The Confucian Politics of Appearance: And Its Impact on Chinese Humor

Author(s): Weihe Xu
Source: Philosophy East and West , Oct., 2004, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 514-532
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4148017

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 THE CONFUCIAN POLITICS OF APPEARANCE-
AND ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE HUMOR

Weihe Xu
Chinese Department, Middlebury College

In traditional China, there was a Confucian vigilance against humor, especially

among the junzi RT (the morally and often socially superior man). Lin Yutang
P (1895-1976), the most devoted promoter of humor in modern China, attrib-
uted this practice of discretion to lijiao Wf (translated by Lin as "Confucian deco-
rum" or "Confucian puritanism," but hereafter referred to as "the rites"), because
lijiao made the Chinese often "pull a long face" (ban miankong if~iTL).1 Indeed,
with respect to proper human appearance and bearing the rites first and foremost
emphasize reverence (jing Q) and gravity (zhuang I). Owing to an apparently natu-
ral antithesis between reverence/gravity and laughter/humor, the enormous weight
of the rites in this matter acted to pull one's face down.
Although this was reiterated by Lin himself and echoed by others,2 Lin's in-
sight here not only needs qualifying but is worthy of further exploration. For the
rites require reverence and gravity from the junzi especially during his public
appearances, thus making him, more than anyone else, look grim and humorless
in public. More important, however, is that Lin somehow forgot to explain why the
rites should place such an overriding emphasis on reverence and gravity in the first
place.
Therefore, my purpose here is not to study Chinese humor per se, but rather, in
the words of Xunzi lij (313-238 B.c.), to "discuss the causes" (yi qi suo yi A;nfljO)
of the traditional Chinese attitude toward humor.3 I shall demonstrate that ancient
Chinese conceptions of appearance and social bearing gave rise to the Confucian
politicization of appearance, and that it was the Confucian politics of appearance
that necessitated the rites' emphasis on reverence and gravity.
In the four-part discussion that follows, the first part concisely describes the de-
notation and connotation of a common classical Chinese term for appearance; the
second and third parts illustrate, respectively, four basic assumptions underlying
the Confucian politicization of appearance and its culmination in the rites; and
the final part discusses the humor-curtailing corollary of the Confucian politics of
appearance.

A classical Chinese equivalent of the English "appearance" is xiang i, since both

the Chinese and English terms denote visible manifestations of what was invisible.

514 Philosophy East & West Volume 54, Number 4 October 2004 514-532
? 2004 by University of Hawai'i Press

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Whereas the English "appearance" refers to "the action of coming forward into
view or becoming visible,"4 xiang is defined at one point in the "Yi zhuan" 91
(Commentaries on the Zhouyi JIA~ or Zhou Book of Changes) as xian nai wei zhi
xiang ONZ~; (that which is manifested or becomes visible is called appear-
ance).5 Throughout the "Yi zhuan," xiang also means sign, image, resemblance, re-
presentation, or, as a verb, to signify, to image, to resemble, to re-present. All these
"derivatives" imply visibility. Furthermore, the visibility of xiang is also borne out by
its "antonym," yi A (that which cannot be seen); by the term ji , meaning,
according to Zhang Zai 39A (1020-1077), "that which appears in sight but has not

yet Li
the assumed a form"
ji's &C (Book (ji zhe,
of rites) xiang xian
inclusion, er forms
in the wei xing ye ##appearance,
of human , '@3ifik.); of
and
a by
person's facial expression (rong 9), countenance (yan 0), body (gong V), form
(xing b), looks (mao I), and so forth.6
The Li ji also states: Sheng zhe, le/yue zhi xiang ye )~ , rt (Utterances/
sounds are the appearances of delight/music).7 Thus, unlike the English "appear-
ance," which emphasizes only visible manifestations, xiang denotes audible mani-
festations as well. In the "Yi zhuan" and the Li ji, therefore, celestial appearances-
besides stars, lightning, and rain-also include thunder and wind; and human ap-
pearance also includes a person's utterances, words, or music. While the celestial
appearances "signify auspiciousness or inauspiciousness" (xian ji xiong ~A~11)
(Zhouyi, p. 367), a person's appearance and bearing reveal his/her character. This
latter sense of xiang is also clear from Mencius' question, "How can a person con-
ceal his true character if you listen to his words and watch the pupils of his eyes?"
(Mengzi 4A: 15). Similarly, the Liji declares not only that one's sheng * (utterances/
sounds), yin ` (patterned sheng), or yue R (organized patterns of yin, or music)
manifests one's emotions but that the music of a society reflects the political state of
affairs and the moral character of that society, that is, an orderly one (zhishi t0t), a
chaotic one (luanshi NLt), or a conquered one (wangguo ti). This is because "the
ways of utterances/sounds and patterned utterances/sounds connect with politics"
(shengyin zhi dao yu zheng tong yi ). Hence, "by examining the
music one can know the politics" (shen yue yi zhi zheng ?i~$-aJn) (Liji, pp. 254-
255). Here we have our first glimpse of the rites' politicization of appearance.
As Mencius' question and the Li ji's remarks on music above suggest, xiang also
connotes outward manifestations of the inner, a connotation mostly absent from
the English "appearance." On the other hand, xiang lacks the strong implication of
the English "appearance," that is, what appears may be an "illusive seeming or
semblance," which is "distinguished from reality."8 As we shall see shortly, this lack
is mainly due to a traditional Chinese conviction that appearances and reality/truth
(qing i1~) are necessarily correlated.9
Finally, just as "appearance" and "phenomenon" are sometimes synonyms in
English,1o xiang can also be a Chinese equivalent of "phenomenon." But in a nar-
rower sense xiang refers only to heavenly phenomena, since what appears on earth
is called xing J (form or shape). In a broader sense, however, xiang can designate
all phenomena in and of the universe, visible and audible (Zhouyi, pp. 349, 364).

Weihe Xu 515

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 II

The Confucian politics of appearance was predicated on four basic assumptions. The
first and most fundamental was that all things are correlated, having originated from,
and are part of, the ultimate One (yi -)-whether it be called the Great One (taiyi
t-) or the Way (dao L) of Daoism, the Great Ultimate (taiji XA ) of the "Yi zhuan,"
or subsequently the Emptiness (kong ?) of Buddhism or the Non-Ultimate (wuji 4)
or the Principle of Heaven (tianli &) of Neo-Confucianism. These are interrelated
not just because of the commonality of their ultimate origin but also because of
their interconnection with each other through mutual production, transformation,
and complementarity, as most saliently in the interrelationship of Yin and Yang. We
can find this "dynamic monism through the dialectic" (as Wing-tsit Chan calls it) in
the philosophy of Yin-Yang and the Five Agents; in Zhuangzi's equation of right and
wrong, existence and nonexistence, and everything else in the universe; in the
Tiantai Buddhist School's identification of the phenomenal world with the absolute;
or in the Neo-Confucian declarations that "Nature and man [form] one body," and
that the "Principle (of Heaven) is one but its manifestations are many."''
A derivative belief from the monism above is the second basic assumption-that
appearance is correlated with reality/truth. It was difficult for many ancient Chinese
to conceive an inherent chasm between appearance and reality/truth (as between
Kant's phenomena and noumenal2), for (except for Zhuangzi13) in their eyes, ap-
pearances always manifested reality/truth in one way or another; the Huayan School,
a purely Chinese school of Buddhism, even proclaimed that every phenomenon is a
complete and perfect manifestation of the absolute (this may best explain why the
Chinese term xiang lacks the strong implication of mere show or pretense).14 Con-
versely, it was also believed that reality/truth always manifested itself in one way
or another. According to the Laozi, for example, the Way has not only "thingless
appearances" (wuwu zhi xiang att) (chaps. 14, 35), but, "as things" (wei wu
I) it has "images" (xiang -) (chap. 21). Can we not, then, call these images the
images of (Daoist) reality/truth?
Sometimes, moreover, the images of reality/truth are man-made. As described in
the "Yi zhuan," the sixty-four hexagrams in the Zhouyi are man-made images or,
more precisely, the re-presentations of the reality/truth of the universe. The story of
the invention of the hexagrams goes like this: assisted by divine powers, ancient sages
created the hexagrams by watching, penetrating, and re-presenting the phenomenal
world; they "imitated its forms and appearances and re-presented the characteristics
of things; therefore, [the hexagrams] are called re-presentations" (ni zhu qi xingrong,

xiang qi wuyi, shigu wei zhi xiang MMEiW~ ) * , ) , ZiLZ) (Zhouyi, pp.
367, 369, 373, 376, 393). The sages' purpose for making these hexagrams was "to
communicate the attainment of the divine, to resemble the reality of all things" (yi
tong shenming zhi de, yi lei wanwu zhi qing 0i I19t , t I0F~l%2), to "follow
theindicate
to principles of nature
the Way and (tiandao
of heaven fate" (jiang yi shun
) ), earth xingming
(didao Mi4), andzhi li ftl$'I~rZT_), and
humankind
(rendao } ) (ibid., pp. 373, 393).

516 Philosophy East & West

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 The sages did so perfect a job in this creative effort that the resultant hexagramic
system of changes, the Yi, was hailed as

tantamount to the universe and thus completely embrace[s] the Way of the universe.
Looking up, we can use the Yi to observe the patterns of Heaven; looking down, we can
use it to examine the principles of Earth. Thereby, we know the causes of the hidden and
the manifest. [Using the Yi] to probe the beginning and end [of all things], we thus un-
derstand why there is life and death....

How vast and great the Yi is! Used to discuss what is afar, it is limitless; used to discuss
what is near, it is quiet and right; used to discuss what is between Heaven and Earth, it is
complete! (Zhouyi, pp. 353, 355)

In other words, the Yi "covers all possible things and situations in the world" (tianxia

zhi nengshi
(dong bi yi(wu
M), affairs T #_-- )-its appearances,
9), enterprises patterns (wen
(ye -), causes/reasons (gu 3c),
ik), movements
will (zhi :),
recondite truths (ze M), and so forth (Zhouyi, pp. 356, 362, 364, 365). To the authors
of the "Yi zhuan," the Yi seemed to be a perfect miniature of the universe,15 a mi-
crocosm that completely corresponds (pei ME) to the macrocosm in both formless
(xing er shang -fiL) and formed (xing er xia JF?iWFT) respects,16 and a "crystal ball"
which encompasses, governs, guides, and explains all (ibid., pp. 355, 389).
Epistemically, if appearance and reality/truth are correlated, then one should be
able to know reality/truth through appearance. According to the "Yi zhuan," this is
precisely how the sages penetrated the ultimate reality/truth of the universe: before
the invention of the Yi, they had watched the phenomena of the world; after the
invention, they "set up and watched the (hexagramic) images."17 Either way, they
gained thorough insights into the principles, nature, and fate of all things and into
"the ultimate recondite truth" (zhize 1i), "the ultimate movement" (zhidong -M),

"the ultimate attainment" (zhide _V), "the ultimate essence" (zhijing _), "the
ultimate
verse change"
(Zhouyi, (zhibian
pp. 355, _), 393).
357, 364, and "the ultimate magic" (zhishen o) of the uni-
Yet the manifestation of reality/truth in appearance is not always direct and
obvious; as Laozi said of the images of the Way, they are often "indistinct and

shadowy" (hu xi huang xi tli,'R ) (Laozi, chap. 21). Sometimes appearances

even seem to differ from or veil reality/truth. Consequently, it is sometimes difficult
to grasp reality/truth through appearance immediately; even Confucius wondered
whether a person who always speaks properly is a junzi or merely assumes a grave
appearance (Lunyu 11 :21).
For Confucius and other ancient Chinese, however, apparent discrepancies
between appearance and reality/truth show no evidence of intrinsic divide be-
tween them; neither does seeming variation, distortion, or veiling by appearance
necessarily conceal reality/truth. This is why Confucius could still penetrate a
person's artful words and pleasing countenance to get to the truth about him-
that he lacked humanity (Lunyu 1:3, 17:1 7). The Guodian Chumu zhujian (Bam-
boo scripts from the Chu tomb at Guodian), moreover, offers these two assertions:

Weihe Xu 517

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 that "one should never be false, because it is knowable" (Ren zhi bu neng yi wei,
ke zhi ye AZ t ,iH , )azT), and that "if you examine what is manifested, how
can you fail to see the truth (about a person)?" (cha qi xian zhe, qing an shi zai

If reality/truth eludes one, that is, if one fails to perceive reality/truth through
appearances, it is only because one does not know how to examine appearances.
Stephen Owen's remarks on this Confucian conviction are especially insightful: "a
complicated confluence of circumstance may veil any particular inner truth; but if
one but knows how to look, that inner truth is immanent in the outer phenome-
non."19 This indirectly confirms that appearances always reflect reality/truth in one
way or another. Hence, a person's pretense or deception always betrays his desire to
pretend or deceive, and thus involuntarily discloses something about the person's
real character-only if we know how to look or listen.20
But not everyone knows how, or is able, to see or hear reality/truth through ap-
pearance; neither is it easy to do so. The "Yi zhuan" states that the sages were able
to penetrate the reality/truth through the phenomenal world not only because of the
divine assistance and their sagehood but also because they "studied what is subtle
extremely deeply" (ji shen er yan ji ye t WJI#R) (Zhouyi, p. 3*Nj (Zhouyi, p. 364). On the other
hand, Confucius and Mencius seemed to think that human sagacity and the knowl-
edge of how to look or listen were sufficient to lead one to reality/truth especially
about another person.
Confucius noted two approaches to knowing a person: (1) to "see how he does,
observe what he is based on, and examine what he is at ease with," and (2) to
understand his words (zhi yan 30 ). Confucius asserted that "not understanding a
person's words, one has no way to know that person" (bu zhi yan, wu yi zhi ren

--, I~ f IaMA), and that one of the characteristics of an accomplished person is

his ability to "examine the words and observe the countenances" (cha yan er guan
se -~W )~- ) of others (Lunyu 2 :10, 12:20, 20:3). As mentioned above, Mencius
suggested that one should listen to a person's words and watch the pupils of his eyes:
"the pupils never conceal what is inside him: if he is upright inside, his pupils will be
bright; if not, his pupils will be cloudy" (Mengzi 4A:15). When asked what the
"understanding of words" means, Mencius replied:

When a person's words are one-sided, I shall know what the person is beclouded about.
When a person's words are excessive, I shall know where the person has fallen. When a
person's words are wayward, I shall know where the person has strayed. When a person's
words are evasive, I shall know that the person has been pushed to his limit. (Mengzi
2A: 17)

Likewise, the "Yi zhuan" asserts:

The words of a person about to betray are evasive; the words of a doubting person, con-
fused; the words of an honest person, few; the words of a restless person, many; the
words of a calumniator, shifting; and the words of a person who has lost his holdings,
crooked. (Zhouyi, p. 391)

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 This kind of "linguistic psychology" makes clear the underlying rationale of
Confucius' "understanding of words"; because a person's words necessarily manifest

his heart/mind (xin ,b) and nature, we can therefore know his true character through
his words. Such reasoning not only implies the correlation between appearance and
reality/truth but presupposes a necessary interconnection between a person's out-
ward appearance and inner character.
Therefore, the third basic assumption of the Confucian politics of appearance
was that the inner necessarily informs the outer; the outer necessarily, although
sometimes problematically, manifests the inner;21 and the outer can cultivate and
change the inner. The quotations above from Confucius, Mencius, the "Yi zhuan,"
and the Li ji should also attest to the first two clauses of this assumption.22 Worth
adding are a few more testimonials from the classics: (1) "Grave and dignified bearing /
Is the corners (manifestations or basis) of virtue." (2) "The heart is inside (a person)
but unconcealed; it is outwardly manifested in the person's appearance and visible
in his countenance." (3) "What is inside must assume an outward form"; "the nature
of the junzi is that humanity, righteousness, the rites, and wisdom are rooted in his
heart but have pure and clear manifestations, visible in his face, brimming in his
back, spread to his four limbs which do not speak but are revealing." (4) "If the
genuine (feeling) is inside a person, the divine will reveal it outwardly." (5) "Sincerity
is inward but assumes outward forms." (6) "As the rites and music act on the inner,
their effects will show outwardly."23
What needs further illustration, then, is the last clause of the assumption in ques-
tion: specifically, that one's outward appearance can influence not only one's
own inner character but also the outward appearance and inner character of others.
For this proves to be a conviction more directly responsible for the Confucian polit-
icization of appearance. While the "Yi zhuan" gives a negative example of this
belief-"coquettish looks induce lust" (yerong hui yin 4~~ r)l (Zhouyi, p. 361)-
the Guanzi furnishes a positive example of the same belief: "rectify your appearance
to cultivate virtue" (Zheng xing she de jIEjfgi). According to the authors of the
"Xinshu xia" and "Neiye" chapters in the Guanzi, if one's appearance is incorrect,
virtue will not come; but if one rectifies one's appearance so as to be "stern, fearful,
and reverent, then the quintessence [i.e., the Way] will become fixed in one" (yan-
rong wei jing, jing jiang zhi ding VAQ , M_4?).24
The conviction that the outer/external can cultivate and change the inner/
internal also underlies the Confucian concepts of rulership and the rites. As Chad
Hansen points out, Confucian moral psychology leads to the Confucian ethico-
politics of "model emulation": when the ruler rules by the model of his virtue, "the
virtue of the ruler will inevitably produce peace and harmony because the people
will be drawn to emulate the ruler's virtue and in doing so will cultivate their own
moral mind."25 For Mencius and Xunzi, the external forces that can cultivate one's
moral mind were the rites. Mencius argued that although human nature is innately
good, people often lost their original goodness because of external influence. How-
ever, one can recover the lost goodness by "way of learning and asking" (xuewen
zhi dao PR Z), that is, by asking about and learning righteousness and the rites,

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 for "righteousness is the way, and the rites are the door"; the key thing to learn is
guiju NZ-literally, compasses and a carpenter's square, or guidelines, rules-and
the rites are such "compasses and square" (Mengzi 4A: 1, 2, 27; 4B :27, 28; 5B :4,
6, 7; 6A:8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20). Despite his diametric view of human nature,
Xunzi held the same conviction of the rites' power to make people good. He main-
tained that in order to build a just and orderly society, it was imperative to "correct
and adorn" (jiaoshi Ai) the human nature from without; this is why the former
sage-kings established righteousness, laws, and institutions as well as the rites. "In-
nately evil," wrote Xunzi, "the human nature must await the sage-kings to govern it
and the rites to transform it, so that it will be both in order and in accord with the
good" (Xunzi, pp. 5, 200, 248, 252).
According to Xunzi, the transformation of the innately evil human nature through
learning and abiding by the rites was the task of xiushen (self-cultivation, culti-
vation of one's moral qualities). The object of xiushen was to make one a good
person, a junzi, even a sage; the attainment of the good, the Way, or sagehood
entailed the rites, because they would help one to "identify the good" (bian shan
VM), "rectify one's body/self" (zheng shen TEh), and "control one's breath and
cultivate one's heart" (zhi qi yang xin #MA ,,). Concretely, the rites govern one's
temper, will, knowledge, and thinking; regulate one's food, drink, clothes, dwelling,
and activities; and refine one's health, appearance, attitude, and demeanor (Xunzi,
pp. 9, 10, 11, 14).
Echoing Xunzi, the Li ji states that the rites are what the sages used to "govern
the seven human emotions and cultivate the ten righteousnesses." The Li ji also
drives home this crucial point that the rites foster one's moral character by regulating
and refining one's appearance: "the rites are that with which to cultivate the outer"

(li suo yi xiu wai ye &#tidkTh,, ) by "adorning one's appearance" (shi mao ~$)
and "governing one's body" (zhi gong &JI). Thus, the Li ji proclaims, "The begin-
ning of the rites and righteousness lies in rectifying one's appearance, dignifying
one's countenance, and ordering one's words" (Li ji, pp. 151, 164, 257, 269, 444).
Here the Li ji echoes not only Zengzi's death-bed advice concerning the junzi's
appearance, countenance, and language (Lunyu 8:4), but a view put forth in the
Shangshu (Book of archaic documents), that human affairs begin with human
appearance.26

But it was the Late Han Confucian writer Xu Gan ,-f (171-218) who made
most clear the rationale for the grave Confucian attention to human appearance:
because the outer and the inner are correlated, the outer can influence and change
the inner; this change will inevitably show in the outer. Accordingly, Xu Gan pre-
scribed that in order to become a junzi, one must first establish a "model appear-

ance" (Faxiang -&V):

appearance and demeanor are one's tallying surface (fubiao jfl ); when one's tallying
surface is correct, one's feelings and nature will be in order; when one's feelings and
nature are in order, humanity and righteousness will exist in one; when humanity and
righteousness exist in one, great virtue will manifest itself. The manifestation of this great
virtue is called a model appearance.27

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 How does one attain such a model appearance, and what does it look like? Xu
Gan's answer was to start by rectifying and dignifying one's mien in accord with the
rites; the result will be a grave and venerable (zun 4) appearance (Zhong lun, p. 3).
Thus Xu Gan reiterated and reinforced the conviction that the rites can make one
good from without. As for when one should be grave or reverent, Xu Gan stipulated
that one should be "grave toward inferiors and reverent toward superiors" (lin xia ye
zhuang, feng shang ye jing T-tf , Lth)$1 ) (ibid., p. 3).
Xu Gan's emphasis on gravity and reverence echoes earlier Confucian classics.
The Shangshu states that "appearances mean reverence," and "reverence creates
gravity." The Shi jing (Book of songs) admonishes one to "Take heed of your de-
meanor," and to do "Reverence, reverence! / By heaven all is seen." The Lunyu, as
we shall see later, blatantly politicizes the junzi's gravity and reverence. The "Yi
zhuan" quotes Confucius as saying that the rites mean reverence. And the Mengzi
also equates the rites with reverence.28 But the classic with which Xu Gan most
resonated is the Li ji, which declares: "respect, modesty, gravity, and reverence are

what the Rites teaches" (gong jian zhuang jing, Li jiao ye iWM , t*)~T). Not
only does the Li ji quote Confucius as saying that the most important thing in
observing the rites is reverence, but it opens with this command: "Never be irrever-
ent; be solemn as in contemplation, and speak calmly and assuredly, so that the
common people will be pacific." According to the Li ji, there are two basic reasons
for the necessity of teaching reverence and gravity: (1) "the junzi can become
stronger every day by being reverent and grave," and (2) "if one's outward appear-
ance is irreverent or ungrave, even for a moment, insolence will enter into one [and
others as well]" (Liji, pp. 13, 269, 343).
As for Xu Gan's stipulation-gravity toward inferiors and reverence toward
superiors-such an imperative is not only moral but has a sociopolitical aspect. To
understand its sociopolitical necessity, we need to understand the traditional Chi-
nese concept of human society, which is the fourth basic assumption underpinning
the Confucian politics of appearance.
The fourth assumption is that the cosmos and human society are inherently
hierarchical. For both realms consist of valorized gradations of orderly and harmo-
nious relationships, so that everyone has their proper place in relation to others,
high or low, superior or inferior, noble or humble, just as Heaven is above Earth in
the universe, male above female among animals, husband above wife, father above
son, and the ruler above his subjects in human society. These discriminations (bian
7), however, do not divide or isolate but distinguish (fen ft) things or people, be-
cause the ancient Chinese were convinced that peace, order, and prosperity result
from harmonious (he fn) interactions (jiao iZ) between things, as between Heaven
and Earth in their intermingling of Yang and Yin, or as between men and women in
lovemaking. Hence, for the Confucians, differentiating distinctions and harmonious
interactions were the two fundamental principles that order and unify human society.
The "Yi zhuan" cosmologizes (and thereby justifies) these two principles:
"Heaven is superior, and Earth inferior, so that Qian and Kun are distinguished. As
the high and the low are shown, the noble and the humble are positioned; as activity

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 and tranquillity have constancy, the strong and the weak are determined...."29
By valorizing and hierarchizing Heaven and Earth, as symbolized by the first two
hexagrams of the Yi ching (i.e., Qian $2 and Kun V4), the "Yi zhuan" thus implies the
necessity of distinctions among all things.
On the other hand, the "Yi zhuan" also emphasizes that intimate intercourse
produces and unites all things in and of the universe.

[Because] Heaven and Earth embrace and interact, all things come into existence, pure
and simple; [because] the male and the female commingle their essences, all lives are
born.

The Master [Confucius] says: "Indeed, Qian and Kun are the gate of the Yi. Qian is the
Yang, and Kun the Yin. The Yang and the Yin join their powers; then, the strong and
the weak have embodiments, which incarnate the creations of Heaven and Earth and the
divine attainment." (Zhouyi, pp. 382, 383)

Moreover, the Tuan At commentaries on hexagrams Tai * and Pi W further politi-

cize the necessity of clear distinctions and harmonious interactions among the things
by remarking that just as the interactions of Heaven and Earth connect all things, the

interactions of what is above (shang _) and what is below (xia T), that is, the ruler
and the ruled, unite their wills; otherwise, there would be "no state under the sun"
(tianxia wu bang fT i 4) (Zhouyi, pp. 66, 72).
It is well known that Confucianism, without blinking, accepts that human society
and relationships are hierarchical.30 For instance, two of Confucius' counsels on
government were that (1) "The ruler must be the ruler, subjects the subjects, fathers
the fathers, and sons the sons" and (2) government "must start by rectifying names"
(zheng ming iEL4) (Lunyu 12 :11, 13 : 3). Whereas modern scholars rightly note the
regulative moral function of rectifying names,31 Xunzi tersely articulated its socio-
political objectives: to "indicate the noble and the humble" (ming guijian ~1WAR)
and to "discriminate similarities and differences" (bian tongyi [I ).32 In sum, the
Confucian rectification of names dictates that each and every member of a society
must fulfill his/her familial, social, political, and moral duties, that is, the responsi-
bilities required by his/her station in the familial and social hierarchy, and implied
by the names or titles by which s/he is addressed.
Predicated on the inequality of things and the indispensability of division of
labor, Mencius' famous argument against the agriculturist proposal that the ruler
farm like a farmer is also an argument for social distinctions. Mencius contended that
there are things for "great people" to do, and things for "lesser people" to do; there
are people working by their brains, and people working by their brawn; the former
are to rule, and the latter to be ruled. This is the "universal righteousness" (tianxia
zhi tongyi ~;XTit), the violation of which will cause chaos in the world (Mengzi
3A:4). Likewise, Xunzi maintained that because they not only separate humans from
wild animals but, more importantly, organize humans into an efficient society, the
hierarchical social distinctions are therefore absolutely indispensable to humankind;
without them, human desires will run amok in pursuit of gratification, causing end-
less strife among people; in consequence, people will become disorderly, divided,

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weak, and unable to conquer other things in the world. Xunzi's definition of socio-
political differentiation (bie 1) was that "There are ranks between the noble and the
humble, differences between the old and the young, and proper places for the rich,
the poor, the important, and the insignificant in society" (Xunzi, pp. 37, 81, 88, 89,
90, 195). And the Liji proclaims that these distinctions are "unalterable" (bu ke bian
ge T4N~VV) (Li ji, p. 236).
However, not all distinctions can render humankind the most powerful of all
species under the sun; only righteous distinctions can bring about social harmony:

How do distinctions work? Answer: by righteousness. Distinguishing by righteousness

creates harmony. If there is harmony, there is unity; if there is unity, there is a great
physical power; if there is a great physical power, there is strength; if there is strength,
things can be conquered. (Xunzi, p. 234)

Thus, by treating social harmony as a means of empowerment, Xunzi echoed Con-

fucius' assertion that "because of [social] harmony, there would never be a shortage
[of man-power or material supplies]" (he wu gua tii~) (Lunyu 16:1). Similarly,
Mencius valued the "harmonious solidarity of the people" (renhe XA) over "heaven-
given opportunities" (tianshi ?f) and "geographical advantage" (dili 1AJl) in warfare
(Mengzi 2B:1). And the importance of social harmony was further emphasized by
later Confucians.33 Hence, Joseph Needham is astute in observing that a crucial as-
pect of Confucianism concerns "just and harmonious social relationships."34
For the Confucians, the most important means for bringing out sociopolitical
distinctions and harmony were the rites and music. Xunzi not only asserted that "no
distinctions are more important than [those dictated by] the rites" (fen mo da yu li
-~Ra ); he also called music "the great unifier of the world, the key to harmony"
(tianxia zhi daqi, zhonghe zhi ji i t ? , p'FZ), and it is by the rites and
music that the former kings had guided people to live with each other, in a way that
was both orderly and harmonious (Xunzi, pp. 37, 215). Echoing Xunzi's view of the
rites and music, the Li ji states that while "the rites are what distinguish the world" (li

zhe, tiandi zhi bie ye k , >ra)hftZ ), "music is what harmonizes the world"
(yue zhe, tiandi zhi he ye kW , )Ui ~tt ) (Li ji, p. 259).
With regard to the relationship between the rites and politics, the Li ji likens
the former to a balance, a carpenter's line marker, compasses, and square, or to the
ruler's "great handle" (dabing kiQf) on politics-in a word, the instrument to rectify
the state. Moreover, Confucius is quoted as saying that the greatest "human way"
(rendao }A ) is politics, the basis of which is the rites; the greatest way to conduct
politics is to distinguish and love; the greatest way to distinguish and love is by the
rites; and the greatest way to observe the rites is reverence (Li ji, pp. 163, 344, 347-
351). As shown above, moreover, a principal task of the rites was to regulate and
refine the human appearances.

III

Because it was believed that appearances are correlated with reality/truth, that the
outer/external is correlated with the inner/internal, and especially that the outer/

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 external can change the inner/internal, in the eyes of the ancient Chinese, therefore,
appearances were forever significant and important: not only did they manifest, re-
flect, or signify something deep and profound, but they were also capable of serious
consequences. For the Confucians, these consequences were more often than not
sociopolitical, concerned with the maintenance or destruction of social order and
harmony. This Confucian preoccupation with politics (which should be fairly clear
from our previous discussion and will become clearer in the discussion below) led to
an extensive politicization of appearances by attaching sociopolitical importance to
them or deriving it from them.
The "Yi zhuan" exemplifies the Confucian politicization of natural phenomena.
Here we learn that the sage-kings, from Baoxi to Yao and Shun, ruled the world
by watching its appearances, for example, images in the sky, forms on the earth, the
traces of animals and birds on the ground (and later the Yi); thereby the sage-kings
taught, benefited, ordered, guarded, and dominated the world (Zhouyi, p. 374). In
other words, by observing the phenomenal world (or its hexagramic equivalent), the
ancient sage-kings understood how to lead a civilized life and rule accordingly.
Thus, the Li ji asserts that "The sages penetrated Heaven, Earth, and the Divine in
order to govern" (Li ji, p. 163). Of course, the most important of the sociopolitical
lessons that the sage-kings learned from the phenomena of the universe was that
an orderly and peaceful society is organized in a valorized hierarchy, clearly dis-
tinguished and harmoniously interactive, just like Heaven and Earth or Qian and
Kun.

Joseph Needham is right in saying that "the system of Zhouyi is in a sense the
mirror image of Chinese bureaucratic society."35 For if natural phenomena are de-
void of human meanings, then the sociopolitical significance that the sage-kings
derived from the phenomenal world was indeed a result of an anthropomorphizing
projection and analogy: the sages projected onto the phenomenal cosmos their
conception of the sociopolitical order of the human world in which they lived, and
then used the resultant concept of the cosmic order-as an analogy-to legitimize
(their original conception of) the human order. This was a common tactic in ancient
Chinese thought: legitimization by cosmologization.
Equally politicized was human appearance. According to the "grand model"
(hongfan WE) of government in the Shangshu, human appearance is one of the
wushi iEK (five things, or five acts) that comprise human behavior: appearance,
speaking, looking, listening, thinking. Each of these five acts targets a desired result:
to appear properly so that one will be reverent; to speak appropriately so that one's
words will be obeyed; to look closely so that one will see clearly; to listen attentively
so that one can hear afar; to think deeply so that one will understand thoroughly. As
the author of the "grand model" suggested, and as his later commentators Zheng
Xuan n 4 (127-200) and Kong Yingda T h!i (574-648) emphasized, these results
were of sociopolitical significance. That is, reverence brings about gravity and re-
spect; obedience brings order and stability; clear vision, clarity to everything; hear-
ing afar, good plans; and thorough understanding, sagehood.36 It seems no coinci-
dence, therefore, that the Shijing admonishes a prince: "Be careful with your words,

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/ Be scrupulous in your appearance and demeanor," so that "You can become a
model for your people" (Shi jing, no. 256).
Hence, human appearance here refers first of all to the junzi or the junzi ruler's
appearance, demeanor, and language in public, because such appearance was
believed to be most capable of sociopolitical impact. Confucius not only stated that
proper personal appearance and language were among the nine main concerns
of the junzi (Lunyu 16:10); the Master also blatantly politicized the junzi ruler's
appearance-(1) by attributing the effortlessly successful reign of King Shun to his
simply maintaining a ritual kingly appearance, that is, a grave and reverent posture
on the throne facing due south; (2) by suggesting that the second important thing in
politics after rectifying names was for the junzi ruler to have his words obeyed, or
nothing would be accomplished; and (3) by affirming that the junzi ruler's words
could sometimes found or ruin a state (ibid., 13:3, 13 :15, 15:5, 17:18).
The "Yi zhuan" not only reiterates the importance of the junzi's words and the
miraculous power of the kingly posture on the throne (Zhouyi, pp. 357, 360, 395),
but relates that order and peace reigned in the world when the sage-Kings Huang Di,
Yao, and Shun simply put on their yishang AR (upper and lower garments) in ac-
cordance with Qian and Kun (ibid., p. 374). We may construe the putting on of
the regal attire here as (symbolizing) the establishment of the proper order of the
world, the distinctions-represented by Qian and Kun-between the high and the
low, the superior and the inferior, the noble and the humble. Indeed, the rites con-
tain detailed dress codes to demarcate social distinctions, stipulating that people,
especially the ruling class, attire themselves in accordance with their ranks and
stations.37

It is logical that the Confucian politicization of the human appearance culmi-

nates in the rites, the regulator and refiner of the junzi's comportment, the ruler's
"great handle" on politics. Chapter 43 of the Liji, on the capping ceremony upon a
man's twentieth birthday that marks the advent of his adulthood, opens with these
statements:

What make human beings human are the rites and righteousness. The beginning of the
rites and righteousness lies in rectifying one's appearance, dignifying one's countenance,
and ordering one's words. After the appearance is rectified, the countenance is dignified,
and the words are ordered, the rites and righteousness will be complete and ready to
rectify the relationship between the ruler and subjects, to bring fathers and sons closer,
and to harmonize the old and the young. After the relationship between the ruler and
subjects is rectified, fathers and sons are brought closer, and the old and the young
harmonized, the rites and righteousness will be established. Thus, after wearing a cap,
one's attire is complete; after the attire is complete, the appearance will be rectified, the
countenance dignified, and the words ordered. Therefore, the capping ceremony is the
beginning of the rites. (Liji, p. 444)

By implication, proper human appearance helps to bring about an orderly,

peaceful, and harmonious society. Thus, the same chapter holds that because of its
sociopolitical importance, the ancient sage-kings attached great importance to the

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 capping ceremony. In a similar vein, chapter 39 of the Liji moralizes and politicizes
the "dark robes" (shenyi r) of the ruling class, while chapter 19 maintains that if
the junzi uses music to harmonize himself inside and the rites to rectify himself out-
side, then,

when the common people look at his countenance, they will not [dare to] contend with
him; when they look at his appearance and deportment, they will not [dare to] be inso-
lent to him. So as his virtues shine inwardly, the common people will all obey him; and
as his principles emit outwardly, all of them will follow him. Therefore, it is said that if the
way of the rites and music is followed, and if the rites and music are used in cooperation,
the world will be free from trouble. (Liji, p. 270)

Furthermore, chapter 19 describes this powerful appearance on the part of the junzi
as grave and reverent.
As many classics would attest, the constant Confucian emphasis on gravity and
reverence resulted from a forceful politicization of the gravity and respectability of
the junzi. The "grand model" in the Shangshu decrees that human appearance
begins with gong A (reverence) (Shangshu, p. 235). Yet in the case of the ruler's
appearance before his subjects, gong actually means an awe-inspiring gravity that
rouses in subjects reverence, seriousness (su K), and fear (wei A-). So when the wise
and righteous Duke Bi "governed his inferiors with a stern countenance, nobody
dared not to revere or obey his words" (ibid., p. 418). Similarly, when asked about
how to make people revere their ruler, Confucius replied, "Rule over them with
gravity; they will then be respectful" (Lin zhi yi zhuang ze jing V~ 2IMW ) (Lunyu
2:20).
The Li ji describes the causality of the majestic gravity and the resultant respect
from the subjects with a heart-body analogy, the heart standing for the ruler and the
body the common people: when the heart is grave, the body will be in order and
comfortable; when the heart is serious, the body will appear reverent. At another
point, the Li ji suggests that the reason for this powerful effect of the ruler on his
subjects is that "gravity and respectability generate powerful rigor and dignity"
(zhuangjing ze yanwei AMOrR ). As a result, seeing the junzi, the common people
will never dare to be careless or unruly but heedful and obedient, and the world will
be in order and at peace. But if the junzi appears other than grave, the common
people will become contentious and disobedient, and chaos will ensue (Li ji, pp.
269, 400).
Here the Li ji echoes Confucius' warnings that "without seriousness the junzi
will not have dignity and power" (junzi bu zhong, ze bu wei Rf19 , PJUTfA), and
that if the junzi ruler "does not rule with gravity, the common people will not re-
vere him" (bu zhuang yi lin zhi, ze min bu jing T;1N Z , rF-4At ) (Lunyu 1 :8,
15: 33). According to the "Yi zhuan," Confucius held that inferior people cannot
be disciplined except by dignity and power (Zhouyi, p. 379). In emphasizing the
necessity of the junzi's gravity toward the common people, moreover, Confucius
also suggested the necessity of rousing through the junzi's grave appearance another
feeling in the common people: fear.

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 Confucius thought that the junzi's appearance should be "so stern that looking
at him, people will fear him" (yanran ren wang er wei zhi ~~YtAi Z) (Lunyu
20:2). The Liji also quotes him as saying that if the junzi properly comports himself,
"his demeanor will be fearful, his countenance dreadful, and his words trustworthy"
(mao zu wei ye, se zu dan ye, yan zu xin ye -Rftl ) i' ) `P) (Li ji,
p. 385). With this expectation of the ruler in his appearance, Mencius was dis-
appointed at Duke Xiang of Liang, because he appeared neither like a ruler nor as
inspiring fear (Mengzi 1 A: 6). Although inspiring fear also plays an important role in
making the junzi ruler serious and careful about his duties (Shangshu, p. 338), the
feeling of fear here primarily refers to the subjects' own response to their ruler.
As such, the Confucian politics of grave and reverent appearance was in effect
the politics of awe, in which the ruler's gravity before his subjects was employed as
a "scare tactic" to ensure a trouble-free government and a peaceful society. This
explains why Xu Gan insisted on gravity toward inferiors and why the Li ji declares
that the objective of the rites is to teach gravity and reverence. Moreover, the Con-
fucian politics of awe also accounts for the detailed regulations in the Li ji for the
junzi's demeanor: his "feet should appear steady, hands respectful, eyes straight,
mouth closed, voice quiet, head upright, breathing solemn, stance virtuous, and
countenance grave" (Liji, p. 218).
For Confucius, clothes offered an efficient means for the junzi to empower his
appearance. When asked how the junzi can appear powerful without looking fierce,
Confucius instructed to "adjust his robe and cap to dignify his looks" (zheng qi
yiguan, zun qi zhanshi iE4A ) 4_-lPm) (Lunyu 20:2). Moreover, Xunzi pointed
out that war dances could also make one's appearance and bearing grave; and that
grave and solemn music could make people orderly, so that no enemy state would
dare to invade them (Xunzi, pp. 214-215).
Hence, the junzi's grave and reverent appearance in public was indispensable:
not only would his appearance assist the junzi's self-cultivation and transform him
into "a model for the common people" (wei min zhi ze *Ki ZA) (Shi jing, no. 256),
but it was believed that his proper public image also influenced public order, peace,
and the fate of the empire.

IV

Although it is difficult to verify the alleged sociopolitical impact of the junzi's ap-
pearance, one consequence was nevertheless visible: the traditional Chinese junzi's
disproportionately long face in public. For in order to dignify and empower his
public appearance, he had to curb his mirth, because a smiling face was (and still
is) seldom deemed reverent or awe-inspiring. On the contrary, levity was usually
regarded as the opposite of gravity and reverence; as Fuzi once remarked, "The
guest laughed when looking at me. This was disrespectful."38 Although the rites
give few explicit injunctions prohibiting a junzi's public display of mirth except that
filial sons "should never be free with slander or laughter" (bu gou zi, bu gou xiao

Z< , ) (Li ji, p. 16), it is nonetheless conceivable that the rites' stringent

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 requirement of gravity and reverence in public, once internalized by the junzi, cre-
ated a self-enforcing vigilance against his expression of humor in public.
This watchfulness was further heightened by a stoic and cautious Chinese atti-
tude toward making sport that saw mirth, playfulness, and humor in a negative light.
Thus, in the "Jingwen" Ur- section of the Zhouyi, joviality (xixi OAA) among women
and children was interpreted as an ominous sign, while in the "Yi zhuan" it came to
signify "a lapse in the family rules" (shijiajie ) (Zhouyi, p. 200). The Shangshu
reflected a similar view on the national level by attributing the downfall of a king-
dom to the king's indulgence in dissolute amusements (yinxi i~S) (Shangshu, p.
193). Therefore, another king admonished his subjects against xidai a, (making
sport and indolence) (ibid., p. 170).
The admonition against making sport was also an admonition against jesting.
The junzi was instructed to be careful with jesting because the language (yan -) of
jest was viewed as inherently malicious (nje 1), as suggested by the formation of
the classical Chinese term for jest, xue M (malicious words).
As noted above, Confucius regarded the junzi's words as capable of effect-
ing dire consequences. Therefore, the Confucian classics call for shenyan It-: "Be
always careful with your words" (shen er chuhua i[A MM) (Shi jing, no. 256).
According to the "Yi zhuan," Confucius insisted on the sociopolitical necessity of
shenyan by warning that "words can be the stairs leading to the birth of disorder"
(luan zhi suo sheng, ze yanyu yiwei jie ALZff , ' IL- M), and he further
cautioned that "Words and deeds are what the junzi uses to move Heaven and
Earth. Can he not be careful with them?" (Yanxing, junzi suoyi dong tiandi, ke bu
shen hu? ' , TfIC~~ ', ifTd?) (Zhouyi, pp. 357, 360). It is safe to say
that such a discreet attitude toward speech had much to do with the formation of the
traditional Chinese virtue of being taciturn or of few words (guayan $-).
If playfulness and playful language are necessary for humor, then the vigilance
against making sport is also vigilance against humor. Again Xu Gan best represented
the corollary of the stoic and cautious attitude above, as well as of the Confucian
politics of appearance, when he enjoined that in order to establish a model appear-
ance "the junzi must never jest with his words, or with his body" (junzi kou wu xixue
zhi yan, shen wu xixue zhi xing Rf ni~ , aIMR) (Zhong lun, p. 3).
Here Xu Gan seemed to be saying that the junzi should shun humor altogether,
sounding indeed like a "rotten Confucian" (furu Afj) whose overseriousness not
only killed the joy of life but corrupted the human heart and mores, according to

Feng Menglong V.,ig (1574-1646), who, among other things, was a compiler of
several Chinese joke books.39 But Xu Gan and Feng Menglong both exaggerated, for
the rites never required the junzi to be grim-faced all the time; even Confucius "did
not care about his appearance at home" (ju bu rong )f~K-) (Lunyu 10:24). As a
matter of fact, the Li ji stipulates: "At home the junzi should appear gentle" (yanju
gao wenwen MERE) (Li ji, pp. 218-219). It is arguable, then, that a private
gentleness actually helped to foster a junzi's private humor, and that in effect the
rites imply that humor, rather than being prohibited altogether, ought to be regulated
and limited to the proper times and places like all other kinds of human behavior.40

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 Indeed, the Confucian politics of appearance may make less sense to us than to
the ancient Chinese, because we may no longer share their convictions concerning
the necessary correlation between appearance and reality/truth, the mutual influ-
ence between the inner/internal and the outer/external, the hierarchical arrangement
of human relationships, or the immanent sociopolitical significance of natural phe-
nomena. The way in which common beliefs are formed and undergo change is a
complex matter, and it is often difficult to prove their validity. William James once
said that "The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's
existence."41 In the case of the Confucian politics of appearance, however, certain
underlying traditional beliefs and attitudes caused the Chinese junzi's sense of hu-
mor to vanish when he appeared in public.

Notes

1 - Lin Yutang, "Youmo zahua," in Lin Yutang xuanji, Dushu yuwen (Taipei:
Dushu Chubanshe, 1969), pp. 1 73, 177, and his introduction to Chinese Wit
and Humor, ed. George Kao (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946), p. xxxi.

2 - See David R. Knechtges, "Wit, Humor, and Satire in Early Chinese Literature
(to A.D. 220)," Monumenta Serica 29 (1971): 81; Yan Guanglin, Xiao: jinchi yu
danbo (Tianjin: Guoji Wenhua Chubangongsi, 1989), pp. 28, 113, 115; and
Chen Xiaoying, Youmo de aomi (Beijing: Zhongguo Xiju Chubanshe, 1989),
pp. 159, 161.
3 - Xun Kuang, "Xing'e pian," in Xunzi, ed. Geng Yun (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji
Chubanshe, 1996), p. 255. All quotations from the Xunzi are taken from this
edition.

4 - The Oxford English Dictionary, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), vol. 1, p. 566. The Latin root of "appear" is
apparere, which means "to come into sight" or "come forth," and is thus akin
to the Greek peparein, "to display" (Webster's New World Dictionary of the
American Language, ed. David B. Guralnik [New York and Cleveland: World
Publishing Company, 1972], p. 66).

5 - "Xici shang," in Zhouyi quanyi, ed. Xu Zihong (Guiyangshi: Guizhou Renmin

Chubanshe, 1991), p. 366. All quotations from the Zhouyi are taken from this
edition and are hereafter cited as "Zhouyi." It is only accurate to call the "Yi
zhuan" a Confucian classic, rather than the hexagrams and the two interpretive
texts, that is, the "Guaci" and "Yaoci," which comprise the so-called "Jing-
wen" ff rZ of the Zhouyi, because the latter texts came into being probably
long before Confucius was born. The so-called "Yi zhuan," as the tradition has
it, came from Confucius' hand.

6 - Laozi, chap. 14; "Xici xia," in Zhouyi, p. 381; Qian Zhongshu, Guanzhui bian
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 44-45. Zhang Zai's concept of

Weihe Xu 529

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 formless appearance may have derived from earlier classics, such as "Jingshen
xun" in Huannaizi, ed. Chen Guangzhong (Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1994),
p. 302. For examples of the Li ji's conception of human appearance, see my
discussion below.

7 - "Yue ji," in Li ji, ed. Zhang Wenxiu (Beijing Yanshan Chubanshe, 1995),
p. 263. All quotations from the Liji are taken from this edition.

8 - The Oxford English Dictionary, 11 :674.

9 - For this sense of qing, see A. C. Graham, Later Mohist Notes: Ethics and
Science (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), pp. 179-182, and his
Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle: Open
Court, 1989), pp. 98, 478.

10 - The Oxford English Dictionary, 11 :674.

11 - Cf. Guodian Chumu zhujian JX~~ffrJrl (Beijing: Wenwu Chubanshe, 1998),

p. 13; A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. and comp. Wing-Tsit Chan
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 183, 184, 245, 246, 499,
524; and Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism: The Light of Asia (Woodbury and
New York: Barron's Educational Series, 1968), pp. 161-163.

12 - Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, chap. 3, "Analytic of Principles."

13 - Cf. "Tiandao," in Zhuangzi quanyi, p. 236, wherein the author unequivocally

negates appearances' necessary manifestation of reality/truth.

14 - Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism, pp. 163-164.

15 - Cf. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1952), vol. 1, p. 390.

16 - This analogy of microcosm and macrocosm is borrowed from Gerald Swanson,

who has noted that the analogy is "a basic presupposition of the Book of
Changes." See Gerald Swanson, "The Concept of Change in the Great Trea-
tise," in Exploration in Early Chinese Cosmology, ed. Henry Rosemont Jr.
(Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), p. 76. Cf. also Joseph Needham's discussion
of macrocosm and microcosm in connection with the Zhouyi, in Science and
Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), vol. 2,
pp. 294-303.
Moreover, Franklin M. Doeringer holds that "the formless" or "the ultimate"
and "the formed," "the phenomenal," or "the nonultimate" constitute the
two aspects of reality that the authors of the "Xici" envisioned, and compares
them to Mircea Eliade's "the nonmanifest" or "chaos" and "the manifest" or
"cosmos." See Franklin M. Doeringer, "The Gate in the Circle: A Paradigmatic
Symbol in Early Chinese Cosmology," Philosophy East and West 32 (3) (July
1982): 310, 315, 316.

530 Philosophy East & West

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17 - Needham might also have had this in mind when he remarked that the Zhouyi
"led to a stylisation of concepts almost analogous to the stylisations which have
in some ages occurred in art forms, and which finally prevented painters from
looking at Nature at all." See Needham, Science and Civilisation in China,
2:336.

18 - Guodian Chumu zhujian, p. 180, 183.

19 - Stephen Owen, Readings in Chinese Literary Thought (Cambridge [M
London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1992), p

20 - Ibid., p. 23.
21 - At one point, however, the Li ji seems to contradict this belief by sayin
"People so hide their hearts that they are unfathomable. Likes and dislikes
in people's hearts and are thus not visible in their countenances." See "Li y
in Liji, p. 164.
22 - Stephen Owen has also given an insightful discussion of the subject. See
Owen, Readings in Chinese Literary Thought, pp. 19-23.

23 - See the Shijing (Book of songs), no. 256; "Xinshu xia" and "Neiye," in Guanzi,
ed. Chen Yonghan (Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 493, 571;
Mengzi 6B:6, 7A:21; Zhuangzi, "Yufu," in Zhuangzi quanyi, ed. Zhang
Gengguang (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), p. 573; "Wen
Wang shizi" and "Daxue," in Liji, pp. 151, 437.
24 - Cf. "Xinshu shang," "Xinshu xia," and "Neiye," in Chen Yonghan, Guanzi, pp.
282, 286-288, 339-344; A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Dao, pp. 100-105.
25 - Chad Hansen, "Freedom and Moral Responsibility in Confucian Ethics," Phi-
losophy East and West 32 (2) (April 1972): 173, 174.
26 - "Hongfan," in jinguwen Shangshu quanyi, ed. Jiang Hao (Guiyangshi: Gui-
zhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1990), p. 235. All quotations from this work are
taken from this edition and hereafter cited as Shangshu.

27 - Xu Gan, "Faxiang," in Zhong lun, in Congshu jicheng chubian, ed. Wang

Yunwu (Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1939), vol. 530, pp. 2-3. All quotations from
the Zhong lun are taken from this edition.

28 - "Hongfan," in Shangshu, p. 235; The Book of Songs: The Ancient Chinese

Classic of Poetry, trans. Arthur Waley (New York: Grove Press, 1996), pp. 257,
287; "Xici shang," in Zhouyi, p. 359; and Mengzi 6A: 6.
29 - "Xici shang," in Zhouyi, p. 349. Cf. "Tiandao," in Zhuangzi quanyi, pp. 224-
225.

30 - T'ung-tsu Ch'u, Law and Society in Traditional China (Paris: Mouton, 1961),
pp. 226-230; Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 23-29; Benjamin I. Schwartz, The
World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge [MA] and London: Belknap

Weihe Xu 531

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 Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 68; Karyn L. Lai, "Confucian Moral
Thinking," in Philosophy East and West 45 (2) (April 1995): 263.

31 - Lai, "Confucian Moral Thinking," pp. 251-253.

32 - Xun Kuang, "Zhengming pian," in Xunzi, p. 234.
33 - See Ban Gu, Han shu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1990), vol. 9, p. 2616.
34 - Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 2:3.

35 - Ibid., p. 338. Cf. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 29-
35.

36 - "Hongfan," in Shangshu, pp. 235-236; Shangshu zhushu, in Sibu beiyao

(Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua Shuju, 1965), vol. 3, p. 113.
37 - Cf. Liji, chap. 13, pp. 212-216, and chap. 39, pp. 420-425; and Xunzi, pp.
89, 276.

38 - Zhanguo ce, juan 21, ed. Liu Xiang (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe,
1998), vol. 1, p. 757.
39 - Feng Menglong, Gu jin xiao (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe, 1985),
p. 9.

40 - Actually, I shall make this argument in an another study of traditional Chinese

attitudes toward humor.

41 - William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
(New York, London, and Bombay: Longmans Green and Co., 1905), p. 25.

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