Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors.

AN ASSIGNMENT SUBMITTED UNDER COURSE NO. LL.M. – 304

“PROJECT WRITING” AS A PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE
OF

MASTER OF LAWS

by
Tasnim Ferdous Charlee

LL.M. Third Semester

Class Roll No. 19

Under supervision of

Prof. (Dr.) Amitabh Singh

(Course Teacher)

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

ASSAM UNIVERSITY

SILCHAR, ASSAM

2023
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I hereby express sincere gratitude to my faculty Dr. Amitabh Singh (Assistant Professor) for his
guidance and support without the aegis of whom this project could not have achieved
completion. I would like to thank all those who have supported me to better understand the case
law of Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors., the resources from online
medium has given me the much-needed clarity.

Last but not the least; I would like to thank the Almighty for guiding me and being with me
throughout.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The core idea behind this project is to throw a light on the proprietary rights of a female in the
ancient and contemporary world and the law governing the rights through the case law of
Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors.

The paper deals in detail with the aforementioned case law and emphasizes the role played by the
Supreme Court of India in recognizing the right to property of a daughter to the self-acquired
assets of her father.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For the completion of the project doctrinal method of research was adopted and secondary source
of information was referred to as mentioned in the “Reference” page.

MODE OF CITATION

A uniform mode of citation has been adopted throughout this assignment.

TABLE OF CASES

Sl. No. Case Name Citation

1. Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011
Ponnusamy and Ors.
2. Bhagat Ram (dead) by LRs v. Teja Singh (2002) 1 SCC 210
(dead) by LRs
3. Bhajya v. Gopikabai and Anr. (1978) 3 SCR 561
4. Chotay Lall v. Chunnoo Lall and Anr. (1878) I.L.R., 4 Cal
5. Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar Civil Appeal Nos. 188-189 of
2018
6. Devidas and Ors. v. Vithabai and Anr. 2008 (5) Mh.L.J. 296
7. Ghurpatari and Ors. v. Smt. Sampati and Ors. AIR 1976 All 195
8. Gopal Singh and Ors. v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 579
9. Katama Natchiar v. Srimut Rajah Mootoo (1863) 9 MIA 539
Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy
Periya Odaya Taver
10. Lal Singh and Ors. v. Roor Singh and Ors. AIR 1953 P H 202
11. Omprakash and Ors. v. Radhacharan and Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 66
12. Prakash and Ors. v. Phulawati and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013
13. Pranjivandas Tulsidas v. Devkuvarbai 1 Bomb. H.C., B. 131
14. Punithavalli v. Ramalingam AIR 1970 SC 1730
15. State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh and Ors. 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 108
16. Sivagnana Tevar and Anr. v. Periasami 1878 (1) ILR Madras 312
17. Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas, Bhagvandas, ILR (1881) 5 Bom 662
and Pranjivandas
18. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors. AIR 2020 SC 3717

CONTENTS
1. Abstract
2. Introduction
3. Arunachala Gounder (Dead) by LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors.
I. Facts of the Case
II. Issue
A. Issue Regarding Date of Death of Marappa Gounder
B. Issue Regarding Self Acquired v. Joint Family Property
III. Arguments Advanced
A. Arguments – Appellants
B. Arguments – Respondents
IV. Sources of Hindu Law
V. Judicial Precedents
VI. Judgement
4. Concluding Remarks
ABSTRACT

The judgement of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs
v. Ponnusamy and Ors. has reaffirmed a woman's rights to accede to the property of the father in
the absence of a male issue even though the succession occurred before the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956,. The issue was regardingwho would succeed to the self-acquired property of the
father – whether the only surviving daughter or son of the predeceased brother. Both the Trial
Court and the High Court of Madras have ruled that the rule of succession would not apply and
that the property would devolve by survivorship to the son of the predeceased brother because
the father did not have any male issue and the daughter died issueless. The second issue was if
the property was passed on to the daughter by succession, what would be the course of
succession of such property after her demise.

Despite the fact that the succession occurred before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was passed,
the Supreme Court of India determined, after considering numerous commentaries and legal
precedents, that the daughter would inherit the self-acquired property through succession and not
the the son of the predeceased by survivorship. Regarding the second question, the Supreme
Court of India stated that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be relied upon
to determine the course of succession of such property upon the death of the daughter.

In this article we would examine the fact, the observations made and the landmark judgement of
the Supreme Court of India.
INTRODUCTION

The proprietary position of Hindu women has improved as a consequence of legislative efforts
and court rulings. The study of ancient and contemporary legal systems around the world
revealed a commonality – all male-dominated legal systems denied women the right to property,
which led to a decline in their social status.

Except for Vijnaneswara, no author of Hindu law – neither ancient nor modern – ever
acknowledged absolute property rights for females. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 is a direct replication of Vijnaneswara's rule that all property, no matter how it was
acquired, must become the absolute property of Hindu women.

Vijnaneswara's viewpoint was prevented from becoming a rule of law throughout the British
regime because the Privy Council favoured the Dayabhaga rule, which provide a restricted
property right to Hindu women.

The dispute about the right to property of daughters has raged for many years. It sets the standard
for gender equality and introduces the issue of women who face economic discrimination. In
addition to recognising women as essential members of Hindu families, this right also restores
citizens’ trust in the judiciary as a source of help in cases of gender-based discrimination.
In the case of Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors. 1, the Supreme Court
of Indiamade the observation that a daughter is capable of inheriting the self-acquired property or
share obtained in the division of a coparcenary property of her father dying intestate.

1
Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011.
ARUNACHALA GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS V. PONNUSAMY
AND ORS.

Case Name: Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Parties: Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By Legal Representatives – Appellants

Ponnusamy and Others – Respondents

Judges: Hon’ble Justice S. Abdul Nazeer

Hon’ble Justice Krishna Murari

Date of Judgement: 20th January, 2022

FACTS OF THE CASE

It is important to understand the parties' lineages and the basis of their claims and arguments,
prior to proceeding into the case's details. The sons of Gurunatha Gounder were Marappa
Gounder and Ramasamy Gounder. Marappa Gounder, had only Kuppayee Ammal, a daughter
who passed away without progeny in 1967. Conversely, Ramasamy Gounder had five children,
four of which were girl and one male. The male issue was Gurunatha Gounder, sometimes
known as Gurunatha Gounder Junior for convenience. Thangammal, Ramayeemal, Elayammal
(Defendant No. 5), and Nallammal (Defendant No. 6) were the four daughters. Four children—
Ponnuswamy, G Thangammal, Papayee, and Kannammal [Defendant No.s 1 to 4 (Respondents
herein)] —were left behind after Gurunatha Gounder's death. Thangammal (Original Plaintiff
now represented by legal heir) left behind a daughter named Arunachal Gounder, who is now
represented by her legal representatives Venkatachalam, Appellant No. 1, and A. Mottaiyappan,
Appeallant No. 2 and Ramayeemal passed away, leaving behind Samathuvam and Kannayan
(Defendant No.s 8 and 9) as children.
Thangammal, a daughter of Ramasamy Gounder, who filed the lawsuit for partition, claimed that
each of Ramasamy Gounder's five children would be entitled to one-fifth share in the suit
property because her father predeceased his brother Marappa Gounder, who passed away on
April 14, 1957, leaving behind the only daughter Kuppayee Ammal, who also passed away
issueless in 1967. Thangammal passed away, and her daughter Arunachal Gounder, who since
having died is represented by Appellant 1 and Appellant 2, contested the lawsuit in her stead.

A graphic representation of the family would help to understand the facts –

The defence put forth by the defendant-respondents was that Marappa Gounder passed away on
May 11, 1949, not April 14, 1957, as the plaintiff-appellant claimed, and that according to the
provisions of Hindu Law that prevailed before 1956, Gurunatha Gounder was the only heir of
Marappa Gounder. As a result, he inherited the properties in question and was in possession of
them, and thereafter the respondents herein continued to be the lawful owner after his death.
Thus, there was a disagreement between the parties over Marappa Gounder's death date. The
defendant-respondent pled the date of death as 15.04.1949, but the plaintiff-appellant alleged the
date of death as 14.04.1957.

The fact that Marappa Gounder independently acquired the suit property, through a court auction
process in the year 1938 and that it was thus his independent property, is undisputed amongst the
parties.

The Trial Court dismissed the case after considering the evidence presented on the record of the
case by the parties and reaching the conclusion that Marappa Gounder passed away on April 15,
1949, and that the suit property would pass to the sole son of Ramasamy Gounder, Marappa
Gounder's deceased brother, by survivorship. As a result, the plaintiff-appellant had no right to
file the suit for partition.

The High Court in the first appeal upheld the findings made by the Trial Court, particularly with
regard to the date of death of Marappa Gounder in 1949, and upheld the decree dismissing the
partition suit, holding that the property would pass to the defendant by way of survivorship.
ISSUE

The main issue that arose was whether the suit property would pass to the daughter following the
intestate death of her father by inheritance or pass to the son of the father's brother by
survivorship.

The adjudication of the issue is dependent on the answers to the following questions –

1. If the property is separate one rather than undivided, what kind of property is it and how
would the succession work?
2. Whether a father's only daughter inherit his separate property in the event of his intestate
death?
3. In the event that such a daughter passed away, what would be the order of succession?

ISSUE REGARDING DATE OF DEATH OF MARAPPA GOUNDER

With regard to resolving the dispute between the parties, the date of death of Marappa Gounder
was taken as 15.04.1949, which is a finding of fact upheld by the Madras High Court and the
Trial Court and is not subject to challenge.

ISSUE REGARDING SELF ACQUIRED V. JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY

The other issue was whether the suit property was solely bought by Marappa Gounder in the
Court auction and was his separate property or it was bought out of the joint family fund and is a
joint family asset. Moreover the Trial Court did not frame any issue about this matter, nor did the
parties present any evidence, and no decision has been reached. Given that the defendant
admitted in paragraph 3 of the written statement that Marappa Gounder owned the suit properties
outright after buying them in a Court auction sale on September 19, 1938, there was no necessity
to raise any objection after the fact was stated in the written statement.

The pertinent portion of the written statement paragraph 3 reads as follows –

“3. It is true that the suit properties are the absolute properties of the Marappa Gounder, he
having purchased the suit properties in the Court auction sale on 19.09.1938.”

Furthermore, the defendants themselves have never claimed that Marappa Gounder purchased
the property with joint family funds. The written statement makes it quite evident that Marappa
Gounder exclusively owns the suit property. Thus, the arguments of the respondent's counsel
regarding purchase of suit property out of joint family fund are without merit and are not entitled
to be taken into consideration.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ARGUMENTS – APPELLANTS

It was contended that the property was acquired by Marappa Gounder through a court auction
sale on December 15, 1938, making it his independent property and never being regarded as a
joint family property. As a result, upon Marappa Gounder's death, the property would pass by
succession to his daughter Kupayee Ammal, who passed away in 1967.

It was further submitted that the right to inherit in Mitakshara law is based on propinquity, or
proximity of relationship. The daughter would receive the property from the father rather than
the son and daughter of the father's sibling because of their closer proximity of relationship.

It was further pointed out that the Mitakshara recognises three classes of heirs, namely (a)
Gotrajasapindas, (b) Samanodakas, and (c) Bandhus. The first class succeeds prior to the second
and third classes.

It was further contended that according to Hindu Law, a daughter is not ineligible to inherit a
father's separate property, and when a male Hindu dies without a son and only leaves a daughter,
his separate property will devolve upon the daughter through succession rather than to his
brother's son through survivorship. As a result, the courts erroneously applied Hindu law
principles and dismissed the lawsuit.

ARGUMENTS – RESPONDENTS

It was submitted that the property in question was bought by Marappa Gounder at a court auction
sale using family funds; as a result, it was a joint property, and upon his death, the defendant as a
coparcener succeeded to the property because Marappa Gounder had no male heirs.

It was also contended that the Trial Court found that the plaintiff and other plaintiff sisters were
not the heirs as of the date of death of Marappa Gounder in the year 1949 and, therefore, plaintiff
was not entitled to the partition of 1/5th share in the suit properties. The Trial Court reached this
conclusion after carefully reviewing the evidence submitted on record by the parties.
It was also pointed out that since Marappa Gounder's death was officially ruled to have occurred
in 1949, the succession to his estate began that year, with Kupayee Ammal, his daughter, being
unable to claim any inheritance rights. Guranatha Gounder, the son of Ramasamy Gounder, who
was the father of Defendants 1 to 4, was the sole heir who could inherit from Marappa Gounder
at the time of his passing. Guranatha Gounder became the owner of Marappa Gounder's
possessions after they devolved on him; as a result, they could not be made the subject of
partition once the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was put into effect since they were Guranatha
Gounder's property.

It was further submitted that the plaintiff-appellant failed to frame any issues or present any
evidence during the entire litigation to show that the property Marappa Gounder purchased at the
Court auction in 1938 was a self-acquired property. As a result, it was assumed that the property
was a joint family possession with no rights of inheritance for his daughter.
SOURCES OF HINDU LAW

The Court observed that the actual origin of Hindu law is obscured by antiquity and referred to
various sources to determine the right of a daughter to the separate property of her father. Hindus
consider their laws to be based on revelations recorded in the Vedas, Shrutis that which is heard
and expressed, and Smritis that which is remembered. The Smritis which are believed to have
been written down in the exact words of Lord Brahma, constitute forensic law or the Dharma
Shastra, The Samhitas, Smritis, or, in other words, the text books credited to the learned sages
Manu, Yajnavalchya, Vishnu, Parasara, and Gutama, among others, are where one may find the
Dharma Shastra, or forensic law. The Hindus regard their writings to be authentic. There have
been digests and annotations written on these commentaries. Thus, the evolution of Hindu law
has been traced back to these ancient sources. These sources are recognised as authoritative
authority because they have developed continuously over time, covering the whole body of law.
In addition to these sources, Customs, equity, justice, good conscience, and court rulings have
also contributed to the evolution of Hindu law.

Different schools of Hindu law have been developed as a result of the commentaries of different
learned scholars, such as Daya Bhaga in Bengal, Mayukha in Bombay, Konkan and Gujarat,
Marumakkattayam or Nambudri in Kerala, and Mitakshara in other regions of India. The
Mitakshara school of law is one of the most significant schools of law with a very broad
jurisdiction, and it applies to the majority of India with a few minor variations while maintaining
the same fundamental principles. The Banaras School, Mithila School, Maharashtra or Bombay
School and Dravida or Madras School were among the sub-schools created as a result of these
minor variances.

The Mitakshara is regarded as the supreme authority in the school of Banaras. With the
exception of Bengal, which is primarily covered by another school known as Daya Bhaga, the
Mitakshara has always been regarded as the primary authority for all schools of law.

A well-known sanskrit scholar of Bengal named Mr. Colebrooke opined, “The range of its
authority and influence is far more extensive than that of Jimiita Vahana’s treatise; for it is
received in all the schools of Hindoo law, from Benares to the southern extremity of the
peninsula of India, as the chief groundwork of the doctrines which they follow, and as an
authority from which they rarely dissent.”2 Failing male issue, therefore, a widow takes the self-
acquired property of her husband. No doubt, on failure of male issue and a widow, the daughter
would take.3

In the case of Pranjivandas Tulsidas v. Devkuvarbai 4, a Hindu with separate property died
without having any male offspring and left behind a widow, four daughters, a brother, and male
offsprings of other predeceased brothers. The court stated that the widow had a life estate in the
property and that, subject to her interest, the property would certainly pass to the daughters in
preference to the brother and the male issues of the predeceased brothers. This case had been
referred to in various reported and unreported case laws.

In Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas, Bhagvandas, and Pranjivandas5, it was observed that –

“...The decision in that case and that in Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbai have been steadily
followed by the High Court in numerous unreported cases, and by the legal profession.... Any
departure now from those decisions would cause much confusion and injustice throughout this
Presidency, and no advantage that we can perceive. We, therefore, must abide by the principles
which they clearly indicate.”

In Chotay Lall v. Chunnoo Lall and Anr.6, the Court stated that –

“The following are the direct authorities on the point. Sir M. Sausse in 1859, in Pranjivandas
Tulsidas v. Devkuvarbai, held that a daughter takes absolutely when inheriting from her father.
In Bhaskar Trimbak Acharya v. Mahadev Ramji, decided in January 1869 by Sir Joseph
Arnould, the head note states that all property acquired by a married woman by inheritance
(except from her husband) classes as stridhan, and descends accordingly. But this case is
founded exclusively on the case of Pranjivandas Tulsidas v. Devkuvarbai.”

The Madras School of Law, one of Mitakshara's sub-schools, usually caters to the majority of
southern India and acts in accordance with the Mitakshara Law School. The commentaries of

2
Standish Grove Grady, Treatise on Hindoo Law (Gantz Brother, Madras, 1868).
3
Standish Grove Grady, Treatise on Hindoo Law 165 (Gantz Brother, Madras, 1868).
4
1 Bomb. H.C., B. 131.
5
ILR (1881) 5 Bom 662.
6
(1878) I.L.R., 4 Cal.
Smritis by "Yajnavalkya" are a key source of the Mitakshara School. 'Vyavastha Chandrika' and
'Smriti Chandrika' are other significant sources that govern the Mitakshara School.

The Court referred to the digest of ‘Yajnavalkya’ which stated that –

“What has been self-acquired by any one, as an increment, without diminishing the paternal
estate, likewise a gift from a friend or a marriage gift, does not belong to the co- heirs.”

The Court also referred to the annotations and commentaries from the principles and elements of
Hindu Law contained in ‘Vyavastha-Chandrika’, a digest of Hindu Law by Shyama Charan
Sarkar Vidya-Bhusha. Clause 118 of Section II of the above said digest dealing with Daughters’
Right of Succession, stated that –

“In default of the widow, the daughters inherit the estate of the man who died separated (from
his coparceners) and not re-united (with them).”

Clause 120 of the ‘Vyavastha Chandrika’ also stated that –

“A daughter being entitled to inherit the divided property of her father, it has been, by parity of
reasoning, determined that, she is entitled to inherit also such property as was separately
acquired or held by him, or was vested in him.”

The Court also quoted ‘Vishnu’ and ‘Vrihaspati’ as under –

Vishnu – “The wealth of a man who leaves no male issue goes to his wife; on failure of her, to
his daughter.”

Vrihaspati – “The wife is pronounced successor to the wealth of her husband; in her default, the
daughter. As a son, so does the daughter of a man proceed from his several limbs. How then,
should any other person [as stated in (B)] take her father’s wealth?

(B) Any other person - These terms exclude the son and widow, (who are preferable heirs), and
include the father and the rest.”7

7
Smriti Chandrika, Chapter- XI, Section (ii), Clause 5 and 6.
The Court interpreted the said section to mean that in the event that the daughter of a man who
died without leaving a male issue, is alive then neither the father nor the like could inherit the
property of such a man.

‘Manu’ was also referred to by the Court as –

“The son of a man is even as himself, and the daughter is equal to the son. How then can any
other inherit his property, notwithstanding the survival of her, who is, as it were, himself.”

The Court also referred to Narada who considered daughter to be equal to son and in case of
failure of the son and the widow to succeed the property, it is the daughter who should succeed
since a daughter is considered equally responsible for perpetuating the race.

While discussing the line of descent in his book Treatise on Hindoo Law of Inheritance, Standish
Grove Grady stated that the Hindoo Law of Inheritance comprises the deceased person's family
and close relatives, such as his children, both male and female; his widow, who inherits right
away in the absence of sons—a phrase that encompasses grandsons and great-grandsons. When
this line of descent is exhausted, the succession moves up to his parents, brothers, nephews, and
grandnephews. This line continues all the way to the grandfather and great-grandfather, as well
as the grandmother and great grandmother. The succession then moves down through their
respective issue, including daughter's sons but excluding daughters, with full blood preferable
over half blood.

The succession of agnates is preferred by the Hindoos, with female successions being treated as
anomalies. They are typically ineligible to inherit. There are only four females who are exempt
from this rule: widows, daughters, mothers, and grandmothers. The aforementioned females only
inherit when the family is undivided, in accordance with the Banaras and Mithila Schools.
Females are not permitted to inherit in an undivided property. However, a widow inherits her
husband's self-acquired property, even in undivided families.

There are two modes of devolution of property –

a. From a sole separate owner.

b. From a female.
Regarding self acquired property, Standish Grove Grady stated that any property that is not
ancestral is self-acquired, regardless of how it was acquired—by gift, purchase, work, mental or
physical effort, or any other means. He also referred to the case of Katama Natchiar v. the Rajah
of Shivagunga8 and observed that the government gave a distant relative of the last zamindar a
new Zaminadari when one was escheated after his death. This was handled as self-acquired
property. In such case, it was determined that all self-acquired property devolves in the same
manner as the family property of a divided member. In this case, a widow inherits her husband's
self-acquired property in the absence of a male issue and in the event of failure of widow and
son, the daughter would inherit.

The Court quoted Clause 135 of Hindu Law and Judicature from the Dharmasastra of
‘Yajnavalkya’ by Edward Roer which provided that if a man died without leaving any male
issue, his wife, his daughter, his parents, his brothers, his brothers' sons, other members of the
same gotra, distant relatives, a pupil, and a fellow student will inherit, each class succeeding on
the failure of the previous. All castes must abide by this rule.

Certain clauses of A Digest of Hindu Law- As administered in the Courts of The Madras
Presidency arranged and annotated by H.S. Cunningham, the then Advocate General of Madras
were also referred to by the Court. Clause 203 of the said digest stated that in the absence of
sons, grandchildren, great grandsons, and widows a life estate in the father's property passes to
the daughter.

Clause 206 provided that despite being infertile or lacking a male child, married daughters and
widowed daughters nevertheless succeed. In the same way, clause 207 stated that daughters of
each class own their estate jointly, the share of each dead daughter vests in the remaining
daughter or daughters of the same class, and descends to the girls of the next class only after all
the daughters of the preceding class are exhausted. A daughter who is not endowed on marriage
succeeds over the daughter who is endowed in each class.

Clause 209 of the said commentary read as the daughter succeeds upon the passing of her father's
widow despite the fact that this widow is not her mother.

8
(1863) 9 M.I.A., 539.
The Mitakshara and Dayabhaga systems of inheritance are followed by Hindus in India,
according to Sir Mulla, who discusses the law before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in his
book Hindu Law. While the Mitakshara system is used in other regions of India, the Dayabhaga
method is dominant in Bengal. The distinction between the two systems is caused by the fact
that, whereas the guiding principle of the Dayabhaga School is the concept of religious efficacy,
the Mitakshara School lacks a clearly defined guiding principle. Consanguinity has occasionally
been recognised as the deciding factor, and other times, religious efficacy. Mitakshara
recognised two methods for devolution of property viz., succession and survivorship. Joint
family property is subject to the laws of survivorship, whereas property held in absolute
severalty by the last owner is governed by the rules of succession.

Section 349 of Principles of Hindu Law by Sir Mulla regarding devolution of property according
to Mitakshara Law was also referred to by the Court.

The right to inherit under Mitakshara Law is based on propinquity, or proximity of relationship,
according to Sir Mulla. Mitakshara divided blood relations into three categories –

a. Gotra-sapindas,
b. Samanodaka, and
c. Bhinna gotra sapindas (also known as ‘Bandhus’ under Mitakshara Law).

Gotra Sapindas and Samanodaka are persons connected to the deceased by an uninterrupted line
of male descendants, i.e., all agantes; and "Bhinna gotra sapindas" are cognates i.e., related to the
deceased through a female.

9
Principles of Hindu Law, s. 34 says that ‘In determining the mode in which the property of a Hindu male, governed
by Mitakshara Law, devolves on his death, the following propositions are to be noted –
(1) Where the deceased was, at the time of the death, a member of joint and undivided family, technically called
coparcenary, his undivided interest in the coparcenary property devolves on his coparceners by survivorship.
(2) (i) Even if the deceased was joint at the time of his death, he might have left self-acquired or separate property.
Such property goes to his heirs by succession according to the order given in Section 43, and not to his coparceners;
(ii) If the deceased was at the time of his death, the sole surviving member of a coparcenary property, the whole of
his property, including the coparcenary property, will pass to his heirs by succession according to the order given in
Section 43;
(iii) If the deceased was separate at the time of his death from his coparceners, the whole of his property, however
acquired, will pass to his heirs by succession according to the order given in Section 43;
(3) If the deceased was re-united at the time of his death, his property will pass to his heirs by succession according
to the rule laid down in Section 60.’
These classifications are outlined as class-I, class-II, class-III, and class-IV heirs under the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. These categories remain significant with regard to the suit property since
its succession began before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The first piece of statute law to include Hindu females in the inheritance system was the Hindu
Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929. Without modifying the fundamental ideas
underlying the textual Hindu Law regarding inheritance, the Hindu Law of Inheritance
(Amendment) Act, 1929 introduced a few female statutory heirs that were already recognised by
the Madras School viz., the son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister, and sister's son in the
order so specified. The only difference is that while they succeeded as ‘bandhus’ before the
Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, they inherited as ‘gotra sapindas’ under the
Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929.

Inheritance by succession is also recognised under the Mitakshara law, but only for property that
is owned independently by an individual, whether male or female. The Mitakshara law includes
women as potential heirs to this type of property. Prior to the Hindu Law of Inheritance
(Amendment) Act of 1929, the various Mitakshara sub-schools acknowledged the female
relatives are entitled to inherit including daughter.

Thus the Court observed that from the various sources referred to it is plainly obvious that a
daughter was in fact eligible to inherit the father's separate property.
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

The Court referred to the judgement of Privy Council in Katama Natchiar v. Srimut Rajah
Mootoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya Taver 10 which was related to the
right of inheritance of Shivagunga Zamindary, situated in the Presidency of Madras. The
arguments of Anga Mootoo Natchiar, the surviving widow, were noted by the Privy Council
where she argued that the Zamindar had been earned only through her husband's efforts and
merits, and it is a matter of law that anything acquired by a man without using his patrimony
should not be inherited by her brothers and co-heirs, but if he passes away without having any
male issue, his widow, daughters, and parents would inherit before her brothers or distant
collaterals. After hearing the arguments, the Privy Council formulated three questions, the third
of which is pertinent. The third question is if the property is self-acquired and separate, what
would be the Hindoo Law succession course of such an acquisition, when the family is an
undivided family.

According to the Privy Council, the commentary on Mitakshara generally upholds a widow's
capacity to inherit in the event of failure of a male issue. According to the aforementioned
commentary, a married wife who remains chaste inherits the entire estate of a man who passes
away without leaving any male offspring if he was separated from his co-heirs and did not later
reunite with them.

But according to the Privy Council, the context of the commentary only applies to situations
where the property in question has been either entirely the separate property of the deceased
husband or entirely the common property of a united family. There was no commentary on the
possibility that the property in question may have been partially the separate acquisition of the
deceased and partially the common property of a united family.

The Privy Council ruled that although it may have been their husband's separate acquisition, it
cannot be assumed that because widows inherit the entirety of their husbands' estates when they
separated from and have not since been reunited with their co-heirs and have passed away
without producing male children, they are not permitted to inherit any portion of their estates

10
(1863) 9 MIA 539.
when their husbands have not been separated. As a result, the commentary in the context could
not be applied.

The Court laid down the following legal principles on an extensive reading of the judgement of
Privy Council in the abovementioned case –

A. “That the General Course of descends of separate property according to the Hindu Law
is not disputed it is admitted that according to that law such property (separate property)
descends to widow in default of male issue.
B. It is upon Respondent therefore to make out that the property herein question which was
separately acquired does not descends according to the general course of law.
C. According to the more correct opinion where there is undivided residue, it is not subject
to ordinary rules of partition of joint property, in other words if it a general partition any
part of the property was left joint the widow of the deceased brother will not participate
notwithstanding with separation but such undivided residue will go exclusively to
brother.
D. The law of succession follows the nature of property and of the interest in it.
E. The law of partition shows that as to the separately acquired property of one member of a
united family, the other members of the family have neither community of interest nor
unity of possession.
F. The foundation therefore of a right to take such property by survivorship fails and there
are no grounds for postponing the widow’s right any superior right of the co-parcenars
in the undivided property.
G. The Hindu Law is not only consistence with this principle but is also most consistent with
convenience.”

As a result, the law affirms that inheritance will control succession and not survivorship in the
instance of a Hindu man dying intestate. In the absence of a male issue, the widow will inherit
the property following the daughter on the failure of widow.

Sivagnana Tevar and Anr. v. Periasami11, another case of Privy Council was also referred to,
where it was observed that the palayapat was the separate property of Dhorai Pandian and upon

11
1878 (1) ILR Madras 312.
his death if he had any undisposed right in the property and despite the fact that the family was
undivided, amongst the descendants of Muttu Vaduga and Dhorai Pandian, the property would
devolve upon the widow of Dhorai Pandian. The law of succession laid down in Katama
Natchiar v. Srimut Rajah Mootoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya
Taver12 that when a Hindu man dies intestate, succession is to be decided by inheritance rather
than survivorship was reaffirmed and applied in this case.

In the case of Ghurpatari and Ors. v. Smt. Sampati and Ors. 13, the Allahabad High Court referred
to various commentaries while dealing with the issue regarding the right of inheritance of a
widow or a daughter of a male Hindu dying intestate while determining whether a custom that
prohibited daughters from inheriting their father's property could also prohibit the daughters'
issues, both males and females, from such inheritance.

The Allahabad High Court observed the rules declared by various sages on inheritance by widow
and daughter. The right of the widow, daughter and daughter’s son to succeed to the property
was laid down by sages like Katyayan, Brishaspati, Vishnu and Manu in their writings and was
well recognized in the Mitakshara law.

The Allahabad High Court then moved on to analyse the issue of custom that is dominant in a
certain sect. For the first time, the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 allowed
the daughter's daughter to inherit the property of a male Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law,
provided that this was allowed by a special family or local custom. In the order of succession to
the estate of a Hindu dying interstate, the daughter was ranked fifth and the daughter’s son was
ranked sixth in the book of Principles of Hindu Law by Sir Mulla.

Reference to the judgement of Lal Singh and Ors. v. Roor Singh and Ors 14 was also made where
a preferential claim to the non-ancestral property was determined to belong to daughters and
daughters' sons over the collaterals.

12
(1863) 9 MIA 539.
13
AIR 1976 All 195.
14
AIR 1953 P H 202.
The observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Gopal Singh and Ors. v.
Ujagar Singh and Ors.15 were also considered to be pertinent where relying upon the writings of
Rattigan in his Digest of Customary Law, the Apex Court stated that the daughter is given
preference over the collaterals in relation to the self-acquired property of the father.

Reference was also made to the ruling rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of
Devidas and Ors. v. Vithabai and Anr 16. In this case, one Arjuna passed away in 1936. When
succession was opened, Vithabai, the daughter of one of Arjuna's predeceased sons, was found to
be entitled to a portion when the estate was divided. Vithabai's name was omitted from the
revenue records. She filed a lawsuit for declaration claiming 1/3 rd share in addition to other
reliefs. However, the lawsuit was dismissed by the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court
overturned the judgement on the grounds that the plaintiff Vithabai, Zolu's daughter, was a
Class-I heir and so qualified for a 1/3 rd share. Thereafter, a second appeal was filed in the
Bombay High Court where the decree of the Lower Appellate Court was reversed and that of the
Trial Court was upheld. The Bombay High Court held that Zolu was joint with his father and
brothers when he passed away in 1935. As a result, rather than by succession, his share of the
coparcenery would pass by survivorship. Zolu admittedly did not own any independent property,
therefore there was no concern about property devolving by succession.

The illustration provided in Section 24 of Principles of Hindu Law by Sir Mulla was also quoted
which squarely covered this case, however negated the claim of the plaintiff. According to the
illustration, when a person died leaving behind his brother and a daughter, the share of such a
person in the joint family property would devolve upon his brother, the surviving coparcener and
not on the daughter. If the deceased were separated from his brother, then the daughter would
have been entitled to such property as the heir of the deceased.

Due to this legal provision, the plaintiff in this case was not entitled to inherit her father's
property. The siblings and father of Zolu were entitled to his property by the rule of survivorship.
Due to the claim made by the plaintiff herself that the property was undivided, the portion could
not pass to the daughter by succession. As a result, the property was passed over to the brothers
and the father, who were coparceners, by the rule of survivorship.

15
AIR 1954 SC 579.
16
2008 (5) Mh.L.J. 296.
The 174th Law Commission also proposed reforms in its report on ‘Property Rights of Women’
regarding the right of female to inherit by succession to the separate property owned by an
individual, be it male or female.

The aforementioned discussions make it evident that several ancient texts, including the Smritis,
commentaries written by eminent scholars, and even judicial decisions have recognised the rights
of different female heirs, with spouses and daughters leading the list.
JUDGEMENT

The Court observed that the old customary Hindu Law and various judicial declarations both
recognise a widow's or a daughter's right to inherit the self-acquired property or share obtained in
partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate. Thus answering the question
nos. 1 and 2, the Court held that the property belonging to the male Hindu who died intestate be
it self-acquired property or received in partition of a coparcenary or a family property would
devolve not by survivorship, but by inheritance thus entitling the daughter of such a Hindu male
to inherit the property in preference to other collaterals.

In the instant case, the property in dispute was admitted to be the self-acquired property of
Marappa Gounder and although the family was undivided at the time of his intestate death,
however such independent property of the deceased would be inherited by the rule of inheritance
by his sole surviving daughter Kupayee Ammal and would not be passed on by survivorship.

With regards to question no. 3 there are conflicting views on the line of succession to be
followed following the death of a daughter who inherited the property from his father under the
ancient customary Hindu Law. One school of thought is of the opinion that such a daughter
would get a limited estate and that upon her death, the estate would go back to the deceased
male's heirs, who would then be eligible to inherit by survivorship. While the opposing
viewpoint is held by other school of thought.

Since, Marappa Gounder's daughter Kupayee Ammal, passed away after the commencement of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which amended and codified the Hindu Law relating to
intestate succession among Hindus, this difference of opinion stated above might not be
significant in the insstant case. The primary aim of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is to provide
absolute equality between the rights to property of male and female. As a result, all concepts of a
limited estate were abolished, and the rights of women were declared absolute. The Act changed
Hindu law on the rule of succession and granted women with property rights that had never
before existed.

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 established a standard and uniform system of inheritance that
includes, but is not limited to only those who are subject to the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga
Schools of Law but also includes those who were formerly subject to the Murumakkattayam,
Aliyasantana, and Nambudri Laws. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is applicable to everyone
who identifies as a Hindu in any of its manifestations, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat, a
follower of the Brahmo Pararthana, or Arya Samaj, as well as to anyone who is a Buddhist, Jain,
or Sikh, with the exception of those who is Muslim, Christian, Parsi, Jew, or Sikh by religion.

According to Section 1417 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a Hindu female's property is her
exclusive property. The purpose behind the enactment of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 was to address the limitation that a Hindu female had, in that she could not inherit
absolute interest in the assets inherited by her, but only was entitled to a life interest in the
property so inherited.

All limited estates owned by women were turned into absolute estates under Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In the absence of a will or testament, Section 15 18 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 would govern the inheritance of these assets.

The objective of Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that when a Hindu female
dies intestate, her property passes to her own heirs, who are listed in Section 15(1) Clauses (a) to
17
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), s. 14 says that ‘Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property.—
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act,
shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property”
includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a
partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not,
before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of
this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any
other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or
other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.’
18
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), s. 15 says that ‘General rules of succession in the case of
female Hindus.—
(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16,—
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the
husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),—
(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or
daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs
referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the
absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not
upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.’
(e) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
provides exceptions only for the property acquired by inheritance nd even then, the exclusion is
only applicable to the property inherited by a Hindu female from either her father or mother, her
husband, or her father-in-law. Only when a Hindu female dies without leaving any immediate
heirs—her son or daughter or the children of the predeceased son or daughter – will the
exclusions outlined in Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would apply.

As a result, if a female Hindu passes away intestate and without any children, the property she
inherited from her parents would pass to the descendants of her father, while the property she
inherited from her husband or father-in-law would pass to the heirs of the husband. If a Hindu
female dies leaving behind her husband or any issue, Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 comes into effect, and the remaining assets, including those she inherited from her
parents, would pass to her husband and her issues as specified in Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.

The main purpose of Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is to assure that the
inheritance of a female Hindu who dies without leaving behind any issue and intestate is reverted
to the previous owner.

According to Section 15(1)(d) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, all of the female's property,
regardless of how it was acquired, would pass to the father's heirs if none of the female's heirs
listed in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 15(1)(d) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 survive her. The
property will pass to the father's heirs in the same manner and under the same conditions as it
would have if the father had owned it and he had passed away intestate in relation to it right
away after her passing.

In the instant case, the Court observed that since the death of Kupayee Ammal in 1967 opened
the succession of the suit properties, the 1956 Act shall apply in the present case, making
Ramasamy Gounder's daughters, who are Class-I heirs of their father, heirs and entitled to a 1/5
share of the suit properties.

The Court also referred to the analysis made of Section 15 and Section 16 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 by the Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Punjab v. Balwant
Singh and Ors.19 The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh and Ors. 20 also
referred to the case of Bhajya v. Gopikabai and Anr.21 where analysis with regard to Section
15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was made. The Supreme Court of India in Bhajya v.
Gopikabai and Anr.22 stated that Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provided the
process to identify the heirs of the intestate and the rule under which the property of the intestate
would devolve is governed by Rule 3 of Section 1623 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The Court also made a reference to the case of Bhagat Ram (dead) by LRs v. Teja Singh (dead)
by LRs24 where Sections 14,15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 were analysed and it
was held that the situation would be governed by the source from which she inherited the
property. The property would otherwise be entitled to be inherited by people who are not even
remote relatives of the individual who originally possessed it and this would be against the aim
and purpose of Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which specified a unique
succession pattern.

The Court applied the aforementioned settled legal proposition to the facts of the instant case and
held that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 should apply because the death of Kupayee Ammal in
1967 death opened the succession of the suit property and as a result, Ramasamy Gounder's
daughters, who are Class-I heirs of their father, should also be heirs and be entitled to 1/5 th share
in each of the suit property.

Thus, the Court allowed the appeal and the impugned judgement and decree delivered by the
Trial Court was set aside.

19
1992 Supp. (3) SCC 108.
20
1992 Supp. (3) SCC 108.
21
(1978) 3 SCR 561.
22
(1978) 3 SCR 561.
23
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), s. 16 Rule 3 says that ‘The devolution of the property of the
intestate on the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) and in sub-section (2) to section 15 shall
be in the same order and according to the same rules as would have applied if the property had been the father’s or
the mother’s or the husband’s as the case may be, and such person had died intestate in respect thereof immediately
after the intestate’s death.’
24
(2002) 1 SCC 210.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The vedic literature stipulated that both a married daughter who didn’t have brothers and an
unmarried daughter should inherit the ancestral property. A Hindu female was not eligible for
inheritance according to Baudhayana, the founder of one of the schools of Yajurveda. On the
premise of the Sruti scripture, which states that “women are considered to be destitute of strength
and of a portion,”25 he established his thesis of excluding women from inheritance. He asserted
that the Vedas forbade women from inheriting, saying that they lack prowess and are incapable
to do it.

A female was not considered capable of independence by Baudhayana. He argues that women
shouldn't be allowed to exercise their independence since the father protects them throughout
their formative years, the spouse during their youth, and the son during their senior years.26

However, the widow, mother, and daughter were listed as heirs by certain legislators during the
mediaeval times. For instance, Gautama included the widow whereas Apastamba included the
daughter as heirs to ancestral property.

A significant shift in public opinion on the propriety status of women occurred during the Smriti
period, and writers like as Manu, Yajnavalkya, Brihaspati, Narada, and other Smriti writers
recognised certain female heirs in the line of succession. In the succession sequence, Manu
explicitly acknowledged the widow, the daughter, and the mother.27

Brihaspati emphasised the right of succession for a daughter. Additionally, he acknowledged the
wife's right to succeed, but he declined to extend it to fixed property. Narada acknowledged the
daughter's right but did not acknowledge the widow's claim. The mother, wife, and daughter
were identified by Vishnu as potential successors. The wife, mother, and daughter were all
named as inheritors by Devala.28

The widow, daughter, and mother were therefore specifically identified as heirs during the Smriti
era. But only in the absence of a male could they take over property of a man.
25
Baudhayana Dharmasutra , II, 2.3.56.
26
Id. at 2-3.45.
27
Prakash Chand Jain, “Women's Property Rights under Traditional Hindu Law and the Hindu Succession Act,
1956: Some Observations” 45 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 509-536 (2003).
28
Ibid.
After the Smriti era the law of female succession was reflected in the commentaries and digests.
The commentaries had made an effort to base their findings on the texts of the Smritis. Five
females—the widow, daughter, mother, paternal grandmother, and paternal great grandmother—
were granted inheritable rights by both the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga. the only point of
difference between the two schools was with regard to the order of succession amongst the heirs
of an individual.

The Mitakshara sub-schools had expressed their opinions on the proprietary rights of females.
When referring to the females as heirs, the Bombay and Mithila schools didn't rely on
Baudhayana's scripture. On the other hand, the Benaras and Madras schools adhered to the Vedic
theory of universal exclusion of women from inheritance. However, they interpreted the Sruti
text to suggest that all females as a class were ineligible to inherit, with the exception of the
daughter, widow, mother, and those female ancestors for whom heritable rights were specifically
provided for by special scriptures.

The number of female heirs recognized by the Bombay school was significantly higher than that
of the ones recognized by Mitakshara. The teachers of the Madras school strictly adhered to the
Sruti text asserting that women are unable to inherit in general. This school held that the
Baudhayana scripture exclusively pertained to females, excluding daughters, widows and the
like.

According to Hindu law, the property of a female was divided into two categories – the stridhana
and the non-stridhana. Women's proprietary rights underwent a general regress from the
beginning of the Smriti period, and ever since, it has been generally accepted that they were
unable to possess property. However, there were few recognised exceptions that allowed her to
have absolute authority over specific types of property which was known as stridhana.

Despite the perceived dependence on males that women, and wives in especially, are said to
have, a wife might own stridhana property. Such property was not under the control of the
husband and the wife had the power to alienate the property at her will.

The property inherited by a female was not regarded stridhana or in any of the Mitakshara sub-
schools, except for the Bombay school, where a female always took it as her stridhana.
Mitakshara had not imposed any limitations on the daughter's entitlement to the property she
would get as her father's heir. Under Mitakshara, the daughter had a distinct personality. Even
her property rights were not comparable to those of a widow. However, the Mitakshara's sub-
schools, with the exception of the Bombay school, did not adhere to it and gave her restricted
estate. The daughter did not have complete rights under the Dayabhaga school either since it was
believed that her claims could not be superior to those of a widow.

Due to education and the effect of the West on Indian socio-cultural life, the attitude and
behaviour pattern in Hindu society regarding property rights of females under the British rule
underwent a significant change.

The situation of women in relation to the right of inheritance amongst those who were governed
by the Mitakshara law had undergone some revision by the Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929.
The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 set rank for certain females in the
sapinda class and included them as heirs for the first time in all Mitakshara sub-schools.

In earlier times, the Hindu female had the position of owner with reference to the property she
acquired as a woman's estate, but she had little authority to sell it. After her death, the property
passed to the last full owner's heir rather than to her own descendant. After the enactment of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the restricted estate for Hindu women had been abolished, and any
property a female Hindu had, regardless of how it was gained, was her own property, and she
had absolute control over it.

The position and status of Hindu women underwent significant and drastic transformation as a
result of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which conferred absolute ownership on a
female Hindu.

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly stated that a female is an absolute owner,
not a limited owner, of any property in her possession, whether it was obtained before or after
the Act's implementation. Subject to the qualification indicated in Section 14(2) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, the rule is applicable to any movable and immovable property that she had
acquired at any time.
The application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is retrospective. No scriptural
rule or interpretation of Hindu law has the authority to limit the scope of that estate.

The Supreme Court of India stated in Punithavalli v. Ramalingam 29 that the estate taken by a
female Hindu under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is an absolute one, not
contestable, and could not have its scope limited by any text or rule of Hindu law, by any
presumption or by any fiction under that law. The Supreme Court of India also ruled that all
property owned by a Hindu woman on the day the Act came into force, regardless of whether it
was obtained before or after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, belonged to
her in its whole.

The successors to a woman's property are listed in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956. Depending on whether or not the property is inherited, there are different rules. Property
obtained by self-acquisition or through a gift, bequest, settlement, etc. is covered under Section
15 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On the other hand, Section 15 (2) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 solely addresses assets that a woman inherits from her parents, spouse, or
father-in-law.

There is a difference in inherited property depending on the source of inheritance. If the property
is inherited from her parents, Section 15 (2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that, in
the absence of any issue, it passes to the father's heirs. In accordance with Section 15 (2)(b) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if the property is inherited from her husband or father-in-law, it
passes to the husband's heirs in the absence of children.

In the case of Omprakash and Ors. v. Radhacharan and Ors.30, it was observed that –

“Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 lays down the ordinary rule of succession. Clause (a) of sub-
Section (2) of Section 15 providing for a non-obstante clause, however, carves out an exception
viz. when the property is devolved upon the deceased from her parents' side, on her death the
same would relate back to her parents' family and not to her husband's family. Similarly, in a
case where she had inherited some property from her husband or from her husband's family, on
her death the same would revive to her husband's family and not to her own heirs.”

29
AIR 1970 SC 1730.
30
(2009) 15 SCC 66.
In its ruling in the case of Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors. 31, the
Apex Court declared that the self-acquired property of a Hindu man who died intestate would
pass by inheritance and not by succession. Additionally, the daughter will be eligible to inherit
both this property and any assets acquired by the partition of a coparcenary or family asset. It
was also noted that if a woman passes away intestate, the property that passed to her from her
father's side would be given to his heirs, and if she passes away without having children, the
property that passed to her from her husband's side would be given to her husband's heir.

The Court interpreted the intention behind the enactment of Section 15(2) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 which is to ensure that the inherited property of a female Hindu who
passed away issueless and intestate goes back to the source.

In accordance with the rule of proximity and the right of the sole surviving daughter to her
father's separate properties, the judgement outlines a succession plan that dates back to before the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The Courts of India have made conflicting observations on the issue of right of a daughter to the
ancestral property. In the case of Prakash and Ors. v. Phulawati and Ors. 32, the Supreme Court
has addressed the issue of the retrospective application of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession
Amendment Act, 2005, which accords equal rights to sons and daughters of a coparcener in his
share of ancestral property.

The Supreme Court of India ruled Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 could not be
implemented retrospectively unless it was intended by the legislature and explicitly authorised
under such legislation, notwithstanding the fact that it is a social legislation.

The Supreme Court of India determined that the two daughters of the father who passed away in
2001 would also be entitled to a portion of the property in the case of Danamma @ Suman
Surpur v. Amar33. The ruling recognised the underlying purpose and spirit of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which was to equalise the rights of sons and daughters.

31
Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011.
32
Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013.
33
Civil Appeal Nos. 188-189 of 2018.
In the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors. 34, the Supreme Court of India
expanded a Hindu woman's right to be a joint legal heir and receive ancestral property on
conditions equivalent to male heirs.

In this case, the issue was whether amendment made to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
permitting daughters equal rights to inherit ancestral property would have a retrospective effect.
This referred to the question of whether, following the passing of the Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005, a daughter of a coparcener shall, by birth, become a coparcener in her
own right, just like the son, or if she can be denied her share on the grounds that she was born
before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 on September 9,
2005, and is therefore not considered a coparcener.

The judgement made it clear that the amendment made to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
allowing daughters equal rights to inherit ancestral property will be retrospective. The daughters'
right to equality, guaranteed to them by Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,
2005, could not be taken away. Daughters have the same birthright to inherit joint Hindu family
property as males do. The father need not be living on September 9, 2005, as the right to
coparcenary for a daughter is conferred at birth.

The judgement made in the case of Arunachala Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and
Ors.35 wherever inheritance were being denied to the female heirs on the basis of succession by
survivorship for the time before to 1956, such female shall become eligible to succession. This
judgement proved to be a much-needed relief to female legal heirs.

The court has considered a daughter's legal entitlement to the inheritance of a father’s property
who passed away intestate before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was passed.

The court affirmed a daughter's claim to her father's property after looking into the origins of
Hindu law and several court decisions. The decision is consistent with other judgements which
recognized the right of a Hindu woman to inherit property.

34
AIR 2020 SC 3717.
35
Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011.
The main question before the Supreme Court of India was the inheritance of self-acquired
property of a deceased Hindu man who died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956.

The Hindu law of succession, according to the Apex Court, is based on the nature of the property
and the interest in it. The Supreme Court of India took into account Hindu customary law and
judgements dealing to succession of the property prior to 1956.

The Supreme Court maintained the principle that the property of a Hindu woman died intestate
shall first pass to her own immediate heirs. Only in case where there is no issue, the property she
acquired from her parents would go to her descendants of her father first, and any property she
inherited from her husband or in-laws would go to the heirs of her husband.

The judgement is of great significance as it recognized equal rights of sons and daughters in
inheritance and for resolving the age-old controversy regarding the right of daughter to inherit.

However, while the ruling would act as a guiding principle for all courts to decide in aa just
manner on cases relating to the issue of proprietary rights of daughters, the decision failed to
address the prospective or retrospective application of the law laid down and as such a number of
cases might arise where daughters were denied a share in the self-acquired property of their
father.

The rights of women in self-acquired property were not clearly governed by the law. The
judiciary provided all the answers about the property rights of Hindu females as to distinct
property of a Hindu man dying intestate through its landmark decision in the Arunachala
Gounder (Dead) By LRs v. Ponnusamy and Ors.36.

Through this judgement, the Supreme Court had carefully analysed the history of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 and the generally progressive stance of Hindu customary rules which
acknowledge women as rightful heirs.

This landmark decision clarified the application of the rule of proximity in accordance with the
rule of succession and provided that even prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, the claim of the sole surviving daughter to the separate properties of her father had been
36
Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011.
crystallised and confirmed by a number of authoritative texts, commentaries, and judicial
precedents.

Thus, the judgement of the Apex Court would put an end to any lingering questions about
women's self-acquired property rights. It is a significant step in the direction of advancing
women's rights and equality and also in enhancing the socioeconomic standing of Hindu women
and daughters in the society.
REFERENCE

RESEARCH PAPER

1. Prakash Chand Jain, “Women's Property Rights under Traditional Hindu Law and the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Some Observations” 45 Journal of the Indian Law Institute
509-536 (2003).