifferentiated the
socialstructure of the Crotonese from what had previously
existedinthePlainofGioia.Thesocialstructure ofthePlainof
Gioia, however,was itselfevolvingtowardgreaterstate
involvement ineveryday life.Thesocialconflicts thatfollowed
thedownfall oftheFascistregime didnotleadinthePlainto
anysignificant changein thesystem oflandtenure. Thiswas
neitherthe objectivenor theoutcomeof thestruggles (see
SectionII. 3). Thedistribution ofpublic-domain landssimply
strengthened and widenedthestructures ofsmall-scale com-
modityproduction, and thecultivators themselves supplied
whatwas requiredin termsof infrastructures (farless than
whatwas requiredin theCrotonese)and of land improve-
ments.40Underthesecircumstances therewaslittleroomfora
largebureaucratic institution suchas theOVS, andinfactno
suchinstitution cameto operateinthePlainofGioia.
Theall-pervasive influence ofthestatewasestablished more
gradually than in the and
Crotonese, through quite different
channels.WhereasintheCrotonese theinfluence ofthestate
workedits way up fromthe structures of propertyand
production, inthePlainofGioiaitworkeditswaydownfrom
the"superstructures" ofsocialconflict andredistribution. The
stepwasthe"politicization"
first ofthefeudandtheestablish-
mentof organiclinksbetweennationalpoliticalinstitutions
andmafia-type authorities. WhentheFascistregime collapsed,
many "scores" had to be settled and thestruggle forpower
and authority amongrivalpatronagegroups,partlyfrozen
underFascism,wasreactivated (see sectionII. 3 above).This
revivalof thecompetitive use of violencetookplace in the
highlypoliticized contextof themiddle1940's.Partlyas a
spontaneous tendency, partlyas a resultof thepracticeof
40. See note 19.

appointingmafiabosses to public office - a practiceinaugu-

ratedunderU.S. military -
occupation rivalpatronagegroups
were driven into opposite political factions. Local party
politicsthusbeganto be turnedintoa newpowerful instrument
in the settlementof scores and in thestruggleforpowerand
authority.41
This tendencywenthand in hand withtheincipientuse of
mafiapoweras an instrument of accumulation.Toward the
endofthe warand in theimmediate postwaryears,themafiosi
began to use theirpowerin the monopolizationof activities
(such as transportand wholesaletrade)thatwerestrategically
placedinthestruggle forbenefits.Atfirstthebenefits consisted
of the largegains that,in the context of acute scarcityof the
immediatepostwaryears,could be reapedby tradingin open
and black marketsand throughsmuggling.Later, when
shortageslessenedand competitivepressuresincreased,the
benefitscame to consist of monopsonisticgains, rents,or
outrightextortionsimposedon the local producers.In both
situations,violencewas used as an instrument of economic
competition and domination rather than as an instrument of
it
social regulationas had been.
In the 1950's,the relationshipbetweennational political
actorsand local patronagegroupsremainedthesame as that
establishedin the 1940's: The latterdeliveredvotes to the
former,and theformerconnivedwiththeuse ofviolenceand
theabuses ofpowerofthelatter.Thisexchangehad important
indirecteffectson the social structureof the Plain of Gioia
since the emergent"entrepreneurial mafia"(Arlacchi,1986),
4 1. Mafiabossesimmediately understoodtheinstrumental benefitsofpoliticsand
directedtheirenergiestowardthe aim of establishingtheirown authorityover the
politicalparties.Theybeganbysupportingone oftheirown relativesor affiliates for
administrative elections,so thattheirbusinessat thelocal levelwould be protected.
They then sought to concentratetheirvotes on individualswho would commit
themselves to becomingthecustodianoftheirinterests at theprovincial,regional,and
nationallevels.
The economicstrugglewas thustransferred to thepoliticalterrain;theclientelistic
feudsenteredinto the municipal,provincial,and regionalcouncils. Assassination
attemptsagainst politicians(which in Olivara resulted in at least one actual
assassination)markedall thecriticalmomentsofpoliticallife;theybecameexpressions
of threatsand mafia vendettas,and instruments for the rise and replacementof
politicalelites.

Development 711
insteadof protecting local societyfromthe disintegrating

tendencies of themarketand thecentralizing tendencies of
stateand capital,triedto turnthesetendencies to its own
advantage. Asa consequence, theintensificationofcompetitive
pressuresintheproductmarkets increased thecentralization
ofproduction andthepolarization ofthesocialstructure.
In the 1960's,the relationship betweenlocal patronage
groupsand nationalpoliticalactorscame to impingeeven
moredirectly and radicallythanin the 1950'son thesocial
structureofthePlain.Thenumber ofstateagenciesoperating
inthesouthmultiplied and, what's more,thepublicfinancial
resources earmarked forthemodernization and reliefofthe
southerneconomyincreasedmanyfold. Since competitive
pressureson theproducers ofthePlainhadbecomeso strong
as to threatenthe viabilityof all but the mostefficient
productive units,accumulation orjustsurvival cametodepend
on a privileged -
accessto theseresourcesan accesswhich,in
turn,required control overthelocalarticulations ofthestate
andofthepoliticalparties.
Two resultsfollowed.On theone hand,thestruggle for
benefitsamongpatronagegroupsshifted fromcontrolover
strategicnodesofmarketnetworks to controloverstrategic
nodesofpoliticalnetworks. Theoverlapbetween politicaland
economicpatronagebecamealmostcompleteand thefeuds
amongrivalgroupsturnedintoconflicts thatweresimul-
taneouslypolitical and economic. On the other hand,local
patronage groups were induced to extend nationally (or even
internationally)thescaleoftheiroperations order ensure
in to
themostprofitable reinvestment ofthecapitalaccumulated in
thePlainofGioiaandto establish a moredirectinfluence on
thenationalcenters ofeconomicredistribution.
As weshallsee,thefusionofthenetworks ofeconomicand
politicalpatronage,and the stretching of thesenetworks
towardthedecision-making centers ofthestate,hadimportant
implications forthepatternof socialconflict/ cohesionthat
emergedin Calabriain thelate 1960'sand early1970's(see
SectionIII. 3). Equallyimportant in thisrespectweredevel-
opments in the Cosentino where similaroutcomeswere

producedvia a different route.Here,theinfluenceofthestate

did not workitsway up fromthe structures of propertyand
production(as in the Crotonese), or its way down fromthe
"superstructures" of social conflictand distribution (as in the
Plain ofGioia). The absenceofacuteclassconflictorofviolent
struggles amongpatronagegroupsmeantthattherewerefewer
opportunities and lesserincentives thanin theothertwoareas
for the state and politicalpartiesto seize upon local social
processesin an attemptto securelegitimacy.As a matterof
fact,in theCosentinothereopeningoftraditionalchannelsof
long-distancemigrationand the openingof new ones were
sufficientto createa widespreadconsensusin favorofthenew
republicanstateand theruling-party coalition.42
This "enclave"of legitimacyand social peace providedthe
ChristianDemocratswitha sourceofreliablecadresto whom
theycouldentrust theperformance ofstateand partyfunctions
in therestof Calabria and beyond.Most functionaries of the
OVS, forexample,came fromtheCosentino.Byrecruiting in
the Cosentino,moreover,stateand partiescould exploitthe
dense and extensivenetworksof kinand neighborstypicalof
thearea to createand consolidatechainsofpoliticalpatronage.
This instrumental use ofkinshipnetworkswas byno means
unidirectional. As thefunctions ofstateand partiesmultiplied,
individualswhooccupiedstrategic positionsinthesenetworks
used themto stepinto,and establishcommandover,thestate
and partybureaucracies.At thelocal level,partylife,govern-
mentalfunctions,and bureaucraticemployment came to be
completely dominated bypatronage based on kinship.On this
basis,stronglocal-powerpositions were created fromwhichto
climbthehierarchies ofpartyand statebureaucracies, bothas
an end in itselfand as a meansto securingcontrolor influence
overthecentersof allocationof publicresources.
The same mechanismsthathad giventheCosentinoa clear
advantageoverneighboring areas in long-distancemigration
were thus activated to create a similar advantage in the
occupationofpositionsofpowerandbureaucratic employment
42. The Cold Warfurthered almosteverybody
legitimation; intheCosentinohad a
relativein the UnitedStates.

Capitalist inHostileEnvironments
Development 713
in stateand partyapparatuses.43Whereasin theothertwo

areasthestateandpoliticalpartieshadsubverted
(Crotonese)
intheCosentino
(PlainofGioia)socialrelations,
orinfiltrated
socialrelations
wereprojected intothestateandthepolitical
parties.
2. Mass Migration
Asthestatecamesouth,thepeoplesofCalabriawentnorth.
The transformations outlinedin theprevioussectionwere
matched bythedevelopment ofmassmigration. Thepreludeto
thisdevelopment was a drasticincreasein thepropensity to
emigrate from all overCalabria. In theCrotonese, theland
reformchangedradically therelationshipbetween thedemand
forandthesupply oflabor.Ontheonehand,theredistribution
oflandbrought abouta sharpcontraction inthedemandfor
laborbecauseit reducedtheamountoflandin thehandsof
producers
capitalist and,simultaneously, inducedthelatterto
switchto morecapital-intensivetechniques ofproduction.In
theshortrun,thiscontraction waspartly for
compensated by
theincreasein thedemandforlaborassociatedwithheavy
privateand publicinvestments in landimprovements and in
Butthisincrease
infrastructure. wastransitory andsubsidedas
soon as the switchto the new systemof land tenurewas
completed.
On theotherhand,thelandreform did notbringabouta
reductionin the supplyof labor commensurate withthe
contractionofdemand.Sincemostpeasantshadnotreceived
enoughlandtosupport/ employ a family,theycontinued tosell
partofthehousehold's laborpoweron themarket. Theydid
so, however,froma radicallychangedcondition.Their
competitive positionvis-à-visthe migrant-peasants of the
and thesemiproletarianized
interior peasants ofthe areasof
43. Cosenza becamethe hometownof politiciansof greatinfluence,such as the
ChristianDemocratMisasi and theSocialistMancini.Thesewerelong-time ministers
who followed an active policy of using trustedmen to occupy and control key
bureaucraticand politicalposts. For a comprehensiveevaluationof theirpolitical
activitiesand theirclientelistic see Cappelli (1985: 567 ff).
strategy,

Arrighi Piselli
petty commodity production hadgreatly improved. Sincepart

ofthehousehold's subsistence wasnowcoveredbyproduction
on the plotsobtainedthroughthe reform, wageswereno
longer required tocover thefullcosts of reproduction. A major
in
disadvantage competing withnonproletarianized andsemi-
proletarianized peasantsfromneighboring territorieswasthus
eliminated, andtheelimination ofthisdisadvantage brought to
theforetheadvantages associatedwithcloseness tothecenters
ofemployment (betterknowledge ofdemandconditions and
shorter transfertimesfromresidence to workplace).
Atthesametime,thelandreform reduced thedependence of
thelaborforceoftheCrotonese onthelocallabormarket. One
ofthemainreasonswhytheruralproletarians oftheCrotonese
hadbeenonlymarginally involved inlong-distance migration
was thattheylackedthematerial and nonmaterial resources
necessary to undertake it(see Section I. 2). The redistribution
oflandprovided themwithsomeoftheseresources. To besure,
thenewlycreatedpeasantry oftheCrotoneseneverhad the
historicalopportunity to createtheextensive kinship networks
through which the longer-established peasantry of the Cosen-
tinohadsucceeded inorganizing long-distance migration. Yet,
through a variety ofarrangements (suchas sellingor renting
theirlandorleavingpartofthefamily on thelandtoproduce
part ofthe subsistence), and often byexploiting thepatronage
networks thathadgrownoutofthereform, thelaborforceof
theCrotonesewas nowin a positionto competeforjobs in
extraregional markets.
The upshotof all thesechangeswas thatthe Crotonese
tendedto turnfroma net"importer" intoa net"exporter" of
-
laborpower thatis to say,itbeganto generate a surplusof
labor capable and willingto seek remuneration outside
Calabria.Forquitedifferent the
reasons, propensityengage to
in extraregional migration increasedalso in the othertwo
areas.In thePlainofGioia,theincipient crisisofsmall-scale
commodity production transformed thecyclical alternationof
excesssupplyandexcessdemandinthelocallabormarket (due
to theebbsandflowsofcompetitive pressures intheproduct
markets) intoa structural disequilibrium ofcumulating excess

supply. More specifically,as had been usual in previous

cyclicalcontractions,thefallinagriculturalpricesthatfollowed
the immediatepostwarboom inducedcapitalistproducersto
cut down theirdemand for labor and semiproletarianized
producersto increasetheirsupplyin the local market.This
time, however,competitivepressuresfromabroad (Spain,
Israel,Greece,Morocco,theUnitedStates)on theagricultural
activitiesof the Plain, and fromnorthernItaly on auxiliary
activities(sawmills,coopers,basketmakers,and so on), was
so strongthatitinducedcapitalistproducerseitherto giveup
productionand emigrateor to undertakeradical rationali-
zationsof activities.
Thisthinning ofthecapitaliststratum and therationalization
of economic activitiesfurtherdepressedthe local economy
leadingto newroundsofdivestment in retailand
(particularly
wholesaletrade) and of The
emigration.44 semiproletarianized
strataof the Plain of Gioia were thus faced,not only with
remunerativeprices for their cash crops, but also with
steadilyworsening opportunitiesto selllaborpowerlocally.As
a consequence, in the Plain the propensityto emigratewas
increasing,not because of an improvementin the living
conditionsofthelaborforce(as intheCrotonese),butbecause
of a worseningin theirconditions.
As for the Cosentino,the traditionalhigh propensityto
engage in long-distanceand seasonal migrationwas further
enhancedby twocircumstances. In thefirstplace, therestric-
tionsimposedon interstate migrationin theprevioustwenty
years had created a "backlog" of would-be long-distance
migrantsreadyto leave as soon as circumstances allowed. In
thesecond place,theintensification of competitionin nearby
44. In Olivara therewere 154 manufacturing enterprisesat thetimeof the 1951

censusbutonly112 in 196 1; thenumberofwood-basedenterprises declinedfrom35 in
195 1to 22 in 196 1; clothingand furniture fellfrom62 in 195 1to 30 in 196 1.
enterprises
The numberofwholesaletradersdeclinedfrom30 in 1951to 20 in 1961and retailtraders
declinedfrom123 in 1951 to 77 in 1961. At the same timestrongmigratory flows
developed.Fromtheend ofthe 1950'semigration becamea mass-basedphenomenon
in everysocial stratum;froma cyclicalphenomenonit became structural;froma
"correction"mechanismof marketdisequilibriait became the veryoriginof such
disequilibria.

labor markets(due to the breakupof the latifundiaand the

crisisof small-scalecommodityproduction,whichdecreased
demand and simultaneously increasedsupply)was inducing
thewould-bepermanent migrants ofthelowersocialstrataand
the seasonal migrantsof the intermediatestrata to seek
employment outsidethe region.
In the firstpostwardecade, therefore, the propensityto
in
engage extraregionalmigration was increasingin all three
territories.This greaterpropensitymaterializedin threesuc-
cessivewavesofmigration, each representinga different stage
of developmentof "mass migration."45 During the firstwave
(i.e., from the late 1940's to the late 1950's), extraregional
migrationremainedpredominantly long distance.The costs
and risksof this type of migration - althoughconsiderably
-
lowerthanhalfa centurybefore werestillhighand generally
beyond the reach of the lower social strata.Moreover,the
restrictions introducedby key recipientstates,such as the
United States, and the peripheralizationof otherrecipient
states,such as Argentinaand Brazil,added new obstaclesto
the involvementof the lower social strata in long-distance
migration.46 As a consequence,the enhancedpropensityto
engage in extraregionalmigrationof the intermediate social
strata(subsistenceproducersunderthepressureofcustomary
rulesand commodityproducersunderthepressureofintensi-
fyingmarketcompetition)foundan outlet,but theenhanced
propensityof the lower social stratagenerallydid not. The
growingdisequilibriumbetweensupplyand demand in the
regional labor marketthus materializedin unemployment
ratherthanemigration(see AppendixII).
The secondwavebeganinthelate 1950'sand lasteduntilthe
middle 1960's. It was characterizedby the almostcomplete
45. The quantitativeaspectsof thethreewavesare shownin AppendixII.
46. Some of the recipientstates that had ceased to importlabor (particularly
Brazil) were also states that at the beginningof the centuryhad offeredspecial
assistanceto immigrants fromsouthernItalyas a wayto competewithwealthierand
more attractivelands of immigration, such as NorthAmerica.This assistancewas
oftenessentialforlowersocial stratato engageinlong-distance
emigration.The ability
of lower stratato engage in long-distancemigrationwas further curtailedby the
importanceattributed to wealthand family connectionsbytheimmigration lawsofthe
UnitedStates.

displacementof the earlierpatternof eithershort-distance

(intraregional)or long-distance(extra-European)migration
by a patternof principallymedium-distance (extraregional,
intra-European)migration.Moreover,intrastatemigration
(thatis,migration fromCalabria to otherItalianregions)came
to account fora large and growingshare of intra-European
migration.This changein thespatialand temporalpatternof
migrationwas accompaniedby a changein the social actors
involved in migration:For the firsttime, extra regional
migrationbecame a mass phenomenondominatedby the
lowersocial strata.
These changeswere promptedby the boom of industrial
innorthwestern
activities Europeand northern Italyassociated
withthe formationof the E.E.C. in 1958 and the spread of
processesof mass productionand capitalistrationalization
("Fordism"and"Taylorism")pioneeredintheUnitedStatesin
thefirsthalfofthecentury.Theseprocesseshad alreadymade
a breakthrough in EuropeduringtheSecond WorldWar,and
above all in theyearsofpostwarreconstruction, butonlywith
the formationof the E.E.C. was therecreatedan economic
space largeenoughfortheircumulativeexpansion.
The industrialboom markedlyincreasedthe demand for
labor in European core regions.It also changed the com-
positionof the demand forlabor because the new lines and
techniquesofproductionwerebased on a systematic and ever-
widening substitutionofhigh-level
manpower(in function-
fact,
ariesofcaptial)and semiskilledoperativesfor skilledcraftsmen
and unskilledlaborers. As a consequence, the sharp and
sustainedincreasein thedemandforlabor was principally for
thefirsttwokinds,managerialand semiskilled. The mostacute
shortages,however,werenotfeltinthekindsofjobs thatwere
expandingmore rapidly.There was no major shortage,for
example,of high-levelmanpowersince the growingdemand
forthiskindoflabor could be and was easilymetbyrecycling
(mainly throughon-the-jobtrainingof the youngergen-
erations)thesurplusofintellectualworkersthathad tradition-
allycharacterizedEurope,and or byeasingtheaccessoflower
social stratato highereducation.

It was not so easy to meet the growingdemand for

semiskilledoperatives.To someextentitwas possibleto do so
bymobilizingand recycling thesurplusoflaborthatstagnated
inlow-status/ low-payjobs within thecoreregionsthemselves.
This was a real possibilityas long as thenewsemiskilled jobs
wereperceivedas providinghigherstatusand rewardsthan
unskilledand lowerstatusjobs, and as longas therewerelarge
reservesof labor employedin theseunskilledand low-status
jobs.47This solutionto theshortageof semiskilledoperatives
was widelyresortedto, but,by divertingsuppliesfromlow-
status/low-payjobs, it transferred the shortageto the latter
occupations. As a matter of fact, in the early stages of
of
development the new linesand techniquesofproduction,it
was quitenormalforlaborshortagesincoreregionsto be more
acute in the slowlyexpandingunskilledjob sectorthan in
quicklyexpandingsemiskilled job sectors.
In the late 1950's and early 1960's the shortage was
nonethelessfeltin semiskilledoccupationsas wellbecause of
the high overallrate of expansion of industrialactivitiesin
47. When theywere firstintroduced,semiskilledjobs were oftenperceivedas
providinghigherstatusand rewards,notonlythanunskilled jobs, buteventhanskilled
jobs (see, forexample,Vallini,1957).One ofthemainreasonswas thatas longas the
newmethodswerenotgeneralizedand werenotoperatingat fullcapacity,theburden
of higherspeed fellmainlynot on those who workedwiththe new methodsbut on
thosewho workedwiththeold ones. In the 1950'sthepiecemealintroduction of the
new lines and techniquesof production,both withinand betweenenterprises,
combinedwiththeweak bargainingpowerof theskilledand unskilledworkersstill
operatingunderthecraftsystem,meantthattheselatterworkershad to bear mostof
theburdenof theintensification of work.A similarpointhad alreadybeen made by
Marx (1959) with referenceto nineteenth-century transformations of the labor
process.
The situationchangedradicallyat theend ofthe 1950'sand evenmoreintheearly
1960Y As thenewmethodsbecamemoregeneralized,theburdenoftheintensification
of workshiftedonto workersin semiskilled jobs. In addition,by thelate 1950's,the
mostcompetitive and easilymobilizablenorthern reservesofpart-lifetimeproletarian
labor had been exhausted.The labor forcein domesticservicehad been drastically
reduced,and,thanksto thecompetitive pressurefromfactory work,itwas enjoyingfar
betterconditionsof pay and workthan in the early 1950's. Similarconsiderations
applyto the labor forcein semiskilledjobs in textilesand otheroldersectors.More
generally,much of the disguisedunemployment in northernagriculturehad been
absorbed, unskilledindustrialwork had ceased to be the main referencewhen
consideringsemiskilledoccupations,and new formsof apprenticeship, particularly
throughformaleducation,werebecomingrealalternatives forthenewgenerations of
peasantand working-class householdswithmultipleincomes.

westernEurope. What's more,as soon as the new lines and

techniquesof productionbecame generalized,the statusof
semiskilledjobs declined, and theireffort-price tended to
increasedrastically.As a consequence,shortagesinsemiskilled
jobs became progressively moreacute thanin unskilledjobs.
These two kindsof shortages(of semiskilledoperativesand
unskilledlaborers)promptedand shapedthedemandof core
European regionsforthe labor powerof peripheralregions.
The regionalsurplusoflaborthathad grownand stagnatedin
Calabria duringmostof the 1950'sthusfoundan outletthat
was withinthereachofthelowersocial strata,and thatcould
evenbe exploitedon a seasonal basis.48
The second wave of migrationthus began to reduce
unemployment and underemployment in Calabria. Initially,
the
however, impact ofmass migration thesocial structures
on
ofCalabria was limitedbythefactthat,up to about 1962,the
predominant experienceofthemigrantsin northern Italyand
abroad was employmentin the low-status/ low-payingjobs
thathad beendesertedbytheindigenousworkers.Thesejobs
werea welcomealternative to openordisguisedunemployment
but notan inducementstrongenoughto giveup self-or wage
employment withinCalabria ifthepotentialmigrantswereso
employed.Migrationthus absorbed the regionalsurplusof
labor withoutunderminingthe viabilityof existingsocial
structures.
In contrastto this situation,between1962 and 1966, the
predominant experienceofthemigrants fromCalabriabecame
employment in the semiskilled positionsof technologically
advancedcore industries.49 These jobs offeredthemigrantsa
48. The meetingof demand and supplywas greatlyfacilitatedby the drastic
reductionsinthecostsand timesoftransport betweensouthernand northern Italythat
took place in the late 1950'sand early 1960's.A furtherfactorwas the widespread
mobilizationof kinshipand patronagenetworksby core employerseitherdirectly
throughsouthernemployeesor indirectly throughvariouskindsof intermediaries.
49. The generalizationof the new lines and techniquesof mass production
increasedcompetitive pressureson employers to reduceunitlaborcosts.As employers
attemptedto stepup theintensity and pace of workin semiskilledpositions(where
most of the directlyproductiveworkhad come to be concentrated),theybegan to
experiencelabor resistanceon the partof theindigenousworkerswho had come to
occupythosepositionsor labor shortages.The masssubstitution ofmigrantworkers

higherstatusand a higherpaythanpreviousoccupations,both
intheplacesofimmigration and intheplacesofemigration. To
be sure,theyalso requireda far more sustainedeffortthan
theseotheroccupations- effort thatcould hardlybe sustained
overa fulllifetime.However, longas themigrants
as perceived
the semiskilledjobs as a steppingstonetowardan improved
social and economicposition,thehigheffort-price ofsuchjobs
was onlya minordrawback.Since tenurein semiskilled jobs
was thoughtto be temporary, the higherthe pay per unitof
timethebetter - almostirrespective of theenergiesexpended
in theirperformance.
As we shall see, in the longer run these attitudesand
expectationswereself-defeating. For a while,however,they
endowedmigrants fromCalabria and otherperipheralregions
with a strong competitiveadvantage vis-à-visindigenous
workers,resultingin the almostcompletesubstitution of the
formerforthelatterin semiskilled jobs. This substitutionhad
"revolutionary" repercussions on social relations in Calabria.
Migrationceased to be a factorofcontinuity and expansionof
subsistenceproduction,as it had been in theCosentino,or a
reflection
oflabor-marketdisequilibriaconnected withperipherali-
zation,as ithad beenin thePlain ofGioia. Instead,migration
becamea factorofdiscontinuity intheevolutionofsubsistence
production, and a primary factor in the peripheralization of
commodityproduction.
As we know,thestructures ofsubsistenceproductionofthe
Cosentino had survived the breakdown of the capitalist
latifundiaof the Crotonese, and the crisis of small-scale
commodityproductionin thePlain of Gioia. Botheventshad
negative repercussionson the ability of the independent
peasantryof the Cosentinoto marketits seasonal surplusof
labor in nearby areas. Nevertheless,these negativereper-
cussions were more than compensated for, first,by the
reopeningof channelsof long-distancemigrationin the late
1940's and early 1950's, and, secondly,by the subsequent
forindigenousworkersin semiskilled thedoublefunctionofbreaking

jobs performed
thisresistanceand overcomingtheseshortages.

emergencein northern Italyand otherEuropeancore regions

of employmentopportunitiesthat could be exploitedon a
seasonal basis. The social structuresof the Cosentinothus
enteredthe 1960'sas wellpreservedas ever.
The first"cracks" in these structuresappeared at the
beginningof the 1960's,whenthehigherrateof migrationto
northernItalian and othercore European regionsbegan to
exhaustthe internalreservesof subordinatedomesticlabor,
mainlyunmarriedrelativesand proietti.Yet, as long as the
predominantexperienceof the migrantsin core regionswas
employmentin low-status/ low-pay jobs, the cracks were
limitedand could be patchedup withmarginalchangesin the
technicaland institutional arrangements of subsistencepro-
-
duction e.g., withsome mechanizationof agricultural work
and a moreintenseexploitationofthemembersofthenuclear
family.Afterall, a plot of land continuedto be a betterand
morereliablesourceofstatusand full-lifetime subsistencethan
anyofthejobs migrants weregettingincoreregions.Butwhen
the predominantexperience of the migrantsbecame the
semiskilledjobs of technicallyadvanced industry, the cracks
widenedand deepened untilthey could no be
longer patched
up.
The twochangesthatmorethananything else haveprecipi-
tated the disintegrationof subsistenceproductionwere a
change in whatAglietta(1979) has called the "consumption
norm"on one side and a changein theeconomicrelationship
betweenage groups on the other. Both changes were the
productof the same technologicaltransformations thathad
openedup core labor markets to migrantsfrom Calabria. The
main products of the new lines and techniques of mass
production (the smallerautomobiles, televisionsets,electrical
householdappliances,mass producedfood and clothing,and
so on) requireda mass marketdependenton the spread of
semiskilledoccupations.As theseproductsenteredthe new
consumption norm,theverymeaningof"subsistence" changed,
not onlyin core regions,but also in thoseperipheralregions
likeCalabria thathad beenheavilyinvolvedin migration. The
old conceptofsubsistence became obsolete,land lostmuch of

itsvalue as a sourceofstatusand full-lifetime subsistence, and

customaryrulesand obligationsbeganto breakdown.50
The main agentsof the transformation were the younger
generations.Apart from being more easilyinfluencedby the
change inthe consumption the
norm, youngergenerations saw
in the new structureof demand for labor in core regionsa
uniqueopportunity to switchto thenewpatternofconsump-
tion and, simultaneously,to liberatethemselvesfromthe
oppressivepatriarchalismthat pervaded the structuresof
subsistenceproduction(see sectionI. 1). Two strategies could
be and werepursued.One was to movedirectlyintothecore
work force and exploit the competitiveand advantage of
youngerover older generationsin the new semiskilledoccu-
pations. The other was to enterthe workforcevia higher
education so as to be able to compete for bureaucratic
employmenteitheras a functionary of capital or as a func-
tionary of the state.51
As theyoungergenerationswentnorthor wentintohigher
education,thestructures ofsubsistenceproductionexperienced
acutelaborshortageswhichcould no longerbe counteredwith
marginalchangesin technicaland institutional arrangements.
Those peasant householdsthatcontrolledthe best land (in
termsof fertility and closenessto the rapidlygrowingurban
markets)and weremoreentrepreneurial^ inclined,switched
to skill-and capital-intensive techniquesof productionand
transformed theirsubsistenceintomarket-and profit-oriented
activities.The majority,however,eitherstoppedcultivating
thelandaltogether orcontinuedtodo so as a sideactivity from
50. Neighborsbeganaskingto be paid forlaborservices,and thegoods received
fromneighbors and relativesbecamesubjectto a preciseaccounting.The social
aspects
of transactions-dominantuntilnow- weresuffocated by pecuniarycalculations
5 1 The firststrategy
could be pursuedindividually, and thereforegave consider-
able leverageto theyoungergenerationsin intrahousehold bargaining,regardlessof
whetherit was actuallypursuedor not. The second strategygenerallyrequiredthe
mobilizationof thehousehold'sresourcesand of thesocial networksin whichit was
embedded,and therefore requiredthecooperationand intermediation of the older
generations.The cooperationand intermediation of theoldergenerations, however,
were generallyforthcoming eitherbecause of the increasedleverageof younger
generationsinintrahousehold bargainingor becausetheoldergenerations themselves
expectedto benefitfromthesocial and economicadvancementoftheiryoungerkin.

Development
Capitalist 723
whichtheydidnotexpectanything morethana subsidy to a

earnedelsewhere.52
subsistence
IntheCrotonese andinthePlainofGioiathecompetition of
for
coreregions peripheral laborsupplies subvertedexisting
in a moredirectandimmediate
socialstructures waythanin
theCosentino.In bothareas,butparticularly inthePlainof
Gioia,production forthemarket was already ruleso that
the
the new consumption norm spread swiftlyvia shiftsin
consumerpreferences and worsening termsof trade.More
important,unliketheCosentino,bothareas werecharacterized
well-developed
byrelatively labormarkets inwhichchangesin
whatlaborcouldearnelsewhere werepromptly into
translated
competitivepressureson workers or employers accordingto
circumstances.53
52. For example, in neighborhoodsA and B of Altopiano (located in two
agricultural districts)almosthalfofthepeasantfamilieshaveleftthefarmand moved
to livein thetownor emigrated.Butevenamongtheremaining familiestheland is no
longertheirmainproductivebase. Instead,theyderivetheirincomeprincipally from
emigrationand wage work. All the men work as wage workersin the districtor
emigrateperiodicallyto northernItalyor abroad. Theirwivesremainat home,near
the parentsor the in-laws,dedicatedto domesticactivitiesand to raisingchildren.
Occasional or part-time agriculturalworkallows bothmenand womento register as
agriculturallaborers and to collect unemploymentand medical insurance.The
childrenstudyat leastuntiltheycompletejuniorhighschool,manyuntiltheycomplete
highschool,and somego on to a university. None workstheland. Betweentheages of
16 and 18 manyemigratetemporarily to Germany,Switzerland,or northern Italy.
53. As we have seen,thecrisisofcommercialagriculture in areas likethePlain of
Gioia had alreadybeguninthe1950's.In thefirst yearsofthesecondwaveofmigration
(1959-62), however,the crisishad givenway to a shortperiod of prosperity.The
economicboom enjoyedby Europeancore regionsin general,and northernItalyin
particular,trickleddownto peripheralregionslikeCalabria in theformofimproved
pricesand moresecureoutletsfortheiragriculturalproduce.At thesame time,the
economic boom did not initiallyeliminatethe favorablelabor-marketconditions
enjoyedbyemployersin Calabria. Even thoughunemployment beganto decline,the
"unlimited"laborsuppliescreatedbythebreakdownofthelatifundiaandtheprevious
crisisof small-scalecommodityproductionremainedlarge. In addition,as long as
migrants fromCalabriawereonlycompeting forlow-status/low-payjobs incorelabor
markets,competitivepressureson employersin thePlain ofGioia and theCrotonese
to improvewagesand workingconditionsremainedweak.
As theboom approacheditspeak in 1962-63,theseconditionschangedradically.
The openingup ofsemiskilled jobs incoreregionsto migrants fromperipheralregions
drasticallyreducedunemployment pressureson employers
inCalabria and intensified
to improvewagesand workingconditionsto matchtheconditionsoffered incorelabor
markets.Also in thesecases, the youngergenerationswerethe main agentsof the

724 GiovanniArrighi& FortunataPiseHi
Squeezed betweenstrongcompetitive pressuresinthelabor

and the productmarkets,small-scalecommodityproduction
was plungedintoitsfinalcrisis.As intheCosentino,onlythose
households(and enterprises) thatcontrolledthebestland and
thateitherhad alreadyswitchedor werequick to switchto
skill-and capital-intensive operationswereable to survive.All
the otherseitherdiscontinuedagriculturalactivitiesor were
able to pursuethemonlyas side activities.
The recessionof 1963-66markedtheendofthesecondwave
of migration.When migrationpickedup again in 1966 after
twoyearsofdecline,a thirdand lastwave ofmigration began.
The expectationsofthemigrantsofthisthirdwavewerequite
differentfromthoseof theearlierwave, and in additionthey
werequitedifferent fromwhatthemigrantsactuallyfoundin
theregionsof immigration. The maindifference was thatthe
migrants of the late 1950's and early 1960's did not expect
employment in core to
regions provide them with full-lifetime
statusand subsistence,whichin facttheyoftengot,whereas
thiswas preciselywhat the bulk of the migrantsof the late
1960'sexpectedand did notget.
The changewas owingto the factthatthe experienceand
activitiesof the migrantsof the earlier wave raised the
expectationsofthemigrantsofthelaterwaveand,at thesame
time,undermined theconditionsnecessaryfortheirfulfillment.
As arguedearlier,thestrength of the migrantsof thesecond
waveincompetingwithindigenousworkersofcoreregionsfor
semiskilled jobs was thattheydid notexpectto spendtherest
of theirlives in thosejobs and, therefore, werepreparedto
expendenergies at a ratethatcould notbe sustained overa full
transformation. However,the greaterstratificationof the social structuresof the

Crotoneseand ofthePlainofGioia relativeto thoseoftheCosentinowas reflected ina
households),whose
splitbetweenthelowersocial strata(fullyor semiproletarianized
youngergenerationstendedto go intothe semiskilledjobs of core regions,and the
middle and upper strata,whose youngergenerationstended to go into higher
education. The end of the boom and the subsequentrecessionof 1963-66greatly
intensified
competitive pressuresintheproductmarketsbutdid notreducecompetitive
pressuresin the labor marketbecause the substitutionof migrantfor indigenous
workersin thesemiskilledjobs ofcore regionsbecameevenmorewidespreadthanin
thefinalyears of theboom.

lifetime.This strongcompetitivepositionfacilitatedthe ad-

vancementoftheearlymigrantsfromthelow-status/ low-pay
jobs into the higher-status/higher-pay semiskilledjobs. This
"unexpected" successshaped the expectationsof the migrants
of the thirdwave who went northin search of social and
economicadvancement. Yet,themoresemiskilled jobs cameto
be "monopolized"by migrants, themoretheylost statusand
themoretheyinvolveda consumptionof energiesthatcould
not be sustainedformorethana fewyears.
Thus, the expectationsof the migrantsof the thirdwave
werebound to be and actuallywerefrustrated. In part,this
frustration inducedindividualizedresponsessuch as a lesser
propensity to migrateor a shiftofpreferencesinfavorofentry
intothe labor marketvia highereducation.These responses,
however,werenot open to everybody.The formerresponse
was limitedbythedisintegration ofthestructuresofsubsistence
and commodityproduction thatthe verydevelopmentofmass
migrationhad precipitatedor accentuated.And the latter
responserequiredresourcesthatmanydid nothaveand,inany
event,concernedtheyoungergenerations(whichhad not yet
undertakenmigration)ratherthan the migrantsthemselves.
In viewoftheselimitations responses,itis not
ofindividualized
surprising thatthe main effect of the unfulfilled
expectations
was the outbreakof redistributive struggles an unprece-
of
dented nature.
3. Redistributive
Struggles
The migrants ofCalabria did notacceptpassivelytheverdict
of the marketthat decreed, one, the liquidation of their
income-earning opportunitiesin theareas ofemigration, and,
two,theirconfinement inthe areasof immigration to dead-end
jobs that gave them only temporary access to the means of
subsistenceof the new consumptionnorm. Rather, they
exploitedthesocial networksin whichtheywereenmeshedto
foran improvement
struggle intheirincome-earning opportuni-
tiesinbothareas.In coreregionsthestruggles tooktheformof
industrialconflictaimedprincipally, althoughnotexclusively,

726 . GiovanniArrighi& FortunataPiselli
at a reductionin theintensity ofwork.In Calabria,ittookthe

form of urban rioting aimed principallyat a territorial
redistribution of state financialresourcesin general and
bureaucraticemployment in particular.
Withrespectto individualconflict, jobs that
thesemiskilled
migrant workershad cometo monopolizeinthelate 1960'sdid
not providethemwiththestatusand full-lifetime subsistence
theyexpected. But theydid provide them witha powerthey
neverhad before- the powerto disruptproductionat a low
cost to themselvesand at a high cost to theiremployers.
Slowingdownproductionor goingoftenon shortstrikescost
themigrantworkerlittleor nothing.Theirmainproblemwas
not thattheyearnedtoo littleper unitof timebut thatthey
consumedtoo muchenergyper unitof time.Slowingdown
productionorgoingoftenon shortstrikeswereways,notonly
ofprotesting againstthepace and theintensity ofwork,butof
recovering one's energies as well. Slowdowns and strikes
naturally had costs and risks:Strikes impliedlossesofincome,
and bothslowdownsand strikesinvolvedrisksofreprisalson
thepartoftheemployer.Buttheimmediatecostswerelargely
ifnotwhollycompensatedbytherecoveryofenergies,and the
longer-term costsand riskswerelargelyirrelevant, sinceat the
currentrateofconsumptionof theirenergiestheworkersdid
notexpectto lastverylong in thejobs.
The costsofslowdownsand ofshortand frequent strikesto
the employers,in contrast,wereextremely high. Semiskilled
jobs occupied a strategicpositionin highlyintegratedand
capital-intensive labor processes.Anyslowdownor interrup-
tion of productionon the part of workersin semiskilled
positionswas disruptiveof theentirecomplexlabor process,
and, therefore,had serious repercussionson profitability.
From thispointof view,longerbut less frequentand more
predictablestrikeswerelessofa threatto profitability thanthe
slowdownsand frequentstrikesmigrantworkerswerespon-
taneouslyengagingin.
Takingadvantageofthisasymmetry ofbargainingpowerin
theworkplace,southernmigrantsinitiatedin 1968-69a wave

oflaborunrestofunprecedented spread,intensity, and length.54

The mainreasonwhythiswave ofindustrialconflictlastedso
to bringundercontrol,incomparison
longand was so difficult
to previouswaves, was thatpreviousmeans of undermining
workers'bargainingpower had been used up, or could no
longerbe mobilizedas effectivelyas inthepast.Thus,thewave
of industrialconflictof 1943-50 was centeredaround the
interestsof skilledcraftworkers whose main objectivewas
controlovertheconditionsofsupplyofand demandfortheir
skills. The protagonistsof that wave, after having been
wereinthecourseofthe1950'sdeprivedof
defeatedpolitically,
theirbargainingpowerthroughtheintroduction ofthetechno-
logicalinnovationsmentionedearlier.
Throughtheseinnovations, thecraftworkers weredisplaced
fromdirectlyproductiveroles by semiskilledworkerswho
were initiallyrecruitedamong the semiproletarianized and
lower social strataof the core regions themselves. When in
1959-62thelattergaveriseto a newwaveofindustrial conflict,
aimed primarily at obtaininghigherwages,theywerelargely
successfulin theirendeavor,but werequicklydisplacedfrom
semiskilledjobs by southernmigrantswho were willingto
expend more energiesfor the same amount of money.The
strongbargainingpowerof thesouthernmigrantsin thelate
1960's and early1970'swas rootedin theveryprocessesthat
had underminedthebargainingpowerof theprotagonistsof
theearlierwavesofconflict, namely,thetransformations ofthe
labor process that had transferredthe power to disrupt
productionfromskilledto semiskilled jobs, and themonopoli-
zation of semiskilledjobs by the migrantsthemselves.If the
powerof themigrantshad to be undermined,new waysand
meanshad to be found.
Two obviousways(widelypursuedin otherstates)wereto
findregionswithcompetitivesuppliesoflabor fromwhichto
"import"labororto whichto relocateproduction.However,in
54. Withups and downs,and changesin formand substance,thewave of labor
unrestlastedfora decade or so. The literatureon the subjectis vast. Regalia et al.
(1978), Lange & Vannicelli(1982), and Barkan(1984) are amongthebestoverviews.

the political atmospherecreated in Italy by the wave of

industrial (as wellas bytheothermovements
conflict ofprotest
to be discussedpresently)neithersolutionto the problemof
labor controlin mass productioncould be pursuedwiththe
necessarydetermination. As a consequence,mass-production
industries wereplungedintoa long,drawn-outcrisis.55
As the outbreakof industrialconflictand it successesin
winninghigherwages and improved workingconditions
broughtintotheopen the loss of competitiveness of migrant
labor,theexpansionof mass productionleveledoff,and the
demandformigrant labordeclined.The downturn ofmigration
fromCalabria, whichbegan in 1970-71and acceleratedafter
1973,was partlytheresultofthisreductionindemand.In part,
however,it mustbe tracedto thedeclinein thepropensity to
emigratejointly produced by the changed conditions of
migration(see Section HI. 2) and by the processof growing
interpénétrationof Calabria's social structures
withnational
politicalinstitutions
(Section III. 1).
The recessionof 1963-66had markeda turning pointalso in
this latter process. As we know, the deepening crisis of
commodity productionand thesuddenobsolescenceofsubsis-
tenceproductionreorientedmigrantstowardthe pursuitof
full-lifetime
proletarianstatusin core regions(Section III. 2).
55. It took manyyears(at least ten and possiblyfifteenyearsafterthe initial
outbreakof industrialunrestin 1968) beforesome freedomof hiringand firingwas
reestablished forlargeemployers.In themeantime,theperipheralstatusofsouthern
Italywas used by workers'organizationsand southernpressuregroupswithinthe
rulingpartiesto constraintheabilityofcoreemployersto relocateproductionto,and
to importcompetitivelabor suppliesfrom,foreignperipheralareas. Immigration of
foreignworkersincreased in the 1970's but remaineda relativelyinsignificant
phenomenon(accountingforapproximately 500,000workers).Sinceitneverbrought
foreignand nationallaborsuppliesintodirectcompetition, itdid notbecomean issue
in employer-worker relations.Relocationof production,in contrastdid becomean
issue. Considerablepressureswere broughtto bear on employersto relocateto
southernItalyor notto relocateat all. The loss ofcompetitiveness ofsouthernlabor
suppliesmeantthatcoreemployers oftenchosenotto relocateat all. As a consequence,
Italian corporatecapital, whichin the early 1960's was far ahead of Germanand
Japanesecapitalinforeign directinvestment, fellbehindbothoftheminthe1970's(see
Onida, 1978). The crisiswas eventuallysolved,amongotherthings,by switchingto
automatedtechniquesthatdid away with(or reducedthedependenceon) theuse of
migrantlabor. FIAT, whichhad beentheepicenterof labor unrestin thelate 1960's
and early1970's,subsequently becameone ofthemajorworldinnovators inthefieldof
robotization.

Development
Capitalist 729
In addition,itpushedall socialstratato seekstatus,profits,

andsubsistence in a closerrelation withthestatein Calabria
itself.
Pensions, subsidies for agricultural products, contracts
forpublicworks, jobs in bureaucratic employment fromthe
lowestto thehighest -
levels theseandotherbenefits became
theobjectofstruggles among individuals and groupsofkin
andclientswhosetypicalarenaswerestateinstitutions rather
thanthemarket.
Forthemostpartthesestruggles werehiddenandscattered
intheabodesofeveryday life.However, thegrowing frustration
overtheactualcapacityofcorelabormarkets inthenorthand
ofstateinstitutions in Calabriato meet, jointlyorseparately,
theexpectations offull-lifetime employment andincomethat
wereincreasingly entertained at a masslevel,madecollective
actionlikely.And in 1970,a highlyvisibleand dramatic
movement ofprotest brokeoutin ReggioCalabriaandwas
onlyheldincheckbythesustained presence ofthepoliceand
army for morethan a year.56 Just as the struggles ofthemigrant
workers intheindustrial plants of the north werereproducing
on a muchlargerscaletheclassstruggles thathadtornapart
thecapitalistlatifundia, so theextensive urbanriotsin the
streets ofReggioCalabriareproduced onanenlarged scalethe
feudsthathaddividedandheldtogether thesocialstructures of
small-scale commodity production.
The feud-like natureof theconflictwas evincedby the
objectives, forms,andideological representations ofthestrug-
gle. The riots
broke out as a reaction to the decisionofthe
central government to make Catanzaro rather thanReggiothe
capitalcityofCalabriawhich, likeallotherItalianregions, was
about to acquiresignificant legislative and administrative
autonomy fromthecentralstate.Thedecisionwasperceived
by the inhabitantsofReggioas aninsult tothe"honor"oftheir
city,whichhadalwaysbeenregarded (andnotonlybythem)as
thedefactocapitalofCalabria.Ata morematerial level,the
decisionseemedtosanction, andthereby further enhance, the
of the
peripheralization province Reggio of in not
relation only
56. For an early evaluationof the Revolt of Reggio, see Ferraris(1971) and
D'Agostini(1972).

to coreregionsbutalso to theothertwoprovincesofCalabria
(Cosenza and Catanzaro).
The provinceof Reggioincludedmostoftheonce prosper-
ous areas of commercialagricultureforexport,such as the
Plain ofGioia. The relativeprosperity oftheseareashad made
Reggioa peripheralbutimportant tradingand administrative
centerand,forthatreason,thehabitatofa relatively largeand
forward-looking bourgeoisie.Up to the Second World War,
neitherof the othertwo provincescould competewiththe
provinceofReggiointermsofmodernfacilities ofproduction,
exchange,and consumption.
Afterthe Second World War, social and economicdecay
proceededapace. The crisisof commercialagriculture, which
we haveoutlinedwithreference to thePlain ofGioia, involved
in one formor anotherthewholeprovince.The recessionof
1963-66was thestrawthatbrokethecamel'sback. Whilethe
lower social stratawent northto see theirexpectationsof
income and statusfrustrated, the local bourgeoisieand the
middlestrata- "crowdedout" froman overcompetitive mar-
ket- foundthemselves seekingrefuge in an overcrowdedstate
apparatus.
It soon becameevidentthattheprovinceofReggiohad lost
groundnot onlyto core regionsbut to theotherprovincesof
Calabria as well.In theprovinceofCatanzaro,whichincluded
mostof theformerareas of thecapitalistlatifundium such as
the Crotonese,theland reformand the activitiesof theOVS
had createdan agriculture moreorientedtowardthenational
thantheworld-market and therefore lessexposedto competi-
tivepressuresthanthe agriculture of theprovinceof Reggio.
Moreover,the investments and modernizingactivitiesof the
OVS had createdintheprovincea morebalancedand,as faras
the vast majorityof the populationwas concerned,a more
prosperouseconomythanhad everexistedbefore.
In the provinceof Cosenza, long-distancemigrationhad
slowlybutsteadilytransformed whatappearedto be themost
backward kind of economic systeminto a highlyresilient
systemof productioncapable of promptadaptationsto the

mostdiverseconjuncturesof the world-economy and of the

nation-state.As alreadymentioned,the solid and extensive
networksof kin and neighborstypical of this province
provideda springboardnot onlyforlong-distancemigration
but also, whenthe occasion arose, forthe infiltration of the
stateapparatus(see III. 1).
The revoltof 1970-71was a reactionofthepeopleofReggio
to the sense and realityof being leftbehind.The reaction
cementedthehighlystratified and segmentedsocial structure
of Reggio and its provinceinto a solid bloc imperviousto
divisiveexternalinfluences.Feuds among local patronage
groupsweretemporarily setaside in a commonstruggle aimed
at forcingthecentralgovernment to reverseitsdecisionon the
regionalcapital. As a meansto thisend thestate'slegitimacy
was challengedthroughextensiveand protracteddisruptions
oflaw and order.The significance oftherevoltof Reggiowas
furtherheightenedby its tendencyto become a model for
urbanunrestin othersoutherncities.57
Threatenedby a general loss of legitimacy,the central
government eventually resortedto thecompromiseofdividing
the role of regionalcapital betweenReggio and Catanzaro.
The mostimportant effectoftherevolt,however,was notthis
compromise. Far more importantwas the attemptof the
centralstateto regainlegitimacy througha further increasein
the economic resourcesdirectlyand indirectlychanneled
toward the Mezzogiorno in general and to Calabria in
particular.Theseredistributive measuresgaveindirectsupport
to the struggleswaged by southernmigrantsin northern
industriesbecause theyconstrainedthetendencyof northern
industriesto rationalizeproductionand cutdowntheemploy-
ment of migrant-labor,while they provided migrantsor
57. WithinCalabria urbanunrestspreadto Catanzaro. Interestingly enough,this
unrestwas farlessdirectedagainstReggio'sclaimto becomeregionalcapitalinsteadof
Catanzaro thanit was directedagainstthecentralgovernment's policiestowardthe
regionas a whole.The RevoltofReggioitselfhad beenprecededbyseveralurbanriots
in southerntownsand cities(Battipaglia,Caserta,Pescara,etc.). AftertheRevoltof
Reggio,however,urbanriotinginthesouthbeganto proliferate (Salerno,L'Aquila, S.
Benedettodel Tronto,and so on).

potentialmigrantswithalternativesourcesof incomein their

regionsof origin.58
Industrialconflictinthenorthand urbanunrestinthesouth
werethuscomplementary responsesto the contradictionsof
massmigration, whichreliedupon and simultaneously under-
minedtheviabilityofcommodityand subsistenceproduction
intheareasofemigration. Thiscontradiction was mostdirectly
experiencedby the migrant-workers who, the end of the
at
1960's,could not find a viable sourceoffull-lifetime
employee
statusand subsistenceeitherin theplacesofimmigration or in
the places of emigration.Spurredby thiscontradiction, the
migrants initiatedorjoined movements ofprotestthatin many
waysimprovedtheprospectsoffull-lifetime statusand subsis-
tencein core regionsor in Calabria.59
58. The redistributive measuresthat mostdirectlyconstrainedthe tendencyof
northernindustriesto rationalizeproductionwere the pressuresthat unions and
government broughtto bearon northern employers to relocateproductionto southern
Italyor notto relocateat all (see note55 above). However,redistributive measuresin
generalindirectlyreducedtheresourcesthatcould be mobilizedfortherationalization
of northern industries.
59. As we have seen, the success of the strugglesof migrantworkersin core
industriesbroughtabout a contractionin thedemandforthemigrants* labor power.
However,manydid notlose theirjobs and wereat last able to enjoythefull-lifetime
status and subsistenceattached to employmentin core industries.Many others
attainedthesame resultbyappropriating in Calabria thebenefits oftheredistributive
measuresinducedby urbanunrestin thesouth.
This success was all the moreremarkablein thatit was attainedin spiteof the
ideologicaland politicalcontradictions ofthemovements ofprotestinwhichactualor
potentialmigrants had beeninvolved.The mostglaringcontradiction was betweenthe
politicsand ideologyembracedby themigrantsin thefactoriesof thenorthand the
politicsand ideologyembracedinthestreetsofReggioand othersoutherncities.This
oppositioncan be explainedbythedifferent social compositionofthemovements in
thetwosituations.In theindustrialenvironment ofthenorth,thealliesofthemigrant
workerwereotherfactory workersand "revolutionary" students- an alliancethatwas
generally cemented by extreme left-wingideologies. In thestreetsof ReggioCalabria
and othersoutherncities,theallies ofthemigrant-workers and oftheheterogeneous
massofpotentialmigrants (unemployed,self-employed, salariedand wageworkersof
variouskinds)includedcapitalistentrepreneurs, stateand otherbureaucrats, mafiosi
and theirclients- an alliance that was generallycementedby extremeright-wing
ideologies.
This oppositionweakenedpoliticallybothmovements sincethepoliticalestablish-
mentcould and did play theseoppostiestremismi one againstthe other.In the last
resort,however,the two movementscould be broughtunder control only by
eliminatingtheircommon structuralroots: a systemof labor migrationthat fed
industrialconflictin thenorthand urbanunrestin thesouth.

Development
Capitalist 733
Theserelatively successful redistributive

struggles brought
to an end the processof transformation of the Calabrian
peasantry intoa wagedand salariedlaborforce.As mass
migration toan end,nopeasantry
came tospeakofwasleftin
Calabria.Therestillwerefarmers andagricultural workers,to
be sure.Buttherewas no numerically or sociallysignificant
groupof low-status cultivatorsthatattachedimportance to
landas a sourceoffull-lifetime statusandsubsistence.
Ourstorymaytherefore endhere.In orderto drawsome
general conclusion, however, thestorymustbequalified inone
important respect. The qualification refersto the fact that
Calabriahasbeenpart(anditspeopleshavebeencitizens) ofa
state(Italy)thathas includedwithinitsnationalboundaries
sizableandimportant coreregions. Thisfactdidnotprevent,
andmight evenhavefavored, theperipheralization ofCalabria
(see SectionII.2). Nor hasitprevented northern Italiansfrom
in
treatingCalabrians,and southernItalians general,as
second-class citizens.Nevertheless,thestatusofItaliancitizens
has giventhe people of Calabriaat leastthreeimportant
advantagesoverthe peoplesof mostotherperipheralized
regions oftheworld-economy.
A first
advantage hasbeena privileged accesstocorelabor
markets. Themassmigration ofthe1960's,whichcompleted
thetransformation of theCalabrianpeasantry intoa wage
laborforce,is unthinkable without a
such privileged access.
Whenpeasantsand proletarians migratefromperipheral
regions to core regions, theygenerally crosspoliticalbound-
aries.As foreigners, theirpoliticaland civilrightsin core
regions aresubjected tovariouslimitations, and,inanyevent,
themigrants mustcompete withmigrants ofothernationalities.
Up to the middle 1950's, migrants from Calabrianormally
faceda situation ofthiskindbecausetheywentpredominantly
abroad.Moreover,up to thelate 1950's,the Leggicontro
I'Urbanesimo narrowly restrictedtheirrightsof residence
withinItalyitself.60 In contrastto thissituation, themass
migration of the 1960's was predominantly internal to the
60. See note32.

Italian state; it was not constrainedby the Leggi contro

I'Urbanesimo(whichceased to be enforcedin the late 1950's
and wererepealedin 1961); and, above all, it neverexposed
migrantsfromsouthernItaly to the competitionof foreign
migrants.
The second advantage was closely related to the first.
SouthernItalianmigrants innorthern Italyweremuchfreerto
engage in collective
struggles against verdictsofthemarket
the
thanmigrants foreigncountriesnormallyare. Thereare of
in
coursemanyinstancesof migrantworkerswho have resorted
to industrialconflictin foreigncountries.But in mostofthese
instances(i.e., exceptinginstancesof industrialconflictin
lands of new settlementwithliberal immigrationpolicies),
migrantswererestrainedby formaland informalinhibitions
against resortingto collectiveaction. Southernmigrantsin
northernItalywerenot altogetherexemptfromsuch inhibi-
tions.Butthefactthattheyweremigrants intheirowncountry
meantthat,in theripenessof time,theseinhibitions could be
and wereset aside.
Finally, a third advantage has been the access to the
economicresourcesofcore regions.The divisionoftheworld
into statejurisdictionsseparatesmostperipheralized regions
frommostcoreregionsand so has protectedthelatterfromthe
movements ofprotestthatoccurintheformer. As longas these
movementsof protesttake place outsidethejurisdictionof
core states,thelegitimacy ofthesestatesis notthreatened and
may even be strengthenedby them. As a consequence,
movements ofprotestinperipheralregionshavegreatdifficul-
ties in layingclaimsto theeconomicresourcescontrolledby
coreregions.Sinceno suchseparationexistedbetweenCalabria
and thecore regionsofnorthern Italy,theprotestmovements
ofitspeopleswereable to induceredistributive measuresthat
are ratherexceptionalby thestandardsof mostperipheralor
evensemiperipheral states.Althoughthesemeasureshave not
eliminatedperipherality, theyhave at leasthelpedCalabria to
livewithit.61
6 1. The redistribution carriedout
ofresourcesfroma coreto a peripheralterritory
bya politicalcenterdoes notnecessarily
alterthestructural throughwhich
relationship

Conclusions
The conceptof "economicdevelopment" is oftenusedto
refer totworelated butdistinct processes. istheprocessof
One
socialchange, through whichtheorganization ofeconomic life
ofa giventerritory is transformed. Theotheristheprocessof
economicprogress, through whichtheabsoluteand relative
commandof theresidents of thatterritory overeconomic
resources(thatis, their"wealth")is increased.It is hardly
conceivable thatintheworld-economy as a wholecommand
overresources canincreaseovertimewithout somechangein
theoverallorganization ofeconomic life.Ifourunitofanalysis
is theworld-economy as a whole,therefore, it maynotbe
necessary to distinguish between socialchangeandeconomic
progress.
Whatis trueforthewhole,however, true
is notnecessarily
fortheparts.Particularly overshortperiodsofhistorical time,
thedistribution ofwealthamongterritories is notdetermined
primarily by theorganization of economiclifewithineach
territory. It is determined firstand foremost bythewayin
whichthepartsarecombined spatially andtemporally andby
therandom processes thatalwaysinfluence thesecombinations
(II. 2). It followsthat,iftheunitofanalysisis a regionofthe
world-economy, or a state,or (as in ourcase) a regionof a
state,socialchangeandeconomicprogress mustbe treatedas
separateprocesses. Thatis to say,theirinterrelations mustbe
subjected toempirical investigationrather thanassumedaway
by definition.
Thisiswhatwehavetriedtodo inanalyzing developmental
processesin Calabria.We hopeto haveshownthatdifferent
waysoforganizing economiclife(suchas subsistence produc-
one territory appropriatesa disproportionate
systematically shareofthebenefits
ofthe
divisionof labor whilethe otherobtainsonly marginalbenefits.It does, however,
counterthe effectsof this unequal distributionof benefitson the welfareof the
residentsofthetwoterritories.In thecase ofCalabria thisseemsto havebeentheonly
effectthatredistributive
measureshavehad so far.Thus,whilethepercapitaincomeof
Calabria relativeto thenationalaveragewas in the 1980'smoreor lesswhatitwas in
the1950's(i.e.,approximately50% ofthenationalaverage),itsconsumption percapita
increasedfromapproximately 50% to approximately 75% of thenationalaverage.

tion,small-scalecommodityproduction,and large-scalecom-
modityproduction)have no necessaryrelationto economic
progress.Theyare neitherstagesleadingto greatereconomic
commandnor attributesof lesser/ greatercommand.Rather,
theyarealternative formsofsociallifeand socialchangewithin
an evolvingworld-economy.Even though elsewherethese
forms,or paths, have all been associated with economic
progress,in Calabria they have all been associated with
economicregress,comparatively at least.
The path of social changefollowedby a territory does not
thereforedeterminethe command of that territoryover
economic resources.It does, however,determinethe distri-
butionofsuchcommandwithintheterritory, and thereforethe
welfareofitspopulation.Thus,in Calabria,economicregress
for the bulk of the populationwas least along the path of
subsistenceproductionenteredby the Cosentino,and was
greatestalong thepath of large-scalecommodityproduction
enteredby theCrotonese.
The experienceofCalabria also seemsto suggestthatsocial
conflictis thekeyintervening variable,to use thatlanguage,in
theprocessofsocial change.It intervened inthedetermination
of theinitialdifferentiationof Calabria along threedivergent
pathsofsocial change.It intervened in disruptingtheviability
of theJunkerroad at theend of theSecond WorldWar, and
thereforein initiatingthe convergenceof the three paths
towarda newsinglepattern.And itintervened at theveryend
of our storyin bringingto a halt mass migration.These
"interventions"underscorethe fact that the peasants of
Calabria,and theirsemiproletarian and proletarian successors,
have not at all been passivepawns in the hands of stateand
capital.Theirhistory is infacta history ofresistanceagainstall
kinds of exploitativetendencies.Sometimesthey lost and
sometimestheywon,and theoutcomedetermined thepathof
social changeforgenerationsto come.
By and large,however,theform,intensity, and outcomeof
social conflictwereshaped by developmentalprocessesthat
wereonlyin smallpart,ifat all, determinedbythepresentor
evenpast actionsofthepeoplesofCalabria. For example,the

conflictsthat led to the differentiation of Calabria were

sparked by a particular world-economic conjuncture (themid-
nineteenth century boom of agricultural world pricesand the
formationof theItalianstate),and theiroutcomewas largely
determined bythesocial ecologyof theterrainon whichthey
werefought.The explosionofclass struggleofthelate 1940's,
whichled to the dismemberment of the capitalistlatifundia,
an
was integralpart of theJunker road to socialchange- itself
the productof a previousdefeatof the peasantry.But the
spreadand intensity oftheexplosionwerelargelydetermined
by the fact that in the Crotonese large-scalecommodity
production had been associated withperipheralization rather
than ascent to core position - a fact that was largelyinde-
pendentof whatlocal actorsdid or could do. Moreover,the
acute hegemonicstrugglesthat were being foughtat the
nationaland worldlevelswhenclass conflicteruptedin the
Crotonese,wereas essentialto the introductionof the land
reformthatliquidatedthelatifundiaas theruralrevoltitself.
Generallyspeaking,we maytherefore saythatsocialconflict
is an integralpartofdevelopmentalprocesses,and thatitsrole
liesnotso muchindetermining theeconomicregress(progress)
of the locale in which it occurs as in determiningthe
distribution ofthecosts(benefits)of economicregress(prog-
ress) among the residentsof that locale. Social conflict,
however,is not the only weapon available to peasants and
proletariansintheirstruggles againstexploitationand periph-
eralization.The historicalexperienceofCalabria is instructive
also because it shows the importanceof migrationas a
substituteforand a complementof social conflictin shaping
developmentalprocesses.
In the phase of regionaldifferentiation, short-and long-
distance migrationplayed a key role in promotingsocial
change,butalongdirections largelydetermined bytheoutcome
ofsocial conflict.In the Cosentino migration consolidated the
informal victoryofthepeasantsoverthelandlords, whileinthe
Crotoneseitconsolidatedtheinformal victoryofthelandlords
over the peasants. In the Plain of Gioia, whereneitherthe
peasants nor the landlords won, migrationfacilitatedthe

reproduction ofa balancedrelationship offorcesinthefaceof

destabilizingmarketinfluences.
The roleof migrationwas notlimitedto a consolidationof
outcomes already determinedby social conflict.Afterthe
Second World War, the deepening peripheralizationof
Calabria on the one hand and the evolution of the labor
processincoreregionson theotherhandcreateda largesupply
of would-be migrantsin Calabria and a large demand for
migrant laborinnorthern Italiancoreregions(III.2). The mass
migrationthatensuedwas a mass responseto peripheraliza-
tion. By goingnorth,the migrantswereseekingindividually
theeconomicprogressthatno individualorcollectiveactionin
Calabria could have broughtwithintheirreach. Migration
thusbeganto go beyondtherealmofpossibilitiesdetermined
by theoutcomesof social conflict.
Many of the migrantsactuallygot what theysought,but
theirsuccessinducednewroundsofmigration thatundermined
thefoundations oftheinitialsuccess.Competitive pressureson
migrants incore regionsbecamemoreintense,whileproductive
structures in Calabria werefurther disrupted.The two explo-
sionsofsocial conflictofthelate 1960'sand early1970'swere
complementary responsesto thissimultaneousincreasein the
of
exploitation migrants on theone sideand in theperipheral-
izationofCalabria on theother.Mass migration thusplayeda
double role. It provided the individualswho were clever
enoughor luckyenoughorgenerationally fortunate to migrate
at the righttime with a way out of peripheralization.In
addition,itchangedthescale and theterrainofsocial conflict,
therebycreatingthe conditionsfor successfulredistributive
struggles.
This successwas possiblebecause of the peculiarjurisdic-
tional positionof Calabria thatwe emphasizedat theend of
our story(III. 3). Notwithstanding thispeculiarity,thestoryof
Calabria maystillbe read as a metaphorfortheperiphery of
theworld-economy. This is a question,however,thatfornow
we are quitewillingto leave open.

APPENDIX I:
Patternsof PopulationGrowth
and Long-distanceEmigration
In FigureA-l we have plottedthe ratesof population

growthand of grossemigration abroad of the Cosentino,
Crotonese, and Plain of Gioia Tauro takentogether overthe
The
period1886-1980. municipalities included in the three
areasforstatistical purposesare listedin Piselli& Arrighi
( 1985:37 1-74)withthe onlydifference thatheretheCosentino
includes alsothemunicipality ofAcri.Theratesofpopulation
growthhave been calculatedby dividingthe increasein
populationin each subperiodby the populationat the
beginning ofthesubperiod. Theratesofemigration havebeen
calculatedbydividing grossemigration abroad in eachsub-
period(i.e., emigration with no for
adjustment returning
migrants andotherimmigrants from abroad)bythepopulation
at the beginningof the subperiod.All rates have been
converted intopercentage rates,andtheratesfor1886-1900 (a
15-year period)and for 1932-40 (a 9-yearperiod) have been
adjustedto makethemcomparablewiththe ratesforthe
10-year periods.
Theratesofpopulation growth arederived from censusdata
andarecomparable throughout the entiretimespanexamined.
Theratesofgrossemigration for the pre-1921 periodsandfor
thepost-1932periods(no data areavailable 1921-31)are
for
basedondatathatarenotstrictly comparable. Fortheformer
periods, rateshave been calculated from data on emigration
proper providedin1ST AT ( 1900 and subsequent years);forthe
latterperiods,rates have been calculated from data on
cancellations ofresidence in municipal These
registries. data
havebeenpublished since1958(ISTAT, variousyears).For
earlier yearsthey takenfrom
were unpublished records keptby
ISTAT (theCentralStatistical Office). Data on cancellations
ofresidence grossly underestimate actualemigration abroad
becausetheydo notincludeall thosepersonswhoemigrated
without theirresidence
cancelling inthemunicipality oforigin.
However,sincelong-distance emigrants are more likelyto

FigureA-1: Overall Rates of PopulationGrowthand of GrossEmigrationAbroad

(Cosentino,Crotonese,Plain of Gioia Tauro)
transfer
officially theirresidence,and sincein theyears1886-
1920 most migrationabroad was long distance,FigureA-l
mayinfactgiveus a rough,butforourpurposesadequate,idea
oftheseculartrendoflong-distance migrationfromthethree
zones takentogether.
All we can confidently say on thebasis of thischartis that
theexplosionoflong-distance emigrationoftheearlytwentieth
centurywas broughtto a sudden halt by developmentsin
interstate
relationsintheinterwar yearsand duringtheSecond
WorldWar.Long-distance migrationrevivedaftertheSecond
WorldWar, but it remainedwell below thelevelsattainedat
the turnof thecentury.As emphasizedin part III, afterthe
Second World War and particularlyin the period 1959-73,
long-distancemigration wasprogressively displacedbyinternal
migration to Italiancore regions.
This displacementwillbe documentedin AppendixII. Our
mainconcernhereis notwiththeoveralltemporalpatternof

migrationbutwitha comparisonofthepatternsofemigration
and population growthof the threezones analyzed in the
article.To thisend, we have calculated,and reproducedin
FigureA-2,thedifferential ratesofpopulationgrowthand of
grossemigrationforeach of thethreezones. The differential
rateshave been obtainedby subtracting theaverageratesfor
thethreezonestakentogether fromthecorresponding ratesof
each zone.Thus,iftherateofgrowthofpopulation(or ofgross
emigration)in a givenperiodfora givenzone is 15% and the
overallrateis 18%,thedifferential rateforthatperiodand for
that zone is -3%. In particular,it should be noted that a
negative(positive)differential ratedoes notimplya low (high)
absolute rate. For example,the negativedifferential rate of
emigration ofthe Crotonese of 1901-10 (-2.5%) was associated
witha veryhighrateof grossemigration(+24.6%).
FigureA-2 showsthatthethreezones have beencharacter-
ized byquitedifferent patterns.If we focuson thedifferential
ratesofgrossemigration, thesharpestcontrastis betweenthe
Cosentinoand Crotonese:whilethelatterhas beencharacter-
ized throughout theperiodby negativedifferential rates(i.e.,
by rates lower than the average), the formerhas been
characterized byrateshigherthantheaverageinall theperiods
except 194 1-50and 197 1-80,whentherateswereslightly below
theaverage.In contrastto this clear-cut opposition, Plain
the
ofGioia showsa mixedpattern:highnegativedifferential rates
in theearlierperiods,and positivedifferential ratessincethe
Second WorldWar.
Ifwefocuson thedifferential ratesofpopulationgrowth,we
get a differentpicture.The sharpestcontrastis now between
theCosentinoand theCrotoneseon theone side,and thePlain
ofGioia on theother.The Cosentinoand theCrotoneseshow
negativedifferentialrates(i.e., lossesintheirsharesofthetotal
populationof the threezones taken together)in the earlier
periods,and relativegainsintheinterwar and postwarperiods.
The Plain ofGioia,incontrast,showslargerelativegainsinthe
earlierperiodsand largerelativelosses sincethe 1930's.
These differentpatternscan be tracedto thecharacteristics
of thethreezones discussedin thearticle:

FigureA-2: DifferentialRates of Population Growth and of Gross Emigration

Abroad

Development 743
(1) The systematically higher-than-average ratesof gross

emigration fromtheCosentinoandthesystematically lower-
than-average rates ofgrossemigration fromthe Crotonese can
be tracedto thefactthattheself-sufficient of
peasantry the
Cosentinohadbetter opportunities thantheruralproletariat
of the Crotoneseto organizelong-distance migration. The
persistence of the difference after the Second World War
(notwithstanding theconvergence oftheland-tenure systems
ofthetwozones)can in turnbe tracedto thefactthatlong-
distancemigration fromthe Cosentinohad all alongbeen
predominantly long-term, whereasthatfromtheCrotonese
had beenpermanent. The former kindof emigration estab-
lishes(and thelatterdoes notestablish)networks ofrecruit-
mentfor,andassistance to,future
long-distance emigration.In
thiswaytheinitialadvantage oftheCosentino wasreproduced
andenhancedovertime.
(2) Themixedpattern ofthePlainofGioiacanbe tracedto
theradicallydifferent economic conditionsthatthisareafaced
intheearlierandinthelaterperiods.Intheearlierperiods, the
PlainofGioiawasat theapogeeofitsphaseofprosperity so
thatthesmallfarmers, traders,and artisans
who had themeans
toengageinlong-distance emigration hada lesserincentiveto
do so thanthepeasantsoftheCosentino. Butas thecrisisofthe
Plain's small-scalecommodity productiondevelopedand
(aftertheSecond World War)intensified,theratesofgross
emigration ofthezoneroseabovetheaveragetomatchthose
oftheCosentino.
(3) Theradicalchangeintheeconomicconditions facedby
thePlain ofGioia also explainswhyitsratesofpopulation
growthwerewellabove averageup to 1920and wellbelow
averagefromthe1930'sonward.Theprosperity oftheearlier
periods not onlydampened the incentiveto emigratebut
increasedthe incentive to immigrate and settlein thePlain.
Thus, whatthe zone lost throughemigration abroad (in
absoluteterms)was morethancompensated for(in relative
terms)byimmigration fromoutsideCalabriaandfromother
areas withinCalabria.Whenthecrisisof small-scale com-
modity production setin,thistendency wasreversed:popula-

Arrighi Piselli
tionlosses(in absoluteand relative terms)dueto emigration

abroadwereaggravated (in absoluteand relativeterms)by
lossesduetoemigration tootherareasofCalabriaandtoother
Italianregions.
(4) The lower-than-average ratesof populationgrowth in
theCosentinoand Crotonese intheearlierperiods,andtheir
higher-than-average rates in the laterperiods,werelargely a
reflection
oftherelative gains and lossesofthe Plain ofGioia.
Theonlydatathatcallforadditional explanation arethelarge
relative
gainsoftheCrotonese from1932to 1960.Thesegains
had different, indeed,oppositecausesaccording to whether
they occurred before or after the Second World War. In the
1930'sand in the earlyyears of the war, the relative gainsin
population wereduetothefactthatthecapitalist latifundia of
theCrotonese hadreachedtheirhighest of
point development
and,thankstotheprotection intheproduct andlabormarkets
providedby the fascist regime,experienced considerable
-
prosperityat leastin relative terms.Proletarians and semi-
proletarians fromthe restof Calabriaand othersouthern
Italianregions werethusattracted totheCrotonese and,over
time,inflatedits rateof population growth. In the last yearsof
thewarandinthe1950's,itwasnottheprosperity butthecrisis
of the capitalistlatifundia thataccountedforthe relative
populationgainsof the Crotonese:Proletarians and semi-
proletarianswere now attracted to thearea the
by prospect of
acquiringlandor bytheactualredistribution oflandcarried
outbytheOVS.
APPENDIX II:
TheThreeWavesofPostwarEmigration
In FigureA-3we haveplottedtheratesofnetemigration
fromCalabriaas a whole.As a measureofnetemigrationwe
havetakenthedifferencebetween andregistra-
cancellations
givenin Malfatti
tionsof residencein municipalregistries
to totalnetemigration
(1976).The upperlinerefers and the
net emigration.
lowerline to intrastate The shaded area

SOURCE: DerivedfromMalfatti(1976).
FigureA-3 : Rates of Net EmigrationfromCalabria
betweenthetwolinesrefers to netemigration abroad.The

rateshavebeencalculatedbydividing netemigration bythe
naturalincreaseof the population(also givenin Malfatti,
1976),andbymultiplying by100theratioso obtained.A rate
of 100thusmeansthatnetemigration is equal to thenatural
increaseinpopulation.
Thethreewavesofemigration havebeendefined bytaking
thetroughsof 1959and 1965 as dividinglines.The main
tendency shownbythechartistheprogressive displacementof
interstate
migrationby intrastate
migration. Interstate
migra-
tionis predominant in theupturnofthefirstwave,butthe
downturnbringsabout a balance betweeninterstate and
intrastate This
migration. balanceisupset infavor ofintrastate
migration intheupturnofthesecondwaveandthentempo-
in thedownturn.
rarilyrestored Finally,in thecourseofthe
thirdwave,intrastate migration becomespredominant and
interstate
migrationfades intoinsignificance.

These changesin thedestinationof migrationare matched

by changesin the relationshipbetweenmigrationand labor
marketconditionsin Calabria. Some key aspects of these
conditionsareshownin FiguresA-4,A-5,and A-6. In all these
figuresthesolid verticallinescorrespondto thetroughs,and
thedottedverticallinesto thepeaks,ofthewavesofmigration
shownin FigureA-3.
In FigureA-4 we have plottedtherateofunemployment in
Calabria and thedifference betweentherateofunemployment
in Calabria and therateof unemployment in Lombardy(the
mostimportantcore regionof Italyand a major recipientof
migratory flowsfromCalabria). In FigureA-5we haveplotted
theratesofchangeof moneyand real wages in Calabria. The
data referto de factowagesinmanufacturing and construction
industries - thesebeingtheonlyreliabledata on de facto(as
opposed to contractual)wages available for the whole of
Calabria and fortheentireperiodconsidered.The difference
betweenthetwolinesrepresents therateofincreaseinthecost
ofliving.Finally,inFigureA-6,wehaveplottedthepercentage
differencebetweende facto wages in manufacturingand
constructionindustriesin Lombardyand de facto wages in
manufacturing and construction industriesin Calabria.
On thebasis ofthesedata and oftheanalysisofpartIII, we
maybroadlycharacterize thethreewavesofpostwarmigration
as follows:
(1) The firstwaveis directedpredominantly abroad, and as
such it involvesprimarily themiddlestrataof local societies.
This is one of themainreasonswhyunemployment does not
decreasebutinfactincreases,bothabsolutelyand inrelationto
core regions.Growingunemployment, in turn,restrainsthe
growth of both money and real wages. The wage differential
between Calabria and Lombardy at firstrises and then
decreases,butin 1959is stillintheorderof60%,i.e.,onlya few
percentagepointsless than whatit was in 1951. The overall
picturethatemergesis one inwhichtheintegration ofCalabria
withthelabormarketofcoreregionsis limited,and migration
does littleto increasesuch integration.

FigureA-6: WageDifferential
BetweenLombardyand Calabria

(2) Integration,in contrast,is the main tendencyof the

secondwave.The rateofinternalmigrationincreasessharply,
and the migrantsnow come primarilyfromthe lowersocial
strata(includingtheunemployed).The rateofunemployment
decreases,and money and real wages experiencewhat by
previousstandardsis a trulyspectacularincrease.The closer
integration ofCalabriawithcorelabormarketsis also reflected
in a drop in theunemployment differential
and, above all, in
the wage differential.The latter,whichhad lost only a few
percentagepointsbetween1951and 1959,loses 30 percentage
points between 1959 and 1965- most of the loss being
concentratedin the yearswhen migrantworkersentereden
massein thesemiskilled jobs of northern core industries.
(3) If the main featureof the second wave is a rapid
integrationof Calabria withcore labor markets,the main
featureofthethirdwave is theattainmentofthelimitsofthis
integration. Labor-market integrationdid notaltertheperiph-
eral positionof Calabria vis-â-viscore regions.Higherwages
simplymade Calabria less competitiveas a locale of produc-
tion. Moreover,to the extentthat higherwages raised the
expectationsof the would-bemigrants,the latter'scompeti-
tivenessin core labor marketswas also undermined.These
contradictionsof the second wave of emigrationbegan to
surfacein theupturnof thethirdwave. The steadydeclineof
migrationabroad can be interpreted as a symptomoftheloss
ofcompetitiveness ofCalabrianmigrants incorelabormarkets.
And theslowdeclineofunemployment, notwithstanding high
ratesofintrastateemigration fromCalabria,can be interpreted
as a symptomof theloss of competitiveness of Calabria as a
locale of production.However,as long as ratesof intrastate
migrationwere rising,thesecontradictionsremainedlatent,
and thefurther integrationwithcorelabormarketsproduceda
new wage explosion and a furtherdecline in the wage
differential.
Thisexplosionand thesubsequentdeclineinrates
ofmigrationbroughtthecontradictions intotheopen:therate
ofunemployment beganrising both absolutelyand in relation
to core regions,and thedeclinein thewage differential itself
was broughtto a halt.

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Research Foundation of SUNY

Capitalist Development in Hostile Environments: Feuds, Class Struggles, and Migrations in a

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The mainpurposeofthisarticleis to analyzetheformation

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Figure1: Map of Calabriaand the Three Areas Analyzedin the Article

In the Plain of Gioia Tauro, in contrast,the peasant

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themorewell-to-dopeasant-farmers, continuedto collectrent

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Figure2: The ThreeTransformations

socialstructures.IntheCrotonese, theJunker roadproduceda

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stratawerefargreater.Almosteverybody had accessto the

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Part I: ThreeRoads to Wage Labor

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dominatedsocial and economicaction,and was enforced

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kinshiprights,and otherindividuals(illegitimate or not) who

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In thisconnection it shouldbe noticedthatlong-distance

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landownersand investment in land improvements and better

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absolutescarcityand social tensionswerelessenedbyall three

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employedwage labor and producedforprofitby sale in the

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and, simultaneously, at preventing humansettlement on the

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Secondly,thedepeasantizationof thelatifundium workers

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was forcedto sell itslaborpowerat wagesbelowthelevel

13. In Campolungo (a fictitiousname for the village of the Crotonesewhere

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solidarity.14However,the strategyof keepingclass antag-

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Many of the wage workersemployedon a stablebasis

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fromthemigrant-peasant road. Far fromleadingto a demise

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one'sproductive andreproductive capabilitiesinthefaceofthe

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peasant road), but by a combinationof marketcompetition

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In addition,thefarmer roadwascharacterized bya much

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subsistencerequirements by sellingproduce as easily as (or

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This combination of inflowsand outflowscould also be

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them to sell land and other assets to financeemigration.

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Eachroundofopenstruggle endedwiththeformation ofan

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