SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner, vs.

ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.

G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002
EN BANC, BUENA, J.

This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the issued memorandum order and department order of the DOTC. They pertain to
a transfer of the powers and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as
an LTFRB Regional Office. Are these valid?

Yes, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders. The
President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly
decree the reorganization of the Department, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

A public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by
law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.

Congress can delegate the power to create positions. Reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, abolish or merge
offices in the executive department is valid. In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was
made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued
by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of
E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987.

NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.
EN BANC, CAMPOS, JR., J

Whether or not membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy
Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.

The position was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. Not being a member of the Bar, she
cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law. Abolition of a position does not involve
or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition,
there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate
body?; and (2) was it done in good faith? Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. If the
newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an
office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an
abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons
of economy are given to an existing officer or office. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.
G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002.
FIRST DIVISION, KAPUNAN, J.:

President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebration (NCC) in 1998. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a
resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner and TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594. Is Laurel a public officer when Expocorp was allegedly
a private corporation?
Yes, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. A definition
of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not
by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. Mechem
describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as [t]he most important characteristic in
determining whether a position is a public office or not. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of
the position.The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006
Second Division, Corona

Facts: Officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL) were charged before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. They question whether or not the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over PAL it being created under the general
corporation law and whether they are public officers.
Issue: Does the Ombudsman have the jurisdiction?
Ruling: No, the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction. Aside from fact that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution covers only GOCC’s with original charters, the officers of PAL were not public officers.
Neither the 1987 Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1990 defines who public officers are. Instead, its varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. Usually quoted in the Court’s decisions is Mechem’s definition, to wit:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not
by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. Mechem
describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in
determining whether a position is a public office or not.
It can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are those endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial
functions. In this case, the government acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its
unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were involved. Hence, the officers were not public officers.

Carandang_v._Ombudsman
G.R. No. 148706, January 12,2011
Second Division, Corona

Facts: Shares of stock of RPN-9 were ceded to the Government based on the judgment of the Sandiganbayan. The percentage ceded
was represented to be at 32.9% but the judgment directed to transfer 72.4%. A motion for reconsideration on this issue has remained
unresolved. The General Manager(GM) of RPN-9 was charged with grave misconduct with the Ombudsman and violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The GM challenges the jurisdiction over him by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan arguing that
RPN-9 was not a GOCC. Hence, he is not a public official or employee.
Issue: Does the Ombudsman and/or Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction?
Ruling: No, they do not have. RPN-9 is not a GOCC.
The Administrative Code defines a government-owned or controlled corporations as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to
the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned or –controlled
corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock.
Although it is true that the Sandiganbayan ordered to transfer 72.4%, such cannot be controlling in view of the timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Concluding that the Government held the majority of RPN-9's capital stock would be bereft of any factual
and legal basis. Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have recognized RPN-9's status as not being a GOCC with the
OP clarifying that “As government ownership over RPN-9 is only 32.4% of its capital stock, pending the final judicial determination
of the true and legal ownership of RPN-9, the corporation is deemed private.” Consequently, RPN was not a GOCC and the GM was
correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the
criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Abeja v._Tañada
G.R. No. 112283, August 30, 1994
Third Division, Bidin
Facts: Protestant sought for the revision of 22 precincts while the protestee counter-protested and sough for the revision of 36
precincts. Protestee, during the pendency of the case, died and was substituted by his wife who continued the action. The revision of
the 22 precincts protested by protestant was made. Protestee, on the other hand, insisted that the revision of the 36 precincts in his
counterprotest be made only if it is shown that protestant leads by at least one vote after the revision of the 22 precincts. The judge
handling the protest case rendered an order ruling on the 22 precincts that showed protestant leading by 281 votes. Protestee would
now want to have the 36 precincts he counter-protested to be revised before the proclamation of protestant.
Issue: Whether or not protestee should be allowed to proceed with the revision of the 36 precincts he counter-protested.
Whether or not the wife may substitute the protestee in his counter-protest.
Ruling: No. The Comelec Rules of Procedure does not allow it.
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provide for the order of hearing where petitioner/protestant comes first, protestant-in-intervention
second and respondent/protestee third. Protestee failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts,
stubbornly maintaining the position that said precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision that petitioner leads
private respondent by at least one (1) vote. No law or rule authorizes such a procedure. Consequently, private respondent must be
deemed to have waived or abandoned his counter-protest.

On the 2nd issue: No, she cannot. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs". The heirs
may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when
death terminated his right to occupy the contested office.

Sampayan vs. Daza

G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992
En Banc, Romero

Facts: Residents of a Congressional District filed a petition for prohibition to disqualify their incumbent congressman because he is a
green card holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. The term for the congressman had expired.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
Ruling: No, the petition should not be granted.
Aside from the petition becoming moot and academic with the expiration of the term and that a writ of prohibition is not intended to
provide for acts already consummated, jurisdiction of the case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal (HET). The
appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel the congressman’s certificate of candidacy before election or a quo
warranto case with the HET after his proclamation.
As a de facto public officer, he cannot be made to reimburse the funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid
as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

De la Victoria vs Comelec
199 SCRA 561

The contenders for mayorship in Albuera, Leyte where X who obtained 5,093 votes and the late Y who obtained 5,103 votes,
and Z who garnered 982 votes. Y was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. In due time, X filed filed an election protest in the RTC
against Y with claims for damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Y filed an answer with counterclaims and damages and attorney’s fees.
Y died and was substituted as protestee by her vice-mayor AC. AC then filed in the RTC a petition to intervene. X later filed
a Manifestation/Motion waiving his claim for damages and cost against deceased Y. Counsel of Y filed a notice of death and motion
for substation of the deceased prostestee by her heirs.
Can the heirs of Y be able to substitute the latter in the election protest case?

No, the heirs of Y cannot substitute the latter.

The late Y’s claim to the contested office was not in any sense a transmissible right that devolved upon her surviving spouse
and her children after her death. Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs. The only
interest of Y’s heirs in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than their interest in defending Y against X’s claim for damages
and costs (which X has already waived). They may no longer prosecute Y’s own counter-claim for damages against X for that was
extinguished when death terminated her right to occupy the contested office of mayor of Albuera, Leyte.
 Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 112386 (June 14, 1994)

Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was then a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the
11 May 1992 elections. He was among those charged before Sandiganbayan with having violated section 3(e) of RA 3019. On motion
of prosecution for the suspension of the accused public officials, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending said accused for a
period of 90 days. Petitioner now contends the following: (i) the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly
committed while still a member of the SP can no longer attach to him now that he is duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor and
(ii) the implementation of the suspension order would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Decide on the
contention.

On the first contention, the term “office” used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently
be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
On the second contention, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Public office is a public agency or trust and it is not a property envisioned by the Constitution.

The General Manager, Philippine Ports Authority vs. Monserate

G.R. No. 129616 (April 17, 2002)

When JM was appointed to a permanent position of Manager II in the Resource management Division of PPA, RA, who
ranked second in the position, protested the same before the PPA appeals board. Thereafter, the PPA appeals board sustained the
protest and replaced JM with RA.

Was JM validly replaced?

No. Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with
previous notice and hearing. Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of
qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised
and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing
authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause.
Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of JM’s appointment by demoting her. JM’s security
of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of appointing authority. When the
Court of Appeals reinstated her to her legitimate position as Manager II, it merely restored her appointment to the said position to
which her right to security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her position as Manager II never became vacant since her
demotion was void.
 Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete
G.R. No. 177795 (19 June 2009)

Petitioners were all bona fide employees of the City Government of Dumaguete. They were appointed to various positions by
City Mayor Remollo sometime in June 2001, shortly before the end of his term. On 2 July 2001, newly elected Ciy Mayor Perdices
announced that he is not recognizing the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. Thereafter, the City Administrator issued a
Memorandum directing the City Treasurer to refrain from making any disbursements, particularly payments for salary differentials to
those given promotional appointments by former Mayor Remollo. Petitioners then asked for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel the City Government to pay their salaries.

Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to pay petitioners’ salaries,
salary adjustments, and other emoluments?

No. The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees already assume the duties
of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once. There is no need to wait for the approval of the appointments by
CSC. The appointments shall be effective until disapproved by the CSC.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned general rules cannot be simply applied to the case at bar. The Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions only categorically recognizes right of the appointee to payment of salaries from the
government, during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration or appeal of the disapproval of the appointment by the CSC-FO
and/or CSC-RO before the CSC-Proper, if the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil
service law. When the appointment was disapproved for violation of pertinent laws, the appointing authority shall be personally liable
for the salary of the appointee.
To recall, petitioners’ appointments were invalidated and revoked by CSC-FO on the ground that said appointments were
made by former Mayor Remollo in violation of items No. 3(d) and 4 of CSC resolution No. 010988 which prohibit outgoing chief
executive from making mass appointments after elections. Upon disapproval by CSC-FO of petitioners’ appointments, they may no
longer claim entitlement to the payment of their salaries from the government. There is no doubt, pending their appeals before the
CSC-RO, then the CSC-Proper, petitioners’ appointments remained effective and they could still continue reporting to work and
rendering service, but there already arose the question as to who shall be liable for their salaries during the period i.e. whether it
is the City Government of Dumaguete or former Mayor Remollo. Only if this court finally rules in G.R. No. 181559 that petitioners’
appointments did not violate any civil service law is petitioners’ right to payment of their salaries by the City Government of
Dumaguete during the given period.

Social Justice Society v. PDEA GR No. 157870 EN BANC November 03, 2008

Facts: Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities.
Issue: Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both
the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. [11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found
in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the
drug-testing requirement.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed
the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

LEON G. MAQUERA V. JUAN BORRA, G .R. No. L-24761 and L-24828, September 07, 1965

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to "post a surety bond equivalent
to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes
cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office".
Issue: WON RA 4421 valid as it imposes a property qualification in order that a person could run for a public office
Ruling:
That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution
and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for
all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office; and

That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of defraying
certain expenses or of compensating services given in connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.

Frivaldo v Comelec G.R. 120295, (1996)

Facts: On March 20, 1995, G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor in the May 8, 1995 elections. A petition was
filed that Frivaldo should "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. The Comelec Division granted the petition. Frivaldo a Motion for
Reconsideration but remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. Frivaldo got the highest votes. On May 11, 1995,
the Comelec en banc[7] affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

Issue: WON Frivaldo is ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor?

Ruling:

An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995--the very day [32] the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) began--he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.

On June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x."

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17,1994.

Monsanto v Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9 1989

Facts: Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to imprisonment. Monsanto appealed her conviction to the SC which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, she requested that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Issues:
 Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment?
 Won she should be paid backpay?

Ruling:
No.
 Full pardon relieves the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt.[17] But it relieves him from nothing more. "
 A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.[19] It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required.” This would explain why though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
 Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the
stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed."
 The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.

FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondent-
appellees.
G.R. No. L-69137. August 5, 1986. En Banc. J. Cruz.

Facts:
Petitioner was appointed as Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City by the Mayor. The appointment was
described as "permanent but the CSC approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the
respondent. The CSC found the respondent better qualified than the petitioner, thus directed that the petitioner's appointment be
revoked.

Issue:
Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified that the appointee
and ordering his replacement?

Ruling:
NO. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC. When the appointee is qualified
and all the otehr requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws.

TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.||| (Santiago v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 92284, [July 12, 1991], 276 PHIL 127-136. En
Banc. J. Cruz)

Facts:
The petitioner was employed in the COA as State Auditor IV In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of
Transportation and Communications. Then, an office order was issued formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration. He was transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under a COA Office Order. As he
was occupying the second position in the MIAA, he was receiving additional compensation for his services therein.

In computing his retirement benefits, the GSIS used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic salary rate
received by the petitioner in the course of his employment. The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis
of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows: Highest
Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to
the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as filed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment.

Issue:
WON his retirement benefits are to be computed on the basis of his monthly salary as State Auditor only.

Ruling:

NO. Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection
by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment (or election).||
|
Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include
the term "designation."

As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It
cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit
as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position
in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which,
following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.

G.R. No. 104216. August 20, 1993.

TEODORO B. PANGILINAN, petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
Facts
Pangilinan was appointed as agent in the NBI, a position for which he had the appropriate civil service eligibility. He later became a
Supervising Agent, but he resigned to accept appointment as Executive Director of the LTO. Pangilinan, however, did not possess the
required civil service eligibility for such position.
Following Pangilinan’s exposè of anomalies in the license plate procurement in the LTO allegedly involving the Secretary of the
DOTC, the Secretary relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director and replaced him with Maglaya.
Pangilinan then prays for reinstatement on the ground that no charge has been filed or proved against him to justify his removal.
Issue
Was Pangilinan illegally removed from his position as Executive Director of the LTO?
Ruling
No, he was not.
First, not having the required civil service eligibility, Pangilinan was only an acting appointee and not a permanent appointee. The fact
that Pangilinan was qualified for his initial appointment as agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other positions he
might later occupy in the civil service.
Second, being an acting appointee, he cannot claim security of tenure but holds his position at the pleasure of his superior. This
guaranty of security of tenure is available only to permanent appointees. Here, the DOTC Secretary relieved Pangilinan, which act is
presumptively that of the President, not being disapproved or reprobated by him.
Third, the separation from office at the pleasure of a superior is not dismissal but an expiration of term. The term “dismissal” is
defined as the ouster of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. Where a person holds his position at the pleasure of a
superior, his separation from office is not a removal but an expiration of the term.
 G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL
TREASURER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent.

Facts
Tito Dato was first appointed as Private Agent and then promoted and appointed as Assistant Provincial Warden by the the Governor
of Camarines. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the latter position, he was only extended a temporary appointment. Tito
Dato subsequently requested the Civil Service Commission for change of status from temporary to permanent appointee, on the basis
that he already passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard.
In the meantime, Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by the Governor after criminal charges were filed against him for allegedly
conniving to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Subsequently, acting on Tito Dato’s request for change of status, the CSC sent a letter to the Governor, informing him that the status
of Tito Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the said examination.
Tito Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement.
Issue

Is Tito Dato entitled to reinstatement?

Ruling

No, he is not.

First, his appointment is merely temporary. At the time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden, he had not yet qualified in an
appropriate examination for the position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed
and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.

Second, his passing a civil service examination does not ipso facto convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one. There must
be a new appointment, since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment. These are two distinct acts
of the appointing authority.

Third, the CSC does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment
status of an employee. It can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position, and thus to approve or disapprove
an appointment set before it. If it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of
the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases.
 G.R. No. 92140 February 19, 1991

REYNALDO D. LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR., respondents.

Facts
Lopez, Luz and Abellana were appointed as Assistant Harbor Masters in the PPA.
Following the reorganization of the DOTC, the number of Assistant Harbor Masters in the PPA was reduced from three to two. A
reevaluation of the qualifications of Lopez, Luz, and Abellana was conducted by a Placement Committee of the PPA. The results
revealed that Lopez was the most outstanding among the three, hence the PPA General Manager appointed him as Harbor Master.
Luz protested Lopez's appointment to the CSC, which ruled that while the candidates were all qualified, there was no finding who
among the three contenders is considered the most qualified and competent to merit appointment. The CSC then directed that
"comparative assessments" be made by an appropriate Placement Committee.
In compliance with the CSC order, the PPA submitted to the CSC the results of the re-assessment conducted by its Placement
Committee. The comparative evaluation showed that Lopez garnered 51 points, Abellana 41.75 points, and Luz 39.75 points.
Despite this compliance by the PPA, the Commission found that the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate
supervisor of Luz was in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely
a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. The CSC stressed that the Placement Committee's current assessment ignored
some of the performance appraisal ratings previously made on Luz, as well as the PPA 201 files containing Luz's record of
achievements. Thus, the CSC directed the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the Lopez.
Issue
Was the action of the CSC proper?
Ruling
No, it was not.
The law limits the CSC’s authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil
service eligibility, nothing else. All the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the
qualifications and appropriate eligibility: If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment simply because it believed that the respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission cannot exceed its power by
substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
The appointing authority’s appointing power is essentially discretionary and must be performed by the officer according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.”
Moreover, the Placement Committee’s work is merely recommendatory and it has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of
the PPA. Hence, it cannot be said also that the Placement Committee encroached on the PPA’s appointing authority.

Amado J. Lansang vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind and Jose Iglesias | GR no. 102667, February 23, 2000
FACTS: Like public streets, public parks are beyond the commerce of man. However, the General Assembly for the Blind, Inc
(GABI) were awarded a verbal contract of lease by the National Parks Development Committee. They were given office and library
space, kiosks for selling food and in return, GAVI will remit to NPDC 40% of tis profits. There was a new chairman of NPDC,
Amado Lansang, and he sought for the clean up of Rizal Park. He sent notice to GABI and terminated the so-called verbal agreement
with GABI and demanded the latter to vacate the premises. GABI president, Jose Iglesias, signed the notice to indicate conformity to
its contents. Upon eviction day, GABI filed for action for damages and injunction. The case was dismissed by RTC ruling that the
complaint was actually directed against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. CA reversed the RTC holding that suit
against the official in official capacity cannot excuse him from the abusive and capricious manner in which authority was exercised
making the official liable for damages under Articles 19, 21 and 24 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1. WON the suit against the Chairman of NPDC and his co-defendants is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued
without its consent.
2. WON petitioner’s act in terminating GABI’s concession is valid and done in lawful performance of official duty (abuse of
authority)

HELD:
1. No. the complaint is not a suit against the state. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applied to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rules is that suit must be regarded as one against the state
 where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act
such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to plaintiff . HOWEVER, the rule does not
apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights
of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their official capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad
faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal
capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. The court
believes that he is not being sued as chairman of NPDC but in his personal capacity.
2. No. Lansang did not abuse his authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a
lease contract. There was no written agreement. Hence GABI’s stay in the park was a mere accommodation by the
government in its favor. That being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to GABI. The Court
cannot sustain the award of damages because Iglesias did not suffer moral injury as a result of the ejectment nor there was
any satisfactory proof to support their cause.

Petition GRANTED. CA decision set aside and complaint for damages dismissed.

GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN, PROVINCIAL ENGINEER

JUANITO C. RODIL AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER AMADEO C. ROMEY, ALL OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS AND MARIANO L. BERROYA, JR., respondents. | GR no. L-80160, June 26, 1989
FACTS: Private respondent Berroya had always been the quarry superintendent in the Province of Laguna since his appointment as
such on May 31, 1959. In May 1973, Governor San Luis, who denounced graft and corruption in his employees, transferred Berroya
to the office of the Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged such transfer and CSC ruled that the transfer was violative of Sec 32 of
RA 2260 and be reverted back to his position as quarry supt. Instead of doing such, San Luis suspended Berroya for gross discourtesy,
inefficiency and insubordination. CSC reiterated the immediate reversion of Berroya to his office and ruled that the suspension was
illegal. San Luis appealed to the OP from CSC. OP reversed CSC. Berroya was dismissed by San Luis from office and such dismissal
was appealed to CSC. CSC resolved appeal saying that dismissal was unjustified.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of Berroya was valid.
HELD:
The validity of Berroya’s dismissal was already passed upon by the Merits System Board of CSC which stated that there is no record
showing that Berroya is notoriously undesirable. IN fact, his records show that his work from 1969 – 1973 was very satisfactory.
Standard laid down by the President on the “test of being notoriously undesirable” is two-fold: 1) whether it is common knowledge or
generally known as universally believed to be true or manifest to the world that petitioner committed the acts imputed against him; 2)
whether he had contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors. The same are not present in the case of Berroya.
Since the decisions of both the CSC and the OP had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the
Courts. It is well established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of admin agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-
judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of res judicata.
Furthermore, the trial court’s act of reviewing and setting aside the findings of the 2 administrative bodies was in gross disregard of
the basic legal precept that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed y the courts, except when the former have acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Since Berroya had established his clear legal right to reinstatement and back salaries from aforementioned final and executory
administrative decisions, it became a clear ministerial duty on the part of the authorities concerned to comply with the orders
contained in said decisions. Berroya is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years.
As to the Provincial Governor’s vehement refusal to reinstate Berroya despite the administrative bodies’ directives; it is well-settled
that when a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty particularly when acting tortuously, he is not nettled to protection on
account of his office, but is liable for his acts like any other private individual. The Court holds that petitioner Felicisimo San Luis,
Governor of Laguna, who has been sued both in hiss official and private capacity, must be held personally liable to Berroya for the
consequences of his illegal and wrongly acts in the form of moral damages apart from back salaries due him.

Arias vs. Sandiganbayan GR 81563, December 19, 1989

FACTS: Bureau of public works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting the towns of Marikina
and Pasig in Metro Manila. The implementation of the prohect was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by District
Engr. Cresencio Data. They purchased overpriced land for the project. It was assessed at P5/sqm then 5 years later sold at P 80/sqm.
Engr. Data signed the Deed of Sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the Sale. Arias is the auditor who signed off
on the transaction. Arias was charged in conspiracy with other who examined, reviewed and prepared falsified documents for the
transaction.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue injury and damage to the
Government?
HELD:
The mere signature of the head of office who had to rely to a reasonable extent on the competence and good faith of his
subordinates is not an evidence of conspiracy. To require the head of office to personally probe records, inspect documents or
investigate the motives of all individuals involved in the transaction before signing it is asking the impossible. There has to be
some added reason why the head of office should examine the documents in detail. Otherwise, he repeats the process all over
again, defeating delegation and division of labor, which are good administrative practices.
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the urchase of the proeprty started in 1977. The deed of sale was
executed on April 1978. Title was transferred to the Tepublic Juen 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been
consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October 1978.
Arias points out that apart from his signature on the voucher, there is no evidence linking him to th transaction. On the contrary, the
other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.
There is no adequate evidence to establish guilt of the peitioners Amado Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate
evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Yolanda Alfonso vs. Office of the President | GR no. 150091 April 2, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Yolanda Alfonso, then the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable for allegedly –
acquiescing to the change of date of the registration of OCT no. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that
there were 2 OCT nos. 994. Consequently she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Alfonso
was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of PHil-Valle Development Corporation who purchased
some parts of the land. Phil-Valle’s letter-complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which finds that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith
recommending the filing of administrative cases against her and her conspirators. On the other hand, LRA finds her guilty of Grave
misconduct and recommended her dismissal. THe Office of the PResdient subsequently dismissed Aflonso and CA affirmed
dismissal. Hence, this petition contending that her right to due process was violated.
ISSUE: WON Alfonso’s dismissal was valid.
HELD:
As aptly observed by the CA, Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during
the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in compliance with the ―show-cause letter of
the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary
evidence.
Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. In the
case at bar, Alfonso stood charged not for changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 but rather, she was indicted for
acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting ―certifications‖ on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it
appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing.
―Serious misconduct, as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee, is improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act or dereliction of duty, which is willful and intentional neglect and not mere
error in judgment. It must be grave and aggravated in character and not merely trivial or unimportant.. In addition, it must be directly
related and/or connected to the performance of official duties. Without question, all of these requisites are present in this case. Alfonso
is thus administratively liable for serious misconduct.
Petitioner is liable too for dishonesty defined in Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit58 as ". . . the concealment or distortion of truth
in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty." It goes without saying that by failing to
prevent the irregularity that she had reason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify it, petitioner had tolerated the
same and allowed it to wreak havoc on our land-titling system. Sadly, that confusion continues to rear its ugly head to this day.

Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658, [April 30, 2008], 576 PHIL 345-357
FACTS: The paymaster of the Cash Division of the City Hall of Cebu was administratively charged before the Office ofthe
Ombudsman for for making cash advances fraudulently incurred by presenting cash items such as payrolls and vouchers already
previously credited to her account to cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. The Ombudsman impleaded Cesa, being the
City Treasurer , and other city officials for failure to observe relevant laws and rules governing the grant, utilization and liquidation of
cash advances that facilitated, promoted, and encouraged the defalcation of public funds. The irregularities could not have happened
without the officials' acts and omissions, as they failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent losses of funds
and efficiently supervise the paymasters.
Cesa argued before the Ombudsman that he could not grant cash advances as the authority belongs to a higher officer and that he
signed the cash advance vouchers not as approving officer but because his signature was required therein. He further argued that
Badana's cash advances were legal and necessary for city workers' salaries and that the matter could be resolved by the city
accountant. He also emphasized that since he had under him five department heads, he was not expected to review the work of some
370 workers under them, by virtue of division of labor and delegation of functions.
The Ombudsman found Cesa and the other city officials guilty of neglect of duty and meted to them the penalty of six months
suspension without pay.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine that a head of office has the right to rely on his subordinates and to presume regularity in the subordinate's
performance of official functions applies only in criminal cases involving conspiracy and not in cases of alleged negligence.
HELD: NO. A public official's foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an irregularity constitutes an added reason to
exercise a greater degree of circumspection before signing and issuing public documents. By failing to prevent the irregularity that
Cesa had reason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify, Cesa had tolerated the same and allowed it to wreak havoc
on the coffers of the city.

Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, [March 3, 2010], 628 PHIL 62-80
FACTS: Santillano, a private contractor, was charged along with three others complaints alleging that the Municipal Mayor Ecleo Jr.,
Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and designated Municipal Engineer of San Jose, Surigao
del Norte for having anomalous and overpriced municipal projects with Santillano. They were all charged with Section 3 (Corrupt
practices of public officers) of RA 3019.
Santillano claims that the Sandiganbayan added an element to the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan allegedly added the phrase "or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the public officer" to the law in order to have a legal basis in holding him liable.
ISSUE: WON Santillano could be charged with Section 3 (corrupt practices of public officers) of RA 3019 given the fact that he is a
private person and not a public officer.
HELD: YES. Various cases concluded that private persons found acting in conspiracy with public officers may be held liable for the
applicable offenses found in Sec. 3 of the law.
While Section 3 does not contain a reference to private individuals, it must be read in conjunction with the following sections also of
RA 3019. Section 4 provides that, “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any
of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.”
Section 9 also provides, “a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.”
Clearly, the law punishes not only public officers who commit prohibited acts enumerated under Sec. 3, but also those who induce or
cause the public official to commit those offenses. This is supported by Sec. 9, which includes private persons as liable for violations
under Secs. 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, 189369, 189553, [July 10, 2013]
FACTS: When an audit team conducted an examination of the Cash Division of the Government of the City of Cebu, the examination
an accumulated shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales. The
team found that Bacasmas (Cash Division Chief), Gaviola (City Administrator), Cesa (City Treasurer), and Jaca (City Accountant)
failed to follow the procedure for approving and releasing cash advances for the City, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine
million pesos on the part of the city government. Specifically, the team said in its report that there were irregularities in the grant,
utilization, and liquidation of cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate and misleading pieces of information were
included in the financial statements. These irregularities were manifested in the following: additional cash advances were granted even
if previous cash advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls or lists of
payees, and cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay
period. The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and approved the cash advance vouchers,
but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies.
Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held liable, because it was not her responsibility to examine the
cash book. She pointed to Jaca and the City Auditor as the ones responsible for determining whether the paymaster had existing
unliquidated cash advances.
Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances. Hence, when he signed the vouchers, he merely relied
on Jaca's certification that Gonzales had already liquidated her cash advances. Besides, he said, he had already delegated the function
of determining whether the amount stated in the disbursement voucher was equal to the net pay, because it was humanly impossible
for him to supervise all the personnel of his department.
Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware of any anomaly. Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the
signatures of Cesa and Jaca.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
HELD: YES. Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith when they approved and disbursed the cash advances in
violation of law and rules and regulations. Petitioners — being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City Administrator —
have to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on the proper procedure for the approval
and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules and regulations state that cash advances can only be disbursed for a legally
authorized specific purpose and cannot be given to officials whose previous cash advances have not been settled or properly accounted
for.
Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still
chose to disregard the requirements laid down by law and rules and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete
information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the absence of payroll to support the cash requested, and the disparity
between the requested cash advances and the total net pay. What is worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for
the reason that it was "common practice" in their office not to follow the law and rules and regulations to the letter. For them to resort
to that defense is preposterous, considering that as public employees they are required to perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. The law and the rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.

Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, [August 2, 2001], 414 PHIL 590-602
FACTS: Petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon. The Civil Service
Commission (CSC) ordered the dismissal of Remolona from the government service for dishonesty in securing a fake civil service
eligibility for his wife. Petitioner contended that the appellate court erred in sustaining his dismissal for an offense not work connected
in relation to his official position in the government service.
ISSUE: WON dishonesty not committed in the performance of duty by the public officer charged should warrant dismissal?
HELD: YES. Dishonesty, as a ground for dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person
charged. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because
by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellowmen,
even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated
from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and
morale of the service.

Eduardo Saya-ang Sr., and Ricardo Lara v Hon. COMELEC, Hon. Pio Jose Joson, Hon. Jose Balbuena, Hon. Lirio Joquino,
and Mantil Lim
GR 155087, Nov. 28, 2003
En Banc, Azcuna

Petitioners Saya-ang and Lara were candidates for the office of Brgy. Captain of Barngays Congan and New Aklan
respectively. However, a report was submitted to the law department of the COMELEC which stated that petitioners are not residents
of the barangays the wish to be elected in. Said law department then sent its study to the COEMELEC en banc recommending the
denial of due course to the CoC of petitioners. On the day of elections (July 15, 2002), COMELEC en banc issued Resolution 5393,
which essentially denied due course to the CoCs of petitioners. Despite this, petitioners were still proclaimed winners, and were able
to take their oath of office on July 31, 2002. Petitioners claim that Resolution 5393 was patently erroneous being without basis in fact
and in law and the issuance of which is in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decide.

At the very outset, it must be made clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered
before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided
further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office. Furthermore, a decision by the COMELEC to
disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after a period of five days. Since the decision of COMELEC had not yet
become final and executory until June 20, 2002 (5 days after Election day), the Brgy Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners’
names in the list of qualified candidates and could not be fulted for counting the votes cast in their favor.

Under Sec. 3, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition to cancel a CoC shall be heard summarily AFTER
DUE NOTICE. In this case, petitioners were not even informed of the administrative inquiry against them, nor were they called upon
to adduce their own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence against them. Petitioners have already been proclaimed as the
winners in the elections. They have already taken their oaths of office and are, at present, serving their constituents in their respective
barangays. In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been questioned on or before
the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect
to the will of the electorate. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers
tasked under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.

ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION P. DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON,
JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA, DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA,
GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT vs. HON. ROBERTO
L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas; HON. SANGGUNIANG
PANGLALAWIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN, CALACA,
BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000
En banc, Buena

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batngas and Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batngas issued ordinances declaring the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao. COMELEC then issued Resolution 2987 providing for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, to decide on the abolition and merger of the barangays.
Petitioners, as residents and officials of Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and COMELEC before the RTC for annulment of the
ordinances and COMELEC Resolution. Petitioners assert that when COMELEC exrcises its quasi-judicia functions, its acts are subject
to the exclusive review by the Supreme Court, but when it performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the
RTC. COMELEC asserts that the power to review or reverse its resolution solely beongs to the Supreme Court.

The issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is
part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent
COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and
duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws. Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was
not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any
question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L.

ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO. TOMAS, SAN
JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO
PLACIDO
G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003
En banc, Ynares-Santiago

Romeo Rulloda ran for Barangay Chariman against Remegio Placido. Rulloda suffered a heart attack and died, so his widow
sought permission from COMELEC to run in his stead. She garnered the most votes during the election, but still, Placido was
proclaimed winner. Later, she learned that COMELEC had resolved to deny due course her CoC. She then filed a petition for
certiorari.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of
the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality
of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number
of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is
no political party from which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of
election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit
to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision
governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a
restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution
of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have
been subsumed by law.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of
the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.

ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO
G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000
En banc, Ynares-Santiago

Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for Mayor of Marogong, Lanao Del Sur. During the counting of votes, there
were serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds committed. Because of said irregularities, petitioner was illegally
proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained 2020 votes while respondent garnered 2000 votes. Respondent, knowing
he was cheated, filed before COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner as duly elected mayor. A Revision
Committee was created to commence the revision of the ballots, when petitioner moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds
that 1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; and 2) Automated
counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots. Respondent thus opposed said motion to dismiss and argued
that the motion is dilatory and that a motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election protest.

It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of elections is to protect the integrity of
elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be
given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.

Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the
text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the
proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. Petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse
to him” or right after the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to move
for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the
preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, he should have filed his motion
to dismiss "within the time for but before filing the answer" pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is
really the lawful choice of the electorate. In an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and
most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be produced or are not available, the election returns
would be the best evidence. In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no evidence, other than the bare
allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest have been violated or the official ballots
contained therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of petitioners claim is to open the ballot boxes in the
protested precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in
accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter.

FELONGCO

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III vs. ROBERT MIRASOL

G.R. No. 108399. 31 July 1997,
EN BANC, MENDOZA.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the general election for the SK on September
30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. The DILG through then
Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding election for the SK on the
ground that the election previously held on May 26, 1990 was to be considered the first under the newly enacted LGC which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Section 532(a) of LGC states that the first election for the SK shall be held thirty days after the next local
election. The first local election under the Code was held on May 11, 1992. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the resolution of the DILG, arguing that the Secretary of the DILG had no power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections of SKs.
COMELEC's placing the SK election under the direct control and supervision of the DILG did not contravene Art. IX, C,
Sec. 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Elections for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

PERFECTO V. GALIDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 95346. 18 January 1991,
EN BANC, PADILLA.
Galido and Galeon were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality
of Garcia Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. Galeon filed an election protest. The RTC upheld the proclamation of Galido. Galeon appealed the decision to the
COMELEC. The First Division reversed the trial court's decision and declared Galeon the duly-elected mayor. Galido's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc which affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the
fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Galeon, in moving to dismiss the petition of Galido to the SC, contended that the decision of the COMELEC is final, executory and
not appealable based from the Constitution.
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action of
certiorari. With regard to the decision of the COMELEC en banc in the case, the COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an
election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled
unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. DISMISSED.

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA

G.R. No. 118861, 27 April 1995,
EN BANC, DAVIDE, JR.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position
of Mayor in Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Respondent was proclaimed the winning candidate. Petitioner filed an election protest
with the RTC. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by
filing her notice of appeal. The trial court gave due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal.
The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution and
the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied. Respondent then filed with the COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution.
COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction,viz., Section 50
of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and that
it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its
judicial functions, the COMELEC is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction.
The Court abandons the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. The last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697 providing as follows: "The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases." remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph
(2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly
act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the
challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES

G.R. No. 142907, 29 November 2000,
EN BANC, PARDO.
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, proclaimed petitioner Carlos as the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela over that of respondent Antonio M. Serapio. Serapio filed with the RTC an election protest challenging
the election results. The RTC set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges of fraud." Despite the
plurality of valid votes in favor of protestee Carlos, the trial court set aside his proclamation and declared protestant Serapio as duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela City. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC and filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. Both the Supreme Court and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over decisions of RTC in election cases involving elective municipal officials.
The court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case, which in this case is the Supreme Court.
Petitioner's appeal to the COMELEC would not bar the present action for certiorari because appeal is not a speedy and adequate
remedy. The proper remedy is an action before the COMELEC en banc to declare a failure of election or to annul the election.
However, the case below was an election protest case involving an elective municipal position which falls within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more than the respondent and, therefore, the nullification of the election
would not lie. Elections are won on the basis of a majority or plurality of votes cast and received by the candidates. The trial court
gravely abused its discretion in rendering the decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his
favor. Contrary to its own finding that petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602 valid votes for the respondent as second
placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the second placer as the winner, a blatant abuse of judicial discretion.

JOSEPH PETER S. SISON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 134096. March 3, 1999.
EN BANC, J. Romero.

Facts: While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before proclamation, Sison filed
a petition before the Comelec seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City, and to declare a failure
of elections on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud." Pending this, the elected officials in Quezon City were proclaimed.
Later, the Comelec dismissed the petition as the allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence and that the grounds recited
were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Sec. 17 of RA 7166. Sison anchored his initiatory petition on failure of
elections, then he built his case as a pre-proclamation controversy.
Held: Petitioner cannot succeed in either remedies. Per the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure
of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In the petition, it
was never alleged therein that the elections were either not held or suspended.
Further, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, the issue proper for a pre-proclamation controversy
is already of no consequence since the more appropriate remedies are a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. A
pre-proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code1, and the
enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive. Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the
law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. If questions require more deliberate and necessarily
longer consideration, file an election protest.
On the issue of due process, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to satisfy the demands
of due process. The law provides that the Comelec shall dispose of pre-proclamation controversies on the basis of the records and
evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers. Owing to the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty and the
precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon
the court, COMELEC did arrive at its conclusion with due regard to the available evidence before it.

SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF

CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 106270-73. February 10, 1994.
EN BANC, J. Bellosillo.

Facts: Several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of election in 49 precincts where average voter turnout was
22.26%. The COMELEC ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter
turnout would not justify a declaration of failure of election. Local elections in May 1992, Datu Gambai was proclaimed the duly
elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. Sultan Mohamad filed a petition for certiorari with SC arguing massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should have at least
heard before rendering its judgment. Also, he filed an election protest with RTC.
Held: Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first,
no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. Here, the first requisite is missing,
since actual voting and election have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. The facts alleged did not
constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought.
The question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better ventilated in an election contest. These
irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchisement the electorate through the
misdeeds of a relative few.
After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law
requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast.

NILO D. SOLIVA, ROGELIO B. DOCE, HERNANITA M. BACQUIAL, ULYSSES B. SUCATRE, ANTONIO D. DURON,
EDUARDO HINUNANGAN, MONICA P. LASALA, CARLOS E. MARTINEZ, and ROSIANA L.
POPADERA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALEXANDER C. BACQUIAL, ISMAEL O. TITO,
FAUSTINO A. ABATAYO, DAVID P. ALEJO, MAMERTO L. BACON, CESAR C. OSA, PRUDENCIO L. PABILLORE,
ARMANDO S. PANGADLIN, ENICETO U. SALAS, and QUINTIN A. SAY-AO, respondents.
G.R. No. 141723. April 20, 2001.
EN BANC, J. Kapunan.

1
SECTION 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
Facts: Alexander Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged "massive fraud, terrorism, ballot switching,
stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes xxx.” Comelec declared failure of election and nullified the
proclamation of herein petitioners as the winning candidates.
Held: We agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of election in the municipality of Remedios T.
Romualdez, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns was clearly attended by fraud, intimidation,
terrorism and harassment. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings and conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The
counting by the BEI and the canvassing by the MBC were done without the accredited watchers or duly authorized representatives of
the petitioners thus making the election returns and the statements of votes not worthy of faith and credit and not reliable documents to
gauge the fair and true expression of the popular will. Further, the transfer was without the authority of the COMELEC as required by
law. The irregularity of the transfer of venue was highlighted by the fact that the same was not recorded by the Board of Election
Inspectors, pursuant to Section 18 of R.A. No. 6646:
SECTION 18. Transfer of Counting of Votes to Safer Place. — If on account of imminent danger of violence,
terrorism, disorder or similar causes it becomes necessary to transfer the counting of votes to a safer place, the
board of inspectors may effect such transfer by unanimous approval of the board and concurrence by the
majority of the watchers present. This fact shall be recorded in the minutes of the voting and the members of
the board and the watchers shall manifest their approval or concurrence by affixing their signatures therein xxx
Furthermore, how then could there have been a valid proclamation on May 12, 1998 when the reading of the votes was finished only
on May 13, 1998?
The election held at Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan del Norte on May 11, 1998 cannot be accorded regularity and validity as the
massive and pervasive acts of fraud, terrorism, intimidation and harassment were committed on such day. While it may be true that
election did take place, the irregularities that marred the counting of votes and the canvassing of the election returns resulted in a
failure to elect. And when there is a failure of election, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the election and to call a special
election. (Cited are the previous cases re grounds of failure of election)
 HADJA NIDA B. ARADAIS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSALI ASMADUN, respondents.
G.R. No. 157863. April 28, 2004.
EN BANC, J. Carpio Morales.

Facts: The canvassing was completed in the morning of May 17, 2001. As there was no pending pre-proclamation controversy, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) of Lugus, Sulu proclaimed respondent as the mayor-elect by virtue of a Certificate of Canvass
(COC). On even date, petitioner was likewise proclaimed as mayor-elect in a COC bearing the same serial number as that of the first
COC, signed and thumbmarked by all three members of the BOC. On May 19, 2001, respondent took his oath of office and assumed
office on July 2, 2001. Petitioner, on the other hand, took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. The COMELEC "recognized only one
proclamation," that of respondent, and petitioner's proclamation was without any legal effect. This prompted petitioner to file before
the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of respondent's proclamation. Comelec formed an ad hoc committee to look into cases of
double proclamations, and on the latter’s findings, the Comelec issued a Resolution declaring the proclamation of ABDULSALI K.
ASMADUN as duly-elected Mayor of Lugus, Sulu, etc is hereby AFFIRMED as VALID and LAWFUL; while the proclamation of
Hadja Nida B. Aradais purporting to have the same serial number 8701805, is hereby declared INVALID and WITHOUT LEGAL
EFFECT.
Issue: WON COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional duty to "hear and
decide" pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee.
Held: Negative. The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the
COMELEC, especially in light of petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings and
recommendations and did not go over the records of the case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the contrary then,
the presumption of regular performance of an official duty stands. It was well within the COMELEC's discretion to avail of the means
it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a
clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a
settled rule that the COMELEC's judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Since the assailed resolution is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be considered whimsical, capricious or arbitrary
warranting this Court's power of review.

JAECTIN

TOPIC: Register Political Parties, Organizations and Coalitions and Accredition of Citizen’s Arms

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147589, 147613, [June 25, 2003], 452 PHIL 899-
936)
EN BANC, PANGANIBAN, J

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected.

Before the Supreme Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. It was contended that the
disqualification of many party-list organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list elections."
Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now
pray for their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the votes cast for the disqualified party-list candidates be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list
system during the said election.

RULING: NO
The Court held that the votes obtained by disqualified party list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for
the party-list system.
In the Labo case, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.
Likewise, these pronouncements referred to regular elections for local offices and involved the interpretation of Section 6, RA 6646.
They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of the latter law provides
that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted ." The
language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application. Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic
aids was warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.

Aklat-Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Lipunan at Adhikain Para sa Tao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162203,
[April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 730-740
RESOLUTION, TINGA, J.

The period stated therein(to file application for party-list) refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration
should no longer be filed nor entertained.

On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May
2004 elections. The Comelec denied the petition for being filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 which
is on September 30, 2003 for registration of party-list organizations; Petitioner only filed its application on November 20, 2003.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC can validly set a deadline for application for party-list system earlier than 90 days prior to election day?

RULING: YES

Aklat’s contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A.
7941provides:
Sec. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system xxx
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelec’s position that the period stated therein refers to the prohibitive period
beyond which petitions for registration should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is simply the minimum
countback period which is not subject to reduction since it is prescribed by law, but it is susceptible of protraction on accoun t
of administrative necessities and other exigencies perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer election laws.
This power includes the determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain
pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued
its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system.
Considering these, as well as the multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its
Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177271, 177314, [May 4, 2007], 551 PHIL 1-16)
EN BANC, GARCIA, J

Petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) as first
petitioners, and petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation as second petitioners,
seek to impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 for effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of
the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales'
previous letter-request.
This is reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they
should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors.

ISSUE:

 Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated
the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING: YES

Surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embraced a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis,
whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.

Citizens' Battle Against Corruption v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172103, [April 13, 2007], 549 PHIL 767-782
EN BANC, VELASCO, JR., J

In order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.

The COMELEC proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the
required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out
of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court
in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, resulted in a percentage of 3.9084. However, in the computation for additional seats
for the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the
chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system for having received less than what was prescribed by the
poll body.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC is correct is adopting simplified formula to computer for additional seat?

2. WON CIBAC is entitled to additional seat?

RULING:

1. NO, COMELEC ERRED.

It is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner
alleges nor the simplified formula that COMELEC adopted.
2. NO
Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number.
Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.

Applying the Veterans formula, the result is as follows:

495,190
———— x 2 =
1,203,305
 0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986

TORAYNO VS COMELEC

Did private respondent Emano meet the 1 year residency qualification in Cagayan de Oro City where he ran for mayor when: (1) he
had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998
elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated
that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998?

Yes. Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of
Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and
registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and
eligible to run for mayor thereof.
Furthermore, there is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He won
by a margin of about 30,000 votes.[24] Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed
through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate.

BANAT VS COMELEC

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in
the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant
to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formulafrom the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation
as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported
by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives,
hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
The formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not
exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2%
of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”.
This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least
2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters
are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional
seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will
still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall
be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that
they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because
it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs COMELEC

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”
Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.

ATONG PAGLAUM INC. VS COMELEC

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for
various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong
to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list
elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate
in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-
list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-
list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In theBANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized
that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented”
or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of
them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts
but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented
groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they areideologically marginalized.

Binhi Partido ng Magsasaka v. Comelec

G.R. No. 204374, April , 2013 (J. Carpio)
Facts:
BINHI is a sectoral party representing peasants/ farmers/farm tillers. It was granted accreditation and participated in the 2010
elections but failed to gain a seat. However, Comelec cancelled its registration due to the following grounds: a) not actually
marginalized and underrepresented because the members are also members of the Cabanatuan City Seed Growers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative; b) it fell short of 5th requirement or guideline set in Ang Bagong Bayani; and c) Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA) gives ample support, attention and assistance to the said group.
Ruling:
SC set the following parameters:
 Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (20 regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations
 National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent “any marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
 Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidate in legislative district elections. A polictical party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district election can participate in party-list electons only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an indepedent party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
 Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constitutencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concersn of
the sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constitutencies include professionals, the elderly, women and the youth.
 A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organization that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector that they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organization that lack “well defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector that they represent. The nominees of either sector must either belong to their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of advocacy.
 National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least five other nominees who remain qualified.

De Jesus v. People
120 SCRA 760, February 22, 1983 (J. Escolin)

Facts:

After the local election, Ananias Hibo filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then
COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their
capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of
section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. Hence, an information was
filed before the Sandiganbayan. However, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan
nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense.

Ruling:

The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly
and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving
this clear constitutional mandate. In other words, it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction on this matter.
 People v. Inting
187 SCRA 788, July 25, 1990 (J. Gutierrez, Jr.)

Facts:

Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the
COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary
investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal
case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. Thus, a warrant of arrest was issued against
the accused OIC Mayor. However, before the accused could be arrested, the court set aside the same contending that Atty. Lituanas is
not authorized to determine probable cause.

Ruling:

The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses
for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of
the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional
provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

People v. Delgado
189 SCRA 715, September 18, 1990 (J. Gancayco)

Facts:

The COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against Delgado for alleged violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as
recommended. However, respondent sought the help of RTC; then, the said court ordered for reinvestigation of the same, which the
Comelec disobeyed arguing that only SC can review its decisions, resolutions, orders, and rulings.

Ruling:

Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power
of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before
the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the
court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

G.R No. 128054. October 16, 1997

KILOSBAYAN, INC., FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, EMILIO C. CAPULONG JR., RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, FRANKLIN DRILON, CESAR
SARINO, LEONORA V. DE JESUS, TIBURCIO RELUCIO, ROLANDO V. PUNO, BENITO R. CATINDIG, MANUEL
CALUPITAN III, VICENTE CARLOS, FRANCISCO CANCIO, JIMMY DURANTE, MELVYN MENDOZA, respondent.

FACTS:
 Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992 allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities.
  Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then Secretary of Interior and Local Government, requested for authority to negotiate, enter
into and sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited NGOs in order to utilize them to projects of the CDF.
 DILG entered into a MOA with PYHSDFI, the latter later requested for allocation of government funds by virtue of the
MOA. The release of such amount to the DILG was made shortly before the 1992 elections. KilosBAYAN filed a complaint
alleging violations of election laws which was dismissed by COMELEC for lack of evidence.

HELD:

The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-
complaint is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offenses
complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election
offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the
burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint. If the complainant fails to proffer the
necessary evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any evidence in controversy, of the accusation, the
complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or
reaction to charges against him.
The Comelec, is acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the
confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their respective
evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the contending parties' respective submissions and proof and weighs the fact and
circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an
occasion for Comelec to, as a duty, spoon feed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case.

G.R. NO. 177508. August 7, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST,

represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
 Petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
 Petitioner argues that R.A. 9369's title is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but still contains provisions for
manual election. It also impairs the power of electoral tribunals and gives prosecuting arms of the government concurrent
powers with the COMELEC in prosecuting election offenses.
HELD:
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC
the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision
was not in the1935 or 1973 Constitutions. The phrase where appropriate leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of
election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.

It is clear that the grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by
virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the
COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the
Constitution. They did not.
 In People v. Basilla, we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff
members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible. In COMELEC v. Espaol, we also
stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal
officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases. The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Thus, given the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not
violate the Constitution.

G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001

ANTONIO M. BERNARDO, ERNESTO A. DOMINGO, JR. and JESUS C. CRUZ, petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., BENJAMIN "BENHUR" D. ABALOS, JR., DR. EDEN C. DIAZ, ROMEO F. ZAPANTA, ARCADIO S. DE VERA and
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:
 Antonio Bernardo filed a complaint in COMELEC against Benjamin Abalos for vote buying.
 The case was dismissed by COMELEC due to insufficiency of evidence.
 Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

HELD:

It is not disputed that petitioners complaint before the COMELEC involves an election offense. But in this petition, they
conveniently kept silent why they directly elevated to this Court the questioned Resolution without first filing a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. It was only after the respondents had filed their comment on the petition and called this
Courts attention to petitioners' failure to comply with Section 1 of Rule 13 that they, in their Consolidated Reply, advanced the excuse
that they "deemed it best not seek any further dilatory motion for reconsideration', even if allowed by Sec. 1 (d) of COMELEC Rule
13."
Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of
the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way
of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a
patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for
certiorari.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for dismissing petitioners' complaint against private respondents
for vote buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the respondents have "more probative value and believable than the
evidence of the complainants;" and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are "mere self-serving statements and uncorroborated
audio and visual recording and a photograph."
Petitioners' complaint expressly states that no supporting affidavits were submitted by the complaining witnesses to sustain their
charge of vote buying. Suffice it to state that the absence of such supporting affidavits shows the frailty of petitioners' complaint.
Indeed, it is vulnerable to dismissal.
 G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60. February 17, 2003

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

FACTS:
 Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. He filed with the COMELEC a
complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe,
Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro
Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the
separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents.
 COMELEC filed the information in the court of the respondent. However, a case of vote selling was filed against the
witnesses. COMELEC filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the witnesses are exempt form criminal prosecution under R.A.
6646. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss by the COMELEC.

HELD:

One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of
immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or
acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case
against the latter. However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents,
Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should
they not tell the truth.

It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The Chief State
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of
the COMELEC, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This
authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful
prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.
In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, which was the basis of the information for
vote-selling, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation was clearly in order,
considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying
incident and became witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts they had earlier denounced. What the
Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the vote-buyers and put in serious peril the integrity of the
COMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and good faith, he
should have brought the matter to the attention of the COMELEC. Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when he denied the motion to dismiss.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et.al. G.R. Nos. 199082,
199085, 199118, September 18, 2012, En Banc, Peralta.

Facts:
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of massive electoral
fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution
No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. Was the creation of the
Joint Committee valid?
Held:
The DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
If the prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation and file the necessary information by virtue only of a
delegated authority, they now have better grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of authority. If deputation
was justified because of lack of funds and legal officers to ensure prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses,
the same justification should be cited to justify the grant to the other prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent
jurisdiction.
x-x-x-x
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. Nos. 102653, 102925, 102983, March 5, 1992, En
Banc, Feliciano
Facts:
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because
it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of
media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Held:
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to
restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions
of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
x-x-x

EMILIO M.R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
132231. March 31, 1998, En Banc, Mendoza.

Facts:
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) prohibiting mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission on Elections is again challenged on the
ground that events after the ruling in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections have called for its reexamination.
Held:
There is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can
be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental
interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution. The provisions in
question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but
require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect,
during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV
stations and allocates these to the candidates.

x-x-x

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK,
INC. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998, En Banc, Mendoza

Facts:

Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission on
Elections. Petitioners challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election

Held:

An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore §2 of Resolution No. 2983-A
of the Comelec providing for payment of just compensation is invalid. B.P. Blg. 881, §92 does not single out radio and television
stations in providing free air time. There are important differences in the characteristics of the broadcast media and the print media,
which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes.The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art.
IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what
Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of
supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition.

SARMIENTO V. COMELEC (1992)

Petitioners impugn several resolutions issued by the COMELEC as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter
alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
The subject matter of the resolutions involved exclusion from canvass of certain election returns and opposition to the composition of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

HELD:

(1) Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

“The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.”

It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all
such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

(2) Appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the
Commission en banc. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the
appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions
are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for
proper referral to a Division.

(3) “All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office
involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a
regular election protest by the aggrieved party. HOWEVER, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus
far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding
to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.”
 ONG JR. V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 105717 |December 23, 1992

Petitioner Ong and private respondent Lucero were candidates for the congressional seat of the second district of Northern Samar
during the May 1992 elections. Ong garnered 204 more votes than Lucero. Subsequently, Lucero filed a petition with the COMELEC
for the suspension of the proclamation of Ong and for a recount of some precincts with prayer for the holding of special elections.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC en banc ordered Provincial Board of Canvassers not to reconvene and to stop the canvassing of
votes, considering “the pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC.” In a subsequent resolution, the
COMELEC also granted Lucero’s prayer for a recounting of votes. Hence, Ong filed petition for certiorari on the ground that the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the chairman of the PBC of Northern Samar not to reconvene the
board and in granting a recount of the ballots.

HELD:
(1) The COMELEC en banc gravely abused its jurisdiction when it ordered a recount in the precincts because these are matters which
should have been first referred to its division.

(2) The COMELEC indiscriminately issued the order of recount even before the remedies under the law as stated in Sections 233 and
234 of the Omnibus Election Code have been complied with. Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code does not authorize a
recount. Indeed, nowhere in Section 233 is there any mention of a recount of ballots. Instead, the remedy under said Section is a
referral to other authentic copies of election returns issued by the Commission. It bears stressing that under Sections 234, 235
and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, an order for a recount shall be issued only as a last resort and only if the Commission is
satisfied that the identity and integrity of the ballots have not been violated.

(3) The allegations of private respondent as contained in his petition for the suspension of the proclamation of the winner of the
second district of Northern Samar evidently involve pre-proclamation issues, specifically on the preparation of election returns.
Consequently, since for purposes of elections, no pre-proclamation case is allowed against a candidate of the House of
Representatives as stated in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued its
order suspending the proclamation of the winner of the congressional seat.

(4) Private respondent’s reliance on the Lim v. COMELEC case, where the SC held that not all pre-proclamation issues are barred by
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, must similarly fail because in that case, petitioner Lim questioned the illegal composition of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers and the irregular appointment of the Board of Election Inspectors, a pre-proclamation ground
which evidently has no connection with the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. As
such, we ruled that the illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code may still
be raised under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, before either the Board of Canvassers or the COMELEC, in accordance
with Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7166.

CANICOSA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120318 | December 5, 1997

Petitioner Canicosa and private respondent Lajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna during the May 1995 elections.
After the canvassing, Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, Canicosa filed with the
COMELEC a petition to declare failure of election and to declare null and void the canvass and proclamation because of alleged
widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and accounting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation,
vote buying, unregistered voters voting and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the
office of the Municipal Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations
therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.

HELD:

(1) There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
i) The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes;
ii) The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
iii) After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.

(2) Averment that more than one-half of the legitimate voters were not able to vote is not a ground which warrants a declaration of
failure of election.

(3) The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must
concur:
i) No voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in failure to elect; and
ii) The votes that were not cast would affect the result of the election. From the face of the instant petition, it is readily
apparent that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.

(4) The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which is a justiciable issue properly
recognized by the regular courts. — Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections, the final list of voters was posted in each
precinct. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.

(5) The correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere clerical task of the board of canvassers. The
remedy invoked was purely administrative. The issue concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his
petition for declaration of failure of election, is an administrative question. Likewise, questions as to whether elections have been
held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured and therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve
the right to vote. Such questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon
directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to pass through any of its divisions. The provision in the constitution
mandating the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by COMELEC en
banc, not applicable if the case about to be resolved is purely administrative in nature.

RAMIREZ V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 122013 | March 26, 1997

Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I. Go were candidates for vice mayor in the election of May 1995. Ramirez
was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) on the basis of results showing that he obtained 1,367 votes
against private respondent’s 1,235 votes. Go filed in the COMELEC a petition for the correction of what he claimed was manifest
error in the Statement of Votes. He alleged that, based on the entries in the Statement of Votes, he obtained 1,515 votes as against
petitioner’s 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition, he was credited with 1,235.

Acting on the petition, the COMELEC en banc issued directed the MBC to reconvene and re-compute the votes in the Statement of
Votes and proclaim the winning candidate for vice mayor accordingly. Ramirez then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
seeking the annulment COMELEC’s order. Ramirez contends that (1) the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction because the case was
resolved by it without having been first acted upon by any of its divisions, and (2) the MBC had already made motu proprio a
correction of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes in its certification and thus it was a grave abuse of its discretion for the
COMELEC to order a re-computation of votes based on the allegedly uncorrected Statement of Votes.
HELD:

(1) Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies involving,
inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc. In a
long line of cases, the Supreme Court this Court approved the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc over
petitions for correction of manifest error directly filed with it.

In any event, Ramirez is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc. Not only did he
participate in the proceedings, but he also sought affirmative relief from the COMELEC en banc by filing a Counter-Protest.
It is certainly not right for a party taking part in proceedings and submitting his case for decision to attack the decision later
for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the decision turns out to be adverse to him.

(2) The corrections should be made either by inserting corrections in the Statement of Votes which was originally prepared and
submitted by the MBC, or by preparing an entirely new Statement of Votes incorporating therein the corrections. The
certification issued by the MBC is thus not the proper way to correct manifest errors in the Statement of Votes . More
importantly, the corrections should be based on the election returns but here the corrections appear to have been made by the
MBC on the bases of the Certificates of Votes issued

(3) The Statement of Votes is a vital component of the electoral process. It supports the Certificate of Canvass and is the basis
for proclamation. But in this case the Statement of Votes was not even prepared until after the proclamation of the winning
candidate. This is contrary to the Omnibus Election Code.

Lazatin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

En Banc, Paras.

Facts:
Lazatin has taken his oath of office, assumed and discharged his duties as Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. He
questions the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in annulling his proclamation contending it is the House of Electoral Tribunal which is
the sole judge of all election contests.
Held:
HRET and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections.
Thus, the alleged invalidity of the proclamation, the irregularities in connection therewith, and the pendency of the protests of the rival
candidates, is a matter that is addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
 Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988
En Banc, Cortes.

Facts:
Lazatin has assumed his office as Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. After SC set aside COMELEC’s
revocation of Lazatin’s proclamation, Timbol, the opponent, filed an election protest at the HRET. Lazatin moves to dismiss the
protest on the ground that it had been filed late under Sec. 250 OEC. HRET ruled it had been filed on time pursuant to Sec. 9 HRET
Rules.
Held:
HRET rules apply. It is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before
it being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HR.
 Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, January 26, 2000
En Banc, Puno.

Facts:
Sandoval was proclaimed as Congressman of Malabon by the Board of Canvassers (BoC) despite COMELEC’s order to
suspend the canvassing and proclamation until the manifest error in the certificate of canvass, constituting the omission of 17 election
returns, was resolved. COMELEC then declared Sandoval’s proclamation void ab initio for: 1) disregarding its verbal order; and 2)
basing the proclamation on an incomplete canvass.
Held:
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation cases except those involving prohibited filing of pre-
proclamation cases against the president, vice-president, senator and congressional candidates. Nonetheless, it may acquire jurisdiction
over these prohibited pre-proclamation cases if it involves the filing of petition for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns pursuant to Section 15 of RA 7166.
In this case, if the error is discovered before proclamation, the BoC may motu proprio, or upon verified petition of any
candidate or party, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. Thereafter, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision
of the Board to the COMELEC. However, the petition for correction of manifest error may be filed directly with the Commission en
banc provided that such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and
proclamation of the winning candidate had already been made.
In the instant case, however, COMELEC’s order is void for its exercise of its jurisdiction is tainted with illegality for non-
compliance with the due process of notice and hearing.

[G.R. No. 160465. April 28, 2004]

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH C. LANTION
and ROLANDO F. SALVADOR, respondents.

Romeo M. Estrella and Rolando F. Salvador were mayoralty candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan.The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Salvador as winner. Estrella filed an election protest which annulled Salvador’s proclamation and instead, Estrella was
declared as duly elected mayor.

Salvador appealed. Estrella filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted. Salvador consequently assailed the RTC
Order granting the motion for execution through certiorari before the COMELEC, which ordered a Status Quo Ante Order. During
this hearing, Commissioner Lantion inhibited himself and so Commissioner Borra was designated in place. By virtue of the Status
Quo Ante Order, Estrella was ousted from the mayoral post. And so, Estrella filed for the inhibition of Commissioner Lantion and
questioned the Status Quo Ante Order of the COMELEC.

The COMELEC affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by
virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the
Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

The issue here is whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc
deliberation

Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously
inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members
concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus
failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section
5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the
purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

[G.R. No. 167499. September 15, 2005]

MILES ANDREW MARI ROCES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIA
ZENAIDA ANG-PING, respondents.

Miles Roces and Harry Ang Ping vied for the position of Representative for the 3 rd Congressional District of Manila. A registered
voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez questioned Mr. Ang Pings candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due
course or cancel his COC alleging that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen. Mr. Ang Ping filed with the
COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC because his wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping was to substitute him. Mr. Ang
Ping also filed a motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation and dismiss the petition to deny due course or cancel his COC on the
same date. The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Pings COC and
ordering the Board of Election Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his favor.

Mr. Ang Ping filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied by the First Division as it was filed after the promulgation of the
resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Ping’s COC. Before the expiration of the five-day reglementary period,
Mr. Ang Ping moved for reconsideration of the resolution and the case was elevated to the COMELEC en banc. While the case was
still with the COMELEC First Division, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6823, declaring moot Mr. Ang Pings Affidavit
of Withdrawal, denying due course to the substitute COC of Mrs. Ang Ping and ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr.
Ang Pings name from the certified list of candidates. Among the signatories to the Resolution were Commissioners Javier, Borra, and
Garcilliano of the COMELEC First Division before which the petition to deny due course was still pending. Mr. Ang Ping had no
knowledge of the resolution.

Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Roces filed his answer
alleging, among others, that the HRET has no jurisdiction over the case. HRET granted the substitution in favor of the spouses. Roces
contends that HRET cannot review decisions of the COMELEC.

Roces is mistaken.

The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. It is true that generally,
the method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC is via petition for certiorari. But it was Roces who submitted these
resolutions to the HRET as proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper party. These same resolutions were collaterally attacked by
Mrs. Ang Ping before the HRET when she alleged that these violated her right to due process. A void judgment or resolution may be
impeached through collateral attack. A direct attack on a judgment or resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or correct it in some
manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose, in the same action and in the same tribunal. Conversely,
a collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judgment or resolution by matters dehors the record, before a tribunal other than the
one in which it was rendered, in an action other than that in which it was rendered. The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject
to collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records. The void resolutions of
the COMELEC, the resolution issued by its First Division, cannot oust the HRET of its jurisdiction over the case at bar. The
circumstances of this case shows that the Spouses were denied due process and was forced to seek justice in the HRET.

[G.R. Nos. L-68379-81. September 22, 1986]

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Javier and Pacificador vied for a membership post in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa. On the eve of the elections, several
followers of the Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by Pacificador’s men. Seven suspects, including Pacificador, are now
facing trial for these murders. During the canvass, Pacificador was the winner, but this was questioned by Javier whose complaints
were dismissed and so COMELEC declared Pacificador as the winner.

Javier moved for the nullification of the proclamation on the basis that it was void for having been made only by a division and not en
banc. Pending litigation, Javier was shot dead. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the case for being moot
and academic.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and
in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. Justice demands that we
act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, Javier went to COMELEC to
prevent the impending proclamation of Pacificador. Specifically, Javier charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching
of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador."
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which Javier had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique.

In making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the
winners.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only
by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be
heard and decided en banc.

As correctly observed by Javier, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be
heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already.

FLORES VS COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484

Review of Decisions

Facts:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in the
elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay. However, his election
was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the
petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of
the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total. 1
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The petitioner then went to the
Commission on Elections, but his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision
of the regional trial court. This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August 1989, was presumably based on Section 9 of Rep.
Act No. 6679,

Issue:
Whether the appeal to the Regional Trial Court from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is proper.

Ruling:
No. Municipal or metropolitan courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections under Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution on. Hence,
the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been appealed directly to the Commission on
Elections and not to the Regional Trial Court of Abra.
In sum, we hold that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 providing for an appeal from the MCTC to the RTC is constitutionally defective
and must be struck down. Likewise, the petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong barangay on election day, and so was not
entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule. The consequence is that the four votes claimed by him were correctly
considered stray, making the private respondent the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, for having received the highest
number of votes for kagawad.

GARCES VS CA
Review of Decisions
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace
respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces, on the other hand, was directed by the Office of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.

On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion, among others. Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging
that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues and Ruling:

Is petitioner’s action for mandamus proper?

No. Mandamus, which petitioner filed below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful. Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding
functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not mandamus. Quo warranto tests the title to ones office
claimed by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal
duties and not to try disputed titles.

Concepcion was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment. If the transfer was made without the consent
of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid cause contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal
except for cause. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be
emphasized, is indispensable to complete an appointment. Corollarily, Concepcions post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic
precept in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed
to an office which is not vacant. Further, Garces appointment was ordered to be deferred then cancelled by the COMELEC.

Is this case for mandamus cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?
RTC. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides: Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it… This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On
the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy. The case or matter referred to by the constitution must
be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision,
rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to
the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials. In this
case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty
done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official.

BARBERS VS COMELEC, GR No. 165691, June 22, 2005

COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunals
Facts:
In the Senatorial race of the 2004 national elections, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this
difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections, hence, it proclaimed
Biazon as the 12th winning Senator. Claiming that Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of
Biazon as Senator with the COMELEC. The petition was assigned to a Special Division of the COMELEC. In his petition, Barbers
asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass.

Issue:
Whether the petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon was validly filed in the COMELEC.

Ruling:
No. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members.

In Javier v. COMELEC, we interpreted the phrase election, returns and qualifications as follows:
The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. 19 Since Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint.

LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC, GR No. 179120

COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunals

Facts:
Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacyhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/178831-
32.htm - _ftn4 (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. A registered voter of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the
House of Representatives. Allegedly, she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. In her separate Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to
a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's
naturalization.

Limkaichong emerged as the winner in the May 14, 2007 while the cases were still pending. In a Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007,
the COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions in the disqualification cases. On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the First District of Negros Oriental.

Issues and Ruling:

Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion
for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner.

Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases.
Yes. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly disqualified Limkaichong on the ground that she is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The SC cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichongs citizenship as the same should have been challenged in appropriate proceedings.

Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory.

No. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc recognized that it no longer has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases following
the valid proclamation of Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a
Member of the House of Representatives.
No. The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives should be exercised with great caution and after the proper
proceedings for the ouster has been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in
the elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings determining ones qualification or disqualification, would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.

Eufrocino Codilla Sr. vs. House Speaker Jose de Venecia, House Secretary-General Roberto Nazareno and Ma. Victoria
Locsin
GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002
Facts:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Eufrocino Codilla Sr. and respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th District of Leyte. Six days before the election, a petition to disqualify Codilla was filed with the COMELEC
main office. Three days before Election Day, the COMELEC Second Division delegated the case for hearing and reception of
evidence to the COMELEC Regional Director . At the time of the elections, the Regional Director was yet to hear the disqualification
case so Codilla was still included in the list of candidates and won overwhelmingly against Locsin by a margin of more than 17,000
votes. Given the victory of Codilla, Locsin filed with the COMELEC Second Division a motion to suspend his proclamation. The
COMELEC Second Division eventually issued an ex-parte order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend Codilla’s
proclamation. Codilla moved to have the Order of Suspension lifted for reason, among others, that he was not afforded due process
because he was not given a copy of the petition for disqualification. On June, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
decision finding Codilla guilty of indirect solicitation. Such decision declared his 71,350 votes as stray votes and thus Locsin was
proclaimed as the candidate with the highest number of votes albeit she received only 53,447 votes. Codilla was able to timely file a
Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. He also filed a Petition to Declare the Nullity of the Proclamation of
Locsin. Come August, the COMELEC granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla. Meanwhile, Locsin claims that the
COMELEC no longer had jurisdiction to nullify her proclamation after she had already taken her oath and assumed office. She argues
that the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House and delivered a privilege
speech stating that she will defy the COMELEC ruling. House Speaker De Venecia, in response to Codilla’s letter informing him of
his election, advised that the matter would be best adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Thus Codilla, filed the petition for Mandamus
and Quo Warranto.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the case after the candidate (Locsin) has already been proclaimed and has
taken her oath of office as representative.
Ruling:
The COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the case. The validity of the decision of the COMELEC Second Division (disqualifying
Codilla, considering votes for him as stray votes and proclaiming Locsin on such basis) has not yet been resolved with finality by the
COMELEC En Banc because a motion for reconsideration has been seasonably filed by Codilla. Thus, the issue is still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC and the HRET cannot yet assume jurisdiction over the matter lest it arrogate to itself the
power to review the resolutions and decisions of the COMELEC. Moreover, Locsin is clearly a second placer who cannot be
proclaimed.

[G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999] MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO,respondents. EN BANC. Mendoza, J.

Facts: Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the 3 rd District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998
elections. Perez then filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least 1 year
immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution. In support of the claim petitioner presents
respondent’s certificates of candidacy for governor and his voter registration stating he is a resident of Gattaran, outside the third
district of Cagayan. In response, Aguinaldo claims that while he had been a resident of Gattaran, he transferrred resident to
Tuguegarao to hide his mistress from public view and substantiated these claims with supporting evidence. On May 10 the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification. Respondent was then declared as the winner and was sworn into office. Perez
filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent plead that the petition be dismissed for the COMELEC had lost jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition and pass upon private respondents eligibility for the office of
Representative?

Ruling:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further
consideration of petitioners action. At the time of the filing of this petition, private respondent was already a member of the House of
Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction; the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the petition.
Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of an
order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event
the motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a
restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or (2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May
16, 1998.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of
Cagayan. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his
residence. Under the law, what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any district or municipality,
one year before the election. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the
fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more
than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that
he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is
the capital of the province of Cagayan.

G.R. No. 134015 [July 19, 1999] JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra.
GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent.
En Banc, DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

Facts: Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.
Private respondents, filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the province. The Comelec Second Division rendered a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. On the day of the election, the
Comelec ordered that the votes cast for Domino be counted but suspended the proclamation if he wins. The result of the election
showed that Domino garnered the highest number of votes. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Comelec,
which was denied by the Comelec en banc. Hence, the present petition for alleging that Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. The
Court then allowed the candidate who received the second highest number of votes in the election to intervene.
Issue: WON Domino was able to comply with the 1 year residency requirement?

Ruling:
1. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of
the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material
facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate
2. The determination of the MTC in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the
list of voters does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass upon
the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters are
summary in character. Thus a decision in these proceedings, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature
of res judicata and cannot operate as a bar to any future action. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion
cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is
not qualified to vote. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence
to another for it is the function of the Election Registration Board
3. Residence means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is question of intention and
circumstances. Three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
4. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate
is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all
times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.
 5. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in
an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have
taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the HoR

G.R. No. 180088. Manuel B. Japzon, Petitioner v. Commission on Elections and Jaime S. Ty, Respondents. En Banc, Chico
Nazario, J.

Facts: Japzon and Ty were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Japzon filed a petition to
disqualify on the ground of material misrepresentation for Ty’s noncompliance with the residency requirement. Japzon contented that
Ty was a former natural-born Filipino who became a citizen of the US and has not fully resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. In
fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA. Japzon
contends that Ty also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Pending the resolution of the petition, the elections were held wherein Ty
obtained the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor. The Comelec 1 st Division found that Ty complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Japzon filed a Motion for
reconsideration, which the Comelec denied. He then filed this peititon.

Issue: WON Ty was able to comply with the requirement of residency?

Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retai n his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship. The said statute does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino. It imposes
no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, the law
treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public
office, he must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.

On residence:
The term residence is to be understood as to refer to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself
admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. Ty’s
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time
of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship 1) he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was
at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6; 2) he voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction and 3) applied for and was registered as
a voter in Barangay 6. Moreover, he has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur. His trips abroad does not
indicate that he does not intend to permanently reside here but is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
The Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.

E. FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

 Sinaca vs Mula
315 SCRA 266
1999

FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing
after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the
canvassing. Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the
COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: (a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was
nominated as a substitute; and (b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.

ISSUE: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.

HELD: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.

Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan
Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had
filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his
written acceptance of the party’s nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member.

There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a
member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

Viviero vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 81059
January 2, 1988

Note: No found case with this title and GR No. (even in CD Asia). Nearest case is Vivero vs Murillo (1929) which is not about filing of
candidacy but about domicile of origin.

Ramirez vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 81150
January 12, 1988

Note: No found case with this title having the stated GR No and date. What’s available in CD Asia is Ramirez vs COMELEC with GR
No 122013 dated March 26, 1997 about jurisdiction of COMELEC en Banc for cases involving PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF
MANIFEST ERRORS nad not on FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

FACTS: Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I. Go were candidates for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar
in the election of May 8, 1995. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) on the basis of results
showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against private respondent's 1,235 votes. 1
On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition for the correction of what he claimed was manifest error in the
Statement of Votes (SPC No. 95-198). He alleged that, based on the entries in the Statement of Votes, he obtained 1,515 votes as
against petitioner's 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition, he was credited with 1,235 votes
ISSUE: WON COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in
the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC in Division forst before En Banc Rule is applicable only when the COMELEC is asked to exercise adjudicatory
function (Quasi-judicial or Judicial).
 Villanueva vs COMELEC
G.R No. 54718
December 4, 1985

Note: The date as stated in CD Asia pertaining to this case is not December 4, 1985 but May 31, 1983.

FACTS: Mendoza, on the last day for filling, filed his sworn certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores Quezon for the 1980
elections. On the same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn but handwritten letter withdrawing his candidacy. Immediately after
Mendoza’s withdrawal, Villanueva filed his own sworn Certificate of candidacy in substitution of Mendoza’s. Villanueva won. The
COMELEC, however, disregarded the votes cast in favour of Villanueva and declared the other candidate as the sole winner.

The COMELEC argued that the withdrawal of Mendoza was not valid and consequently he could not have been substituted
by Villanueva since the withdrawal by Mendoza was not sworn to as required by Section 27 of the Election Code which provides:

... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ...

unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate ...
or with the commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects?

HELD: No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people’s
will in favour of the petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers (48 Phil. 211), which is clearly
applicable, mutatis mutandis, the Supreme Court held that “The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the
certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the
election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of
the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy.” (See also Gundan vs.
Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. COMELEC (107 Phil. 607), the legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement
should be considered a harmless irregularity. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent
Commission in resolving the issue of last minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.

Note: Initially the Supreme Court dismissed Villanueva’s petition. The Court considered its dismissal when it was shown that
the COMELEC proclaimed winner abandoned the position

TANGPUZ

Quinto V. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698,

February 22, 2010 EN BANC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
The petitioners argued that the resolution violates equal protection clause as it applies only to appointed officials and not to elective
officials. In this defense, the COMELEC averred that the resolution is pursuant to Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of
RA 9369.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

Yes. The provision does not violate equal protection clause.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even
to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to
the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions
in government or not. Furthermore, Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to
civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding
the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of
their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is
the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. His widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on
June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. the wife
obtained the highest number of vote, but COMELEC ruled that the votes cast in her favor are invalid as she was prohibited from
running as substitute candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not substitution in barangay election is allowed.
Ruling:
Yes. The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition
against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is
more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law. To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the
contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of
the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Lastly, in our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of
the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality
of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number
of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment
of the results.

FEDERICO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013

Principle: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections, the Comelec is empowered by law to
prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election: “the Comelec, which
has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,”

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678,
COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

FACTS:
Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the
May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. On April
29, 2010, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the
corresponding Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.

Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and
as substitute candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna Sanchez.

Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed after the deadline had lapsed pursuant
to Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of Edna and Petitioner.

However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been printed, the name of Edna was still on the ballots for the
position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna garnered the most votes for that election, beating Private
Respodent for the position of mayor. Eventually the board of canvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the
replacement of Edna).

Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner Federico.

The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner (Renato M. Federico) and proclaimed Private Respondent
Maligaya as mayor. The COMELEC declared that Petitioner's substitution of Edna was void because if was filed after the period for
filing of COCs had lapsed.

Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that Comelec Resolution No. 8678, which fixed a period for
the filing of COCs and CONAs cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's
replacement candidate of one who withdraws, dies or is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled Federico’s proclamation as the winning candidate on the
ground that his substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make
efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election. RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated
elections specifically allows COMELEC to set deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.

Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678,
COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

As Federico's substitution was not valid as it was filed out of time, there was only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race in Sto.
Tomas, Batangas - Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he should be
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10,2010 elections.

Thus, the substitution of Petitioner as Mayor was made out of time and was thus void.

G.R. No. 188456 February 10, 2010

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T.
ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P.
MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and
AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, Petitioner-in-Intervention.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Movant-Intervenor.

Facts:
By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic). The Court also denied the petition-in-
intervention of Pete Q. Quadra, praying that the respondents be directed to implement the minimum requirements provided under pars.
(f) and (g), Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, or the Election Modernization Act, as amended by RA 9369.

On a motion for reconsideration, petitioners maintain that the Comelec abdicated its constitutional mandate to decide all questions
affecting elections when, under Article 3.3 of the poll automation contract, it surrendered control of the system and technical aspects
of the 2010 automated elections to Smartmatic in violation of Sec. 26 of RA 8436. Comelec, so petitioners suggest, should have
stipulated that its Information Technology (IT) Department shall have charge of the technical aspects of the elections.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners’ contention has merit?

Decision:

No. The petitioners’ contention has no merit.

Art. 6.7 of the automation contract could not have been more clear:
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En Banc, the entire process of voting,
counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall [still] be conducted by COMELEC’s personnel and officials and
their performance, completion and final results according to specifications and within specified periods shall be the shared
responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER.

The aforequoted provision doubtless preserves Comelec’s constitutional and statutory responsibilities. But at the same time, it
realistically recognizes the complexity and the highly technical nature of the automation project and addresses the contingencies that
the novelty of election automation brings.

Comelec, to reiterate, is the constitutional body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. In the discharge of this responsibility, Comelec has been afforded enough latitude in devising means and methods that would
enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct
of elections, the Court—or petitioners for that matter—must not, by any preemptive move or any excessive zeal, take away from
Comelec the initiative that by law pertains to it. It should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of
an organization of lesser responsibility.

Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC and Edgar Andanar

G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009; En Banc, Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts: Penera and Andanar were candidates for mayor for the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte. Andanar filed a Petition
for Disqualification against Penera for having unlawfully engaged in election campaigning and partisan political activity (Section 80,
Omnibus Election Code) when Penera held a “motorcade” on March 29, 2007 the last day to file a Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
and also one (1) day before the start of the campaign period. While the Petition was pending, Penera won as the duly elected mayor
and assumed office on July 2, 2007. The Comelec 2 nd Division ordered her disqualification on July 24, 2007. Comelec en banc denied
her Motion for Recon. She elevates this case to the Supreme Court via Petitioner for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64.
Penera’s main argument is that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, as the supporters merely joined her and other
candidates along the way to the Comelec.

Issue: Whether Penera violated the prohibition on premature campaigning?

Ruling: Yes. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code includes a violation of Section 80 on premature campaigning as a
disqualification from continuing as a candidate, or if elected, from holding the office. The dissenting opinion’s view is that it is
impossible to commit premature campaigning because as defined in the Automated Election System laws (RA 8436, amended by RA
9369) a candidate commits premature campaigning outside the campaign period but one is only considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period.

The majority opinion says that RA 8436 as amended by RA 9369 did not repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. The two
laws may be harmonized.

First, Section 80 punishes any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, to engage in election campaign or partisan political
activity, except during the campaign period. So premature campaigning may be committed by one who is not a candidate.

Second, RA 8436 as amended says one is only a candidate at the start of the campaign period. However, the filing of the COC, is an
explicit declaration of his/her intention to run as a candidate in the upcoming election. When the campaign period starts and [the
person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.

Thus, Penera committed premature campaigning when she participated in the motorcade held after the filing of her COC and before
the start of the campaign period and is disqualified from holding the position. Per rules of succession under the Local Government
Code, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor will succeed as Mayor, not respondent Andanar who garnered the second highest votes for mayor.

Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC and Edgar Andanar

G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 (Resolution on MR); En Banc, Carpio, J.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration:

The Decision (above) reversed Lanot v. COMELEC which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.

Lanot was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal
framework for an automated election system. The early deadline for filing of COCs was to allow for the early printing of official
ballots without changing the election periods already fixed. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a COC under the early
deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the
start of the campaign period. This Lanot ruling was then included as an amendment to RA 8436, in the form of the amendatory law
RA 9369.

Thus, when the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period.

A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight —
any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the
campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has
no recourse but to apply the law that a candidate is only considered such at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his COC
and the proviso that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period.

Penera’s MR is granted. The Decisions and Resolutions of the Comelec en banc and Second Division are set aside. Penera shall
continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

Hadji Rasul Batabor. vs. COMELEC, Barangay Board of Canvassers, Board of Election Inspectors of Precincts 3A, 4A, and
5A, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and Mocasim Abangon Batondiang
GR No. 160428, July 21, 2004.
Facts:
Hadji Rasul Batabor and Mocasim Abangon Batondiang ran for Barangay Captain in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur in the
July 15, 2002 elections. Batabor lost to Batondiang by 29 votes. Not able to accept his defeat, Batabor filed with the COMELEC a
petition to declare failure of elections in Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A. He alleged that the Chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors
in these precincts discontinued the voting, tore the ballots and padlocked the ballot boxes and as a result, more than 100 of his
relatives and followers were unable to vote. The COMELEC eventually dismissed his petition and thus Batabor filed a petition for
certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC’s decision denying the petition to declare failure of elections was proper.
Ruling:
As held in Benito vs. COMELEC, for failure of elections to be declared, two conditions must concur: (1) no voting has been held in
any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the
results of the elections. The cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. Moreover,
the power to declare such failure is exclusively vested by law on the COMELEC.
In the case of Batabor, albeit the 100 or so votes can possibly overturn the results, the first requisite was not present because he failed
to prove that voting did not take place in the precincts he mentioned. In fact 220 of 316 voters (69.62%) have voted and this prima
facie negates the claim that there was a failure of elections. Moreover, Batabor seeks to annul only the proclamation of his opponent
and not the other elected and proclaimed candidates. Thus, COMELEC in its assailed ruling which was upheld by the Supreme Court
stated that: “The Commission may not, on the ground of failure of elections, annul the proclamation of one candidate only…because
failure of elections necessarily affects all the elective positions in the place where there has been a failure of elections.”

Jose Emmanuel Carlos vs. Judge Adoracion Angeles (RTC Caloocan, Branch 125) and Antonio M. Serapio
GR No. 142907, November 29, 2000
Facts:
Jose Emmanuel Carlos and Antonio Serapio both ran for mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. Carlos
emerged the winner with 102,688 votes versus Serapio’s 77,270 votes. Serapio later filed with the RTC an election protest to
challenge the results. The case was assigned to Judge Adoracion Angeles. Based on the revision of ballots as conducted by the trial
court, Carlos still emerged as the winner albeit by a smaller margin of around 17,007 votes. However the trial court set aside the final
tally because of what it perceived to be several “significant badges of fraud” attributable to the camp of Carlos (e.g. ballot box keys
from the City Treasurer-custodian did not work, absence of watchers for Serapio during counting, brownout during the counting,
seven ballot boxes found empty). Instead, it declared Serapio as the winner as though no valid votes were cast at all for the candidates
(i.e. there was failure of election).
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in coming up with its decision (in relation to failure of election).
Ruling:
The Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
It is the COMELEC En Banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election which could only be appreciated
if two requisites concur: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the dates fixed by law, or even if there were
voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. Under
the Omnibus Election Code, moreover, there are only three instances when failure of elections may be declared on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, to wit: (a) the election has not been held on the date fixed; (b) the
election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting; and (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect.
Neither was obtaining in the case. But due to its perception of fraud by the camp of Carlos, the trial court, in effect, pronounced a
failure of elections by disregarding and setting aside the results of the election.
Assuming that the trial court had jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of its power is likewise only limited to the
annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. It cannot declare a winner because to begin with, no votes can be
considered due to the failure.