G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005. * (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO
ORBECIDO III, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree.—This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy.
The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
115
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 115
Republic vs. Orbecido III
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.—We are
unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.—We state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for
Declaratory Relief.—The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Br. 23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
1
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure
question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to
remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is
no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before
the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
2
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.
The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing
the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must
dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what
was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time
the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but
later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the
following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even
for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-
marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
3
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court
of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen
in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy
of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition
for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and
in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of
the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
4
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
April 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
1 2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15
October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed
a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by
virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial
hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper
of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order
dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation
and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court
granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
5
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract
xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her
divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese
former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and
the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in
order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of
marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation
of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use
her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave
for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were offered
and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General
in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit.
In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together
with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."
6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V.
Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling that the meaning of the law should
7
be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who
filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was
Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. where the mariage between a foreigner
8
an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this
petition.
6
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In
9 divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the
11 12
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by
an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Shortly thereafter ,
16
E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. Aside from amending
17
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to
Article 26. This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code
18
Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a
Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. As modified,
19
Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the where country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
20
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
21
tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
22
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the
idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still
being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad
that is recognized by his or national law. The aim was that it would
24
solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil
Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the
latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a
case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained
a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court
of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted,
by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
7
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the
divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation
of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not
appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign
28 29
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for
the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a
US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it
was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing
that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu
not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that
the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction x x x.
30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a
complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his
Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be
a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same.
Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that
she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-
husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction .
In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the
effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in
the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
8
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the
Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al. and Medina v. Koike.
32 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in
marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she
1âwphi1
filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article
26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity
to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and
9
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and
ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al. and Garcia v.
35
Recio, the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must
36
be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not
stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as
both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's
personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute
divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese
law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the
Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on
a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. The legislature is
37
presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure." 38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated
by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as
39
not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held
40
in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.: 41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner
in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and
lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or
her countr. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
42
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien
spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and
unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed
10
if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have
the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if
they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review. The deference stops where the classification violates a
44
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by
the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
45
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require
a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. If a
46
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that
it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution. It includes the right to free speech,
48
political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote. On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
49
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest
50
of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. It
51
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the
force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this
case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of
53 54
the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse
is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a
Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well
as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse .
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no
longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would
not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37
and 38 of the Family Code. In filing for divorce based on these grounds,
56
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever
law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of
her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the
dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our
courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
11
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating State. Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
64

divorce proceedings against their alien spouses. divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response
to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
The supposition is speculative and unfounded. 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. Their
65

exchange reveal as follows:

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever
was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas
the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on be recognized.
evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted
and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
wrong, that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, that
57 59
recognized.
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law and fact, that a man and woman deporting
60
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
marriage, and that the law has been obeyed. It is whimsical to easily
61 62
Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the
just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of
genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention.
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage,
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the
the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding
to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien Officer.
national. In one case, it was said:
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have FR. BERNAS. Thank you. 66

children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,

marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. On 67

marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
a marriage. 63 Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines
and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce
Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for
12
absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of
for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or respondent;
gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to
make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
insanity. When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
68

Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
2710 again prevailed. From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
69
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce
obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another
recognized. 70

person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when
upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a
of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of child after being a victim of rape;
fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116 1062 2380 and 6027 were filed in the House of representatives.
71 72 73 74

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a

In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting
Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee
on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19,
2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:
common child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath
two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an
absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, 1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family
modified or amended, as follows: Code restated as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-
one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
change religious or political affiliation;
age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband and wife;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;

13
 c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or appears
to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection
found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the
time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36
of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery
or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in
the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and
repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce,
viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has
looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.
76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they
are good for country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has
77
civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It 78
is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should
not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other
constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
79
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To
80
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We
limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the
women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354
("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as
a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. 81
14
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than
good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign
divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him
or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code,
any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime
shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any
child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to
hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that
the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time.
With the advancement of communication and information technology, as
well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly
connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become
not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are
made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for
83
some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and
self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and,
at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. In reiterating that the Filipino
84
spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis quoted:
85
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues
to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case
brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A87
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
15
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be
89
proven. Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
90
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The
decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject
Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. 93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court. As it
94
appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity
of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved.
x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law
on divorce.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000. *
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO, LTD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES, INC,
respondents.
International Law; Evidence; Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them.—It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
16
 Same; Same; A distinction must be made as to the manner of proving a
written and an unwritten law.—A distinction is to be made as to the manner
of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is
quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is “unwritten,”
the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Same; Same; Section 25 (now Section 24) interpreted to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a
written foreign law.—The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24)
to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law.
Same; Same; Requisites for a copy of a foreign public document to be
admissible.—For a copy of a foreign public document to” be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer
having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere
technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; When a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.—With
respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written
law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a
foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by
a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
Same; Same; Under the rules of private international law, a foreign
law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact x x x otherwise it will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law.—We reiterate
that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof,
the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our
own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; There being no contractual
obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence
required of a good father of a family.—Petitioner alleges that there was
negligence on the part of the private respondent that would warrant the award
of damages. There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is
obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in
accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; The diligence of a good father of a family requires
only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with
regard to his own property.—The diligence of a good father of a family
requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise
with regard to his own property. This we have found private respondent to
have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the “main engine,
machineries, and other auxiliaries” were checked and found to be in good
running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on
watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the
Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel’s double
bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
apply.—The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar
because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate
negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to
apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused
215
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 6, 2000 215
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario for petitioner.
17
 Arthur D. Lim Law Office for private respondent. Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom
tanks.15

DECISION
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
BUENA, J.: River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
16

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of
CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff- Puerto Ordaz on that day.
appellant, versus Philippine President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President
Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs,
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in
and expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the
Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. 17
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle
Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
1

February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.

2 3 "1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective
pleadings;
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon,
was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third "2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine
mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left Roxas at the time of the incident;
the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge
4 5

when the vessel was under way. 6

"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance
underwriter for defendant PPL;
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the
San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with
7
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the
the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the vessel Malandrinon, whose passage was obstructed by the
shallowness of the channel. 8
vessel Philippine Roxas at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified
in par. 4, page 2 of the complaint;
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations. These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that the watch officer
9 10
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was
called the master to the bridge. 11
navigating the channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel grounded
and as a result, obstructed navigation at the channel;
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that
12

it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down,
13
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory
the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis,
14
pilotage channel;

18
 "7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas,
was under the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned
by the government thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the
command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is
related to the present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a
vessel owned by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes
approximately 12 hours to navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after
the Philippine Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by
the Steamship Mutual Underwriters Ltd." 18
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the
petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S.
$259,243.43, as actual and compensatory damages, and U.S.
$162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus
additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's
local lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED." 19
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest
with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the
case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came
out with its questioned decision dated June 14, 1994, the dispositive
20
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious,
judgment is hereby rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the amount of Three Hundred Twenty-three
Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (₱323,042.53) as
and for attorney's fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is
DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED." 21
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for
22
lack of merit in the resolution dated March 29, 1995. 23
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MASTER NOR
THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE
GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE
BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL
COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN DISREGARDING VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION FROM
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS
INTERPOSED BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
19
 5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS
WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS
MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD BE ENTITLED
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is
applicable to the case at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 24
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder.
Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral
testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. 25
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence
of a written foreign law.
26
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal, it was 27
held that:
"… Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
since the year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the
California Civil Code and stated that said section was in force at the time
the obligations of defendant to the plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on
November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently
established the fact that the section in question was the law of the State
of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of
our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact …You ask the witness what the law
is; he may, from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books,
say what it is.' (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief
Justice Denman in a well-known English case where a witness was
called upon to prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to
testify, though he referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council
of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume 4,
pages 3148-3152.) x x x."
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela, to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la
28
Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento Para la
29
Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the
Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for
eight years. As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for
30
maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of
the documents that come into the office of the harbour masters. 31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in
the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of
32
20
the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of
the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in
a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only 33
a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers of Venezuela. 34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having
legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a
35
mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit
to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. 36
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section
24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain
Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal
custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and
authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the
public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the
case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not
pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue. 38
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
39
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption. 40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the
errors assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to
give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance
with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
"If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required."
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence
which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own
37
property. This we have found private respondent to have exercised when
the vessel sailed only after the "main engine, machineries, and other
auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in good running
condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch
41
on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco
21
River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double
bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew. 42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities
of a master of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these
persons are quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall
be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property
at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he
has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize the
damage.
"The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command
of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a
vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence
of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said
Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light
of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
"x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots’ Association. --
The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
"x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the
time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or
berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at
the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of
a captain of a vessel, to wit:
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of
captain:
"x x x
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering
and leaving ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot
on board discharging his duties. x x x."
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of
the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of
the ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by
law despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the
43
vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is
being navigated by a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and
anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting
from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
"xxx."
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the
engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every
shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot
Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the
Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, and that he had been a pilot for
44
twelve (12) years. He also had experience in navigating the waters of the
45
Orinoco River. 46
22
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the
order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the
vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were
47
navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the
48
pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very familiar
with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that
he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco
River.49
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the
master chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited
knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge
and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in
a different class from ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill
and a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters over which their
licenses extend superior to that of the master; pilots are bound to use due
diligence and reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in
proportion to the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a knowledge and
observance of the usual rules of navigation, acquaintance with the waters
piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known
obstructions. The character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot
in charge of a vessel on the rivers of a country is very different from that
which enables a navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the
ocean, a knowledge of the rules of navigation, with charts that disclose
the places of hidden rocks, dangerous shores, or other dangers of the
way, are the main elements of a pilot's knowledge and skill. But the pilot
of a river vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the individual's
personal knowledge of the topography through which the vessel is
steered." 50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When
the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going
on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the
channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of
the channel." 51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel
Philippine Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his
knowledge of the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been
aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to
determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set
course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold
him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
"x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury
done by the negligence of the crew employed in the ship. The same
doctrine will apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master or owner,
by whose negligence any injury happens to a third person or his property:
as, for example, by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his
negligence. And it will make no difference in the case that the pilot, if any
is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master is at
liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master
acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily required to select from a
particular class. On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master
to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty,
then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will be liable for
injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a case
the pilot cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master or the
owner, but is forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit
per se does not apply." (Underscoring supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none, the 52
voyage has been sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the
following actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to
wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF for information regarding the
channel, river traffic, soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on
53
the buoys. The officer on watch also monitored the voyage.
54 55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the
cause for the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar
because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate
negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to
apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
23
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and record states, the vessel was class or maintained, and she is fit to travel
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or during that voyage."
contribution on the part of the person injured.56

"x x x
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control
over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory "ATTY. MISA
pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to
apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the
absent. 'class +100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?

As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not. "WITNESS

The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping confirmed the vessel’s seaworthiness in "A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules
a Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the and she is capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly
above named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1 capable of carrying Ore Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC)
and +LMC" from 31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about
"x x x
12/2/88." The same would not have been issued had not the vessel been
57

built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.

"COURT
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified
thus: The vessel is classed, meaning?

"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any "A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy." 58

bearing at all to the seaworthiness of the vessel?

It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class must be reasonably fit to perform the services, and to encounter the
record of the vessel, wherein recommendations were made on the top ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy. 59

side tank, and it was given sufficient time to be repaired, it means that the
vessel is fit to travel even with those defects on the ship. As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the
deposition of pilot Vasquez:
"COURT
"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even complied with because of the inability of the vessel to do so?
with defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"A No.
"WITNESS
"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the
third party looking into the condition of the vessel and as far as their "A. The vessel was navigating normally." 60

24
Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an
accident report wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked
and prepared the main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and
found them all to be in good running condition and ready for
maneuvering. That same day the main engine, bridge and engine
telegraph and steering gear motor were also tested. Engineer Mata also
61
prepared the fuel for consumption for maneuvering and checked the
engine generators. 62
Finally, we find the award of attorney’s fee justified.
1âwphi1
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
"x x x
"(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
"x x x"
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was
unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of attorney’s fees was
proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
36821 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.*
MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law;
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
70
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.—A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen,
25
over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment
was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
71
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 71
Fujiki vs. Marinay
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”—Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the
Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.72
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.”—Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest
in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628
SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse
of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
26
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.73
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 73
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband
or the wife of a subsisting marriage.—Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition
for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws.—To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding
civil registry is located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry. However, this does not
74
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage;
Foreign Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse” under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign
Judgments; The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
27
 75
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 75
Fujiki vs. Marinay
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy; If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the
Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated —
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—Under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines
to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine
courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.—Philippine courts
will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact
that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code.—The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Br. 107.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
77
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 77
Fujiki vs. Marinay
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
28
 This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” based on improper venue and the
lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.3
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3 See Rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18
August 2010. Translated by
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
_______________
Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see Rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.
5 Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
79
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 79
Fujiki vs. Marinay
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from
its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.—
(a) Who may file.—A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue.—The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case
of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
29
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
“gross violation” of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that “[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may
be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.” 8 Apparently, the
RTC took the view
_______________
7 The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN
from the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to
refund to the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the
Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which “seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact,”9 and
_______________
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.—(1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against
forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
9 Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See Rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration).
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
not a civil action which is “for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”10 In other words, the petition
in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the
rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that “a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.” To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki,
“[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage.”14 Fujiki had
_______________
10 Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11 Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
12 Rollo, p. 56.
13 Family Code, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
30
 14 Rollo, p. 68.
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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is
the “procedural implementation” of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the “successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to
the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.”17Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries
in the civil registry relating to “marriages,” “judgments of annulments
of marriage” and “judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning” are subject to cancellation
_______________
15 Enacted 26 November 1930.
16 Civil Code, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
17 Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage.—All civil officers and priests
or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage
contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in
the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the
names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and relationship of the
minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent to the
marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of
the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court,
and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.
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VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 83
Fujiki vs. Marinay
or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that
the trial court “gravely erred” when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the “trial court cannot preempt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case.”20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the
trial court should not have “immediately dismissed” the petition under
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds
for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered
Fujiki as
_______________
18 Rules of Court, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
19 273 Phil. 1; 195 SCRA 641 (1991).
20 Id., at p. 7; p. 646. See Rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21 Rollo, p. 47.
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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
a “third person”22 in the proceeding because he “is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x.”23 On the other hand, the
31
RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said
that “[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.”24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Brazaruled that “[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x.”26 Braza emphasized that the
“validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction
of entry] x x x.”27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court
held that this is a “jurisdictional ground” to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
_______________
22 Id., at p. 46.
23 Id., at p. 48.
24 Id.
25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26 Id., at p. 641.
27 Id., at p. 643.
28 See Rollo, p. 49.
29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition.—x x x
xxxx
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
Hence, this also warranted the “immediate dismissal” of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s “pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside” and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the
_______________
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against
forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32 Rollo, p. 137. The “Conclusion and Prayer” of the “Manifestation and Motion (In
Lieu of Comment)” of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements provided in A.M.
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86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
32
 “injured spouse” who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court
_______________
No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34 Id., at p. 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp.
8-9. See Rollo, pp. 132-133.
35 Rollo, p. 133.
36 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
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VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 87
Fujiki vs. Marinay
held that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the
civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is the procedure to record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons” in the civil registry as required
by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, “[t]he law requires
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x.”38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared
that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.” 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on
_______________
37 Id., at p. 287.
38 Rollo, p. 133.
39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.
40 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).
41 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at p. 169.
42 Supra note 30.
43 See Rollo, p. 120.
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88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear
that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
33
 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that
the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declara-
_______________
44 Id.
45 See Rollo, p. 146.
46 Id.
47 Supra note 33.
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VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 89
Fujiki vs. Marinay
tion of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.”48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court
_______________
48 Supra note 33 at p. 655.
49 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order, is as follows:
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90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of
the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the
trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” 57 The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
_______________
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50 See Rules of Court, Rule 132, Secs. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
supra note 36 at p. 282.
51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52 Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54 Id., Secs. 11-15.
55 Id., Secs. 17-18.
56 Id., Secs. 19 and 22-23.
57 Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386; 455 SCRA 397, 412 (2005) citing Eugene
Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
91
34
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that “[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.”59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
“[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case
as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status,
_______________
58 Id.
59 Id., at p. 386.
60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
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92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a “presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
_______________
61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at p. 386; p. 412. “Otherwise known as the
policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous
litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of
courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and — in a larger
sense — to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of
all law: ‘rest and quietness.’ ” (Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at p. 382; pp. 407-408. “The rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.” (Citations omitted)
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
35
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages
are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
_______________
63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266,
280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723; 366 SCRA 437 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
supra.
65 Family Code, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
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94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact.”67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
_______________
66 Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register.—A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c)
marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at p. 287.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
Sec. 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
36
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported “in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family”70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
_______________
68 Family Code, Arts. 35-67.
69 Family Code, Arts. 74-148.
70 Family Code, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71 See supra note 69.
72 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law x x x.”
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
further to relational rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife”) of the Family Code. 73 A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC cannot “diminish, increase, or modify” the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse
of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife”75 ― it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Arti-
_______________
73 Family Code, Arts. 68-73.
74 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75 Emphasis supplied.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
cle 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy
is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to
confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in
the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of
_______________
76 Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty
of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
77 See III Ramon Aquino, The Revised Penal Code (1997), 518.
78 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
37
 xxxx
79 Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest.―A real party in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.” 80Being a real
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a “trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages” in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
“validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action”
to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and chil-
_______________
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81 Supra note 25.
82 Supra note 25.
83 See supra note 68.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
dren,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for decla-
_______________
84 Family Code, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide
for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The
Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in
Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 61.
85 Family Code, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which
are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.―(1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86 Family Code, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
ration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in
the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is
located.”87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
38
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.
It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign
_______________
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.―(1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties
are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if
any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
87 Rules of Court, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse”89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to
address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Phil-
_______________
88 509 Phil. 108; 472 SCRA 114 (2005).
89 Id., at p. 114; p. 121.
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102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
ippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse
“should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.”91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
39
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is
not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No.
_______________
90 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
91 Id., at p. 363; p. 144.
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VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 103
Fujiki vs. Marinay
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and
duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationaliiexpressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event
that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
_______________
92 See Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
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104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
“[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
_______________
93 See Rules of Court, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions.—In
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule III, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—x x x
40
 If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may,
upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the
civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription
of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
105
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 105
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer
sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Resort to foreign jurisprudence is proper only if no local
law or jurisprudence exists to settle the controversy. (Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Stockholders of Intercity Savings
and Loan Bank, Inc., 608 SCRA 215 [2009])
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws — the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. (Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas,
628 SCRA 266 [2010])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. *
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs.NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) in
relation to Article 58.—A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic “autonomous social
institution.” Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
“inviolable social institution,” and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
“a special contract of permanent union” and case law considers it “not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment.”
Same; Same; Same; There are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with.—There are several
instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a mar-
________________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
123
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 123
Niñal vs. Bayadog
riage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
41
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why
no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication
of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.
Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage.—Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nul-
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
lify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void.—This is the same reason
why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where
the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy
and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as “husband and wife.”—Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
125
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 125
Niñal vs. Bayadog
which case the parties and their offspring will be left: as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.—The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by
the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
42
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.—Jurisprudence under the Civil Code
states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—Other than
for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of decla-
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
ration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when
at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead;
43
 (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
father's death. 1 concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court
2 the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from
grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
3 issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4 contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
5
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
6
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
7
58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
8
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest
9
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." Specifically, the Constitution considers
10
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family
11
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
12
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
14
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the
15
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names,
that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." The only
16
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract
of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
44
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The Civil
17
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down
the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application
for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject
18
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
19
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file
a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
20
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who
can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
21
45
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
22
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
23
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be
noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void
24
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary
25
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
26
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
27
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the
28
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
29
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
1âwphi1
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001. *
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ.)
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001. *
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ.)
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
46
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE
R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
Marriage; Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife; Legal Ratification
of Marital Cohabitation; Requisites.—For this provision on legal ratification
of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The
man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other, 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment
between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties
must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry
______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
2 3
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge
ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.—Respondent
Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting
another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Legal separation does not
dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry, and
this holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto.—The fact
that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code
allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage—marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.—Neither can
respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife
for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
VOL. 354, MARCH 8, 2001 3
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge
demonstrates gross ignorance of the law when her solemnizes a void and
bigamous marriage.—Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special application to
judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who
were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of
the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
47
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were
born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when
he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know
that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without
the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to
him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea
for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment.
He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of
the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married
to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had
both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with
their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that
he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March
1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
48
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
"separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged
him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage,
as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of
the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in
the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.
It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
"ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to
judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997. *
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.—“If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
325
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 325
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.”—Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
49
the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order.—While the law
provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have
cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the
hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in
its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over
time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of
Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial
court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals its decision are as follows:
1
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
50
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will
not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can
be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he
is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on
May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
51
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings
and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What
said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial.
The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since
their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by
the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court
prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion
between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he
must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
52
 suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He
points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily
due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual
intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show
that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent;
that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological
but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she
balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that
he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that
there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection. Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
5
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to
be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go
to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim.
This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations
of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
53
 We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and
which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative
of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997. *
APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x
x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug
wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of
a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It
is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed
that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. The expert
____________________________
*
EN BANC.
54
 199
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 199
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code.—From their submissions and the Court’s own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.—The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage.—The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.”
The manifestation of the illness
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.—Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.—Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as rootcauses. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.—The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision. Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are
incapable of contracting mar-
201
55
 VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 201
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for respondent.
Oscar V. Cruz and Ricardo C. Puno amici curiae.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although
this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case,
finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of
1
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
2
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which
3
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
4
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility"
as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
56
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody
of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well
as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
5
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court
of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr.
6
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
57
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug
7
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:
8 During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of
the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living
with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist
that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for
their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more
questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there
was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar
9
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court
10
takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
58
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
11
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
12
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
13
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
59
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004. *
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL
SIAYNGCO, respondent.
Marriages; Family Code; Psychological Incapacity; Whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case.—Our
pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag is apropos. There, we held that
whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the
case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own
facts as there can be no case that is on “all fours” with another.
Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.—It was in Santos v. Court of
Appeals where we declared that “psychological incapacity” under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.—We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation
of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be
resolved in
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
423
VOL. 441, OCTOBER 27, 2004 423
Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.—
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential
marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is
the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In
60
herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: “I had [extramarital]
affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point.”
Same; Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Harry P. Jaminola for petitioner.
Dick B. Perez for respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January
2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent
Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and
respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a
baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less
about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose
before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation
from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is
permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will
involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of
the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and
loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still
living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry
his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she
supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy
childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the
witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He
testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still
harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of
their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted
as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife
started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and
61
his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became
the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their
union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to
Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981,
when he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift
apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly
embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with
an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark
that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across
the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused
his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she
confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an
affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show
her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter
quarrels.14Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to
celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it,
ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to
celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that
he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent
Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that
petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when
she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and
the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner
Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his
address book while the latter was in Subic attending a
conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer
she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone
number of respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was
requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the
locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998,
witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent
Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA
GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were
admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr.
Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain
the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a
defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both
partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their
disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory,
critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive,
Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to
satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his
felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the
detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize
the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and
sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings. The matrimonial
plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic]
incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of
marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise
specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will
bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology.
These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the
marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s
allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their
own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent
Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to
her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her
marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that
she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him
62
while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he
already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway,
respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted
by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric
evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in
his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-
Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough
psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of
marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-
sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-
oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to
be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992
described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The
couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both
were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she
would often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000,
she still saw respondent Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in
part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily
married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son.
Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and
prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical,
depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’
relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-
jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital
relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed,
due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain
lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the
dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In
contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she
sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated
04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying
mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel
and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is – a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266
SCRA 324).
63
 This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less,
but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff
Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also
of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS
THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION
UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN
BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held
that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours"
with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi
despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi
Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed
from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation
on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition
for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the
reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is
procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein.
Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his
wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet
"irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his
person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a
case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
64
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the
issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in
Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding
that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own
evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in
the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good
provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he
65
 wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not
having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now.
He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him
to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship
is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is
not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her,
"You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family."
She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my
right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential
marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any,
is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-
marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point." 52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him,
her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability
to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that
paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr.
Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on
the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the
doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically
incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root
cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the
inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences
during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted
their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted
no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints
a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the
marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming
busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a
couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his
direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have
been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived
therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to
a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January
66
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated
and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA
QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Constitutional Law; The court is mindful of
the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.—The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
—The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos:“psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.” The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or
clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Although, as a rule, there was no need for an
actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case
had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
—We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
Same; Same; Same; As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.—We must remember that abandonment
is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting
and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.—In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and
a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be
a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
PETITION FOR REVIEW on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
67
 Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001
of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void
the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano,
a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no
longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996,
respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12,
1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving
Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to
the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on
November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report
finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that
the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the
trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex
parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics
Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which read:
68
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter
a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with
the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to
"observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social
inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a
marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left
them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment
of error:
I unity of the family. x x x
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able
to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to
perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and
his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations.
Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the
ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
69
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved
Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
70
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for
and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He
made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We
disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,
the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable
social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we
commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband
may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004. *
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM,
respondents. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; Annulment; Psychological
Incapacity; There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders.—x x x “psychological incapacity”
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
“legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It must be shown that the disordered
personality completely unable respondent to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.—Respondent’s sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
71
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Dedel vs. Court of Appeals
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Counselors Circle Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while
he was working in the advertising business of his father. The
acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the
exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September
28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20,
1 Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
1967. 2 infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on
September 18, 1968; Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
3
1969; Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971; and Ingrid born on October
4 5
20, 1976. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither
6
property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs
with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by
Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite
the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two
illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,
Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special
occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed
on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article
36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star
Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering
that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. 7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from
for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to
live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. 8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
72
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the
parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of
property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights
previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 9 behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
appealed alleging that –
I x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial
court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. 10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
January 8, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.
11
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion
and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations;
(2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity,
juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of
evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological
incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual
"psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled:
12
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions,
73
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists,
psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable. 13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy
analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can
hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
14
respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital
union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
15
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
16
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
17
in Marcos v. Marcos that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
18
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds
for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent.
The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court
of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of
1âwphi1
petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,
like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem. While we sympathize with
19
petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the
law no matter how harsh it may be. 20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995. *
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Circular 28–91; Circular 28–91 requires a
certification of non-forum shopping.—The petition should be denied not only
because of its non-compliance with Circular 28–91, which requires a
certification of non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Void able Marriages;Psychological
Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b)
juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.—Justice Sempio-Diy cites with
approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
74
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage.—It should be obvious, looking at all the
foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma’s “Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,” quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s “Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases”). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
_______________
*
EN BANC.
21
VOL. 240, JANUARY 4, 1995 21
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
in our law on marriages. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity”
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be “legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.—The other forms of psychoses, if
existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Voidable Marriages;Psychological
Incapacity; Private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e.
that of living and cohabiting with her husband.—To my mind, it;is clear that
private respondent has been
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one
essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent
Same; Same; Same; Same; A spouse’s obligation to live and cohabit
with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage.—
A spouse’s obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a
spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons; husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains.
Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
75
absent spouse to at least have regular contacts with the other to inform the
latter of his/ her condition and whereabouts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband.—In the
present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining
contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of
living and cohabiting with him.
ROMERO, J., Concurring:
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Voidable Marriages;Psychological
Incapacity; Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the
absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity.—Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family
Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another
ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a
marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion
of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that
every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the
23
VOL, 240, JANUARY 4, 1995 23
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by “experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, maybe given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.”—
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, “the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” Moreover, the judge, in
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
“experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 is a recognition of the reality
that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.—
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment -of the ideal
which we all cherish, If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall
short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an
end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alexander G. Amor for petitioner.
Saleto J. Erames for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo and the Court of Appeal, Leouel persists in
1 2
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
76
 herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work
as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get
in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that
it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.
3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance
with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but
also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife
who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight
on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
77
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say
"wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of
judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make
the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy
remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make
the marriage null and void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting
in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity?
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it
is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph
(7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in
the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the
Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are
no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is
not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase
"even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations
of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" —
78
in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one
does not know all the consequences of the marriages,
and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages
since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that
he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a
loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case
of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties,
which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the
very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other,
because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but
there should be no prescription. In other words, as long
as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment
so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might
have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has
been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested
that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in
the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there
is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at
the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
79
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity
to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence
that in some instances the impotence is only temporary
and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy
stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still
void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it
is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted
with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista
proposed that the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted
since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out
that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and
physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent
while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in
the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent.
He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack
of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there
was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the
reason why they classified it as a special case.
80
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there
having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically
annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote,
which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were
for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
9
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid,
at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, giving an account on
10
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
81
 The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave
any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable
to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon
297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon
1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted
to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this
defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to
render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from
giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota,
Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but
that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
11
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
82
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is
that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus
of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we
still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
83
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000. * of the marriage or that they are incurable.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS,
respondent.
Actions; Marriage; Husband and Wife; Declaration of
Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; Guidelines
Governing the Application and Interpretation of Psychological Incapacity;
The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition,
for indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.—In Republic v. CA and Molina, the
guidelines govern-
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
756
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
ing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by
this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The guidelines incorporate the three
basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or
clinicallyidentified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There could be no conclusion of
psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable.—Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.—Article 36 of the Family
Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage, it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles
68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Neither is Article
36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.—Neither is Article 36 to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
757
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 757
Marcos vs. Marcos
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jimeno, Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for petitioner.
Macaraig Law Office for private respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
84
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There
is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision of the Court of
1 in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in
Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in
accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children,
their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H.
Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983
which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain,
at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park,
Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B.
Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under
the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them
sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at
the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702
Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she
acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still
single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in
1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not
however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so
that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family
and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would
hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite
her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a
slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling"
and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make
deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she
was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
85
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994,
when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately,
she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when
she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him.
He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she
and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing
child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
[beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find
work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and
their children, x x x."
3 In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated
in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of
the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code
and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about
the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that
the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as
would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged
in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence
at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
6
following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside
the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
86
 incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests
that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity
to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed
aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken
those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that
under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources
of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application
8
and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36
of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows:
9
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
87
 other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity
11
must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain
a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he
had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than
six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds
12
for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
88
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this
Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167459. January 26, 2011.*
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, petitioner, vs. BONA J. ALANO
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity;
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
—In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it
_______________
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura, per raffle dated January 24, 2011.
* FIRST DIVISION.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code does
not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place.—It is also established in jurisprudence that from
these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does
not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction—already then existing—was
so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume
or had assumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves.—We have stressed time and again that
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar T. Zaldivar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1dated October 11,
2004 as well as the Resolution2 dated March 10,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 28-39; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with
Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 41.
519
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 519
Ochosa vs.Alano
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 11, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-
2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted
petitioner Jose Reynaldo Ochosa’s (Jose) petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano
(Bona).
89
 The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
“It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year
college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual
intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl
whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste
Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with
him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did
Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when
Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of
the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given
living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their
military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in
the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had
illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 42-46.
520
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their
living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita,
a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of
Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose
could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden
and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is
currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to
nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served
upon Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the
reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the parties.
Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both parties
but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether
or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two
military aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita,
testified about respondent’s marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
who testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion
that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she
described as follows:
“Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention
seeking behavior. So therefore they don’t develop
521
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 521
Ochosa vs.Alano
sympathy in feelings and they have difficulty in maintaining
emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has been a military
man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the
Philippines. And while he is being transferred from one place to
another because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona
Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only
few occasions in which she followed him. And during those times that
they were not living together, because of the assignments of Mr.
Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with other man of which she
denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she
admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondent’s
driver. I believe with this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking
attention and seeking emotions from other person and not from the
husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in
a marriage.”
90
 According to Rondain, respondent’s psychological disorder was traceable
to her family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a
mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since
respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused
to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimonies, petitioner formally
offered his evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the
petition on the ground that “the factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).”
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and nullified the parties’ marriage on the following findings,
viz.:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
‘A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.’ 522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of
incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the
psychological incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY,
ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average
couple existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The
gravity was manifested in respondent’s infidelity as testified to by the
petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced
back to respondent’s history as testified to by the expert witness when
she said that respondent’s bad experience during her childhood
resulted in her difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her
continuous illicit relations with several men before and during the
marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality
disorder have no insight of their condition, they will not submit to
treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondent’s psychological
incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will
remain incurable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
4
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated
January 11, 1999 read:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DECLARING the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA
J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground
of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family
Code as amended with all the effects and consequences provided for by all
applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local
Civil Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 28-33.
523
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 523
Ochosa vs.Alano
said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati
City for its information and guidance.” 5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling
to the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSG’s contention that
the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Jose’s abject failure
to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the
dispositive portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated
11 January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.” 6
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated
March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
91
 The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be
deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed
in the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
_______________
5 Id., at p. 46.
6 Id., at p. 39.
524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 8 the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
“(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the deci-
_______________
7 310 Phil. 21, 39; 240 SCRA 20, 33 (1995).
8 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
525
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 525
Ochosa vs.Alano
sion. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
92
outburst” cannot be accepted as rootcauses. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
527
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 527
Ochosa vs.Alano
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.” (Citations
9
omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
“medically orclinically identified.” What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements
arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction—already then existing
—was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she was to assume or had assumed.11
A little over a decade since the promulgation of
the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same
in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:
“In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the
world.” The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 676-680; p. 213.
10 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 760 (2000).
11 Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389.
12 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
93
528 Ochosa vs.Alano
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the
Ochosa vs.Alano evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose.
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose.
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’s thesis that the
fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
totality of Bona’s acts constituted psychological incapacity as
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has credible evidence that her “defects” were already present at the
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged
individuals.”
13 psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an “juridical antecedence.”
abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply With regard to Bona’s sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to
declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to Jose, we have only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the court to support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years
Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each —
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I
have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to- men.
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and Q: With other men. And, of course this—her life with other men of course before
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church the marriage you have already known—
A: Yes, your honor.
tribunals.14 Q: So, that this gossips—because you said that you thought that this affair would go
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the to end after your marriage?
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so that’s why you can’t bear it
Rondain’s testimony15 and her psychiatric evaluation report16 as well as anymore?
the individual testimonies of Jose17 and his military aides—Mrs. A: Yes, ma’am.20
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal18 and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19 _______________
_______________
20 TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 8.
13 Id., at pp. 224-225. 530
14 Id., at p. 228. 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
15 TSN, September 14, 1998.
16 Records, pp. 70-74. Ochosa vs.Alano
17 TSN, March 3, 1998. Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not
18 TSN, July 1, 1998. provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-
19 TSN, August 21, 1998.
529
sided assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrist’s
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 529 conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that
existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition
94
purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause,
infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue
to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in since the trial court judge had found them to be credible enough after
determining psychological incapacity. personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we
The psychiatrist’s findings on Bona’s personality profile did not cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
emanate from a personal interview with the subject herself as admitted Bona’s pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence
by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows: in this case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact,
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how Bona’s dysfunctional family portrait which brought about her
about the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, ma’am. Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based
Q: Did you try to take her for such? solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has
A: Yes, ma’am. the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, ma’am.21 incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bona’s family history or
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs.
interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their
record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit: employment in petitioner’s household during the marriage. It is
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview? undisputed
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma’am. _______________
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who
testified in this court? 22 Id., at pp. 6-17.
A: Yes, ma’am. 532
xxxx
_______________ 532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
21 TSN, September 14, 1998, p. 8.
Ochosa vs.Alano
531 that Jose and Bona were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 531 Corporal Bajet started to live with petitioner’s family only in 1980 and
Ochosa vs.Alano 1986, respectively.
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent
the parties?
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a
other witnesses, ma’am. personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
xxxx incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances
report? given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the
other witnesses, your Honor.22
determination though of a party’s complete personality profile,
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the
indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the
witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it
avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
95
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case
because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the
information.23 quarters have different rooms?
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make _______________

conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition 25 TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 9-10.
based on the information fed by only one side, similar to what we have 534

pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Court’s mind, not different 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the Ochosa vs.Alano
content of such evidence.24 A: Yes, ma’am.
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Q: But very near each other?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Bona did not wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial A: Yes, ma’am.
records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit: Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that
you have a chance to be with the spouses?
_______________
xxxx
A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.
23 Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154. xxxx
24 Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your
157, 181. husband?
533 A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 533 Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?
A: Yes. Ma’am.
Ochosa vs.Alano Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?
JOSE OCHOSA’S TESTIMONY: A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: How long did you stay with your wife? Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
were only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
time I’m in the field. A: Yes, ma’am, G-3.
Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not—your wife Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
come with you in any of your assignments? A: Fort Bonifacio, ma’am.
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then— Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you? A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan. _______________
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan. 26 TSN, July 1, 1998, pp. 7-10.
535
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is
not very far— VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 535
A: No, ma’am, once in a while only.
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
Ochosa vs.Alano
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN’S TESTIMONY:
days every other month. Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were A: Yes, ma’am.
supposed to have been living together? Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in
A: No, actually in 19—middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25 different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
GERTRUDES PADERNAL’S TESTIMONY: A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife? Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in
A: 1979. different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason
why she did not like to go those places?

96
 A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because… by transferring
from one place to another, she just don’t want to go, she just wanted to stay in
Basilan where her hometown is, ma’am.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don’t want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with
him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far
away different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this
war regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they
were in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in
Manila, ma’am.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, ma’am. She did not follow immediately. She stayed
with him only for four (4) months, ma’am.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as
husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, ma’am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few
months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they
536
were together the husband was giving an attention to her. The
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ochosa vs.Alano
husband was always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention
was not there anymore, ma’am.27
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary
to Jose’s assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the
record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by
reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those
locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to
Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that
Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during
the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment,
can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.28
_______________
27 TSN, September 14, 1998, pp. 13-15.
28 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 10 at p. 857.
537
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 537
Ochosa vs.Alano
While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the
truly appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound
by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castilloand Perez,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established. (Suazo vs. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 [2010])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 218630. January 11, 2018.*
97
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.KATRINA S.
TOBORA-TIONGLICO,** respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage;
Psychological Incapacity; Time and again, it has been held that
“psychological incapacity” has been intended by law to be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—
Time and again, it has been held that “psychological incapacity” has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), has set out the
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration
of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases.—The
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198
(1997), has set out the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of
practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity cases that We have decided: (1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
* * Referred to as Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico in the RTC and CA Decisions and
other pleadings.
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
x x x (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. x x x (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. x x x (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x (7) Interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Their frequent fights, his
insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a
psychological illness.—Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity
and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Allegations; Basic is the rule that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.—Although We commiserate
with Katrina’s predicament, We are hard-pressed to affirm the
109
VOL. 851, JANUARY 11, 2018 109
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
98
 RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support
the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina’s marriage is
void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to
prove Lawrence’s alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that
bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart
from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate
her allegations on Lawrence’s psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Francis A. Africa for respondent.
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated
May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision 2 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article
36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Law-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate
Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Mario V. Lopez. Rollo, pp. 25-36.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando L. Felicen; id., at pp. 31-34.
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110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
rence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of
mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship.
When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were
very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as
he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents
would take the situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22,
2000.4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by
bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were
fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the time
and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence’s parents
until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on
December 30, 2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing
their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a
family.7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties
and drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly
dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of
immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with
him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a
maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 32 and 44.
4 Id., at p. 26.
5 Id., at p. 37.
6 Id., at p. 42.
7 Id., at p. 26.
8 Id., at p. 37.
9 Id., at p. 46.
10 Id., at p. 47.
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Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of
Katrina’s decisions — from the manner by which she took care of
Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up
99
in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when
Katrina remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then
committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to
stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to
leave his parents’ home and to never come back. They have been
separated in fact since then.12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr.
Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed
Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized
by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that
he is unique in some way.13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; 14 and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible
behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity,
respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina
and Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
_______________
11 Id., at p. 38.
12 Id., at p. 48.
13 Id., at p. 52.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 53.
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112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as
to avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wife of
respondent. Custody over the couple’s minor child is awarded to
petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent,
preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among
themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General,
the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus,
Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, so that the
appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the parties’ marriage
can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and
counsel.
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in
Civil Case No. 4903-11 dated 8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED. 17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has
been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based
solely on the information coming from either party in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It
is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 33-34.
17 Id., at p. 29.
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Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding
circumstances of each and every case for the nullity is different from
the other and must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out
100
that the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-
accepted scientific and reliable tests 18 to come up with his findings. In
any case, the decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have been
sufficient in proving Lawrence’s psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence
presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the
CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his
essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage
with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in
the negative.
Time and again, it has been held that “psychological incapacity”
has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e.,
_______________
18 Psychiatric and psychological interviews, Rhodes Sentence Completion Test,
Draw a Person Test, Zung Anxiety and Depression Scale, Examination of Mental Status
and Mental Processes, Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale, Social Case History, and Survey
of Interpersonal Values, id., at pp. 54-55.
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114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 20 has set
out the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity cases that We have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
_______________
19 Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017, 816 SCRA 595.
20 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
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Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. x x x21
101
 Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently
prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on
the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 22 Here, We find
the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano’s findings that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated were based solely on Katrina’s statements. It bears to
stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the
proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite
being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and
Marilyn B. Matudan23 is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and
finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to
substantiate the petitioner-appellant’s theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings
below. The clinical psychologist’s evaluation of the respondent-
appellee’s condition was
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 676-679; pp. 209-213.
22 Mendoza v. Republic, 698 Phil. 241, 254; 685 SCRA 16, 29-30 (2012).
23 G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, 808 SCRA 480.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the
petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is
noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of
age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to
know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very
reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have
been there when the spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between her parents until long
after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas’
description of Marilyn’s nature would certainly be biased, and a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can
hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.
Angelito Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating
the expert opinion evidence — the psychologist’s testimony
and the psychological evaluation report — that Jocelyn
presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only
in an indirect manner — she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied
upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more
rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that
there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
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Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
From these perspectives, we conclude that the
psychologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed
an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the
conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
102
 In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward
Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that ‘[t]o make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.’
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical
psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-
appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report,
Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she
perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the
respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis
Ours)
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118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests
conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the
psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be
indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was
simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations apart from Katrina’s self-serving statements. To make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is,
to the Court’s mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of
Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated
husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and
frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. 25 It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the
party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina’s predicament, We are
hard-pressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality
_______________
24 Supra note 19.
25 Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1083; 596 SCRA 157, 178 (2009).
26 Id., at p. 1092; p. 188.
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VOL. 851, JANUARY 11, 2018 119
Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico
of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina’s marriage is void ab initio. No
other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove
Lawrence’s alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that
bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that
apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence’s psychological incapacity.
Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.28
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8,
2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite,
Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the
103
marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico DECISION
void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903- REYES, JR., J.:
11 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1

Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Decision dated July 10, 2013, and Resolution dated November 28,
2 3

Bersamin*** and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A person’s psychological incapacity to comply with his or
her essential obligations in marriage must be rooted on
_______________
27 Supra note 19.
28 Id.
* ** Designated additional member per Raffle dated
2017 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
2013, rendered in relation to CA-G.R. CV No. 98015. In these assailed
issuances, the CA reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (R TC)
of Pasig City, which dismissed the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier (Martin) against
respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier (Michelle) under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
November 20,
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002. 4

120 On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the Family Code. Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were
5

Republic vs. Tobora-Tionglico psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and marriage. He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
6

shown to have existed at the time of marriage. (Republic vs. and for the joint custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier. 7

Pangasinan, 800 SCRA 184 [2016])

If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his
own behalf, and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D.
8

of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the

Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin
person concerned need not be resorted to. (Id.) and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle). 9

——o0o—— In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos

diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Likewise, Dr.
10

APRIL 18, 2018 Adamos concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin
suffered from the same disorder. Their disorder was considered grave
11

G.R. No. 210518 and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further testified before
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the
vs Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER, and the respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose
Respondents Vicente ). He was unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not
12

respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological

evaluation. 13

104
 Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition for
14
failure to establish a sufficient basis for the declaration of nullity of the
respondents' marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision
reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed [Martin] to be
afflicted with a narcissistic personality disorder, which rendered him
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations of observing
love, trust and respect. [Martin's] testimony is found by the Court to be
not supportive of such finding and vice-versa. In fact, on the basis of
[Martin's] declarations, the Court came up with an impression that
[Martin] is a man gifted with a lot of patience; that he was righteous, that
he laudably performed his role as husband and father, and that in spite of
[Michelle's] alleged wrongdoings, he still exerted his best efforts to save
their marriage.
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds
[Martin's] testimony to be self-serving and Dr. Adamos' findings to be
without sufficient basis.
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court finds no sufficient
basis for granting the relief prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18,
2011. Finding the arguments in the motion unmeritorious, the RTC
16
denied the motion in its Order dated September 7, 2011:
17
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for making a finding
that either petitioner or respondent or both were afflicted with a
psychological disorder within the contemplation of existing law and
jurisprudence. Such being the case, there was no need to resort to Dr.
Adamos' findings.
Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason to set aside its
March 10, 2011 Decision.
Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his
petition to the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it is not
19
necessary for the psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated
spouse, or Michelle in this case, before the court may rule on the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. He also argued that, at the very
20
least, there was sufficient evidence to support his own diagnosis of
psychological incapacity. Martin thus claimed that the RTC committed a
21
reversible error in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing
that there was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's
psychological incapacity, the Republic asserts that there was no
independent proof to establish this claim. Furthermore, the Republic
argued that Martin supported his petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with self-serving testimonies and hearsay evidence. 22
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision dated July 10,
23
2013, the CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 07, 2011,
respectively, issued by the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 261, are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between
[Martin] and [Michelle] is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 24
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim
that he is psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated the RTC's
ruling by referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his
tendency to impose his own unrealistic standards on Michelle. In its
25
challenged decision, the CA likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was
adequately supported by the narrations of Martin and Jose Vicente. 26
105
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's
Decision dated July 10, 2013. The CA denied the motion in its
27
Resolution dated November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its
28
earlier arguments.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for
the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in relation
to Dr. Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
According to the Republic, there were no other witnesses that were
presented in court, who could have testified on Michelle's behavior. 29
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of
evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the Court
discussed in Santos v. CA, et al. as follows:
30
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 31
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that for purposes of
32
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required
that a physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person
concerned. It is enough that the totality of evidence is strong enough to
sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In such case, however,
the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of the other spouse's psychological
incapacity. 33
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina, these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for
34
declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined
on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another. 35
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of
evidence to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He
testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse,
Michelle. In particular, he stated that Michelle was confrontational even
before their marriage. He alleged that Michelle always challenged his
36
opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he insisted on because he
witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his biological
father. He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and
37
easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that
Michelle acted recklessly and without consideration of his feelings. 38
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial
court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of childhood
trauma and defective child-rearing practices. This disorder was
39
supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin, who she constantly
lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological Impression Report that
Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of
Michelle was the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente. Jose 1âwphi1
Vicente was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to
each other before their marriage. Jose Vicente was also allegedly a
41
regular confidant of Michelle.42
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for
purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling
that Dr. Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with
Martin. Even if that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are
43
not immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Because a marriage
necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who witnessed the
other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to the
psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings
that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot
absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle.
There were no other independent evidence establishing the root cause or
juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity.
106
While this Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is highly
unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of
Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not show that
Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the
other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either
Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle,
could not have known about her childhood, how she was raised, and the
dysfunctional nature of her family. Without a credible source of her
45
supposed childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough
information from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is
suffering from a chronic and persistent disorder that is grave and
incurable.
The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua judiciously discussed
46
the dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-spouse to the
psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed
to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent
set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively,
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third
party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor's probes.
xxxx
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report - i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder
declared to be grave and incurable" - is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of
the respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence. (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)
47
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected
to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos
diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Additionally, the
48
diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who
underwent several-or to be accurate, more than 10-counselling sessions
with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009. These facts were uncontroverted
49
by the Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose
self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards
ideal love and ideal marriage." Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked
50
empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle. 51
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
with tendencies toward sadism. Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests
52
administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic
experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up
around a violent father who was abusive of his mother. This adversely
53
affected Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and
standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual
practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not
only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. Other
54
manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement,
immaturity, and self-centeredness. 55
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential
characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such,
insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the
CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring the marriage of the
respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
107
As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances
obtaining in this specific case warrant the declaration that Martin is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
at the time of his marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor
abandonment of previous doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family
Code. The guidelines in Molina still apply to all petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court does not lose sight of the
constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological
incapacity of respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The
Decision dated July 10, 2013 and Resolution dated November 28, 2013
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the
extent that the marriage of the respondents on February 8, 2002 is
declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity
of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 214529. July 12, 2017.*
JERRYSUS L. TILAR, petitioner, vs. ELIZABETH A. TILAR
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.—Our Constitution
clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Thus, the State is
mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in
turn is the foundation of the nation. The State has surrounded marriage with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security
and stability of the State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of
each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
117
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017 117
Tilar vs. Tilar
about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead
to its destruction.
Same; Same; Same; As marriage is a special contract, their terms and
conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting
parties but are governed by law.—As marriage is a special contract, their
terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the
contracting parties but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for
the essential as well as formal requisites for the validity of marriage. The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for
the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained
in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties
and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage
license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where
no license is required. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into
their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Church Annulment of Marriage; The proceedings
for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law
is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each
other in the eyes of the civil law.—As petitioner correctly pointed out, the
instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties
as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is
another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in
accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the
couple is still considered married to each other
118
108
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the
church and state finds no application in this case.
Same; Same; Same; As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the
parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the
grounds for the termination of marriage.—As marriage is a lifetime
commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code
has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds
may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage
or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided
upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision and order of the
Regional Trial Court of Baybay City, Leyte, Br. 14.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gerentsein T. Banzon for petitioner.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision 1 dated June 3, 2014
and the Order2 dated August 19, 2014, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, (RTC) in Special Proceeding
(SP) No. B-10-11-39 dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Carlos O. Arguelles; Rollo, pp. 18A-22.
2 Id., at p. 31.
119
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017 119
Tilar vs. Tilar
On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition 3 for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of private
respondent’s (respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article
36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and respondent were
married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes,
Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer; that a son
was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first
few months but respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent
person which resulted to frequent quarrels and petitioner being
threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-go-lucky and
extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually
separated in 2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man
in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and
respondent was said to be suffering from “aggressive personality
disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder” which made her
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with
summons. The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and
Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of
collusion between the parties.4 Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner
and his witness testifying.
On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
5
In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 14-18.
4 Id., at p. 19.
5 Id., at p. 22.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
109
 x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly
[pass] upon the validity of church marriage in the light of the separation of
the Church and the State as enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987
Constitution. Withal, marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the
Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the
Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal
determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The
procedure is governed by the Church’s Canon Law not by the civil law
observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the
principle of separation of Church and State finds application in this case.
xxx
xxxx
Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus,
resolving the validity of the church marriage is outside the province of its
authority. Although the Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject
of the petition for nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil
that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the church
jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the State is bereft of any jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case.
As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution on the
jurisdiction of this Court, the same becomes moot due to the non-affirmance
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.6
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied in an Order dated August 19, 2014.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 20-21.
121
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017 121
Tilar vs. Tilar
Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are [per se] governed
by its Canon Law. Although the Family Code provides for some regulations,
the same does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity,
The Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written in all laws, acts and
transactions, hence, the same must be upheld.
7
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground
that:
The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the
ground that the validity of church marriage is outside of the province
of its authority.8
Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally
on the ground that the validity of church marriage is outside the
province of its authority, however, it is the civil law, particularly the
Family Code, which principally governs the marriage of the
contracting parties.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on
the petition for review arguing that the courts have jurisdiction to rule
on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family
Code, and that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
contracts of marriage and marital relations.
We find merit in this petition.
Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
_______________
7 Id., at p. 31.
8 Id., at p. 8.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested.9Thus, the State is mandated to protect marriage, being the
foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the
nation.10 The State has surrounded marriage with safeguards to
110
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of
each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing
about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately
lead to its destruction.11
Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the
constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and the
family relations. In one of the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is
stated:
Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New
Constitution that strengthen marriage and the family as a basic social
institution and ensure equality between men and women.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
_______________
9 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, 282 Phil. 348, 356; 205 SCRA 337, 344 (1992).
10 Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution, thus:
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
11 Jimenez v. Cañizares, 109 Phil. 273, 276 (1960).
123
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017
Tilar vs. Tilar
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not
merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are
governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential 12 as well
as formal13requisites for the validity of marriage. The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.14 No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which
shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage
12 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
13 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
14 Art. 4.
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except
123
in marriages where no license is required. 15The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.16
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how
marriage may be solemnized, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect
duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil
111
registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by
his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting
parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
xxxx
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office
of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with
the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The
_______________
15 Art. 9.
16 See Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569; 550 SCRA 435, 453 (2008).
125
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017 125
Tilar vs. Tilar
marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a
Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the
above quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a
sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly
pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage
contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the
Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in
the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. 17 Notably, the
proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the
norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the
principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in
this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just
dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds 18 for
the termination of marriage. These
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 9-A.
18 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
_______________
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order No. 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up
to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between stepparents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
112
 (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
127
VOL. 831, JULY 12, 2017 127
Tilar vs. Tilar
grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of
voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 provides:
_______________
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease
found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tilar vs. Tilar
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which
petitioner filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its
exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari isGRANTED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution
of the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Mendoza and Martires, JJ., concur.
Leonen,** J., On Leave.
Petition granted, Regional Trial Court of Baybay City, Leyte, Br.
14 ordered to proceed with resolution of the case.
Notes.—Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie. (Republic vs.
Romero II, 785 SCRA 164 [2016])
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons. (Republic vs. Pangasinan, 800 SCRA 184 [2016])
——o0o——
EN BANC
113
 A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2224-MTJ), April the couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees of the
03, 2018 solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the
service fee and the passport fee; and that Siega later on confirmed to the
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, couple the date, time and place of the solemnization of the marriage.
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY
OF SAMAL, Respondent. According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on
May 19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that
the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy of
DECISION the marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20,
2008, the couple returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the
BERSAMIN, J.: documents as promised by Siega; that the couple was surprised to find
erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the application for
marriage license, specifically: (a) the certificate stating "Office of the MTCC
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial
jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solmenization of the
marriage although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He
Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement in the application for
should be properly sanctioned.
marriage license that she and her husband had applied for the marriage license
in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8, 2008 although they had accomplished their
The Case
application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours; and (c)
the statement in their application for marriage license on having appeared
before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, which was
This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated
untrue.
November 4, 2009,1 whereby the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
In his comment dated February 2, 2010,4 the respondent professed no
appropriate action the complete records of the case initiated by affidavit-
knowledge of how the complainant had processed and secured the documents
complaint by complainant Rosilanda Maningo Keuppers against respondent
pertinent to her marriage; denied personally knowing her and the persons she
Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
had supposedly approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that
Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She
he had met her only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that
thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa; violation of Republic Act No.
the solemnization of the marriage had been assigned to him; asserted that the
6713; and grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
documents necessary for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and
service.2
claimed that he was entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties considering that the documents submitted by her
The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6,
had been issued by the appropriate government agencies. He contended that
20083 that on May 12, 2008, she and her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to
he should not be blamed for the erroneous entries in her certificate of marriage
the Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage
because the same had been merely copied from her marriage license and from
license because they wanted to get married before Peter's departure on May
the other documents submitted therewith, and also because he had not been
22, 2008 so that he could bring the marriage certificate with him back to
the person who had prepared the certificate; and that he had only performed
Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO, explained the process
the ministerial duty of solemnizing the marriage based on the proper
for securing the license, and apprised them that it would be virtually impossible
documents submitted to him, with the real parties involved having personally
to solemnize their marriage before May 22, 2008 because of the requirement
signed the certificate of marriage before him.
for the mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage license;
that Gasatan then handed a note with the advice for the couple to proceed to
The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage
the office of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in
of the complainant and her husband; and pointed out that he had not been
Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for a person who might be able to help
aware as the solemnizing officer if any of the documents submitted by her was
the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours, Lorna Siega, the
spurious. He recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate
owner, told the couple that the marriage processing fees charged by her office
of marriage; and that it was the same document that had been filed in the
would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in the City Hall in Davao City;
Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He declared that the marriage
that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get the original as well
certificate itself stated the place of the solemnization of the marriage; and that
as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate; that
he did not alter, modify or amend the entries therein.
Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to
leave the spaces provided for the address and other information blank; that
114
 Report & Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Upon the recommendation of the OCA,5 the Court referred the complaint to the
Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation, report and
recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice
Pamela Ann Abella Maxino for such purposes, was re-assigned to Associate
Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in view of the transfer of Associate Justice
Maxino to the Cebu Station of the Court of Appeals.
On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report
and recommendation as the Investigating Justice,6 whereby she concluded and
recommended as follows:
The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of the investigation, has
been hurled with overwhelming evidence that the marriage between
complainant and Peter Keuppers was held only in the premises of DLS Travel
and Tours Corporation, Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was
solemnized by respondent. Several witnesses for complainant affirmed the
same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said inspection, it was confirmed
that the premises shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-5"
where respondent is seen solemnizing a wedding, is the same place subject of
the ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the
actual venue of complainant's wedding.
It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed
solemnized the subject marriage outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his
testimony, respondent stated:
A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be performed since
that was the very day of the marriage as the German fiance will be leaving
soon. Because of pity, I accommodated the parties. I risked your honor
because I didn't want that the marriage be postponed as it was for the best
interest of the couple because according to Rosilanda Maningo that was the
only day, the German fiance was leaving for Germany. So, I decided to
solemnize the marriage in the office of DLS Travel and Tours.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction is
further bolstered by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage of
complainant and Peter Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and not in his
territorial jurisdiction in the Island Garden City of Samal.
Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the aforementioned act
when he said:
A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but because of my
honest intention to help the parties because they were already begging that
the solemnization be performed [sic]. I was honest with my intention and my
conscience was clear.
However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that respondent had no hand
in the preparation and processing of the documents pertaining to the subject
wedding. The witness for complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:
Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your establishment was the one
who processed the documents for Rosilanda Maningo Kuppers and Peter
Keuppers to get married, you confirm that?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?
A: Orlan.
Q: How about the marriage contract?
A: My employee.
-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-
Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?
A: Based on the marriage license.
-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-
Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving Peter Keuppers, I have
here the copy of the marriage contract, have you seen this document, if any?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed there is the office of the
MTCC Judge, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper portion in the
certificate of marriage which is Davao del Norte, Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding that
respondent had no hand in the preparation and processing of the subject
marriage, he indeed solemnized a marriage outside of his territorial
jurisdiction, subject to sanctions that the Office of the Court Administrator may
impose.
115
The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states that a marriage
can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.
Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island Garden City of
Samal, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Davao
City.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiance Peter
Keuppers was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a
sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than
his sala. What in fact appears on record that respondent took pity on the
couple and risked sanctions to attend to the urgency of solemnizing the
marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers.
In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must
also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the
law; he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges,
by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers
couple is not enough reason for respondent to risk possible sanctions that may
be imposed upon him for not observing the applicable laws under the
circumstances. It is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all
times despite the inconvenience that it may cause to others.
Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates:
-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.
It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be charged with
ignorance of the law considering that he knew the consequences of his actions
and he also cannot be seen as a judge that demonstrates a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear
from the records that he has been previously charged with any offense or that
there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.
RECOMMENDATION:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed respondent is guilty of
solemnizing a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction under
circumstances not falling under any of the exceptions as provided for in Article
8 of the Family Code. Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant
case and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent be meted a fine of P5,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future will
be dealt with severely.
Issue
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service?
Ruling of the Court
We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of
the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the
office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family
Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxxx
Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband
in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the
foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly violated
the spirit of the law. Article 8 of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the
marriage in a venue other than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect. (57a)
116

Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the
complainant after she had supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was
soon returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of
the marriage certificate did not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his
dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements
instituted to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing to
solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that
had nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge,
he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not
elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of the solemnization of the
marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed,
the limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the
complainant and her husband as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation."7 The only exceptions to the
limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of
one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in
accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,8 or where both of the
complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in
writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in
their sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct
concerning the discharge of the office of solemnizing marriages. He had been
charged on February 28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v.
Judge George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City), Judge Virgilio G. Murcia,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, et al. with having affixed his signature as
the solemnizing officer on the marriage contract without having actually
solemnized the marriage. The charge was in violation of Administrative Order
No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary). The Court declared him guilty of
gross misconduct, and fined him in the amount of P40,000.00.9 The present
offense was committed on May 19, 2008.
Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, or, more particularly, in an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer. It implies wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error
of judgment. Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct
because he had at the very least the wilful intent to violate the Family Code on
the venue of a marriage solemnized by a judge, and to flagrantly disregard the
relevant rules for such solemnization set forth in the law. The office of
solemnizing marriages should not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or as
a business activity. For sure, his act, although not criminal, constituted grave
misconduct considering that crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as
separate grounds for dismissal under the Administrative Code.10 It is relevant
to observe, moreover, that his acts of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service seriously undermined the faith
and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.
The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent Judge of
the measly fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely. The
recommendation did not take into account that the present charge was the
second offense respondent Judge committed in relation to his office of
solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was committed with a wilful
intent to violate the letter and the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family
Code, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for the solemnization of
marriages set by the Family Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the
service.
Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the
intervening retirement from the service of respondent Judge. Instead, the
Court forfeits all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO
G. MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY,
DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement benefits, except his accrued leaves,
with prejudice to his appointment in the government service.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Acting C.J.),** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo,
Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., on official leave.
G.R. Nos. 212656-57. November 23, 2016.*
MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Presumption of Innocence; The Constitution presumes a person
innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.—At the
outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense’s evidence for it has the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused — ei incumbit probatio qui
elicit, non que negat — he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
117
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.—
The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the
strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Criminal Law; In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required
to prove two (2) things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the
offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the
crime.—Worthy to mention that in every criminal conviction, the prosecution
is required to prove two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the
offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the
crime.
Same; Falsification of Public Documents; The elements of Article 171
are: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he
takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document
by committing any of the ways it is done.—It bears emphasis that what is
punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. Generally,
the elements of Article 171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee,
or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that
he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.
Same; Same; In falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has
the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.—In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that
the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in
making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has
the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.
Sandiganbayan; Factual findings; Exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of Sandiganbayan (SB) are conclusive to the Supreme Court (SC).—
We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the SB are
conclusive upon this Court. However,
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Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
there are exceptions to said rule, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record; and (6) said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
Presumption of Innocence; In order to overcome the presumption of
innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt.—In order to overcome the presumption
of innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to discharge its
heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it
becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; It is a fundamental rule in criminal
procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove.—By way of reiteration, it is a
fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a
means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of
proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2)
118
the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
accused.
Same; That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates
that it is for the prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused
to establish innocence.—That the defense the accused puts up may be weak
is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge
the onus of his identity and culpability.
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348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the prosecution to
demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed,
the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or
her shoulders.
Same; Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two (2) or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.—Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Not only that, where
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.
Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of falsification
of public documents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Napoleon Uy Galit and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Sandiganbayan (SB) in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and
SB-12-CRM-0172 dated 27 February 2014 and 23 May 2014,
respectively, finding petitioner Mayor Amado Corpuz, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 90-110; penned by Associate Justice Efren N. Dela Cruz, with Associate
Justices Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Rafael R. Lagos, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 194-201.
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VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 349
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of the above
mentioned criminal offense. The accusatory portions of the two (2)
separate Informations filed against him before the SB are as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0171
That on 28 October 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named [petitioner], a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and
taking advantage of his official position, did there and then deliberately,
willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Manny
Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan by certifying therein that it was he who
solemnized their marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who
solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar
(of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and
of public interest.
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0172
That on 18 December 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named [petitioner], a public officer, being the
119
Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and
taking advantage of his official position, did there and then deliberately,
willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Alex Pascual
and Esperanza Arizabal by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized
their marriage when in truth and in fact,
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350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
he was not the one who solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the damage and
prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.
3 observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who solemnized the same.5
As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with
the prosecution presenting five (5) witnesses, and the defense
presenting three (3) witnesses, inclusive of documentary evidence
admitted therein, in order to resolve the jointly proposed issue of “who
among the parties — the complainant on the one hand, [and] the
married couples and the sponsors who attest to the fact that it was the
accused who solemnized the said marriage is telling the truth?”
At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio Flores,
a retired government employee who testified that being one of the
wedding sponsors of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he
attended and witnessed the actual ceremony of their wedding which
was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, and
not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar’s Office where it was held;
that with the knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not
authorized to solemnize marriage, he did not sign as a witness their
marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents, including
pictures and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal acts; that
based on the documents he gathered, it was made to appear that
petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his
signature appearing on the corresponding marriage certificates; and
that he could not explain why the subject marriage certificate was
already signed by petitioner when in fact he was not around during the
ceremony, and was immediately given to them on the same day. 4 His
testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-
law of Alex Pascual, who testified that he rendered his services for free
as a photographer dur-
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 90-91.
4 Id., at pp. 94-95.
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Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
ing said wedding, and witnessed the actual ceremony, with the
As to the marriage ceremony of Manny Asuncion and Dina
Lumanlan, Jorge N. Lazaro, a freelance photographer and pilot,
testified that the latter and her mother engaged his services as a
photographer, and even requested his live-in partner, Tessie Atayde, to
stand as one of the principal sponsors; that while taking photos for the
event, he naturally witnessed the actual ceremony which was held at
the Senior Citizen Building (now called Multi-Purpose Building); and
that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, who actually solemnized said marriage.6
Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., who testified that complainant Arsenio Flores filed a case
for usurpation of official functions against him before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) in connection with the marriages of the couples,
which he allegedly solemnized; that he changed his plea of NOT
GUILTY to that of GUILTY, in order to have a peace of mind and to
reveal the truth that it was actually him who solemnized said
marriages; that it was actually him who was standing in front of both
couples as shown by the pictures presented as evidence; that after
pleading guilty, he immediately filed a Petition for Probation before
the same court; that he did not execute any affidavit of desistance to
that effect; and that his son Thelmo Corpuz III was already separated
from the government service, and that in the recent local elections, the
latter sided with the political rival of petitioner. 7 The above narration
was corroborated and attested to by witness Felicisima D. Almonte,
Clerk of Court of the MTC, with the stipulation of the
120
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 95-96.
6 Id., at pp. 92-93.
7 Id., at pp. 97-98.
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352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
parties on the authenticity and due execution of its 15 July 2013
Decision. On cross-examination, she affirmed that as part of the
records of the case, that there was a counter-affidavit attached
therewith by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but without an affidavit of
recantation against his previous counter-affidavit denying such
accusations against him; and that during the last local election, both
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded her
to vote for petitioner’s opponent.8
In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he
actually solemnized at his office the marriage of spouses Pascual and
that of spouses Asuncion; that spouses Asuncion executed a joint
affidavit of cohabitation based on Article 34 of the Family Code
making them exempted from securing a marriage license as appearing
in their marriage contract; that complainant Arsenio Flores was not
present at the mayor’s office when the wedding of spouses Pascual
took place; that in the subject weddings, all signatures appearing on
the marriage certificates were actually signed in his presence; that as a
mayor for eighteen (18) years, he knew that the power to solemnize
marriage cannot be delegated; and that he is aware that a case for
usurpation of official function was filed against Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr., but has no knowledge about his change of plea. The above
testimonies were further bolstered by no other than the parties
themselves of said marriage ceremonies. Both Alex Y. Pascual and
Manny M. Asuncion appeared and testified that petitioner was indeed
the one who solemnized their respective marriage; that their respective
marriage is valid and legal; that both ceremonies were held at the
mayor’s office; and that, as reflected in the pictures shown by the
prosecution, they appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. only to
receive marriage counseling and to be taught on how to act during the
actual ceremony, before they went to the mayor’s office for the actual
solemnization by petitioner.9
_______________
8 Id., at p. 96.
9 Id., at pp. 98-100.
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VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 353
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
From the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence,
including the stipulations between the parties, the facts, as taken and
appreciated by the SB, are presented as follows:
At the time material to the Informations, the [petitioner] was the
incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while Thelmo
O. Corpuz, Sr. was the Municipal Civil Registrar until his retirement from
the service in 2011.
As set forth on the invitation for the Asuncion-Lumanlan Nuptials, the
couple was united in matrimony on October 28, 2009 at around 9:30 in the
morning at Cuyapo Town Hall, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Jorge N. Lazaro
attended the occasion along with his live-in partner Tessie Atayde, who was
one of the principal sponsors. Lazaro was hired as photographer for the event
and was able to capture the actual ceremony. A marriage certificate was then
issued to Spouses Asuncion, duly signed by the [petitioner] as the
solemnizing officer.
Another wedding which took place at the Municipal Hall of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija on December 18, 2009 at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning
was that of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal. Among those present was
Arsenio Flores who stood as one of the principal sponsors. The ceremony
was similarly witnessed by Honorato M. Tolentino, a brother-in-law of the
groom who was also hired as photographer for the said wedding. As proof of
the wedding, a marriage certificate bearing the signature of the [petitioner] as
solemnizing officer was thereafter issued to spouses Pascual.
Displeased with what transpired during the wedding ceremony of Alex
and Esperanza, Arsenio Flores came up with a complaint-affidavit, dated
February 8, 2010, setting forth the violations committed by the [petitioner]
and that of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the former as mere signatory of the
marriage certificates, and the latter acting as the solemnizing officer on
121
behalf of the mayor. Flores’ declaration with respect to the Pascual-Arizabal
nuptial was corroborated by the affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, of Honorato
M. Tolentino, Sr., who cov-
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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
ered the said wedding. Flores included in his affidavit other nuptials
specifically that of Manny and Dina which was held on October 28, 2009 and
which was also solemnized by Thelma Corpuz, Sr. His statement was
supported by Jorge Lazaro’s affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, inclusive of
snapshots he personally took on that day. In view of Thelma O. Corpuz’s
entry of plea of guilty for two (2) counts of usurpation of official functions
filed against him before the Municipal Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
the court, in its Decision dated July 15, 2013, duly considered his plea of
guilty as a mitigating circumstance, and imposed on him the straight penalty
of one (1) year imprisonment for each case.
Discussion
In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he
questions the trustworthiness and reliability of the prosecution’s witnesses.
According to him, the presumption of authenticity of public documents, the
marriage certificates in these cases, should prevail over the inconsistent
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution that it was not him who
officiated these ceremonies. According to him also, the couples themselves
through Alex and Manny, who are definitely in the best position to attest that
it was the [petitioner] himself who solemnized their marriage, did so in open
court and expressed such fact in their Joint Affidavits. Further, the rebuttal
evidence of the prosecution sans the affidavit of recantation of Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., did not alter his previous declaration that he did not solemnize
the subject weddings but the herein [petitioner] who rightfully certified his
deed in the marriage certificates. With these, the defense avers that the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable
doubt and, therefore, the [petitioner] should be acquitted.
On the other hand, in its memorandum, the prosecution asserts that from
the pieces of evidence presented and the testimonies of its witnesses, it has
proven all the elements of the offense charged based on the quantum of
evidence required by law. The accused clearly committed
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VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 355
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts when, by taking advantage of his official function, he
certified in the marriage certificates of spouses Asuncion and spouses
Pascual that as the Municipal Mayor, he personally solemnized their
marriage when it was Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Civil Registrar,
who did so on his behalf. Thus, for this false declaration, the [petitioner]
should be held criminally liable.
10
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In the assailed Decision dated 27 February 2014, the SB found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the said crimes, the
dispositive portion of which is stated hereunder for ready reference, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court finds
[petitioner] Amado R. Corpuz, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized
under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prisión mayor, as maximum, for each count, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 for each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 11
It ruled that with the prosecution’s pieces of evidence taken
together, all the elements of the crime of falsification of public
documents, by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,
were adequately established. The SB further explained that being a
local chief executive and duly authorized officer to solemnize
marriage, petitioner was duty-bound to observe his solemn affirmation
on the marriage certificates.
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 100-102.
11 Id., at p. 109.
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Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
356 1.2 SERIOUS MISAPPRECIATION OF FACT UPON ITS FAILURE
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED AND/OR OMISSION TO CONSIDER GLARING DISPARITIES
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People BETWEEN PROSECUTION’S VERY OWN EVIDENCE, I.E.,
More so, by taking advantage of his official position, petitioner (SAID) INVITATION CARDS AND ITS OWN WITNESSES’
certified the particulars of an event, the subject marriages, despite full STATEMENT AS TO THE PLACE OR VENUE OF
knowledge that he did not personally solemnize the exchange of SOLEMNIZATION WHICH ON MATTERS OF CREDIBILITY
MORE SO, BY THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES IN
marital vows of spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion. In other
HERE, TOUCHES ON THE VERY ISSUE OF COMPETENCY OF
words, what he certified was absolutely false and for such reason, THE WITNESS AND THE STRICT RULE ON ASSESSMENT OF
petitioner’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. By way of EVIDENCE AGAINST THE STATE AND LIBERAL FOR THE
conclusion, the court stressed that in falsification of public or official ACCUSED. THIS RULE WAS SADLY IGNORED. WE TAKE
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or THIS TO NOTE AS NO TRIVIAL ASPECT AS THE
intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of public RESPONDENT COURT PUT IT.
document, what is being punished is the violation of the public faith 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.12 LAW AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof and his LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED FACTS NOT OFFERED IN EVIDENCE
supplemental thereto were likewise denied for lack of merit in the 23 AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE RECORDS — HOLDING DEFENSE
May 2014 Resolution. TWO (2) WITNESSES, THE SPOUSES HUSBANDS, ALEX PASCUAL,
AND MANNY ASUNCION, WERE ALLEGEDLY INDEBTED OF
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter through a petition for
GRATITUDE TO THE ACCUSED FOR BEING ALLEGEDLY
review on certiorari before this Court asserting the following errors, EMPLOYED BY THE LATTER; HENCE, DEBUNKING CREDIBILITY
grounds or arguments: OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (RESPONDENT COURT FOR BREVITY)
COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE
MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION IT AND SUBSTANCE SO MATERIAL POINTING TO THE DEFENSE AS
ADMITTED MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF PROSECUTION’S ALLEGEDLY THE ONE WHO SAID THAT THE BEST PERSONS WHO
EVIDENCE, I.E., (1) INVITATION CARDS AND (2) PICTURES OVER COULD ATTEST WHO THE SOLEMNIZER WAS IN THEIR
THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENSE — RESPECTIVE WEDDINGS WERE THE COUPLES THEMSELVES
1.1 WORSENED BY THE ALLOWANCE OF SECONDARY WHICH COR-
EVIDENCE (AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE IN ITS
ADMISSION) WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RUDIMENTS ON SECONDARY EVIDENCE; AND
358
_______________
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
12 Id., at pp. 108-109. Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
RECT PRONOUNCEMENT AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION, WAS
IN FACT, MADE BY ONE OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICES, THE
357 HONORABLE RODOLFO PONFERRADA, IN OPEN COURT — NOT
123
THE ACCUSED — WHICH OBSERVATION WE NOT ONLY SUPPORT
BUT TREASURE SO MUCH.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS
OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT AGAIN MADE ANOTHER
PRONOUNCEMENT DECLARING THAT “ACCUSED ONLY RELIED
ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY WITHOUT
PRESENTING ANY OTHER EVIDENCE NOT TO DOUBT HIS
PERSONAL APPEARANCE ON THOSE DATES AND THAT HE
SIGNED THESE DOCUMENTS AFTER ACTUALLY SOLEMNIZING
THE SAID MARRIAGES.”
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS — WHEN IT
DECLARED TIIE PRESENCE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
FALSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 171 [OF THE] REVISED PENAL
CODE, AGGRAVATED BY THE MISAPPLICATION OF
THE DICTUM IN ITS CITED GALEOS V. PEOPLE.
6. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF
LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH ARE MATTERS
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW ADOPTING
TWO (2) STANDARDS OF APPLICATION OF LAW OVER TWO (2)
OPPOSSING DOCUMENTS, I.E., (1) THE TWO SETS OF MARRIAGE
CERTIFICATES ON ONE HAND, AND (2) THE ADMITTEDLY
FALSIFIED THREE (3) AFFIDAVITS OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, HONORATO TOLENTINO, JORGE LAZARO AND
THELMO CORPUZ, THEREBY GROSSLY MISAPPLIED ART. 171 [OF
THE] REVISED PENAL CODE AS CITED IN GALEOS V. PEOPLE,
WHEN IT TURNED DOWN THE TWO (2) CERTIFICATE OF
MARRIAGES IGNORING THE DECIDENDI IN THE CITED CASE —
WHILE CASUALLY DOWNPLAYED THE FALSIFIED 3 WIT-
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VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 359
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
NESSES AFFIDAVITS, ITS LEGAL AND NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCES.
7. OVER ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED THE MOST SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN CLINGING TO ITS
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL ON THE
BASIS OF THE OPPOSING EVIDENCE RESPECTIVELY PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION ON ONE HAND AND THE DEFENSE ON THE
OTHER HEREAFTER PRESENTED IN GRAPHIC FORM. 13
It is the contention of petitioner that none of the five (5) witnesses
presented by the prosecution was competent to testify on accused’s
actual solemnization of and presence during the subject marriages.
Neither did any of the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was not
the one who solemnized the same. Thus, in his defense, petitioner
believes that he is innocent considering that he was able to present the
husbands of the subject marriages, who appeared before him during
the actual solemnizations, and both testified in his favor, supported by
various documentary evidence, such as the subject marriage
certificates, including the joint affidavit of cohabitation and joint
affidavit of confirmation issued by the couples, and also the counter-
affidavit issued by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the person alleged to have
actually conducted the said solemnization of the subject marriages,
who initially denied being the one who acted as a solemnizing officer
to any marriage ceremony.
Respondents, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed on
28 April 2015 its Comment14 to the instant petition, and counters that
the SB acted in accord with law and jurisprudence on the basis of the
evidence on record when it found
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 16-20.
14 Id., at pp. 778-808.
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360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
petitioner guilty of the felonies charged; that petitioner raised
questions of fact contrary to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the
124
equipoise doctrine is inapplicable in the case of petitioner; that
petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes of falsification of
public document since all the elements to establish the same were
proven beyond reasonable doubt; and that the other issues and
arguments raised by petitioner do not constitute reversible error on the
part of the SB.
The Issue
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
The Ruling of the Court
At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until
proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense’s
evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused — ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que negat — he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove.15
In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the prosecution,
which must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness
of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.16
_______________
15 People v. Masalihit, 360 Phil. 332, 343; 300 SCRA 147, 156 (1998).
16 People v. Villanueva, 427 Phil. 102, 128; 376 SCRA 615, 637 (2002).
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VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
Worthy to mention that in every criminal conviction, the
prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable
doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the
presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that
the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.17
In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article
171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, which provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or
ecclesiastical minister.—The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document
by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. x x x
It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public
document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. 18Generally, the elements of Article
171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he
falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.19
Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
_______________
17 People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1004; 333 SCRA 319, 332 (2000).
18 Lastrilla v. Granda, 516 Phil. 667, 699; 481 SCRA 324, 345 (2006),
citing Lumancas v. Intas, 400 Phil. 785, 798; 347 SCRA 22, 33-34 (2000), further
citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).
19 Regidor, Jr. v. People, 598 Phil. 714, 732; 579 SCRA 244, 263 (2009).
362
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
361 Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the
facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.20
In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that
the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official
125
position in making the falsification. In falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has
the official custody of the document which he falsifies.21
In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is
undisputed that petitioner was a public officer, being the Municipal
Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, duly authorized by law to solemnize
marriages, at the time such alleged criminal offense was committed.
Likewise, in issuing marriage certificates, being a public document
issued by the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the
legal duty to prepare said document, and not only to attest to the truth
of what he had given account of but more importantly, to warrant the
truth of the facts narrated by him thereon. 22 Undoubtedly, these factual
circumstances were clearly established since petitioner himself admits
the same. Accordingly, we are now left with one final matter to
determine, i.e., whether or not the facts narrated by petitioner on the
subject marriage certificates were absolutely false. If answered in the
affirmative, then petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
_______________
20 Delos Reyes Vda. del Prado v. People, 685 Phil. 149, 161-162; 668 SCRA 768,
780-781 (2012), citing Galeos v. People, 657 Phil. 500, 520; 642 SCRA 485, 505-506
(2011). See also Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1216-1217; 347 SCRA 386,
393 (2000).
21 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, p. 216, Book Two, Arts.
114-367 (Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998), citing People v. Uy, 101 Phil. 159, 163
(1957) and United States v. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376, 378 (1911); Adaza v. Sandiganbayan,
502 Phil. 702, 720; 464 SCRA 460, 478-479 (2005).
22 Rollo, pp. 103-105.
363
VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 363
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be exonerated.
Relevant thereto, the initial query to be resolved is whose evidence
between the prosecution and defense is credible in order to determine
the guilt of the accused in a criminal action.
For ready reference, we find the necessity of reproducing hereunder
the actual pertinent portion declared by petitioner in his official
capacity as a solemnizing officer, common to the subject marriage
certificates, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BEFORE ME, on the date and place above
written, personally appeared the above mentioned parties, with their mutual
consent, lawfully joined together in marriage which was solemnized by me in
the presence of the witnesses named below, all of legal age.
xxxx
(Signed)
HON. AMADO R. CORPUS, JR.
MUNICIPAL MAYOR
CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA 23
From the above quoted statement, petitioner categorically expresses
that, in both marriages, all parties (referring to spouses Pascual and
spouses Asuncion), personally appeared before him, as their
solemnizing officer, in the presence of other witnesses.
In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject
marriages, the SB relied heavily on the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution’s witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all
witnessed an alleged ceremony conducted on said dates wherein
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was the one who
acted as the solemniz-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 261 and 266.
364
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
ing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered the photos and
photocopies of the invitations presented and offered as additional
proofs to establish the aforesaid incidents which show spouses Pascual
and spouses Asuncion standing in front of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr.
Moreover, the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal
126
evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion
that it was petitioner who solemnized their respective marriages, was
vastly recognized as acceptable and damaging to petitioner’s defense
since the principle of res inter alios acta (the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or mission of another) does not
apply in this case.
We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of
the SB are conclusive upon this Court. However, there are exceptions
to said rule, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record; and (6) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.24
A perusal of the offered and admitted evidence, testimonial and
documentary, reveals some misappreciation of facts of which if
considered may result in a different conclusion. In other words, there
were findings grounded entirely on speculation and/or premised on
want of evidence that are needed to be resolved in the case before us.
Hence, we rule to reverse the SB’s ruling of conviction against
petitioner.
First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by
the prosecution was able to dispute the presumption of regularity of an
official function and authenticity and due
_______________
24 Cadiao-Palacios v. People, 601 Phil. 695, 704; 582 SCRA 713, 724-725 (2009).
365
VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
execution of the public instruments issued by petitioner as the
Municipal Mayor, which may only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. As can be gleaned from the
narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing that
an actual appearance by the concerned parties (spouses Pascual and
spouses Asuncion) before petitioner as their solemnizing officer did
not occur or happen. Looking into the evidence presented, the only
patent conclusion that can be derived from the prosecution’s evidence,
as admitted by the witnesses for the defense, is that both couples
appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of
receiving marriage counseling and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing
more.
Second, as mentioned in the assailed Decision, the SB expressed
that the testimonies of the defense’s witnesses appear biased
considering that they “owe their current employment with the accused
as these narrations rang no truth and sounded to have been well-
coached”; hence, they found the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses more credible. Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite
odd considering that there was no iota of evidence to show that both
Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of gratitude to
petitioner. Indeed even it is taken as true that the defense witnesses
who are the husbands in the questioned marriages owe their
employment to the accused such fact can rightfully be construed as
itself the reason why these witnesses would truly want their respective
marriages officiated by the accused. As a matter of fact, it was the
prosecution’s witnesses who have manifested some tainted credibility
in their testimonies when it was declared, among others, that: (a) all
the judicial affidavits were prepared by the complainant Arsenio A.
Flores and were given to them for their signatures; (b) Thelma Corpuz
III, the son of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., was separated from the
government service, and that in the recent local election, he sided with
petitioner’s political rival; and (c) Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. and his son,
Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded Felicisima D. Almonte to vote for the
petitioner’s op-
365
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
ponent during the local election. Clearly therefore, if there were any
doubts as to the credibility of the witnesses in this case, it is those of
127
the prosecution who should be considered guilty of potential political
motivations.
Third, as to the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., we do not find
the same damaging on the part of petitioner considering that his
admission of conducting his own ceremony in the capacity of a
solemnizing officer simply confirms his criminal liability in the case of
usurpation of authority as his conviction was already pronounced by
the MTC. Such testimony does not necessarily result in the falsity of
petitioner’s declaration that he nonetheless conducted his own
solemnization of the subject marriages. The fact remains that, as
testified to by Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion, it was
petitioner who solemnized their marriages on said date and at said
office.
Fourth, the burden of proof in establishing that petitioner made an
untruthful statement in the marriage certificate in order to be convicted
of the crime of falsification of public instrument solely lies on the
prosecution.
If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that
the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the
right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional
duty to acquit him.25
Lastly, considering that the subject public instrument in this case
refers to the marriage certificate, we find it apropos to point out that
the validity of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked since under
existing laws and jurisprudence, the same may be questioned only in a
direct action. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive
_______________
25 People v. Wagas, 717 Phil. 224, 242; 705 SCRA 17, 20 (2013).
367
VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 367
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that the one who
solemnized the subject marriages had no authority to do so would
indirectly result in the declaration that said marriages are void. This is
what our jurisdiction intends to prevent.26
By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure
that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 27 and as a means of respecting
the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the
dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to
show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the
actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable
doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the
weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to
discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of
innocence dictates that it is for the prosecution to demonstrate the guilt
and not for the accused to establish innocence. 28 Indeed, the accused,
being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her
shoulders.
Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that “[c]ourts must
judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on
mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.”29 It is iniquitous to
base petitioner’s guilt on the pre-
_______________
26 See Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, 10 February 2014, 715 SCRA 605,
616.
27 People v. Subingsubing, G.R. Nos. 104942-43, 25 November 1993, 228 SCRA
168, 174.
28 People v. Arapok, 400 Phil. 1277, 1301; 347 SCRA 479, 498 (2000).
29 People v. Anabe, 644 Phil. 261, 281; 630 SCRA 10, 27 (2010).
368
128
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
sumptions of the prosecution’s witnesses for the Court has, time and
again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty
and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.30
In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution in
this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant
petitioner’s conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.31 Not
only that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction.32 Accordingly, the prosecution failed
to establish the elements of falsification of public documents. With the
prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained, as
is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-
12-CRM-0172 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Amado
Corpuz, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
_______________
30 People v. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 364, 373,
citing People v. Remorosa, 277 Phil. 400, 411; 200 SCRA 350, 360 (1991), also cited
in Franco v. People, G.R. No. 191185, 1 February 2016, 782 SCRA 526.
31 See People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57; 271 SCRA 344 (1997).
32 Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 188694, 12 February 2014, 716 SCRA 84, 104-105.
369
VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 369
Corpuz, Jr. vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., On Wellness Leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Petitioner
Amado Corpuz, Jr. acquitted.
Note.—The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence
nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Caranto,
718 SCRA 182 [2014])
——o0o——
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.*
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ].
REX M. TUPAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO,
Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental, respondent.
Notary Public; Judges; Municipal trial court and municipal circuit
trial court judges may act as notaries public; They may notarize documents,
contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official
functions and duties.—This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as
notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities.
They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the
exercise of their official functions and duties.
Same; Same; Judges of municipal trial courts may act as notaries
public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or
notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio.—They may also act as
129
notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of
lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio: However,
the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities
which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC
judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries
public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act
within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over
to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-
MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in
such municipality or circuit.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
237
Civil Law; Judges; Marriage License; Before performing the marriage
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license
presented.—Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements
they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and
formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage
license. A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who
have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract
marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented. If the contracting parties
have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge,
as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation
as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The
judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the
parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Same; Same; Notary Public; Affidavit of Cohabitation; Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is
inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage.
—Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’
affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’
marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The
Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine
the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized
the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavit’s state-
238ments before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be
any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he
notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage
despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Notary Public; Judges; Affidavit of Cohabitation; Judges cannot
notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.—Judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the
parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are
documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties “on the same day [he solemnized their marriages].” He notarized
documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. Judge Rojo argued
that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation.
Same; Affidavit of Cohabitation; An affidavit of cohabitation remains a
private document until notarized.—An affidavit of cohabitation remains a
private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document, “[rendering the document] admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.” The affidavit of cohabitation, even
if it serves a “public purpose,” remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized
nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
130
 Same; Same; Judges; That other judges have notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the
practice legal.—That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation
of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice legal.
Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary.
Same; 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph
(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from
notarizing documents if the signatory is not per-
239sonally known to him.—Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—x x x x (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if
the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document — (1) is not
in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is
not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Administrative Law; Judges; 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; Gross
Ignorance of the Law; For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.—For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; New Code of Judicial Conduct; Under the New Code of
Judicial Conduct on integrity, “[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.”—Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
integrity, “[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.” If the
law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes “lack of integrity.” Violating
basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
240
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.[1]
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly
solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation [2] and issued them to the
contracting parties.[3] He notarized these affidavits on the day of the
parties’ marriage.[4] These “package marriages” are allegedly common
in Bacolod City.[5]
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of
cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized
on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.[6] The affidavits
contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City,
Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge[7]
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20, letter of complaint with complaint-affidavit notarized on May 24,
2012.
[2] Family Code, Art. 34 states:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
[3] Rollo, p. 6.
[4] Id.
[5] Id., at p. 9.
[6] Id., at pp. 21-40, complaint-affidavit, Annexes “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “F,” “G,”
“H,” “I,” and “J.”
[7] Id.
131
 241
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990.[8] Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court
judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only
if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. [9] Thus, Judge Rojo
cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also
did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of
evidence of identity as required by law. These omissions allegedly
constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules “[are] x x x
simple and elementary to ignore.”[10]
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.[11] He argued that Rex
was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has
a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint
against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyn’s case.[12]
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation.
He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected
with his official functions and duties as a judge. [13] The Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by
_______________
[8] Power of the Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judges to Act as Notaries Public Ex Officio.
[9] Rollo, p. 6.
[10] Id., at p. 7.
[11] This comment was dated July 23, 2012.
[12] Rollo, p. 52.
[13] Id., at pp. 79, 84, and 92-93.
242the Members of the Judiciary [14] does not prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.[15] Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not
required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.[16]
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits
with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who
executed the affidavit.[17] The parties’ identities are
“unquestionable.”[18]
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay
City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they solemnized.[19] He pleaded “not to make him [complainant
Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block” [20] since other
judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. The
Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be
fined P9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense
will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court
judges’ official functions and duties. Under the
_______________
[14] Administrative Order No. 125-2007.
[15] Rollo, pp. 92-93.
[16] Id., at p. 62.
[17] Id., at pp. 94-95.
[18] Id., at p. 95.
[19] Id., at p. 87.
[20] Id., at p. 90.
243Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of
the Judiciary,[21] a judge’s duty is to personally examine the
allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the
marriage ceremony.[22] Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to
notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of
cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended a
fine of P1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.[23]
132
 The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may
act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex
officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties.
Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC)
judges are empowered to perform the function of notaries public ex
officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following
qualifications on the scope of this power:
_______________
[21] Administrative Order No. 125-2007.
[22] Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 5.
[23] Rollo, p. 456, Office of the Court Administrator’s report, citing Simon v. Judge
Aragon, 491 Phil. 9, 14-15 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
244
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the
notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their official
functions and duties
x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins
judges to regulate their extrajudicial activities in order to minimize the risk of
conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in
the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or
notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They
must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that
MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio,
perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter
No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made
in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit.[24]
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were
lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90.
_______________
[24] Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.
245
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.[25] The parties must have complied with
all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal
requisites is a marriage license.[26]
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties
who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications
to contract marriage.[27] Before performing the marriage ceremony,
the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.[28]
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are
exempt from the marriage license requirement. [29] Instead, the parties
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. [30] The judge, as solemnizing
officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the
parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. [31] The
judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally
ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.[32] Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides:
133
 Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together
_______________
[25] Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 4.
[26] Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 4.
[27] Family Code, Art. 9.
[28] Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 4.
[29] Family Code, Art. 34.
[30] Family Code, Art. 34.
[31] Family Code, Art. 34; Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 5.
[32] Family Code, Art. 34; Administrative Order No. 125-2007, Sec. 5.
246as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by
the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of
the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation.—In the case of a marriage
effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a)
personally interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications
to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to
the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5]
years and the absence of any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c)
execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the
solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage
by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the
contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who
will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed
lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the
parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with
the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing
officer notarized the affidavit of
247cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony.
Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he
solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the
parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation
are documents not connected with their official function and duty to
solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties “on the same day [he solemnized their marriages].” [33] He
notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty
to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not expressly prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be
prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing
officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and to issue a
sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with
redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a
document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary assume that “the person authorized by law to administer
oaths” who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the “solemnizing
officer” who performs the marriage ceremony are two different
persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal
trial court judges from notarizing “private docu-
_______________
[33] Rollo, p. 94.
248ments x x x [bearing]no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges.”[34] Since a marriage license is a public
document, its “counterpart,” the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a
134
public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation,
he notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until
notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, “[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity.” [35] The affidavit of cohabitation,
even if it serves a “public purpose,” remains a private document until
notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he
notarized nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to
solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to “eliminate
competition between judges and private lawyers in transacting legal
conveyancing business.”[36] He cited Borre v. Judge Moya[37] where
this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-
90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he
notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did “not compete with
private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.”[38] Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-
90.
_______________
[34] Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.
[35] Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, 486 Phil. 254, 267; 444 SCRA 61, 75 (2004) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]; Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 449 Phil. 1, 6; 401 SCRA 35, 39
(2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division], citing Coronado v. Atty. Felongco, 398 Phil. 496,
502; 344 SCRA 565, 568 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[36] Rollo, p. 92.
[37] 188 Phil. 362; 100 SCRA 314 (1980) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
[38] Id., at p. 369; p. 321.
249
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context
in which this court stated that “[judges] should not compete with
private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business.”[39]
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to
documents used to transact “legal conveyancing business.” So long as
a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions
and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,[40] this court fined
Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v.
Judge Galapon, Jr.,[41] this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing
the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in
these cases were not used to transact “legal conveyancing business.”
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty
of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize
marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod City.
Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the
municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation of
Circular No. 1-90.[42]
_______________
[39] Id.
[40] 449 Phil. 1; 401 SCRA 35 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
[41] 391 Phil. 456; 336 SCRA 566 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
[42] Fuentes v. Judge Buno, 582 Phil. 20, 27-28; 560 SCRA 22, 30 (2008) [Per J.
Leonardo-de Castro, First Division]; Simon v. Judge Aragon, 491 Phil. 9, 13-14; 450
SCRA 414, 418 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Mayor Quiñones v.
Judge Lopez, Jr., 449 Phil. 1, 5; 401 SCRA 35, 38 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division];
250
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice
legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary.
[43]
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule
IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is
not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document —
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
135
 (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or
document to be notarized. If the notary public
_______________
Gravela v. Judge Villanueva, 444 Phil. 109, 115; 396 SCRA 105, 110 (2003) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]; Barbarona v. Judge Canda, 409 Phil. 1, 12-13; 357
SCRA 1, 11 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., 391
Phil. 456, 464; 336 SCRA 566, 574 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division]; Doughlas v.
Judge Lopez, Jr., 382 Phil. 8, 14; 325 SCRA 129, 135 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First
Division]; Guillen v. Judge Nicolas, 360 Phil. 1, 13; 299 SCRA 623, 634 (1998)
[Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
[43] Civil Code, Art. 7.
251does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he
only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits
before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally
known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of
evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the
affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before him to
subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them
on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the
affidavit of cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of
evidence of identity.[44]
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he
interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him.
The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at
least be acquainted with them.[45] Interviewing the contracting parties
does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in
good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How[46]where this court held that
“[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations x x x”[47] were de-
_______________
[44] Rollo, pp. 94-95.
[45] Lustestica v. Atty. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 613,
623-624 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[46] 542 Phil. 22; 513 SCRA 25 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
[47] Id., at p. 36; pp. 36-37.
252fenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good faith in
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him
administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that “good faith in
situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment x x x.”[48] Good faith “does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and
basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.”[49]
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction before
notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires
notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they
will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence
of identity. These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo
violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is
not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,[50]“[j]udges
shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.” [51] If the law
involved is basic, ignorance constitutes “lack of
integrity.”[52] Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times
is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance
of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge:[53]
_______________
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 2.
[51] A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 2, sec. 1.
[52] Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691,
April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 348, 378 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[53] Rules of Court, Rule 140, sec. 8 (9).
253
136
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;[54]
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;[55] or
c. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[56]
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been
dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law. However,
Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the
requirements of the law. They should act with caution with respect to
affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as
in this case will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and
other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon
service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in
Bacolod City and Talisay City.
_______________
[54] Rules of Court, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (1).
[55] Rules of Court, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (2).
[56] Rules of Court, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (3).
254
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Bersamin** and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Judge Remegio V. Rojo suspended from office for six (6) months
without pay.
Notes.—While affidavits may be considered as public documents if
they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still
classified as hearsay evidence. (Republic vs. Marcos-Manotoc, 665
SCRA 367 [2012])
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
emphasizes the necessity of the affiant’s personal appearance before
the notary public. (Agbulos vs. Viray, 690 SCRA 1 [2013])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008. *
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO,
petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked; Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—The Court
holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(2000), we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
Same; Same; Same; Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.—In Nicdao Cariño
v. Yee Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the
main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that
the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
137
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a marriage an absolute nullity.
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
163
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 163
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.—Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
crossexamination, thus—ATTY. CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic) the fact that
you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years
on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct? AYes,
sir.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders the marriage void ab initio.—The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The
law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was
no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at
all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.—Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children
may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Macario D. Carpio & Christine P. Carpio for petitioner.
Richard Lee for respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of
the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in
138
order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna
Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that
the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their
marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign
the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that
he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as
the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity
has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition,
the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA
testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7
April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he
is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for
declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings
before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and
admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a
marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false
affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
139
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there
was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case
because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative
defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity
where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the
parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his
vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective
comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere
dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that
the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and
from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner
hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a
marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at
least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In
addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child
is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had
the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether
the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus,
in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is
clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages
despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal,
we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
140
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in
the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate
daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can
prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus
stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque,
Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial
court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the
petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but
also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner
at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to
have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as
earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the
occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1"
and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1"
and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of
the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another
picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act
of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig
City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
141

G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.*
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
respondent.
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract, in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby
the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void; The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.—Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character
of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official
has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason for the
law on ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is
required, is that the publicity attending a marriage
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.—The instant case pertains to a
ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage. The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is
that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons
who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.—It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained the age of maturity;
that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other.” One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the
affirmative.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Marriages of exceptional
character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license, and under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed.—Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only437
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 437
Republic vs. Dayot
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
142
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable construction of
Article 76 of the Civil Code leaves the Court with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written—the exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.—A strict but
reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but
to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil
Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but
as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that
Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths;
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.—It is noteworthy that the
question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on
the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are
ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled that:
The general rule 438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if
such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married does not
apply to a case which does not involve an apparent marriage.—Anent
petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the
presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and
Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.—The declaration of the Civil
Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered
into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the 439
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 439
Republic vs. Dayot
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be
wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
143
 Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of the parties’ cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath—if the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is
but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.—We are not impressed
by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant.
The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and
not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be
a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for application where
there is a law.—In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing.
This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, 440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.
Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible.—The Republic further avers in its third
assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality
of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took
Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel
had set in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.In
this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.
Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To settle all doubts,
jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.—To settle all doubts,
jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity—meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity
that is unbroken.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for Felisa Tecson-Dayot.
Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. for Jose A. Dayot.
441
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 441
Republic vs. Dayot
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-
Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot
(Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
144
 On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating
that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to
his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa
in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,
Felisa requested him to accom-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-
70; Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Id., at pp. 1-8.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
pany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay
City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three
folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and
told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It
was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on
top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful
_______________
5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’
marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.
6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-
258.
443
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 443
Republic vs. Dayot
and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension
from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
“WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].” 9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986
was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
“Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt
to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall
to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces
of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And
145
yet it took him, more or less, three months to “discover” that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does
not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be “taken in for a
ride” by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the
fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
com-
_______________
7 Id., at p. 257.
8 Id., at pp. 313-323.
9 Id., at p. 323.
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
pany I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame
excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in
the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was
the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was
really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.” 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 321-322.
11 ART. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
parties and within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after attaining the age of
twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or
eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during
the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of
unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after
the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from
the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after
the marriage.
445
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 445
Republic vs. Dayot
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
“That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have
filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest
possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.” 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision
to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court
of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive
portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.” 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
8614 of the Civil Code
_______________
12 Records, p. 322.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to
in number 4 of the preceding article:
146
 (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that
the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals
struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
“Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed
on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February,
1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.” 15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing
an affidavit of marriage
_______________
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
447
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 447
Republic vs. Dayot
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity
in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was
misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court
of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage
must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The
prescription was established only
_______________
17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or
sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-
consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that
the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
147
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision,
dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005
is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
_______________
18 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized
by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the
limits of the written authority granted him by his church or religious sect and provided that at
least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious
sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of
the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
449
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 449
Republic vs. Dayot
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City.” 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling
of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
“In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they
had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived
together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other,
the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
“x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
_______________
19 CA Rollo, p. 279.
20 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be
void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.” 21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside
for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for
Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
148
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments
for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF
THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
_______________
21 CA Rollo, pp. 278-279.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.
451
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 451
Republic vs. Dayot
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage,
a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their
marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case
had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose
and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this
Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in
lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with;
and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affida-
_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
25 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
26 377 Phil. 919; 320 SCRA 76 (1999).
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
vit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under
a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their
marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25
July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24
of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card,
dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue
of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
149
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of
the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites
are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.” (Emphasis ours.)
453
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 453
Republic vs. Dayot
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75. 28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes
it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
_______________
27 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
28 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by
consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil
registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character.
30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
31 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following
essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual
consent.
32 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages,
and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is
that the publicity attending a marriage license may
_______________
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter
2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.
34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.),
pp. 302-310.
35 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at pp. 668-669; pp. 129-130),this Court
articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
“However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of
150
455
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 455
Republic vs. Dayot
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that “they have attained the age of maturity; that
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry
each other.”37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus:
whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
_______________
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye
of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication
of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.”
36 The Report of the Code Commission states that “No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons from legalizing their status,” Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an “Affidavit on
(sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband
and Wife for at Least Five Years.”
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to
the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua
non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms,
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No
other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as
_______________
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744; 364 SCRA 334, 357 (2001).
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137; 303
SCRA 508, 515 (1999).
40 Id.
41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145
SCRA 654, 659.
457
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 457
Republic vs. Dayot
a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
151
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that
it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under
_______________
42 The first part of Article 76 states, “No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other x x
x.”
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April
1999.
45 Id., at p. 159.
46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27
January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s
review.47 It is already well-settled that:
“The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on
this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.” 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied
with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied
that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet
the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband
_______________
47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471
SCRA 589, 605.
48 Id.
459
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 459
Republic vs. Dayot
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49Restated
more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to
be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling
Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of
a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered
152
into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the expo-
_______________
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708; 312 SCRA 772, 787
(1999).
50 Id.
51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at p. 4083.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
sure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the
law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage,
we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures
set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is
with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it
is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities
are
_______________
53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588; 355 SCRA 285, 288 (2001).
54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196; 296 SCRA 184, 191
(1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108; 331
SCRA 82, 93 (2000).
461
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 461
Republic vs. Dayot
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is
without prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack
of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel
had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does
not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that
the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means
a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.57 It covers
153
_______________

55 Supra note 33 at p. 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family

Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that “If the parties falsify their affidavit
in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been
cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and
they will also be criminally liable.” Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the
Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
56 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at p. 134. G.R. No. 204494. July 27, 2016.*
57 Id., at pp. 130-131. JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C.
462
SALGADO, petitioners, vs. LUIS G. ANSON, respondent.
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; While the jurisdiction of the
Republic vs. Dayot Supreme Court (SC) in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as
the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions
by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time recognized by the Court, such as when the Court of Appeals (CA) manifestly
within the five years—and continuity that is unbroken.58 overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.—While the
jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is,
of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions
68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
liability, if any. No costs. would justify a different conclusion.
SO ORDERED. Civil Law; Marriages; Since the marriage between Luis and Severina
Austria-Martinez (Acting Chairperson), Tinga,**Velasco, was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
Jr.*** and Reyes, JJ., concur. _______________
Petitions denied, amended decision affirmed.
* THIRD DIVISION.
Notes.—“Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the 542
contracting parties. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
[1994])
A marriage license is a formal requirement, and its absence renders
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in
the marriage void ab initio. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 550
effect at the time of its celebration December 28, 1966.—Since the marriage
[2000]) between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
——o0o—— Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of its celebration on December 28, 1966.
154
 Same; Same; Void Marriages; Marriage License; A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the
absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).—A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence
thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). x x x “Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages
in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages.” To reiterate, in any of the
aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a
valid marriage license is dispensed with.
Same; Same; Marriage Contracts; Being a public document, the
marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also
a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.—The reference to Article
77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of
marriage, but is also a prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein. This is
pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Consequently, the entries made in
Luis and Severina’s marriage contract me prima facie proof that at the time
of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code.
543
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 543
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Same; Same; Marriage License; Religious Ratification; The parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license
insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the
religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance
with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious
in nature.—Article 77 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 77. In case two (2)
persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered
as a purely religious ceremony. The foregoing provision pertains to a
religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which
was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists;
the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious
practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required
issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is
concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is
purely religious in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Void Marriages; To be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties.—“[T]o be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.” Considering
that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract
itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other
plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Same; Same; Same; There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception.—The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the
marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of
marriage. “The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
155
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly
fall within the ambit of the exception.” “The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic ‘autonomous social institution.’”
Same; Same; Same; Property Relations; Article 147 of the Family
Code “applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license.”—As
there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is
void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the
pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of
the Family Code “applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license.”
“Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industryshall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s ‘efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household.’”
545
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 545
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Same; Partition; Words and Phrases; It is stated under Article 1079 of
the Civil Code that “partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.
The thing itself may be divided, or its value.”—Accordingly, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of
the Civil Code that “partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.
The thing itself may be divided, or its value.” As to how partition may be
validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that “partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x.”
The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid.
Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and
Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
Same; Marriages; Void Marriages; Marriage License; The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one (1) of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.—The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of
the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Valenton, Gramata, Loseriaga Law Offices for petitioners.
Francisco, Paredes & Morales Law Offices for respondent.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2dated August 6, 2012
and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the
Decision4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.
The Facts
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a
Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-
156
Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado)
along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya
(Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds
of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis dated October
25, 2002.7
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the
late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a
previous relationship.8
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-72.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Elihu A.
Ybañez and Florito S. Macalino, concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 569-597.
3 Id., at pp. 698-699.
4 Rendered by Judge Luis R. Tongco; Records (Vol. IV), pp. 142-152.
5 Records (Vol. I), pp. 3-14.
6 Id., at pp. 16, 18 and 20.
7 Id., at pp. 22-23.
8 Id., at p. 4.
547
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real
properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the
following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R). 9
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement
between him and Severina, the above listed properties pertain to their
conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina
executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and
5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the
said properties.10 When Severina died on September 21, 2002, 11 Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself
as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003.12
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of
his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a
compulsory heir of Severina.13
In Jo-Ann’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14which the
trial court considered as the Answer of her hus-
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 5-8.
10 Id., at p. 9.
11 Id., at p. 272.
12 Id., at p. 10.
13 Id., at p. 11.
14 Id., at pp. 38-47.
548
547 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
band, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any
marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that
Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both
acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition
Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented
through another Partition Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus,
Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue
of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral
Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs
covering Severina’s properties were under Severina’s name only and
she was described therein as single without reference to any husband.18
157
 Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado’s ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the marriage
stance in their Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-
Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the
and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife — a alleged marriage.27 Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution
relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 28 The logical conclusion
Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned
described as single and they acknowledged that they were living by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she
together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29
partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis already On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers,
received his share in the properties 20 and is estopped from denying the explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is
same.21 After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the
to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and contrary.30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses
had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship _______________
and cus-
_______________ 22 Id., at p. 103.
23 Id., at p. 201.
24 Id., at p. 104.
15 See RTC Order dated May 3, 2004; id., at p. 88.
25 Id., at pp. 146-152.
16 Id., at pp. 112-114.
26 Records (Vol. II), pp. 20-38, 55-83.
17 Id., at pp. 49-50.
27 Id., at p. 23.
18 Id., at pp. 40-41.
28 Id., at p. 31.
19 Id., at pp. 100-111.
29 Id., at p. 34.
20 Id., at p. 102.
30 Id., at p. 356.
21 Id., at p. 107.

549
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 549
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
tody of Severina.22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya
were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of
Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.24
Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented
documentary evidence which included a certified true copy of his
marriage contract with Severina,25the Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. 26 The Spouses
Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina’s marriage on the
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration, 31which the trial
court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the
CA.33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived
their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled
hearings before the trial court.34
Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence
filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the
trial court “to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to
evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on
the basis of [the Spouses Salgado’s] proffered evidence[,]” 35whereas
158
the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and
ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.36
In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the
order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific
terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held
that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently
established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision 38 in favor of Luis,
holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It
noted that the marriage contract, being a public
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 357-369, 371-392.
32 Id., at p. 433.
33 Records (Vol. III), pp. 1-32, 169-220.
34 See RTC Order dated April 23, 2007; Records (Vol. IV), p. 44.
35 See CA Decision dated April 30, 2007; id., at p. 53.
36 See CA Decision dated May 16, 2007; id., at p. 64.
37 Issued by Judge Luis R. Tongco; id., at pp. 140-141.
38 Id., at pp. 142-152.
551
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 551
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is
conclusive as to the fact of marriage. 39 The trial court also based its
ruling in Geronimo v. CA40 where the validity of marriage was upheld
despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract.41The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by
the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot
be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.42
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:
1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING
OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all
dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];
2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING
OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-
R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-
Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;
3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R,
11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069,
respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and
[Severina].
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 43
_______________
39 Id., at p. 150.
40 G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494.
41 Records (Vol. IV), p. 150.
42 Id., at pp. 151-152.
43 Id., at p. 152.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another
Decision44 which ordered the “ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING
ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina de
Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x.”45 The
RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the
said Deeds.46
The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective
motions for reconsideration on September 11, 200747 and August 28,
2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus
Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the
Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of
appeal before the CA on December 13, 2007 50 and April 24,
2009,51respectively.
159
 Ruling of the CA and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by
their failure to secure the said certification and present evidence during
The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise the trial.”58
Agreement52 which was approved by the CA in its Decision 53 dated The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for
October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses reconsideration59 which the CA denied through its Resolution60 dated
Maya’s appeal.54 November 26, 2012.
On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision, 55dismissing the The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising
appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The falloreads as follows: the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible error in
_______________ affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis
and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.
44 Id., at pp. 313-325. _______________
45 Id., at p. 325.
46 Id.
56 Id., at p. 596.
47 Id., at pp. 167-188.
57 Id., at p. 585.
48 Id., at pp. 154-164.
58 Id., at pp. 592-593.
49 Id., at pp. 216-217.
59 Id., at pp. 607-650.
50 Id., at pp. 228-229.
60 Id., at pp. 698-699.
51 Id., at pp. 360-361.
52 CA Rollo, pp. 517-522.
53 Id., at pp. 524-533.
54 See CA Decision dated August 6, 2012; id., at p. 583. 554
55 Id., at pp. 569-597. 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
553 Ruling of the Court
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 553
The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Severina is null and void for want of marriage license based on the
WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado]
is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig
Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. established its absence.62
SO ORDERED. 56 Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on
the ground that it raises a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses
the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer any testimonial Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory. 64 If the
and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the
Luis.57 The CA further explained that “the best evidence to establish Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and
the absence of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil convincing evidence.65
Registrar that the parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition,
marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which
that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review
license was issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis on certiorari.
160
 Contrary to Luis’ contention, the present petition raises a question
of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be
proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account
of the marriage being of an exceptional character.
In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought
before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule, limited to
reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66
_______________
61 Rollo, p. 159.
62 Id., at p. 36.
63 Id., at pp. 596-603.
64 Id., at p. 598.
65 Id., at p. 600.
66 (1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of
555
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Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.67
Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of
its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
69
_______________
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 499 Phil.
207, 213; 460 SCRA 220, 227 (2005), citing The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86.
67 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction
Company, 548 Phil. 354, 362; 519 SCRA 432, 441 (2007).
68 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667; 328 SCRA 122, 128 (2000).
69 Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character.
x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
“Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular
marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages,
and (7) mixed marriages.”71 To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned
marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage
license is dispensed with.
The marriage is not of an
exceptional character
161
 A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and
Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated
therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license
_______________
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
70 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
71 Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569; 550 SCRA 435, 454 (2008).
557
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic
Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The
pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on
x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage
license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character
performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x. 72
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage
contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage
contract is not only a prima facieproof of marriage, but is also a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section
44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage
contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the
reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article
77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to
ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any
church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the
requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any rati-
_______________
72 Rollo, p. 159.
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
fication made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
557
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed
with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly.
In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent
ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices.
Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required
issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious
ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine
qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already
be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage);
and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and
Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony
officiated on December 28, 1966 — the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis
in open court:
Atty. Francisco:
Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that
you were married to the late [Severina].
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?
A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic)
one (1) year old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was
born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she
turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.
Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?
A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.
162
 Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
559 the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 559 the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the
Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966? required marriage license.
A- Yes, sir.
Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage? However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed
A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73 issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the
xxxx presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold
[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were
married to [Severina]? water vis-à-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its
A: Yes sir. face has established that no marriage license was presented to the
Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her? solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and
A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28,
1966.74 (Emphasis ours) Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all.
Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented.
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only No other witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is
marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that
pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the documents they
one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his
purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin testimony:
ATTY. VALENTON:
requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and
the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied [Severina]?
with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of ATTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?
ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that
an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis took place, Your Honor.
and Severina’s marriage to be valid. COURT: Answer.
What preparations were done?
A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during
Absence of marriage license that time and the Mayor is a close friend of ours. So, when he knew that we
are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to
The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before
you
existence or nonexistence of the marriage license?
Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage
contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to
561
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VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 561
73 TSN, June 6, 2005, pp. 15-16. Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
74 TSN, June 7, 2005, p. 30. travel because your daughter will be illegitimate.75
xxxx
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?
560
A- We did not.
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

163
 A- No. A- Yes.
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before
BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS the solemnization of the marriage?
[Q-] There was no marriage license? A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar,
A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license. Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is
COURT: inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.
Not necessarily.
A- But, I don’t know whether there was an application for the license because it
563
was at the house of the Mayor.
COURT: VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 563
But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?
Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?
A- No.76
A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let
xxxx
us signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is. 77 (Emphasis
REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF [LUIS]:
ours)
Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by
counsel as well as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or
not you applied for a marriage license when you got married on In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and
_______________ the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage
75 TSN, June 14, 2005, pp. 15-16.
contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
76 Id., at pp. 17-18. officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both
the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage
562 contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson case of mere non-recording of the marriage license number on the
December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78
meant by that? The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the
COURT:
By what? case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the
ATTY. FRANCISCO: absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract
When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court. presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no
COURT:
Whether he applied? statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character.
ATTY. FRANCISCO: Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and her husband
Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased
you answered no.
WITNESS: was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the
I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or National Archives and Records Section where the marriage license
application before we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but number appears.
that was about — I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days
ago. “[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
ATTY. FRANCISCO: license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
you referring to?
A- [Severina]. supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
Q- And, yourself? marriage license
164
_______________
77 Id., at pp. 46-48.
78 Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40 at p. 500.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
was issued to the parties.”79 Considering that the absence of the
marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a
false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character,
and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible
conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was
celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80 the Court similarly
declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license based
on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a
marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false
affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the
Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of
marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. It was further explained:
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license.
xxxx
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that
as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrong-
_______________
79 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 203-204; 531 SCRA 446, 455 (2007).
(Emphasis ours)
80 Supra note 71.
565
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 565
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
fully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by
law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity
of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it
is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there
was no affidavit at all.81
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the
marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal
requisite of marriage. “The parties should not be afforded any excuse
to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception.”82 “The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic ‘autonomous social institution.’”83
_______________
81 Id., at pp. 573-575; pp. 458-460.
82 Supra note 68 at p. 670; p. 131.
83 Id., at pp. 667-668; pp. 128-129.
165

566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
Partition Agreement is Valid
Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their
cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition
Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their properties
between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such
agreement on the ground that “the separation of property is not
effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore,
becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is
void.”85
The Court does not subscribe to Luis’ posture.
In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86 the Court held that
“[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil
Code x x x.”87 It provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
_______________
84 Records (Vol. I), pp. 112-114.
85 See Consolidated Appellee’s Brief; id., at p. 519.
86 328 Phil. 1289; 260 SCRA 221 (1996).
87 Id., at p. 1295; p. 226. (Italics in the original)
567
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 567
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivosof his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis ours)
88
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to
marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that
their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage
license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the
Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their
property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code “applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is none-
_______________
88 Id., at pp. 1295-1296; pp. 226-227.
89 Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
166
theless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage
license.”90 “Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party’s ‘efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household.’”91
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code
shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and
Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that
“partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing
itself may be divided, or its value.” As to how partition may be validly
done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that “partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings
x x x.” The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement
to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly
done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition
Agreement.
Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and
authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 92 It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the
Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the
said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of
any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least,
voidable.
_______________
90 Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861, 872; 351 SCRA 127, 136 (2001).
91 Valdez v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, supra note 86 at p. 1297; p. 228.
(Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
92 TSN, June 17, 2005, pp. 30, 36.
569
VOL. 798, JULY 27, 2016 569
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification
of no record of marriage license or certification of “due search and
inability to find” a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license, 93 such certification is
not the onlyproof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina’s
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil
Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it
may be well to note that Luis’ failure to assert his marriage to Severina
during the latter’s lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981,
and until Severina’s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled
with her.94 All those years, he never presented himself to be the
husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of
the marriage. During trial, he never presented any other witness to the
marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and
subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad.
Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the
evidence he himself had presented.
“The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution
_______________
93 Abbas v. Abbas, 702 Phil. 578, 593; 689 SCRA 646, 662 (2013); Cariño v.
Cariño, supra note 90 at p. 869; p. 133; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103047,
September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
94 Rollo, p. 502.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.”95
167
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez andJardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. (Go-Bangayan vs.
Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702 [2013])
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license
is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” (Id.)

——o0o——

168