Question

Critically analyse how New Zealand mitigates against the effects of Black Swan
disasters whilst protecting itself against risks to its security posed by normal
disasters

Student: LTCDR Duncan Mackenzie, RNZN

ID Number: 02240785
Paper Details: 149.821: Applied Security Planning Exercise Essay One
Teacher's Name: Oiroa Kaihau
Due Date: 27 July 2015
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Duncan Mackenzie
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“The Titanic, name and thing, will stand for a monument and warning to human
presumption.”
- The Bishop of Winchester, Southampton: April 21 1912

Introduction
In 2007 Nassim Taleb popularised the ‘Black Swan’ term, christening it as an outlier event
that carries an extreme impact and makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence
afterwards.1 The underlying concept, however, is not a new one. In defending the US
Government’s ‘knowledge’ of Iraqi-controlled weapons of mass destruction in 2002,
Secretary of State Rumsfeld offered three pieces to solving the search puzzle; ‘known-
knowns, known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns,’ cautioning sceptics that it would be
wrong to assume that the absence of evidence was evidence of absence.2

As defined, Black Swan disasters (unknown-unknowns) are beyond the notions of even
the most abstract planner’s mind. Furthermore, as the disaster events themselves are
discounted, the effects of such events will go unconsidered. Moreover, Black Swan
disasters are subjective in their definition; disasters that present as Black Swan to
individual nation states such as the US and New Zealand, may be different. As such, the
scale of impact required for an event to be considered by a state as a Black Swan disaster
would also be different. For example, the 2010-2011 earthquakes in Christchurch killed
185 people3, with economic loss estimated at US$30 billion.4 Natural disasters in the US
in 2011 killed 1096 people,5 with economic loss estimated at US$67 billion.6 On the face
of it, the human and economic costs for the US are far higher. However, when respective
GDPs (New Zealand US$166 billion and US US$15.5 trillion7) and populations (New
Zealand 4.1million and US 311million8) are taken into account, the Christchurch
earthquakes directly transposed onto a US scale equates to around 14,000 deaths at a
cost of around US$2.275 trillion - about ten times worse than the US’ most costly natural
1
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007). pxvii
2
United States Department of Defense, ‘Defense.gov Transcript: Secretary Rumsfeld Press Conference at NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium’, 2002, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3490.
3
Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Christchurch Earthquake Kills 185’, 2015,
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/page/christchurch-earthquake-kills-185.
4
Chris Brown, ‘Country Profile : New Zealand’, Lloyd’s, 2014, http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the market/tools and
resources/new market intelligence/country profiles/asia pacific/nz_mi_2014_05_15_country profile.pdf.
5
National Weather Service, ‘Summary of Natural Hazard Statistics for 2009 in the United States’, Statistics, 2010,
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats/sum11.pdf. p1
6
National Centers for Environmental Information, ‘Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats’,
accessed 27 July 2015, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats.
7
The World Bank, ‘GDP (current US$) | Data | Table’, accessed 27 July 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
8
The World Bank, ‘Total Population (in Number of People)| Data | Table’, accessed 27 July 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.
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disaster, Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in 1325 deaths and economic loss of $250
Billion.9

Aim
The aim of this essay is to critically analyse how New Zealand mitigates against the effects
of Black Swan disasters whilst protecting itself against risks to its security posed by
normal10 disasters. This will be by examining how the threats from disasters in New
Zealand are mitigated through risk analysis, education, preparedness and response, and
insurance. It will be demonstrated that New Zealand faces many challenges posed by
disasters and that the provision of several layers of protection against normal disasters
New Zealand employs a reasonably effective mitigation strategy against Black Swans.

Black Swans, Security and Mitigation

As individual Black Swan disasters are outliers (and are not defined) they can’t be
accounted for in planning. Conversely, conventional risks to New Zealand’s security are
well defined and updated.11 As a result, there is no ability to achieve a measurable balance
between risks from Black Swan disasters and risks from normal disasters. However, a
certain level of risk reduction, or mitigation, against Black Swan disasters is achievable
through everyday protection against risks to security posed by normal disasters. New
Zealand is vulnerable to disasters; a 2012 report by insurance underwriter Lloyd’s
identified NZ as the third most vulnerable country to natural disasters behind only
Bangladesh and Chile,12 Therefore, everyday protection against risks to security posed by
normal disasters will go a way towards mitigating the risks of Black Swan disasters.

The New Zealand Government defines the concept of national security as “the condition
which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from
fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life.” 13 Of the
seven objectives underpinning this concept, five directly correlate to a requirement of
resiliency in the context of any disaster: protecting lines of communication, sustaining
economic prosperity, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, ensuring
9
‘Tropical Storm Gustav and Hurricane Katrina’s 3rd Anniversary’, University of North Texas News, 2008,
http://news.unt.edu/news-releases/unt-experts-can-discuss-tropical-storm-gustav-and-hurricane-katrinas-3rd-
anniversary.
10
In the context of this essay, a ‘normal’ disaster is one that is accounted for during disaster planning processes.
11
The New Zealand Government: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘New Zealand’s National Security
System’, 2011. p 9
12
Cebr, Lloyd’s Global Underinsurance Report (London, 2012). p7
13
The New Zealand Government: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘New Zealand’s National Security
System.’ p3
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public safety, and protecting the natural environment.14 A constant strive to adhere to
these objectives will better enable the government to “prepare and plan for, absorb,
recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events.”15 This is resilience. To be
resilient, a state must continually prepare for adversity, and in order to do so, a mitigation
process needs to be identified to cover the actions required to be undertaken by
responsible governments.

Mitigation measures are important to the long-term reduction of disaster losses. 16 As New
Zealand is vulnerable to disasters, a robust mitigation strategy can reduce the requirement
of having to rebuild again and again with each recurrence of a similar disaster such as an
earthquake.17 In order to be a truly effective measure, the costs of any mitigation strategy
need to be weighed against risk to national security. Risk is the result of a threat that
exploits a vulnerability to take, damage or destroy assets.18 Therefore, although a threat
(actual or conceptual) may exist, if there is no vulnerability then there is no risk. Along the
same lines, if there is vulnerability but no threat, there is also no risk. One internationally
recognised measure to reduce risks is the ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (‘ALARP’)
tool. Essentially, ALARP weighs risk against the measures required to further reduce it. 19
In an extreme example, if it would cost $2 million to ensure public safety by implementing
measures to prevent three citizens from getting bruised knees, that risk may be accepted
without further measures, on the other hand, if it would cost $20 million to prevent the risk
of a major explosion killing 200 people, then further measures are likely to be
implemented.

Risk Analysis
The first step for mitigation is for scientific assessments of threats across the spectrum of
possibilities. Once threats have been evaluated, they can be prioritised according to the
likelihood of the threat in contrast to its possible risk to identified vulnerabilities. Once the
threat assessment is complete, the next step is to address the threats through elimination,
substitution and control measures.20 Although many disasters themselves can’t be
14
Ibid.p3
15
National Research Council, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperitive (Washington D.C.: The National Academies
Press, 2012).
16
Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning’, 1996.
17
Ibid. p96
18
Threat Analysis Group, ‘Threat, Vulnerability, Risk – Commonly Mixed up Terms’, 2015,
http://www.threatanalysis.com/2010/05/03/threat-vulnerability-risk-commonly-mixed-up-terms/.
19
Health and Safety Executive, ‘Risk Management: ALARP at a Glance’, accessed 27 July 2015,
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm.
20
‘Hazard Control : OSH Answers’, Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, accessed 18 July 2015,
http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/hsprograms/hazard_control.html.
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eliminated (prevented) or substituted (one threat swapped for another), measures to
mitigate (control) the risk generated by the threat can be focussed on. Mitigation controls
may include lasting, ideally permanent, reduction of exposure to, probability of, or potential
loss from disasters.21 Once implemented, controls such as zoning, building code
requirements and processes reducing exposure to the threat, legislation, policy and
procedures (training, maintenance etc.) and surveillance will reduce risks and improve
responses,22 subject to the disaster they are designed towards.

In assessing threats relevant to their locality, regional authorities (such as district or city
councils) should act to further mitigate any identified risks to security posed by disasters, 23
and where they fail to do so should be held accountable by the government. An example
of a failure to protect was the Christchurch City Council (CCC) in the lead up to the 2010-
2011 earthquakes. Despite an awareness of certain areas being prone to risks from
disasters, the CCC “continued to issue permits for subdivision in liquefaction-prone areas
such as Bexley and for building new houses close to cliffs or on hillsides prone to rock
falls.”24 The CCC’s failure to address risk reports the undermined its ability to provide the
security condition outlined in the government’s national security strategy. Furthermore,
although it could be argued that the council consents complied with the government’s
national security strategy in that it ensured developers could go about their business free
from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life (pre-
2010), by issuing permits it not only failed to protect the future economic prosperity, public
safety and the natural environment, encouraging residential development actually
increased risk in those areas.

Education
Education is critical to building resilience. In NZ, the Ministry of Civil Defence and
Emergency Management’s (Civil Defence) vision is a “resilient New Zealand -
Communities understanding and managing their hazards.”25 Key to this an increased
understanding of disaster threats. As people are ultimately affected by disasters,

21
Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning.’
22
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘The Johns Hopkins and International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Public Health Guide for Emergencies’, 2007. p35
23
Insurance Council of New Zealand, ‘Protecting New Zealand from Natural Hazards’ (Wellington: Insurance Council of
New Zealand, 2014). p 15
24
Simon Nathan, ‘Living in the Shaky Isles: The Human Response to Earthquakes since 1840’, Professional Historians’
Association of New Zealand/Aotearoa, 2011, http://www.phanza.org.nz/content/living-shaky-isles-human-response-
earthquakes-1840.
25
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, ‘About the Ministry’, accessed 19 July 2015,
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/about/about-the-ministry/.
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education is important for people to gain an awareness of the spectrum of threats that they
face on a daily basis. Education on disaster threats is required at all levels; in schools, in
the workplace and at home.

Despite NZ’s vulnerability to natural disasters, that vulnerability does not necessarily
translate to New Zealanders understanding the risk inherent in living here. A 2013 report
identified that those living in regions that are deemed to have a lower risk of earthquakes
than other regions are likely to think that they are not at risk at all as they think that an
earthquake will strike the higher risk region first.26 The same report highlighted that prior to
the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, civic agencies and media regularly told Wellingtonians
that their city was likely to experience an earthquake, but this was not the case for citizens
of Christchurch27 despite several large earthquakes in the preceding 140 years.28 The
experience of the earthquake however, changed the threat perception of earthquakes.
Before the earthquakes, significantly more Wellington citizens reported as being prepared
than people in other cities, whereas after the earthquakes significantly more Christchurch
citizens reported as being prepared.29

Preparedness and Response

Identifying response options further mitigate the risks from disasters. In order to do so,
responses need to be adequately resourced with the availability of time, personnel and
budgetary allocations hedged against assessed warning times. The New Zealand
Defence Force (NZDF) for example, maintains varying levels of its military capability based
on the contexts the NZDF has been assessed as likely to operate within. To carry out
certain military operations (e.g. counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa) requires a higher,
operational level of capability (OLOC).30 It would be expensive (and largely unnecessary)
for the NZDF to maintain the high-end capabilities for its personnel and equipment. As
such, a lower, directed level of capability (DLOC) is maintained, from which OLOC can be
achieved within a time agreed between the NZ Government and the NZDF.31 Although the
understanding works at this level, it is acknowledged that when additional actors such as
26
John Mcclure, David Johnston, and Liv Henrich, Changes in Preparedness and Earthquake Risk Perception: Lessons
from the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury Earthquakes (Wellington, 2013). p5
27
Ibid. p24
28
Environment Canterbury Regional Council: Department of Environmental Quality and Hazards, ‘Historic Earthquakes’,
accessed 23 July 2015, http://ecan.govt.nz/advice/emergencies-and-hazard/earthquakes/pages/historic-
earthquakes.aspx.
29
Mcclure, Johnston, and Henrich, Changes in Preparedness and Earthquake Risk Perception: Lessons from the 2010
and 2011 Canterbury Earthquakes. p26
30
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, ‘Statement of Intent of the New Zealand Defence Force for the Period 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010’ (Wellington: Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, 2010).
31
Ibid. p64-65
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other government agencies, non-government organisations and local councils - to name
but a few - are involved, the relationships become more complex.

New Zealand needs to be prepared to face disaster threats that have not been fully
mitigated. As the complexity and scale of a disaster may evolve so quickly that it cannot be
effectively managed, government-led preparations may ameliorate the negative impacts.
Strong governance is required to encourage
preparedness. This can be achieved through
legislation and dedicated government agencies
overseeing co-ordinated strategies directed at
reducing the impact of disasters before they
happen. At the national level, government should
“assign staff for emergency management duties
and designate or procure facilities, equipment, and
other resources for carrying out assigned duties.”32
Below this, regional and local government bodies,
along with private sector, non-government
organisations, as well as all forms of media, all
Figure 1: Civil Defence approved Locker at NZDF CSC
have roles to play. Even simple (though not
inexpensive) measures such as the placing of emergency, New Zealand Civil Defence
approved 100-person emergency survival cabinets provided throughout all disaster-prone
NZDF establishments (see figure 1)33 contribute towards mitigation efforts.

The aim of any response to any disaster should be to “provide immediate assistance to
maintain life, improve health and support the morale of the affected population.” 34
Assistance may include the provision of aid, such as logistic assistance (water, food,
transport and shelter) or the initial repairs to damaged infrastructure. During this stage, it
can be expected that humanitarian and other non-government organisations will have a
strong presence. In the event of a disaster, people will expect their leaders, either elected
or appointed, to be able to act to deal with the resultant problems. The government should
be able to marshal resources, coordinate efforts of voluntary and private organisations in
the community and seek external assistance if required In preparing for emergency

32
Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning.’ p18
33
Author’s own photo taken at the New Zealand Command and Staff College, Upper Hutt City, taken 18 July 2015
34
Corina Warfield, ‘The Disaster Management Cycle’, Global Development Reseach Center, accessed 22 July 2015,
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/disasters/1-dm_cycle.html.
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operations in the US, its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identifies
planning requirements to ensure the assignment of responsibility, delegation of authority,
identification of organisational relationships, a description of how people and property will
be protected, the identification of resources to be used during response and recovery
operations and ways to mitigate concerns during response activities.35 In other words,
FEMA has identified the requirement of an emergency management plan to be dealt with
by ‘all agencies’ This approach can defined as one that involves all agencies - both
government and non-government - in the management of emergencies, including the
protection of own and collective interest from risks.36

In developing frameworks to manage security challenges posed by disasters, it must be

acknowledged that the best plans will not always anticipate specific disasters.
Furthermore, frameworks within the plans may not offer the perfect solutions to overcome
them. For example, on 5 October 2011, the 236 metre, 37,000 tonne MV Rena grounded
on Astrolabe Reef (Otaiiti), resulting in New Zealand’s most significant maritime disaster to
date. The disaster represented a significant risk to national security: lines of
communication were severed with the temporary closure of the Port of Tauranga; 37 public
safety, the natural environment and our values of maintaining a ‘clean-green’ image were
all placed at risk by the 1,041 tonnes of waste (including oil) and 2,410 dead birds
deposited on the beaches38 and an estimated $47million economic cost was borne by the
government.39

The New Zealand Government’s agency responsible for the response to maritime
disasters, Maritime New Zealand (MNZ),40 failed to adequately prepare. An independent
report released in 2013 cited shortcomings “inherent in the gap between MNS’s planned
capability and the scale of the incident.”41 Overall, it was considered that the lack of inter-
agency preparedness that would be achieved through training was evident.42 This finding
came as no surprise to this author, who deployed for a three week period as the NZDF

35
Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning.’ p15
36
Australian Government: Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Emergency Management Approaches’, accessed 21 July
2015, http://www.em.gov.au/emergencymanagement/pages/emergencymanagementapproaches.aspx#AHA.
37
Simon Murdoch, Independent Review of Maritime New Zealand’s Response to the MV Rena Incident on 5 October
2011, 2013. p63
38
Ministry for the Envinroment, ‘Rena Recovery: Maritime NZ Rena Update - Rena by Numbers One Year on’, accessed
22 July 2015, http://www.renarecovery.org.nz/latest-news/maritime-nz-rena-update-rena-by-numbers-one-year-on.aspx.
39
Murdoch, Independent Review of Maritime New Zealand’s Response to the MV Rena Incident on 5 October 2011. p69
40
Maritime New Zealand, ‘About Maritime New Zealand’, accessed 21 July 2015, http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/About-
us/About-Maritime-New-Zealand.asp.
41
Murdoch, Independent Review of Maritime New Zealand’s Response to the MV Rena Incident on 5 October 2011. p92
42
Ibid. p56
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maritime component lead planner at the Incident Control Centre (ICC) in Tauranga. With
the scale of this disaster almost unprecedented in New Zealand, the ICC grew from a team
of 20 on day three to over 300 at the end of the second week, with representatives from
MNZ, the NZDF, Department of Conservation (DOC), various politicians (Ministers and
opposition members), salvors, media and local iwi (to name just a few) all contributing to
efforts towards protecting the natural environment but having different, sometimes
competing priorities. For example, the NZDF was primarily involved in human security
operations, DOC in the preservation
environmental security, the salvors in
maximising commercial gain (economic
security), the media to inform the public,
and protesters making full use of their civil
liberties (see Figure 2).43 Through the
maintenance of a DLOC as mentioned
earlier, the NZDF fared much better in the
report, with its preparedness described as
“vital as the response was sustained over a number of months.”44 Its everyday
maintenance of DLOC provided very good mitigation against the MV Rena Black Swan
disaster.

Insurance
Complementary to (or in lieu of) other mitigation measures is the opportunity to insure
against risks to security. Insurance is the provision of a guarantee of financial protection
against specified contingencies, such as death, loss, or damage, in return for payment of
regular premiums,45 with insurance policies held at various levels, from personal to
national (government). As all aspects of New Zealand’s security are vulnerable to
disasters, insurance is commonly held, with over three-quarters of households having
home contents insurance.46 House insurance is usually required as a pre-condition to
securing a mortgage47 and associated with both of these insurances is a government-
guaranteed insurance coverage against loss or damage resulting from earthquakes,

43
Author’s own photo taken at the MV Rena Incident Control Center, October 2011
44
Ibid. p 96
45
‘Definition of “insurance”’, Collins English Dictionary, accessed 27 July 2015,
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/insurance?showCookiePolicy=true.
46
Statistics New Zealand, How Prepared Are New Zealanders for a Natural Disaster ? Results from the 2010 General
Social Survey (Wellington, 2012). p 7
47
Commission for Financial Capability, ‘Insurance Types’, 2015,
Figure https://www.sorted.org.nz/a-z-guides/insurance-types.
2: Protestors at the MV Rena ICC, October 2011
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48
natural landslips, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity and tsunamis. At the national
level, the ALARP model is evident. According to a 2012 report by the Auditor-General, the
largest 200 entitles across central government had assets recorded at about NZ$113
billion.49 Of this value, only around half had insurance cover at an annual cost of about
$180 million. However, most of the uninsured assets were held by the New Zealand
Transport Agency, the Department of Conservation and the New Zealand Defence Force,
and in each case the primary reason they were not insured was due to the cost of
insurance exceeding the risk.50 The measures taken by New Zealand to protect itself
against disasters is evident in the 2010-2011 earthquakes. Insurance losses represented
67 percent of the total economic loss. In contrast, the insured losses in the 2010 Chilean
earthquake represented only 28 percent of total economic loss, and the 2011 Japanese
earthquakes an even lower, 17 percent.51

Conclusion
New Zealand faces several challenges in mitigating against the effects of a Black Swan
disaster. The inherent inability to identify or predict these outlier disasters is compounded
by the fact that New Zealand is more vulnerable to disasters than most other states and
with a reasonably small population and GDP is susceptible to high economic effects of
such events. In order to reduce risk, New Zealand has adopted measures to mitigate
against a Black Swan disaster through its approach to protection against normal ones.

From a risk-analysis perspective, New Zealand utilises systematic approaches towards

identifying and reducing risk. As systems are only as good as the people that operate
them, there are isolated instances at local level, such as the CCC’s failure to protect its
citizens against a known risk. From an education of the population is provided at national
level by Civil Defence, which markets a strategy of resilience through management of
hazards. Although the level of understanding of disaster-related threats has (historically)
been low, the recent earthquakes in New Zealand have resulted in a renewed public
interest. From a preparedness and response perspective there are particularly strong
organisations such as the NZDF who spend the bulk of their time exercising in adversity.
Other organisations with a disaster-response mandate, such as MNZ will suffer less
struggle in responding to Black Swan disasters if they exercise with other disaster-

48
Earthquake Commission, ‘EQC Insurance’, 2015, http://www.eqc.govt.nz/what-we-do/eqc-insurance.
49
Office of the Auditor-General, ‘Insuring Public Assets’, 2013. p27
50
Ibid. p28
51
‘Comparing Claims from Catastrophic Earthquakes’ (London, 2014). p2
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response partners on a more regular basis. From an insurance perspective, New Zealand
has robust procedures to deal with normal disasters. The recent Christchurch
earthquakes proved a high level of insurance against earthquake as a mitigation strategy
strongly underpins the other measures.

To date, New Zealand has been largely successful in mitigating against the risks of Black
Swan disasters. However, this is all with the benefit of retrospective analysis. As Taleb’s
mused “the inability to predict outliers implies the inability to predict the course of history.” 52
Without the certainty of what Black Swans exist in New Zealand’s future, the only real
mitigation strategy may just be ‘hope’.

52
Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. pxx
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