AMIEL BRYAN E MANREAL JD-4A

CASES FOR LEGAL ETHICS

Canon 2

Rule 2.01

JASPERJUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY.

EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY.
JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. A.C. No. 9259 August 23, 2012

Facts:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.”
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly

Issue:

Whether the Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
defined: Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is
palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.

Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided
for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition
of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract
drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is
not controlling.

What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of the services
it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

Rule 2.02

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR. VS. ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ A.C. No. 8243. July 24,
2009

Facts:

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its
members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he
earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock
of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos
(₱30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of
the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active
members. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard
quitclaims for creditors. Later on, complainant knew that respondent was representing the
creditors of Multitel. Assuring the complainant that it was part of respondent’s strategy of settling
all the legal problems of the former, both parties continued to work together.

Fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote
respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and
properties given to the latter. When complainant found respondent’s explanation to be
inadequate, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the
disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit, respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She
claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance
because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization.
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant.

IBP Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation finding that a lawyer-
client relationship was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of
a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment. IBP Board of
Governors issued a Recommendation adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:

Whether the respondent violated the canon 2 of the CPR.

Ruling:

YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel,
eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield
herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she
rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," 47 precisely because
at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors
and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Rule 2.03

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

Facts:

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also
attached "respondent’s" calling card which contains the phrase “with Financial assistance”.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent committed solicitation of legal business.

Ruling.

YES. lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.

Rule 2.04

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

Facts:

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also
attached "respondent’s" calling card which contains the phrase “with Financial assistance”.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent committed solicitation of legal business.

Ruling.

YES. lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.
Canon 3

Rule 3.01

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent. A.C. No. 5299 August
19, 2003

Facts:

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that
her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case
and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him,
but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come
to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation.

Issue:

Whether the respondent violated Rules 2.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

YES. There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits
that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs
for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his
legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention
to violate the rules. What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as
a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.

For solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Such data must not be misleading
Rule 3.02

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs.BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR.

Facts:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he
be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose
in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint.

Issue:

Whether the use of the foreign law firm in the country unethical.

Ruling:

YES. The respondent’s use of the firm name constitutes a representation that being associated
with Baker and McKenzie they could ―render legal services to the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

Rule 3.03

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch

Clerk of Court, respondent. A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999

Facts:

Respondent Gatdula was charged with grave misconduct in engaging in the private practice of
law. The complainant was the representative of her sister for ejectment pending with the MTC.
The execution of that decision in favor of the plaintiff was enjoined by Branch 220, RTC, Quezon
City where the respondent is the Branch Clerk of Court. The complainant alleged that the
respondent tried to convince her to change his lawyer if she wanted the execution of the
judgment to proceed and even gave her his calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig, and Celera Law Offices” with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City which complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint. Respondent,
when asked to comment, claimed that it was the complainant who showed him said calling card
and asked him if he could handle the case but to which he refused as he was not connected with
the law firm, though he was invited to join the firm.

The case was set for hearing several times but the complainant nor her counsel did not appear.
The return of the service stated that the complainant was abroad. Respondent testified in his
own behalf and vehemently denied the complainant’s allegation. He, however, did not deny that
his name appeared on the calling card or that the calling card was printed without his knowledge
and consent.

The Court ruled that the inclusion or retention of respondent’s name in the professional card
constitutes an act of solicitation which is a violation of Section 7, subparagraph (b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials or
Employees).

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but
above all else must be above suspicion.

Issue:

Whether the respondent violated Canon 3.03 for engaging in the private practice of law while
holding public office.

Ruling:

YES. The respondent denies the complainant’s allegations, he does not deny that his name
appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of
the complainant.

While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his
name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office.
Thus, while he may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name
appears on the calling card as partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law
Offices give the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation
and private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. Respondent was reprimanded and ordered
by the court to exclude his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of
law.

Rule 3.04

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent. G.R. No. L-12871
July 25, 1959

Facts:

Respondent Francisco G. H. Salva was filed a case of certiorari and prohibition with a
preliminary injunction by the petitioner Timoteo V. Cruz for the investigation he was conducting in
September 1957. A criminal investigation was conducted by the Fiscal towards the killing of
Manuel Monroy in 1953 committed by Oscar Catelo and his co-defendants. As Fiscal Salva
conferred with the Office of the Solicitor General, a Conference was held publicly with
the Secretary of Justice wherein reporters were invited at the session hall of municipal court and
Timote Cruz was subpoenaed by Fiscal Salva represented by Atty. Baizas. In the session hall of
the Municipal Court of Pasay City to accommodate the public and members of the press, he told
the press that “if you want to ask question, I am allowing you to do so and the questions will be
reproduced as my own”.

Issue:

Whether the conduct of investigation was in violation of Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Yes, there is a violation of the code, herein, Fiscal Salva as held by the court that the publicity
was unnecessary if there is only just to acquaint the evidence and questioning towards those
who were accused.

Furthermore, the investigation was conducted on a session hall wherein there is a big crowd
filled with reporters, as such the Fiscal incited reporters to interfere with the investigation through
entertaining questions in connection. As the court added, the publicity expressed that the press
will be in favor. As fortunately, the press declined the offer to ask questions.

But the effect took place on the publications, narrations, and comments as a concomitant result
of the public investigation as already intervened by the press, the court was disturbed for such
publicity in violation of Canon 3 Rule 3.04 of CPR as giving value to mass media in which result
regarded as a grievous error and poor judgment. Wherein the court issued censure and
reprehension to Francisco G.H. Salva for contempt of court and violation of publicity and
sensationalism.
Canon 5

RUFINA LUY LIM, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, Respondent. A.C. No.
10261

Facts:

Rufina is the surviving spouse of Pastor Y. Lim (Pastor) who died on June 11, 1994. She claimed
that during his lifetime, Pastor used conjugal funds to organize several dummy corporations,
using his mistresses and employees as incorporators and/or stockholders, in order to defeat her
claims to said properties. Rufina filed a Joint Petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City for the settlement of Pastor's estate. Miguel Lim (Miguel), brother of Pastor, on
behalf of his mother Yao Hiong, filed a Petition for Intervention stating under oath that Skyline,
etc., are dummy corporations and that the persons whose names appear as incorporators,
stockholders and officers thereof were mere dummies. The Petition for Intervention was
executed before Atty. Mendoza, as notary public.

Later, however, Atty. Mendoza, as counsel of Skyline, argued that Skyline is the registered owner
of several real properties and that it has all the right to protect its interest against Rufina. Rufina
averred that Atty. Mendoza made such allegation despite his knowledge that Skyline is a dummy
corporation and it has been judicially declared as conjugal property of Rufina and Pastor.

Rufina also claimed that Atty. Mendoza, acting as Vice-President of Nell Mart demanded from the
tenants of lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 236236 and 236237 to vacate
the property, claiming that Nell Mart owned the same, even while knowing that Nell Mart is a
dummy corporation.

Atty. Mendoza, in his Answer, countered that Rufina and Pastor were separated for more than 26
years by the time Pastor died. Also, the couple entered into an Agreement where they already
partitioned their conjugal properties. As for the issue on the dummy corporations the RTC of
Quezon City already held in Special Proceeding Case 4 that "the bank deposits in the names of
[Nell Mart] and Skunac Corporation which were found to be properties distinct from the estate,
are not properties of the estate of Pastor and are, therefore, ordered excluded therefrom." Atty.
Mendoza further pointed out that this is the second complaint filed by Rufina against him before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) involving the same issue of ownership of the
properties. He claimed that Rufina filed the disbarment complaints against him in retaliation for
her losses in other cases.

Issue:

Whether the member of the bar is fit to continue the practice of law.

Ruling:

NO. It has been pronounced, time and again, that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform a four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR.

In the report adopted by the court, though Atty. Mendoza admitted that the 1972 Agreement may
be improper, he still argues that the same is valid between the parties. Respondent's insistence
on the validity of the Agreement only betrays his ignorance of the law which contravenes Canons
1 and 5 of the CPR.

As properly observed by the IBP-CBD, respondent drafted and signed the Petition for
Intervention which avers in essence that the subject corporations, Skyline, etc., were mere
dummies created by the late Pastor Lim. He also notarized the affidavits of Teresa Lim, Lani
Wenceslao and Susan Sabado stating in essence that they were dummies in the corporations of
Pastor.

Respondent in his Position Paper before the IBP-CBD claimed however that the statements in
the Petition for Intervention, as well as the Affidavits in support thereto were not his statements.
The petition was filed pursuant to "agreed arrangements" between complainant and the late
Miguel Lim and that the assignment of shares of stock by Miguel to him, was a "pre-arranged
agreement as payments for attorney's fees and for reimbursements of whatever litigations [sic]
expenses advanced by the respondent. The flip-flopping averments of respondent in his
pleadings betray a lack of forthrightness and transparency on his part. He initially averred,
through the Petition for Intervention and supporting affidavits which he signed and notarized, that
the corporations were dummies of Pastor. He now claims, however, that the statements in the
Petition were mere hearsay and that the shares of stocks he now owns in the corporations were
actually payments to him for his services and advances. With the incompatibility of the two
positions, it is clear that respondent has been less than truthful in at least one occasion.

Respondent also cannot feign ignorance as to the veracity of the statements in the petition
because he signed the same. Lest respondent forgot, a counsel's signature on a pleading is
neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for identification. It is a solemn component of
legal practice that through a counsel's signature, a positive declaration is made. In certifying
through his signature that he has read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it
is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his competence, credibility, and ethics.

The sworn obligation of every lawyer to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing
condition for retaining membership in the profession. He is also expected to keep abreast of legal
developments. To claim that such agreement is binding against third persons shows either
respondent's ignorance of the law or his want on disregard for the laws of the land. Either of
which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Canon 6

Rule 6.01

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

Facts:

After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for violation
of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated February 9, 1994, petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled
"SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL". The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other things, granted the substitution
but denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already
denied on February 9, 1994.

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION

FOR NEW TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17,
5

1994. The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and
6

manifestation within ten (10) days from notice.

In the Comment filed, the Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a
new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's
brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate
petitioner from criminal liability.

Issue:

Whether the Solicitor General Violated Canon 6 Rule 6.01 for the new trial.

Ruling:

No, Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction
of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this
Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has
no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for
only questions of fact are involved therein.

The convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons
which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the
judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which
reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality.

Rule 6.02

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent. Adm.

Case No. 7332\

Facts:

Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto
F. Carreon, ordered PT&T to pay complainant ₱113,100.00 as separation pay and ₱73,608.00 as
backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. The NLRC set aside LA
Carreon’s ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to his former position and
pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, including moral
damages and attorney’s fees.

Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
affirmed the NLRC’s ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of
service were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and backwages.
The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the same purpose.

Complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on
October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein
respondent. Unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. Thus, complainant
proceeded to respondent’s office to personally follow-up the matter. In the process, complainant
and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former’s monetary awards should be;
however, their computations differed. To complainant’s surprise, respondent told him that the
matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?"

Respondent issued a writ of execution, directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T
and collect the amount of ₱1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. Unfazed,
PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash. Respondent rendered an Order in open court,
recalling the first writ of execution he issued. Wherein complainant’s monetary awards were
reduced from ₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

Complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting
money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision
to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.

Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.

Ruling:

YES. Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from
using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3)
allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the monetary
awards due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already been
final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice at that – respondent slept on
the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on
November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after. the
Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon after the aforesaid visit
casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the
complainant.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T’s initial motion to quash through an
Order but later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T’s supplemental motion to
quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As a result,
respondent recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant’s
monetary awards from ₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege
accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige
and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity
and honor.

Rule 6.03

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division). G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

Facts:

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.

A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA
Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio
Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them
by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos.

The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and
counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s
former function as Sol. Gen. and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Whether respondent Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

NO. Under, Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, and Civil Case before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents Tan, et al.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles
of law.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03.

The advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.

Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while Sol. Gen. is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the
Civil case of sequestration.

In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the
Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “drafting,
enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing
abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK.
The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the Sol. Gen. is not that of
the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.