Defence Studies

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“Phantom operators”: special operations forces

and asymmetric warfare in Northern Nigeria.

Folahanmi Aina

To cite this article: Folahanmi Aina (2023) “Phantom operators”: special operations
forces and asymmetric warfare in Northern Nigeria., Defence Studies, 23:2, 177-197, DOI:
10.1080/14702436.2023.2206958

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2206958

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DEFENCE STUDIES
2023, VOL. 23, NO. 2, 177–197
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2206958

“Phantom operators”: special operations forces and

asymmetric warfare in Northern Nigeria.
Folahanmi Aina
School of Global Affairs, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Across the world, Special Operations Forces (SOFs) play a leading role Received 13 December 2022
in asymmetric warfare. The unique trainings, skills, weapons, and Accepted 21 April 2023
equipment of these elite Tier 1 operators, differentiates them from KEYWORDS
conventional forces, making them the preferred choice in complex Special Operations Forces;
environments. SOFs are ideally deployed for short operations, which Strategic utility; Asymmetric
include direct action missions, hostage rescue, hunting high-value warfare; Boko Haram; Armed
targets (HVTs), mobility operations, intelligence operations, airborne bandits; Northern Nigeria
operations, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) opera­
tions, and covert operations among others. While the literature has
mostly focused on the utility of major powers’ SOFs in the Global War
on Terror (GWOT), with little attention on Africa’s SOF’s, this paper
examines the origins, evolution, composition, and deployments of
Nigeria’s SOFs specifically in the Northeast, Northcentral, and
Northwest theatres of operation, against the Boko Haram insurgency
and armed banditry, respectively. Drawing on primary data from inter­
views with key informants and other secondary data sources, the
paper interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects of
Nigeria’s SOFs. The strategic utility and overreliance on Nigeria’s SOFs
by political leaders and the Military’s High Command puts a strain on
their strategic value which potentially undermines their strategic effi­
cacy as a force-multiplier in the long run, against unconventional
threats.

“Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win.”
- Sun Tzu

Introduction
The events of 9/11 brought to bear the severity of new threats to global peace and
security by violent non-state actors (VNSAs) as Finlan (2003) rightly noted. In the
past two decades, VNSAs have continued to evolve and adapt in ways that require
new strategic foresights into how they are fought against, of which conventional
forces are not adequately prepared for. Degrading, dismantling, and defeating them
has given rise to an increased deployment of elite tier 1 operators, known as special

CONTACT Folahanmi Aina Talk2fola@hotmail.com School of Global Affairs, King’s College London, London,
United Kingdom
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or
with their consent.
178 F. AINA

operations forces (SOFs), to complement the efforts of conventional forces and

intelligence services (King 2017; Byman and Merritt 2018). SOFs are uniquely
trained and deployed for direct action, surgical strike raids, interdiction, hostage
rescue, hunting high-value targets (HVTs), mobility operations, intelligence opera­
tions, including long-range reconnaissance, airborne operations, counterterrorism
(CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and covert operations to mention
a few.
Owing to their rigorous selection processes, trainings, weapons, size, and expertise on
the battlefield, the strategic utility of SOFs in asymmetric warfare remains relevant (King
2017). As Bernd Horn (2018) argues, the true test of strategic utility of an organisation
lies in what it contributes to national power and its ability to project or defend national
interests. Some examples of SOFs across the world include the United States 1st Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force) and Naval Special Warfare
Development Group (DEVGRU, or SEAL Team 6), Britain’s Special Boat Service
(SBS), Poland’s Group for Operational Manoeuvring Response (GROM), France’s
National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN), and Israel’s General Headquarters
Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), also known as “Unit 269” to mention a few.
Despite the literature on the strategic utility of SOFs which focuses on the SOFs of
major powers, mostly those of the West, Africa is also home to some of the world’s most
elite SOFs. These include Egypt’s “Unit 777” also known as Task Force 777, Algeria’s
Special Intervention Group (GIS), popularly known as “the Ninjas,” South Africa’s
principal SOF brigade known as “the Recces,” and Somalia’s “Danab Brigade,” among
several others.
In Nigeria, the nefarious activities of VNSAs such as Boko Haram and the Islamic
State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Northeast region and those of armed
bandits in the Northwest and Northcentral regions have led to the deaths of thousands
and displacement of millions (UNDP 2021, UNHCR 2022 Hassan and Barnett 2022). The
increased deployment of SOFs which include the Army’s SOFs, Air Force SOFs, and the
Navy’s SOF, known as the Special Boat Service (SBS) in counterterrorism (CT) and
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against these groups, has resulted in significant
successes. However, this paper argues that their continued utility and overreliance on, by
the Military’s High Command puts a strain on them, thereby potentially undermining
their efficacy as a fighting force in asymmetric warfare, in the long run against uncon­
ventional threats.
To the author’s knowledge, there is no single academic peer-reviewed journal article
focusing on Nigeria’s SOFs, specifically on internal security operations against Boko
Haram and armed banditry in the Northern regions, which makes this research a timely
and worthy pursuit. The study’s objective is to examine the origins, evolution, composi­
tion, and deployments of Nigeria’s SOFs in asymmetric warfare specifically in the
country’s Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest theatres of operation, against the
Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry, respectively. The study, in addition,
interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects of Nigeria’s SOFs. This paper’s
central argument is that while Nigeria’s SOFs have contributed significantly to mitigating
the threats to national security, particularly in the Northern region, their continued
strategic utility has the unintended consequence of creating diminishing returns because
of war fatigue, thereby affecting their strategic value, over time.
 DEFENCE STUDIES 179

The paper is divided into seven parts. Following the introduction, a conceptual and
theoretical discourse on special operations and SOFs is presented. The paper then
provides insights into the origins, evolution, deployments, and composition of
Nigeria’s SOFs across the three services that make up its Armed Forces. An overview
of the threat of insurgency in Northern Nigeria is then examined. This is then followed by
a section which interrogates the composition, strengths, deployments, and operations of
SOFs in Northern Nigeria. The next section considers the successes and achievements of
SOFs in Northern Nigeria, which is then followed by the section on the challenges and
prospects of Nigeria’s SOFs in the future. The paper ends with a conclusion.

Methodology
This qualitative study’s research design is based on a single case study that utilises
exploratory and descriptive analysis, while drawing on primary data obtained from
fieldwork involving semi-structured interviews with five key informant operators from
across Nigeria’s SOF enterprise. The ethnographic style of interviewing was adopted, as
the questions asked where not intended at eliciting predetermined responses. The kinds
of questions asked focused on the deployments, trainings, successes, and challenges of
Nigeria’s SOFs. The interviews were conducted over a period of January 2020 to
December 2021. In selecting the interviewees, the non-probability sampling approach
was adopted over the random sampling approach. This was to ensure that the risk of
excluding important interviewees was significantly minimised. The snowball/chain-
referral sampling approach as a type of non-probability sampling approach was adopted
for this research. This approach was useful in corroborating what had been established
from other sources while conducting the research. Other secondary sources of data
consulted included books, reports, journal articles, local and international news sources,
as well as periodic press briefings from the Nigerian military on its SOF’s operations
across the Northern theatres of operation. Content analysis was used to derive relevant
information from these secondary sources. Data for the study was analysed using the
thematic data analysis method which is particularly useful in identifying and reporting
patterns within the data. The study’s scope is limited to a 5-year period beginning from
2016, which marked a heightened period in the nefarious activities of Boko Haram/
ISWAP and armed bandits in the Northern region, thereby necessitating an increased
deployment of, and reliance on Nigeria’s SOFs in internal security operations, up until
2021. SOFs are still currently involved in several ongoing operations in Nigeria.

Special operations, and special operations forces – a conceptual discourse

Special operations
Conceptually, special operations have existed since ancient times (Leong Kok
2014). Defining special operations overtime has proven to be quite a difficult
undertaking, partly because of the word “special” which is associated with these
operations. It is why Alastair Finlan (2008) suggests the use of “Different Forces”
instead. Adam Leong Kok Key, however, contends that there are two broad
categorisations in defining special operations, which include what a special
180 F. AINA

operations unit does, and secondly what a special operation is and a suggestion of
who should conduct it (Key 2014). Special operations as defined by Tugwell and
Charters (1984) are “small scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an
unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant
political or military objectives in support of foreign policy.” This definition
encapsulates the distinctiveness of special operations as compared with other
regular military operations.
The United States military defines special operations as operations which
require unique modes of employment, tactical equipment, and training which is
often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and
characterised by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low
visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional
expertise, and/or a high degree of risk (Joint Publication 3–05, 2014). Within the
U.S. Special Operations community, the theoretical discussion on Special
Operations is mostly considered in two broad approaches. These include the
“direct approach” and the “indirect approach.” As Scott Morrison (2014) notes,
the former is mostly associated with direction action (DA) whereas the latter is
associated with foreign internal defence (FID) or security force assistance (SFA).
Achieving these objectives is largely dependent on the successes of special
operations.
This study, however, adopts the definition of special operations by James D. Kiras
(2006) who notes that special operations are “unconventional actions against enemy
vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to
enable conventional operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems
at operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with
conventional forces alone.” Drawing on the works of Sun Tzu and Sextus Julius
Frontinus, Key (2014) identifies what refers to as key elements of special operations
which include the principles of extraordinary (indirect/unorthodox) forces; surprise;
flexibility and the ability to operate behind enemy lines; intelligence; and deception
among others. It is pertinent to note that special operations are also used interchangeably
in the literature with “special warfare.” Homer W. Harkins (2019), notes that special
warfare differs from conventional warfare given its emphasis on the human domain and
its premium on psychological operations, occurring in both traditional and irregular
warfare.
Colin S. Gary (1999) identifies 17 conditions which are essential to the success of
special operations. These include fitting the demands of policy, having a tolerant political
and strategic culture, having political and military patrons who understand their strategic
value, being assigned to feasible objectives, being directed by a strategically functioning
defence establishment, and having flexibility of mind. Others are providing unique
strategic services, finding, and exploiting the enemy’s vulnerabilities, technological assis­
tance, tactical competence, having a reputation for effectiveness, as well as a willingness
to learn from history. These can be essentially categorised into three core themes which
are state of mind, forces, and a mission, according to him. Long (2016) however argues,
that special operations are not a panacea for all security-related challenges. James
D. Kiras (2006) therefore contends, that the key to understanding how special operations
improve strategic performance is in the concept of strategic attrition.
 DEFENCE STUDIES 181

Special operations forces

The use of special forces dates to the Revolutionary War, as Paul and Schwille (2021)
note. Furthermore, the creation of modern special operations forces has its origins in
World War II (Shamir and Ben-Ari 2018). During this time, SOFs, particularly the U.S.
Army’s Green Berets, were mostly tasked with fighting Marxist insurgencies and other
Soviet-supported guerrilla movements across Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Byman
and Merritt 2018). These forces, have since evolved over time from the first golden age of
SOFs during the Vietnam War to today’s Fourth Age of Special Operations characterised
by the Great Power Competition. Ansbacher and Schleifer (2022) note that the first age of
SOF (1940–1945) was characterised by operations intended at supporting conventional
forces behind enemy lines. The second age (1946–2001) witnessed the proliferation of
proxy-wars following the Cold War and the nuclear age, which were fought with and
against guerrilla forces in addition to aiding political ends. The third age (2001–present)
reflects the strategic value of SOFs in the global war on terrorism. Irwin and Wislon
(2022), however, classify these ages as 1941–1960, 1961–1979, 1980–2020, and 2021 to
present, as the first, second, third, and fourth ages, respectively.
King (2017) attributes the rise of SOFs to three factors. These are a response to
declining defence budgets, changed security and defence threats, and an increasingly
intrusive media and legal environment. On the enlargement of SOFs, which are mostly
attributed to factors which are external, Shamir and Ben-Ari (2018) contend that this is
also the result of internal organisational dynamics, as well as the adaptive potential of
contemporary armed forces in contemporary conflicts while maintaining and extending
their institutional autonomy. The increased reliance on SOFs has also resulted in some
instances in their misuse. Ansbacher and Schleifer (2021) identify some reasons which
are attributed to this, such as a general misunderstanding of unit classification; the
limitations, capabilities, and effectiveness of SOFs; the absence of a clear and unified
conceptualisation; as well as a lack of understanding of how to effectively employ them in
the field.
Brailey (2008) has defined special forces as discrete elements of legitimate state-based
military forces possessing a unique military capability for conducting “special opera­
tions” requiring specifically selected personnel that are trained and organised for these
operations. Colin S. Gary (1999) defines SOFs as “regular troops trained to fight
irregularly.” These strategic assets often referred to as “operators” offer unique strategic
value which is often required in complex environments. They have therefore proven to be
valuable national strategic assets towards advancing national interests at acceptable risks
and costs (Horn 2018). Most modern militaries have found the need to establish special
operations forces, to which these units have since tended to be among the most utilised
portions of military establishments (Cline 2005). Over the years, these elite combat units
have transformed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and have gradually
developed into modern armed forces outside, and separate to, conventional structures
and doctrine (Brailey 2008).
Scott (2014, 50) notes that some of these unique capabilities include the surgical
application of force through offensive action, more methodological long-term efforts
intended at supporting and influencing others through training, in addition to advice,
assistance, or a combination of both. In addition, Fitzsimmons (2003) notes that some of
182 F. AINA

the capabilities of SOFs that make them increasingly relevant include their high readiness
for rapid deployments on short notice, extensive foreign language and area training, as
well as their stealthy and independence of support in penetrating denied areas which
would be inaccessible to other forces. They are therefore highly trained military units
capable of performing combat operations in unstructured and ambiguous environments
while bringing to bear unconventional military tactics acquired from their training
(Goldenberg and Saindon 2018).
The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) identifies four
pillars of SOF capability which include indigenous approach, precision targeting, under­
standing and influence, as well as crisis response (USASOC 2017). It is, however,
pertinent to note that the strategic utility is derived not only during times of war but
also at peace times. The Joint Publication 3-05 (2014) further points to 12 doctrinal core
SOF activities. These include direction action, special reconnaissance, counter-weapons
of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence,
security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, and counterinsurgency. Others
include foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations and
civil affairs operations. Among SOFs, the United States SOFs have been described as the
technologically advanced, best-resourced, and most combat-experienced force of profes­
sional soldiers on the face of the earth (Zweibelson 2019).
King (2017) therefore argues that what makes SOFs special is not primarily a function
of their capabilities but rather their location in a domestic, politico-military-intelligence,
and transnational military nexus. Shamir and Ari-Eyal (2018) attribute the “specialness”
of SOFs to their ability to maintain the ethos of the warrior, that is the direct face-to-face
contact or heroic physical friction between adversaries. Jennifer D. Kibbe (2020) cate­
gorizes the conduct of operations by units which constitute Special Operations
Command as over operations (“white” operations) as well as both covert and clandestine
missions (“black” operations). The former is mostly concerned with training foreign
forces in CT and COIN, civil government projects, and the dissemination of information
through the media to foreign audiences. The latter is, however, concerned with direct
action operations involving hunting down terrorists and rescuing hostages.

Special operations and special operations forces – a theoretical discourse

Research in the field of special operations is still at its nascent stage, despite the recogni­
tion of the important role of SOFs across the world (Marsh, Kenny, and Joslyn 2015).
Attempts at developing a theory on special operations remain a problematic issue. As
Marsh, Kenny, and Joslyn (2015) rightly note, one reason for this is attributed to the fact
that special operations from a social science perspective are too broad. The essence of
a theory of special operations is in linking the tactical, operational, and organisational
considerations into a value proposition considering the role and importance of uncon­
ventional operations in times of peace and war (Wirtz 2021). On theorizing special
operations, Christopher Mash et al. (2015) have argued that focusing on a doctrinal
division between surgical strike and special warfare is beneficial for developing both
theories of special warfare and surgical strike.
Anaphylaxis as a potential model of warfare propounded by Alastair Finlan is also
suggested as a way of theorising special operations. Anaphylaxis here connotes the
 DEFENCE STUDIES 183

emancipated thinking about warfare in a non-confluent way whereby the battlespace is

perceived beyond the frontlines and clashes of conventional forces thereby grasping the
potential of applying state action using special forces in a markedly different way (Finlan
2019). For analytical purposes, this study, however, adopts McRaven’s “theory” as it
relates to special operations. William McRaven contends that special operations are
conducted by forces which are specially trained, equipped, and supported for the specific
target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or
military imperative (McRaven 1995). This theoretical approach reflects the strategic
utility of Nigeria’s SOFs in various internal security operations with the character of
asymmetric warfare against Boko Haram and armed bandits. Hence, its application and
suitability within the Nigerian case study.
The theory highlights six principles which are necessary for special operations to
achieve their full potential. These include simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed,
and purpose (McRaven 1995). It is, however, pertinent to note that McRaven’s theory
does not necessarily represent a holistic theory of special operations. For research
purposes, Ben-Ari et al. (2018) suggest the use of the “ideal type approach” rather than
the “definitional approach” which they argue is useful as it allows for the sketching out of
core features of SOF, towards delineating how these characteristics vary, thereby
hypothesising the reasons for such variances.

The threat of insurgency in Northern Nigeria

The threat to Nigeria’s national security has been mostly pronounced in Northern
Nigeria owing to the nefarious activities of violent non-state actors (VNSAs). This
study focuses on two significant threats across Nigeria’s Northern region: Boko
Haram/ISWAP and armed banditry.

Boko Haram/ISWAP
The Boko Haram terrorist group is known as Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah
wa’l-Jihād (JASJ) in Arabic, meaning: “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teaching
and Jihad (BBC 2016).” The groups origins could be traced back to 2003 in Northeast
Nigeria where it was initially led by Muhammed Ali (Bukarti 2022). Its preaching (dawa)
would eventually take on an extremist posture, leading to the arrest of its subsequent
leader time Muhammed Yusuf, who was the son of Ali, in 2009, by Nigerian security
forces. Following Yusuf’s death in police custody in the same year (USIP 2012).
Abubakar Shekau, a protégé of Yusuf, would eventually emerge as leader (Zenn 2020).
In 2015, the Shekau-led faction of Boko Haram would pledge allegiance (bay’ah) to the
Islamic State and adopted the name Islamic State in Syria and in West Africa Province
(BBC 2015). Boko Haram has since been responsible for attacks on government institu­
tions, kidnappings, suicide bombings, exploitation, and sexual violence and abuse against
women and girls, to mention a few mostly in Nigeria’s Northeast region and in parts of
the Lake Chad Basin region. The Nigerian state has responded to the threat posed by
Boko Haram/ISWAP through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.
184 F. AINA

Armed banditry
The origins of contemporary armed banditry in Nigeria can be traced back to 2011
following major transnational movements into Nigeria (Rufa’i 2021). Kungiyar Gayu,
known to be the first of these bandit organisations, emerged in Northwest Nigeria’s
Zamfara state under the leadership of Buharin Daji. Its primary goal was intended at
responding to perceived social injustices against Fulani pastoralists such as exploitation,
deprivation, and extortion. It sought to achieve this by fostering the social welfare and
security of Fulani pastoralists. Its activities would later include Kaduna and Sokoto states
in the Northwest region, despite initially starting in Zamfara state (Rufa’i 2021). Armed
banditry in Nigeria today has become an offshoot of the prevalent farmer-herder crisis-
induced conflicts in the North (Ademola 2021). They have been growing in numbers,
with an estimate of over 30,000 fighters across the northern region (Yaba 2021). Some of
the activities of these groups include indiscriminate killings, kidnappings for ransom,
theft, illicit gold mining, and sexual violence. Between 2011 and 2019 alone, armed
bandits were responsible for the death of about 8,000 people (International Crisis
Group 2020). This is in addition, to the displacement of around 1 million people in
Nigeria as of 2022 (Hassan and Barnett 2022). Like Boko Haram/ISWAP, Nigeria has
responded to this threat through a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic
measures.

Nigeria’s special operations forces

As Colin S. Gray (1999) contends, some of the qualities that make SOFs appeal to military
and particularly political leaders include the low investment associated with their use, in
addition to potentially high political returns, as well as deniability and flexibility. Johnson
(2006) attributes this to a dramatic change in the security environment, characterised by
irregular threats, as well as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and conduct of SOFs
in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also pertinent to note that in the case of Nigeria, owing to
the multiple threats to its national security from VNSAs, the state has increasingly
utilised SOFs by deploying them as a response to these threats internally.

The Nigerian Air Force special operations forces

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) is made up of six commands which are the Tactical Air
Command, Mobility Command, Air Training Command, Ground Training Command,
Logistics Command, and Special Operations Command in Benue, Bayelsa, Kaduna,
Enugu, Lagos, and Bauchi state, respectively. The NAF’s SOFs can be traced to its links
with the NAF’s Regiment which was established in 1978 and was part of efforts to
reposition the NAF at the time. The NAF Regiment represents the ground combat
elements of the NAF, tasked with defensive and offensive operations. For several years
following its creation, there was a continued focus on airpower projection at the expense
of airpower protection. With the changing character of warfare and particularly the
growing threat posed by VNSAs in asymmetric warfare, the establishment of the NAF’s
SOFs was necessitated, given the events of December 2013, with the attack on a NAF base
in Maiduguri, Borno state.
 DEFENCE STUDIES 185

The AFSOFs, also known as the “Nigerian Air Force Panthers,” essentially serve as
a force multiplier to the NAF regiment and the NAF. The Air Council which includes the
Federal Minister of Defence, and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) approved the creation
of the Nigerian Air Force Special Operations Command in 2016 as part of efforts to
reposition to the NAF for modern warfare, as well as to bridge the gap between airpower
projection and airpower protection.
The first batch of AFSOFs completed their training in 2017. AFSOFs training is
preceded by a selection process at the Air Force Regiment Training Centre in Kaduna
state, which takes about 2 weeks, where the best candidates from the regiment are
selected for the SOF units. These initial selection stages include medical examinations
of the eyes, the ears, dental, muscular, psychological, and other examinations by the NAF
medical personnel, intended at determining the fitness of candidates for SOF. Other
aspects of the selection process include drills, mental endurance, weapon handling skills,
and between 50- and 100-km-long walks daily, among others (Anonymous 2020a;
interview). Combat, Search, and Hostage Rescue trainings are also conducted, which
cover endurance trainings, medicals, map reading and navigation, unarmed combat,
communication and weapons handling, search theory and tactics, field tactics, general
aircraft orientation, mountaineering, survival, and evasion, such as being deployed in the
bush for longer hours with limited rations (Anonymous 2021b; interview), resistance and
escape trainings, and swimming. Describing the intensity of their trainings in terms of
thinking under pressure, one SOF operator notes “bombs being thrown at you while still
hitting the target” (Anonymous 2021c; interview). After these gruesome trainings, they
are then deployed to other units for further environment acclimatisation trainings before
being deployed for combat missions.
It is, however, pertinent to note that as early as 2015, the development of local SOF
training capabilities for air role missions had begun in the NAF with assistance from
Israel and the United Kingdom. Other elements of AFSOFs have been trained in Belarus
and Pakistan. Between 2016 and 2019, over 1,000 AFSOFs were trained (Alhassan 2020).
In February 2022, a total of 150 AFSOFs were trained in an Advanced Special Operations
Course by a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), covering counter
improvised explosive devices, air-to-ground integration, remotely piloted aerial systems,
and close quarter battle, among others (Bakam 2022). As of November 2022, the NAF
had trained 2,000 SOFs both in Nigeria and abroad (Vanguard 2022). AFSOFs have also
taken active part in Operation Lafiya Dole alongside other services, against Boko Haram
in the Northeast theatre of operation. They have also conducted independent operations
such as Exercise Hard Strike in Kaduna. As of 2019, the NAF had contributed about 300
SOFs in the fight against armed banditry in Zamfara state as part of an intervention force.

The Nigerian Army special operations forces

The origins of the Nigerian Army’s Special Operations Forces can be traced to 1978 when
the British Assistance Training Team (BATT) established the Special Warfare Wing. The
SWW would later be renamed as the Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency
Director of the Nigerian Army’s School of Infantry towards providing special forces
training for the Army (Onuoha and Ugwueze 2020). As the threat to national security
posed by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast became more imminent, the
186 F. AINA

need to create SOFs for the Nigerian Army (NA), who had played a leading role in the
war against the insurgency group.
On 13 January 2014, the federal government announced the creation of the
Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC). The Command at its for­
mative stage was initially supported with training and equipment by the United States
Africa Command, the US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), and
the Office of Security Cooperation in the US Embassy Abuja, Nigeria (Warner 2014).
In May 2014, the US Army trained a 650-man Nigerian Ranger Battalion. The army’s
SOFs which were part of a Special Forces unit would subsequently undergo CT and
COIN trainings in Pakistan and other Eastern European countries. In 2017, a total of
26 out of 440 soldiers of the unit were trained by Pakistan’s Special Services Group
(SSG) at Tarbela by the Zarrar Battalion after which they returned to Nigeria. As of
2017, the NA had deployed 2,000 Army SOFs against Boko Haram in the Northeast
(Muhammad 2017).
In July 2018, the Nigerian Army began the formation of five FOBs to compliment the
already existing ones (Premium Times 2018). The Nigerian Army also has its own
training school known as the Nigerian Army School of Special Forces (NASFS), in
Buni Yadi, Yobe state. Like the NAF SOFs, the NA SOFs also undergo similar selection
and training processes before they are deployed. The Army’s SOFs are also known as “the
unconquerable” (Anonymous 2021a; interview). Of all SOFs in Nigeria, the Nigerian
army is noted to have the most (Anonymous 2020b: interview).

The Nigerian Navy special operations forces

The Nigerian Navy (NN) since its creation in 1956 has continued to play a significant role
in ensuring Nigeria’s maritime security, including during the country’s Civil War (1967–
1970). Since after the Civil War, however, the NN has been involved in several internal
security operations (ISOs) especially aimed at containing multiple threats to Nigeria’s
national security (Onoucha and Michael 2020). Some of which include against piracy,
militancy, oil thefts, illegal oil bunkering, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing, among others, in the country’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. One of such opera­
tions is Operation Delta Safe.
The NN which consists of three Naval Operations Commands (NOCs) including the
Western, Eastern, and Central Commands, and the Nigerian Navy has evolved overtime.
This has also included through the acquisition and induction of modern state-of-the art
platforms. The asymmetric nature of warfare against these threats necessitated the
creation of the NN’s SOFs popularly known as the Special Boat Service (SBS) in
July 2006 by the Nigerian Navy Order 2006. The SBS is primarily tasked with reconnais­
sance and surveillance missions, unconventional warfare, psychological operations,
counterterrorism, covert beach reconnaissance ahead of an amphibious assault, and the
protection of ships. Others include the protection of oil installations and offensive action
(Onuoha and Ugwueze 2020).
In October 2013, the SBS was reorganised to respond to asymmetric threats such as
those posed by Boko Haram in the Northeast, where it has actively participated in
Operations Lafiya Dole, Safe Haven, among others (Anonymous 2021: Interview). The
SBS has undergone training by the U.S. Army’s Special Forces such as through Joint
 DEFENCE STUDIES 187

Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (United States Africa Command 2021). Some of
the NN’s bases include the Nigerian Navy Pathfinder, Delta, Jubilee, Soroh, Lugard, as
well as the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) Fomoso, Escravos, and Igbokoda, among
others. The SBS has been the NN’s most potent instrument against asymmetric threats
(This Day 2019). The Nigerian Navy’s SBS also undergoes very intensive trainings just
like the Army and Air Force SOFs.

Successes and achievements of Nigeria’s special operations forces in

asymmetric warfare
Across the world, while the public might be aware of the failures and trials of SOFs, their
successes remain a secret (Neuringer 2019). However, in Nigeria, since their deployments
across the Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest theatres of operations, SOFs have
continued to record significant successes and achievements against Boko Haram and
armed bandits. Some of the successful missions executed in the Northern region by
Nigeria’s SOFs have included direct action missions, hostage rescue, hunting HVTs,
mobility operations, intelligence operations, airborne operations, counterterrorism (CT)
and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and covert operations, among others. These
have also been part of ongoing operations with conventional forces in the region such as
Operations Hadarin Daji, Sahel Sanity, Hadin Kai, Gama Aiki, and Thunder Strike to
mention a few.
In February 2016, Army SOFs working along with troops of 112 Battalion from the 7
Division Garrison carried out joint operations at Kwaptara, Mijigete, Garin Boka,
Mosole, Ngubdori, Ma’asa, Dukje, and Gulumba in Borno state, Northeast Nigeria.
During these operations, several Boko Haram terrorists were neutralised, and several
items were also recovered including 2 logistic trucks, 180 motorcycles, and 750 bicycles,
among others. Furthermore, during these operations, a total of 195 persons held hostage
were rescued, while 300 cows, 200 sheep, and 130 goats rustled by the terrorists were
recovered (DHQ 2016). On 2 March 2016, the Army’s Headquarters Special Forces
(AHQ Sf) Battalion rescued 63 hostages held captive by terrorists in Maleri, and 3 days
later, the same SOF unit rescued 779 hostages at the Fotokol general area, which is
a border town between Nigeria and Cameroun (Nigerian Army 2016a). Similarly, in the
same month of March 2016, Army SOFs Team B, 7 Division Garrison, decimated Boko
Haram hideouts in Lawin Meleri, Matiri Bulaka, and Aljeri villages were they neutralised
5 terrorists and rescued 63 hostages (Nigerian Army 2016b).
In a similar operation in April 2016, Armed Forces Special Forces (AFSFs) along with
troops from 3 Battalion, 22 Brigade, and the Army Headquarters Strike Group (AHQ SG)
recaptured Kala Balge Local Government Area of Borno state which had been under the
control of Boko Haram terrorists. During this period, they eliminated 22 terrorists in
Wumbi, Tunish, Tilem, Malawaji, Makaudari, Daima, Buduli, Sadigumo, Jiwe, Sidigeri,
and Kala villages while rescuing a total of 309 hostages (Nigerian Army 2016c). In
May 2016, AFSF in a joint operation with other troops and local vigilantes rescued 97
women and children held captive by Boko Haram terrorists in Damboa, Borno state,
including one of the Chibok girls kidnapped in 2014 by Boko Haram (Nigerian Army
2016d). As part of efforts to ensure the safety of commuters, and non-governmental
organisations providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs, 111 Special Forces Battalion,
188 F. AINA

along with troops from 7 Division and the civilian Joint Task Force, provided escort
services to no fewer than 300 vehicles along the Maiduguri-Damboa road, Borno state, on
a daily basis in the month of June 2016 (Nigerian Army 2016e).
In June 2017, following an ambush by Boko Haram on a team of the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC) who had been returning from an oil exploration exercise at
Barno Yasu, in Magumeri Local Government Area of Borno state, AFSFs were deployed
to rescue them. All NNPC staff were successfully rescued by the Special Forces (Army
2017). On 8 April 2018, NAF SOFs in a joint operation with troops of the Nigerian Army,
successfully foiled a suicide bombing attack by Boko Haram insurgents at the University
of Maiduguri, Borno state (DHQ 2018a). Similarly, SOFs of the 101 Special Battalion
cleared the Suntai-Muji-Kungana road, in Taraba state, which was under the siege of
armed bandits. In the same month, SOFs with the 707 Special Forces Battalion mobile
strike team successfully prevented 2 suicide bombers from infiltrating the defensive
positions of troops (Army 2018). Over a period of 6 months, between June and
November 2018, SOFs from the Defence Headquarters, under Operation Whirl Stroke
and Operation 777, led to the recovery of 57 weapons, 27 AK 47 magazines, and 1,311
rounds of ammunition across the northcentral states of Benue and Nassarawa, and
Taraba in the Northeast. Owing to these successes, over 157,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) were able to return to their homes (DHQ 2018b).
In March 2019, SOFs deployed by the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) had ambushed
and neutralised Boko Haram insurgents at Maikadiri Village in Askira Uba Local
Government Area of Borno State, who had fled after attacking a bank and some shops
(DHQ 2019). In the early hours of 22 April 2020, SOFs under Operation Whirl Stroke
carried out a special raid operation on a suspected armed bandit’s camp at Anku Mbagen
in Ukum Local Government Area of Benue state where they recovered a large cache of
arms, ammunition, and other items. During the raid, some of the items recovered
included seven locally fabricated mortar tube guns, three SMG rifles, three double barrel
rifles, five AK 47 magazines, and nine pairs of camouflage uniforms, among others (DHQ
2020a). Similarly, on 22 May 2020, NAF SOFs were deployed to Katsina state targeted at
armed bandits, under the Defence Headquarters (GHQ)-led Operation Hadarin Daji
(Nigerian Air Force 2020a). Three days earlier, on 17 May 2020, NAF SOFs had also been
deployed to Nasarawa state as part of efforts to disrupt the activities of armed bandits in
the northcentral region (Nigerian Air Force 2020a). On 2 June of the same year, SOFs
under the 401 Special Forces Brigade conducted a combined clearance operation along
with troops of 19 Brigade at Doron Naira and Daban Magai, where they neutralised 9
Boko Haram insurgents and recovered an anti-aircraft gun, 2 AK-47 rifles, and a large
cache of anti-aircraft ammunition, among other items (DHQ 2020b). SOFs under Sector
2, in a combined operation with troops of 25 Task Force Brigade on 7 July 2020,
neutralised 17 Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgents along Damboa-Maiduguri Road in the
Northeast (DHQ 2020c).
In January 2021, SOFs with the 402 Special Forces Task Force Brigade, under
Operation Tura Takaibango, a subsidiary operation of Operation Lafiya Dole neutralised
5 Boko Haram insurgents in the Abbagajiri and Dusula towns in Damboa. During the
encounter, items seized and destroyed by the troops included materials for making
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), among others (DHQ 2021a). In January 2021,
NAF SOFs under Sector 1 of Operation Hadarin Daji neutralised no fewer than 30
 DEFENCE STUDIES 189

armed bandits at the Maje Riverline in Bungudu Local Government Area of Zamfara
state in Northwest Nigeria after they had been deployed from the FOBs at Kekuwuje,
Kwatarkawashi, and Maru (Nigerian Air Force 2021). Similarly, in March 2021 SOFs of
402 Special Forces Brigade along with troops of Sector 1 Operation Lafiya Dole elimi­
nated 25 Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists as part of the Phase II of Operation Tura
Takaibango. Some of the items recovered include three anti-aircraft guns, two automatic
grenade launchers, and two gun trucks (Army 2021).
While Nigeria’s SBS still operates in the Northeast (Anonymous 2020a; interview),
however, specific information in this regard has proven difficult to come by. While
Nigeria’s SOFs involved in asymmetric warfare in the northern region of the country
have recorded significant successes and achievements, they have also suffered losses
including deaths from gun duels, ambushes, and IEDs, to mention a few by Boko
Haram/ISWAP and armed bandits in the region.

Challenges and future prospects on the strategic utility of Nigeria’s special

operations forces
Overstayed deployments
The strategic value of an SOF is subject to the strategic quality of both its political and
military masters (Gary 1999). The inability of SOFs to achieve decisive strategic success
on their own explains one of the fundamental limitations of SOFs (Long 2016). A second
limit of SOFs is their inherent high-risk nature, which can only be managed but not
eliminated (Long 2016). This paper’s central argument is that while they have contrib­
uted significantly to mitigating the threats to national security, the continued strategic
utility of Nigeria’s SOFs in asymmetric warfare against domestic insurgent groups has the
unintended effect of resulting in a “wearing and tearing” or war fatigue on the part of
these forces. In 2018, an army captain and 70 others staged a mutiny at the Maiduguri
airport and were subsequently detailed for trial, after they defied orders to engage Boko
Haram insurgents due to long years of fighting without rotations (Daniel 2018).
Similarly, in 2014, a military court sentenced 54 soldiers to death after they had refused
to join the 111 Special Forces Battalion troops as part of a military campaign to recapture
Delwa, Bulabulin, and Damboa, in Borno state which were under the siege of Boko
Haram (Ibeh 2014). Overstayed deployments undermine troops’ efficacy against insur­
gents in Nigeria (Oriola 2021). As one SOF operative noted “ideally we are supposed to
do 6 months rotations, but sometimes we overstay our deployments for as long as 2
years” (Anonymous 2021; interview).

Psychological strains and limitations to cognitive agility

Despite their strategic utility, there is a high likelihood of their cognitive agility coming
under severe stress due to multiple long-term deployments. As Jessica LaCroix et al.
(2021) describe cognitive agility as it relates to SOFs, as their ability to deliberately adapt
cognitive processing strategies which are in accordance with dynamic shifts in situational
and environmental demands, towards facilitating decision-making and change
adaptation.
190 F. AINA

Financial constraints and technological needs

Furthermore, Friend and Culbertson (2020) note, while referring to the case of SOFs in
the US, that despite the huge financial resources and technological resources at their
disposal, their narrow focus on and responsibility for current campaigns against insur­
gent groups abroad will continue to consume skills, capabilities, and personnel (Ibeh
2014; Friend et al, 2020). Given Nigeria’s current economic challenges, SOF’s serve as an
attractive economy-of-force alternative in waging asymmetric warfare and are prone to
facing similar challenges. This is in addition to challenges associated with lack of
adequate and appropriate gears and weaponry and state-of-the-art technology to prose­
cute asymmetric warfare (Ikem et al. 2022). For instance, some SOFs in Nigeria still
issued modified AK-A7s, while some are issued CAk103 riffles and CZ sidearms
(Anonymous 2020 interview).

Absence of a Joint Special Operations Command

As James J. Wirtz contends, for SOFs to continually play a relevant and significant role in
mitigating the threats to national security, they would have to be placed under the
command of officers who are drawn from their ranks (Wirtz 2021). In Nigeria, the
absence of a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) serves as a hinder to the effective
utility of these forces especially with regards to their deployment in theatres of operations
(Aina 2021). SOFs are under the directive of the DHQ (Anonymous 2020c; interview).
However, one SOFs operative notes that “on the battlefield, decision making is the
prerogative of the SOF ground commanding officer” (Anonymous 2020; interview).
A JSOC organisational structure is of immense importance for the success of studying,
planning, and executing future special operations in Nigeria. There are however concerns
that while a decentralised command supports SOF’s ability to conduct distinct opera­
tions, it limits their ability to complement the efforts of the military itself (Leslau 2010).
In the case of the United States, the establishment of a JSOC was the result of the failure
of the attempted rescue of hostages by joint service SOF members in 1980, in the embassy
in Tehran, Iran, under Operation Eagle Claw (Grant and Huntley 2016; Byman and
Merritt 2018). King (2017) however attributes the establishment of JSOC to the Iraq War
under the leadership of General Stanley McChrystal.

Size and vulnerability in complex environments

Another challenge attributed to SOFs, which also applies to Nigeria’s SOFs are their small
sizes and the fact that they are highly trained, which makes them extremely vulnerable.
On 5 April 2021 for instance, SOFs under 72 Special Forces Battalion were attacked and
brutally murdered in Konshisha forest, Benue state, after they were captured by armed
bandits (DHQ 2021b). For this reasons, high casualties among SOFs translates to
a diminished combat effectiveness rapidly overtime (King 2017). As Bryman and
Merritt (2018) rightly contend, the continued expansion of SOFs will likely produce
diminishing returns over time, due to the risk of lowering standards and opportunity
costs for other branches. Given that Boko Haram and armed bandits have also made
some in roads into urban environments in their attacks, Nigeria’s SOFs would need to
 DEFENCE STUDIES 191

adapt to match the urban capabilities of these terrorist groups in such complex environ­
ments. This is generally required for SOFs to sustain and defeat terrorists across the
world (Neuringer 2019). Currently, Nigeria’s SOFs have mostly been deployed to areas
with minimal government presence, referred to as ungoverned spaces (Ojo 2020), where
they have waged wars against terrorist groups.

Absence of robust legal frameworks

There are also potential legal framework issues that may arise from the continued
strategic utility of Nigeria’s SOF’s especially for covert operations or in response to
civil unrest, within the homeland, especially as conventional forces remain stretched
beyond their limits while responding to internal security operations (ISOs). Ideally SOF’s
are deployed outside the shores of the nation state, as part of efforts aimed at achieving
specific political objectives. As Gramnt and Huntley (2016) note, for instance, the Posse
Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits the deployment of the Army and Air Force in law
enforcement on U.S soil except under the express authorization of the Constitution or
by an Act of Congress. For now, Nigeria’s current 1999 Constitution does not make any
such provisions distinguishing SOFs from conventional forces and their utility on
Nigerian soil, given that the country’s SOF community only took root several years
after the adoption of the constitution. To remain relevant and maintain its status as
a preferred fighting force, Nigeria’s SOF’s would require periodic revisions of its doctrine
that informs their engagement in asymmetric warfare for effectiveness, especially given
the changing character of warfare.

Conclusion
As strategic assets in waging low-intensity wars, SOFs offer important strategic value.
However, as Austin Long rightly notes, being cognizant of the limits of these forces is not
only crucial to preventing an overreliance on them, but it could also potentially help in
ensuring that a significant reduction in the willingness to support or utilise them is
averted. As Colin Gray rightly contends, the success of special operations is dependent on
the vulnerabilities of the enemy (Gray 1999). However, Nigeria’s SOFs also face multiple
challenges that affect their chances at achieving success such as protracted deployments,
lack of adequate and appropriate weaponry and state-of-the art-technology, political
misuse, legal matters, and absence of a Joint Special Operations command, (JSOC)
among others. Despite these, Nigeria’s SOFs have recorded significant successes in the
areas of recapturing territory, rescue operations, and the elimination of Boko Haram/
ISWAP insurgents and armed banditry in the northern region.
The study is limited in its scope as it mostly focuses on the strategic utility of Nigeria’s
SOF’s in the Northwest, Northcentral, and Northeast theatres of operations. However,
SOFs continue to be deployed across other geopolitical zones in Nigeria. In addition to
this, Nigeria’s SOFs have taken active part in military operations against the Boko Haram
insurgency across the Lake Chad Basin region. Despite this study’s limitations, it is the
first to examine the evolution, composition, and deployment of Nigeria’s SOFs specifi­
cally in internal security operations against Boko Haram and armed bandits. This is in
addition to being the first study that interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects
192 F. AINA

of the continued strategic utility of Nigeria’s SOFs in waging asymmetric warfare against
insurgents within Nigeria. Future research on the subject could therefore consider the
specific contributions of the various SOF components of the Nigerian Armed Forces
against a wider spectrum of threats to national security including piracy and militancy in
the country’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, as well as the role of Nigeria’s SOFs in foreign
internal defence (FID) operations across its immediate sphere of influence in West
Africa. There is also the need for research that investigates the psychological demand
dimensions that are not uncommon to Nigeria’s SOFs and how this affects their
performance on the battlefield. As the character of war continues to change, so would
the continued strategic utility of SOFs (Yoho, DeBlanc-Knowles, and Borum 2014).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Folahanmi Aina is an international security expert and resaercher with reserach interests in grand
strategy, military strategy and operations, including special operations forces. He is currently a
fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, U.S.A.

ORCID
Folahanmi Aina http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4999-2042

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