Case Facts Issue/s Ruling/Rationale

SECTION 1
GOVERNMENT OF The National Coal Company (NCC), which is government owned WN the legislative has the The general rule is that appointing power is vested on
THE PHILIPPINE and controlled, was created by the Philippine Congress wherein power to appoint officials. – the executive department alone, with some
ISLANDS vs. by the terms of the charter of the corporation, the Governor- NO. exceptions as provided for by law.
SPRINGER General was directed to subscribe on behalf of the Government of
the Philippine Islands for at least 51 per cent of the capital of the The court ruled that it is beyond the power of any branch
corporation. The Philippine Legislature then, passed a statute (Act of the Government of the Philippine Islands to
No 2705 as amended by Act No. 2822) which creates a voting exercise its functions in any other way than that
committee or board of control which also defines the duties and prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which
powers thereof. Governor-General claims (Executive Order 87) conform to the Organic Law. The Governor-General
the invalidity of the portion of the Acts. Due to its nullity as claimed must find his powers and duties in the fundamental
by the Governor-General, the Governor-General must exercise law. An Act of the Philippine Legislature must comply
exclusively the duties and powers assumed by the voting with the grant from Congress.
committee or board of control, and neglect the elected committee,
which include the defendants, who were voted by the Senate Furthermore, the court deduce that the power of
President and the Speaker of the House. appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor
exceptions, to the executive department; that
membership in the voting committee in question is an
office or executive function; that the National Coal
Company and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the government; that the duty to
look after government agencies and government
property belongs to the executive department; and
that the placing of members of the Philippine
Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
invasion by the Legislative Department of the
privileges of the Executive Department.

The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen, is authorized

to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has
lawfully provided for a National Coal Company and a
committee to vote the government stock in that company,
but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in
the committee. The incidental purpose of the Legislature
was to provide a method to vote the stock owned by the

EASTERN SHIPPING Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when WN there had been a valid
LINES vs. POEA he was killed in an accident. His widow sued for damages under delegation of power. – YES.
E.O. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as the vessel owner, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant.
Petitioner came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to
move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA
should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be
given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions,
however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has not
objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing
that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to
her prejudice.
Government in the National Coal Company. In addition,
the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on
the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the
Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive
Department, for Section 18 of the Organic Act disqualifIes
Senators or Representatives for election or appointment
to office, and on other subsidiary matters.
Administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity of competence to
provide.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 which prescribes a model
contract has been applied in a significant number of cases
without challenge by employers.
Standard: to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to “fair and equitable employment practices”.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
peculiar problems, the legislature has found it more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate
legislation.
Delegation of power is permitted because of the
increasing complexity of the task of government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and

TATAD vs. The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act
SECRETARY OF THE No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
DEPARTMENT OF Industry and For Other Purposes". R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six
ENERGY years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may
import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject
only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions
of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392,
petitioners offer the following submissions:
1. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
WN Section 15 of R.A. No
8180 and E.O. No. 392 are
unconstitutional on the ground
that they constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power
to the President and the
Secretary of Energy. – YES
AND NO.
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to
them.
The reasons for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is
called the "power of subordinate legislation."
SECTION 15 OF RA 8180 – Constitutional
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness testand the
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress
expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation
will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before the end of
March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment
of the President — he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
EO 392 – Unconstitutional
On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department
 2. Petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged
depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A.
No. 8180.
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline
of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the
"determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry.
PEOPLE vs. In a complaint filed the private respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
DACUYCUY Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials
of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang,
thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670.
Private respondents filed for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VIII, to restrain from proceeding with the trial of said
WN Section 32 of said
Republic Act No. 4670
constitute undue delegation of
legislative power. – YES.
to the depletion of the OPSF2 fund. Section 15 did not
mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation.
On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that
some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-
condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund
must not be in deficit. . The misappreciation of this extra
factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive
department considered anyway the stability of the prices
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering
another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180.
The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180
for it has no power to make laws.
In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar.
On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department
to the depletion of the OPSF fund. In light of this
uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O.
No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge
erroneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the
legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion
to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment.
It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment
where no points of reference have been provided by
 Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal
Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
An additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law,
is unconstitutional for It constitutes an undue delegation of the
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were
the legislative department of the Government.
Respondent Judge rendered the afforested challenged decision
holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and
constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case
to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for
preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s
decision but the same was limited only to the portion thereof which
sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670.
FREE TELEPHONE There was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for
WORKERS UNION unfair labor practices stating the following grounds:
vs. MINISTER OF 1. Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of
LABOR AND Conduct to the detriment of the interest of our members.
EMPLOYMENT 2. Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers and
members as a result of the implementation of said Code of
Conduct.
3. Unconfirmation of call sick leaves and its automatic
treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence
(AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of
our Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The respondent Ministry, certified the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and
the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of
service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits provided
by law, the absence of which designated limits well
constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if
not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such
that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the
accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in
the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in
nature and which, as applied to this case, does violative to
the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-
delegability of legislative powers.
WN BP 130 amending Art. 264 To determine whether there is an undue delegation of
of the Labor Code is an undue legislative power, inquiry must be directed to the
delegation of legislative scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. A
powers. standard defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
– NO. out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. What is delegated is authority non-legislative in
character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves
the hands of Congress being assumed.
The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative
powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The power which
he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such
principle is for petitioner labor union within the
competence of the President, who in its opinion can best
 enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment. The
labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National Labor
Relations Commission. Private respondent, following the lead of
petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy
regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged
in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed
indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of
the labor dispute.
It is now the submission of petitioner labor union Free Telephone
Workers Union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it
amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable
Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration
to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make
or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue
delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the assertion
that such conferment of authority "may also ran contrary to the
assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-organization and
collective bargaining.
TABLARIN vs. Petitioners Tablarin et al. sought admission into schools of WN the Medical Act of 1959 is
GUTIERREZ medicine for SY 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or an invalid delegation of
did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test legislative powers. – NO.
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education thereby
determine national interests, but only when a strike is in
progress.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor
disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter
decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is not on its face
unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of
nondelegation of legislative power. It stressed further that
compulsory arbitration must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor.
Even on the assumption, indulged in solely because of the
claim earnestly and vigorously pressed by counsel for
petitioner, that the authority conferred to the Minister of
Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of
an unlawful delegation of such power may be discerned.
The legislature does not abdicate its functions when
it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only was in which the
legislative process can go forward.
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation
of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may
not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law to which no valid objection can be made.
The standard does not have to be spelled out
specifically, it being implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole.
 rendering them unqualified/disqualified for admission to medical
school under RA 2382 (Medical Act of 1959).
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education with the functions specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission
into a recognized college of medicine;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said
certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty- five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating
fund of the Board of Medical Education;
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary
rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the
foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied).
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants
to medical schools and one of these is a certificate of eligibility for
entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education.
Petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to
be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education.
SECTION 3
SOCIAL JUSTICE Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, WN Section 36(g) of RA 9165
SOCIETY vs. a.k.a. the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires is Constitutional. – NO.
DANGEROUS mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
DRUGS BOARD secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses, particularly those who are charged
▪ Adding the NMAT as a requirement for medical
school applicants is well within the authority of
the Board of Medical Education.
▪ Standard: standardization and regularization
of medical education.
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by
then Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta —
The standard may be either expressed or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit
upon the roads.”
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are
set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education"
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of
the statute itself, and that these considered together
are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle.
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated
in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
Legislative power remains limited, it is subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which
 with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and
1 day of imprisonment.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in
the May elections, FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION under Rule 65.
In his petition, he seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that
they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition
to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution, to wit: (a)
citizenship, (b) voter registration, (c) literacy, (d) age, and (e)
residency.
Section 36(g) provides that ALL candidates for public office
. . . both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test .
He also said that beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to
run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. In addition, the Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,
or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
SECTION 5
MARIANO vs. R.A. 7854, which aims to convert Makati into a city, is assailed as WN Section 52 of RA 7854
COMELEC being unconstitutional on the grounds that R.A. 7854 aims to violates Art. VI, Sec. 5(3) of the
increase membership of the House which the Constitution fixes. Constitution. – NO.
The petitioners contend, among others, that the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law (it can only be made by a
general reapportionment law), and that Makati’s population xxx
stands at only 450k hence it allegedly violates Art VI, Sec 5(3) of
the Constitution.
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes.
With the presumption that the legislature is not capable of
addressing everything with respect to the needs of the
community, it is acknowledged that legislative power may
be duly delegated. However, it shall be subject to
limitations as mandated by the constitution: it shall be
complete in the sense that it shall, and it shall fix a
standard.
If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Reapportionment is not strictly limited through a general
apportionment law, special laws can be passed for
reapportionment purposes or else it will deprive the people
of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
A city whose population has increased to more than
250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
Application of 250,000 minimum population requirement
for cities is limited to the initial legislative district (Section
5(3) of Article 6 of the Constitution).
 Section 52 thereof provides that Makati, upon conversion into
a Highly Urbanized City, shall have at least 2 legislative
districts xxx.
TOBIAS vs. ABALOS Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. RA 7675 was enacted which in effect converted the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City and
divided the legislative district of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2
separate districts.
Petitioners as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong assail the
constitutionality of the RA contending it is contrary to Sections
5(1), 5(4), 26(1) and 26(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Makati’s legislative district (population of 450,000) may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000, it does not have to increase
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district (progressive ratio).
1. WN RA 7675 contrary ARTICLE 6 SECTION 5(1)
to Art. VI, Section 5(1) The Constitution clearly provides that the present
of the Constitution. – composition of the House of Representative may be
NO. increased, if Congress itself so mandates through
2. WN it is contrary to legislative enactment. Hence, the increase in the
Section 5(4) of the composition is valid.
same Article. – NO. ARTICLE 6 SECTION 5(4)
3. WN it is contrary to It was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
Section 26(1) of the and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly
same Article. – NO. preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (right to
4. WN it is contrary to reapportion legislative districts).
Section 26(2) of the
same Article. – NO. ARTICLE 6 SECTION 26(1)
The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city,
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
xxx. Thus, the title necessarily includes the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
A liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule has
been invariably adopted so as not to cripple legislation. It
should be given practical rather than technical
construction; it sufficiently complies with the rule if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.
ARTICLE 6 SECTION 26(2)
To the argument that there is no mention in the RA of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each

MONTEJO vs. Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3 rd District of the WN the COMELEC have the
COMELEC province of Leyte. It was later converted into a sub-province then power to reapportion districts.
a regular province. – NO.
COMELEC sought to remedy the consequent inequality of the
distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province
of Leyte by promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred
(in Section 1 thereof) the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District
and Palompon of its 4th District to its 3rd District.
Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of Leyte sought to annul said
Section of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the principle
of equality of representation.
To remedy the alleged inequity, he prays to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd District of the
province.
attained the minimum requirement of 250k inhabitants
provided in Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution to justify
their separation, the Court held that the reason does not
suffice. The Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements of the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any
rate, It is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.
The court held Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and
conceded that the conversion of Biliran to a regular
province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could
devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
However, what is prayed for involves an issue of
reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for
such lies with Congress in accordance to Article VI, Sec
5(4). While this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as Montejo would want the Court to do
by directing COMELEC to transfer Tolosa from the 1st
District to the 2nd District. Transferring a municipality
from one district to another is a substantive (not
minor) change.
COMELEC is only empowered to make minor
adjustments of reapportionment, it cannot transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another.
Minor adjustments: adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created (i.e. If one of the
 municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended
to, but is actually within territory of the district).
BAGABUYO vs. Cagayan de Oro City used to have a single legislative district. In 1. WN RA 9371 involve 1. Both RA 9371 and Resolution 7837 are purely and
COMELEC 2006, RA 9371 was passed making it a two legislative districts. the division or simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
Bagabuyo opposed it before the SC, claiming that the split must conversion of an LGU, accordance with the power given to the Congress
be approved by a plebiscite and that the split violates the or does it only provide under Article VI Section 5 (4).
constitutional standard of equal representation. for legislative
reapportionment. – Under the law, there was no division of Cagayan
The implementing agency, COMELEC, countered that the petition NO. de Oro as a political and corporate entity. In
should have been filed with the RTC; and that a plebiscite is not fact, it remains a single unit and its administration
needed. 2. WN it violates the is not divided along territorial lines. CDO remains
equality of completely whole and intact; there is only the
representation addition of another legislative district and the
doctrine. – NO. delineation of the city into two districts for
purposes of representation in the House of
Representatives.

Rather than divide the city either territorially or as

a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance
voter representation by giving each city voter more
and greater say, both in Congress and in the
Sangguniang Panlunsod.

2. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: District 1 has only

93,719 voters while District 2 has 127,071. Also,
District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays
while District 2, of urban barangays. Hence,
unequal.

The Court discussed that what the law provides

as basis for districting is the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
number of registered voters therein.

Petitioner failed to provide information about the

actual population of Cagayan de Oro City. With

SEMA vs. COMELEC • The 1987 Constitution apportioned two (2) Legislative
Districts to the province of Maguindanao (which is part of
the ARMM). The first legislative district is composed of
Cotabato City and 8 Municipalities, however Cotabato City
is not part of ARMM but Region XII, having voted against
its inclusion in the ARMM.
• On August 28, 2006, the ARMM regional assembly
(ARMM’s legislature) exercised its power under
Section 19 of RA 9504 [Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 (MMA 201)] creating the province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
• On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of
the conversion of the first legislative district into its own
separate province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
WN Section 19, Article VI of
R.A. 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional. –
NO.
that, the Court take judicial notice of the August
2007 census of the National Statistics Office
which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan
de Oro's first district have a total population of
254,644, while the second district has 299,322
residents.
In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
shall have one representative" (Section 5(3),
Article 6), while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population.
As to the contention of rural and urban barangays,
the Court discussed that it cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in the
barangays' levels of development or
developmental focus as these are not part of
the constitutional standards for legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.
The power to create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative district.
Under Congress’ plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government
Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can create provinces,
cities or municipalities.
While there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts
with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
• On March 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
(RN) 07-0407 maintaining the status quo of Cotabato City
as part of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
• On March 29, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated RN 7845
stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment
of MMA 201.
• On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued RN 7902 by
renaming the first legislative district as the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City.
• The petitioner, Sema, was a candidate in the May 14, 2007
elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City. The petitioner prayed for the nullification of
the RN 7902 and exclusion of the votes casted by the
inhabitants of Cotabato City in that office.
• Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to
one representative in the congress under Article 6,
Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution and section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
petitioner claimed that in issuing RN 7902, the COMELEC
usurped Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives.
A province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. For
Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district.
Thus, legislative districts are created or reapportioned
only by an Act of Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts.
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily
includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through
a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The
allowable membership of the House of Representatives
can be increased, and new legislative districts of
Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic
 act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority
to create legislative districts.
BANAT vs. Following the May 2007 elections, petitioner Barangay Association 1. Is the 20% allocation
COMELEC (April 21, for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before for party-list
2009 Decision) respondent COMELEC a petition to proclaim the full number of representatives
party-list representatives provided by the Constitution, i.e. 20% of provided in Section
the total number of representatives (55 seats in the current 5(2), Article VI of the
Congress). Meanwhile, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. Const. mandatory? –
07-60 proclaiming all party-list candidates garnering at least 2% of NO.
the total party-list votes (13 party-list candidates). 2. Is the three-seat limit
provided in Section
COMELEC en banc thus declared the BANAT’s petition moot and 11(b) of RA 7941
academic and declared further that the total number of seats of constitutional? – YES.
each winning party-list will be resolved using the Veterans 3. Is the 2% threshold
ruling.65 BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said vote to qualify a party-
resolution of the COMELEC. list to congressional
seats prescribed by the
In the other petition, petitioners party-list candidates Bayan Muna, same Section 11(b) of
Abono, and A Teacher assail the validity of the Veterans formula. RA 7941
constitutional? – YES.
4. How shall the seats for
party-list
representatives be
allocated?
5. May major political
parties participate in
the party-list elections?
– NO
——
4 inviolable parameters:
1. the 20% allocation — the
combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House
1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives
is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives. Neither the
Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up
of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in Section 5(1) of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress.
**but in the case at bar, 20% was mandatory.
2. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, is a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
3. Yes, as to the guaranteed seats; but no, as to
the additional seats, hence, void. The 2%
threshold vote for additional seats makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2%
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives. It presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible
of Representatives, including
those elected under the party
list
2. the 2% threshold — only
those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified"
to have a seat in the House of
Representatives
3. the three-seat limit — each
qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that
is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats
4. proportional
representation — the
additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number
of votes.
representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”
4. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
c) Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in 4.1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
d) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in RA allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, we
do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the
 two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by the
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in
the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.

5. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to

disallow major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Notably however, neither the Constitution nor RA
7941 prohibit major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
BANAT vs. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
COMELEC 1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list
(Resolution) organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be
distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including
those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the all ocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of
21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. aSTAcH
 4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There
is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well- settled rule
is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.

These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent
of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only
that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Court's Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ATONG PAGLAUM A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong WN Comelec committed grave Comelec did not commit grave abusive of discretion,
vs. COMELEC Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections reinterpreted Section abuse of discretion in following however, since the court adopts in this decision new
5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in prevailing decisions of this parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National court in disqualifying sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections petitioners from participating in abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
(BANAT). the coming 13 may 2013 party- Comelec in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to all the
list elections. – NO. present petitions for the Comelec to determine who are
In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
which were disqualified by the Commission on Election from participate in the coming 13 may 2013 party- list elections,
participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because they under the new parameters prescribed in this decision.
allegedly do not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sector of society, the majority is of the view New guidelines for party- list; controlling rule:
that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties 1. Three different groups may participate:
but also non-sectoral parties. (i) national parties or organizations
(ii) regional parties or organizations
Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list (iii) sectoral parties or organizations
system is not the exclusive domain of sectoral
representatives belonging to the “marginalized and 2. National parties or organizations (ex. Bayan Muna)
underrepresented sectors” but may be participated in by non- and regional parties or organizations (ex. AkoBicol) do
sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
marginalized and underrepresented sector. to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3. GR: political parties can participate in party-list elections

provided they register under party-list system.
XPN: they do not field candidates in legislative district
elections.
XPN to the XPN: they can field candidates in legislative
district elections however, it must be done only through
their sectoral wing that is separately registered in the
COMELEC, and it is linked to a political party through a
coalition.

4. Two groups of Sectoral parties or organizations:

a) marginalized and underrepresented (i.e. labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers)
b) lacking in well-defined political constituencies (i.e.
professionals (ex. Ang bantay), elderly, women,
and youth).
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector (no track
record needed).

5. NOMINEES:
a) In sectoral parties or organizations: either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors.
b) In national and regional parties or organizations:
must be a bona-fide or good faith members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided, that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
Note: not at least 5 representatives ang ipapasa sa
COMELEC (Section 8, RA 7941).

ANGKLA vs. Petitioners ANGKLA: Ang Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc.,
COMELEC (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) and Petitioner-in-
(Decision) Intervention Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-
PTN) essentially assert that the allocation of additional seats
in proportion to a party-list's "total number of votes" results
in the double-counting of votes in favor of the two-percenters.
WN Section 11 (b), RA 7941
allocating additional seats to
party-lists in proportion to
theirtotal number of votes
unconstitutional. – NO.
The present case only corrects the definition of valid
party- list groups. We affirmed that party-list groups may
be national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. We abandoned the requirement
introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list
groups should prove that they represent a
"marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been
set, not all parties in the party-list system have to
represent a sector that is marginalized and
underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the
Constitution never intended the party-list system to be
reserved for sectoral parties. The latter were only part of
the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two
more groups composing the system — national and
regional parties. This is evident from the phrasing of
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts... and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis
supplied)
Section 11(b) of RA 7941
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x
x xxx xxx xxx
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two-percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two-percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
For the same votes which guarantee the two-percenters a seat in
the first round of seat allocation are again considered in the
second round. The proviso purportedly violates the equal
protection clause, hence, is unconstitutional.
On May 22, 2019, the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC)
promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 004-19 declaring the winning
party-list groups in the May 13, 2019 elections.
Based on the National Canvass Report No. 8 and adhering to the
Court's pronouncement in BANAT, respondent COMELEC
distributed sixty-one (61) congressional seats among the following
parties, organizations, and coalitions taking part in the May 13,
2019 party-list election.
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats. (emphasis
added)
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions taking
part in the party-list elections shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the total number
of votes they each garnered in the party-list
elections.
2. Each of the parties, organizations, and coalitions
taking part in the party-list elections receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast under
the party-list elections shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Votes amounting to two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections obtained by
each of the participating parties, organizations,
and coalitions should then be deducted from the
total votes of each of these party- list groups that
have been entitled to and given guaranteed seats.
4. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
thereafter be re-ranked from highest to lowest
based on the recomputed number of votes, that is,
after deducting the two percent (2%) stated in
paragraph 3.
5. The remaining party-list seats (or the "additional
seats") shall then be distributed in proportion to the
recomputed number of votes in paragraph 3 until
all the additional seats are allocated.
6. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Just because a party-list was allocated a guaranteed
seat and an additional seat does not mean that its
 votes were counted twice. It just means that the party-
list concerned surpassed the proportional thresholds
prescribed under the law in both rounds of seat
allocation. Similarly, just because a party-list is not
awarded a guaranteed seat or an additional does not
mean that its votes were not counted.

Failure of a party-list to obtain a seat only means one

thing—it lost the elections. It was outvoted or
outperformed by other party-lists. It was simply left
without a seat in the game of musical chairs. Under
these circumstances, their remedy is not to wrest
others of their allocated seats by changing the rules
of the game, but by doing better in the subsequent
elections.

The Court was not just changing formulas simply to

accommodate the political aspirations of some party-list
candidates. Its decisions were based on the original intent
as well as the textual and contextual dynamics of RA 7941
vis-à-vis Section 5 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
ANGKLA vs. Same facts. WN Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, Petitioners are misguided with their view of “one person,
COMELEC as implemented through the one vote policy.”
(Resolution) Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Court’s decision in BANAT formula, violate the
upholding the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of RA 7941. "one person, one vote" policy, The constitutional standard of proportional representation
as well as the equal protection is rooted in equality in voting power — that each vote is
clause. – NO. worth the same as any other vote, not more or less. In
constitutional parlance, this means representation for
every legislative district "in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" or proportional representation.
Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in
voting power is inherent in proportional representation.

Subscribing to this concept of "one person, one vote"

would cause chaos in the political landscape not only

ANG LADLAD LGBT Petitioner Ang Ladlad represented itself as a national lesbian, gay, WN Ang Ladlad’s application
vs. COMELEC bisexual and transgender (LGBT) umbrella organization with for accreditation be denied. –
affiliates around the Philippines composed of numerous LGBT NO.
networks throughout the country. It alleged that the LGBT
insofar as the application of Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
to party-list systems is concerned, but also with
respect to laws reapportioning legislative districts.
The BANAT formula is in accordance with the clear
language and intent of the law.
As it currently stands, the BANAT formula mirrors the
textual progression of Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. As
keenly noted by Senior Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, the first round is based on the first
sentence of Section 11 (b), while the second round is
based on the first proviso that follows in sequence.
Petitioners admit that there is a substantial distinction
between two-percenters and non-two-percenters and
agrees that the former should be given preference in
the form of a guaranteed seat. But they nevertheless
claim that such preference should be limited to the first
round of seat allocation; when it comes to the allocation of
the additional seats, the votes of the two-percenters
should first be reduced by 2%.
Allowing the two-percenters to participate in the
second round of seat allocation with full votes does
not result in double-counting of votes.
All votes were counted, considered, and used during the
first round of seat allocation, not just those of the two-
percenters. But in the end, the non-two-percenters simply
did not meet the requisite voting threshold to be allocated
a guaranteed seat.
Ang Ladlad complied with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors [in the
Constitution and RA 7941] is not exclusive. Taking note
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670k persons. It applied for accreditation as a party-list
organization with respondent COMELEC in 2006 but was
denied, and again in 2009—also denied.
In its resolution denying the latter application, COMELEC cited the
following grounds: Ang Ladlad tolerates sexual immorality,
citing provisions of the Bible and the Koran. Ang Ladlad
collides with Arts 695, 1306 and 1409 of the Civil Code, and
Article 201 of the RPC.
The LGBT sector is not enumerated in the Constitution and RA
7941. To accredit Ang Ladlad would be to expose our youth
to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of
our faith.
Ang Ladlad claims compliance with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC. Ang Ladlad argues that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.
of the size of the LGBT sector and the extensive
affiliation of Ang Ladlad, the Court ruled that Ang
Ladlad sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation.
It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Morality referred to
in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious.
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require compel the non-
believers to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed
by a religious belief, anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, the government would thereby tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. On the other hand, COMELEC has failed to explain
what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be
so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
an organization from participation in the party-list
system.
COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws is flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. The
remedies for which are a prosecution under the RPC or
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings [and not denial of accreditation].
In ruling for the accreditation Ang Ladlad, the Court further
cited the equal protection clause, the guarantees of
 freedom of expression and association, and our
international obligation to protect and promote human
rights.

Equal protection clause: Ang Ladlad, which represents

the LGBT sector, has the same interest in participating in
the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. Laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve
to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. We are
not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment.
SECTION 6
GALLEGO vs. Petitioner won the municipal elections in Abuyog, Leyte. WN petitioner lost his domicile The term “residence” used in the election law is
VERRA Respondent questioned Gallego’s residence qualification, residence after performing the synonymous with “domicile” which imports not only
enumerating: above acts (refer to a,b,c). – intention to reside in a fixed place but also a personal
a) his registration as a voter in Malaybay, Bukidnon; NO. preference in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
b) his having actually voted in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in the of such intention.
1938 election for assemblymen;
c) his residence certificate for 1940. To acquire domicile by choice, there must concur:
a. a residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondent stating that petitioner b. an intention to remain there; and
has lost his domicile, hence, his election win is void. Gallego then c. an intention to abandon the old domicile.
brought the case before the Supreme Court. The Court then ruled
in his favor and reversed the decision of the appellate court. In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi
and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time. The act must conform to the purpose. The change of
residence must be voluntary the residence at the place
chosen for the domicile must be actual and to the fact of
residence there must be added the animus manendi.

With these guidelines, the Court is not persuaded that

petitioner has the intention to reside in Malaybalay
indefinitely. He is a native of Abuyog and has the very

ROMUALDEZ- Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in WN Tacloban, Leyte the legal
MARCOS vs. Tacloban, Leyte, ran for Congress representing the 1st district of residence of Imelda thereby
COMELEC Leyte. satisfying the residence
requirement mandated by
Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her candidacy on the Article VI, Section 6 of the
ground that, among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year Constitution. – YES.
of Tacloban and therefore she did not satisfy the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution
as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided
“in the constituency where” she sought “to be elected” for only
“seven months”. She later claimed it to be an honest mistake
intention to return to Abuyog. In the past, he moved from
places to places yet he always comes back to Abuyog. He
even run for the municipal mayor in the same municipality
after he resigned as a teacher. Him leaving after his lost
was only temporary and only for the purposes of
looking for work. After being hired in Malaybalay, he
didn’t ask his wife and children to come with him
there. Moreover, his decline to the house and parcel of
land offered by the government manifest his intention
of not staying in Malaybalay indefinitely. What he
bought was a land in Abuyog. Ultimately, during his stay in
Malaybalay, he occasionally went back to Abuyog.
Manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner won with nearly
800 majority votes, the Court has all the more reason to
uphold the validity of the election as it was the voice of the
people.
For purposes of the Election law, “residence” is the same
as “domicile”. Successfully changing residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old one.
The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy
regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact
of residence if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
It was held that Tacloban, Leyte was in fact the domicile of
origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the
domicile of her parents (which was the same). She did
 brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her
domicile “since childhood”.
However, COMELEC resolved in favor of Montejo and contended
that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the
last few decades except Tacloban.
In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Mla. and San
Miguel, Mla. as places where she resided and served certain
positions. Mention was even made of her residence in Malacañang
and Honolulu, Hawaii.
AQUINO vs. Petitioner Aquino was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50
COMELEC years. He, in fact, indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for the
1992 congressional elections that he was a resident of thereof for
52 years immediately preceding that election. His birth certificate
also places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both his
parents.
For the 1995 elections, Aquino ran for the Congress representing
the new 2nd district of Makati City. He stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency where” he
lose her domicile of origin because she acquired
Ferdinand Marcos’ domicile when they married, and
automatically reacquired her domicile or origin early
enough to meet the 1-year residence requirement.
However, upon Ferdinand Marcos’ death, she was free
to establish her domicile and she chose Leyte.
Successfully changing residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and Imelda has clearly
always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even
at the height of the Marcos Regime’s powers, she kept her
close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal
milestones there, instituting well-publicized projects for its
benefit and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power always
with either her influence or consent.
Two conclusions:
1. If a person retains his domicile of origin, for purposes
of residence requirement for representatives, 1-year
period is irrelevant because, by legal fiction, wherever he
or she may be, he is a resident of his domicile of origin
2. If a person re-establishes a previously abandoned
domicile or acquire a new one, the 1-year requirement
must be satisfied.
WN Aquino satisfy the The essence of representation is to place through the
constitutional residence assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
requirement in the 2nd district needs of a particular district.
of Makati City as mandated by
Article VI, Section 6. – NO. Clearly, Aquino’s domicile of origin was Concepcion,
Tarlac, and the same is not easily lost. That coupled with
the fact that Aquino himself claims to have other
residences in Metro Manila. and that he claims to be
resident of the condominium unit in Makati for only a
short length of time “indicate that” his “sole purpose
 sought “to be elected” for only “10 months.” He in fact has just
transferred to a leased condominium in Makati from his residence
in Tarlac.
Private respondents filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground
that he lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman mandated in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
The following day, Aquino amended his Certificate of Candidacy,
indicating he has been a resident in said place for 1 year and 13
days. Meanwhile, elections were held and he garnered the highest
number of votes. However, COMELEC, acting on the private
respondents’ petition, suspended his proclamation permanently.
Hence this instant petition for certiorari.
DOMINO vs. Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
COMELEC of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.
Private respondents, however, filed with the Comelec a petition to
deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Domino because he is neither a resident nor a registered voter of
the province of Sarangani. The petition was assigned to the
Comelec Second Division, which rendered a resolution declaring
Domino disqualified as candidate for the position and ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
On the day of the election, the Comelec ordered that the votes cast
for Domino be counted but suspended the proclamation if he wins.
The result of the election showed that Domino garnered the
highest number of votes over his opponents. He filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the Comelec, which was
denied by the Comelec en banc.
WN petitioner Domino has
resided in Sarangani Province
for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998
elections, thereby fulfilling the
residency requirement. – NO.
in transferring his physical residence” is not to
acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd
district of Makati City.”
The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification— sentimental,
actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement [of the
condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was
effected all belie his claim of residency for the period
required by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reiterated how to successfully
effect a chage of domicile:
• Actual removal/actual change of domicile;
• Intention to abandon former domicile and establish
a new one; and
• Definite act which correspond with the purpose
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was
Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991; he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as
shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election.
A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; bona fide intentions of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary
mandatory injunction alleging that Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence
requirement. The Court allowed the candidate who received the
second highest number of votes in the election to intervene.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into
sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile. The mere absence of individual
from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in
loss or change of domicile.
Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot
in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of
intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in
Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino
registered in his former barangay.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence
in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that
intention.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice:
a) must be for an indefinite period of time
b) the change of residence must be voluntary
c) the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual
Animus manendi (intention of remaining) coupled with
animus non revertendi (intention of returning).
CO vs. HRET Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the 2nd district of Northern Samar. His adversaries, which
include petitioners Co et al., filed election protests against him
averring that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
that he is not a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar and
therefore he did not satisfy the qualification for representatives
mandated in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. It is argued
that Ong does not even have real properties in that district.
Respondent HRET ruled in favor for Ong, hence his petition for
certiori.
Ong was born of a natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese
father who was later naturalized while Ong was a minor. Ong was
born in the said district of Samar and grew up there. Their house
was twice burned and, in both times, they rebuilt their residence in
the same place. After elementary, he pursued his studies in Manila
and practiced his profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the
Philippines Later, he engaged himself in the management of the
family business in Manila He married a Filipina. In between, he
made periodical journeys back to his home province. However,
Ong does not have property in the district.
1. WN Ong is a naturally 1. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Section 15
born Filipino citizen. – of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
YES. applies its benefit to him for he was then a
2. WN Ong is a resident minor residing in this country. Thus, it was the law
of the 2nd district of itself which elected Philippine citizenship to him
Northern Samar. – when he was only 9 years old.
YES.
Election through a sworn statement when he
turned 21 (age of majority) would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one
who is already a Filipino citizen. Moreover,
formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship.
For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding (e.g., entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical
acts of similar nature).
2. The domicile of origin of Ong, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar (in the district). Although no merit was
found in the petitioners’ argument that Ong does
not even have property in the district, the Court
nonetheless held, for the sake of argument, that
did it is not required that a person should have
a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile because that would tantamount to a
property qualification. It is enough that he should
live in the municipality. Although he studied in
Manila and practiced his profession therein, the
periodical journeys made to his home province
reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

BENGSON III vs. Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
HRET was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
However, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship.
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
He then ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
WN respondent Cruz can still
be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. –
YES.
Animus revertendi: intention to return
Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship as
provided under Section 1 of R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected
as a member of the House of Representatives. The
HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, thus
the petition was dismissed.
VALLES vs. This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the
COMELEC COMELEC, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by
petitioner against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in
the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian
citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, because: she is a
holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her
Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her
application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant
certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia.
SECTION 7
DIMAPORO vs. Petitioner incumbent Rep. Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur filed on WN Section 67, Article IX of BP Term v. Tenure
MITRA January 15, 1990 for Certificate of Candidacy for the position of 881 shorten a term of a
Regional Governor of the ARMM. congressman by means other
WN the dual citizenship of the
private respondent disqualify
her from running for a public
office. – NO.
▪ Term is the period during which an official is
entitled to hold office.
The Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary
consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries,
be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained
that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that
for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.
Filing of COC sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship
because one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express.
Aznar vs. COMELEC: alien certificate of registration not
tantamount to renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
Mercado vs. Manzano & COMELEC: American passport
and registration as an American citizen were just
assertions of American nationality before termination of
American citizenship.
 than that provided in the
Respondent Speaker Mitra and the Secretary of the House then Constitution. – NO.
excluded Dimaporo’s name from its Roll of Members xxx,
considering him permanently resigned from his office upon filing of
his Certificate of Candidacy pursuant to the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881) Article IX, Sec 67 which states “any elective official
xxx running for any office other than the one which he is holding in
a permanent capacity except for the President and VP shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the election, Dimaporo expressed his intention “to
resume performing” his “duties as elected Member of Congress”
but he failed his bid hence this petition.
He argues that Section 67, Article IX of BP 881 is unconstitutional
in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of
office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
FARIÑAS vs. In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed WN Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
EXECUTIVE into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the 9006 Is Violative for being
SECRETARY Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, discriminatory. – NO.
except the President and the Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an
elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files
his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is
still in office.
▪ Tenure is the period during which the official
actually holds the office.
▪ Note: Tenure can be shortened, e.g., by death or
removal. But term is changed only by amendment.
Dimaporo seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office.
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not
be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period
during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure),
may be affected by circumstances xxx. Under the
questioned provision, when an elective official covered
thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office,
he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure not
his term. The term remains xxx.
Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office xxx.
It is not necessary that the other position be actually held.
The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in
Section 67, Art. IX of BP, Blg. 881, which is actually a mode
of voluntary renunciation of office under Sectiom 7(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution.
Petition dismissed.
The Court held that equal protection clause under the
Constitution is not absolute.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an
appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however
retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority
group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground
that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He
averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue
advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its
entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation
of the said law.
Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000
and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions
between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee
was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened
which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its
record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never
subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd
BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon
even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to
how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and
made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities
made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
SECTION 9
TOLENTINO vs. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, after her succession to the WN special election
COMELEC presidency in 2001, nominated Senator Guingona as Vice- validly held. – YES.
President, thus, leaving a vacancy in the Senate.
The Senate passed Resolution 84 calling on COMELEC to fill the
said vacancy through a special election to be held
SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular elections on May the same
year. 12 senators each with a 6-year term were to be elected.
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of officials
differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in
the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy
for any position other than those occupied by them.
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
was A special election to fill a vacant 3-year term Senate seat
was validly held on May 14 2001. Although COMELEC did
not comply with the requirements of RA 6645, either
strictly or substantially, it does not invalidate the special
election.
In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body
charged to administer the election.
 Resolution 84 provided that the candidate with the 13 th highest
number of votes shall serve for the unexpired term of former Sen.
Guingona (3 years).
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th in the polls. COMELEC issued
Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming the 12 senators (with
6-year terms) and the 13th senator (for the unexpired term).
Petitioners (Tolentino and Mojica) filed a petition for prohibition
against COMELEC, enjoining them from the final proclamation the
13th senator, and prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-005.
SECTION 11
PEOPLE vs. The Accused-Appellant Romeo Jalosjos is a full-fledged member WN the arrest of the accused-
JALOSJOS of Congress, convicted of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six appellant while the National
(6) counts of acts lasciviousness. Nevertheless, his conviction is Assembly in regular or special
pending appeal while he is confined in the New Bilibid Prison. session is invalid. – NO.
During the pendency of his appeal, he won a reelection bid as
Representative for the First District of Zamboanga Del Norte. As
such, he filed a motion to be allowed to discharge his mandate on
the grounds that his election win must be given priority over any
ruling.
Section 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already
provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the
special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. The law already charges the voters with
knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure
to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such
special election, much less invalidate it.
Moreover, there is no proof that the COMELEC’s failure
to give a formal notice of the Office to be filled and the
manner of determining the winner in the special
election actually misled voters and thereby changed
the results of the election. After all, the voters can be
duly notified through other sources such as media reports
and election propaganda during the campaign.
Special elections to fill a vacancy:
• Notice is not mandatory when statute fixes the
date and operates as the call for that election.
• Notice is mandatory when law does not fix time
and place but empowers some authority to fix it
after the happening of a condition precedent.
The Supreme Court held the immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily as Congressmen,
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication, or equitable considerations.
The ruling on Aguinaldo v. Santos whereby a public officer
cannot be removed from office for acts done prior to his
 present term of office, or the condonation doctrine, does
not apply to imprisonment for arising from the enforcement
of criminal law. It only applies to administrative removal of
a public officer.

In the present case, firstly, the Accused-Appellant has

been convicted for the crimes committed. Although
pending appeal, confinement is public self-defense
whereby society must protect itself. Secondly, the
Condonation Doctrine cannot be applied because the
case involves criminal offenses, not administrative
offenses. Finally, the election to the position of
Congressman or Representative is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.

With regard his mandate as member of the Congress,

Members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if reason for absence is
a legitimate one, more so a confinement for a crime
committed which is punishable by imprisonment of
more than 6 months. He cannot claim that he should be
free because of popular sovereignty and need of his
constituents to be represented.

Allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and

committee meetings virtually makes him a free man. Such
situation not only elevates Jalosjos' status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.
JIMENEZ vs. Respondent Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote 1. WN the publication in 1. The aforementioned publication does not fall
CABANGBANG an open letter to the President and caused the same to be question is a privileged within the purview of the phrase ―speech and
published in several newspapers of general circulation. communication. – NO. debate therein – that is to say in Congress – used
 2. WN it is libelous. – NO. in Art.VI, Sec.15 of the Constitution (now Section
The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including 11, Article VI).
petitioners Col. Jimenez et al., associating them in purported
operational plans for a coup d’état. Jimenez et al. instituted this Said expression refers to utterances made by
present action for recovery of damages for libel against Congressmen in the performance of their
Cabangbang. official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
In his defense, Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity Congress, while the same is in session as well as
averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art. VI, bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11) of the Constitution. in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized
to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not

belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November
14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not
in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member
of Congress or as officer of any Committee
thereof. Hence, the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.

2. It is true that the complaint alleges that an open

letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that is false and with the intent to impeach
plaintiff‘s reputation, to expose them to public

SECTION 14
PUYAT vs. DE Assemblyman Fernandez moved to intervene for Acero et al. in a WN in intervening in the SEC
GUZMAN case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, an Case, Assemblyman
administrative body) involving an intra-corporate dispute with Fernandez is, in effect,
Puyat et al. regarding the election of the directors of International appearing as counsel, albeit
Pipe Industries (IPI, a private corporation). indirectly, before
administrative body
Puyat et al. objected, averring it is in violation of Art VIII, Sec 11 contravention of
(now Article VI, Section 14) of the Constitution which bars Constitutional provision. –
assemblymen from appearing as counsel before any YES.
administrative body. On the basis of ownership of 10 shares of
stock of IPI, Fernandez alleged legal interest in the matter in
litigation. In view thereof, SEC granted Fernandez the motion.
Hence this petition. Reviewing the circumstances surrounding his
purchase of the shares, it was noted that he had acquired the mere
10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares on May 30, 1979—
after he has signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero
but was denied on constitutional ground, after the quo warranto
suit had been filed by Acero et al. on May 25, and one day before
the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31.
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to
alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter
and cannot prevail over the same, it being the
very basis of the complaint.
The very document upon which plaintiffs‘action is
based explicitly indicates that they might be
absolutely unaware of the alleged operational
plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools
of the planners. This statement is not derogatory
to the plaintiffs to the point of entitling them to
recover damages.
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the
Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
an ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
in
the However, certain salient circumstances militate against
the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had
acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He
acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979,
after the contested election of Directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified
his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but
which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation.
 Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an
indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative
body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is
to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended
to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent
Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez
leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set
aside.
SECTION 16
DEFENSOR- On the first regular session of the 11 th Congress, Senators Fernan WN Guingona unlawfully usurp The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number
SANTIAGO vs. and Tatad contested for the Senate Presidency. Fernan won by a the position of Minority Leader of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total
GUINGONA vote of 20 to 2. With the agreement of Senator Santiago, Tatad in the view that Article VI, or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than
manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader Section 16(1) of the half or more than half of any total." The plain and
explaining that those who had voted for Fernan comprised the Constitution was not observed. unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
majority, while those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, – NO. simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
belonged to the minority. votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineatewho comprise the
However, the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDF senators had chosen "majority", much less the "minority," in the said body. And
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Later, Fernan formally there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
recognized Guingona as such. had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

Senators Santiago and Tatad of the People’s Reform Party then Hence, while the Constitution mandates that the
instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that President of the Senate must be elected by a number
 Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad.
They assert the definition of “majority” in Article VI, Section 16(1)
of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1) voted for
the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan (the elected Senate President), belongs to the “majority.”
In view thereof, they assert Article VI, Section 16(1) has not been
observed in the selection of the Minority Leader.
BAGUILAT vs. Prior to the Election of the Speaker of the House of
ALVAREZ Representatives, the then acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and
Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former:
(a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong
to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates
shall belong to the Minority;
(b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and
(c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the
members of the Minority.
The Elections for the Speakership were held:
▪ 252 Members voting for Speaker Alvarez
▪ 8 voting for Rep. Baguilat
▪ 7 voting for Rep. Suarez
▪ 21 abstaining, and
WN respondents may be
compelled via a writ of
mandamus to recognize Rep.
Baguilat as the Minority Leader
of the House of
Representatives. – NO.
constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is
that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." The method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
From the records, Rep. Farinas, before the Speakership
election, articulated the process for who shall belong
to the Majority and the Minority.
▪ Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the
House proceeded without any objection.
▪ Notably, the election of the Speaker is the essential
and formative step conducted at the first regular
session of the 17th Congress to determine the
constituency of the Majority and Minority,
considering that the Majority would be comprised
of those who voted for the winning Speaker and
the Minority of those who did not.
▪ The unobjected procession of the House at this
juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July
25, 2016, which is conclusive as to what
transpired in Congress.
 ▪ 1 registering a no vote
Thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker
of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that
Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light
of:
(a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority
Leader; and
(b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to
said Minority Leader position. For his part, Rep. Suarez
maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal
matter to the House of Representatives.
Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal
matters of a co-equal branch of the government.
AVELINO vs. Senators Tañada and Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating
CUENCO charges against the petitioner Senate President Avelino and
ordering an investigation thereof. During the session day when
Sen. Tañada was supposed to have his privilege speech, all
members of the Senate were present except two Senators (Sen.
Sotto was confined in a hospital and Sen. Confesor was in the US).
When the session was called to order, Sen. Tañada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour speech but Sen.
President Avelino kept on ignoring him, and announced that he
Under Sec. 16(1) of Art. VI, the Speaker shall be elected
by a majority vote of the House’s entire membership. It
also states that the House may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and
manner as to how these officers are chosen is
something within its sole control. In Defensor-Santiago
case, it was ruled: while the Constitution is explicit on the
manner of electing a Speaker, it is, however, dead silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers.
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3) of Art. VI vests in the
House the sole authority to “determine the rules of its
proceedings.” These rules are procedural and internal in
nature. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. As
such, courts will observe the rule of separation of powers
absent any GADALEJ (grave abuse of …) on the part of
the House.
Hence, the House deviate from the legal bases of the
petitioners, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of
automatically awarding the Minority Leadership to the
second placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep.
Baguilat; […]
** kaya hindi pwede yung contention ni petitioner na
second placer dapat ang maging Minority leader.
1. WN the rump session 1. A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving
a continuation of the the Hall, prevent the other 12 senators from
morning session. – passing a resolution that met with their
YES. unanimous endorsement.
2. Supposing the rump 2. In view of Sen. Confesor’s absence from the
session was not a country, for all practical considerations, he
continuation of the may not participate in the Senate deliberations.
morning session, was Therefore, an absolute majority of all the members
there a quorum when of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
Sen. Avelino was constitutional majority of the Senate for the
 would order the arrest of anyone who would speak without being
previously recognized. A commotion broke out. A move for
adjournment was opposed. Suddenly, Sen. President Avelino
banged his gavel and walked out of the session hall followed by
his followers (leaving only 12 senators in the hall).
Thereafter, senators who remained went on with the session (so-
called “rump session”), and voted to declare vacant the position
of the Senate President and designated respondent Sen. Cuenco
as the Acting Senate President.
In this petition, Sen. Avelino prays for the Court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and to oust respondent Sen. Cuenco.
OSMEÑA vs. Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
PENDATUN verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution
No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground
of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. He also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be
ousted and Sen. purpose of a quorum; that is, 12 senators in this
Cuenca was elected case constitute a quorum. Even if the 12 did not
as the Senate constitute a quorum, they could have ordered
President? – YES. the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members. If one had been so arrested, there
would be no doubt [that there is a quorum] then,
and Sen. Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as, at most, only 11 will side with
Sen. Avelino. It would be most injudicious [then] to
declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate.
Notes:
▪ For unparliamentary conduct, members of
Congress could be censured, committed to prison,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
Hence, absence from the country or arrest renders
the Senator NOT a part of “majority of the House.”
▪ When the Constitution declares that a majority of
“each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the
House” does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members may constitute
“the House.” There is a difference between a
majority of “the House,” the latter requiring less
number than the first.
▪ Coercive jurisdiction – in this case, the base used
was the number of members present in the
Philippines.
WN the House of The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
Representatives discipline its behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
members pursuant to Section conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
16(3) of Article VI of the depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
Constitution. – YES. House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the
Courts.
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the
portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
of bribery against then President Garcia with the admonition that if
he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule
XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business
has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The Special Committee during the pendency of his petition, found
said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House
approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended
from office for 15 months.
Rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.
Privileged speech does not protect legislators from
responsibility before the House itself when words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
The disciplinary action taken by Congress against a
member is NOT subject to judicial review because
each House is the sole judge of what disorderly conduct
is.
The parliamentary immunity of members of Congress
is NOT absolute. While parliamentary immunity
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible before the courts
or any other forum outside of Congressional Hall, it does
NOT protect him (her) from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress
can be censured, committed to prison, suspended,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
Is preventive suspension considered an interruption
of a term? (NO)
Preventive suspension is NOT considered "interruption" of
a term under Sec. 8, Art. X and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be considered an
interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended official's
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent

US vs. PONS The respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were charged
with illegal importation of opium (addictive drug). Pons and Beliso
were tried separately on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet
been arrested. Each was found guilty of the crime, charged and
sentenced accordingly. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
Respondent‘s motion alleged to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th
day of February, that Act No. 2381 under which Pons must be
punished if found guilty, was not passed nor approved on the
28th of February but on March 1 of that year.
Also, counsel for Pons alleged that the Assembly‘s clock was
stopped on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters among
which was Act NO. 2381 to prove aid allegations, counsel argued
the court to go beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as
recorded in the journals.
WN the Court can go beyond
the recitals in the Journals to
determine if Act No. 2381 was
indeed made a law on
February 28, 1914. – NO.
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one
since no vacancy exists.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
the existence of the "official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands… shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof;
but the court may receive evidence upon any of the
subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its
aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.
While the court can look into the journals to ascertain
the date of the adjournment, it cannot go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals
are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when
they are, as the Court has said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.

Courts accept legislative journals as conclusive evidence.

To inquire into the veracity of legislative journals

would be to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Journals may be notice by the courts in determining the

question whether a particular bill became a law or not.
ARROYO vs. DE HB 7198 was transmitted by the House of Representatives to the WN RA 8240 is First, it is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
VENECIA Senate and was thereafter approved with amendments. Upon unconstitutional because it alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A.
being sent back to the HoR, Rep. Albano moved to ratify the No 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
bicameral conference committee report. Deputy Speaker Daza was passed in violation of the
approved Albano’s motion after apparently hearing no objection Rules of the House. – NO.
thereto.
Notably, Arroyo did not request to be recognized in accordance to
the House Rules. The Deputy Speaker then called the session
adjourned upon Albano’s motion notwithstanding the pending
query of Arroyo.
Petitioners aver these are violative of the Rules of the House and
that RA 8240, the law which evolved from HB 7198, is thereby null
and void. Petitioners contend that the Rules embody the
“constitutional mandate” in Art. VI Section 16(3) that “each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that consequently,
violation of House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself.
House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI, Secs. 26-27. The
Constitution provides that ―each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings. The prevailing
view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. We have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of
H.B. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment. Where there is no evidence to the
contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to
determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to
pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not
been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the
courts."
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law
in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference

CASCO vs. Central Bank issued a memorandum which fixed a uniform margin WN the phrase urea
GIMENEZ fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions with exemptions to, formaldehyde as used in the
among others, urea formaldehyde. statute should be read as urea
and formaldehyde. – NO.
Petitioner Casco Phil. Chem. Co. (Casco Co.) bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid
margin fees. Relying on said memorandum, Casco Co. sought
refund but was refused on the ground that urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord to the provision “urea
formaldehyde”.
Casco Co. argued however that Congress intended to exempt
“urea” and “formaldehyde” claiming that the bill approved in
Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms
“urea” and “formaldehyde”.
In support, it cited the individual statements of the Members of the
Congress before their respective Houses during the consideration
of the bill.
ASTORGA vs. House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of WN RA 4065 was validly
VILLEGAS Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made enacted. – NO.
substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The
House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its
committee report on H.B. No. 7198, which became R.A.
No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4).
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
The Court said that “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a
finished product which is patently distinct and different
from “urea” and “formaldehyde” as used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin (ingredients)
known as “urea formaldehyde.”
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and”
between the term “urea” and “formaldehyde”, not the latter
as a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof.
Individual statements made by Members of the House
[documented in the Journal] do not necessarily reflect the
view of the House. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President. If there
has been any mistake in the printing of a bill xxx the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it
is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject
approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and
attested to the bill.
The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it
did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
by the Senate.
Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their
signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner
argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can
be looked upon in this case.
As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein,
the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is
supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate
that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
Function of an attestation is not of approval, but
merely a mode of authentication that bill being
presented to Chief Executive has been duly approved
by Congress and is ready for approval or rejection.
ESSENTIAL: The approval by Congress, NOT the
signatures of the presiding officers.
If the attestation is absent, courts may resort to journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
Enrolled bill shall prevail in the event of any
discrepancy.
Probative weight: The certification it receives from the
officers of the legislature; hence, when Speaker of the
House, Senate President, and the President withdrew
their signatures in the enrolled bill, it was STRIPPED OFF
of its probative value and had to yield to the version found
in the journal.
 SECTION 17
BONDOC vs. • Emigdio Bondoc, a member of Nacionalista Party, and WN the House of
PINEDA Marciano Pineda, a member of Laban Demokratikong Representatives could change
Pilipino, were rival candidates for the position of its representatives in the
Representative for the 4th District of Province of HRET at the request of the
Pampanga. dominant party. – NO.
• Pineda (LDP) was proclaimed as the winner of the election;
Bondoc (NP) filed for protest with the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal.
• The HRET ruled in favor of Bondoc because of the
increase of vote by 23. The LDP insisted for a recount.
▪ Recount: Bondoc’s votes increased from 23 to 107
votes.
▪ Congressman Camasura (member of the LDP) voted
and proclaimed Bondoc as the winner. Moved by
candor and honesty, Camasura revealed the final tally.
• Before the promulgation of Bondoc, Camasura’s
membership with the HRET was withdrawn on the ground
that he was expelled by the LDP Davao Del Sur chapter.
• As such, the decision could not be promulgated since
without Congressman Camasura’s vote, the decision lacks
the concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of
the Tribunal.
The HRET shall remain a non-political body.
The court held that the use of the word "sole" in both
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of
the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive
jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge
of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990).
The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan
court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It
is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission
applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial.
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent
and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of
members of the National Assembly is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
 jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election
contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and

independent of the legislature and though not a power
in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority,
an independent organ; while composed of a majority of
members of the legislature it is a body separate form and
independent of the legislature.

Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be

terminated except for a just cause, such as:
ANGARA vs. The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Article VI 1. WN the Court has
ELECTORAL Section 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 17) which jurisdiction over the
COMMISSION conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all contests Electoral Commission
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members and the subject matter
of the National Assembly.” of the controversy. –
YES.
The National Assembly (NA) passed Resolution 8 confirming the
election of petitioner Angara as member of the NA on December 2. WN the Electoral
3, 1935. On December 9, 1935, the respondent Electoral Commission acted
Commission formally organized for the first time and resolved to without or in excess of
fix the same date as the final day of filing of election protests. its jurisdiction in
assuming to the
Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his cognizance of the
election protest before the Electoral Commission on the same protest filed the
election of the herein
▪ Expiration of member's congressional term
▪ Death
▪ Permanent disability
▪ Resignation from political party he represents in
tribunal
▪ Formal affiliation with another political party
Removal for other valid cause.
1. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.
In the case at bar, here then is presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a
grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. The Electoral
Commission is a constitutional organ created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral Commission from petitioner contests relating to the election, returns and
taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion. notwithstanding the qualifications of the members of the National
Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the Commission’s previous confirmation Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission
jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of such election of such election by may not be interfered with, when and while acting
contests. Morever, the Commission can regulate the proceedings resolution of the within the limits of its authority, it does not follow
of election protests only if the NA has not availed of its primary National Assembly. – that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional
power to so regulate such proceedings. NO. mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions.

The Electoral Commission is not a separate

department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers
and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases.

Upon principle, reason and authority, we are

clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts
of the present case, this court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject
mater of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

2. It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the

origin and history of this constitutional provision
and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and
significance.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional
creation, invested with the necessary authority
in the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly.

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly

confirming the election of members against whom
no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, cannot be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the
initiation of election contests. While there might
have been good reason for the legislative practice
of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide
election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission
of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time
for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation
by the National Assembly of the returns of its
members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.

GARCIA vs. HRET • On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period
from respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly
elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila,
petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET against
Congressman Harry Angping.
• Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman
Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives,
claiming that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a constitutional requirement.
• On June 10, 1998, however, the HRET issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay
the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules.
• After receiving a copy of the Resolution, petitioners paid
the P5,000.00 cash deposit on June 26, 1998 and attached
the corresponding receipt to the Motion for
Reconsideration they filed with the HRET on the same day.
• Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which
required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees
for quo warranto cases.
• Hence, the instant petition.
WN the HRET has committed
grave abuse of discretion in
summarily dismissing the
petition for quo warranto of
petitioners and in refusing to
reinstate the same even after
the payment of the required
(P5,000.00) cash deposit. –
NO.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that
the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
Imperative justice requires proper observance of
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and
swift dispensation.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET (look at the
provision kasi baka tanungin ni Mano) provides that in
addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo warranto
proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.
It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the
required cash deposit; but after their petition was
summarily dismissed by the HRET for such non-
payment, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid
the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash
deposit, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of the
dismissal.
The cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is
fixed, i.e., P5,000.00. It does not vary nor can it be
varied; it is required to be paid together with the filing
fee at the time the petition is filed.

ABBAS vs. SENATE Petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including
ELECTORAL Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of
TRIBUNAL the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated
with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of
SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before
that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of therespondents in the
same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a
Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of
the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T.
Paterno, another respondent in the same contest, thereafter, filed
his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for
disqualification or inhibition.
WN Senators-Members of the
Electoral Tribunal may be
compelled to inhibit
themselves from hearing the
contest (or dapat daw ba ma
disqualify sila). – NO.
Petitioners herein, Perla Garcia, Paz Cruz and Geraldine
Padernal, filed their petition for quo warranto on May
29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit of
P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was
after the dismissal of the petition and only after an
unreasonable delay of twenty eight (28) days.
Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted
judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It
was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly
authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of
discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal
basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the Tribunal.
HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
applying its Rules strictly.
Disqualifying all Senator members of the Electoral
Tribunal on the ground that they were respondents in
the contest filed by the opposition party, would leave
Tribunal to abandon its duty that no other court or
body can perform.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative"
components commonly share the duty and authority
of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Senators.
Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that
the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 —
an unmistakable indication that the "legislative
component" cannot be totally excluded from participation
 Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments
were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards
issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of
public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and
that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a
solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent
Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest
being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) —
requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members
shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one
(1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
PIMENTEL et al. vs. Following the 1998 elections, the House of Representative (the
HRET House) constituted its HRET and Commission on Appointments
(CA) contingent. Following the customary practice, the contingents composition of the HRET and
to the HRET and the CA were nominated by their respective
political parties.
The party-list groups did not nominate any of their NO.
representatives to the HRET or the CA. Thus, the HRET and CA
contingents were composed solely of district reps. Petitioner Sen.
Pimentel wrote a letter to the Chairman of the HRET and another
to the Chairman of the CA89 requesting the restructuring of the
WN the Court may rule on the
issue of whether or not the
the CA violate the
constitutional requirement of
proportional representation. –
in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a
case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests
or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
The House is granted by the Constitution under
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI the discretion to choose
its members to the HRET and the CA.
Thus, the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives clearly rests with the House of
Representative and not with this Court. Only if the
House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political
parties can the party-list reps seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review. But in this case, the
 HRET and the CA, respectively, to include party-list reps to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
No positive action was done on the letters, hence this petition.
Pimentel was joined by 5 party-list reps as co-petitioners.
Considering the current House composition, petitioners insist that
the party-list reps should have at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2
seats in the CA, and that LP was overrepresented by 1 seat in both
the HRET and the CA.
Petitioners thus raise the issue on whether or not the composition
of the HRET and the CA violate the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation.
GUERRERO vs. Rodolfo C. Fariñas was elected Congressman in the May 11, 1998
COMELEC elections. He took his oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives on June 3, 1998. However, a petition to disqualify
Fariñas as a candidate for the elective office of Congressman,
claiming that his Certificate of Candidacy was fatally defective,
was haunting the COMELEC. And when the COMELEC ruled that
the determination of the validity of the Certificate of Candidacy of
Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), this petition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed.
**Ni-refuse ni COMELEC na i-rule yung validity/invalidity ng
Candidacy ni Fariñas.
WN the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the determination
of the validity of the certificate
of candidacy of respondent
Fariñas is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives (HRET). –
NO.
party-list representative were not prevented from
participating in the election of HRET and CA contingents;
they simply refrained from doing so. [Thus, there can be
no violation of the Constitutional directive].
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently,
petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature.
Moreover, for the Court to interfere with the exercise
by the House of its discretion in this instance, absent a
clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Note: Party-list representatives are NOT prohibited
from designating nominees in HRET and CA but must first
show to the House that they possess required numerical
strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and CA.
HRET and CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute
themselves.
While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare
valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to
exercise that power following the proclamation and
assumption to the position of Congressman by
Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
(HRET).
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET
has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives.

VINZONS-CHATO vs. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and Renato Unico were candidates for WN the COMELEC have
COMELEC representative of the lone legislative district of Camarines Norte. jurisdiction to hear and rule on
During the canvass of the votes, Vinzons-Chato raised several Chato’s protest. – NO.
objections in certain elections returns. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers continued with the canvass of the votes, which were
then forwarded to the Provincial BOC.
On May 14, 2004, the PBOC proclaimed Unico as the duly elected
representative of Camarines Norte. Vinzons-Chato raised the
matter with the Comelec, which was dismissed on the ground
that “Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not
only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral
tribunal.”
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
HOR, COMELEC's jurisdiction ends, and HRET's
jurisdiction begins.
Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue
exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in
deference to the HRET's own jurisdiction and functions.
Electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction is not limited to
constitutional qualifications. The reason for this ruling is
self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a
clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with
due regard to the people's mandate.
The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by
the term "constitutional." Evaluation of qualifications (e.g.
CoC) is still within HRET's or SET's jurisdiction.
Note: NOT a contest involving qualification but a contest
involving election over which the HRET has jurisdiction.
The Comelec had lost jurisdiction upon respondent
Unico’s proclamation and oath-taking as a Member of the
House of Representatives.
The constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its members must be upheld.
JURISDICTION OF HRET IS EXCLUSIVE. It is the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of its members. The
use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
 Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

Note: Jurisdictiom of HRET

▪ Election: conduct of the polls, including the listing
of voters, holding of electoral campaign, and
casting and counting of votes
▪ Returns: canvass of returns and proclamation of
winners, including questions concerning
composition of board of canvassers and
authenticity of election returns
▪ Qualifications: matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

Note: Re-count of ballots is NOT within the province of

pre-proclamation controversy (which is the jurisdiction of
COMELEC).
LIMKAICHONG vs. Limkaichong rans as a representative in the 1 st district of Negros 1. WN the proclamation of 1. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
COMELEC Oriental, with Paras as her rival. Paras, together with other Limkaichong as the Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,
concerned citizens, filed a disqualification case against winning candidate is Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En
Limkaichong. They alleged that she was not a natural born citizen valid. – YES. Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as
of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still for the lifting of the incorporated directive
a Chinese, although her mom was a Filipino, also lost her 2. WN COMELEC should suspending her proclamation. The filing of the
citizenship by virtue of marriage. When the case was still pending still exercise motion for reconsideration effectively suspended
in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), election still jurisdiction over the the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint
continued and votes were casted. matter. – NO. Resolution.

The results showed that Limkaichong won over her rival, Paras. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint
COMELEC, after due hearing declared Limkaichong disqualified, Resolution was suspended, there was no
at about 2 days after the counting of votes. On the following days impediment to the valid proclamation of
however, notwithstanding their proclamation discqualifying Limkaichong as the winner.
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the conducted elections. This is in Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy Procedure provides:
guidelines of not suspending theproclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases. Paras then petitioned before the
COMELEC, regarding its proclamation.
Limkaichong, on the other hand argued that the Commission
had already proclaimed her as winner, and with that,
COMELEC could no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) which should exercise jurisdiction from then
on, not the COMELEC. Thus, the COMELEC agreed.
Note: Mere allegation as to the invalidity of proclamation
does NOT divest Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for
Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution for implementation
of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
2. HRET must exercise jurisdiction after
Limkaichong's proclamation. The Supreme
Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives (HOR), the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and disqualification ends.
With that, the HRET's own jurisdiciton begins. It
follows that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning COMELEC's
proclamation should now present his case before
the HRET, which is the constitutionally mandated
tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 250 of the OEC underscores, the word
"sole" is used to emphasize the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.
 SECTION 18
DAZA vs. SINGSON Herein petitioner Raul A. Daza was chosen and listed as WN the replacement of Daza
representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on in the CA in accordance with
Appointments (CA). the proportional representation
of parties contemplated in
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino Article VI, Section 18 of the
(LDP) was reorganized. Twenty four (24) members of the Liberal Constitution. – YES.
Party resigned and joined the LDP. Based on this, the House of
Representative revised its representation in the CA by
withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the LDP member Luis C. Singson.
The petitioner argued that he cannot be removed from CA
because his election thereto is permanent. He further
contended that LDP is not a duly registered political party and
has not yet attained political stability because it was just
established recently.
In the first place, the Commission on Election has already
approved the petition of the LDP for registration as political
party.
Under Daza’s theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House would still not be entitled
to representation in the CA as long as it was organized
only recently and has not yet “aged.” LP itself would fall
in such a category. Yet no question was raised as to its
right to be represented in the CA xxx by virtue of its status
as the majority party xxx. At that time it was only 4 months
old.
It is true that there have been, and there still are, some
internal disagreements among the members of LDP, but
these are to be expected in any political organization and
it surely cannot be considered temporary because of such
discord. We resolve in favor of the authority of the House
of Representative to change its representation in the CA
to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood
that such changes must be permanent and do not include
the temporary alliances.
Note:
▪ Representation in the CA – based on
proportional representation. Its members
nominated and elected by each House (not by
their respective political parties).
▪ HRET has authority to change its
representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes
that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership.

COSETENG vs. When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized it
MITRA formed the new majority in the House of Representative. The 80%
of the membership of the House then belonged to LDP. The next
largest party in the Coalesced Majority was the Liberal Party (LP).
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was the principal opposition
party. Thus, the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments (CA) had to be reorganized. CA then composed of
11 members from the LDP, 1 from LP and another from KBL.
Petitioner Coseteng of KAIBA then wrote a letter to Speaker
Mitra requesting that she be appointed as a member of the
Commission and the House Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner contested the validity of their election to the CA on the
theory that their election was violative of the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation. She also argues that the
members representing the political parties must be
nominated and elected by their respective political parties.
She alleges further that she is qualified to sit in the CA having the
support of 9 other house representatives of the minority.
▪ Changes must be permanent and do NOT
include temporary alliances or factional divisions
not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
WN the election to the CA After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the
violative of Article VI, Section respondents, we hold that the petition should be
18. – NO. dismissed not because it raises a political question which
does not, but because the revision of the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments is
based on proportional representation of the political
parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
The composition of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was based on a
proportional representation of the political parties in the
House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House.
They represent 79% of the House membership. 88% of 12
members in the Commission would equal to 9 members,
which may be rounded off to 10 members from the LDP.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition
party, its lone member represents only 4% of less than 1%
of the House membership. Hence she is not entitled to one
of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments.
Notes:
▪ The composition of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments is based on
proportional representation of the political parties
in the House.
▪ Other political parties or groups in the House are
bound by the majority's choices.
▪ To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party

GUINGONA vs, As a result of the national elections held last May 1992, the Senate
GONZALES is composed of the following members representing the political
affiliation:
LDP – 15 Senators (7.5)
NPC – 5 senators (2.5)
LAKAS-NUCD – 3 senators (1.5)
LP-PDP-LABAN – 1 senator (.5).
On September 23, 1992, Senator Guingona filed a petition to
prohibit respondents Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada
from sitting and assuming the position of members of the
Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senator Neptali
Gonzales from allowing respondents to sit as members
thereof on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator
Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation as enunciated in Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
WN the constitutional rule on
proportional representation in
the CA violated when LDP
rounded up its membership by
1/2 a seat. – YES.
should represent at least 8.4% of the House
membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect
at least 17 congresswo/men.
▪ House members in Commission on Appointments
are elected by the House, NOT by their parties.
▪ Coseteng minority: 9 supporters; not same
party, invalid
In converting the fractional 1/2 membership into a
whole, one other party’s fractional membership is
made greater while the other suffers diminution of its
rightful membership.
The provision of Section 18 of Article VI on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the Senate to disobey or disregard
the rule on proportional representation.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not contemplate that
the CA must necessarily include 12 senators and 12
members of the House of Reps to function. Although CA
rules by a majority vote of all its members (Article VI,
Section 18), evidently in Article VI, Section 19 all that is
required for the CA to function.
Notes:
• Commissions perform their functions so long as
there is the required quorum.
▪ Quorum: at least 13 members present
provided that at least 4 of the members
constituting the quorum should come from
either House
• 12 senators and 12 representatives is not
mandatory, proportional representation is;
guidelines are as follows:
 ▪ In the Senate, a political party or coalition
must have at least 2 duly elected senators
for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments.
▪ Where there are more than 2 political parties
represented in the Senate, a political party or
coalition with single senator in the Senate
CANNOT constitutionally claim a seat in the
Commission.
▪ Entitlement to proportional representation
requires a minimum membership in each
House.
▪ Does not and should not be construed to
mean that all political parties, irrespective of
numerical representation in the Senate are
entitled to at least 1 representative in the
Commission.
• Minority party in Commission on
Appointments
▪ Opposition has lone member: by force of
circumstance, he or she becomes a member
of the Commission of Appointments because
he or she alone represented the minor party
▪ Opposition has 2 members: rule of
proportional representation applies where
opposition is entitled to one full member
• Function of Commission on Appointments
▪ Confirm nominations or appointments
submitted by President
▪ Intended to serve as an administrative check
on the appointing authority of the President
▪ Shall act on all appointments submitted to it
within 30 session days of Congress and should
rule on a majority vote.
 SECTION 21
BENGZON vs. The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against WN such inquiry is within the
SENATE BLUE Kokoy Romualdez, et al., in connection with ill-gotten wealth. power of the Congress to
RIBBON conduct investigation. – NO.
COMMITTEE During the pendency of the case, there were rumors that the
properties involve in the case were already being disposed of by
Romualdez. Senator Enrile in his privilege speech before the
Senate called the attention of the Senate regarding the matter.
On motion of Senator Mecado, the matter was referred to the
Committee on Acountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Committee). The committee subpoenaed petitioner who was
also one of the defendants in said case. Petitioner declined to
testify on the ground that his testimony might unduly
prejudice the defendants. The committee continued in its
inquiry, thus the present petition for prohibition to restrain
respondent from investigating.
The committee commented that the Court cannot properly inquire
into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative
investigations in aid of legislation under this doctrine of separation
of power. Petitioners contend that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not
done in aid of legislation.
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the
rights of persons appearing in such inquiries shall be
respected, the petitioner’s right to due process and
right against self-incrimination must be respected. It
appears that the contemplated inquiry by the
Committee is not really “in aid of legislation” xxx since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President (Lopa) had violated the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter within the
province of the courts rather than the legislature. Petition
to prohibit the Committee from compelling the petitioners
to testify before it, granted.
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. Questions in aid of legislation, the sum total of
information gathered therefrom, must be pertinent to the
subject matter in inquiry. It is not necessary that every
question be pertinent to any proposed legislation.
The contempt power of the legislative body extends to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that
body (i.e. at the adjournment of the last session)
Notes:
• Power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is NOT absolute, it is
circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI.
• In aid of legislation:
▪ May refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with
any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation.
*mandatory in comparison to Section 22’s
“question hour”
 ▪ Issue sought to be investigated by respondent
Committee is one over which jurisdiction had
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan.

Baremblatt vs. US: “Congress ... cannot inquire

into matters which are within the exclusive
province of one of the other branches of the
government.”

• Investigation must be "in aid of legislation in

accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected."
▪ Rights...shall be respected refers to Bill of
Rights! and the right against self-incrimination
and unreasonable searches and seizures and
the right to demand, under due process, that
Congress observe its own rules.
SENATE BLUE
RIBBON
COMMITTEE vs.
MAJADUCON
SABIO vs. GORDON
STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK
vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE IN
BANKS
ARNAULT vs,
NAZARENO
ARNAULT vs.
BALAGTAS
BALAG vs. SENATE
ABAKADA
PARTYLIST vs.
PURISIMA
SECTION 22
SENATE vs. ERMITA
NERI vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE