Module23 - Consequence Analysis - Impact Criteria

Risk ID & Assessment Training Course DNV Consulting
Module 23: Consequence Analysis (4) – Impact Criteria
MODULE 23
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (4)

IMPACT CRITERIA
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Module 23: Consequence Analysis (4) – Impact Criteria Page i
CONTENTS
23. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING (4) – IMPACT CRITERIA ....................................1
23.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
23.2 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS AND CRITERIA .........................................2

23.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................2
23.2.2 Radiation Effects and Criteria..........................................................................3
23.2.3 Effects of Convected Heat.............................................................................13
23.3 EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE .........................................................................14

23.3.1 The Effects of Overpressure ..........................................................................14
23.4 TOXIC EFFECT CALCULATIONS ....................................................................18

23.4.1 Effects of Exposure to Toxic Materials..........................................................18
23.5 EFFECTS OF SMOKE.........................................................................................22

23.5.1 Effects of Carbon Monoxide .........................................................................22
23.5.2 Effects of Carbon Dioxide .............................................................................23
23.5.3 Effects of Toxic Gases in Smoke ...................................................................24
23.5.4 Effects of Oxygen Depletion..........................................................................24
23.5.5 Effects of Smoke on Breathability .................................................................25
23.5.6 Effect of Smoke on Visibility.........................................................................25
23.6 WORKED EXAMPLES .......................................................................................27
23.7 REFERENCES.....................................................................................................29
Module 23: Consequence Analysis (4) – Impact Criteria Page 1
23. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING (4) – IMPACT CRITERIA
23.1 INTRODUCTION
The results of consequence models are usually expressed in various units, depending on the
type of event. Such terms could be thermal radiation levels, smoke concentrations, explosion
overpressures, etc. In order to produce useful measures of risk, it is necessary to convert these
consequences into impacts on personnel, structure or safety functions, and possible event
escalation.
In order to produce overall measures of risk, it is necessary to express the impact of all the
different types of possible events in common forms such as:
• Number of fatalities
• Impairment of safety functions
• Extent of property damage
• Quantity of oil spilled
Impact criteria are used to relate the various event consequences to the required impact type.
There are several types, and the following criteria are covered:
• Human impact criteria - defines the effects of thermal radiation, smoke and explosion
overpressure on personnel. These are used both for input to the impairment criteria for the
safety functions, and also for prediction of evacuation behaviour and fatalities due to
hydrocarbon events.
• Failure criteria - define the effects of thermal radiation and explosion overpressure on
items of equipment or structure. These are used both for input to impairment criteria for
the safety functions, and also for prediction of escalation and structural collapse in
hydrocarbon events.
• Impairment criteria - define the conditions under which the safety functions (escape
routes, means of evacuation and the TR) are considered to be impaired (i.e. unable to be
used by personnel). These are used for prediction of evacuation behaviour in hydrocarbon
events on offshore installations.
This module concentrates on human impact criteria. The main mechanisms by which fires,
explosions and gas releases may affect personnel are:
• Heat, including thermal radiation and convected heat

• Smoke, including toxic gases, notably carbon monoxide, and also impairs visibility
• Explosion overpressure
• Toxic gases, such as H2S.
23.2 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS AND CRITERIA
23.2.1 Introduction
When flammable materials are burned a number of different forms of combustion can take
place. These, for QRAs, are commonly categorised as flash fires, pool fires, jet fires and
fireballs. This section concentrates on the effects of thermal radiation on humans but gives
some information on the effects on structures and/or materials. Probits are then reviewed and
also single impact criteria are derived.
Where there is line-of-sight between the person and the flame, the main impact is by thermal
radiation (radiant heat). The degree of harm to people exposed to thermal radiation is, as for
toxic gases, a function of both the intensity of thermal radiation and the time for which the
individual is exposed. With increasing dose onto exposed skin a person feels pain, then begins
to suffer burn injury. The latter are often characterised with increasing injury as:
First degree burns: - Superficial burn giving red dry painful) skin.
Second degree burns: - Blister formation with the epidermis being affected.
Third degree burns: - Full thickness burn when the dermis and nerve extremities
are affected resulting in a dry skin which has no feeling.
The probability of burn injuries leading to death depends on their severity (or depth), the area
affected, the age of the victim, and the type of medical attention received. These effects are
quite complex. For example, the probability of death for a 70-year-old can be an order of
magnitude higher than for a 20-year-old. Data on fatality rates in burn injuries have been
presented by Hymes et al. (1993) and Lees (1994).
Data on the effects of clothing on burn injuries has been presented by Hymes et al (1996) and
TNO (1992). At low levels of radiation, clothing protects the skin from burns. At high levels,
synthetic fabrics may melt, increasing the exposure to the fire, while cotton-based fabrics are
likely to ignite, especially if ignition is piloted by burning embers. Burning clothing rapidly
causes extensive burns, and also typically halts any attempt to evacuate.
Second degree burns may cause disability, and are typically associated with a 1% probability
of death. Third degree burns may be accompanied by ignition of everyday clothing, and might
be associated with a 50% probability of death. These probabilities of death assume an exposed
population with a range of vulnerabilities, including the very young and the elderly. Thus the
probability of death among a healthy population of offshore workers may be less. They also
assume a typical area of skin burned.
In addition to the incident thermal flux and the duration of exposure, a number of other factors
are likely to affect the degree of harm. These include:
• Source of thermal radiation, e.g. hydrocarbon fire or thermonuclear device.

• Area of skin exposed.
• Age of person.
• Type of clothing.
• Speed and type of medical attention after exposure.
In most assessments carried out for an onshore installation single value criteria have been used
to indicate the impact of thermal radiation. This is obviously a gross oversimplification but in
may instances may give an acceptably accurate prediction. Hydrocarbon fires are typically
characterised as either vapour cloud fires, jet fires, pool fires or fireballs, and the impact
criteria have been used such that within the criterion envelope there is 100% fatality, and
outside it there is a decreasing probability of fatalities.
23.2.2 Radiation Effects and Criteria
23.2.2.1 Thermal Radiation Dose
The degree of harm caused by thermal radiation is related to both the intensity of thermal
radiation and the time for which the person is exposed. Human tolerance to thermal radiation
is illustrated in Figure 23.1 (Neisser 1983). Most types of clothing melt or ignite at roughly the
same heat dose as would cause third degree burns to bare skin (Hymes 1983). Figure 23.1
shows that this is also roughly the 50% lethality level in average clothing.
The pain threshold is defined in widely-used data presented in Table 23.1 (API 1982). Some
other applications of thermal radiation levels as criteria are set out in Table 23.2 and Table
23.3.
Table 23.1 Pain Threshold from Thermal Radiation
Radiation Time to Pain Threshold (sec)

Intensity (kW/m2)
1.74 60
2.33 40
2.90 30
4.73 16
6.94 9
9.46 6
11.67 4
19.87 2
Figure 23.1 Tolerance Times to Burn Injury Levels
300
200
100
70
60
50
40
Incident Heat Flux kW/m2
30
Third Degree Burns to Bare Skin (2mm)
20
50% Lethality (average clothing)
1% Lethality (average clothing)
10
7 Start of More Than Second Degree Burns

6
5
4 Range of Blistering of Bare Skin
i.e. Threshold Second Degree
3
Pain
2
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 100
Exposure Time (sec)
Table 23.2 Recommended Design Flare Radiation Levels (API 521)
Permissible Design Level Conditions

(kW/m2)
15.77 Heat intensity on structures and in areas where operators are not
likely to be performing duties and where shelter from radiant heat is
available, for example, behind equipment.
9.46 Value of K at design flare release at any location to which people
have access, for example, at grade below the flare or on a service
platform of a nearby tower. Exposure must be limited to a few
seconds, sufficient for escape only.
6.31 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1 min
may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate
clothing.
4.73 Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1 min
may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate
clothing.
1.58 Value of K at design flare release at any location where personnel
are continuously exposed.
Table 23.3 Effects Of Thermal Radiation (World Bank)
Radiation intensity Conditions

(kW/m2)
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment.
25 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long
exposures (non-piloted).
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of
plastic tubing.
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. second degree burns after 20 sec.
4 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within
20 sec. however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely;
0:lethality.
1.6 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure.
For brief exposures, the degree of harm is slightly more sensitive to thermal radiation intensity
than to exposure time. It is often represented by a thermal dose of the form (Eisenberg et al.
1975):
V = Q4/3 t
where: V = thermal dose [(kW/m2)4/3 s]

Q = thermal radiation (kW/m2)
t = exposure time (sec)
Eisenberg et al. (1975) suggested that a dose of the form Q4/3 t was appropriate for lethal
effects and Q1.15 t was appropriate for non-lethal effects. However, Q4/3 t represents the pain
thresholds in Table 23.1 quite well, and is commonly used for all thermal effects. The units of
V, [(kW/m2)4/3 s], are known as “thermal dose units” (tdu) by HSE.
For longer exposures, the degree of harm is much less affected by exposure time, and the
above relationship is inappropriate. The skin can absorb thermal radiation of up to 1 kW/m2
(equivalent to mid-day summer sunshine) for long periods without feeling pain. Available data
(TNO 1992) suggests that the pain threshold (and probably other effects) is independent of
duration above about 120 seconds.
The thermal doses for various effects are summarised in Table 23.4 (based on Hymes et al.
1996).
The thermal dose necessary to ignite cotton-based clothing is expressed in the form Q2 t = 2.5
× 104 kW2 m-4 s (TNO 1992). Lees (1994) uses 3.5 × 104 kW2 m-4 s.
Table 23.4 Effects of Thermal Radiation
Thermal Dose (kW/m2)4/3 s Effects
125 Threshold of pain

210 Threshold of first degree burns
500 Threshold of second degree burns
1200 Threshold of greater than second degree burns
2600 Threshold of third degree burns
1500 - 3000 Melting of nylon and polyester fabrics
2500 – 8000 Piloted ignition of clothing
3500 – 12000 Auto-ignition of everyday clothing
23.2.2.2 Thermal Radiation Probits
Probit functions provide a mathematical relationship between a dose effect and the proportion
affected in an exposed population. The probit takes the form:
Pr = a + b ln V
where: Pr = probit function

a, b = constants
V = dose variable; in this case thermal dose as above.
The probit function is converted to a percentage affected using tables (e.g. TNO 1992).
Examples are given in Table 23.5.
Table 23.5 Fatality Probability Versus Probit Values
Probability 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.90 0.99

Percentage affected 1% 2% 5% 10% 20% 50% 90% 99%
Probit (Pr) 2.67 2.95 3.36 3.72 4.16 5.0 6.28 7.33
The percentage affected is often used as an estimate of the probability of death for an
individual; in effect an individual with average vulnerability.
The best-known probit for death from thermal radiation was derived by Eisenberg et al.
(1975):
Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 ln (I4/3 t)
where: I = thermal radiation (kW/m2)

t = exposure time (s)
This gives 50% lethality for a thermal dose, V, of 2,377 and values for exposure times that
would lead to stated fatality levels as in Table 23.6.
Table 23.6 Fatal Radiation Exposure Levels (From Probit)
Radiation Seconds exposure for percentage fatality levels

Level (kW/m2) 1% 50% 99%
1.6 500 1300 3200
4.0 150 370 930
12.5 30 80 200
37.5 8 20 50
The first two rows are outside the range of the data used to derive the Probit equation, and the
relevant times stated above must be considered as indicative only.
In general it might be possible to “shelter” within a half to one minute. As can be seem over
this time scale the change between very low and very high fatality probability occurs between
flux levels of 12.5 kW/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2. The lower levels of flux are significant from the
point of view of pain, but not of fatality.
Of the three types of fire modelled within a consequence model, two (pool and jet fires) are
likely to be of significant duration. A BLEVE or fireball, however, will be of limited duration,
between about 2 and 30 seconds for the range of flammable masses normally allowed by the
models of these phenomena. Clearly only the higher flux levels are significant with such
events; clearly also the primary effects will be on personnel and not on structures or process
equipment.
The Eisenberg probit was derived from nuclear weapon explosions (Hiroshima and Nagasaki)
supplemented by US tests involving animals. The exact basis is not clear, but it probably
involved:
• Very short duration exposure (1 to 2 seconds) to high intensity radiation

• Lightly clothed population
• A high proportion of elderly people and children exposed
• Poor conditions of medical care and hygiene
Thus, the probit will reflect these as well. In particular, it is only appropriate for short-duration
exposure. For example, the probit would indicate 50% lethality from 40 minutes exposure to
1 kW/m2, which is equivalent to the radiation in hot sunshine. This is evidently absurd, and
indicates at least that the probit is not appropriate for durations exceeding a few minutes.
Thermal radiation from hydrocarbon fires is mainly in the infra-red region, unlike that from
nuclear explosions which is mainly in the visible and ultra-violet regions of the spectrum. The
Eisenberg probit in effect assumes that skin acts as a “black body”, and hence the heat
absorbed is independent of the wavelength. Tsao & Perry (1979) modified the Eisenberg
probit to apply to hydrocarbon fires by scaling from data on first-degree burns from different
wavelengths.
The resulting probit is:
Pr = -12.8 + 2.56 ln (Q4/3t)
Other work by TNO (Pietersen 1989) asserts that this applies to unprotected skin, and gives a
probit for clothed bodies of:
Pr = -13.65 + 2.56 ln (Q4/3t)
This has subsequently been withdrawn by TNO.
A more recent probit has been derived by Lees (1994):
Pr = -10.7 + 1.99 ln (Q4/3t)
This is based on a theoretical model which combines:
• Burn depth versus thermal dose from experiments on pigs at exposures of 0.5 to 30
seconds.
• 20% skin exposure, typical for adults with light clothing.
• Clothing ignition after a thermal dose, V, of 1,800

• Mortality rates versus age and burn area from UK hospitals, 1981-87, averaged to apply to
the age range 10-70.
The Lees probit gives 50% lethality for a thermal dose, V, of 2,670, which is quite similar to
the Eisenberg probit. However, the Lees approach provides a justification for reducing the
incident thermal radiation to account for the average angle between the radiation and the
exposed skin, up to the time of clothing ignition. Marshall (1987) used a reduction factor of π.
Lees (1994) uses a factor of 2, but this is sufficient to produce a substantial reduction in
lethality compared to Eisenberg. In the example given by Lees (1994), 50% lethality occurs at
a thermal dose, V, of 4,470, which would give 95% lethality in the Eisenberg probit.
The Lees model could be modified to obtain a probit for offshore workers, using a more
restricted age range, say 20-50, and flame-retardant clothing.
23.2.2.3 Validation of Probits
Several studies have attempted to validate thermal radiation probits by comparing them with
actual fatality experience in fireballs, for which the consequence models are relatively well-
established:
• Marshall (1987) compared predictions with experience for LPG fireballs at San Carlos,
Good Hope and New Jersey Turnpike, concluding that fatality risks were over-predicted
using the Eisenberg probit, and suggesting that better agreement could be obtained with a
reduction factor of π for incident radiation.
• Spouge (1993) compared predictions with experience for LPG fireballs at Cairns and
Mexico City, concluding that the Eisenberg probit gave better agreement than the TNO
probit, but was still conservative for the Mexico City accident.
• Hymes et al (1996) compared predictions with experience in LPG fireballs at San Carlos
and Tewksbury, concluding that fatality risks were over-predicted using the Eisenberg
probit, due in part to sheltering by trees and other objects.
• Hockey & Rew (1996) reviewed several LPG fire incidents, concluding that fatality
predictions tend to be conservative, but this could be due to uncertainties in incident
descriptions, fireball radiation modelling, effects of protective clothing, evacuation
parameters or thermal effects models.
All the above studies were performed before the Lees probit was available, but clearly much
better agreement would have been obtained if it had been used.
The uncertainties in all the thermal radiation probits are substantial. There is insufficient data
on deaths due to radiation from hydrocarbon fires to justify a probit properly. In these
circumstances, although the Lees probit may give the best agreement with accident experience,
a cautious approach would be to use the Eisenberg probit until the uncertainties are reduced.
The best justification of the probit approach is to help produce smooth spatial variations in risk
predictions, and it cannot be considered more accurate than a simple single-value fatality
criterion.
Probits are also available for burn injuries (TNO 1989, DNV Technica ARF T15). These are
rather better validated than the lethality probits.
23.2.2.4 Thermal Impact Criteria
The uncertainties in the analysis of thermal radiation impacts are so great that it is often
appropriate to use a single-value criterion for thermal impact, defining a hazard zone (or
consequence zone) with a constant percentage of fatalities inside it.
The simplest approach is to set the criterion at the point where 50% fatalities are expected,
and model 100% fatalities inside this zone and 0% outside it. This in effect assumes that the
number of people who survive inside the hazard zone is equal to the number of fatalities
outside it. It is a reasonable approximation to the total number of fatalities if the population
density is uniform, or if the people are equally likely to be at any point within the area.
The thermal dose causing 50% fatalities (LD50) has been estimated in several ways:
• Lees probit approach, which gives a typical thermal dose, V, of 4,470 for 50% lethality.
For workers with flame-retardant clothing, the value would be even greater.
• Eisenberg probit approach, which gives a thermal dose, V, of 2,377 for 50% lethality.
• Data from Hymes et al. (1996) (Table 23.4) which gives a thermal dose, V, of 2,600 for
third degree burns.
• Hong Kong BLEVE model (Technica 1989) of a thermal energy level of 375 kJ/m2 based
on data from nuclear fireballs (quoted in Technica 1982) for third degree burns. This is in a
different form from the other approaches, but is an established standard for fireballs.
When a single-value criterion is used to predict individual risk contours, the LD50 inevitably
under-predicts individual risks outside the hazard zone. This bias may be corrected by using
the LD01 (see below), but this is a poorer representation of the variation of risk with distance
overall. As an alternative, an intermediate criterion such as the Hong Kong 375 kJ/m2 energy
level could be used. Since this produces effect distances at least 50% larger than the Eisenberg
50% lethality criterion, i.e. effect areas at least twice as large, it could be combined with a
fatality probability of 50%, giving conservative results in some areas but reducing the chance
of being non-conservative.
The thermal dose causing 1% fatalities (LD01) is often used as a fatality threshold. It can be
estimated in several ways:
• Eisenberg probit approach, which gives a thermal dose, V, of 957 for 1% lethality.
• Data from Hymes et al. (1996) (Table 23.4) which gives a thermal dose, V, of 1,200 for
more than second degree burns.
• The approach used by the UK HSE (Kinsman 1991) which gives a dose, V, of 1,000 for a
“small” probability of death.
• SAFETI model of a thermal energy level of 250 kJ/m2 based on data from nuclear fireballs
(quoted in Technica 1982) for second degree burns.
23.2.2.5 Thermal Impact Modelling for Continuous Fires
The impact zone from a long-duration fire (e.g. a jet fire or pool fire) is conveniently described
by thermal radiation contours. Because the harm to personnel depends on both the radiation
intensity and the exposure time, definition of impact criteria requires some assumption about
the length of time for which personnel are exposed to the fire. Two assumptions are possible
about behaviour in such situations:
• The individual remains where they are, and attempts no escape action (likened to being
“tied to a post”). This results in exposure to the full duration of the fire, until the inventory
is exhausted. This approach is used in onshore QRA in the Netherlands. It is a very
conservative approach, and is not normally used offshore.
• The individual attempts realistic escape action. Thus the exposure time depends on the
escape routes available, or the ability of the individual to shelter out of sight of the fire.
This is a more realistic approach, and is normally used offshore, although many studies fail
to make the assumed escape times explicit.
The thermal dose approach is not valid for exposures above about 2 minutes. Therefore,
simple thermal impact criteria are usually used. Numerous different values have been used, and
examples are given below.
A simple approach is to adopt a single criterion, i.e. assuming an average exposure time. For
example, many studies have assumed that 100% of personnel within the 12.5 kW/m2 zone
become fatalities (e.g. OCB/Technica 1988). A typical approach for fatalities in pool fires and
jet fires onshore is to use 70% fatalities within the 12.5 kW/m2 zone (DNV Technica ARF
T16). The apparent precision in the criterion is not significant (12.5 kW/m2 was a standard
output from WHAZAN I), and it could be rounded to 10 kW/m2.
In offshore studies, a more sophisticated approach is often used, with different criteria
depending on the escape options which are available to the affected personnel. A typical set of
criteria (Technica 1991) is as follows:
• 5 kW/m2. At this level, the pain threshold for exposed skin is reached in about 15 seconds
(Table 23.1). Second degree burns on exposed skin would be expected after about 2
minutes. This level is similar to the value of 4.7 kW/m2, used as the limiting exposure for
escape actions lasting several minutes by personnel in “appropriate” clothing (API 1982).
This should be taken to be the limiting radiation intensity for escape actions lasting more
than a few minutes (such as passing along an unprotected escape route) in normal
offshore clothing.
• 10 kW/m2. At this level, the pain threshold is reached in about 4 seconds, second degree
burns on exposed skin in about 40 seconds. The Eisenberg probit predicts 50% lethality in
about 80 seconds. This should be taken to be the limiting radiation intensity for escape
actions lasting a few seconds (such as jumping into the sea). If escape is not possible in a
few seconds, death is assumed to occur.
• 37.5 kW/m2. At this level, the pain threshold is virtually instantaneous, and second degree
burns on exposed skin occur in about 8 seconds. The Eisenberg probit predicts 50%
lethality in about 20 seconds. All exposed personnel are assumed to be immediate
fatalities at this level.
The application of these criteria is as follows:
• Below 5 kW/m2 - no effects, provided personnel can take normal escape action.
• Between 5 and 10 kW/m2 - escape routes are treated as “impaired”, meaning that workers
will not enter this zone. Personnel already in the zone are able to use the escape routes,
providing this allows them to leave the zone within about 30 seconds. Otherwise, they must
take emergency action, such as jumping into the sea.
• Between 10 and 37.5 kW/m2 - personnel in this zone may use escape routes, providing this
allows them to leave the area within a few seconds, or jump into the sea, but they suffer
second degree burns.
• Above 37.5 kW/m2 - death for all personnel.
Personnel in the water are assumed to survive radiation intensities up to 37.5 kW/m2. In an
enclosed space, 60% of which is above 10 kW/m2, death of all occupants is assumed to result
from asphyxiation, and not from radiation. This does not apply to open-sided modules.
The value of 40 kW/m2 for immediate fatality is quite widely used, although values as low as
15 kW/m2 for immediate fatality and 7 kW/m2 for death after 60 seconds have also been used
(Kinsella 1994).
23.2.2.6 Thermal Impact Modelling for Transient Fires
For a short-duration fire (e.g. a flash fire or fireball), escape action is not usually practicable in
the time available, and the impact modelling is simpler.
For flash fires, personnel within the gas cloud are engulfed in a fire which, although brief, is
likely to cause death due to inhalation of hot combustion gases, if not due to burns. For people
within the cloud, a probability of death of 100% is assumed for simplicity (Technica 1989,
DNV Technica ARF T15) although, since the burning of the cloud may be uneven, a lower
probability might be more realistic.
Expansion of the hot combustion products is normally upwards, and radiation from the flame
surface is minimal, and hence no fatalities are expected outside the fire envelope. The
possibility of impacts to people above the cloud due to rising hot gases is usually neglected.
For fireballs, all personnel within the fireball itself are expected to become fatalities, as for
flash fires. Additional fatalities are likely in the surrounding area due to the intense thermal
radiation.
23.2.2.7 Immediate Fatalities and Lethal Injuries
The lethality criteria above are based on predictions of the proportion of personnel who
become fatalities in due course. This includes personnel who are severely injured and
subsequently die, perhaps several hours, or even days, later. These fatally injured personnel are
significant because other personnel will naturally try to rescue them, perhaps devoting several
lifeboat seats to stretcher-cases. During an emergency, it is impossible to tell which individuals
will die and which will survive. In the absence of better data, it might be appropriate to assume
that 50% of the predicted fatalities are killed outright, while the other 50% survive long
enough to require rescue and evacuation, although they are likely to die subsequently
(Technica 1991).
23.2.3 Effects of Convected Heat
Where there is no line-of-sight between the person and the flame, the impact is dominated by
convected heat.
Above temperatures of 120°C, the impact is dominated by pain from burns to the skin, which
occur in less than 5 minutes. Below 120°C, the impact is dominated by hyperthermia, which
requires exposure of around 15 minutes or more in temperatures of at least 70°C (for dry air).
The average time to incapacitation has been proposed as follows (SFPE 1988):
t = exp (5.1849 - 0.0273 T)
where: t = exposure time (minutes)

T = temperature (°C)
This may be related to the thermal radiation criteria by assuming that “incapacitation” is
equivalent to second degree burns. Then, the following equivalences are obtained:
• Escape route impairment (equivalent to 5 kW/m2) - 165°C (440 K), producing second
degree burns in 2 minutes.
• Escape action limit (equivalent to 10 kW/m2) - 205°C (480 K), producing second degree
burns in 40 seconds.
• Lethality criterion (equivalent to 37.5 kW/m2) - 265°C (540 K), producing second degree
burns in 8 seconds.
23.3 EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE
Overpressures which can be hazardous to people may be caused by a number of mechanisms.

These include condensed phase explosions, vapour cloud explosions (VCE), thermal
explosions etc. The characteristics of the overpressures generated by these means are slightly
different. The hazardous effects described in this section are biased towards VCE effects,
although the principles are appropriate for all types of explosion effects.
This section gives an indication as to the possible impact of different levels of explosion on
both people and structures.
23.3.1 The Effects of Overpressure
Most data on the effects of explosion overpressures on personnel (e.g. TNO 1992, and DNV
Technica ARF T15) is derived from explosions of solid-phase explosives onshore, in which
people were at some distance from the source. The main effects are then:
• Direct blast effects of the overpressure caused by the explosion, causing lung and ear
damage which may lead to death. (Primary Effects)
• Impact from missiles projected by the explosion. (Secondary Effects)
• Impact from collapsing buildings or glass. (Secondary Effects)
• Whole-body translation due to the blast wave, resulting in impact with stationary objects,
which may cause injury or death. (Tertiary Effects)
The effects on humans are normally categorised as follows:
Direct or Primary: - Injury to the body as a result of the pressure change.
Secondary: - Injury as a result of fragments or debris produced by the

overpressure impacting on the body.
Tertiary: - Injury as a result of the body being thrown bodily by the

explosion wind and impacting on stationary objects or
structures.
The actual form of overpressure generated by any explosion is characterised by:
• The shape of the waveform.

• The peak overpressure (Ps).
• The positive phase duration (tp).
• The impulse (1/2 Pstp).
When examining the effects of overpressure it is common for the effect to be related to peak
overpressure as this is relatively easy to measure. This simplification is reasonable for many
effects, but in some circumstances e.g. whole body translation, control room design, it may be
necessary for other wave characteristics to be determined.
23.3.1.1 Primary Effects
The human body is capable of adapting to pressure changes. However, organs can be damaged
if the change is sudden. The lung is generally regarded as the most susceptible organ which is
affected by overpressure and can lead to death. The ear is more sensitive but damage to it does
not lead to fatality. Peak overpressures which cause damage to these organs are given in Table
23.7. The values given for VCEs are derived assuming a similar impact for a peak
overpressure which is three times that of the condensed phase explosion. These are injury
levels from the overpressure wave only. Other injury levels should be taken into account when
working out the injury criteria.
Table 23.7 Human Injury Levels Resulting From Blast Waves
Injury type Injury level Peak overpressure (bar)

Condensed Vapour Cloud
Phase Explosion
Eardrum Failure Threshold 0.35 1.0
50% 1.0 - 1.4 3.0 - 4.2
Lung Damage Threshold 0.7 - 0.8 2.1 - 2.4
Lethality Threshold 2.1 - 2.9 6.3 - 8.7
50% 2.9 - 3.9 8.7 - 11.8
Virtually 100% 3.9 - 5.5 11.8 - 16.6
23.3.1.2 Secondary Effects
Secondary effects cause an impact on people either because of structural e.g. building collapse
or because of missiles e.g. glass fragments. the former effects are generally of most
significance. Buildings can collapse when subject to blast loadings far lower than those
required to produce primary effects on humans.
Empirical data relating the degree of damage of a building subject to an overpressure wave are
generally given in terms of peak overpressure and are usually from observations following
condensed phase explosions. Typical examples of these data are given in Table 23.8. These
lists are oversimplifications as different explosive masses give different overpressure values for
similar effects and wave reflection which can cause significant damage is not taken into
account.
Table 23.8 Damage Produced By Blast
Pressure Damage
bar (psig)
0.0014 (0.02) Annoying noise (137 dB), if of low frequency (10 to 15 cps).
0.0021 (0.03) Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain.
0.0028 (0.04) Typical pressure for glass failure.
0.01 (0.15 “Safe Distance” (probability 0.05 no serious damage beyond this value).
Missile limit.
Some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken.
0.02 (0.3) Limited minor structural damage.
0.028 (0.4) Large and small windows usually shattered occasional damage to window
frames.
0.034 to 0.069 (0.5 to 1) Minor damage to house structures.
0.048 (0.7) Corrugated asbestos shattered. Corrugated steel or panels, fastenings fail,
followed by buckling.
Wood panel (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in.
0.069 to 0.138 (1 to 2) Steel frames of clad building slightly distorted.
0.090 (1.3) Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.
0.138 to 0.207 (2 to 3) Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shattered.
0.159 (2 to 3) Lower limit of serious structural damage.
0.207 (3) Heavy machines (wt 3000 lbs) in industrial building suffered little damage.
Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations.
0.207 to 0.276 (3 to 4) Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished.
Rupture of oil storage tanks.
0.276 (4) Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured.
0.345 (5) Wooden utility poles (telegraph etc.) snapped.
Tall hydraulic press (40000 lbs wt) in building slightly damaged.
0.345 to 0.483 (5 to 7) Nearly complete destruction of houses.
0.483 (7) Loaded train wagons overturned.
0.483 to 0.552 (7 to 8) Brick panels, 8 to 12 inch thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing and flexure.
0.621 (9) Loaded train box-cars completely demolished.
0.689 (10) Probable total destruction buildings.
Heavy (7000 lb) machine tools moved and badly damaged.
Very heavy 12000 lb) machine tools survived.
20.68 (300) Limit of crater lip.
When buildings collapse people inside can be expected to suffer injuries ranging from minor to
fatal. Experience with earthquakes has indicated that between 20 and 50% of people would be
expected to be killed. In VCE incidents higher probabilities of fatalities have been recorded
e.g. Flixborough where everyone in the control room at the time of the incident was killed,
although not all fatalities are necessarily due to blast. Factors which are likely to affect the
probability of fatality/survival of a person within a collapsed building are building size (larger
buildings give higher fatalities), age of the person (young and old are more susceptible) and
age of the building (old housing causing higher fatalities than new houses).
23.3.1.3 Tertiary Effects
Injury results from a person being displaced by the wind associated with the blast and a part of
the body impacting on a fixed/solid structure. The extent/seriousness of injury depends on the
velocity of impact, the hardness or shape of the structure and the part of the body involved in
the impact. The most critical body part is the base of the skull for which the threshold value of
velocity for fatality is 4m/s (velocities below 3m/s regarded as being safe). For a VCE which
has a positive phase duration of 100 ms the threshold overpressure value is approximately 0.7
bar. It is noteworthy that experience from VCE incidents indicates that prior to 1983 there had
been no recorded fatalities for people outside the flammable cloud as a result of
primary/tertiary overpressure effects.
The criteria to use for explosion overpressure depends on the nature of a study. If the
explosion happens in a housing area or in industrial areas with e.g. office buildings, the most
used criteria is 0.35 bar overpressure since this level has the potential to cause nearly complete
destruction of houses. On the other hand, if the explosion happens in the open this criterion
seems to be too conservative. Hence another criteria should be used.
23.4 TOXIC EFFECT CALCULATIONS
The toxic effect consequence toxic effect models take the output from the dispersion models
and use it to calculate the effects on people (or effect zone), given that the specified release
and weather conditions occur. Toxic consequences are expressed as one set of results which
give the variation in fatality risk with distance from the release point.
23.4.1 Effects of Exposure to Toxic Materials
The effects of exposure to a toxic material can be divided into two categories according to the
duration and concentration of exposure.
• Acute Toxic Effects
These arise from short-term exposure at high concentrations. Carbon monoxide poisoning
is an example of an acute toxic effect.
• Chronic Toxic Effects
These arise from long-term exposure at low concentrations. Asbestosis and lead poisoning
are examples of chronic toxic effects.
Hazard assessments are usually concerned with releases of large quantities of material,
which disperse after an hour or so; therefore, hazard assessments consider acute effects
only.
The effects of acute exposure include:
• Irritation
Irritation can be felt by the respiratory system, by the skin, and by the eyes. With some
materials the irritation occurs at low concentrations and can be a warning to people to
seek shelter.
• Narcosis
Some materials affect people's responses, in such a way as to make them slow to seek
shelter or to warn others.
• Asphyxiation
Most gases can cause asphyxiation by displacing oxygen from the atmosphere; others, such
as carbon monoxide, cause asphyxiation by displacing oxygen from the blood and thus
preventing oxygen from reaching the tissues.
• Systemic damage
Some materials cause damage to the organs of the body. This damage may be temporary,
or it may be permanent.
The severity of the effects depends on the concentration and duration of exposure, and on the
toxic properties of the material. However, the toxic properties of many materials are not well-
established because the data about their effects of humans are very sparse. It is difficult to
derive properties from real incidents because the concentrations and durations in these
incidents are usually not known. Most toxicity data are based on experiments on animals, in
which concentrations and durations can be controlled. However, the applicability of the results
of such experiments to humans is questionable, given the differences in body weight and
physiology. Therefore the analyst should regard toxicity data with caution.
Another problem in predicting toxic effects is the variation in vulnerability among the
population. Because of this variation, expressions for toxic effects give the proportion of the
population which would be expected to manifest the effect after a given exposure. The above
problems make it difficult to summarise the toxicity of materials in order to compare them,
since duration, concentration, and percentage-affected all have to be standardised.
One way of comparing the toxicity of materials is to use the LC50 for a stated duration of
exposure; this is the Lethal Concentration which would be expected to cause fatal effects to
50% of the exposed population over the exposure period. Another way of comparing or
expressing toxicity is to specify a harmless level of exposure for a given period as the limiting
exposure criterion; these levels are known as Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) and are specified
for periods such as a normal working life and short-term periods for emergency exposure.
Yet another criterion is the IDLH value for a 30 minute exposure, as described in NIOSH
(1994); this is the dose which is Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health at the exposure
duration.
All of these criteria can be useful when choosing the lowest concentration of concern in
dispersion calculations. Some consequence models use LC50 in order to illustrate how toxic
effects can be analysed but he analyst might want to use a different concentration; the analyst's
chosen criterion can simply be substituted for the LC50.
For toxic gases and vapours it is generally appropriate to use a multiple value criterion, based
on probits. Probits use a “sliding scale” of impact, rather than a hazard level/fatality
probability envelope. This is because toxicity is a function of both concentartion and exposure,
and it is difficult to adequately define fatality probabilities using concentration alone.
However, single value criteria can be used for toxic effects, as these are simple to use and if a
low concentration is specified, will give conservative results. However, for a detailed analysis
it is recommended that the probit approach is adopted.
In onshore QRAs toxic effects are normally calculated using the probit equation. This relates
the probability of fatality to the dose (concentration-time relationship) received. In this way
curves of probability of fatality versus downwind distance can be produced for releases of
toxic chemicals.
Eisenberg et al. (1975) published a Vulnerability Model for toxic agents, amongst other
hazards, based on a probability function or probit of the toxic load. This probit equation is in
the form of:
Pr = a + b ln (Cnt)
Where: Pr = Probit function value

C = Toxic gas concentration (ppm)
t = Duration of exposure (minutes)
a, b and n = constants, depending on the material.
The probit function is a normally distributed function with a mean of 5.0 and a variance of 1.0.
A probit of 5.0 corresponds to 50% fatalities, 3.36 to 5% fatalities and 6.64 to 95% fatalities.
Implicit in the toxic load method is the concept of variable vulnerabilities to a given
concentration of toxic material for a specific duration. The very young and the elderly are
most vulnerable. Table 23.5 shows the relationship between probability of fatality values and
probit values.
The corresponding ppm values (to the probit values) can be calculated by substituting the
constants for a, b and n and the exposure time (t) with the values for that particular material.
It is then possible to calculate the concentrations likely to kill half those exposed (the LC50 in
biological terms).
Table 23.9 gives a selection of toxicity data for a range of toxic materials for which QRAs are
often undertaken. Because toxicity is a function of both concentration and exposure, toxicity
criteria give both a concentration and a time to give a certain level of risk. For the probits, the
units of concentration, C, are ppm, and the units of time, t, are minutes.
Table 23.9 Single Value and Probabilistic Criteria for Common Substances
Single Value Criterion

Material Time LC50 Fatality IDLH HSE DTL Probit
(min) (ppm) Threshold (ppm) (ppm)
(ppm)
Ammonia 10 10800 6000 6000 Pr = -9.28 + 0.71 ln(C 2t)
30 6200 3600 500
Chlorine 10 940 100 100 Pr = -10.1 + 1.11 ln(C1.65t)
30 490 60 30
Hydrogen fluoride 10 5900 1200 1200 Pr = -48.33 + 4.853 ln(Ct)
30 2000 400 30
Hydrogen sulphide 10 950 670 670 Pr = -31.42 + 3.008 ln(C1.43t)
30 440 510 300
Hydrogen cyanide 10 165 40 Pr = -9.56 + ln(C 2.4t)
30 105 25 50
Methyl isocyanate 10 620 160 Pr = -5.642 + 1.637 ln(C 0.653t)
30 120 30 20
Sulphur dioxide 10 1900 470 Pr = -15.67 + 2.1 ln(Ct)
30 630 160 100
23.5 EFFECTS OF SMOKE
23.5.1 Effects of Carbon Monoxide
23.5.1.1 Introduction
Carbon monoxide (CO) is usually the main cause of death in fires. It combines with
haemoglobin, the oxygen carrier in the blood, to form carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb). CO has a
much greater affinity for haemoglobin than oxygen, thus reducing oxygen delivery to the body
tissues, causing “asphyxia”, a choking fit which leads to death. The natural level of COHb in
the blood is 0 to 5%, and is greatest for smokers. The fatal level of COHb in the blood is
generally considered to be 50% (TIL 1991), although Debanne et al (1992) believe this is not
a realistic value, and their work indicates that lethality is possible at COHb levels greater than
20%.
CO uptake and intoxication is extremely insidious, producing minimal effects until a critical
dose has been accumulated, which rapidly leads to collapse. Therefore, victims may not realise
the danger until it is too late to escape. The rate of uptake is greatly increased at higher
activity levels.
23.5.1.2 Carbon Monoxide Doses
The effects of exposures to different levels of CO for different lengths of time are given in
Table 23.10 (Stensaas 1991). The CO concentration causing unconsciousness or death is
inversely proportional to the exposure time. The critical toxic effect is therefore best measured
as a dose in the form of:
D=C×t
where: D = dose (ppm-min)

C = concentration (ppm, parts per million)
t = exposure time (min)
The time to unconsciousness can be represented approximately by a CO dose of 45,000 ppm

min. This is considered appropriate for conditions of light physical activity (Stensaas 1991).
Table 23.10 Effects of Carbon Monoxide
Carbon Monoxide Effects

Concentration
(ppm)
1,500 Headache in 15 minutes, collapse in 30 minutes. Death in 1 hour.

2,000 Headache in 10 minutes, collapse after 20 minutes. Death in 45 minutes.
3,000 Maximum ‘safe’ exposure limit for 5 minutes. Danger of collapse in 10 minutes.
6,000 Headache, dizziness in 1 to 2 minutes. Danger of death in 10 to 15 minutes.
12,800 Immediate effect, unconsciousness in 2 to 3 breaths. Danger of death in 1 to 3
minutes.
23.5.1.3 Carbon Monoxide Probits
A probit for carbon monoxide impact which is consistent with the above data is (ten Berge
1978, quoted in DNV Technica ARF T15):
Pr = -37.98 + 3.71 ln (C.t)
where the terms are as defined above.
23.5.1.4 Carbon Monoxide Impact Criteria
A CO concentration of 0.04% is taken as the limit for impairment of a TR in 2 hours, based on

the critical dose of 45,000 ppm-min. If escape is not possible in this time, death is assured to
occur.
A CO concentration of 0.15% is taken as the limit for impairment of an escape route in 30

minutes. This is consistent with the IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health)
concentration of 0.15% for CO (NIOSH 1990), from which escape is considered possible in
30 minutes without any escape-impairing or irreversible effects.
A CO concentration of 1.0% is taken as the limit for escape actions lasting a few seconds. If
escape is not possible in a few seconds, death is assumed to occur.
23.5.1.5 Application of Impact Criteria
Initial CO concentrations in smoke are estimated to range from less than 0.1% for well-
ventilated fires to 3% for under-ventilated fires. Thus, only under-ventilated fires (i.e. those
occurring inside a module) have any potential for causing fatalities by asphyxia.
In the smoke plume outside the module from an under-ventilated fire, the CO concentration of
0.15% necessary to impair escape routes would occur in a combustion gas concentration of
0.15/3 = 5% (i.e. dilution in air to 20 times its original volume).
If the smoke plume from a fire inside a module entered the TR (due to failure of the ventilation
dampers), an internal CO concentration of 0.04% would be necessary to cause TR impairment
in 2 hours. This would occur in a combustion gas concentration of 0.04/3 = 1%.
23.5.2 Effects of Carbon Dioxide
Carbon dioxide (CO2) occurs naturally in clean air at a concentration of 0.03% by volume.
Humans produce CO2 as waste from respiration. On average, 4.1% of the exhaled volume is
CO2. CO2 concentrations in air above 0.1% are experienced in a “stuffy” room.
Excess CO2 causes “hypercapnia”, characterised at first by increased respiration. Since CO2
itself is not very toxic, the most important effect of CO2 in smoke is to increase the uptake of
other toxic gases, although CO2 may also have a beneficial effect by increasing the oxygen
uptake.
CO2 concentrations of 5% triple the rate of breathing (Technica 1991). At this concentration,
breathing becomes difficult for some individuals, although it can in general be sustained for up
to an hour without serious after-effects (Stensaas 1991). 5% is also the IDLH (immediately
dangerous to life and health) concentration for CO2 (NIOSH 1990), from which escape is
considered possible in 30 minutes without any escape-impairing or irreversible effects. This is
taken to be the limiting concentration for impairment of an escape route. TR impairment could
be at a slightly lower concentration, of about 3%.
CO2 concentrations above 10% cause loss of consciousness in times ranging from 30 minutes
at 10% to 1 minute at 15% (Stensaas 1991). In order to allow for the increased respiration
increasing the uptake of other toxic gases, 10% may be taken to be the limiting CO2
concentration for escape actions lasting a few seconds. If escape action is not possible in a few
seconds, death is assumed to occur.
Initial CO2 concentrations in smoke are estimated to be in the range of 8 to 12%. Thus, a
combustion gas concentration of at least 10/12 = 83% would be required to cause death from
CO2. In general, this is not a dominant factor.
23.5.3 Effects of Toxic Gases in Smoke
Smoke from liquid hydrocarbons often contains toxic gases such as nitrogen oxides (NOx),
ammonia (NH3), sulphur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen fluoride (HF), as well as carbon monoxide
(CO). The content of the toxic gases in the smoke depends on the composition of the materials
being burned. Although CO is not the most toxic of these gases, it is present in relatively high
concentrations in smoke, and so its effects are usually dominant.
Evidence is mixed as to whether combinations of toxic gases may produce more significant
“synergetic” effects than the additive effects of the individual components (Stensaas 1991).
For simplicity, the effects of toxic gases other than CO are usually neglected.
23.5.4 Effects of Oxygen Depletion
Oxygen constitutes 21% by volume of clean air. Decreases in oxygen concentration down to
about 15% are counteracted by the body increasing the flow of blood to the brain, and only
minor effects on motor coordination are apparent.
Oxygen concentrations below 15% by volume produce oxygen starvation effects such as
increased breathing, faulty judgement and rapid onset of fatigue. This is taken to be the
limiting oxygen concentration for impairment of an escape route or TR. An oxygen
concentration of 15% requires an air content in the smoke of 15/21 = 71%. This would be
achieved when the smoke was diluted to 29% of its initial concentration.
Oxygen concentrations below 10% cause rapid loss of judgement and comprehension,
followed by loss of consciousness, leading to death within a few minutes (Stensaas 1991). This
is taken to be the limiting oxygen concentration for escape actions lasting a few seconds. An
oxygen concentration of 10% requires an air content in the smoke of 10/21 = 48%. This
would be achieved when the smoke was diluted to 52% of its initial concentration. This would
cause death unless escape was possible in a few seconds.
23.5.5 Effects of Smoke on Breathability
The combined effects of CO, CO2, other toxic gases and oxygen depletion are the main cause
of fatalities in smoke. For under-ventilated fires, CO has the main effect, which depends
strongly on exposure time. For well-ventilated fires, CO production is much reduced, and
oxygen depletion appears to have the main effect.
A simple indication of combined effects is given in Table 23.11, based on simple additive
combination of the independent effects suggested above. For example, an overall combustion
gas concentration from under-ventilated fires of 0.32 x 0.52 = 17% would cause death unless
escape was possible in a few seconds.
Table 23.11 Effects of Smoke on Breathability
Gas Combustion Gas Concentration (%) to Prevent Escape in a few Seconds

Well-Ventilated Fire (Outside) Under-Ventilated Fire (Inside)
Gas Fire Liquid Fire Gas Fire Liquid Fire
CO - - 33 32
CO2 92 85 - -
O2 52 52 52 52
Combined 48 44 17 17
These values are extremely uncertain. An alternative set of criteria, based on similar data, is
given in Table 23.12 (DNV Technica ARF T8).
Table 23.12 Effects of Smoke on Breathability
Effect Combustion Gas Concentration (%)

Well-Ventilated Fire Under-Ventilated Fire
(Outside) (Inside)
Gas Fire Liquid Fire Gas Fire Liquid Fire
Impairment after 30 minutes 3.6 1.9 0.05 0.05
Incapacitation after 1 minute 81 80 43 40
23.5.6 Effect of Smoke on Visibility
The reduction of visibility due to smoke is one of the main causes of impairment of escape
routes in fires. Data on evacuation through smoke in building fires is given by SFPE (1988).
Very few occupants turned back when the visibility distance exceeded 10 m, and this is
sometimes used as a criterion for impairment of escape routes. However, this is quite
conservative, since about half of the people moved through visibility of less than 4 m (SFPE
1988). This could be used as a more optimistic impairment criterion.
For offshore personnel with smoke hoods and well-marked or well-known escape routes,
evacuation may be possible in visibility equal to an arm’s length, i.e. about 1 m (Light 1993).
However, a simple smoke hood will only function for 10 to 15 minutes, after which the user
can be regarded as unprotected.
A visibility of 1 m corresponds roughly to an optical density of about 1 m-1 for unilluminated

objects. Initial combustion gas optical densities are estimated to be in the range from 100 m-1
for oil fires to 7 m-1 for gas fires. Thus, in order to provide an optical density of 1 m-1, the
combustion gas would need to be diluted to 1% of its initial concentration for oil fires and
14% for gas fires. Other conditions are given in Table 23.13.
Table 23.13 Effects of Smoke on Visibility
Material Combustion Gas Concentration (%) for:

1 m Visibility 10 m Visibility
Gas 14 0.7
Condensate 2 0.1
Oil 1 0.05
The estimation of the visibility limits is very uncertain. Other estimates of the limiting
concentration have been in the range of 1 to 8% for oil and 3 to 17% for gas (DNVR 1994).
The present estimates for 1 m visibility are within these ranges.
23.6 WORKED EXAMPLES
To use the results of the dispersion analysis, it is necessary to estimate the critical fatality
concentrations for use in the calculations. The current preferred approach for this is to use the
toxic load method which considers both the toxic concentration and the duration of exposure.
Single value toxic criteria (such as the Coast Guard IDLH values) have an implicit duration of
exposure which may not be appropriate for many accident scenarios. Eisenberg (1975)
published a Vulnerability Model for toxic agents, amongst other hazards, based on a
probability function or probit of the toxic load. Withers and Lees (1985) updated the
coefficients of the probit equation for chlorine to the following form:
Pr = - 8.29 + 0.92 ln (C 2 t)
Where: Pr is the probit function value.

C is the chlorine concentration (ppm).
t is the duration of exposure (minutes).
The probit function is a normally distributed function with a mean of 5.0 and a variance of 1.0.
A probit of 5.0 corresponds to 50% fatalities, 3.36 to 5% fatalities and 6.64 to 95% fatalities.
Implicit in the toxic load method is the concept of variable vulnerabilities to a given
concentration of chlorine for a specific duration. The very young and the elderly are most
vulnerable.
The IDLH, “Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health”, value is sometimes used as the
minimum concentration of interest for dispersion calculations. It is defined as the maximum
concentration from which one could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing
symptoms or any irreversible health effects. For chlorine the IDLH is 25 ppm.
Calculate the probit value for the IDLH and find the corresponding fatality probability.
IDLH
Probit value = -8.29 + 0.92 ln (252 × 30) = 0.76
Fatality probability = << 1% from Table 23.5
Given the relation it is possible to calculate the concentrations likely to kill half those exposed
(the LC50 in biological terms). Consider liquid and vapour releases, both of 10 minutes
duration (Incidents 1 and 2), and a release from a safety valve (incident 3) resulting from a fire
of 60 minutes duration (it might last longer than this, but cooling water could be applied after
this period greatly reducing the heat input).
Now calculate the LC50 for Incidents 1, 2 & 3:
INCIDENTS 1 AND 2 – LC50 CALCULATION FOR A 10 min EXPOSURE
1/ 2
  Pr + 8.29  
 exp 
  0.92  
• Rearrange probit equation to: c= 
t
 
 
1/ 2
  5 + 8.29  
 exp 
  0.92  
• Pr = 5 for 50% probability of death: c= 
t
 
 
1/ 2
  5 + 8.29  
 exp 
  0.92  
• Incidents 1 and 2, t = 10 minutes: c=  = 430 ppm
10
 
 
LC50 (10 min) Conc = 430 ppm
INCIDENT 3 - LC50 CALCULATION FOR A 60 min EXPOSURE
• Rearrange probit equation as above for incidents 1 and 2, and for Pr = 5 for
50% probability of death.
1/ 2
  5 + 8.29  
 exp 
  0.92  
• Incident 3, t = 60 minutes: c=  = 175ppm
60
 
 
LC50 (60 min) Conc = 175 ppm
Thus for those incident cases dispersion should be tracked down to these concentrations.
This approach can also be used for time varying exposures as might occur following a large
instantaneous failure. The toxic load can be accumulated for increments of time as the cloud
passes over.
23.7 REFERENCES
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Edition.
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pp368-372, quoted in Hymes.
NIOSH (1990), Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, National Institute for Occupational
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Personnel Offshore, OTN-88-175, Department of Energy.
Pietersen, C.M. (1989), Consequences of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Material, Loss of

Containment Conference, London.
SFPE (1988), Fire Protection Engineering, Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE),
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Module23 - Consequence Analysis - Impact Criteria

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Module23 - Consequence Analysis - Impact Criteria

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Risk ID & Assessment Training Course DNV Consulting

Module 23: Consequence Analysis (4) – Impact Criteria

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (4)

23. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING (4) – IMPACT CRITERIA ....................................1

23.2 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS AND CRITERIA .........................................2

23.3 EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE .........................................................................14

23.4 TOXIC EFFECT CALCULATIONS ....................................................................18

23.5 EFFECTS OF SMOKE.........................................................................................22

23.6 WORKED EXAMPLES .......................................................................................27

23. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING (4) – IMPACT CRITERIA

• Heat, including thermal radiation and convected heat

23.2 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS AND CRITERIA

• Source of thermal radiation, e.g. hydrocarbon fire or thermonuclear device.

23.2.2 Radiation Effects and Criteria

23.2.2.1 Thermal Radiation Dose

Table 23.1 Pain Threshold from Thermal Radiation

Radiation Time to Pain Threshold (sec)

Figure 23.1 Tolerance Times to Burn Injury Levels

Third Degree Burns to Bare Skin (2mm)

1% Lethality (average clothing)

7 Start of More Than Second Degree Burns

Exposure Time (sec)

Table 23.2 Recommended Design Flare Radiation Levels (API 521)

Permissible Design Level Conditions

Table 23.3 Effects Of Thermal Radiation (World Bank)

Radiation intensity Conditions

where: V = thermal dose [(kW/m2)4/3 s]

Table 23.4 Effects of Thermal Radiation

Thermal Dose (kW/m2)4/3 s Effects

125 Threshold of pain

23.2.2.2 Thermal Radiation Probits

where: Pr = probit function

Table 23.5 Fatality Probability Versus Probit Values

Probability 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.90 0.99

Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 ln (I4/3 t)

where: I = thermal radiation (kW/m2)

Table 23.6 Fatal Radiation Exposure Levels (From Probit)

Radiation Seconds exposure for percentage fatality levels

• Very short duration exposure (1 to 2 seconds) to high intensity radiation

The resulting probit is:

Pr = -12.8 + 2.56 ln (Q4/3t)

Pr = -13.65 + 2.56 ln (Q4/3t)

This has subsequently been withdrawn by TNO.

A more recent probit has been derived by Lees (1994):

Pr = -10.7 + 1.99 ln (Q4/3t)

This is based on a theoretical model which combines:

• 20% skin exposure, typical for adults with light clothing.

• Clothing ignition after a thermal dose, V, of 1,800

23.2.2.3 Validation of Probits

23.2.2.4 Thermal Impact Criteria

23.2.2.5 Thermal Impact Modelling for Continuous Fires

The application of these criteria is as follows:

• Above 37.5 kW/m2 - death for all personnel.

23.2.2.6 Thermal Impact Modelling for Transient Fires

23.2.2.7 Immediate Fatalities and Lethal Injuries

23.2.3 Effects of Convected Heat

t = exp (5.1849 - 0.0273 T)

where: t = exposure time (minutes)

23.3 EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE

Overpressures which can be hazardous to people may be caused by a number of mechanisms.

23.3.1 The Effects of Overpressure

• Impact from missiles projected by the explosion. (Secondary Effects)