Cases

Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985 (En B

Facts: Petitioners are seeking to compel the respondents to publish the various presidential decrees, letters of
instruction to the official gazette on the ground that they have the right to be informed on matters of public concern.
-The respondents through the OSG contend that they are personally and directly affected by the non-publication of
presidential issuances, and not being aggrieved parties.

Decision:

The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence.

The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and to the public as a whole.

Tañada v. Tuvera

Facts: Due process was invoked by the petitioner. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

Ruling:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?- term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there
are some that do not apply to them directly.

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?- all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

3. What is meant by "publication"?- in full, in the print or online version of the Official Gazette and in the print or
online version of a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines

4. Where is the publication to be made?- Official Gazette and newspaper in general circulation

5. When is the publication to be made?- After the signing of the law. It shall be effective after 15 days of publication.

6. What is unless otherwise provided?- Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
6

become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication."
Basa v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-42226, July 26, 1935

Joaquina Basa filed a motion to reopen the proceedings and alleged that the RTC Pampanga has no jurisdiction to
act on the last will and testament of Ines Basa because the Court failed to comply with the requirements as to the
publication of the prescribed notice of hearing provided under the civil code.

SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the
court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall
cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of
general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will
shall be allowed until such notice has been given.

Held:

It does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for
the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days
before the day appointed for the hearing.

The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made
in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.

The assignments of error of the appellants are overruled and the appealed order of the trial court is affirmed with
costs in this instance against the appellants.

National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007

Victoriano Gonzaga was not allowed by the ZAMSURECO to run for Board of Director because her wife is already in
the position of Sanggunian which is prohibited under the Electric Cooperation Election Coded (ECEC). He likewise
invoked that the ECEC was null and void because it was not published in any newspaper of circulation.

Held:

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to "order, ruling or decision" of NEA. What is being challenged in this
case is the decision of the screening committee of ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent.

With regard to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial courts’ nullification of the ECEC. The CA
correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code with the
University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in the Official Gazette nor in a
newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and
regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, reinforced the requirement of
publication and outlined the procedure, as follows:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.

(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March 6, 2003 Decision and June 10, 2003
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs against petitioner.

Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, April 4,
2001

Rodrigo Mikin was an OFW in Saudi Arabia. He was employed by the Philsa, a recruitment agency, with contract
with Al-Hehailan in January 185. While in Saudi he was made to sign a second contract which changed some of the
provisions of his original contract resulting in the reduction of some of his benefits and privileges. His foreign
employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a
week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract,
the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines

Upon arrival in PH, he demanded before the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO) of POEA to return
his placement fees and payment for his salary for unexpired potion of his contract. NLRC ruled in favor of Mikin and
held Philsa liable for illegal exaction.

Ruling:

Philsa contended that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of
1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.

Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to
a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of
our ruling

Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014

Spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was
succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3,
1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor
of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute
sale dated May 4, 1984. They claimed that through them and their predecessors possessed the Lot for more than
50 years.

Pastora>Clemente and Emeteria(renounced)>Clemente>Rodolfo Cuenca>Spouses Fortuna

Republic opposed the application for the registration of the Lot citing that there is no official proclamation from
the government that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land.

Ruling:

RTC granted the registration but CA denied because it was not proclaimed as disposable land.

They only relied to the survey plan and DENR-CENRO certification. The offices that prepared these documents are
not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the
public land as alienable and disposable. Failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and
Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the
spouses Fortuna.

Benhur Shipping Corp./Sun Marine Shipping S.A. and Edgar B. Bruselas v. Alex Peñaredonda Riego, G.R. No. 229179,
March 29, 2022

Facts:

Alex Riego was hired as a chief cook in a contract of service by Benhur Shipping Corp in Oct. 2013. The contract
was for 12 months with monthly pay of 535 dollars with OT pay and vacation leave. In Dec. 2013, He suffered an
abdominal and lower back pain, while working on board the ship of Sun Marine Shipping SA. On Dec. 15, 2023, He
was brought back to the Philippines for medical check-up by the company’s doctor. He was referred to gastro-
enterologist and orthopedic surgeon for further examination and in May 2023 found him with disability of only partial
grade of 11. He sought for a second opinion from another doctor that he preferred and was given a certification of
permanently unfit to work. He sent a letter to his company requesting for assistance to fer him for a third opinion

Issue:

the extent of the disability, whether partial or total and permanent, suffered by respondent. While petitioners do
not dispute that respondent's injuries are work-related, they argue that he is only entitled to disability benefits under
Grade 11, as against the findings of the CA that respondent is entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits or total and
permanent disability benefits.

Decision:

As a result of said injury, respondent was rendered disabled to perform his usual work and lost earning capacity.

1. Without such valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physicians, the law already
steps in to consider the seafarer's disability as total and permanent.
2. The referral to a third doctor (assigned by the labor tribunals) has been held by this Court to be a mandatory
procedure as a consequence of the provision under the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor's
assessment should prevail. In other words, the company could insist on its disability rating even against a
contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the
referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on
the parties.91

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, G.R. No. 229179, March 29, 2022

The seafarer is required to send the medical report issued by his doctor to the employer.- Disagree

Following the Court's pronouncements in Carcedo and Gere, it is my view that the seafarer, in notifying the
employer for the purpose of initiating the conflict resolution mechanism, is required to duly and fully disclose the
assessment of his/her chosen doctor by providing the employer a copy thereof. This is to equally apply the
requirement of proper notice to both parties as held in the case of Gere. Just as the seafarer must be fully informed
of the findings of the company-designated physician as to his/her medical condition, the employer has a similar right
to be sufficiently informed by the seafarer of the contrary findings of his/her personal physician.

The employer's failure to comply with the dispute resolution mechanism makes the assessment of the
seafarer's doctor binding on it. Disagree
 In Ranoa v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Phils. Inc. 25 (Ranoa), the Court found that the seafarer is only
entitled to Grade 12 disability rating in accordance with the findings of the company-designated doctors because he
inexplicably failed to comply with the POEA-SEC's mandated procedure for referral to a third doctor. The seafarer's
non-compliance with the conflict resolution procedure renders conclusive the disability rating issued by the
company-designated doctor.

In summary, when the non-compliance with the conflict resolution mechanism is due to the fault of the seafarer, the
medical assessment of the company-designated physician is deemed conclusive and binding. However, when the
failure to comply is due to the fault of the employer, the medical findings of the seafarer's doctor shall be conclusive
and binding against the employer. The courts are obliged to uphold the conclusive and binding findings unless the
same are tainted with bias or not supported by medical records or lack scientific basis, in which case, the courts are
not precluded to review the conflicting findings and decide the case based on the totality of the evi

SSS v. Simacas, G.R. No. L-217866, June 20, 2022

Irnido Simica, complained of back pains and coughing while working as fabrication helper/ cutter of steel materials at
Fieldstar Manuf. Corp. from April 1995 to Feb 2010. He was hospitalized and was diagnosed with prostatic cancer and
Hepatitis A. He died in July 2010. Violeta, his wife, filed a claim for compensation benefits which was denied by SSS on
the ground that his death was non-occupational disease/ no casual relationship with his job as fabrication helper.

Issue:

1. W/N factual questions may be resolved by the Petition;

2. W/N respondent Violeta is entitled to death benefit under PD 626, as amended

Ruling:

ECC: It was affirmed by the Employees Compensation Commission. Violeta was required to prove that his risk of
contracting prostate cancer was due to his work. She appealed before the CA.

CA: reversed the decision and required SSS to pay for her claim of death benefits citing PD 626 (protecting workers from
loss of income due to hazards of disability and illness and adopt a liberal attitude in deciding claims.

SC: 1. Petition is unmeritorious. It is an oft-repeated principle that only questions of law should be raised in a
petition for review. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed binding and conclusive upon this Court
especially when supported by substantial evidence.[38] Not being a trier of facts, this Court is not obligated "to
examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision. Exception: Records show
that the Court of Appeals' factual findings differ from those of petitioner and the Employees Compensation
Commission. Due to these conflicting findings and conclusion, this Court, in resolving the case, may reevaluate
the evidence presented by the parties.

2. The established risk factors for prostate cancer "are advanced age, ethnicity, genetic factors and family
history[.]"[49] However, several studies have suggested that work-related exposures to certain substances, such
as chromium, have the potential of affecting the risk of getting prostate cancer.[50] A recent study "revealed a
small but significant increase in prostate cancer risk for chromium exposure. It is said that "[w]orkers engaged
in the manufacturing or handling stainless steel are exposed to chromium in varying degrees.

3. It must be stressed that while Presidential Decree No. 626 has not incorporated "the presumption of
compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the 'Workmen's Compensation Act[,]"[53] it
continues to be "an employees' compensation law or a social legislation"[54]which should be liberally construed
in favor of labor
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' August 29, 2014 Decision and April 8, 2015
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126890 are hereby affirmed

Nacilla,et.al.v.MTRCB,G.R.No.223449,November10,2020

The controversy arose from a Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) which the MTRCB and the MTRCB
Employees Association (MTRCBEA) executed on October 29, 2004 (2004 CNA), which covered the period from
October 29, 2004 until October 29, 2007.7 It appears that Jacobe was assigned to register the 2004 CNA with the
CSC and for which he brought copies to the CSC Personnel Relations Office (CSC-PRO). He was, however,
informed that the 2004 CNA could not be registered because it was not properly ratified by the MTRCBEA and was
not submitted for registration within 30 days from its execution. CSC-PRO advised Jacobe to cause the signing of
the 2004 CNA anew, post a copy in conspicuous places for at least seven days and ratify it again before re-
submitting it to the CSC-PRO for registration

October 1, 2007, since the 2004 CNA was about to expire, a CNA Committee was formed to convene with the
officials and representatives of the MTRCBEA in order to frame a new CNA. 14 During the meeting, Nacilla, as
President of the MTRCBEA, informed the CNA Committee that it was not yet necessary to negotiate a new CNA
since the 2005 CNA registered with the CSC was effective until December 1, 2008

Laguardia called for an investigation of the matter.

The OP ruled that the CSC had jurisdiction following Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 29 or the MTRCB Charter
and that since appeal is a statutory privilege based on law, petitioners must show a statutory basis for their appeal
to the OP. They failed to do this.

CSC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.

CA denied the petition.

Issue:

1. W/N the Adjudication Committee had the power/authority to order dismissal of petitioners-Yes

2.W/N petitioners’ lost their right to appeal to CSC when they wrongfully filled it to the OP- Yes

Ruling:

1.Lacks merit. Section 16 of the MTRCB Charter provides that the MTRCB "shall have the power to suspend
or dismiss for cause any employee and/or approve or disapprove the appointment, transfer or detail of
employees." Further, Section 3(j) of P.D. No. 1986 states that the Board can "prescribe the internal and
operational procedures for the exercise of its powers and functions as well as the performance of its duties and
responsibilities, including the creation and vesting of authority upon sub-committees of the BOARD for the work of
review and other related matters." The MTRCB was likewise authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
implementation of P.D. No. 1986 and its purposes and objectives.

Section 40 of the 1998 MTRCB Implementing Rules and Regulations40 (IRR) allowed the creation of a Hearing and
Adjudication Committee composed of three members of the Board to be designated by the Chairperson to hear and
decide cases involving violations of the MTRCB Charter and its IRR

2. When the Adjudication Committee rendered a decision against petitioners on April 8, 2008, the applicable CSC
rule was MC 19, as amended by Resolution No. 07-0244. Following Section 43 as amended, petitioners had two
options: appeal to the department head before appealing to the CSC or directly file an appeal with the CSC.

it is a basic rule that when a party to an original action fails to question an adverse judgment or decision by not filing
the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law, that party loses the right to do so, and the judgment or
decision, as to that party, becomes final and binding
Caltexv.Palomar,G.R.L-19650,September26,1966

Caltex had a promotional scheme called “Caltex Hooded Pump Context” to increase the patronage for its oil products
where a participant would guess the actual number of liter a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense in a
Specific period. Entry forms/stubs will be placed in a sealed can for drawing. Forseeing the extensive use of mails, they
went to postal authorities to be cleared in advance for mailing.

Caltex submitted a formal request letter to the Postmaster General in Oct 1960 together with contest rules and citing that
the contest did not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Palomar maintained that if the contest was
pursued, a fraud order will be issued against them.

Doctrine: Construction is defined as the “art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law”. It applies in this case in how the ponencia examined the meaning of “lottery”
to come to a conclusion. Specifically, it applied when the court looked into what lottery meant: consideration, prize, and chance. This
allowed for a decisive interpretation of the word in question.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petition has sufficient cause for declaratory relief.
(2) Whether or not the Caltex Hooded Pump contest is violative of the anti- lottery
provision of the Postal Law as provided by Section 1954 (a) of the Revised Administrative Code

RULING:
(1)Yes. Per Section 1 Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, declaratory relief is available to any person “whose
rights are affected by statute… to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the… statute
and for a declaration of his rights thereunder”. This is the case here, as the question of the promo violating the
PostalLaw requires an inquiry to the intent of the legislation, which is the act of construction – the art or process
of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst other, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws).This petition, then,
warrants a declaratory relief.
(2) No. The Court held that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provision, whichmakes absolutely non-
mailable “any information concerning any lottery, giftenterprise or similar scheme depending in whole or in part
upon a lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises”. Lottery in thiscase was described as
having three (3) requisites: consideration, chance, and prize;

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under P.D. No. 198. It is authorized to supply
water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. Sec.
47* of P.D. No. 198 states that its franchise is exclusive.

In 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC), a cooperative registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad,
Benguet, filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang.

LTWD opposed TMPC's application on the ground of the exclusivity of its franchise.
NWRB: Approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive
since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to
operate and maintain a waterworks system.
LTWD appealed to the RTC.

RTC: Reversed NWRB's ruling. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in
character" so as to preclude the State itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the
present grantee when public interest so requires. However, the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a
franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or
privilege to the exclusion of all others.

TMPC filed the present petition to challenge the RTC's ruling.

ISSUE: W/N LTWD is exclusive?- NO

RULING:
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in
character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in
character.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need
explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

As applied in this case, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character when
clearly, they are proscribed by the Constitution from doing so.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to
which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not
conform to it. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.

Granted, Sec. 47 of P.D. No. 198, which vests LTWD's franchise with an exclusive character, is unconstitutional, and therefore void.
Section 47 gives the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the absolute
prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in
character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a management board
of a water district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any exception to the absolute
prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot exercise.

Social Security Commission and Social Security System v. Teresa Favila, G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011

Teresa Favila averred therein that after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the
latter designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner SSS on June 30,
1970. When they begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise designated each one of
them as beneficiaries. Teresa further averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits
under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21.
Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante’s pension benefits,

SSS averred that on May 6, 1999, the claim for Florante’s pension benefits was initially settled in favor of Teresa
as guardian of the minor Florante II. SSS also alleged that Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante, wrote a
letter9 stating that her brother had long been separated from Teresa. She alleged therein that the couple lived
together for only ten years and then decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had an affair with a
married man with whom, as Teresa herself allegedly admitted, she slept with four times a week and she had an
affair with a police officer. Section 8(k) of the SS law would have simply stated "spouse" without the
descriptive word "dependent".

Issue: W/N Teresa has the right to claim for death benefit of his husband

Rule:
SSS: NO.

spouse’s entitlement to an SSS member’s death benefits :

(1) legality of the marital relationship;

(2) dependency for support- separation de facto of the spouses, marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient
to disinherit a spouse under the law. Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florante’s designated
beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not
dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity. "REMARRY" under said provision has been
interpreted as to include a spouse who cohabits with a person other than his/her deceased spouse or is in
an illicit relationship.

Her alleged illicit affair with another man was never sufficiently established.

CA: WITH MERIT ON TERESA. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary beneficiary because she is the lawful
surviving spouse of Florante and in addition, she was designated by Florante as such beneficiary. There was no
legal separation or annulment of marriage that could have disqualified her from claiming the death benefits and
that her designation as beneficiary had not been invalidated by any court of law.

SC: MERIT ON SSS (Teresa is NOT DEPENDENT). For a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under
paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under
paragraph (e), that is, one who is dependent upon the member for support. Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of
RA 1161 are very clear. "Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

Because the wife abandoned her family to live with other men for more than 17 years until her husband died.
Her whereabouts was unknown to her family and she never attempted to communicate with them or even check
up on the well-being of her daughter with the deceased. From these, the Court concluded that the wife during said
period was not dependent on her husband for any support at the time of his death, financial or otherwise,
hence, she is not a dependent within the contemplation of RA 8291 29 as to be entitled to survivorship benefits.

Commission on Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 230016, November 23, 2020

Philex Mining is a domestic corporation engaged in the mining business, such as the exploration and operation of
mining properties and the commercial production, marketing, and exportation of mineral products. 7 It is a VAT-
registered taxpayer with duly approved Application for Zero-Rate effective April 12, 1998. It filed its amended
quarterly VAT returns for the second and third quarters to reflect excess input tax arising from its zero-rated sales.

Issue: W/N Philex Mining can claim for tax refund OR W/N the 4th requirement was met/ non-compliance with
the invoicing requirements

W/N the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against the output tax

Ruling:

Court of Tax Appeal (CTA): PARTLY GRANTED Philex Mining's petitions.14 It held that Philex Mining timely
filed its administrative and judicial claims for a refund within the period prescribed under Sections 112 (A) and
(C) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended15 (Tax Code), and that it attached to the
Claimant Information Sheets the required documents to support its claims.

CTA was able to determine the existence of Philex Mining's valid creditable input VAT attributable to its zero-
rated sales by probing all the official receipts, quarterly VAT returns, and the import entry declarations
submitted. The CTA evaluated the ICPA's report and concluded that Philex Mining incurred input taxes in
connection with its zero-rated sales and the input taxes were not applied against any of its output tax liability.

The CIR moved for reconsideration alleging that the judicial claim for refund was premature, Philex Mining did not
submit to the DOF-OSS the required checklist of documents, and Philex Mining failed to comply with the accounting
requirements, specifically the keeping of subsidiary sales journal and subsidiary purchase journal, and the filing of
monthly VAT declarations. CIR petition was denied for lack of merit.

SC: CIR IS MISTAKEN in alleging that Philex Mining did not comply with the requirement of Section 4.113-3 27 of
Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-200528 to keep, preserve, and maintain subsidiary sales and purchase journals.

The reason for strict compliance with invoicing requirements is only a "VAT invoice/official receipt" can give rise to
any input tax from domestic purchase of goods or service.42 Without input tax, there is nothing to refund. On
the other hand, the particulars recorded in the subsidiary journals do not affect the character of an invoice or receipt
as a "VAT invoice/official receipt."

To be creditable, the input taxes must be evidenced by validly issued invoices and/or official receipts
containing the information enumerated in Sections 113 and 237. The law does not require that subsidiary
journals where the sales and purchases (and the output taxes and their corresponding input taxes) were
recorded, are also kept.

Garcia v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No.170735, Dec. 17, 2007

The Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia et al. were the directors of Impact Corporation. The said corporation was
engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers. Impact Corporation started to face and
encountering financial problems. The corporation filed in Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition
for the Suspension of the Payments. The company directed to pay all entitled workers unpaid wages, unpaid
13th month pay and to remit the Social Security System (SSS) loan amortization and premiums that was
deducted from the wages of the workers. The union of Impact Corporation filed a Notice of Strike with the
Ministry of Labor which was followed by declaration of strike. The Ministry of Labor made a same order. SSS
filed a case before the SSC for the collection of the unremitted premiums contributions

In 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. They filed a ____ before the SEC because they can
no longer pay for the benefits of their employees.

In 1985, SSS filed a case before the SSCommission for the collection of unremitted SSS contributions withheld by the
impact corporation from its employees. SSS filed an amended petition wherein the directors of the Impact Corporation
were directly impleaded as respondents namely: Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo
Villanueva and the petitioner.

Issue:

Petitioner was a mere director without managerial functions, and she ceased to be such in 1982
she cannot be made personally liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation since her liability
extended only up to the extent of her unpaid subscription, of which she had none since her subscription was
already fully paid.
She is only liable of the penalties and not the liability of the employer..

Ruling:

Section 28(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties
provided in this Act for the offense. II. Section 28(f) Section 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and not to the
liability of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions.
Petitioner Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay for the
collected and unremitted SSS premiums and penalties of Impact Corporation. The case is REMANDED to
the SSS for computation of the exact amount and collection thereof

Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010

Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for nullity of her marriage with Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Issue: W/N the declaration of the nullity of marriage is valid on the basis of the family code? NO

Ruling:

RTC: Granted the petition for annulment. Declared the marriage null and void.

Danilo appealed but was denied due to failure to file the required MR in violation of Null and Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Appealed again to CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and prayed that he be psychological capacitated to render marital obligation.
He said that his wife is guilty of abandoning him and his children.

CA: Granted in favor of Danilo on the basis of marriage was solemnized in Feb 1980 long before the Family
Code took effect. Thus the “Rule on Declaration of Abuse Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages” not applicable.

SC: Their marriage is not covered by the provisions and rules of the Family Code. The “Rule on Declaration of
Abuse Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” promulgated in March 2003 is explicit
in its scope.

The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the family codewhich took
effect in August 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered vy the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.

Republic v. Lacap G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007

The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid"... doing business under the
name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction),... he was awarded the contract
for the concreting... a Contract Agreement was executed... personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San
Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed... respondent sought to
collect payment for the completed project.
The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.[9] However, the DPWH withheld payment
from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor's license of
respondent had expired
DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the
Contractor's License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has... expired is void and
there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract,... the District Engineer requested
clarification from the DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works
accomplished... no payment... was made to respondent.
respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
the RTC rendered... that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed
project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and consistent
pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of... another.
petitioner filed an appeal with the CA
It held that since the case involves the application of the principle of estoppel against the government which is a...
purely legal question, then the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply; that by its actions
the government is estopped from questioning the validity and binding effect of the Contract Agreement
Issues:
whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
Ruling:
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to
construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this
Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or
file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in
obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate... another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be
deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred
pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis... supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[40] This rule derived from the
maxim
Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
The legislature is presumed... to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[41] Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no... departure.[42]
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into
by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine
prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be... paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is
without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed und
Gonzales v. Office of the President, Barreras-Sulit v. Ochoa, et.al., G.R. Nos. 196231and 196232, September 4, 2012

In August 23, 2010, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hijacked a bus packed with tourists and killed most
pf its passengers in a 10-hour hostage drama. The brother of the hijacker said that his brother was upset over a dismissal
from the police force, without due process, no hearing, and no complaint. In the aftemath of the hostage taking, IIRC /
Incident Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearing and executive sessions. However petitioner refused to participate inisisting that the Office of the
Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. Nevertheless, IIRC found that the Petitioner committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules by allowing Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than 9 months in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motion for reconsiderations for
administrative disciplinary cases within 5 days from submission. Inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperated resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from office
through Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770. Petitioner seeks to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 “Ombudsman Act” which
gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman unconstitutional.

Issues:
1) whether or not the Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is constitutional
2) whether or not the administrative action of removal taken against Gonzales is valid

Held:
Constitutional. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his
poeer to appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is alrdy implied from the President’s constitutional authority to
appointthe afpresaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Invalid. The motion for reconsideration which remained prolonged for nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of
petitioner’s undue interest in the case considering the lack of any evidence of personal grudge, social ties, or business
affiliation with any parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. The Office of the President’s
pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty
of dismissal must be reversed and set aside as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in the office do not amount to
betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President while he may be vested the authority, he cannot order the removal of the
petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting a
betrayal of public trust.

Uy Tuazon v. World Wiser International, Inc. G.R. No. 241699, August 4, 2021

PAL Maritime Corporation v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 218115, January 27, 2021