Question

4. What are some of the major issues in the COE and what measures can be
applied to prepare commanders to respond to such issues

Student: LTCDR Duncan Mackenzie, RNZN

ID Number: 02240785

Paper Details: 149.704 Leadership, Management and Command

Assignment: Two

Instructors Name: Dr Carl Bradley

Due Date: 30 October 2015

 Duncan Mackenzie
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In his 1883 memoir Life on the Mississippi, Mark Twain wrote that two things became
apparent to him over time. “One was, that in order to be a pilot a man had got to
learn more than any one man ought to be allowed to know; and the other was, that
he must learn it all over again in a different way every twenty-four hours.”1 Whilst few
parallels can be drawn between a writer’s days as a steamboat pilot and what can be
expected by of a military commander in contemporary operations, the ever changing
nature of the environment is somewhere the twain can meet.

The aim of this essay is to identify some of the major issues in the contemporary
operational environment (COE) and what measures can be applied to prepare
commanders to respond to them. This will be done by firstly describing and
discussing the features of the contemporary operating environment. This will be
followed by demonstrating how volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature of
the COE has been increased by the introduction of other actors such as civilian
contractors and non-state adversaries into conflict. Finally, this essay will make
evident that in order to prepare their personnel for command; militaries need to
develop greater levels of cultural literacy, adaptive leadership and recognition-primed
decision making.

The term COE is used to provide context around the employment of military forces.
It can be defined as “the combination of all the critical variables and actors that
create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military
operations today and in the near- and mid-term.”2 The political, social, economic,
religious and cultural environments have been shaped through a rapid advance in
technology and economic interdependence and challenged by the shifts in power
brought about through the collapse of the Soviet Union and enduring cultural and
ethnic rivalries.3 Changes in what governments deem to be threats to national
security indicate that there has been a shift in the practice of warfare. Previously,
wars between states were driven by ideological and political motives and carried out

1
Mark Twain, ‘Life on the Mississippi’, The Literature Network, accessed 22 October 2015, http://www.online-
literature.com/twain/life_mississippi/9/.
2
‘A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century’ (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007).
p2
3
Paul A Ott, ‘Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special
Forces’ (Fort Leavenworth: School Of Advanced Military Studies, 2002). p23

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along identifiable front lines of combat.4 The COE, however, presents a new type of
warfare, characterised by various low-level conflicts where there are no clearly
demarcated front lines of combat and an inability to distinguish between civilians and
combatants.5

The majority of change in the operational environment has come about in the last
century. Lind describes four generations of war, with a semblance of order on the
battlefield beginning through the creation of nation states with the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648. Over the last century - and especially since World War One -
war has progressed from the simple idea of order on the battlefield, to attrition
warfare (Second Generation) where mass firepower was the flavour of the day, to
manoeuvre warfare (Third Generation) where the idea was to bypass and collapse
rather than close and destroy. The COE has seen the advent of Fourth Generation
war, where the state loses its monopoly on war, with non-state actors (such as Al-
Qaeda) the primary opposition.6 The fourth generation also includes hybrid and
asymmetric warfare methods, with actors adopting a wide range of tactics including
acts of conventional, irregular, terrorist or criminal nature.7 Two hundred years ago,
Clausewitz described war as an act of violence to enforce ones’ will upon the enemy;
“a continuation of state policy by other means.”8 Furthermore, Clausewitz identified
the ‘Trinity model’ comprising three aspects of war; the people, a commander and
his military, and the government. Whilst this model held true for the first three
generations of war, fourth generation warfare retains only one part of the trinity;
people. The military and government are often absent from conflict.9

The COE is also characterised by a complex system of state and non-state actors.
The interaction between actors is shaped by various drivers, such as culture, religion

4
Rebecca Dunning, Heroes or Mercenaries? Blackwater, Private Security Companies, and the U.S. Military,
Case Studies in Ethics (The Kenan Institue for Ethics, 2007). p3-4
5
Ibid. p3-4
6
William S Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, Military Review 84, no. 5 (2004): 12–16.p13
7
Ibid. p13
8
Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War, Vol. 1 (1832)’, ed. James John Graham, Online Library of Liberty: On War, Vol.
1, accessed 23 October 2015, http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2050.
9
Colin M. Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2
(2009): 213–41, doi:10.1080/01402390902743175. p218

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and ethnicity and often underpinned by economical motives.10 Whilst state actors
generally conform to conventions which govern the rules of war, non-state actors are
not so restricted, as seen by the Al-Qaeda (a non-state actor) October 2000 attack
on the USS Cole whist the ship was refuelling in the Port of Aden, Yemen.11 With
the operational area having extended from the traditional battlefield to everywhere, 12
urban areas can quickly become combat zones, with civilians deliberately targeted
by an adversary, as was the case with the September 2001 attack on the U.S. by Al-
Qaeda. Furthermore, some argue that economic motives contribute to the
prevention of conflict between states due to the effects that globalisation has had on
economic interdependence.13 Others counter that as non-state actors such as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are financed through the selling of oil from
territories it controls, that their involvement disrupts the economic interdependence
between states, inevitably resulting in military intervention.14

The rapid changes over the last century suggest that predicting further changes with
any level of fidelity will be difficult at best, and more likely, impossible. In 2002, the
possibility of a hacker working for President Putin using a laptop to single handedly
bring down the strategic information infrastructure of a large power was described by
Lind as “wildly exaggerated.”15 In 2003, however, this scenario was played out
almost to the letter when Edward Snowden copied - and subsequently leaked -
hundreds of thousands of U.S. (and other nations) intelligence files whilst working for
the U.S. National Security Agency.16 This point is not raised to question the integrity
of Lind’s forecasting - his article on understanding fourth generation war accurately
predicted how the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of the U.S. military from

10
Johan Hansson, ‘The Use of Military Means in the Contemporary World Challenges to the Military Profession’
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2012). p8
11
‘USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts’, CNN.com, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-
bombing-fast-facts/.
12
Hansson, ‘The Use of Military Means in the Contemporary World Challenges to the Military Profession.’ p8
13
Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future.’ p214
14
Erika Solomon, ‘The Isis Economy: Meet the New Boss’, The Financial Times, 2015,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2c6b5ca-9427-11e4-82c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3q0KrhAI8.
15
Martin Van Creveld, ‘The Transformation of War Revisited’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 13, no. 2 (2002): 3–15,
doi:10.1080/09592310208559177. p10
16
‘Interview Transcript: Former Head of the NSA and Commander of the US Cyber Command, General Keith
Alexander’, Australian Financial Review, 2014, http://www.afr.com/technology/web/security/interview-
transcriptformer-head-of-the-nsa-and-commander-of-the-us-cyber-command-general-keith-alexander-20140507-
itzhw.

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Iraq in 2011 would result in a rise of non-state actor control in the region17 - but to
demonstrate how the rapidly changing nature of the COE requires states to limit their
strategic outlooks to relatively short periods of time. The UK Ministry of Defence for
example, acknowledges that there is little use in looking beyond 30 due to the
continual change in the nature of conflict.18

With the variables influencing the COE subject to rapid change, they are often
grouped into four areas as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, or VUCA.19
In identifying the future trends in leader development, Petrie describes volatile as
rapid and large scale change, uncertain as the lack of precision in predicting the
future, complex as challenges complicated by many factors with few single causes of
solutions and ambiguous as minimal clarity on what events mean and the effects
they may have.20 In a military context, the U.S. Joint Forces Command emphasised
in 2010 that over the next 25 years, U.S. military forces will continue to be engaged
in some dynamic combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and
reconstruction.21 Military Operations in Afghanistan, for example, present a large
number of challenges. Its geolocation reduces options for carrier-based aircraft
operations and the climate and terrain within which soldiers routinely operate vary
from hot, urban environments to cold mountainous ones.22 Adding to the complexity
of the environments that commanders will work in is the increase of joint,
multinational and indigenous collaboration and the overwhelming amount of
information from myriad sources.23

Although militaries are historically suited to operating unilaterally, the presence and
variety of civilians in the COE is increasing. Civilians now work alongside military
forces to provide various services across a spectrum of operations. Examples
include the contribution made by multinational forces into the investigation of
17
Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War.’
18
‘Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding’ (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2010). p1-3
19
Scott Berinato, ‘A Framework for Understanding VUCA’, Harvard Business Review, 2014,
https://hbr.org/2014/09/a-framework-for-understanding-vuca.
20
Nick Petrie, ‘Future Trends in Leadership Development’, Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), 2011, 1–36. p7
21
‘The Joint Operating Environment’ (Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010). p4
22
Ott, ‘Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces.’
p28
23
Henry A. Leonard et al., ‘Something Old, Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic
Environment’ (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006). p 1

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Malaysian Airline MH17 which was shot down in the Eastern Ukraine,24 and by the
number of Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) working alongside
uniformed military personnel in Iraq. PMSCs provide an increasing range of
functions traditionally considered to be solely in the domain of the military, including
“the protection of diplomatic, military, business, and humanitarian personnel in
conflict zones, the provision of detention services; military training;
counterinsurgency; intelligence operations; and training of indigenous security
forces.”25 The ratio of PMSCs to military personnel in Iraq shifted from 1:60 in 1991
to 1:3 in 2003.26 By 2015 the ratio was approximately equal to the number of troops
and in the near future it can be expected that PMSCs will actually outnumber military
personnel in Iraq.27 With the military in a foreseeable position of being outnumbered
- and perhaps even outgunned - by civilians in the COE, commanders will be
required to utilise skills to build relationships across the diverse groups they will
invariably interact with.

Military commanders in the COE can be expected to plan, coordinate and execute
operations with any combination of joint, interagency and multinational facets. The
diversity a commander may face in the COE will require the reduction of cultural
barriers which inhibit productive relationships. This diversity is evident in three
trends - an increase in joint and multinational teams, growing presence of non-
government organisations in and an increased awareness of the influence of
indigenous people and organisations the operations areas. The multinational facet
of contemporary operations is evident in the combined New Zealand (NZ) and
Australia defence force members providing training to the Iraqi Security Force in a
range of military skills to aid in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 28
Furthermore, in 2014 a NZ officer commanded Combined Task Force (CTF) 151; a

24
Peter Hartcher and James Massola, ‘MH17: Five-Nation “Coalition of the Grieving” Set to Supply Forces to
Secure Crash Site’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2014,
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/mh17-fivenation-coalition-of-the-grieving-set-to-supply-
forces-to-secure-crash-site-20140724-3cj24.html.
25
Dunning, Heroes or Mercenaries? Blackwater, Private Security Companies, and the U.S. Military. p6
26
Ibid. p6
27
Warren Strobel and Phil Stewart, ‘As US Troops Return To Iraq, The Need For PMCs Vastly Increases’, OAF
Nation, 2015, http://www.oafnation.com/news-1/2015/8/28/as-us-troops-return-to-iraq-the-need-for-pmcs-vastly-
increases.
28
‘NZDF - Kiwi Contingent Settling into Taji Task’, NZDF Media Release, accessed 24 October 2015,
http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/2015/201050522-kcsitt.htm.

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multinational force dedicated to the disruption of piracy off the Horn of Africa and
Gulf of Aden. A typical 3 month command period may see a combined team
comprised of several contributing states directing an even greater variety of naval
and air assets in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and European
Union task groups, as well as ‘independent deployers’ such as The Republic of
Korea, China and Russia undertaking their own counter-piracy operations.29
Moreover, the CTF 151 commander is expected to “engage with regional and other
partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities.”30 One operation during
the NZ period of command saw five countries - normally separated by ethnicity,
language, culture and religion - collaborate to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome.
A Dutch planner, led by a NZ commander, planned and executed an operation
where a Turkish ship, supported by a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft worked with
the Yemeni Coast Guard to enhance the understanding of maritime patterns of life
within the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait with the aim to reduce piracy false alarm rates. 31 As
the period of command for CTF 151 lasts only around three months, the Commander
needs to be well prepared before assuming the role. The experience required to
develop and execute such a plan can’t be attained quickly. Preparation for this type
of senior command in must be undertaken years in advance, through exposure to
the nuances of combined operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level.

In outlining his theory on how to run an effective team in the US Navy, Cole writes
that it can be “daunting and intimidating task.”32 In acknowledging the complexity of
the COE within which a commander may be deployed to, anticipation of leading a
team through an operation that that many may not have previously experienced, with
wildly different levels of foundation knowledge at the start of the operation may lead
to apprehension. If not anticipated beforehand, this apprehension may eventually
lead to the poor execution of an operation. When it is anticipated, it allows the
command to contemplate how to influence his or her team.
29
‘New Zealand Passes Command of CTF-151 to Thailand’, accessed 21 October 2015,
http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2014/11/25/new-zealand-passes-command-of-ctf-151-to-thailand/.
30
‘CTF 151: Counter-Piracy’, Combined Maritime Forces, 2014, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-
counter-piracy/.
31
‘International Counter-Piracy Efforts Boosted by CTF-151 Focused Operation’, Combined Maritime Forces,
2014, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2014/10/30/international-counter-piracy-efforts-boosted-by-ctf-151-
focused-operation/.
32
J. Michael Cole, ‘How to Run an Effective Operational Planning Team’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 140,
no. 1 (2014).

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Commanders need to understand the various power types that they will have at their
disposal. Raven identifies five different types of power: legitimate power, coercive
power, reward power, expert power and referent power.33 Initially, a commander will
have a limited amount of legitimate power in that team members should feel obliged
to follow direction due to the commander’s appointment by a superior command. In
the absence of knowledge of the other types of power commanders may, revert to a
reliance on legitimate power, to the detriment of the team environment. As coercion
and reward powers rely on an ability to punish or to favour, a commander in a
multinational or interagency environment is likely to have insufficient power to utilise
incentives. Referent power, though powerful, is based on trust and as such it will
take a period of time to build. The majority of power a commander will exercise will
be expert power, generated through repeated exposure to the nuances of command,
either real or simulated during military exercises. Due to the variances within the
COE, a commander may be expected to exercise any or all of the types of power at
a given time. Tannenbaum and Schmidt propose that there is no single style of
leadership that characterises an effective leader but the one that succeeds is the one
that is able to judge the situation and then apply a style which fits it. 34

In order for a commander to be comfortable to make such a deviation from doctrine,

he or she needs to be encouraged to make decisions in ‘safe to fail’ environments
such as a training exercises. In the first generation of warfare, German officers
routinely received problems during 19th-century wargames where their initiative as
commanders was deemed to be more important than obedience and problems could
only be solved through the disobedience of orders and through intuitive decision
making.35 Within the context of the COE, commanders need to understand when to
trust their own intuition over applying the rational processes and conformity to
doctrine practised used by most modern militaries.36

33
Bertram H. Raven, ‘The Bases of Power and the Power/interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’, Analyses
of Social Issues and Public Policy 8, no. 1 (2008): 1–22, doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2008.00159.x. p1
34
Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, ‘How to Choose a Leadership Pattern’, Harvard Business
Review 36, no. 2 (1958): 95–101, doi:10.1225/73311.
35
Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War.’ p13
36
Examples of rational planning processes are the British ‘Estimate’ Process, the US Marine Corp Planning
Process and the Canadian Operational Planning Process.

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In rational decision making processes, outcomes are achieved through detailed

analysis during several planning phases. More recently, militaries such as the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) have recognised that their joint military appreciation
process (JMAP) shouldn’t be entirely rational. Although the JMAP has a series of
sequential steps, with each step building on outcomes from the previous - when
contrasted against the new component of the JMAP referred to as ‘operational art’
the process appears significantly less rational. Operational art is defined by the ADF
as “the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the
design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and operations.”37
Furthermore, skill is the “the ability to do something that comes from training,
experience, or practice”38 which is more aligned to a recognition-primed model39 than
a rational one.

Recognition-primed decision making requires a level of intuition based on experience

(skill) and pattern recognition, the primary benefit being the ability of a commander to
select and develop a single best course of action for a given task based on intuition
and to do so without full cognizant reasoning, thereby reducing the planning
timeframe.40 Recognition-primed decision making was developed by Klein,
Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco in 1989, and has subsequently been used by to
further develop the planning process of the United States Marine Corps.41 It has
been suggested by some academics that processes such as the JMAP (where
multiple courses of action are developed) serve only to waste time, as the first
course of action developed by an experienced person, is usually the best one.42 This
theory is supported by research, which shows that recognition-primed planning can
be completed faster and result in the development of better plans.43 Critics of
intuitive decision making identify that as intuition is based on pattern recognition, that
the human brain is geared to give more weight to information that confirms

37
‘Joint Military Appreciation Process: ADFP 5.0.1’ (Australian Defence Publishing Servics, 2015). p1-4
38
‘Skill’, Merriam-Webster, accessed 12 September 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skill.
39
Karol G Ross et al., ‘The Recognition-Primed Decision Model’, Military Review -, no. July-August (2004),
doi:10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597751.
40
Fred C Lunenburg, ‘The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your Gut Feelings to Make Better Managerial
Decisions’, International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration 13, no. 1 (2010): 3.
41
Ross et al., ‘The Recognition-Primed Decision Model.’ p3
42
Ibid. p6
43
Ibid. p8

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assumptions or prejudices while dismissing information that calls them into

question.44 Klein’s view counters this as he states that recognition-primed decision
making includes analysis as well as intuition. He concedes that to rely solely on
pattern matching would be unwise, but offers that the a mixture of the rational and
recognition primed decision making processes offer the best solution if the
applicability of each is understood by the commander.45 Decisions invariably rely on
information, and complicating the process in the contemporary context is the
abundance of information pushed into the process. Moreover, when the time taken
for military planning can be literally the difference between success and failure, or life
and death, it is important that commanders are encouraged to use intuition over
following rigid processes.

In conclusion, the last 100 years has seen a significant evolution of the operational
environment. Whilst the first generation maintained its relevance for over 250 years,
the last 100 years has seen war progress to the fourth generation, with change itself
the only constant amongst the increasing variables. Whilst it is difficult to forecast
what changes will affect the COE, it may be assumed that there will be many in the
near to mid-term period. The volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature of
threats makes it difficult to predict the operational environment with any certainty
beyond the near to mid-term. A broader spectrum of friendly partners and a gradual
transition from the traditional model of interstate warfare to one focused on conflict
with non-state actors will presents increasingly complex challenges to military
commanders.

It has been demonstrated that militaries need to commence preparation of their

officers well in advance of assuming command. The development of cultural literacy
can be achieved only through education about, and exposure to, other cultures at the
tactical, operational and strategic levels. As militaries face new, unpredictable
methods of warfare, and commanders are increasingly ceding means of control in
conflict situations to civilians such as PMSCs, they need to be equipped with skills to
adapt to, and build relationships with, the various groups they will interact with. A

44
Eric Bonabeau, ‘Don’t Trust Your Gut’, Harvard Business Review, no. May (2003). p118
45
Ross et al., ‘The Recognition-Primed Decision Model.’ p8

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key component to a commander’s success will be the ability to make decisions under
constraints of time and space. With military decision making often required to be
rapid, military personnel should be encouraged to develop recognition-primed
decision making skills in order to enable faster decision making. To achieve this,
militaries must expose their future commanders to opportunities to make decisions in
controlled environments where they can safely make mistakes.

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‘A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century.’ US Army Training and
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Berinato, Scott. ‘A Framework for Understanding VUCA.’ Harvard Business Review,
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Bonabeau, Eric. ‘Don’t Trust Your Gut.’ Harvard Business Review, no. May (2003).
Clausewitz, Carl von. ‘On War, Vol. 1 (1832).’ Edited by James John Graham. Online
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Insurgencies 13, no. 2 (2002): 3–15. doi:10.1080/09592310208559177.
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Dunning, Rebecca. Heroes or Mercenaries? Blackwater, Private Security
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to the Military Profession.’ Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2012.
Hartcher, Peter, and James Massola. ‘MH17: Five-Nation “Coalition of the Grieving”
Set to Supply Forces to Secure Crash Site’. The Sydney Morning Herald, 2014.
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/mh17-fivenation-coalition-
of-the-grieving-set-to-supply-forces-to-secure-crash-site-20140724-3cj24.html.
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20140507-itzhw.

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‘Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding.’ Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence,

2010.
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Lind, William S. ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War.’ Military Review 84, no. 5
(2004): 12–16.
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Better Managerial Decisions.’ International Journal of Management, Business,
and Administration 13, no. 1 (2010): 1–5.
‘New Zealand Passes Command of CTF-151 to Thailand.’ Accessed 21 October
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command-of-ctf-151-to-thailand/.
‘NZDF - Kiwi Contingent Settling into Taji Task.’ NZDF Media Release. Accessed 24
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kcsitt.htm.
Ott, Paul A. ‘Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment:
Transforming Special Forces.’ Fort Leavenworth: School Of Advanced Military
Studies, 2002.
Petrie, Nick. ‘Future Trends in Leadership Development.’ Center for Creative
Leadership (CCL), 2011, 1–36.
Raven, Bertram H. ‘The Bases of Power and the Power/interaction Model of
Interpersonal Influence.’ Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 8, no. 1
(2008): 1–22. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2008.00159.x.
Ross, Karol G, Gary A Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F Schmitt, and Holly C Baxter.
‘The Recognition-Primed Decision Model.’ Military Review -, no. July-August
(2004). doi:10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597751.
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webster.com/dictionary/skill.
Solomon, Erika. ‘The Isis Economy: Meet the New Boss.’ The Financial Times, 2015.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2c6b5ca-9427-11e4-82c7-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3q0KrhAI8.
Strobel, Warren, and Phil Stewart. ‘As US Troops Return To Iraq, The Need For

12
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PMCs Vastly Increases.’ OAF Nation, 2015. http://www.oafnation.com/news-

1/2015/8/28/as-us-troops-return-to-iraq-the-need-for-pmcs-vastly-increases.
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Pattern.’ Harvard Business Review 36, no. 2 (1958): 95–101.
doi:10.1225/73311.
‘The Joint Operating Environment.’ Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010.
Twain, Mark. ‘Life on the Mississippi.’ The Literature Network. Accessed 22 October
2015. http://www.online-literature.com/twain/life_mississippi/9/.
‘USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts.’ CNN.com, 2015.
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/.

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