Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan

Author(s): Hamza Alavi

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51 (Dec. 21-27, 2002), pp. 5119-5124
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412987
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 Social Forces and Ideology in the
Making of Pakistan
Religious parties were implacably hostile to the Pakistan Movement. When, inaugurating
Pakistan's constituent assembly, Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's secular ideology he
was voicing the established secular ideological position that the Muslim League had adhered
to throughout its career. Futndanmentalist Islamic ideology played no part in the origins of
Pakistan, although contemporary ideologues of Islamic fundamtentalism, including
academics, claim that it was Islamic ideology and slogans that created Pakistan and that
they therefore have the right to decide its future.

HAMZA ALA\VI

isolate the Bengali nationalists by raising

ments of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran
and the Sunna.' That was not intended, asreligious slogans. Slogans of 'Islamic'
M a 'any of you will recall Mohammad yet, to signal adoption of Islamic ideology.
ideology and 'Islamic' identity were taken
Ali Jinnah's well known speech That was made quite clear in the speech
up to counter Bengali anger. Instead of
that he gave when inaugurating of Liaquat Ali Khan when he moved the looking at the underlying causes of Bengali
Pakistan's new constituent assembly. In objectives resolution. This was no more
discontent, they put forward an argument
that speech he spelt out the secular vision than a formal nod in the direction of that we are all 'Muslims and Pakistanis'
and therefore we cannot be Bengalis or
for the new country, which had inspired religious rhetoric, without actually restrict-
him and others through the many decades ing the constitution in any way. When Sindhis or Baluch or Pathan. This was an
of struggle. He said: ethnic redefinition which had little to do
moving the objectives resolution Liaquat
You may belong to any religion or caste explicitly ruled out mullah ideology.with He religious values as such. It was merely
or creed. That has nothing to do with the said: 'Sir, I just now said that the people
a bankrupt political argument which led
business of the state. ... We are starting are the real recipients of power. This,
only to disaster.
with this fundamental principle that we are naturally, eliminates any danger of the
In response to the Bengali movement,
all citizens and equal citizens of the state.
establishment of a theocracy'. That therefore,
was the Final Report of the BPC,
...We should keep that in front of us as
followed, in September 1950 by thepresented
In- on December 22, 1952, now
our ideal and you will find that in the
course of time Hindus will cease to be contained a large dose of 'Islamic' ideol-
terim Report of the Basic Principles Com-
Hindus and Muslims will cease to be mittee (BPC) which too said little about
ogy. G W Choudhury, jumped with joy
Islamic and wrote: 'The second draft constitution
Muslims, not in the religious sense be- ideology. Indeed, G W Choudhury,
cause that is the personal faith ofwhoeachwas a committed Islamist, said that(which was his name for the final report
it contained
individual, but in the political sense, as ofas
'very little if any provision the BPC) was noted for its elaborate
citizens of the state. to the Islamic character of the new con- provisions relating to the Islamic character
It was not until 1952 that Jinnah's stitution. The ulama, he continued were of the proposed constitution.' (ibid, p 31).
unworthy successors turned away from most unhappy about that. (Speeches and Liaquat and his cohort, when faced with
Documents
that secular ideal and began to exploit the on the Constitution of Paki- the challenge of regional movements as
stan, p 30)
worn out rhetoric of religion to restore well as a crumbling party, shouted even
However, before the BPC could move
their failing political fortunes. They cried more loudly that 'Islam was in danger'.
out that 'Islam was in danger'! Coming
on to prepare its final report, a major event Nearly five years after partition, thus,
from them, that was an insincere, bogus
took place which shook the foundations Islamic ideology was adopted by our
of the state of Pakistan to its roots. On
and empty slogan, when they had nothing mediocre rulers, who had nothing positive
February 21, 1952 the historic Bengali
positive to offer to the people. Our totter- to offer to the people. To make this about-
ing leadership believing mistakenlylanguage
that movement erupted spontaneously turn more credible, they decided to give
the slogan of Islam would be sufficientall over
to East Bengal, with great force. For
the newfound religious ideology an insti-
silence any opposition, resorted to several
that days the whole of East Bengal was tutional form. A board of Talimat-i-Islamia
stratagem. in the hands of the language movement was set up and the senior ulama whom
At first they had not yet gone beyond committee. Surprised at the unbelievable Liaquat had persuaded to find their for-
paying lip-service to the name of Islam. success of the movement, its leadership tunes in Pakistan, were given jobs in it.
In March 1949, the constituent assembly was unprepared to take the movement any The board was not to have any real
adopted the 'Objectives Resolution' which further forward. In a few days it subsided.
powers. Pakistan's ruling bureaucracy was
included a clause which said that: 'Mus- But it remained a major potential chal- in no mood to share power with mullahs.
lims shall be enabled to order their lives,
lenge. Rather foolishly Pakistan's rulingTherefore, the function of the board was
elite, instead of going some way to meet
in the individual and the collective spheres, only advisory and that too on matters spe-
in accord with the teachings and require- Bengali demands, thought that they could cifically referred to it. 'Advice' from the

Economic and Political Weekly December 21, 2002 5119

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board was not binding on the government. predominantly non-Muslim. The educated and depend on careers in salaried employ-
When the board did make suggestions, classes that were behind modern Indian ment, overwhelmingly in the government
they were unceremoniously brushed aside. in the absence of a large enough private
Muslim politics were absent in those areas.
But the senior ulama seemed to be happy It was in northern India, that modern sector. Associated with the salariat were
enough with their well paid jobs and at- Indian Muslim politics were triggered off professionals such as lawyers and doctors.
tendant prestige. Recalcitrant mullahs such by the new Anglo-vernacular language For them the new language policy meant
as Maulana Maududi found themselves in policy that was introduced by the British that they too had to have English educa-
jail. Such nominal concessions to Islamicin the 19th century. It abolished the use tion. Competing with the Muslim salariat
ideology continued under successive gov- of Persian as the official language. Persian and professionals were Hindus who as-
ernments until Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, withwas the language of the northern Indian, pired to similar employment in govern-
his misguided populist policies, reactivatedMuslim Ashraf, the pre-colonial ruling ment or as professionals. Unfortunately,
the mullahs who, ironically, turned out toelite. Abolition of Persian as the official given the communal (caste!) structure of
be his nemesis. General Zia, in turn, lack-language hit them hard. To qualify for Indian society, Muslim and Hindu mem-
bers of the salariat and professionals were
ing all legitimacy, decided for his part togovernmentjobs, they had to take to English
exploit Islam to the hilt. Several decadeseducation. Hindu service castes, like pitted against each other because their lives
and careers were embedded within rival
later, we are still suffering from his legacykayasthas, khatris and Kashmiri brahmins
which even successive democraticallyin northern India (or the baidyas, kayasthas institutionalised communities. The mutual
elected governments have failed to undo. and brahmins in Bengal) took to English competition between the Muslim and Hindu
The unexpected successes of fundamen-education more rapidly and competed more salariat was of no direct concern for the vast
talist religious parties in the general elec-successfully for jobs than the Muslim majority of Muslims or Hindus. Muslim
tions of 2002, testify to the fact that weAshraf had previously monopolised. Ashraf were preoccupied with questions
are reaping the inevitable fruit of the policy Muslims began to lose their primacy. about their own future and ignored poor
of placating them. Muslims and their problems. For example
In looking at the impact of colonial rule
Sweeping aside Jinnah' s clear statement on the Muslim Ashraf, we can divide them large numbers of Muslim Julahas were
about Pakistan ideology, his successorsinto three categories, for they were af- going through a profound crisis in the 19th
belatedly redefined it. In 1969 Generalfected differently. Firstly, there were thecentury, because of competition from mill
made cloth, both imported and locally
Yahya Khan's minister, General Sher Ali, landlords who were political allies of the
declared that 'Islamic ideology' was to beBritish for which they were much favoured.
produced in Indian textile mills. The Ashraf
'Pakistan ideology'. This solution wasAs a class they were the most loyal to the were unconcerned with the problems of
projected backwards into the past and raj. There were some exceptions though, the very poor and suffering Julahas. The
historians (in Pakistan and also abroad) like the rajas of Mahmoodabad (father and salariat and the professionals had their
have taken up the task of justifying thatson) who were active in the Muslim League. own specific interests to pursue. Compe-
bogus claim. Textbooks were rewritten.The second group of Muslim Ashraf were tition between these petit bourgeois Mus-
Today we are separated from our past bythe ulema, who were the hardest hit by the lim and Hindu groups, shaped the policies
half a century of lies. Even people withnew language policy. They lost out when of the All India Muslim League, and the
a secular outlook, have begun to wonderchildren who used to go to their madaris, Indian National Congress, respectively.
whether it was not religion, after all, that to learn Persian and Arabic, were now sent
They used concepts of Indian nationalism
really brought about the creation of Paki-to English teaching schools. The introduc- and Muslim nationalism, to legitimise their
stan. Some of them assume that there must narrow class demands.
tion of new statute law written in English,
have been a mass movement. How can a took away legal roles which the ulama There is a myth that Muslim Ashraf
performed by way of the application were
mass movement get off the ground without of underprivileged and backward. That
a powerful religious ideology driving shari'a
it. idea comes from William Hunter's book
law in particular cases or issuing
What other explanation could there be, fatawa on contentious issues or mediating on Indian Musalmans, which is based on
they ask. All this is mere conjecture. No disputes. These functions atrophied. In eastern Bengal data, where Muslims were
one has as yet examined the social forces response, the ulama at first engaged in truly underprivileged. But Muslim Ashraf
that were actually responsible for the militant campaigns against the British of northern India were over-privileged. In
(and the Sikh) and played a prominent role
creation of Pakistan. Our true past has been the UP, Muslims were only about 12 per
snatched from us and lies buried where it in the national revolt of 1857. They were cent of the population, a small minority.
cannot be found. We have to disinter it. crushed brutally. After the revolt the ulama Nevertheless, in 1857 Muslim Ashraf of
Let us therefore have a look at it. retreated into their seminaries such as the UP held no less than 64 per cent of posts
newly established dar-ul-uloom at Deoband in the subordinate judicial and executive
II or the older Firangi Mahal, etc. As a class, services (positions above that rank being
they did not re-enter the political arena the domain of the white-man). However,
Moder Indian Muslim politics had its until they were drawn into the Khilafat those highly privileged Muslim Ashraf were
beginnings in the Muslim minority prov- movement in 1918. rapidly losing that lead. By 1886 Muslims
inces of northern India, notably the UP, The most important Ashraf group, how- held only 45 per cent of those posts, though
and Bengal. In the Muslim majority areas ever, behind modern Indian Muslim poli- with a Muslim population of only 12 per
of western India, that now form Pakistan, tics, were the educated Ashraf who cent, they were still very privileged. These
namely, the Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan depended mainly on careers in govern- figures show that their lead was being cut
and the NWFP, Muslims were relatively ment employment. I have designated them down. Sir Syed Ahmad therefore proposed
backward and the urban population was as the 'salariat', i e, those who aspire thatto there should be a 50-50 quota each

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for the two communities. Modem Indian performance' at the behest of the viceroy, However, we must not turn our faces away
as part of a policy of divide-and-rule. Itfrom reality. ...The question before us is:
Muslim politics, in its origin, was therefore
quota politics and not a religious move- has now been established that this charge'What kind of education does our commu-
ment. English education was the key tohas no truth in it. Amongst others the nity want and need? In my view the kind
future prosperity. The Aligarh movement Indian historian Bimal Prasad has recentlyof education that we most need is educa-
sought to propagate English educationunravelled the details of that story to provetion that would be most useful in helping
amongst Muslims. Given Sir Syed Ahmad's that this charge is not at all true. Theus to deal with the affairs of this world
lead Muslim educational societies beganinitiative for the meeting came entirely ... which can help the coming generations
to come up all over India, to teach English.from Mohsin-ul Mulk. to earn their livelihood.' (Aimal Nama,
A new Anglo-vernacular culture, which Later in the same year, in December 1906, p 170). That was the essence ofthe Muslim
was relatively more oriented towards sci-the Muslim League was founded when League ideology.
ence and reason, began to evolve, thoughMuslim leaders met at Dhaka at the invita- Raza Ali warned that the need of the
often expressed in Indian idiom. It was thetion of Nawab Salimullah. But the UP Indian educated Muslim middle class was
culture of Muslim Ashraf salariat and Ashraf, led by Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk
notof
that of a hypothetical return to original
Islam and the creation of an 'Islamic State',
Aligarh, hijacked the new organisation
professional groups. It did not extend to
the poor, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. to be
taking all the top posts and a majority of ruled over by mullahs. Their most
The culture of the Muslim poor tendedtheto working committee memberships.urgent
The need was the provision of an edu-
be dominated by the mullahs. Sir Syed League took up secular demands ofcationthe that would help them in grappling
Ahmad pioneered the cause of English western educated Muslim professionalswith the affairs of this world; education
education and rational and scientific
and the salariat. Attempts to place the that
issue would help their coming generations
thought amongst Indian Muslims. He ofwas
Islamic ideology on the Muslim League
to earn their livelihood. He spelt out the
concerned only with the future of Muslim secular ideology of Muslim nationalism,
agenda were rare and invariably unsuccess-
Ashraf; not with the future of all Muslims clearly
ful. Religious ideology played no part in its reiterating the interests of the
inclusive of the poor. This is not widely ideology. Not surprisingly, the mullahs Muslim salariat and professional classes.
realised. Sir Syed Ahmad looked upon were hostile to the Muslim League from Shibli had to leave Aligarh, for it was not
'low born' people with aristocraticthe outset.
dis- a place where his theocratic ideas could
dain. Commenting upon qualifications Arguably,
for the earliest attempt to take up flourish.
membership of the viceroy's legislative Islamic ideology, was made by Shibli As for the Muslim League, as it attracted
council, for example, he expressed Nu'mani,
his who was committed to theo- more and more support, there was a parallel
whenvalues. He proposed that the Aligarh shift in its class support base. There was
deeply rooted class (caste?) prejudice cratic
syllabus should be Islamised. Shibli wanted an increased participation of men drawn
he said that 'It is essential for the viceroy's
council to have members of high social to change the syllabus away from English from more modest strata of society. Far
standing. Would our aristocracy likeand modern sciences, towards Islamic
that fewer of them were now from substantial
learning and the Arabic language. The landed families. According to Francis
a man of low caste or insignificant origin,
though he may be a B A or an M A response , and of the Muslim professional andRobinson, the great majority (of them)
have the requisite ability, be placed in a classes to that attempt is exempli-belonged to the class which occasionally
salariat
position of authority above them and fied
haveby the views of Sir Raza Ali, a lawyerhad a small pittance in rents from land but,
the power of making laws that affect who
theirwas a close and very influentialgenerally, in order to survive, had to find
lives and property?' collaborator of Sir Syed's successors,employment in service or the professions.
Mus- ul-Mulk and Viqar ul-Mulk, at theThat was a less privileged section of the
Political activity on behalf of the Mohsin
lim salariat and professionals emergedcentre
on of the Aligarh establishment. RazaMuslim Ashraf. Amongst them the Mus-
the public platform in 1906, when a
Ali attacked Shibli's proposal in an articlelim League found its enduring class base,
delegation of Muslim notables called on
published in The Statesman, of which he even though salariat members from better
Lord Minto the viceroy to lobby for offers
the an extract in his autobiography off families, some landlords like the Raja
Raza Ali wrote that there is sometimes
English educated Muslim Ashraf. When of Mahmudabad, the father (not to be
a conflict between reason and sentiments.
Nawab Mohsin ul-Mulk, who then headed confused with his equally active son, Amir
But,
the Aligarh establishment, learnt about he wrote, the conflict between reason Ahmad Khan) and some businessmen, still
the
and the
speech of Lord Morley, the secretary of sentiments that underlie Shibli's continued to play a part in it.
state for India, announcing plans forproposal
con- is greater than such conflict about
stitutional reforms in India, he at once
anyset
other issue. The memory of the achieve- III
ments of Cordova and Baghdad is as
about organising a delegation of Muslim
notables to put their proposals before tile to Muslims as her amulet ('taawiz') With these changes in its class base, the
enticing
viceroy, setting out demands of theisedu-
to a superstitious woman who holds centreit of gravity of the Muslim League
close to her heart. The truth is that it is
cated Muslim Ashraf. Francis Robinson, shifted away from the Aligarh conservatives
summing up the result, writes: Lord Minto
extremely difficult not to sympathise with to a relatively more radical leadership based
'promised (them) ...nothing except such feelings of Muslims. But it is also trueon Lucknow (to which the League office
sympathy.' Indian nationalist as well
thatas
to deny reality that is open and mani- was moved). By 1912 the energetic and
communist historians have blown upfest, the would also be very foolish. The radical Wazir Hasan, took over as general
significance of that meeting out of allproposal
pro- that is now in front of us (i e,secretary. A new phase began in the
portion, claiming, in Maulana Mohammad Arabic education, as proposed by Shiblipolitical style of the League and its attitude
Ali's words, that this was a 'command towards the Congress. There was a grow-
HA) is, superficially, extremely appealing.

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ing realisation in the Muslim League that imperialism. It was the Muslim League League and the Congress, was lost some-
they would not make any headway against and Jinnah who had initiated that bid for where along the way.
the British colonial rule without establish- unity and the Congress responded posi- It is quite true that the Muslim League
ing a united front with the Congress. Calls tively. Jinnah was a unifier and not a represented only a small Muslim elite. The
for Hindu-Muslim unity were therefore separationist, as generally suggested. He Muslim masses, the workers and peasants,
reiterated. persisted in that difficult role, despite were largely untouched by it. The mullahs,
The Muslim League looked for someone setbacks, for a quarter of a century until who were behind the Khilafat movement,
who could build bridges between the a point was reached when, despite all his did not voice the demands of the Muslim
League and the Congress. Jinnah was the efforts, unity was no longer an option. peasant and the working class either; its
obvious choice. He had a high standing in The Lucknow Pact was not only about methods remained restricted to elite nego-
the Indian National Congress and was Muslim demands. It also incorporated tiations at the top. The mullahs were petty
ideally placed to bring the two movements shared demands of the Congress and the bourgeois radicals who represented the
together. In October 1913 when Wazir League vis-a-vis the colonial government dead past rather than the future, the direc-
Hasan and Maulana Mohammad Ali were against which they would struggle together. tion towards which Muslims along with
Thus, for example, the pact demanded that the rest of India needed to go. The main
in London to see the secretary of state for
India (who, in the event, refused to see in the legislatures, elected members should consequence of the Khilafat movement
be in a majority. It demanded that in the was that it dealt a blow to the Muslim
them!) they took the opportunity to meet
provinces there should be four-fifths elected League from which it did not recover for
Jinnah. The two persuaded him to join the
Muslim League and work for Congress- members and only one-fifth nominated, more than a decade. Having no true mass
and that the members of councils should
League Unity. Jinnah agreed, provided that base amongst the working masses, the
his commitments to the Congress would be elected directly by the people, on asMuslim League existed during that time
remain. broad a franchise as possible and so on.only nominally, as a side-show for the
Jinnah worked hard for Congress-League Thus contrary to popular opinion, theKhilafatists.
unity, which was sealed by the Lucknow Lucknow pact was not just about con- After the abolition of the Ottoman
pact adopted at a joint session of the cessions to the Muslim League. It also Khilafat by the Turkish republican nation-
Congress and the League in 1916. Under spelt out the basis on which the Congressalists led by Mustafa Kemal, the Khilafat
the pact, the Congress accepted someand the Muslim League could carry themovement, in spite of its mass base, be-
Muslim demands, including their key anti-colonial freedom struggle forward came a lost cause in India. It did not leave
demand for separate electorates, a Muslim a permanent mark on Indian Muslim
together, as close allies. The significance
demand which was strongly supported by of the Lucknow pact was greater than is politics, except that it had enabled the
Gokhale. The pact also specified province-generally supposed. mullahs to organise. Gandhi helped
wise weightage for Muslims. That wasBefore the politics of the Lucknow pacthardliner Muslim mullahs, the so-called
very controversial. Muslim minority prov- could have a chance to unfold, it was 'Deobandi Sunnis', to set up a political
torpedoed .by the Khilafat movement of
inces like the UP, were given a bigger share organisation, namely the Jamiat-i-Ulama-
of seats than that provided under the 1918-24, in which the mullahs were the i-Hind which implacably opposed the
Morley-Minto Reforms. That was at the main force. Until then religious ideologyMuslim League and its leadership. The
cost of Muslim majority provinces. Bengal was absent from Indian Muslim politics. Barelvi Sunnis, more superstitious but also
with a Muslim population of 52 per cent The religious focus of the Khilafat move- more tolerant, played no part in the Khilafat
was given a share of only 40 per cent ment of brought about shifts in the Muslim movement because they did not accept the
seats. Punjab with a Muslim population League leadership. Secularists like Jinnahlegitimacy of the Ottoman Khalifa, on the
of nearly 55 per cent was given a share and Wazir Hasan were driven out of the ground that he was not descended from the
of only 50 per cent of the seats. On the League and second rank leaders like Quraysh. It might be noted that in addition
other hand, the UP with a Muslim popu- Maulana Shaukat Ali moved into the first to the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, two other
rank. It was Mahatma Gandhi, however, extremely dogmatic religious political
lation of only 12 per cent was given a share
of no less than 30 per cent. After all thewho was the true leader of the Khilafat organisations of mullahs were to emerge,
UP elite were running the show. This turned
movement - in his own words he had namely, the Majlis-i-Ahrarand theJamaat-
out to be the most contentious aspect become
of the dictator of the movement. i-lslami. They were all bitterly opposed
the Lucknow pact. The Congress for its around him were fanatical mullahs like the Muslim League and its westernised
part had conceded the Muslim demand for Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal. Butleadership, and eventually they also
separate electorates because Muslims at every stage they asked Gandhi to tellopposed the demand for Pakistan with
believed that they could not get electedthem what to do. Under Gandhi's leader- unabated vehemence.
under joint electorates even in Muslim ship the Khilafat movement became a These religious parties were unable to
majority constituencies, because of the powerful mass movement. But it collapsed generate enough support to allow them to
soon because of its own internal contra-
effects of property qualifications. Later, stop the Muslim League. Some Muslim
dictions. Gandhi claimed that he had
however, this turned out to be a sore point Leaguers, like the Ali Brothers and even
made the Khilafat movement a means of
with a new generation of Congress leaders. Jinnah's ward, the young Raja Amir Ahmad
establishing Hindu-Muslim unity. But Khan of Mahmudabad (the son) did
Justified criticism of the Lucknow pact
unlike the Lucknow pact, the Khilafat succumb for a time to Islamic ideology.
should not make us underestimate its signi-
ficance. It had succeeded in bringing the
movement triggered off fierce communalBut, as he told me, that was a passing
Congress and the Muslim League together riots in the 1920s. The Lucknow pact whichphase. He realised soon that this funda-
on to a common platform to fight Britishhad worked for unity between the Muslim mentalist ideology was a delusion. Like-

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wise, the Ali Brothers and others like them that the British would rule over India for
the Muslim landed magnates of the Punjab
too returned to the secularist Muslim ever. Their aims therefore were narrowlyhad joined it, except for a small misguided
League. The Khilafat interlude did not focused on governing and exploiting therump under Khizr Hayat Khan. They hung
Punjab and insulating it from outside on to the dreams of an independent Punjab
convert the Muslim League into a religious
ideological movement. It was only on theinfluences while the going was good underin the British Commonwealth which the
the British. As the prospects of indepen- British were not going to give them. The
eve of independence that Liaquat Ali Khan
was able to induce a few Ulama of the dence (under Congress rule) appeared onsituation in Sindh was similar to that of
Jamiat-i-Ulanla-i-Hind, to migrate the to agenda they opted for an independent the Punjab. So by the time that indepen-
Punjab, within the British Commonwealth. dence came, the feudal landed magnates
Pakistan in the hope that in a Muslim state
Chief minister Sikandar Hayat, Fazli of Punjab and Sindh had taken over the
they might fare better than in Hindu India.
They formed the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam.Husain's successor, even tried to get Muslim League. No ideology except their
Churchill's support for an independent concern for self-preservation was needed
They had little influence on state power
Punjab within the empire. But, in the event, to draw them to the League. The peasants
until the advent of the regime of General
Zia. All that while, the Pakistan movement
that project was not taken up. whom they dominated completely needed
remained a secular movement of Muslims, Fazli Husain successfully divided the no ideology to make them vote as their
not a movement of Islam. Punjabi middle class into two rival groups,landlord instructed them to do.
However, by the time secularists like urban and rural. The salariat and profes- The Pakistan movement, thus, was not
Jinnah, who had left the Muslim Leaguesionals of rural origin, who enjoyed feudal driven by any religious ideology and except
at the time of the Khilafat movement, patronage, got priority and preference. for East Bengal, there was no mass move-
rejoined it, it was a changed Muslim League Urban Muslims, on the other hand, were ment as such to go with it. Many pirs in
in a radically changed political (and consti-a deprived minority in unionist ruled Punjab and Sindh were among the great
tutional) context. As a result, the centre ofPunjab. Being bitter about social injustice, landed magnates who opted for Pakistan.
gravity had shifted from Muslim minority many of them responded to the hot rhetoric At their behest their 'mureeds' celebrated
provinces like UP and its salariat base, to
of the fundamentalist religious group, thethe idea of Pakistan with gusto. From this
Muslim majority provinces and their domi- Majlis-i-Ahrar. The Muslim League wasa false impression has been taken by some
nating feudal landed magnates. That hap- weak and ineffective and too dependentscholars that it was the idea of Pakistan
pened because of the implementation of on the unionists, to be able to give them which had motivated them, whereas in
the Montague-Chelmsford reforms under an independent lead. The Punjabi feudals, truth what they were celebrating was the
especially, SirFazli Husain, saw the Muslimjoy of their pir, when he joined the League
the government of India act of 1919. Under
that act, limited power was transferred toLeague not as a serious rival who mightand thereby averted the threat of Congress
Indian ministers, at the provincial level,possibly threaten their hold over power in land reforms.
over certain departments of the govern- the province. They tolerated it, and even 'Islamic' ideology was indeed invoked
ment. That injected a new logic in Indian patronised it and certainly used it for their in the Punjab but not by the Muslim League.
purposes when the occasion required it. It was invoked by the hardliner Majlis-i-
politics. From then on distribution of state
patronage by Indian ministers began to Sikandar Hayat therefore even entered Ahrar, which bitterly opposed the Muslim
into a pact with Jinnah.
play a part in building up political support. League, tooth and nail, denouncing its
Muslims of the UP and Muslim minority leaders as kaffirs. It was the only 'mass'
provinces and their salariat and profes- IV movement in the Punjab that made its
sionals, who were the Muslim League's appeal in the name of Islam and with it
main power-base, being a minority and It was not until the mid-1940s, when the opposed the Pakistan idea. The main base
approach of independence began to look
unable to form a government, were now of the Majlis-i-Ahrar was amongst the
like a reality, that the landed magnates of
out of the game. Nordid the Muslim League urban petty bourgeoisie, the lower middle
Punjab realised, firstly, that they would not
secure the support of the feudal magnates class, which had been neglected because
be given an independent Punjab within the
automatically. They had theirown politics. of the anti-urban policy of the unionist
The Muslim League continued on their Commonwealth, which they wanted. party with whom the Muslim League had
support but it was now a shadow of its Secondly they saw a mortal danger to their collaborated.
former self. survival as a class, if independence were It was only in Bengal that the Muslim
to come to the Punjab under the Indian
In the Punjab, Muslim feudals, in alli- League led a genuine mass movement, in
ance with Hindu and Sikh feudals and the National Congress. The Congress was fully the 1945 elections; but that was not a
jat biraderi of East Punjab (led by Sir committed to land reform, on which a religious movement. Until the elections of
Chhotu Ram) ruled the roost under thecommittee, presided over Pandit Nehru 1937 the Bengal Muslim League was under
banner of the unionist party, which was himself, had been working for some years. the control of the Dhaka Nawab family and
presided over by Sir Fazli Husain who wasFor the survival of their class, the Punjabi a small coterie around it - the Bengali
not a feudal but who understood the feudals reckoned that Pakistan under the feudals. They were challenged by the
needs of feudals better than they couldMuslim League was a workable alternative Krishak Proja Party, led by Fazlul Haq,
themselves. Along with their clear for class
them, the more so because they knew whose political base was amongst the well
interests as landed magnates, the unionist
that if they 'joined' the League, they would, off peasantry. The final vote in the 1937
ideology included Punjabiyat, i e, Punjabi
in effect, 'take it over'. They would control election was evenly divided between them
nationalism. They were wary of more it. Mian Mumtaz Daulatana was amongst and they formed a coalition government.
radical politics impinging on them fromthe first to see this and hejoined the Muslim In 1943 the great Bengal famine killed
League in 1943. By 1945 virtually all of three and a half million Bengali poor
other parts of India. The unionists believed

Economic and Political Weekly December 21, 2002 5123

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peasants who had no reserves to fall back assembly as against a total of 121 Muslimneeded; nor did any mass movement
on when the famine hit. The peasants were seats. Religious ideology played no partactually arise. Anyone who has lived in a
soon on the warpath. Their movement Punjab village for an extended period
in this, not even by way of rhetoric. But,
known as the Tebhaga movement, was in the end, the peasants were cheated, aswould realise this. In East Bengal there
mobilised by the communist led All India they always are. Abul Hashim having was indeed a powerful mass movement,
Kisan Sabha. It was against that back- served their purpose, the powerful Daccaas I have said. It was led by the legendary
ground, when the Bengal peasant had been Nawab group had little difficulty in Hashim Khan, with the help of cadres of
aroused, that the 1945 elections were held. manoeuvring him out of the way; in the Tebhaga movement. Their slogans,
In 1943 a remarkable man named Abul February 1947 when he was sent on in- however, were explicitly secular. There
Hashim was elected as the general secre- definite leave to his native village in were indeed occasional popular demon-
tary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim Burdwan. The Bengali Muslim feudals strations in towns. The slogans would be
League. He professed a confused mixture were back in the saddle - that is a long cast in terms of demands of Muslims and
of socialism and Islam. He took over the story and sad story by itself. not in terms of Islam, though at times a
task of organising support for the Muslim The final result, as we can see, was a rare voice speaking in the name of Islam
League, with the help of the Tebhaga Pakistan dominated by feudals (both of might join in. But that would not make it
activists as his local cadres. Pushing asideWest Pakistan and also of East Bengal) an Islamic 'mass' movement. Negotiations
the Dacca Nawab family and other eliteassociated with a ruling bureaucracy. The with the Congress and the British were
leaders who had so far controlled the ruling group was soon joined by an all settled through negotiations at the top.
Bengal Provincial Muslim League, powerful Abul military. In the Punjab and Sindh When Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's
Hashim organised the Muslim League the feudals won and imposed their feudal secular ideology he was voicing the estab-
election campaign in which he focused values on us for decades. In Bengal, de- lished secular ideological position that the
on the concrete needs and economic spite the overwhelming popular victory, it Muslim League had adhered to throughout
demands of the small peasants. Ifwas the Bengali Muslim feudals who were its career. Fundamentalist Islamic ideo-
that
mass movement was driven by anback ideo-
in power at the time of the partition. logy played no part in the origins of
logy, it was not religious ideology. He time when it was created, Pakistan's Pakistan, although contemporary ideo-
At the
mobilised the peasantry behind theproblem
Mus- was not that of religious ideology logues of Islamic fundamentalism includ-
lim League by giving class slogansbut,
andrather, that of feudal domination.. ing academics, claim that it was Islamic
not religious slogans. Contrary to the present-day claims of the ideology and slogans that created Paki-
Religious ideology therefore played mullahs,
no the Muslim League had consis- stan and that they therefore have the right
part in the 1945 election campaign in maintained a secular stance through- to decide its future. BE
tently
Bengal. It turned almost entirely on out the
its career except for the brief Khilafat
economic demands of the Bengal peasant; interlude. There had been some attempts Address for correspondence:
the genius of Abul Hashim and his to col-
bring Islamic ideology on to the Muslim halavi@cyber.net.pk
leagues of the All India Kisan Sabha, League platform. But such attempts were
prevented their movement from degene- rare and they were invariably defeated. For [This paper is based on the author's Professor
Karrar Hussain Memorial Lecture delivered on
rating into communal slogans that it brevity,
could to give only one example, one of
November 2, 2002.]
have happened all too easily. The Bengal the rare attempts to bring the issue of
peasants (who were overwhelmingly Islamic ideology on to the agenda of the
Muslim) depended very largely on jute All India
as Muslim League has been docu-
a cash crop and were thereby enmeshed mented by Sharifuddin Pirzada in his
in the globalised cash economy. Their collection of Muslim League documents. THE CHALLENGES OF
immediate conflict was with traders and At the AIML session in Delhi in 1943, one
PARENTING
moneylenders, who all happened to beAbdul Hameed Kazi canvassed support
Hindu, Abul Hashim took up both these for a resolution that he proposed to table, Implications of Maternal
issues but as purely economic class issues,to commit the Muslim League to Islamic Employment for Psychological
without allowing them to turn into com-ideology and the creation of an Islamic
Development of the Child
munal conflict. He promised the peasants state. Immediately there was pressure from
that the future Pakistan government would everyone that forced Kazi to abandon his
Kiran Mathur
be their government, a peasant raj. Thatidea. It was such widespread opposition The book reports an empirical
government would scale down their debts in the Muslim League to the ideology of study of relationship between
and take steps to prevent the traders from the religious parties that marginalised employment and personality
religious fanatics who were bitterly op- development of children of
manipulating prices against their interests.
The peasants were also promised abolition posed to the All India Muslim League and
employed and unemployed
of zamindari. The Bengal peasantry was its leadership and, eventually, to the idea mothers.
led to believe that Pakistan was going to of the Pakistan.
2001 255pp. Rs. 350
be ruled by the peasants. If an ideology Religious parties were, as I have said,
Concept Publishing Com
there was, it was a peasant ideology. That implacably hostile to the Pakistan move-
A/15-16, Commercial Blo
was the opposite of the feudal dominated ment. In Punjab and Sindh, the power of
Punjab and Sindh. Due to Abul Hashim's the feudal landed magnates was itself Mohan Garden, New Delhi-59
successful campaign the Bengal Muslimsufficient to line up support in the 1945 Ph.5351460,5351794 Fax:091-11-5357103
League secured 114 seats in the provincial elections and no mass movement was Email : publishing@conceptpub.com

5124 Economic and Political Weekly December 21, 2002

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