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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA , SAN DIEGO

In 8/16 :49 Mui

3 1822 02188 8680
Z
UNITED STATES-UGANDA RELATIONS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON
AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY- FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 1 , 2, 9, 22 ; APRIL 6 AND 26, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

DEPOSITORY ITEM

REC'D

JUL 3 - 1978
1 1 06 8ARY
THAL
S0OCUMENTS DEPT.
UCSD
 UNITED STATES -UGANDA RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA , SAN DIEGO

3 1822 02188 8680

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON
AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 1 , 2, 9, 22 ; APRIL 6 AND 26, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

26-826 WASHINGTON : 1978
 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin , Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN , North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD , Michigan
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida EDWARD J. DERWINSKI , Illinois
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR. , Michigan PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
LEE H. HAMILTON , Indiana LARRY WINN, JR. , Kansas
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN , New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
GUS YATRON , Pennsylvania ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
MICHAEL HARRINGTON , Massachusetts WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
LEO J. RYAN , California SHIRLEY N. PETTIS , California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER , Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON , California
WYCHE FOWLER , JR ., Georgia
E ( KIKA ) DE LA GARZA, Texas
GEORGE E. DANIELSON , California
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH , Nebraska
JOHN J. BRADY, Jr. , Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR. , Ohio
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR. , Alabama
DON BONKER, Washington
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HERSCHELLE S. CHALLENOR , Subcommittee Staff Director
THOMAS E. POPOVICH , Minority Staff Consultant
JUANITA M. TERRY, Subcommittee Staff Associate
NATHANIEL FIELDS, Subcommittee Stafi A880ciate
SARAH LISENBY , Staft Assistant

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

DONALD M. FRASER , Minnesota , Chairman
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING , Pennsylvania
LEE H. HAMILTON , Indiana
LEO J. RYAN, Indiana
ROBERT B. BOETTCHER, Subcommittee Staff Director
THOMAS R. SMEETON , Minority Staff Consultant
John P. SALZBERG, Staff Consultant
MARGARET E. GALEY, Subcommittee Staff A88ociate
ESTRELLITA JONES, Subcommittee Staf A880ciate
JOSEPHINE WEBER, Staf A88istant

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York, Chairman
ANDY IRELAND , Florida CHARLES W. WHALEN , JR., Ohio
WYCHE FOWLER, JR. , Georgia PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
E ( KIKA ) DE LA GARZA, Texas
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH , Nebraska
R. ROGER MAJAK , Subcommittee Staff Director
THOMAS E. POPOVICH , Minority Staf Cons:Itant
VICTOR C. JOHNSON, Subcommittee Staff Associate
PAULA BELKNAP, Subcommittee Staff Associate
CAROL PAGE ROVNER, Staff Assistant
( II )
 CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Wednesday, February 1, 1978 :

William J. Butler, chairman, executive committee, International Com- Page
mission of Jurists .-- 4
Hon. Henry Kyemba, former Minister of Health , Government of
Uganda 15
Carlos Russell, professor of African studies, Brooklyn College, City
University of New York - 23
Remigius Kintu, executive secretary, Committee on Uganda, Arling
ton, Va ----- 29
Thursday, February 2, 1978 :
Hon . William C. Harrop, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 59
African Affairs, Department of State --
Rauer H. Meyer, Director, Office of Export Administration, Depart
ment of Commerce . 63
Hon. Donald J. Pease, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Ohio . 65
Thursday, February 9, 1978 :
Hon . Julius L. Katz, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business
Affairs, Department of State - 98
Hon. Jim Mattox, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas - 123
George E. Boecklin , president, NationalCoffee Association of U.S.A., 132
Inc., New York, N.Y.
Donald J. Mulvihill, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, Washington, D.C .-- 137
Wednesday, February 22, 1978 :
Hon. Thomas Patrick Melady, president, Sacred Heart University,
Connecticut... 144
Hon. G. Lukongwa Binaisa, chairman , Uganda Freedom Union . 146
Ali A. Mazrui, professor of political science, University of Michigan . 188
Thursday, April 6, 1978:
Hon . Mark O. Hatfield , a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon.- . 221
Andrew J. Schroder, vice president for public affaifs, General Foods 232
Corp
John Lankester , division manager, buying department, the Procto
and Gamble Co .-- 235
John C. K. Buckley, vice president of purchasing, the Nestle Co., Inc. 237
Paul J. Miller, president, Hills Brothers Coffee, Inc.- 238
James H. Drum , vice president for government affairs, A.M. General
Corp--- 244
Hon. James V. Stanton, legal counsel, Harris Corp 245
John P. Innes, corporate legal counsel, Grumman American Aviation
Corp --- 252
Alexander H. Lorch, executive vice president, Lockheed -Georgia Co., 254
and vice president, Lockheed Corp.- .
Robert K. Danning, president, International Technical and Industrial
Trade Co.- 255
George Galerstein , chief legal counsel, Bell Hellicopter Textron . 269
Michael Madigan , legalcounsel, Page Gulfstream , Inc.- 271
Gerald D. Morgan , Jr., legal counsel, Ronair, Inc. 275
Wednesday, April 26, 1978 ( joint subcommittee markup ; no witnesses). 287
( III )
 IV

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Page
Comparison of United States policies toward Uganda and South Africa,
submitted by the Department of State--, 73
Statement on precedents where the United States has closed its Embassy
and withdrawn its personnel from a country but allowed that country to
maintain an Embassy and personnel in the United States, submitted
by the Department of State . 82
Statement concerning instructions to United States representatives to
international financial institutions regarding loans to Uganda, submitted
by the Department of State -- 86
Statement on United States humanitarian assistance to Ugandan refugees,
submitted by the Department of State . 92
Statement on foreign economic assistance to Uganda, submitted by the
Department of State .. 94
Statement on Ugandan exiles in the United States from the Department
of State .. 95
Letter to Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham from Hon. Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State,
concerning assets ofthe Government and nationals of Uganda and South
Africa in the United States 103
Statement of views of other Western countries which have significant trade
relations with Uganda, submitted by the Department of State 108
Statement of administration intent in discontinuing the Clinch River
breeder reactor program , submitted by the Department of State 114
Statement on actions with respect to economic sanctions against the
Dominican Republic, submitted bythe Department of State --- 114
Statement of position on proposed Uganda resolution, submitted by the
Department of State .. 119
Letter to the Speaker of the House from Hon . Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. ,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State,
conveying an invitation to Members of Congress to visit Uganda .. 121
“ Amin Warns Americans Against Anti-Ugandan Activity,'' text of radio
broadcast monitored by the Department of State 128
Letter to Hon. Donald J. Pease from Stephen F. Kahl, E. A. Kahl & Co.,
Inc., San Francisco, Calif., expressing views on economic sanctions - 141

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD

Statement of Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, a Representative in Congress

from the State of Illinois---- 163
Statement of Hon . Robert J. Lagomarsino, a Representative in Congress 167
from the State of California .
Statement of Hon . Robert K. Dornan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California 169
Chart showing real growth rates of member nations of World Bank . 174
Letter to Hon. Donald J. Pease from Sister Andrea Lee, president, Na
tional Coalition of American Nuns, expressing views on proposed legis 176
lation
Letter to Hon . Donald J. Pease from Howard Schomer, world issues
secretary, United Church Board for World Ministries, conveying the
board's resolution with respect to Uganda 177 -
Letter to Hon . Donald J. Pease from Řev . David B. Birney, staff officer,
overseas personnel, Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, convey
ing a resolution and statement with respect to Uganda --- 178
Letter to Hon . Donald J. Pease from Rev. Paul M. Washington, The
Church of the Advocate, expressing views on proposed legislation . 180
Press release of B'Nai B'rith, endorsing an embargo of trade with Uganda 181
Letter to Hon . Donald J. Pease from Jack Nelson, politics of food program
coordinator, Clergy and Laity Concerned, expressing views on proposed
legislation . 181
Letter to Hon . Donald J. Pease from Rev. John Joe Braun, Provincial, 182
White Fathers — U.S.A., expressing viewson proposed legislation .-
Letter to Hon. Donald J. Pease from BakerJ. Cauthen, executive director,
Foreign Mission Board ofthe Southern Baptist Convention, expressing
views on proposed legislation ... 183
 V

Page
Letter to Hon. Warren M. Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, from
Ross Barzelay, president, General Foods Corp., urging articulation of
a national policy with respect to trade with Uganda --- 234
Letter to the chairmen of the subcommittees from Gerald G. Wilmot,
president, Page Gulfstream , Inc., concerning his company's trade with
Uganda 274
Closing statement of Hon . Donald J. Pease 279
Wire service story concerning speech by President Idi Amin . 280
“Ugandan Coffee - From the Tree to the Cup,” by Remigius Kintu, ex
ecutive secretary, Committee on Uganda, Inc. , Arlington , Va ---- 281

APPENDIXES
1. Legislation :
Text of H.R. 9252, a bill to amend the Export Administration Act
of 1969 to prohibit exporting to Uganda of goods subject to con
trol under that act --- 299
Text of House Concurrent Resolution 394, a concurrent resolution
to denounce acts committed by the dictator Idi Amin which sup
press the expression of political thought and violate the rights of
the individual, and urge thePresident to take effective measures
against the government of Idi Amin .. 300
Text of HouseConcurrent Resolution 426, a concurrent resolution
providing that the President should implement measures to dis
courage activities which benefit the Government of the Republic
of Uganda --- 302
Text of House Concurrent Resolution 612, a concurrent resolution
condemning violations of rights by the Government of the Re
public of Uganda and urging the President to take certain actions
with respect to those violations 305
2. Letter to Hon. Donald J. Pease and Hon . Robert K. Dornan from
George E. Boecklin of the National Coffee Association, conveying the
text of the association's resolution with respect to Uganda 307
3. " Africa's Press Speaks Out,” from New African , April 1977 309
4. Imports of Ugandan coffee by company , in pounds and dollar amounts,
for 1975 and 1976 combined ; submitted by Hon . Donald J. Pease 310
5. Statement with questions for Bell Helicopter Textron, correspondence
between Hon. Brock Adams, Secretary of Transportation, and Hon.
Jim Mattox concerning airman certification by the Federal Aviation
Administration for Ugandan personnel; “ U.S. Seeks End to Uganda
Pilot Training” (Washington Post , Nov. 22, 1977) ; " FAA to With
hold U.S. Certification From Ugandans Training as Pilots ” ( Dallas
Times Herald , Dec. 3 , 1977); Ugandan Pilots' Training in Fort
Worth Suspended ” ( The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 4, 1977) ; sub
mitted by Congressman Mattox; statement and responses from
George Galerstein , chief legal counsel, Bell Helicopter Textron, in
cluding “ Another Cup of Coffee ” ( The New Republic, May 13,
1978 ) ---- 312
6. Fact sheet on United States-Ugandan Commercial Trade, submitted 335
by Hon . Donald J. Pease .
7. Letter to Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham from A. H. Munkenbeck, Jr., vice
president and treasurer, the Perkin-Elmer Corp. , concerning the
corporation's trade with Uganda----- 337
8. Statement of Hon. Richard L. Ottinger, a Representative in Congress 338
from the State of New York ,
9. Letter to Congressmen Diggs, Fraser, and Bingham from Hon. Dawson
Mathis, a representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, con
cerning markup of legislation relating to Uganda --- 339
10. Answers for the record from Michael Madigan, legal counsel, Page
Gulfstream , Inc., to questions asked at the April 6, 1978, joint sub
committee hearing - 340
 UNITED STATES -UGANDA RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY , FEBRUARY 1, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittees met at 2 p.m. in room2172, Rayburn House Of
fice Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. ( chairman of the Subcom
mittee on Africa ) presiding.
Mr. Diggs. The subcommittees will come to order.
Repeated reports of disappearances and widespread detentions and
deaths in Uganda, since the coming to power of President Amin, by
eyewitnesses and such respected organizations as the International
Commission of Jurists have aroused the concern of the American peo
ple,many African leaders, and the international community at large.
The purpose of these hearings on Uganda is to investigate these al
legations, and examine the implications of our findings for U.S. policy
toward the Government of Uganda. We believe our purpose should be
to seek an evenhanded and judicious approach in our implementation
of a human rights policy - one which is based upon a full understand
ing of the issues, and the impact of the American response; one which
guards against a self- righteous response that might create greater
dangers for innocent persons; and one which does not discriminate
between the authoritarianism of the left and the tyranny of the right.
Above all, we should avoid policies which exact penalties in one case
because the exactions of such penalties would be popular and not cost
ly ; but fail to act in another, because of resistance from special inter
ests. For, while actionin the first instance may be honorable, only in
the latter case would it be courageous.
I am reminded of what Donald Woods, the South African editor of
the East London Daily Dispatch , who escaped from a banning order
placed on him by the Pretoria Government, said in our hearings yes
terday, when asked to compare the repression in Uganda with that in
South Africa. Suggesting that if President Amin were removed the
repression would probably cease, he said, “ It is not one maniac doing
these things in South Africa, but the whole political corpus does all
those horriblethings while praying to Jesus Christ.”
So it is against that background that I believe the Congress should
try to avoid inconsistenciesin its human rights policies. How can we
justify refusing to provide $1.4 million for over 43,000 destitute
Zimbabwe refugees who happen to be in Mozambique when, consistent
with our humanitarian traditions, we provide $7.1 million for earth
quake disaster victims living under Communist rule in Rumania ? Is
 2

not war one of the greatest of human disasters ? If we have withdrawn

Embassy personnel and terminated all economic assistance to the Gov
ernment of Uganda, which we have done, should we not at the very
least reduce the levelof our diplomatic representation in South Africa ?
If we insist upon continuing economic assistance to Ethiopia for
humanitarian reasons, despite the human rights violations there, should
we cut off trade with Uganda ?
We hope to find out in the courseof these hearings :
If it is the tyranny of President Amin, or the anarchy caused by
the breakdown of law and order, that accounts for the repression
there;
What international institutions, such as the OALL and especially
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, have done to ad
dress the problems in Uganda ;
What the impact of the suffering has been on the Uganda people;
those who remain , and those who have gone into exile in the United
States or elsewhere ; and finally,
What the U.S. response should be to the situation in Uganda, and
on that connection, what position should be taken in the various meas
ures on Uganda pending before the subcommittees : H.R. 9252 intro
duced by Congressman Pease ; House Concurrent Resolution 394 in
troduced by Congressman Mathis ; and House Concurrent Resolution
426 introduced by the gentleman from Washington and member of the
Subcommittee on Africa,Mr. Bonker.
We are privileged and honored today to have a distinguished group
of witnesses who will assist us in these deliberations. We are going to
call first Mr. William Butler,the president of the International Com
mission of Jurists in Geneva .
Before I call upon the witnesses, I would like to say that Mr. Bing
ham , who is chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade, and Mr. Fraser, who is chairman of the Subcom
mittee on International Organizations, could not be present. However,
Mr. Bingham submitted an opening statement for the record which
we will include.
[Mr. Bingham's statement follows :]
STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Chairman , I am pleased we have this opportunity to examine the current
status of U.S. economic and political relations with Uganda. A number of de
velopments point to the need for renewed consideration of U. $. policy options
towards that country , as my colleagues Messrs. Bonker and Pease have recog
nized in introducing various legislative proposals. But I would like to express
my skepticism about the wisdom and effectiveness of such economic sanctions.
As the members know, I am generally critical of trade embargo policies and
have introduced legislation to repeal such measures currently in effect against
Vietnam and Cuba . Unless applied on a multilateral basis, which is extremely
difficult to negotiate, economic sanctions are rarely an effective foreign policy
tool and have tended historically to harm the general populations of embargoed
countries more than their governments. I feel that it is important to draw on
these past experiences, and I look forward to expert testimony on this subject
in subsequent hearings in this series.
In reviewing briefly the statements for today's hearing, I note the strong
criticism of the Ugandan Government and calls for the imposition of economic
sanctions. I trust that we will hear other views on this subject over the three
days of hearings, and that if necessary, we will schedule additional meetings to
hear from experts who could not come on such short notice.
 3

Mr. Diggs. Now, let me yield to the gentleman from Washington ,

Mr. Bonker, for whatever comment he might care to make.
Mr. BONKER. I wouldlike to begin by commending you for schedul
ing these hearings on Uganda. This is a very important and timely
subject, and also a very difficult one to address, so I would like to com
mend you and your staff for convening these proceedings.
I do have an opening statement I would like to submit in the record
andjust mention that our legislation deals specifically with U.S. com
plicity in perpetuating Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. We have seen
authoritative accounts that show a pattern of repression in Uganda ,
and it is getting worse instead of better. The United States is provid
ing technical training to over 70 Ugandan Government officials at
facilities in Rochester , N.Y.; Daytona Beach , Melbourne, and Vero
Beach, Fla.; and Fort Worth, Tex.
This assistance ishighly useful in strengthening the basic infra
structure and overall effectiveness by which repression in Uganda is
carried out. According to staff studies I have seen , most of the
Ugandan officials receiving training as pilots and communications
specialists are members of Uganda's State Research Bureau or other
wise connected with Government.
Congressman Pease has introduced legislation which I have co
sponsored, that will affect U.S. trade with Uganda, trade which is
helping to prop up the declining economy.
Specifically , Mr. Chairman, my resolution calls upon the President
to take measures to discourage activities which are beneficial to the
Government in Uganda, including restricting training of Ugandans
in the United States .
The resolution also states that the Ugandan Embassy to the United
States should be closed down . I might add, the United States closed
its Embassy in Kampala several years ago and the movement of other
Uganda diplomats should be restricted.
Mr. Diggs . Mr. Whalen, do you have an opening statement ?
Mr. WHALEN. I have no prepared opening statement. Let me say,
however, that as ranking minority member of your subcommittee, I
do welcome these hearings. As you pointed out in your initial com
ments. I think it is important that as we deal with the subject of hu
man rights that we do all we can to ascertain the facts before we
either take action or withhold action. I look forward to these witnesses
today and those that we will be hearing from in the days ahead.
Mr. Diggs. We look forward to the gentleman's participation also
because we all know he is at the present time serving as part of the
U.S. delegation at the United Nations and has close contact with indi
viduals in groups there that are very sensitive about this issue and
related matters . The gentleman's own historic contributions to civil
rights here in the United States will be a very valuable factor in these
deliberations.
I would like to know if Mr. Pease would care to make a statement
at this point .
Mr. PEASE. Thank you , Mr. Chairman.
I do not wish to make a formal statement. I do wish , however, to
extend my thanks to you and to Mr. Bingham and to Mr. Fraser for
organizing what I consider to be a crucial series of hearings on
Uganda. I would also like to thank you for allowing me to participate
in the hearings.
 4

Mr. Diggs. I thank the gentleman for his comments and look for
ward to his contributions to the deliberations.
Does the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Derwinski, care to make any
general remarks at this point ? We will be delighted to entertain them .
If not, Mr. Butler, you may proceed , sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BUTLER, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, my name is William J. Butler. I am a

practicing lawyer, member of the New York bar. I am also chairman
of the executive committee of the International Commission of Jurists
and president of the American Section of the International Commis
sion of Jurists, together with being chairman of the Committee on
the Independence of Lawyers in Foreign Jurisdictions of the Ameri
can Bar Association.
But today, I appear before you, Mr. Chairman, to acquaint you with
some of the work the Commission has done in establishing the funda
mental factsand findings as to allegations involving gross patterns of
violations of human rights whichmayhave occurredinthe State of
Uganda since 1973.
Mr. Chairman, the International Commission of Jurists ( ICJ) is
a nonpolitical, nongovernmental organization of lawyers based in
Geneva, devoted to promotion of the rule of law and the legal protec
tion of human rights in all parts of the world. During the 25 years
of its existence it has published studies of the rule of law and human
rights in many different countries and we hope that we have earned
a reputation for objectivity and impartiality in connection with these
countries' studies.
The International Commission also enjoys consultative status with
the United Nations Economic and Social Council and in that regard
is entitled to submit to the United Nations organs communications
pursuant to resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations.
Commencing in 1973 the International Commission of Jurists,
alarmed by reports of gross patterns of violations of human rights
in Uganda, initiated an inquiry into the facts and circumstances sur
roundingthose allegations. The reason for this inquiry was not only
the fact that we were alarmed by certain reports of other nongover
mertal organizations and other governments but also that we had as
a men jer of our Commission at that time and still do today, a former
Attorney General of Uganda, Mr. Godfrey Beraise, who is a Queen's
Counsel and a distinguished member of the Uganda bar who has since
left Uganda and is now living in the United States, having been
admitted to the New York bar. Because of his interest and because
of the interests of other sister organizations with whom we have a
great deal in common , we initiated these investigations.
Mr. Chairman , over the period of years since then, the International
Commission of Jurists has submitted to the United Nations five 1503
communications regarding Uganda. The first ofthese communications
was submitted on May 27, 1974 ,and included four subdivisions entitled
 5

“ Expulsion of Asian Noncitizens From Uganda ,” “ Political and Legal

Structure of Uganda," " The Reign of Terror in Uganda," and
“ Conclusions.”
The second communication was on July 16, 1974, which was an open
letter to General Amin from Wanune Kibedi, a former Ugandan
Foreign Minister and I believe a brother -in -law of General Amin .
The third communication was an open letter from Wanune Kibedi
concerning the Ugandan situation and the fourth communication on
August 23, 1974, was a statement by Wilson Yakia that was submitted
also as a 1503 communication.
The fifth communication was an extensive review of all of our
investigations in Uganda between 1973 and 1974, a 120 -page review of
all of the facts andcircumstances surroundingthesealleged violations
which was filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations on
June 2, 1974.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, that we believe it was this communica
tion that was the subject of the 1503 communication referred out by
the Subcommittee to the Human Rights Commission meeting in
Geneva in February of 1976. Those five communications had been
published in a bookentitled “Uganda and Human Rights, Reports of
the International Commission of Jurists to the United Nations." With
your permission, I will refer this entire publication to your staff for
whatever purposes you may deem to use it in determining basic facts.
Suffice it to say that after these several years of investigating
allegations of violations of human rights in Uganda, the International
Commission of Jurists came to certain conclusions which it submitted
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. One of them is
that we are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence, as shown by these
communications, that in the first few years of President Amin's regime
at least 80,000 to 90,000 people had been killed, or massacred, during
this stated reign of terror.
Many sources, Mr. Chairman, believe the figure is now well over
100,000. It would be impossible for us to document exactly the extent
of the killing in this country by the Government and by Government
agents, but we believe that the figure of over 100,000 is a credible and
believable figure.
Other conclusions that we arrived at arc amply stated in our sub
missions to the United Nations and I don't think they have to be
repeated here. However, since the submission of our 1503 reports to
the United Nations in June of 1976 and since that matter had been
debated within the Commission at that time , we feel that other in
stances, not included in these 1503 communications, should be brought
to the attention of these subcommittees.
In August of 1976, a massacre of students occurred in Makerere Uni
versity. A detailed report was published in the London Observer on
August 8 and 22. On returningfrom vacation the previous month, the
students demanded details of the findings of an inquiry by President
Amin into the death of Paul Serwanga and the disappearance of a
Kenyan student, Miss Esther Cheshire, as well as information about
the death during the vacation of Mrs. Teresa Bukenya, a lecturer in
mathematics. On August 3, the students assembled to petition the
 6

vice chancellor about these matters and various grievances. President

Amin thereupon sent troops on the campus and , in the words of one
student, " a reign of terror began .” Some students were shot on the
spot. Others were made to liedown and were beaten. Some women
students were raped and those resisting had their breasts slashed off.
In addition, up to 1,000 students were rounded up and taken to prisons
at Makindye, Bugulobi, and Naguru. There, many were tortured and
beaten and somewere killed. On the following day another attack ,
led by one of President Amin's sons, was made, more students were
killed and wounded, and eight halls of residence were looted by the
troops.
At a degree ceremony on October 8, both President Amin and the
vice chancellor of the university denied these reports saying they were
“ ill founded and groundless."
OnAugust 25 aCatholic Uganda daily, Munno—Your Friend — was
closed and its editor, John Serwaniko, and two of his staff were
arrested. Six weeks later it was reported that the editor had died in
prison, thus meeting the same fate as his predecessor, Father Clement
Kiggundi, who waskilled by soldiers in1974.
On September 5 , according to “ Le Monde," some 30 foreign tech
nicians, mostly Italians, resigned from the staff of an electric power
station on the River Nile owing to the constant sight of corpses float
ing in the river.
On October 14, a press photographer, Jimmy Parmar, was arrested .
A week later it was reported that his bullet ridden body had been
found in a forest outside Kampala. Accordingto the “ Kenya Stand
ard” of November 4, this was due to his knowledge of the killing of
Dora Bloch, the 74 -year -old Entebbe raid hostage, whose body he is
alleged to have photographed after it was dumped in a forest. The
“ Washington Post” of October 23 reported a "highly placed military
officer ” as saying that 20 Ugandans with knowledge of Mrs. Bloch's
death had been executed.
On October 31, at the Organization of African Unity - OAU
meeting in Mauritius, President Amnin launched an attack upon the
International Commission of Jurists for having suggested that people
had been slaughtered in his country .
At the beginning of February 1977, the Ugandan security forces
believedthey had uncovered a plot to smugglearms into Uganda and
to kill President Amin. According to a statement made later by the
President, Archbishop Janani Luvum, Anglican archbishop of
Uganda, was named as a conspirator by some of those who had been
arrested. On February 5, soldiers ransacked the archbishop's house
for arms but found nothing.
Most of the suspected conspirators belonged to the Acholi and Langi
tribes and according to numerous reports a massacre of members of
these tribes took place. According tothe " London Observer” of Feb
ruary13, one witness reported 116 bodies collected in prison lorries in
the village of Gulu, the bodies of others being thrown in the Nile by
the army at Karuma Falls. Another eyewitness counted 25 bodies
in the street at Gulu and 10 in the village of Lira. Hundreds were
arrested and hundreds of others succeeded in fleeing across the border.
 7

Among the prominent people reported arrested were Y. A. Engur,

former Minister of Culture under Amin, Ben Emor, a member of the
East African Legislative Assembly, and Leji Olobo, Assistant Com
missioner of Labor.
On February 10, a letter was sent to President Amin from the arch
bishop and bishops of Uganda . A copy was sent to Kenya and later
published abroad. In this letter the bishops stated :
There is also a war against the educated that is forcing many of our people
to run away from this country in spite of what the country has paid to educate
them. This brain drain , the fear and the mistrust, make development, progress
and stability almost impossible. The gun which was meant to protect Uganda
as a nation , the Ugandan as a citizen and his property , is increasingly being
used against the Ugandan to take away his life and his property . Many cars
almost daily are being taken at gunpoint and their owners killed , and most of
the culprits are never brought to justice. If required we can enumerate many
cases. Too much power has been given to members of State Research to arrest
and kill at will innocent individuals.
Six days later, on February 16, Archbishop Luvum and two min
isters, Erinayo Oryema, Minister of Land and Water Resources, and
Oboth Ofumbi, Minister of Internal Affairs were arrested and brought
before a meeting of 3,000 soldiers. When accused of plotting against
the Government, Archbishop Luvum shook his head in denial. The
troops at the meeting chanted " Kill them, kill them today.” The
next day it was announced that the three prisoners had been killed,
but in a motor accident. This explanation was widely disbelieved , par
ticularly as the versions given ofthe accident varied considerably. Cir
cumstantial reports were soon received that the three men had in fact
been murdered. The director of All Africa Conference of Churches,
Canon Burgess Carr, stated that Archbishop Luvum was " only one
more victim in the wave of atrocities in Uganda ” and that the “murder
of the archbishop may be part of a campaign of terror unleashed
against Christians in Uganda.” The archbishop's body was not released
to his widow , nor was she able to see it. She was toldit had been taken
north for burial. Other reports state that the body was burned.
President Amin at first invited any government of the OAU to
send a delegation to Uganda to investigate the deaths, but when the
U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim , appealed on February 24 to
President Amin to permit "an impartial international investigation ”
into the deaths of the archbishop and two ministers, permission was
refused .
Later there were reports of purges in the army, with more killings.
On February 22, Uganda Radio admitted that there had been incidents
involving dissidentsin the army and that some people hadbeen killed.
On March 2, the British Foreign Secretary , Dr. David Owen, an
nounced in the House of Commons that the United Nations Human
Rights Commission had decided in its private session merely to keep
the matter of human rights in Uganda " under review ."
Mr. Chairman, that is the extent of the work of the ICJ and the
factfinding aspect of what is happening within the state of Uganda
over the last 4 years. We would like to bring to your attention one
other aspect which has developed recently and that is the matter of
using forced labor in Uganda.
In 1975 the Ugandan Government adopted a law entitled " Com
munity Farm Settlement Decree, 1975.” Mr. Chairman, these com
munity farms appeared to provide for the forced settlement, with en
1

forced labor of any unemployed able-bodied person between the ages

of 18 and 40 and of any person of the age of 12, or appearing to be the
age of 12, or older found begging or wandering around without visible
means of subsistence who is unable to rendersatisfactory account of
himself.
By decree of the Government — Decree No. 5 in 1977 — the authori
ties announced that theprescribed authority — that is the minister, gov
ernor, or district commissioner of chiefs — may, instead of sending such
persons to a farm settlement, order them to be sent for training to any
prescribed place or sent to any Government -owned or other approved
industry. Penal sanctions were applied to enforce the scheme with
fines of up to 150 shillings or up to 3 months in prison or both.
In our opinion, Mr. Chairman, these statutes are being used by
Ugandan authorities to develop and to carry out at least slavery -like
practices within the state of Uganda.
Mr. Chairman , we are also concerned as lawyers with the independ
ence of the judiciary. You probably have heard the report which has
since been substantiated that the chief justice of Uganda, while
sitting in his courtroom , was summarily arrested and taken from the
courtroom and has been missing. There have been reports that he has
been beheaded . At any rate, he has been eradicated and it appears,
Mr. Chairman, that the day before this occurred, the chief justice
had granted a writ of habeas corpus to a British businessman doing
business in Entebbe.
More recently, on August 6, 1977, four jurists reportedly opposed
the naming ofan institution in Uganda after President Amin . The
New York Times reported that these four professors who opposed the
naming of this institution were arrested and shot to death.
The Standard, an independent English newspaper, said, “President
Amin's secret police reportedly arrested the four this week after they
met in Kampala , the capital and site of the university .”
The paper said, “The meeting was in opposition to the President's
proposal to rename theinstitution, one of east Africa's oldest, Dr. Idi
Amin University later this year.”
One of the fourprofessors is a German,the Standard said, identify
ing him only as a Professor Luhmort, head of the medical faculty. The
others were said to be Ugandans.
Along these lines of the independence of the judiciary and the
independence of lawyers, on July 14, 1977, it has been reported — and
we have substantiated these findings, chat,
Seven Ugandan judges and magistrates were arrested after the Chief Justice
and several other jurists resigned in protest against " excessive abuses of the
rule of law today.”
No confirmation of the report, which appeared in The Standard, was available.
The paper said the arrests were made Tuesday, but Chief Justice Muhamed
Saeed, a Pakistani national, was not among those rounded up.
The paper said the arrests were made by agents of the State Research Bureau,
the secret police unit that has been held responsible by foreigners for many
apparent political murders in Uganda. The report said the prisoners were taken
to Makasero, the bureau's headquarters.
The Nairobi paper reported that the arrests were made on Tuesday
of that week but that Chief Justice Muhamed Saeed, a Pakistani na
tional, was not among those rounded up. The arrests, again in accord
ance with typical Uganda procedure, were made by agents of the State
 9

Research Bureau, the secret police unit that has been held responsible
by many nongovernmental organizations and other authorities for
many ofthe apparent political murders in Uganda.
Mr. Chairman, it is not for the International Commission of Jurists
to comment on the wisdom of domestic legislation in any state. We are
merely factfinders and our work is available to all governments and
nongovernmental organizations and to the United Nations. These
reports may be of some value to them .
Accordingly, I would prefer with your permission, Mr. Chairman,
to refrain from commenting on any domestic legislation and respect
fully submit this testimony in support of the factual situation in
Uganda as we see it at this particular time.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Drags.Wethank the gentleman for his very valuable contribu
tion. The ICJ is one of the most respected organizations in the world
and the kinds of facts that have been submitted here carry with them
a credibility that cannot be overlooked.
We noticed, Mr. Butler, a reference in the report to the inaction
by the U.N. Human Rights Commission on these violations and I
would like to hear what you have to say about that.
As you know, there have been U.N. ad hoc committees on southern
Africa and occupied territories, and a working group on Chile look
ing into human rights violations there. There have been other ad hoc
committees and working groups involved in human rights matters.
Why have alleged human rights violations in Uganda not been sub
jected to similar scrutiny ?
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to comment on that
question . Of course , you understand that all nongovernmental organi
zations are subject to the rule of confidentiality of all proceedings
pending before the Human Rights Commission and we cannot com
ment publicly on what might have happened within the deliberations
of these committees themselves. But we can make an overall comment
on the effectiveness of the 1503 procedure and we have very mixed
feelings about 1503.
As you know , Mr. Chairman, there is a move by the socialist states
in theUnited Nations to terminate all 1503 communications, the argu
ment being that now that the committee is in existence under the
covenants, under the civil and political covenants, that jurisdiction for
human rights violations can be transferred to the committee and there
fore there will be no need for other communications from nongovern
mental organizations.
All communications can be made by countries who are participating
in the committee under the covenants. We strongly oppose the termina
tion of 1503. It is the only place, Mr. Chairman, where nongovern
mental organizations can take complaints to the international body at
the United Nations. It is the only place where we can say " look, the
government is not measuring up to the international standards set
forth in the declaration or the covenants.” And we can ask , of course,
for one of two actions. One action calls for a study of the violation of
human rights in that country and the second, that an ad hoc committee
be sent to that country, but of course, as you know, Mr. Chairman, that
can only occur with the consent of the government involved.
 10

But nevertheless we think that it is a useful procedure from the point

of view of focusing public opinion on alleged violations of human
rights.
Now, over the years, there have been literally tens of thousands of
1503 communications submitted to the United Nations. We estimate
somewhere around 40,000 communications. Every year they get 10,000
to 12,000 communications. Of all these communications which are theo
retically submitted in August to a working group of the subcommis
sion, only approximately 25 cases have beenreported out to the Human
Rights Commission .
This working group has the jurisdiction to say whether or not a
prima facie case has been established and if it has, it refers it up to the
Commission. We have been involved in many of those cases that have
survived this first test. And yet, Mr. Chairman, I have to report to you
that the United Nations has never, after all of these communications,
taken action on any complaint that has been submitted even though
some cases have survived as far as the Human Rights Commission
itself.
I shouldsay, Mr. Chairman, that ironically enough, thePresident of
my Commission, the distinguished African jurist , Mr. Keba M'Baye,
Chief Justice of Senegal, is the current Chairman of the Human
Rights Commission, and he will be confronted with our 1503 communi
cations on Uganda when it meets next week in Geneva because the
action taken at the last meeting was to adjourn consideration of the
Uganda submission to the 1978meeting of the Commission .
Butit is very depressing for us in the field to have toreport to you,
Mr. Chairman, and to other governments that the 1503 process has
never resulted in even one study being made of any situation.
There are very speculative reasons for this. One is that the United
Nations is a club of governments and if one government allows this
precedent to go forward, they may be the next one to be investigated.
There is a reluctance on the part of governments to investigate one
another. They all have common interests.
Whereas, nongovernment organizations believe that.interference into
the internal affairs of countries is proper, where they feel that interna
tional standards are being violated. There are some exceptions, such as
in the case recently of theoccupied territories, Chile, and other situa
tions where the United Nations has been very active.
So , Mr. Chairman, I hope I answered your question. It would be
speculative of me to say in any way why 1503 is not working, why the
United Nations has never carried out one study as a resultof the mas
sive doses of well -documented evidence submitted to it. I think that
their failure should be a cause of concern for governments and very
important to the advancement ofhuman rights generally.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Derwinski, I am certain that you have several ques
tions for this witness.
Mr. DERWINSKI. As I go over the various statements there are some
reasonable discrepancies in the figures. Could you go over the pro
cedures you use in estimating the number of political prisoners now
being detained by the Government of Uganda ?
Mr. BUTLER . We have no estimate on that.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you have any way of arriving — in other words,
you have never given that any special effort ?
 11

Mr. BUTLER. We have given it special effort but it is impossible for

us to arrive at any credible and well-documented conclusions.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Then could you review for the subcommittees the
adoption of police powers and the detention laws under the Amin
administration. In other words, the growth of a police state, if I may
phrase it that way. Have you followed that construction of greater
andgreater authority and oppression ?
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Derwinski, all through our reports are references
to the centralism of the society itself and the tight control that is had
over the society by the army and by General Amin and his control
over the instruments of arrest such as the state research bureau . But
really there is no general pattern. The gentleman acts one way in one
day and the next day he might be completely at odds with something
he had done the day before. There is no way to predict - it does not
seem tobe systematic day to day—it is sweet and bitter.
We absolutely are convinced of theaccuracy of our reports concern
ing the brutal massacres that have taken place over the years.
Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, are you saying that the internal
functions of government within Uganda are a reaction to the day-to
day whims ofGeneral Amin ? If I understand you correctly, whatever
government they have — basically their approach is anarchy — but
whatever government they have is entirely at the whim of this one
individual ?
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Derwinski, we are attorneys and we are factfinders.
I think all we can give you are the facts and if you or your colleagues
or anyone else would like to speculate as to why this has happened
I don't think it is within our competence to inquire into the psycholo
gical motive of any given government or leader.
Mr. DERWINSKI. But I clearly understood you to say the internal
function of the Government depended in effect on the day-to-day at
titude of this one individual.
Mr. BUTLER. We feel it is a highly centralized authority .Now ,where
that authority is, whether it is ultimately in the general himself or
whether it is in the general and a composite group of military leaders
or close associates, I don't think we could document that specifically
at this time. It appears to be a highly ıuthoritarian state.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Bonker.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for your testimony and also
foryour report, which is informative and in some ways alarming:
Your section entitled “ What Are Amin's Future Designs ?” I find
most disturbing because you say that “ Amin intends to do some of
the following: Continue to liquidate all people of influence. More and
more money will be spent on the army. Other public sectors will be
run down. He will usethe army to infiltrate right down to the village
level so as to forestall any rival uprisings against him .” And it goes
on and on. So your prospect for human rights in Uganda looks pretty
dismal in view of the facts that you presented to us.
You go on to say on the nextpage, under “ Conclusions,” that “ con
demnation alone is not enough. Amin and his clique should be removed
and this should be done by causing the least suffering to the civilian
population.”

25-826 0 - 78 - 2
-
 12

Do you want to share with the subcommittees some alternatives on

how we would go about removing Idi Amin from power ?
Mr. BUTLER. Well, I really don't think that is our prerogative. I
think we should stick to our position that these are matters of domestic
decision that should bemade by thecountry involved.
Mr. BONKER. Don't you think the United Nations and other inter
national organizationsshould do something — it seems to me you made
reference to actions that can be taken to bring about pressure on the
Amin government? Don't we have aa moral responsibility if not a polit
ical one, to bring this to an end ?
Mr. BUTLER. Yes ; I would think so. The ICJ responsibility is not
to a given government but to the standards set forth in universal dec
laration and the covenants. We feel these standards are being violated
in the most extreme manner by the authorities of the state of Uganda
and we think that all pressures should be brought on them to bring
them in line with internationally accepted standards of civilized
nations.
As to the specific steps that should be taken by a given government,
I think that we would have to leave that up to the governments
involved .
Mr. BONKER. The Commission on Human Rights will be convening
shortly in Geneva ?
Mr. BUTLER. February 6.
Mr. BONKER. There is a suggestion, recommendation, that we ap
point aa U.N. Commissioneron Human Rights. Do you think this would
be more effective or helpful in addressing the areas where there is
evidence of human rights violations ? Would you support this ?
Mr. BUTLER. Yes; as a matter of fact, we consider the Ugandan
case before the Commission on Human Rights one of the great - prob
ably the underlying reason for lack of faith in the United Nations
human rights program itself and perhaps the Ugandan case will be the
test of whether or not the United Nations procedures are viable pro
cedures available for the redress of human rights throughout the
world .
We think it is an outrage that the United Nations has not acted in
this case and an insult to its members who believe in the fundamental
rules of law and the supremacy of law as the best protection of human
rights.
Mr. BONKER. One final question, Mr. Butler. Did you , in collecting
facts during your research , come across any definitive analysis of the
death of the archbishop which was so controversial a few months ago,
the Episcopal archbishop ?
Mr. BUTLER .We have a complete file on the archbishop. Of course ,
fed into that file are reports from various different sources. I don't
think at this time I would be willing to make an ICJ statement on
the actual facts.
Mr. BONKER. Can you make a personal statement ?
( No response.]
Mr. BONKER. There seems to be some question as to the circumstances
surrounding his death and this is a rather comprehensive report. If
you can't reveal something of the circumstances, I don't know where
we are going to find them .
 13

Mr. BUTLER. Well, as you know, he was killed in an automobile acci

dent together with two members of the Ugandan Government and cir
cumstantial evidence points to a conclusion that the Government may
have been involved in the termination of his life but as a jurist , I
don't see how I can testify before these subcommittees of any certain
conclusions.
Certainly it is a prima facie case that does not look good on its face
but I don't think that we could conclude with any certainty.
Mr. BONKER. What about the church in Uganda today ? Is there
evidence of Christians being singled out for an unnecessarily brutal
part of the killings, especially in view of Amin's efforts to convert
Uganda into Islamic faith ?
Mr. BUTLER. I will take that in two parts. The first part, yes, we
feel as if Christians are being singled out and are a target of attack by
the Government.
On the second part of the question of whether or not the motive is
to convert the country to Moslem faith, again I could not—that would
be a speculative opinion of mine which I don't think I could sustain
at this particular time.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Buchanan .
Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Do you feel many nations today regard what is happening in
Uganda as purely an internal matter ? I would hope they do not. The
rule of law ,as I see it—and I think this is the position ofthe President
of the United States — is that when there is a violation of interna
tionally accepted standards of conduct as set forth in international
instruments such as the declaration, the covenants and any other
international instruments that have been adopted, then in that event,
any nation can complain about any other nation violating those
international standards and that would not breech the doctrine of
improper interference in domestic affairs of another state. I think
most governments would agree to that proposition. At least I would
hope they would.
One of my own personal concerns is that while here in Congress or
the United Nations organization or the Human Rights Commission
you can get some people very concerned about apparent violations of
human rights in a given area such as South Africa, with others it
might be in the Communist countries, Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact
countries, with others it might be Chile, I think there is an insufficiency
of impartial concern for people wherever they are who appear to be
the victims of oppression and denial of their rights.
I would like to commend you for your stance in this matter and
this broad approach .
Mr. BUTLER. There are two kinds of human rights activists. One
we call special interest types that really are only concerned with their
own specific human rights interests and the other are activists inter
ested in people that are willing to apply a single standard to human
rights everywhere in the world no matter where it is, black , white,
yellow , whatever the basis is.
Ambassador Kennon outlines this in his book called " Cloud of
Danger” and very often the special interest groups get more action
 14

than others. But I think in the long run the single standard approach
is the more viable one and hopefully it will survive longer than the
limited interests of some states, without mentioning any specific
situations.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Has anyone asked — and I apologize - concerning
security groups. There are in Uganda I understand four main security
groups, military intelligence, military police, state research unit, pub
lic safety unit of the police. I don't know whether you responded to a
question about those groups.
Mr. BUTLER. I chiefly concerned myself with the State Research
group which is doing I think most of the intelligence security activity
in the country. The army has its unit. The Presidential guards have
its unit and there are other police.
Mr. BUCHANAN . Thank you very much .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Pease.
Mr. PEASE. No questions.
Mr. Diggs. Thegentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Cavanaugh.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . No questions, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. Diggs. In the summary of your report, you go on to cite specific
violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I, therefore,
must assume that the ICJ has a set of criteria for determining when
such violations occur.
Consistent with what I tried to point out in the opening statement,
I wonder if the following examples would fit ICJ criteria. Article 15
of the Declaration of Human Rights says no one shall arbitrarily be
deprived of his nationality. Thousands of people in South Africa were
made citizens of the Transkei when that “ homeland ” was granted
“ independence .” Many of these people, who reside in urban areas of
the Republic of South Africa, havenever seen the Transkei of which
they are now citizens. Does the ICJ define this act of the Government
of South Africa as a violation of the United Nations Declaration ?
Your report also refers to the arbitrary banishment. I am here re
minded of the case of Winnie Mandela who was banished by the South
African Government to the Orange Free State, 350 kilometers from
her home in Soweto. Does the ICJ define this as a violation of the U.N.
Declaration ?
Article 17 of the declaration states “No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." In South Africa, under the Group Areas
Act, literally thousands of Africans, Indians, and Asians have been
removed from their homes without adequate, or in many cases, with
out any compensation. If you can, comment on that kind of an analogy
to indicate whether or not this constitutes a violation of the United
Nations Declaration according to your definition.
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, those are very complicated questions
as I am sureyou understand, because for instance, take your reference
to the Transkei. We all know one of the most serious problems there
is that the residents of the Transkei never lost their South African
nationality. So that we did not accept that as a proper transfer or a
separation of a people from a division of a givenstate. That the issue
is clouded by the fact that South Africa is creating a so -called in
dependent state but it is not independent at all even in terms of
 15

nationality. So I can't really answer your question as to whether that

violates this fundamental principle that no one should be deprived of
his nationality.
The secondquestion involving the right of personal property is a
very involved and complicated question in the international human
rights movement today. You know , Mr. Chairman, that although there
isa reference to the right of private property in the declaration, there
is no reference to the right of private property in the covenants.
One of the reasons for this is that many of the nations of the world
came into existence after the adoption of the universal declaration
which I think at that time there were only 52 nations existing in the
world. The covenants came along 25 years later and involved coun
tries in Africa and Asia that had become free after that time and
different principles applied. Many African countries do not believe in
the right of private property. They believe in tribal aspects of property
and communal property and that right of private property issue is
giving us a lot oftrouble in the world today.
The issue of private property, over the years is going to give us in
the international community alot of trouble because in some parts of
the world you can't realize a proper distribution of wealth and pro
tect the institution of private property at the same time.
I would love to discuss it with you further but I think we need aa lot
more time than we have today.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much for your response, limited as it
was . We will, hopefully, have an opportunity to discuss this further.
We are going to ask our next three witnesses to testify as a group.
Following thetestimony the members of the subcommittees will sub
mit questions. The members of that group will be the Honorable
Henry Kyemba, who is a former Minister of Health in Uganda and
author of “State of Blood” , Carlos Russell, a professor of African
studies in Brooklyn College in New York ; and Mr. Remigius Kintu ,
who is executive secretary of the Committee on Uganda here in
Washington .
We have testimony from Mr. Kyemba and from Mr. Russell that
has been submitted in advance. Mr. Minister, if you want to summarize
your statement, that would be helpful. You may proceed, however, in
any way you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KYEMBA, FORMER MINISTER OF

HEALTH , GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA

Mr. KYEMBA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Henry

Kyemba. I am former Minister of Health, Government of Uganda' ;
former Chairman of the African Health Ministers from 1976 to 1977 ;
and former Vice President of the World Health Assembly.
It is a great privilege, Mr. Chairman, to have the opportunity to
come before you. We are fully aware, those of us living in exile, of
the great responsibility that the United States bears with regard to
the events happening in our very small country. I have submitted my
testimony but I would like just to go through a few points that I feel
I should enlighten the committee on from my past knowledge of the
regime and the man I have known for some time.
 16

UnlikeMr. Butler, the previous gentleman who has given his testi
mony, I don't go by press reports. I will state what I have seen in the
country where I wasborn and whereI have lived for allmy life.The
first and most important point, Mr. Chairman, I would liketo tell the
subcommittees is that IdiAmin , otherwise called Field Marshall Amin,
conquerer of the British Empire and all other titles he has established
for himself, is the most tyrannous ruler that any of us have ever read
or heard of in our country.
It is very difficult, Mr. Chairman, to talk about my country without
emotion for right now many of us go by different titles. I amarefugee.
I am an exile. I am a displaced person and by whatever title others
may wish to confer, from my beloved country.
Över the years, Mr. Chairman, Field Marshall Amin hasestablished
a rule in my country whose full extent is not fully appreciated in the
West and certainly in the United States.
The second point I wish to dwell on is the fact that Amin has been
able to maintain his rule mainly because of the control over the purse
strings of my country, the money which belongs to the country. Thus
Amin personally has been able to maintain terror organizations in the
country which have no regard whatsoever for the sanctity of human
life.
To many of us, Uganda is our only home; and despite the gravity of
the situations that have faced us from time to time it has been difficult
to change the system from within. We do know , Mr. Chairman, that
with Amin's hold on themoney that belongs to the country, and with
the terror organizations he uses, he can remain for quite some time to
comeunless something is done.
I feel, Mr. Chairman , that the United States and Great Britain ,
who between them control the greatest majority of interests as far as
trade is concerned, hold the key to the future of my country. I do re
call, Mr. Chairman, your considerable interest in Africa when I was
serving as private secretary to the former President. I do remember
your visit to our country. It is a very different country today, Mr.
Chairman. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the country has
changed tremendously to the extent where there is no known code of
conduct which can insure security of life, the United States has con
tinued to provide this terror, Amin, with all the money he needs to
buy the weapons from the Soviet Union and elsewhere.
I have known Field Marshall Amin for a long time and I know
how very vulnerable he is if his purse strings arecut. It is no longer
a question of having a country which is supported in some degree by
its population. Amin has imposed a foreign regime on the people of
Uganda mainly by his Nubian thugs from the Sudan and from neigh
boring Zaire, and from his Kakwa tribesmen .
These people have established the system where Ugandans are
caught on the streets, are caught in concentration centers, without
fear of anything happening to theperpetrators of those actions.
We have considerable faith in the United States. We feel that the
United States has not yet pulled its full weight on the way things are
going in Uganda today.
It is not a question of either / or with regard to South Africa and
Uganda. Dictatorship and tyranny against the humanity represent
tyranny against humanity wherever it occur. Many of us feel de
 17

pressed when an attempt is made to give the impression that tyranny

by the white man is worse than tyranny by the black man. Field Mar
shal Amin has been responsible for themassacre and killings of many
people in my country far in excess of anything that we have heard of,
except possibly during Nazi Germany.
When I was listening to the testimony, Mr. Chairman, I was dis
tressed to hear that obvious murders which have been perpetrated by
Amin in full view of diplomats of Western countries have been
questioned.
I was Minister of Health in the Ugandan Government from 1974
until I left of my own free will in 1977. I possibly would still be Minis
ter in the same government, but I felt that the time had come for me
to tell the world in no uncertain terms vhat was happening to my
country, Uganda. For too long Amin has been excused from the atroci
ties he has perpetrated because everything that is written about him
has been interpreted as imperialisticpropaganda . Nobody likes to say
anything bad about an African leader.
Mr. Chairman , I would like to put it before you . That nobody in
Africa has damaged more the image of the black man on the continent
than Field Marshal Idi Amin. Anyone who excuses him on the basis
of color has possibly done the greatest damage to my color, if I may
put it, Mr. Chairman .
When Amin assumed power in 1971, Mr. Chairman, he appointed
a government which to many ofus was a sign of great hope for a fresh
start, particularly after the undemocratic process that had overtaken
the country toward the latter part of that year.
Many qualified people were appointed to various posts, and we were
certain that the country stood to gain by these appointments. We were
awfully aware of the inadequacies of the President we had at the time.
He could hardly write or read. He could not speak, of course , the for
eign language, the official language properly. But we excused him in
view of the fact that he left the technocrats to run the country. Un
fortunately within a very short time Amin decided rather than to
overcome his inadequacies, to instead try and eliminate those people
that represented a better performance than himself.
In many ways Amin's appearance on the scene can be traced back
to the British who imported the Nubians andSudanese as missionaries
during their colonial exploits. This is true because at the time they
were brought in to man the army and the police, and at the time after
independence, everybody relied on Amin in the hope that with his
illiteracy he represented the leastof danger to then.
Of course history proved that he was very much mistaken in under
estimating Amin's reserves.
Since the past few years of the coup, Amin has, of course, com
pletely dissolved the old Cabinet that started thenew regime. He has
appointed directors to be ministers who, Mr. Chairman, if I went
through some of them you will be ashamed for our mother Africa.
And if I may say so I have great respect for these people I am going
to mention since I know them personally.
They are friends of mine, the Minister of Transportation is a former
driver who used to drive one of the escort cars. He is now supposed
to bein charge of automotive associates. The Minister of Agriculture
is a former driver. The Minister of Finance was a former driver in
 18

the army. The Minister of Commerce is a former driver who used

to drive a garbage truck for one of the municipalities. He was licensed
in 1969. The Minister of Administration in charge of local govern
ment was a former driver in the army. He was a sergeant in 1971.
Most of them are brigadiers from the same rank.
Now , Mr. Chairman, there are no criteria for ministerial appoint
ment. No one can claim he deserves ministerial office, but where you
have about 8 or 10 former drivers as ministers, one wonders whether
he should take on a driving job in order to take on a ministerial ap
pointment in Amin'sUganda.
Amin has established, Mr. Chairman, a reign of terror that is a
shame to many of us. He has three units, mainly manned by groups
from Southern Sudan : The State Research Bureau, the military police,
and the public safety unit. All these people are above the law that any
one can imagine exists in the country. They can walk in here and take
anyone from here to his deathbed or to the torture chambers.
All of these recruits have no regard whatsoever for the people of
Uganda because they know that whenthe day of reckoning comes they
will flee across the border to Southern Sudan or to Zaire.
In Washington Mr. Amin has an Embassy. If you had the oppor
tunity I amsure many exiles would be able to testify against some of
the so-called excellencies who represent Amin in some of the greatest
democracies we have.
It is impossible, Mr. Chairman, with any degree of certainty to
estimate the number of deaths that have been perpetrated by Amin
during his period of office . All the orders he gives are verbal because
he can't write anyway and it is one way in which he can escape re
sponsibility. So that reviewing the orders is one of the most difficult
tasksanyone could encounter in trying to find out what has befallen
the Ugandan people.
The ICJ report referred to the abduction of the chief justice from
the high court chambers and his subsequent execution. Amin , of
course, stated that the chief justice was collected from the high court
chambers by a body of guerrillas, and that any talk of his being
executed by government thugs was imperialist propaganda.
Mr. Chairman, if the government of Idi Amin can allow its chief
justice to be taken in that fashion, and be unable to explain the true
nature of his going, it is very difficult for many of usto understand
whether Amin deserves the right to be in charge of the country.
I was Minister of Health whenthe Israeli raidtook place at Entebbe
on the 4th of August, 1976. One hostage, Mrs. Dora Bloch, was in my
hospital when the raid took place. I visited her after the raid to see
to her comfort. A few hours later members of Amin's state bureau
marched up to the hospital ward and took the old lady to her execution.
While the international police were demanding to know what hap
pened to her, Amin was saying that Uganda was not responsible for
her whereabouts since she had been taken by the Israeli soldiers who
raided Entebbe.
Many people, hundreds of people, saw the body of this woman on
the outskirts of Kampala, and at an appropriate time it shouldbe
possible even to exhume the body from where she was buried. The
property belonging to this lady is still left in Uganda.
Next , Mr. Chairman , we have the late archbishop of Uganda, Arch
 19

bishop Luwum . I was with the archbishop when an attempt was made
to show his involvement in the plot against Amin . He was paraded
around a conference room with other ministers. The archbishop was
ordered out of one door and two other ministers were ordered out
through another door. This was about 3:30 in the afternoon. Within
11/2 hours the three of them were officially reported as having died in
a motor accident.
The auto accident, Mr. Chairman , according to President Amin took
place 1 mile from the hospital of which I was in charge, and I was
telephoned at 9 p.m. to be ready to receive their bodies. The bodies
were subsequently brought to my hospital at five in the morning, 12
hours after the accident in which they had died. The bodies of the
archbishop and the two cabinet ministers were dumped from a truck
onto the ground without any regard or respect to any dead human
being. I was telephoned immediately and I hastened to the hospital
to see what had happened.
Mr. Chairman, it is very sorry for me to tell you that the bodies
were all bulletridden. I asked President Amin whether I should release
the bodies to the relatives and he told me he arranged for the army to
deliver their bodies to their respective homes. The bodies were collected
about 5 or 6 hours later after a military doctor wrote what he con
sidered to be a post mortem report of the cause of their death.
None of the relatives of the deceased were ever able to see the bodies.
They were supposed to have been buried. Mr. Chairman, we all feel
considerable abhorrence about the regime in South Africa, but I was
relieved when I read the other day and was able to see the body of Steve
Biko being buried by his relatives, and seeing the U.S. Ambassador
taking a wreath to his burial. In the case of the archbishop of Uganda,
nobody was able even to send a message of condolence to his widow
or to the family.
I don't want to give unnecessary comparisons between what Vorster
does which is inhuman on the basis of race to what Amin is doing,
hiding behind the question of his color. But I am sure, Mr. Chairman,
your committee will be able to see what it is that this man has done
to the principles which the United States has supported over the
years.
The basis of the legislation being proposed, Mr. Chairman , is to
deny, as far as I know, Amin considerable funds from the United
States mainly through the sales of coffee. I have tried to indicate that
the proceeds of thosesales do notdo anything for the ordinary man in
Uganda, but rather maintain Amin's mercenary army. In 1976 Uganda
exported 150,000 tons ofcoffee and was able to receive in return some
thing in the region of about $200 million from the United States.
Much ofthismoney, Mr. Chairman , was toenable Amin to buy a
few more Migs and tanks from the Soviet Union, to terrorize the
defenseless population. Some of these dollars were used by Amin to
send his children for shopping in New York and London. At the same
time the ordinary people whoproduced the coffee have no sugar, have
no salt, have no soap to wash, have no aspirin for headaches. Some
mention I know has been made that any stopping of the trade will
harm the Ugandan people.
 20

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that nothing is further from the truth.
I know Amin's planes have been sent here to Rochester on the pretext
that they are coming to pick up drugs for the Minister of Health, for
the Ugandan people. I know that they have been sent here in fact to
pick up Amin's Cadillac and flown to Kampala so that his son and
others can enjoy the luxuryof the American high life.
You, Mr. Chairman, are in a position to ask some of these companies
dealing with Amin — they will be able to tell you — how the medical
supplies have remained lying in places like Rochester while the planes
are flying in here to take the luxury goods to maintain Amin's soldiers.
was sponsor for a very difficult ministry and I know how much the
people are suffering as a result of it. Even if the medicine were avail
able,Mr. Chairman, most of the doctors and other technicians have
fled.I don't know who is supposed to prescribe the medicine with almost
all of the medical people of any name out of the country. Amin has
been able to recruitaа . few Pakistanis and a few others to go and main
tain his family and a few of his henchmen because he knows that that
is what he depends on . But the ordinary man, Mr. Chairman — nobody
should come here and deceive us that he is getting any benefit from the
sale of coffee to the United States.
The coffee sales to the United States represent about 30 percent of
Uganda's total production. It is my view, Mr. Chairman, that the
United States is capable of doing a service to the 11 million people
by denying Amin the huge cash which is only going to maintain the
arms that are terrorizing our mothers, fathers, and brothersin Africa.
The figures for 1977 are becoming most worrisome in view of the
fact that due to the price increase the United States contribution to
Uganda’s treasury is likely to be inthe region possibly of $ 400 million
to $500 million. It is my view, Mr. Chairman, that the greatest democ
racy on earth should not be the instrument to sustain the greatest
tyranny on the African Continent. We suffered the slavery centuries
ago. We had the Arab slave trade in Uganda. We had the Atlantic
slave trade. We cannot allow the people of Uganda to be subjugated
again by anotherforeign power ; namely Aminand his henchmen from
the Southern Sudan .
We have heard, Mr. Chairman, of the evidence given about the
training of people in the United States to man Amin's planes. He has
claimed these planes are for civilian purposes. I can tell you here and
now , Mr. Chairman, that nothing is further from the truth . Many of
the so - called civilian planes from the United States are used to ferry
troops who are in Uganda to terrorize the peasants in the villages who
have no soapand who have no sugar, on the pretext that they are
smuggling coffee out of the country.
We know in fact, Mr. Chairman, that the smuggling of coffee is the
work which is reserved for Amin's offices. Amin himself knows it,
and he has had to take some action against aa few ofhismost notorious
officers when it has become too obvious. But don't be deceived in this
committee,Mr. Chairman , that any ordinary peasant inUganda can
beinvolved in the smuggling of coffee. This is, as is well known, the
sole prerogative of Amin's three units, the State research bureau, the
army, and the secret police.
Mr. Chairman, I am very sorry to take so much of yourtime, but I
felt it necessary for me to give you as much as I could in the very
 21

short time that I had. I have tried to enlighten the public of what is
happening in my country through the publication of my book “ The
State of Blood.” I have listed there and given much information in that
book on what I believe that the world can do and on what Amin has
done. I sent a copy to your Ambassador to the United Nations and I
hope that it will be possible at some stage for the United States to take
the necessary steps to save the people ofUganda.
I have been encouragedby the fact that the National Coffee Associa
tion has written to you asking for guidance as to how they should deal
with the monstrous regime in Kampala .I hope the administration will
give that guidance on the basis of what is known by the entire world .
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Kyemba's prepared statement follows :]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KYEMBA, FORMER MINISTER
OF HEALTH, GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA
I am delighted that you have invited me here to speak to you, for I feel that
in your hands lies the power to bring to an end the monstrous evil that has
overtaken my country during the last seven years.
I would like to set out the issues, as I see them, as simply as I can. There are,
in essence, just two major issues : the first is that Amin has established a per
sonal reign of terror the true nature of which is still not fully appreciated in
the West. The second point is that Amin holds power by controlling Uganda's
purse strings. With the money the country - and thus Amin - receives from
foreign trade, in particular coffee, he can buy luxury goods that go directly to
pay off his troops. His authority thus depends on Uganda's foreign trade links.
His greatest trading partners are the United States and Great Britain . It is my
contention that US should at once cut trade links with Amin to hasten his fall — an
act that would do no damage to the American economy but incalculable good to
the Ugandan people. Before I come to the details of Amin's actions and the
United States role in Uganda's economy, I would like to tell the House subcom
mittees of my experience of Amin's rule. I have known Amin since I was a teen
ager. My government experience spans the period from independence in 1962 to
the day of my defection in May , 1977. My career began when I joined the office of
the former prime minister, Milton Obote, in 1962 after my graduation with an
Honours Degree in History from the University of London. Shortly after inde
pendence, I became his private secretary . I remained in this post until Amin's
coup in January , 1971. During this time Amin had risen to prominence as the
commander of the army. Under Obote's rule tribal animosities continually
threatened to tear apart the newly formed nation . Uganda , which in 1962 had a
strong western- style democracy, slipped steadily towards military dictatorship.
President Obote committed the unforgivable sin by overpromoting an illiterate
and evil soldier to be Chief of the Army in the hope that Idi Amin would never
have political ambitions, and would thus protect Obote against possibile mili
tary or political opposition . Needless to tell you that as things turned out, Obote
was utterly wrong. Idi Amin found no difficulty in toppling him in January, 1971.
On Amin's assumption of power he appointed a government of technocrats based
on merit and experience. The top civil servants in most ministries became min
isters and I remained in my post as Private Secretary to the President. Later I
was promoted to enter Idi Amin's Cabinet as Minister of Culture from which
I was transferred to the Ministry of Health . I , therefore, had a long and un
enviable experience of watching from close quarters Idi Amin's way of run
ning a government and its devastating effects on the Ugandan nation.
It is well known that Amin heads a murderous regime. It is not perhaps
sufficiently appreciated how murderous it is and how directly Amin is respon
sible for what goes on. The murders began immediately after the coup. They
were at first confined to the barracks, and to political opponents. They soon
1 The letter referred to appears in appendix 2.
 22

spread to the civilian population. Bodies are routinely dumped in the Nile, where
one can see those corpses that remain uneaten by crocodiles floating downriver.
Total deaths will forever be impossible to state exactly, but they certainly ex
ceed 150,000.
This system of terror is headed directly by Amin . He is illiterate, and his
orders are always verbal. He depends on personal authority. His troops are
largely recruited over the border in the southern Sudan and from his own Kawa
tribesmen, who span the borders of Uganda, Zaire and Sudan. The southern
Sudanese have no loyalty to the country or to Ugandans. They are mercenaries
who are offered cash and luxury goods in return for their services. They live well
and send their goods and cash back to their homes in the Sudan. The entire army
is organized as a terrorist organization to terrorize the unarmed civilian popula
tion. These terrorists number now more than 15,000 men .
These men enjoy facilities and amenities that are not available to ordinary
Ugandans for instance; they have access to all types of western luxury
goods - sports goods, drink , food, clothes, cars — which are flown in , mainly from
Great Britain and the United States and sold through a chain of army shops
which can be entered only by the armed forces.
Meanwhile, the mass of Uganda's 11 million people have been steadily de
prived of basic essential items, like soap, sugar and salt. The rural areas support
themselves by food they grow such as sweet potatoes, bananas, corn and millet.
About 90 percent of Ugandans live in the rural areas, where they produce those
cash crops on which the country has depended for its economic prosperity
coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and sugar. It is on these exports that Amin must
depend if he is to receive the foreign exchange he needs to buy the luxury goods
from the United Kingdom and the United States and military hardware from
the Soviet Union to ensure his survival.
You undoubtedly have access to detailed figures, but I should like to emphasize
the significance of the role of coffee in Uganda's economy. Uganda is about the
fifth largest producer of coffee in the world - it exported 150,000 tons in 1976.
The frost which hit the Brazilian harvest in 1975, and which forced prices up
world wide, boosted Uganda's foreign trade earnings dramatically. About 80
percent of the coffee exports is Robusta, which is used widely for instant coffee.
The main importer of Uganda coffee is the United States represented principally
by General Foods and Folger. One third of Uganda s coffee exports — about 50,000
tons, valued at almost 200 million dollars went direct to the United States in
1976. More reaches the United States as a result of re- exports by European coun
tries. The United States thus certainly provides over 30 percent — and perhaps
more than half - of all Uganda's foreign trade earnings. Although the figures for
1977 are not yet complete, by July last year the United States had already im
ported well over 40,000 tons of green coffee from Amin's Uganda valued at well
over $ 200,000,000, i.e., more than the total for 1976 !
With this cash, Amin can purchase from the Soviet Union the arms he needs
to equip his armed forces and thus keep a firm grip on the entire Ugandan popu
lation. He can buy American planes which he uses for military purposes, like
ferrying troops. American helicopters have been used by Amin to bomb fishing
buais on Lake Victoria on the pretext that the occupants are smuggling coffee.
( Coffee smuggling is an official monopoly of Amin's own officers and they
protect their trade ruthlessly. ) Many of Amin's pilots have been trained in the
United States.
It is my contention that the United States, the world's greatest democracy
and the world's leader in the area of human rights, has for too long provided
direct economic support for a regime that has become a byword for oppression.
No American would deny the monstrous nature of Amin's regime. The entire
world is aware of President Carter's commitment on the issue of human rights.
The U.S. National Coffee Association has itself stated, in a resolution dated
November 29, 1977, a copy of which is annexed hereto for ease of reference, that
it would be happy to follow a government lead concerning trade deals with
Amin's Uganda . What then can prevent Congress immediately passing the
legislation necessary to impose such a ban ? A trade ban would enhance the
United States image internationally, in particular in black Africa , which, despite
its painful failure to condemn Amin outright, knows well enough the truth
about his barbaric regime. The ban would in no way damage the U.S. economy,
it would certainly deny Amin's access to the profitable market of the United
States and hasten Amin's ultimate downfall.

1 The resolution referred to appears in appendix 2.

 23

Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. You made a very
comprehensive statement. Although I am placing Mr. Kintu's and
Mr. Russell's complete testimony in the record, in the interest of get
ting on to the questions, I hope that both of you will confine your
formal testimony to remarks that will supplement or in any way
differ from the points covered in yourstatements.
Professor Russell.
STATEMENT OF CARLOS RUSSELL, PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES,
BROOKLYN COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you said, you have
my statement in front of you and in order to facilitate theprocess I
would like to summarize briefly a few points which I think support
the formal statement which you now have before you. First let me
state that I do not view myself as an expert on the intermachinations
of Uganda nor as an apologist for that Government. My views stem
primarily from having spent 10 weeks in Uganda over the last 2 years
and having witnessed in Uganda some of the distortion which wehave
seen here in the United States press. As an example I willcite that
during September of 1977 when there was ostensibly an alleged at
tempt on the life of President Amin , we were in Kampala. One of the
members of our group was a reporter.
She received innumerable calls from the major wire services in the
Western World, ABC, UP, Reuters and what have you. Their question
was is there blood in the streets of Kampala and when this reporter
denied that because we were present when she said that she had spoken
to the President, the foreign reporters were unbelieving. We were
there. I would like to say also that one of the major criticisms of the
present regime is that there is an attempt to destroy the Christians in
that country.
Our stay in Uganda contradicts that so much so, that while we were
there Uganda celebrated the introduction of Christianity in thatcoun
try 100 years ago with a national holiday, with the statementsall over
the newspaper , the one major newspaper in English in that country
which is also state controlled and prominently picturing Archbishop
Huane and Cardinal – I cannot pronounce his name— S -n -u -b - g -u .
In addition the retiring High Commissioner from the United Na
tions during Refugee Week made it clear that Uganda was one of the
few countries thatmet the financial quota and far surpassed most of the
African nations in meeting the United Nations requirements for the
refugee program . What this told us — and we asked ourselves if
Uganda was in fact under a reign of terror, if it were true that bodies
kept floating downthe Nile, whythen would refugees from neighbor
ing countries like Burundi and Ethiopia seek asylum and succor in
Uganda ?
As I said earlier youhave before you the testimony. I would like to
make two brief points. One of themis it is my conviction that what we
are witnessing in Uganda is an internal struggle for power and the
best way that I can support that testimony is by merely repeating some
of the language thatwas used here today, for example, the foreign
 24

power of the Nubian thugs of President Amin. It seems to me what we

are witnessing in a real sense is that phenomena that grows out of the
imposition of external border limitations and the creation of nations
which supercedes the traditional national African concept of nations
which wetend to call tribes. It is because of the internal strugglewhere
each potential leader seeks his own power base among his people that
the struggle that is occurring is expressed in the manner that itis being
expressed.
As Isaid, I make no claim to be an expert on Uganda but I do believe
that I have some understanding of the political struggles that occur
in developing countries. I would suggest also that one listen very care
fully to some of the language that is being used, and juxtapose that
with the language that is used by others who presently find themselves
out of power and seek the support of the United States to help them
to reenter and regain power.
The same languagewas used by the Cuban refugees in this country
who wanted the United States to invade Cuba and regain their
homeland.
Finally, let me say this, that I am concerned with the concept of
human rights but I'think that when the United States is seemingly
singling out Uganda there is a degree of hypocracy in that since the
racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa have not been equally
singled out for the kinds of measures that are presently being proposed
in the bills that are now before you. It seems to me that if we are
talking about equality and sincerity, then by definition it is necessary ,
that the same vehemence and energy with which those who would like
a change in the Government of Uganda advocate certain measures be
expressed with the same force to advocate change in the Governments
of Rhodesia and South Africa.
It seems to me also that when we talk of human rights we should
not forget human rights within the borders of the United States. I
now make reference to the Wilmington 10. I believe that the concept
of human rights goes a little further than just the physical obliteration
of a human being. It deals also with jobs, housing, and health. We are
witnessing in the United States perhaps the highest unemployment
rate amongblack youngsters from time immemorial.
We are listening to the clamoring of black, of brown, yellow , and
poor people asking for a change and a redistribution of the wealth in
this country, and still what we hear from the leadership is an attempt
to intervene in what I would consider an internal struggle in the devel
oping country of Uganda .
As I said I will be brief. I do not view myself here in a position to
debate anyone. My attempt is merely to share what we witnessed, what
we saw and what we felt.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. Russell's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARLOS RUSSELL, PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN
STUDIES, BROOKLYN COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to share my perceptions
on Uganda . At the outset, however, let me state that I do not consider myself
an expert on the inner political machinations of the government of Uganda ; nor
 25

do I view myself as an apologist for the government. My testimony this after

noon is the perception of one who has spent a total of ten weeks, over the past
two years, in that country. It is the testimony of one who has had the opportunity
to meet and spend sometime with the President, cabinet officials, and the common
people of Uganda. In addition, I must state that mine is the testimony of one
who is repulsed by what appears to be an unfair onslaught by the media on the
government of Uganda — with the apparent sanction of vested interests and
forces within the U.S. I say this without trepidation, since I am confident that
any unbiased observer would be compelled by the weight of the evidence to agree
that the media attack on Uganda - irrespective of whether the allegations of the
denial of human rights are valid or not - has been excessive and in many cases
bordering on the obscene.
Suffice it to cite one recent example of the insidiousness of the media which
forces one to wonder whether the present aim of the media is to prepare the
mind of the American public so as to make an eventual attack, economic or mili
tary, on Uganda palatable to the American people. On Sunday, January 29th ,
the NBC network presented a program called " The Hardy Boys, Nancy Drew
Mysteries . " In it there was a scene in which one of the boys while convalescing
in a hospital is seen viewing the news on television . On this simulated newcast,
the reporter says, " President Carter is on his way to Uganda to meet with the
new president . . . following the overthrow of thetyrannical dictator Idi Amin .”
The reporter continued , and I paraphrase, “ This move by the President is in
tended to improve the relations between the two countries.” After seeing this
totally unrelated and gratuitous interjection of politics on the part of the pro
grammers one could not help but ask why and what next ? One has yet to witness
similar license and attack on leaders of other countries or on the racist regimes
of South Africa and Rhodesia. For that matter one hears little outrage over the
plight of the moslems in the Philippines or the Marxists in Chile. They too have
human rights. Further given the allegations of repression and reputed denial of
the rights of Soviet Jewry, the same intensity and energy is absent in the media
attacks on the Soviet Union. In none of these cases is there a rush by the Con
gress towards the establishment of boycotts, and embargoes.
Why Uganda one is forced to ask ? And one cannot help but come to the con
clusion of an inherent political bias predicated on a need to project an aura of
bravura , if not outright racism on the part of those whose personal economic
interests will best be served by a change in the leadership of Uganda . Thus, this
display of media attack and unbridled power is best categorized in common ver
nacular as being nothing more than a cheap shot. I view the current bills before
the Congress in the same vein, and as an extension of the media attack. These
bills, as I see it, while clothed in the trappings of moral indignation and masking
the viciousness of an unrequited lover are also cheap shots. My allusion to the
unrequited lover is a direct reference to the fact, which was substantiated by
Ambassador Andrew Young, in a recent statement in which he acknowledged that
President Idi Amin came into power with the help of the United States, Britain
and France. As most of us are aware President Amin's rise to power was greeted
with hosannas from the West. “Obote the socialist was gone, long live Idi Amin.”
Now that President Amin appears to be listening to his own drummer, those
who wooed him and failed to win him, now shower all their fury upon him.
Let me try to be clearer. This statement is in no means intended to suggest
that there may not be problems in Uganda, I am sure that there are. But what
ever problems exist, and there may be many, these in my view are not of the
exaggerated magnitude and nature as projected by some of those who may have
left, or have been asked to leave.
As I have previously stated, I do not profess to be an expert on the politics
of Uganda , for no visitor can tell if the beds in his host's bedrooms are made
while sitting in the livingroom . But one thing is certain if the garbage in the
kitchen is reeking and the odor is pungent, the stink will reach the nostrils of
all who sit in that livingroom . While we were in Uganda we saw no puffed
bodies floating down the Nile. We saw no blood in the streets, and heard no
cries of terror .
Let me be more specific. On our first trip in September of 1976 , ten Black
journalists were invited by the government to see for themselves what was billed
as “ the real Uganda and an opportunity to interview His Excellency President
Idi Amin Dada .” Most of use, if not all, were filled with some anxiety, since we
too had been victims of what the media had said. At that time, I served as a
consultant, in the capacity of Editor to the Brooklyn section of the New York
 26
Amsterdam News. The others with me represented radio station WBLS /WLIB
in New York, the Bilalian News, The Black American , a New York based news
paper, and the People's Communications Network , a community -based video
group from New York.
While there will be those who will suggest that ours was a guided tour, a sales
job, similar to New York's recent treatment of Senator William Proxmire. To
them we respond that their argument is in part true. We did have a guide which
for us was very helpful. But, we visited the places we wanted to visit and we
asked whatever questions we desired . One has only to read News Director David
Lampel's opening remarks to President Amin in our joint video taped interview
with him to understand the tenor of our questions. This statement was as
follows :
" We have been hearing reports in America that Uganda today is a police state,
and that students and political opponents are being taken away in the night and
that you have been in league with hijackers and so -called international ter
rorists, and that your administration as a consequence is on the verge of col
lapse. Could you please begin by giving us your reaction to these questions.”
In the same manner that Senator Proxmire did not appear to have been
affected by this New York guided tour, and that few questioned his right to
make an objective decision in the future, so do we claim the same objectively and
right. We know that our present views emanate from what we saw , heard and
felt .
During our stay in Uganda our sense of the country was that of a relatively
open place. There was no feeling of terror and repression. One example may help
to convey this sense. When we visited a school in Kabale, which incidentally was
run by a white nun, and met the President's children, there were no visible
armed guards or police, which to our minds we would have expected if a reign
of terror existed . Granted, there could have been secret service men in and
around the school, but on the day that we were there they too were invisible.
President Amin , who we saw often , traveled through the city with few visible
bodyguards. He mingled freely with the people and gave the appearance of one
who was quite comfortable in this setting. I do not intend to burden this com
mittee with the names of people we met, suffice it to say that we met a number
of Americans, Black and White who reside in Uganda. We even met one Black
American who was traveling solo . Among the cabinet members we met was
Mr. Oboth-Ofumbi who was later to die in what the Uganda government main
tained was a car accident.
What appeared clear to us was that Uganda was in dire need of technicians
and training in a sundry of fields. Some of us felt this could be forthcoming
from Black Americans.
It was this concern that led us to return to Uganda in the summer of 1977.
The composition of the members of this group, however, was quite different: we
had a doctor, an educator, an administrator of a major vocational training pro
gram in this country , a reporter, and a businessman . Once again , we felt that we
had access to the country. For myself, however, the atmosphere was slightly dif
ferent in the sense that the President did not appear to be as accessible. Nonethe
less, the major tone and tempo of this beautiful city was the same, as on our
previous visit.
It was on this trip that we became convinced that much of what was said about
Uganda was being exaggerated and đistorted . As an example of this, we had
heard that Uganda was anti- Christian . Yet on June 30th , the lead article in the
Voice of Uganda was a story about the church of Uganda being 100 years old.
The article was accompanied by a prominent picture of Archbishop Wani, and
His Eminence Cardinal Nsubuga and others. It was a government holiday.
We asked ourselves how could this be ? If it is true that a government is anti
Christian, why would it celebrate the birthday of the church, and prominently
portray this church in its paper, especially in a state-controlled press. In addi
tion, it was on this trip that information of an alleged assassination attempt
was made on the life of Dr. Amin . The reporter in our group was besieged by
the international wire service for information on the bloodbath that was sup
posedly taking place in Kampala . And when she told them that there was no such
bloodbath . They were unbelieving. We were there, we walked the streets and
talked to people, including President Amin . In fact , when the reporter said that
she had spoken with the President, she was asked, how did she know that it was
he, could it not have been someone else ? She answered that they spoke of things
that only he could have known . In addition , during this time of alleged siege, we
 27
were accompanied at a number of social functions by many of the top military men
in the country. Hence it was for us difficult to accept what the international press
was saying. For us, it was as if here in the U.S. a coup was in progress and the
President's chief advisors and friends were entertaining foreign guests. It was
all ridiculous, this exaggeration of the news media. So much so that one reporter
based in Kenya called us in Kampala to say that he was coming to Kampala .
When he was asked by the reporter in our group about a visa, he said that he
would get one from Kenya. We knew this was impossible. Nonetheless, later that
week we received a frantic call from the editor of the Toronto Star, inquiring
about the whereabouts of their now missing reporter. We conveyed this infor
mation and concern to the Ugandan authorities. We were later informed that
the reporter had been arrested and subsequently released.
Ours then is a view much different from what is projected. The media , we feel,
has distorted much of what is occurring. We have no way of proving or dis
proving what organizations like Amnesty International states and I make no
attempt to do so here. I will say, however, that as you know , Uganda is still a
member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and it seems to me
that if the alleged violations of which this nation is accused were substantive
then that international body would have made some attempt to castigate Uganda .
Also, speaking of the United Nations, while in Uganda , we heard the former U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Komorsky, say that Uganda's contributions
to the refugee program was more than all of the other African countries put
together. He went on to mention the number of refugees residing in Uganda. It
seemed to us that in a country where there is a reign of terror, refugees from
neighboring countries would not seek asylum and succor within that country.
Is my statement a denial that people have been killed in Uganda ? Definitely
not. I believe that people have been killed. I personally abhor killing, but I suggest
that what we are witnessing is an internal struggle for power of two or more
factions. The struggle in Uganda is a phenomenon common to most developing
countries and in particular African nations, especially those wherein the in
digenous nations, which the Western nations call tribes, were forced to reside
within externally imposed borders and where a vacuum of power has been
created . In my view , the problem of Uganda must be resolved by the people of
Uganda. One should not forget that the United States had its own violent struggle
for power — the Civil War—and that struggle bloody and inhuman as it was
was resolved by the people of the United States.
Am I condoning violence ? Not at all, I am merely attempting to describe a
reality and I am suggesting that this committee not become a party to those who
. would have the United States, under the guise of concern for human rights,
become supportive of one faction or the other in the internal power struggle which
I believe is what the problem in Uganda is all about.
In addition, it is for me an act of hypocrisy for the United States to vehemently
express concern for human rights abroad, while seemingly ignoring these con
cerns within her own borders. I speak now of the Wilmington Ten , and the host of
others who like them still languish in jail. I speak also of another aspect of human
rights, the aspects of hunger, unemployment, education , especially here where
past gains by Blacks are now being threatened. I speak also of those millions of
people within these United States — Black , brown, and the poor in general— who
are clamoring for their right to live and to eat and yet we appear to be more
concerned with the internal struggle of a foreign nation . I subscribe to the old
adage, " charity begins at home.” Therefore, I would like to see some of the
energy and resources which are being expended in the attempt to chastize Uganda
be used in assisting the rural and urban poor of this nation . I believe further
that Uganda has been unfairly singled out for special treatment and I condemn
this.
As I have said earlier, I hear no serious talk of bills suggesting economic
embargoes for those countries where there are longstanding and flagrant viola
tions of the most basic human rights — the political right of majority rule as
exists in Azania and Zimbabwe. There is more lip service in this regard than
action emanating from those who now so articulately argue for the economic
isolation of Uganda. These countries continue to defy the world order and we
talk of an embargo on Uganda while propping up the governments of Rhodesia
and South Africa with large investments. I say let us be fair with Uganda . May I
respectfully suggest that rather than listen to some of us who have been there,
or to those Ugandans who have left there for their own political reasons, that a

25-826 0 - 78 - 3
 28

Subcommittee of this body visit Uganda and see for itself what is occurring. I
plead with you not to be carried away by this wave of emotionalism magnified
by the media and fostered by those who would one day like to see themselves in
power .

Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much , Professor. You have expressed
yourself most eloquently and we appreciate having your point of view
as we consider this issue.
So that the members will know aa little more about you and thetrips
that you refer to, I think it might be helpful if you would indicate
to us the circumstances under which you made these two trips to
Uganda and anything relating to those trips that you think might be
helpful.
Mr. RUSSELL. Surely. The first trip was in September of 1976 and
the “ we ” refers to 10 black journalists. These newspaper peoplewere
from the New York Amsterdam News. During that timeI served as a
special consultant to the Amsterdam News as its Brooklyn editor. Ac
companying us on that trip were, among others, a journalist from a
black American newspaper, a team of video experts called the People's
Communications Network which is New York based, and the news
director of WBLS- FM , WLIB - AM of the Innercity Broadcasting in
New York .
This trip was at the invitation of the Ugandan Government to meet
His Excellency and to observe for ourselves what was occurring in
Uganda. The second trip in a sense was an extension of the first insofar
that after our first visit we felt that Uganda was in dire need of
help: technical help, resources, et cetera ; and so we took a group of
black Americans with expertise in certain areas. One was a doctor,
theother was a businessman. Wetook .a reporter, an editor, andmyself.
The purpose then was to see if there was any possibility of develop
ing a mechanism through which some of the necessary help that
Uganda needed in developing its economy could be forthcoming from
black America.
The first trip was September of 1976 and the second trip was the
summer of 1977, June 1977.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman , since you opened that line of question
ing I would like to ask Mr. Russell who financed these trips.
Mr. RUSSELL. As I said we were invited by the Government of
Uganda and theypaid for it.
Mr. BONKER . They paid for the trip?
Mr. RUSSELL. They paid for the trip, that is all. They took us there
and back. There was no money givento anyone. In the same manner
that journalists from across this country go to different countries to
see it.
Mr. BONKER. Just one final question and then I would like to come
back to Mr. Russell later. I understand there is an island or lake in
Uganda that is named after you ?
 29

Mr. RUSSELL . That is true .

Mr. BONKER. Thank you.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Kintu, if you could give us someinformationabout
the Committee on Uganda ; that is, how you are affiliated, whether or
not included in your experiences were any trips to Uganda under simi
lar circumstances.
STATEMENT OF REMIGIUS KINTU , EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
COMMITTEE ON UGANDA, WASHINGTON , D.C.

Mr. Kintu. Thank youvery much, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Remigius Kintu. I am the son of a. coffee farmer and I
come from a district which is the largest coffee producer in the country,
I was brought up and raised on a farm and I would say, thank God
you called me here because I feel I represent the silent majority of
Uganda, the rural people who have been brutally tortured , murdered,
and slaughtered by Idi Amin's regime.
After seeing this wonderful panel you called here, I am quite im
pressed because I stand on the extreme end of the whole spectrum ,
especially coming right after such a well-articulated mercenary, Mr.
Russell, a prominent advocate of Idi Amin in the United States who
has witnessed before you that his trips have been fully financed by
Idi Amin and he has been brought here by the Uganda Embassy ac
companied by the second man in the Uganda Embassy in Washington,
D.C., right here from the state bureau — who we are going to refer to
in our testimony - well chauffeured by the official Embassy chauffeur
sitting right in the back here.
I would not expect any better statement from him when they are
watching him outhere blowing off hismouth telling them everything
he hasbeen instructed totell you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to proceed with my testimony, Mr. Chairman , after making
two comments about such .
For the past 7 years, Mr. Chairman, the people of Uganda have
longed for this opportunity to tell you and Members ofthe U.S.Con
gress about the horrors going on in Uganda under Idi Amin. For 7
years we have consistently labored to draw the attention of the civil
ized world about wholesale murders, persecutions, and abominable
tortures being inflicted upon our people by Idi Amin's regime. Our
cries have not been responded to as effectively as we had anticipated
due to reasons beyond my comprehension. Unfortunately, this day
has come too late for thousandsof Ugandans who would have loved
to come here and explain to you theirordealunder Idi Amin and his
henchmen. These people have been systematically slaughtered as the
world kept mum .
A small number of people, mainly here in the United States, take
Idi Amin as their hero. I would love to deliver him to their doorsteps
 30

free of charge. Applauding such a murderer reveals absolute loss of

human decency , complete absence of judgment, and civilized under
standing that I feel weary of seeingthem live among civilized persons.
African independence is not a license to kill people. The young
generation of Africans have watched in total dismay and disgust
many African states and almost the entire OAU shying away from
persevering and protecting African lives in Uganda in the pretext of
anoninterferencein internal affairs of aa sister state.”" This is an act of
utter irresponsibility and undermines the integrity and substance of
African liberation.
The world's attention to Uganda has all the time focused on Idi
Amin's bizarre and ferocious behaviors, his outrageous reign of terror,
and violation of human rights. Oftentimes, mention has beenmade of
Amin's victims such as the two Americans – Stroh and Siedle—who
were murdered in Mbarara in 1971, Fr. Clement Kiggundu, Ben
Kiwanuka, Kalimuzo,Mubiru, Dora Block, and Archbishop Luwum .
Yet there are hundreds of thousands of Ugandans whom Amin has
killed whose names never cause a ripple in the international news
media. The respectable International Commission of Jurists came up
with a conservative estimate of between 150,000 and 300,000 people
having been killed by Amin's regime.
Based on information from Ugandan exiles and our contacts still
inside the country and noting events following Amin's takeover of the
country when his faction constituted only a minor percentage of the
army, he insured control by systematically purging other tribes in the
Army and replacing them with Nubian Sudanese mercenaries. Syste
matic purges of all adult males in Acholi and Lango districts have been
confirmed. Acholi people were liquidated from Gulu Town and such
high schools like Sir Samuel BakerHigh School, Obote High School,
Laibi High School, Kitgum High School, and Lango College. Many
villages were wiped out. Amin's methodical killings have occurred in
other parts of the country; namely, Buganda, Bugishu, Ankole, and
Busoga . There Amin has slaughtered everybody with influence, prop
erty and potential, noting that the educated Christians throughout the
country have been targeted. It is clear that the number of casualties is
far greater than previous reports have indicated. The difficulties in
giving a definite number is absolutely astounding. Despite all this, the
death toll is stillrising each day Amin reigns. I often cry out : Where
is the God of the just when the innocent are suffering?
Idi Amin's tyranny is no longer a question of human rights, but
rather it is pure andsimple genocide. The impact of these enormous
murders may not make any sensational impact on a people who are far
removed geographically , but to missions of Ugandans the impact is
not merely disgusting. These are real people asinnocent as an unborn
lamb whose only crimes are to be well educated, Christians, potential
or actual leaders in their respective communities, successful business
men, church leaders. To us Ugandans, these are fathers or mothers,
 31

sons or daughters, neighbors or partners, friends or foes, teachers or

students, storekeepers,accountants, doctors, nurses, farmers, managers
of businesses, mayors, taxi drivers, office messengers, priests, nuns,
babies, and pregnant women and sometimes legislators like you, et
cetera, gone forever, not to be seen again. Unfortunately, they have
left thousands of widows, orphans, and wailing relatives and neigh
bors to remind us of Amin's genocide.
Anarchy : Justice Brandeis once said that when the government
breaks the law, thenthere is no law. Mr. Chairman, Uganda is incom
plete anarchy now .For thousands of Ugandans who have been killed, I
must sadly admit their cases have been closed. But for the remaining
millions of Ugandans who have to live under the yoke of Amin's re
gime it is more than a nightmare. A
A Ugandan refugee told me jokingly
in Nairobi last August that if one hada house in hell and a big farmin
Uganda, he wouldsell that farm and rush to his house for safety.
I think that explains the situationin Uganda.
Idi Amin, the black Hitler of Africa , has established his genocidal
rule so well that there is no way opposition could successfully come
from within Uganda. He calculated his steps so well by establishing
four notorious killer squads which are directly under his own com
mand . These are: the Public Safety Unit, the State Research Bureau,
the MilitaryPolice, and the Uganda Army.Their official duties are to
terrorize, kill, rape,rob, and torture Ugandans.
These murder squads have set up concentration camps around Kam
pala where they constantly slaughter Ugandans in some of the most
barbaric ways this world has seen since Hitler's time. These concen
tration camps are at Naggulu, Makindye, Nakasero, Kololo ( in Amin's
Lodge ), Namanve Forest, Republic House ( formerly Bulange) and
State House Entebbe. For 24 hours a day, Amin's men go out on the
streets and travel to houses, villages, and offices to pick up victims,
put them in trunks of cars at gunpoint like luggage and haul them
away for torture and slaughter like chickens.One is lucky if his
death came with a singlegunshot.Manythousandsof Amin's victims
have been subjected to the most brutal methods of torture in the his
tory of modern Africa .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Kintu, may I suggest that because votes may be
coming up soon that you may summarize that portion of your testi
mony concerning what you call concentration camps. Theremainder
of your testimony cites examples which the committee fully accepts.
We would appreciate your then going on to describe how in your
opinion Amin has destroyed the economy.
You talk about manufacturing capability and how it has deteri
orated. You touched on coffee prices, East African trade, medical
service,and how it has been affected, as has been pointed out by the
former Minister of Health.
You speak of inflation, how the educational standards have de
teriorated , and so on. All of this, of course, will be made part of the
 32

record which will be reviewed by the members of the committee and

their staff. We would , however, like to allow the members of the sub
committee to pose questions to all of the panel.
Some of the points that you make in the remainder of your testi
mony might well be expressed in response to the questions. So if you
could summarize then we can proceed to that.
Mr. KINTU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will jump to the next question. That is how Amin has destroyed
the economy which I am sure has not been fully elaborated by the
previous witnesses.
I state in my testimony, Mr. Chairman, that Idi Amin has killed
the Ugandan economy and some economists likingly have stated
“Uganda is racing at supersonic speed backward.” It is only the
subsistence sector which has shown a positive growth rate averaging
3 percent during 1972–76 which is absorbed by population growth of3
percent per annum . All other sectors of the economy have had nega
tive growthrates since Amin took power.
Among the factors which have led to the collapse of Uganda's
economy are : the dismantling of commercial networks, the break
down of transportation systems, the killing of and flight of business
men to exile and the terrorization of every town, village andbusiness
center. Normal commercial activity has ceased to exist under these
conditions.
During 1962–70 Uganda's GNP used to grow at an annual rate
of 5 to 6 percent in 1969 prices. Amin's government reports that from
1971 to the present time, Uganda's GNP has been negative.
Manufacturing: Between 1963 and 1966 Uganda's manufacturing
capability maintained an annual growth rate of 18 percent. This
rate was even higher during 1966–70. By 1975, the Ugandan Govern
ment shamelessly reported that only 45 percent of the country's in
dustrial capability was being utilized . Reliable sources have con
firmed to me that industrial production was much less than what the
Government reported to be the case.
My sources (a respectable international organization ) revealed to
me the following average decline in industrial production during
1972–76 :
Textiles, a drop of 24 percent; blankets, a drop of 65 percent; stock
ings, a drop of 56 percent; soap, a drop of 68 percent; matches, a drop
of 50 percent; fertilizers, a drop of 25 percent; plywood, a drop of 50
percent; corrugated iron sheets, a drop of 80 percent; cement , a drop
of 30 percent; and blister copper, a drop of 43 percent.
Other factors which haveheightened this decline are shortages of
imported raw materials and components, spare parts, and lack of
technical and managerial personnel.
Agricultural production and exports: Actual physical production
in the agricultural sector has been declining. In 1972'Uganda exported
200,000 tons of coffee , but 1976 figures show 130,000 tons having been
exported ; a decline of 35 percent. In 1972, 80,000 tons of cotton were
exported . Yet in 1976 only 20,000 tons were exported, representing a
drop of 75 percent.
 33

[Mr. Kintu's prepared statement follows :]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REMIGIUS KINTU , EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMITTEE ON
UGANDA, ARLINGTON , VA.
For the past seven years, Mr. Chairman , the people of Uganda have longed
for this opportunity to tell you and Members of the U.S. Congress about the
horrors going on in Uganda under Idi Amin. For seven years, we have consistently
labored, to draw the attention of the civilized world about wholesale murders,
persecutions, and abominable tortures being inflicted upon our people by Idi
Amin's regime. Our cries have not been responded to as effectively as we had
anticipated due to reasons beyond my comprehension. Unfortunately , this day has
come too late for thousands of Ugandans who would have loved to come here and
explain to you their ordeal under Idi Amin and his henchmen . These people have
been systematically slaughtered as the world kept mum.
A small number of people, mainly here in the United States, take Idi Amin as
their hero . I would love to deliver him to their doorsteps free of charge. Applaud
ing such a murderer reveals absolute loss of human decency, complete absence of
judgment and civilized understanding that I feel weary of seeing them live
among civilized persons.
African independence is not a license to kill people. The young generation of
Africans have watched in total dismay and disgust, many African states and
almost the entire 0.A.U. shying away from preserving and protecting African
lives in Uganda in the pretext of " non-interference in internal affairs of a sister
state". This is an act of utter irresponsibility and undermines the integrity and
substance of African liberation .
The world's attention to Uganda has all the time focused on Idi Amin's bizarre
and ferocious behaviors, his outrageous reign of terror and violation of human
rights. Oftentimes, mention has been made of Amin's victims such as the two
Americans - Stroh and Siedle — who were murdered in Mbarara in 1971, Fr. Clem
ent Kiggundu, Ben Kiwanuka , Kalimuzo, Mubiru , Dora , Block and Archbishop
Luwum . Yet there are hunılreds of thousands of Ugandans whom Amin has killed
whose names never cause a ripple in the international news media . The respect
able International Commission of Jurists came up with a conservative estimate
of between 150,000 and 300,000 people having been killed by Amin's regime.
Based on information from Ugandan exiles and our contacts still inside the
country and noting events following Amin's takeover of the country when his
faction constituted only a minor percentage of the army , he ensured control by
systematically purging other tribes in the army and replacing them with Nubian
Sudanese mercenaries. Systematic purges of all adult males in Acholi and Lango
districts have been confirmed . Acholi people were liquidated from Gulu Town
and such high schools like Sir Samuel Baker H.S., Obote H.S., Laibi H.S., Kitgum
H.S., and Lango College. Many villages were wiped out. Amin's methodical kill
ings have occurred in other parts of the country ; Namely, Buganda, Bugishu,
Ankole, and Busoga. There Amin has slaughtered everybody with influence, prop
erty and potential, noting that the educated Christians throughout the country
have been targeted, it is clear that the number of casualties is far greater than
previous reports have indicated. The difficulties in giving a definite number is
absolutely astounding. Despite all this, the death toll is still rising each day Amin
reigns. I often cry out : Where is the God of the just when the innocents are
suffering ?
Idi Amin's tyranny is no longer a question of human rights, but rather it is
pure and simple genocide. The impact of these enormous murders may not make
any sensational impact on a people who are removed geographically, but to mil
lions of Ugandans, the impact is not merely disgusting. These are real people as
innocent as an unborn lamb, whose only crimes are to be well educated, christians,
potential or actual leaders in their respective communities, successful business
men, church leaders To us Ugandans, these are fathers or mothers, sons or
daughters, neighbors or partners, friends or foes, teachers or students, store
keepers, accountants, doctors, nurses, farmers, managers of businesses, mayors,
 34

taxi-drivers, office messengers, priests, nuns, babies and pregnant women , etc.,
gone forever not to be seen again. Unfortunately , they have left thousands of
widows, orphans and wailing relatives and neighbors to remind us of Amin's
genocide.
ANARCHY

Justice Brandeis once said that when the government breaks the law, then
there is no law. Mr. Chairman, Uganda is in complete anarchy right now. For
thousands of Ugandans who have been killed, I must sadly admit, their cases
have been closed . But for the remaining millions of Ugandans who have to live
under the yoke of Amin's regime, it is more than a nightmare. A Ugandan refugee
told me jokingly in Nairobi last August that if one had a house in hell and a
big farm in Uganda, he would sell that farm and rush to his house for safety.
Idi Amin, the black Hitler of Africa, has established his genocide rule so well
that there is no way opposition could successfully come from within Uganda. He
calculated his steps so well by establishing four notorious killer squads which
are directly under his own command . These are : the public safety unit, the state
research bureau, the military police, and the Uganda army. Their official duties
are to terrorize, kill, rape, rob, and torture Ugandans.
CONCENTRATION CAMPS

These murder squads have set up concentration camps around Kampala where
they constantly slaughter Ugandans in some of the most barbaric ways this
world has seen since Hitler's time. These concentration camps are at Naggulu ,
Makindye, Nakasero, Kololo ( in Amin's lodge ) , Namanve Forest, Republic House
( formerly Bulange) and State House Entebbe. For 24 hours a day, Amin's men
go out on the streets and travel to houses, villages and offices to pick up victims,
put them in trunks of cars at gun - point like luggage and haul them away for
torture and slaughter like chickens. One is lucky if his death came with a single
gun shot. Many thousands of Amin's victims have been subjected to the most
brutal methods of torture in the history of modern Africa .
Ugandan refugees who have miraculously escaped those camps have told me
of some of the most horrifying acts going on inside Amin's slaughter houses. I
met a Ugandan refugee in Nairobi last July whose skin now looks like that of
a Zebra . He escaped from the Republic House Camp where he was beaten with
an iron rod for two hours each day for twenty days. They used to tie his hands
and legs then push him downstairs rolling like a brick. They also made prisoners
crawl on broken pieces of glass with their hands and legs cuffed and then fork
lift them with guns mounted with bayonets. Forcing victims to drink human
urine from Amin's murderers was considered among mild punishment.
The mayor of my home town , Francis Walugembe, was murdered in public
view . First they cut off his genitals and stuffed them in his mouth like a cigarette.
Later on they dismembered him and left him to die. Fr. Kiggundu's death was
widely publicized in the international press. He was first beaten extensively, shot
and burned in his car. Only a few pieces of his head and car were found and led
to his identification. Ugandan refugees I talked to myself confirmed the stories
of victims being forced to kill one another by clashing each other's heads with
hammers.
A close friend of mine who escaped from Makindye concentration camp told
me that he used to see on the average 15 people murdered every day in that
section of the camp where he was placed. Outbursts of cries and groaning were
common throughout the days and the nights from all over the camp while he
was there. These sounds always subsided when the victim or victims ended
their journey out of Uganda and indeed out of this world, forever without a
word or a will.
Idi Amin rewards his killers handsomely. He has promoted some to cabinet
posts on the basis of their brutality in murdering people. For example : Mali
yamungu who dismembered Francis Walugembe publicly and licked the sword,
has been promoted rapidly through military ranks. He is now Brigadier
Maliyamungu and chief of training in the entire Uganda army. It has been
learned from reliable sources that Juma Aiga and Ali Fadhul who killed the
two Americans have all been rewarded with promotions. Juma is now Minister
of Transportation . Ali Fadhul was made Governor of Northern Region and
recently promoted to cabinet post as Minister of Regional Administration .
 35

In fact, Mr. Chairman, Nakasero is not only a concentration camp, it also

a training institution for Idi Amin's Foreign Service officers. It is an open secret
that he places at least two of his State Research men in every Ugandan Em
bassy as overseers to spy on Ugandan exiles and coordinate other activities.
A State Research officer in training at Nakasero qualifies for his overseas post
by having killed at least 25 persons. The inspector for this qualifying exam
is Idi Amin himself. This was told to me þy a lucky Ugandan refugee now living
in Nairobi. He saw Amin come to Nakasero to inspect these trainees who
jubilantly displayed their victims. After the inspection, this man together with
other prisoners were ordered to load the battered bodies on army trucks and
dump them in Lake Victoria.
Amin's genocide has permeated every segment of Ugandan society today. He
has turned that country into one big slaughterhouse. He has imposed restriction
on travel from Uganda to the outside world in fear that these travellers will
release information about what is taking place inside Uganda. He does not allow
foreign journalists nor visitors except a few of his unsuspecting disciples like
Carlos Russell. To our dismay there are a lot of black American journalists
who have been paid off to lie to the outside world about Idi Amin .
A Ugandan must apply in writing to the governor in his district and the
illiterate vice-president for permission to travel outside Uganda. The application
must be in three copies with personal photos on it, and the applicant then under
goes intensive interrogation by the State Research men. Not many people are
naive enough to take that route. Instead they walk through the jungles and
swamps and escape into neighboring Kenya or Tanzania to safety with a promise
never to return to their country as long as Idi Amin's regime is still in power.
THE ECONOMY

Besides killing people, Idi Amin has destroyed the economy so badly that
some economists have stated " Uganda is racing at supersonic speed backward."
It is only the subsistence sector which has shown a positive growth rate aver
aging 3% during 1972-1976 which is absorbed by population growth rate of 3%
per annum . All other sectors of the economy have had negative growth rates
since Amin took power. Among the factors which have led to the collapse of
Uganda's economy are : the dismantling of commercial networks, the break
down of transportation systems, the killing and the flight of businessmen into
exile and the terrorization of every town, village and business center. Normal
commercial activity has ceased to exist under these conditions.
During 1962–70 Uganda's GNP used to grow at an annual rate of 5-6 % in
1969 prices. Amin's government reports that from 1971 to the present time,
Uganda's GNP has been negative.
MANUFACTURING
Between 1963 and 1966 Uganda's manufacturing capability maintained an
annual growth rate of 18% . This rate was even higher during 1966–70. By 1975 ,
the Ugandan Government shamelessly reported that only 45 % of the country's
industrial capability was being utilized . Reliable sources have confirmed to me
that industrial production was much less than what the government reported
to be the case .
My sources ( a respectable international organization ) revealed to me the
following average decline in industrial production during 1972–76 :
Percent Percent
Textiles 24 Steel 25
Blankets 65 Plywood 50
Stockings 56 Corrugated iron sheets. 80
Soap 68 Cement 30
Matches 50 Blister copper 43
Fertilizers 60

Other factors which have heightened this decline are shortages of imported
raw materials and components, spare parts, and lack of technical and mana
gerial personnel.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS
Actual physical production in the agricultural sector has been declining. In
1972 Uganda exported 200,000 tons of coffee, but 1976 figures show 130,000 tons
 36

having reported ; a decline of 35% . In 1972, 80,000 tons of cotton were exported .
Yet in 1976 only 20,000 tons were exported ; representing a drop of 75% . Sugar
exports in 1972 were at 70,000 and dropped to 15,000 tons in 1976 or 80 % drop.
Tea exports in 1972 were at 20,000 tons against 15,000 tons in 1976 , a decline of
25% . Tobacco exports in 1972 which stood at 4,000 tons declined to 3,000 tons in
1976 or 25% decline.
COFFEE PRICES
Although in 1975/76 , the price of coffee skyrocketed worldwide, this was not
reflected in what the Ugandan coffee farmer received . Nevertheless, the Ugandan
authorities benefitted from this increase extraordinarily well.
In 1972, a Uganda coffee farmer was earning 1.20 shilling per kilo ( an equiv
alent of 17¢ U.S. ) . In 1973/4 the price of coffee to farmers was 1.25 shillings
per kilo or 18¢. In 1975/6 the farmer got 1.40 shillings per kilo or 1942 ¢. In
1976/7 the price of coffee to farmers was increased to 2.50 shilling per kilo or
30¢. While at the same time, the Ugandan Government was pocketing around
36.00 shillings ( or $ 4.00 ) per kilo.
THE FATE OF FARMERS

Despite those official prices I have indicated above, Mr. Chairman , the fate of
Ugandan farmers is alarming. Idi Amin's government is robbing those poor
farmers of their coffee and issuing them vouchers with an empty promise that
they ( farmers) will be reimbursed after the coffee has been sold overseas. They
never reimburse them . If a farmer complains, he is immediately slaughtered and
silenced forever. I witnessed the greatest smuggling of coffee into Kenya by
farmers who live near the border. What some farmers have done is to cut down
their coffee trees once and for all. Idi Amin was quite upset by these actions and
ordered his murder squads to shoot any farmer that cuts his coffee trees. He also
ordered helicopters to shoot at canoes on Lake Victoria suspected of smuggling
coffee into Kenya.
The production of cotton has dropped significantly as I have shown above,
due to low prices awarded to farmers and also due to government refusal to
reimburse these people, whatever little is due to them . Consequently , many
farmers simply refused to grow the crop .

EAST AFRICAN TRADE

Mr. Chairman , you remember the East African community and how it had
established an excellent market for the three East African nations. Uganda's
imports from Kenya and Tanzania used to average $ 50 million per year during
1960–70. Exports during the same period ranged about $ 30 million per year.
Outside trade, that is trade to countries outside East Africa, during the same
period stood at $ 120–40 million for imports and $ 200 million for exports
annually.
Currently trade between Uganda and other East African countries is in
shambles dominated by smuggling, barter, and black marketeering. As a result,
even the essential goods like sugar, salt, medicine, cars, clothes. bicycles, tires,
and other manufactured goods are no longer imported into Uganda for civilian
use , but only for the army and the other killer squads. Magendo ( the black
market ) is the name of the game for the common man to get manufactured
goods. The majority of Ugandans have been forced to accept the situation in
despair and do away with all those commodities and services.

MEDICAL SERVICES
Uganda's hospitals exist only in name. Many of Uganda's doctors, nurses and
medical personnel have either been killed or have run away. There are about 400
Ugandan doctors in Nairobi alone. There is no medicine in Uganda's hospitals
nor instruments to operate on patients. As a result of this breakdown in services,
thousands of our people are dying every day when they could have otherwise been
saved ( increasing Amin's casualties ).
INFLATION

Inflation in Uganda is monumentally high. It has made the Ugandan currency

almost certainly valueless. From the IMF standpoint, the Uganda shilling is on
a par with that of Kenya and Tanzania . In actuality, that is not the case . I per
 37

sonally checked this out when I visited Busia last August. I found out that 100
Uganda shillings were being exchanged for 17 Kenyan shillings. These rates do
not improve over time but only get worse. Our people are putting up with all
those losses without much choice. This has encouraged a drastic shift of re
sources from the cash economy to production of basic foods and barter exchange
to ensure at least basic survival.
The prices of goods inside Uganda ( if one can be lucky enough to find any ) do
reflect the loss in currency exchange and also the laws of supply and demand.
Obviously, this does not leave the common man in a comfortable place even with
other factors discounted .
EDUCATION

The education system of Uganda has also fallen victim of Amin's brutality,
Makerere University which used to be the pride of East Africa is now no better
off than a high school. Almost the entire faculty and administration have fled to
outside countries after the head of that institution, Kalimuzo, and some of the
teaching staff were killed . Mass killings and terrorizing in some schools around
the country have caused many to close, or be without teachers, students, books or
equipment. Amin and his soldiers are constantly reminding the entire population
of Uganda that it does not pay to be educated . He sights himself and his illiterate
vice -president as examples of success without going to school. Soldiers have been
heard ridiculing educated people to the effect that people with degrees whine like
pigs when a knife cuts through their throats. Consequently, the youth do not
want to go to school to get a passport to death. You find teenagers as young as
thirteen are prostitutes, and young boys are the best smugglers of goods between
Uganda and Kenya .
HOW PEOPLE SURVIVE

Idi Amin may have killed our people and the economy, but he has not succeeded
in killing the good weather of Uganda. This is the main element that is enabling
our people to survive in Uganda. Thousands have retreated back to the villages
and simply survive by producing their own food . Production of such staple foods
like cassava, corn , sorghum , beaus, peanuts, and peas has been increasing at a
remarkable rate . Bananas have held constant though .
AMIN'S HELP

Mr. Chairman, people often ask : Who is helping Amin stay in power ? The
greatest benefactors of Idi Amin are : the Soviet Union , American coffee com
panies, the P.L.O., Libya , Nubians, Sudanese mercenaries, Cubans and a few
Arab countries.
The Soviet Union is the principle supplier of weapons and military hardware
to Amin . There are Soviet technicians and intelligence officers helping Amin in
teaching his men how to operate sophisticated military equipment, and to monitor
Ugandan refugees in Kenya .
The KGB has taken over Kampala International Hotel as their regional head
quarters.
American coffee companies have recently risen to the number two position in
sustaining Amin's regime. In buying Ugandan coffee, they give Idi Amin around
$ 200 million - an equivalent of 83 percent of his total foreign exchange earn
ings — with which he buys weapons from the Soviet Union in cash , pays fat sal
aries to his mercenary soldiers, and buys luxury goods here in the U.S. and
England. Amin's planes make shuttle flights to America and England to pick up
requested items for Amin and his mercenaries on a regular basis.
Libyans, Nubians and Sudaneses mercenaries form his most notorious killers
and body guards. Idi Amin has virtually killed off all Uganda soldiers and re
placed them with Sudanese mercenaries and Nubians from all over East Africa .
The PLO is there in full swing. They are housed in the former Israeli Embassy
buildings. Our reliable sources reveal to me that among their functions are to
teach Amin's men methods of torture and terror.

WHAT CAN BE DONE ?

Mr. Chairman , I have tried to give you a true picture of the state of affairs in
Uganda under Idi Amin. We the people of Uganda ask you and all the members
of the U.S. Congress to dissassociate the United States from Idi Amin's rule of
genocide by swiftly cutting off all commercial, diplomatic and cultural ties with
that ferocious regime. We are convinced beyond doubt that withdrawal of finan
 38

cial backing now enjoyed by Amin through sales of coffee to this country will
inevitably hasten change for the better in our country. We appeal to your sub
committee to do everything possible within your power to help stop the suffering
of our people. God will reward you for that.
Mr. Diggs. I have been advised that a vote will be coming on an
amendment very soon, and the thought occurred to me if you could
suspend at this time at least one member could get in somequestions
before the vote and then we will come back. There is one member who
has not had an opportunity for interrogation and I am going to yield
to him at this point. I refer to the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Solarz .
Mr. Solarz. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, but will the other
members have a chance ?
Mr. Diggs. We will return once we vote.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.
I must say I am enormously impressed with the testimony of these
gentlemen . This is a dreadful situation and while we may grope and
grapple for a way of dealing with this problem, I want you to know
it is on the mindsof every one of us. Wehave to figure out a way to do
something about it. Let me ask you this. It is not clear to me from
your testimony the extent to which the peoplewho are getting killed
in Uganda are getting killed randomly or whether or not there is some
reason why one person rather than another is being hauled off and
executed. Is there a tribal correlation between who gets killed and
who is not getting killed ? Is it a function of their status in the society
or is it simply randomterror where whomever Amin's agents happen
to see as they prowl the streets gets plucked off and sent to one of
these camps ?
Could you give us a sense of the rationale behind the selection of
the victims ?
Mr. Kintu or Mr. Kyemba.
Mr. KYEMBA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
I think it is both . It is systematic: In the case of the Acholis and the
Langis Amin is very sensitive to the strengths of these two tribes in
the army in the past. And it has been one of his deliberate policies to
eliminate those tribes first from the army forces and also from the
areas where they are open to influence.
The other side of it is, of course, random slaughter where any of
these mercenaries who are scattered all over the place may feel they
want your Pugeot or your Cadillac and they shoot you on the street
and take your car. Many people have lost their lives in this sort of
situation. So it is almost impossible, in my view , to say anything
other than that it is random slaughter. You don't know how to behave
in order not to be killed in Amin's Uganda, since the people who are
doing it are the worst mercenaries that we have ever had on the globe.
Mr. SOLARZ. How secure is Amin's position in Uganda ? We pick
up reports in the western press every so often about attempted as
sassination plots against Amin, none of which ever seemed to work.
Is he relatively secure ? Is there major opposition within the country
of an organized nature ? Could you enlighten us on that ?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman ,in my view Amin is highly insecure,
very, very insecure. Because of the fact he has a populationof at least
11 million people, Ugandans he has not yet killed and he has got
 39

only a backing of about 20,000 or 30,000 mercenaries from the Nu

bian tribe. Those are the only people on whom he depends. Every
Ugandan in his own heart of hearts looks at his regime as repugnant
because every single family, in my view, has lost a relative — there is
no doubt about it — including those in the civil service who are living
in Uganda.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any knowledge of the number of assas
sination efforts that have been attempted against Amin ? Could you
at least let us know how many you are aware of ? Obviously there
were some you were not awareof, but is this a fairly common occur
rence there ?
Mr. KYEMBA. I was present at one assassination attempt. That was
in June 1976, when a grenade was thrown at his jeep and his driver
was killed by asplinter from the grenade. I was Minister of Health at
the time and I was at the function at which this took place, but I
would say there, Mr. Chairman, that Amin uses assassination attempts
in two ways. If he wants to eliminate a certain group like the Arch
bishop and the two Ministers and so on, he will claim that the Acholis
and the Langis want to topple him and he will create an assassination
plot to justify the senseless killing of people like them. But there is no
doubt that there have been attempts on him given the fact that so many
people have lost their relatives, and they know that since Amin is
President for life it can only change when he ceases to be alive.
Mr. SOLARZ. To your knowledge, is Amin actively encouraging his
mercenaries to go out and kill people or is he simply sort of ac
quiescing in their bloodlust, as it were?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman, Amin has established a system where
those under his command know howto get what they want. In certain
cases with regard to prominent individuals nobody in the State Bu
reau could go and pick up a foreign national and execute them like
Mrs.Dora Block ora prominent individual like the Archbishop with
out the proper sanction of Amin .
But, as I said, other mercenaries have taken the leave from Amin's
system in that they do what they like. If they want a car they just
pick it on the street and take it. My own wife's car was taken fromthe
street although I was Minister of Health at the time. This is the
sort of thing that happens.
Mr. SOLARZ. You suggested to the committee that we in effect
support legislation which has been introduced which would require
a termination of American trade with Uganda. You pointed out in
your testimony, I think , that we account for about 30 percent of
Uganda's coffee export, which is its main export crop. Assuming we
did this, wouldn't Ugandan coffee simply be bought by other coun
tries with the net result that Amin's treasury would remain as full
after the termination of American trade as it is now ?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman , I don't know whether the money
available from the United States will be able to come from another
place. The Soviet Union, I know , takes a lot of Ugandan coffee, but
they are not coffee drinkers. I don't know if as a result of the non
involvement in the United States they would wish to take on more
coffee from Uganda except for resale to some other areas as they have
done in the past.
 40

I have a feeling, Mr. Chairman, that what Amin may try to do

to get around the ban on coffee should be left to the executive branch
to sort out, because with regard to all embargoes you find there are
many people who are determined to try and find some loophole some
where .
I believe Amin would try , but most of Amin's bankers fortunately
are not the biggest coffee drinkers including Libya and the Soviet
Union .
Mr. SOLARZ. You know Amin well. You worked very closely with
him. In your judgment, do you think the man is mentally unbalanced
or do you think that he is fully in control of himself, knows exactly
what he is doing and is not — in thesense in which we understand
it — a person who is mentally deranged ?
Mr. KYEMBA. In myview , he is not mentally sick. He knows how
to calculate his move. Rightnow he knows that there is international
pressure to isolate him . Therefore, he must say something to the
United States on the basis that he wants to reestablish good relations.
When he is being attacked about executing people during the
holy month of Ramidan he organizes a situation where he isin a
coma, so apparently the execution takes place when officially he is
not aware ofwhat isgoing on.
Those are things, in my view , Mr. Chairman, which I know are
calculated by a very organized plan .
Mr. Diggs. If the gentleman would yield at that point, one of the
most constant rumors about the head of state is that he has a physical
ailment that has some bearing on his mental state and, as his former
Minister of Health, perhaps you could enlighten us without interfer
ing with his privacy.
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman, it has been stated by Amin's former
physician who was the professor of dermatology at Makerere Medical
School that Amin suffers from syphilis and this accounts for some of
his actions. I am not qualified to dispute the testimony or the state
ment of the physician who looked after him. He was certainly one of
his doctors, as I know .
Mr. SOLARZ. Could you tell us what you think would happen if
Amin were deposed ? What would happen in Uganda following his re
moval from power ?
Mr. KYEMBA. I think, Mr. Chairman, Amin's system is so person
alized that the moment he goes there can be no question that the situa
tion will change dramatically. We know that Amin has made sure that
there is no heir apparent whether it is Vice President or brigadier's he
has appointed. Weknow they have nostatus except as long as Amin is
there, and they struggle for power. The uncertainty for the future as
far as that group isconcerned should give the people of Uganda an
opportunity to reestablish fresh .
Mr. Solarz. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to ask
these questions. I want to come back, but I yield my time.
Mr. Diggs. The Chair declares a 10 -minute recess.
TA brief recess was taken .]
Mr. Diggs. The subcommittees will resume their sitting.
I yield to the gentleman from Washington , Mr. Bonker.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
 41

I would like to ask several of the panelists who are natives of

Ugandawhat theirpersonal status is at the moment, whether they re
side in the United States or wherever ? We have had information that
different so -called students who are here from Uganda are allied with
the government and are also members of the State Research Bureau.
This poses a question for your own personal safety and others who are
inexile speaking out against Idi Amin and the government.
Do you fear for your lives,and have you been intimidated, or do you
feel there have been efforts to silence your voices ?
Mr. Kintu . Mr. Chairman, if I could answer that question.
We know for a fact that there are a few Ugandans hereunder the
sponsorship of the Ugandan Government, mainly those in Florida and
Texas. Some of them are here on student visa, regular Ugandan pass
ports. Others are here on diplomatic passports even though they are
students.
I am very pleased to note that those who were in Texas have been
kicked out of there,but a good number of them are still in Florida. I
personally went to Florida to check this out myself. I found out that
Idi Amin's own cousin who was raised by Idi in his own house — the
name Gordi Buluko-- is a student at the University in Daytona Beach.
I checked with the officials at the university and they confirmed he is
there and they even told me he is a private student.
We have known through reliable sources that Mr. Buluko is a mem
ber of the State Research Bureau. He has been heavily involved in co
ordinating spying activity with Amin's agents here in Washington
posing as diplomats and those posing as diplomats in New York with
the Ugandan Mission to the U.N.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Kintu, I want to thank you for your response, but
just pursue it one step further. If the people who are here posing as
students and diplomats are actually part of the Amin regime, what is
their purpose in the United States and what are they up to ? What kind
of activity are they engaged in and do they intimidate you personally ?
Mr. Kintu . The ones who are here posing as diplomats have not
yet done any direct threat to me or to someone else I know of, but I
have had some kind of harassment which I thought was instigated by
these people .
The U.S. Secret Service came to my house one morning and said
they have heard a report that I am trying to assassinate Idi Amin. I
have never had a gun or sharp knife in my hand in my life and I said,
who told you such an open lie ? 'They said they got a report. I did not
bother checking where they got the report, but it had to come from one
of those people. Anyway the Secret Service man was very kind.
We workedtogether. He checked everything he needed to and found
no evidence of such allegation. So he went back home. So I am expect
ing more harassment especially that SRB are right here in this room
watching and recording everything I say and I could care less. I am
prepared for it.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Kyemba .
Mr. KYEMBA . Mr. Chairman, it is true that a number of Amin's mem
bers of the State Research Bureau are posted in various Embassies in
various categories. There is one in this very room. He has aa number of
people dead on his hands back home.
 42

Fortunately in the freedom of this city and this great Nation I have
no fear at all because I don't think he can do anything to me. I know,
of course, that the moment he lands in Kampala the same individual
can cause terror to many innocent Ugandans. I don't know whether
they provided the curriculum vital to your Government when they
are being posted here. What is their past service, whether they are
members of the armed forces or State Research Bureau or whether
they are meant to bemere Ugandans or of what category.
They are not only in Washington. Wehave met so many of them in
Germany, in France, and elsewhere. This is part of Amin's policy of
giving them a little holiday from the killings back home for a little
time and then they go back.
I have been followed, of course , in one or twoplacesin the United
Kingdom myself, but that was a matter which the British police
themselves took up. I would say that I would be surprised if their
job here is not to see what Kyemba is doing or what Kintu is doing in
Washingtonin order to telephone to Amin ; and possibly use some of
the U.S. dollars from coffee to send people around to follow us.
Mr. BONKER. Legislation before this committee provides, among
other things, for the closure of the Ugandan Embassy here in the
United States, restricting the movement of Ugandan officials to the
U.N., limiting their number,and prohibiting the training of Ugandans
under various devices and scholarships in this country,
Do youthink that passage of this legislation would help and, if so,
in what way ?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman, in my view, the passage of this legis
lation will be of immense help to the people of Uganda because one
thing that has got to be shown is that Amin and what he stands for
is rejected by all known civilized countries outside Uganda, which is
is. The people of Uganda in fact are looking anxiously to the United
States and other Western governments to take aa firm stand on Amin's
excesses. But, unfortunately, that stand has not yet been taken, and
there have been interpretations put on why the United States, having
closed its Embassy in Kampala, has not closed Amin's Embassy in
Washington.
Others have tried to explain it is because they, the U.S. Government
has still got a few hundred Americans in Uganda and Amin will re
taliate against them . Now, to many of us nothing would be further
from the truth. Amin has committed crimes against Ugandans, but
all the trouble he has always had has come from his handling of for
eign nationals.
When he killed the two Americans, Nicholas Straus and Robert
Snyder , in 1971 there was considerable pressure by the U.S. Govern
ment which forced him to appoint a commission which established
their murder, and he paid the compensation for it.
With the question of Mrs. Dora Bloch, that led to considerable
constraint in relations with Great Britain and the United States and
France.
He likes to have the Americans in Uganda in order to show some
degree of respectability that you recognize that Amin's country is
where Americans still live. But we know that there is nothing that
Amin can do to the Americans merely because some legislation is being
passed here.
 43

First of all, he knows these are missionaries who are there doing a
good job for the people of Uganda out of their own free will. There is
nothing that you can do to force those people out if they don't want
to come out and Amin knows that. But any threats to retaliate against
them is merely the thing that he wants to use in the hope that the
United States will continue to give him so many million dollars to
spend on his army, and to maintain his jobs here.
Mr. KINTU. Mr. Chairman , if I could add on that. I am convinced
beyond doubt that Amin understands force very well and I believe
that Amin has a great respect and a fear of the United States. If this
dummy, to underestimate the ability of the United States to respond
any time any how if he starts messing around with American lives in
Uganda. He knows the U.S. Marines are far tougher than his State
Research Bureau men.
I am convinced that passage of this legislation is going to leave the
American lives untouched. They will be able to come backto the United
States free of wounds.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Kintu.
Mr. Russell, I don'thave any questions for you, but I have a few
comments. I don't understand how anybody could come before this
committee and defend the atrocities of Idi Amin . Either you have been
duped and you are ignorant of the realities in Uganda or you are
deliberately justifying and defending a regime that perpetuates the
terror and the killings that we know about not only through testimony
here but through actual firsthand accounts with discussions with people
that I have come in touch with .
In your statement you say you are repulsed by what appears to be
the unfair onslaught of - really ironic choice of words — the media
against the Government of Uganda. And you go on to say this is
promoted by certain interests in the United States. You alsogo on to
say that you view the current legislation before this committee in the
same vein as the extension of the media attack.
As sponsor of one of those bills I can tell you it is not an extension,
but it stems from my own concern and compassion for the people who
are victimized by what is probably one of the worst examples of geno
cide that we have seen since Nazi Germany.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like the opportunity to respond
to the distinguished Congressman .
I appreciate your concern, Mr. Bonker, but I would suggest to you
that I have been to Uganda and I can onlyshare with you what I have
seen. But to speak about being appalled : I would like to suggest that
I was appalled when I heard you say ina question to Mr. Butler, “what
can we do to topple President Amin ?” It seems to me that that smacks
of arrogance, itsmacks of blatant disregard for the sovereignty of a
foreign nation. It is the same kind of language which we have heard
before which is covered in self-righteousness and camouflages what I
consider to bepseudo -compassion. I would hope to hear you say the
same thing of Vorster and Ian Smith .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman, may I also make a small comment on
this outburst. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is utterly scandalous in this

25-826 0 - 78 - 4
 44

committee for people to be picked by Amin to come here and tell you
that they spent 2 weeks in Kampala having been flown there from
here at the Ugandan taxpayers expense, given a Mercedes Benz to
drive around ; and come here and tell you they did not see any dead
bodies. Amin has told me he has eaten human flesh. I think it is utterly
wrong when people whom we respect called professors come nere and
say they spent 2weeks in a country, they were able to see nothing of
the blood that is spoken about. It isa shameful thing when we are here
trying to help the administration to come to some conclusion when
people are paid to come and say certain things.
If I may also add, we know that the U.S. Government is doing ail
it can to change the system in South Africa, to change the system in
Rhodesia . Legislation has been passed to topple the Smith regime.
There is already an embargo against Rhodesia. There is already
an arms embargo against South Africa. Should Amin be spared be
cause he happens to be black ? He should not be toppled ? I think all
of these tyrannies — whether in South Africa or Rhodesia or in Ugan
da — they should go together. It is not a question of either or.
Thank you,, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RUSSELL. Again I point to the question of privilege, Mr. Chair
man, and I would make no more statements at this time.
Mr. Diggs. You may make more statements as we progress. I just
want tointervene so we mayproceed. I would like to say, before yield
ing to the gentleman from Ohio, that I have been on this committee
with the gentleman from Washington for a long enough period to
know that he has, contrary to whatyou have implied, vigorously pro
tested conditions in Rhodesia and South Africa, which is a much less
popular stand , considering the complexion of his district, than the
position he hastaken in connection withUganda.
The gentleman has exhibited the kind of conceptual compassion
that I am afraid you either don't know about úr prefer to ignore. But
what you imply in your statement, whether you agree with Mr. Bonker
or not, does not square with the facts as they relate to the gentleman's
expressed views. I think that your statements in this regard have been
unfair .
You do a disservice to your own position , which I have tried to con
sider in the interest of being evenhanded here, by making these kinds
of implications.
You know, it has not been easyto get people to come forward to
express the point of view that you have expressed. We have got many
people available to take supportive positionswith respect to this mat
ter,but in the interest of being fair, and making sure that wehad an
equitable presentation here I personally called upon the Diplomatic
Mission of Uganda to make sure that somebody would be here to pre
sent its view. And it is for that reason that you are here ; I do not know
you personally. You have articulated your position very well and your
presentation will be considered along with all the others.
But I just want to come to the defense of my colleague from Wash
ington in connection with the remarks that you made.I know both on
the record and off the record, having traveled with him in Africa,
having been associated with him in private and public forums about
Africa, that his concern for human rights throughout the continent
is unassailable.
 45

Let me yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to participate in the hear
ing. I have a couple of questions I would like to begin with for Mr.
Kyemba and Mr. Kintu.
Mr. Russell in his testimony referred to the fact that refugees from
other African nationsare coming into Uganda for refuge and if that
is the case Uganda can't be so bad .
Do you have any experience with refugees from other African na
tions coming to Uganda ?
Mr.KINTU . Mr. Chairman,yes, Uganda has been a haven for a num
ber of years for refugees from Zaire, Sudan, and Rwonda. The refu
gees that came from these countries poured into Uganda in the early
1960's. They have been there ever since.
The refugees that came from Rwonda were mostly the aristocratic
group that came with a King who was later turned back to Rwonda
and dethroned, a complication Idi Amin had at least a 70-percent
share of.
Now, we know through our contacts and our past experiences that
Batusi refugees who came to Uganda in the early sixties are heavily
involved in being the superintelligencia group in Uganda. Theirbeing
bilingual makes them aspecial asset for Idi Amin both in spying in
French areas as well as English and Uganda .
We know for aa fact and wehave already identified this in our testi
mony, both Mr. Kyemba's and mine, that the Southern Sudanese who
poured into Uganda as refugees are nowin the Ugandan Army, State
Research, andthe Public Safety Unit. More South Sudanese are com
ing into Uganda for better conditions of life. They had to kill all
Achdis in Gulu Town to accommodate Sudanese mercenaries.
Anybody who has known what is going on in Southern Sudan after
the civil war would be able to compare that these guys are better off
being in Idi Amin's State Research Bureau and army whereby they
are licensed to kill, torture anybody, take away property, wives and
everything they want. Major Moledo returned to Sudan in 1973 with
boxes of money andtrucks of goods he collected from dead Ugandans.
Zairian refugees who entered Uganda in the 1960's came from the
Orientale Province. They mostly settled in the West Nile District and
have a tribal resemblance with the Kakwa where Idi Amin comes from .
So these are his cousins and uncles. They are also heavily involved in
being the principal characters in the State Research, Ugandan Army
and other killer squads.
So if you really want to call them refugees, you can use that term
with reservation.Right now they are not refugees as far as we know.
They are the executioners, blood -thirsty profiteers.
Mr. KYEMBA. I want to add in factMr. Russell's testimony is cor
rect in that the refugees from the Southern Sudan have takenover the
entire country, and obviously in that sense it is a very good place for
refugees from that particular area. Beyond that Amin's record with
refugees is well known.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Russell , did you want to comment ?
Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; in my testimony all I suggested and repeated was
in regard to the U.N. High Commissioner, Mr. Komorski, on the
refugee problem in Uganda. I made no implication as to where they
 46

were or what they were or anything of that nature. I would like

also to state, Mr. Chairman, that if you perceived what was em
bodied or implied in my statement when I responded to Mr. Bonker
then I would hope to recant that in the sense of fair play.
as unfair,
But Mr. Bonker did say we were duped. I have found that the posi
tionhe takes on Uganda is often not coupled with similar views on
southern Africa .
I am pleased that I was wrong in making that statement regard
ing his efforts in South Africa and Rhodesia.
If we listen carefully to some of the other things that Mr. Kyemba
said, I think it merely supports one of the points that we have been
trying to make. What we have in Uganda is essentially really an
internal struggle. When responding to Mr. Solarz regarding what
would happen if President Amin could be replaced, Ithink it was
Mr. Kintu who suggested that the State Research would probably
have to leave because they possibly could not stand the onslaught.
The question is, “ What do you mean by that?” It seems tome that
implied in all or most of the argument that is being made about
Uganda is that it is essentially a developing country in the throes
of internal strife. Therefore , to suggest that the United States sanc
tion an embargo as a means of toppling President Amin is, in my view,
asking for support of a political viewpoint which may or may not be
correct.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you , Mr. Russell.
Mr. Butler, did you want to respond ?
Mr. BUTLER. Could I shift the emphasis on the use of existing
international machinery for the protection of human rights. I think
the United States has a great opportunity in the next 2 weeks at
the Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva to come forward
with a very strong position as a member of theHuman Rights Com
mission on Uganda. The issue of Uganda and its compliance with
this international standard is under review and perhaps it might be
a good idea if I mght suggest, Mr. Chairman, if you — I notice your
hearings are going on for a couple of days — you might ask Ed
Mesvinski to comeand testify before you before he leaves for Geneva
to get straight exactly what will bethe position of the United States
on the Ugandan issue before the Human Rights Commisson.
Very often the United States can use its influence to impress upon
friendly governments that are also members of the Commission to
go along with certain positions that it takes in the Commission itself.
While I am very pessimistic about whether or not a resolution
would come out of the Commission under these circumstances, I think
that such a move would go a long way toward impressing on the
Government of Uganda that the United States meansbusiness in this
area and it is one of those cases where you might not win but you
are not going to lose either.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you , Mr. Butler.
Mr. Diggs. If the gentleman will yield, I wonder if Mr. Butler is
aware that two members of thepanel here today are on that Commis
sion, Mr. Bonker and Mr. Buchanan, the ranking minority member.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman , I have another question for Mr. Kyemba
and Mr. Kintu .
 47

Newsweek magazine this week has an article on Idi Amin . It is

titled , I believe, “Amin, a New Leaf.” The title at least seems to sug
gest that Mr. Amin may be changing his previous ways.
Do you think that the world at large can take any credence in any
change of heart on Mr. Amin's part ?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman,I have seen the report referred to and
my only comment is that Amin fully realizes that for the first time
he is not initiating but is reacting to the international opinion that
is rejecting and is continuing to reject all that he stands for.
He knows of the legislation before this House. And it is in his own
interests to deceive the Members of this House into believing that
he is in for a new leaf. Of course, the killings possibly have reduced
in the sense that every possible outstanding individual has been killed ,
and by the nature of the killing there arefew who remain that he is
goingto pick on .
He said that he is prepared to forgive the United States. I don't
know what the United States has to be forgiven for in its handling
of the Ugandan case. On the contrary, it is the United States which
should forgive this manwho has done so much damage to the country.
So I wouldn't, Mr. Chairman , pay any regard whatsoever to this
report which you refer to .
Mr. Chairman, may I also just ask if it would be possible to have
another question since I was due to leave in a couple of minutes.
Mr. PEASE. I have no further questions.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Kyemba, I would like to ask you , since you have
been there recently — and Mr. Russell — about the status of two Amer
icans presently in Uganda. One is the sister of one of our former
Ambassadors to Uganda, Clyde Ferguson and the other is Isabelle
Deskins. Isabelle Deskins was a resident of the District of Columbia .
She was a schoolteacher here and went to Uganda under an AID
contract to the girls' secretarial school which was under the admin
istration of the University of Massachusetts. After that contract ran
out she elected to stay inUganda because she was well received and
was getting along fine.
I received a letter from her several months ago indicating that she
was thinking about coming back to Washington and asking me to
explore certain possibilities for her. The letter indicated that she
was going to Nairobi on a holiday. I sent a messageto Nairobi ask
ing them to locate her and tell her that I would explore these possi
bilities, and I haven't heard any more from her. Do either ofthese
names ring a bell ?
Mr. RUSSELL. The names do not ring a bell. However, there were
two black Americans that we met while we were there. One has been
in Uganda for over 10 years. If that is the person you are speaking
about, that person was teaching in the Uganda system .
Mr. Diggs. That sounds likeMs. Deskins. She is about 50 years
old or thereabouts.
Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; we met a women who would fit that descrip
tion on our first trip. There was another woman who said she was
leaving to come to the United States, she was much younger. I do
not remember her name because we saw her once or twice. There
was also another white American from Ohio who was teaching at
Makerere at the time we were there.
 48

In addition, we met a businessman from New York and his wife

who was from Chicago traveling and living in Uganda. They did not
express any fear.
Mr. Diggs. Well, we thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kyemba.
Mr. SOLARZ. Could I have one question ?
Mr. Diggs. I was trying to be respectful of the gentleman's time.
I don't know if he must catch a plane or what.
Mr. KYEMBA. I can answer one more question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SOLARZ. Based on your own experience there, is the level of
killing and violence in Uganda increasing, staying about the same
or is it sort of diminishing ?
Mr. KYEMBA. Mr. Chairman, my comment on that is that obviously
7 years of panic has reduced considerably the public appearance of
notables that Amin's system has taken with it, and by the nature
of that system very few distinguished people remain .
If you look at the list I put in that book there, you find almost
all of the former Members of Parliament and all of the civil servants
have been killed. But, in my view, the killing still continues. The
only difference is that those who are being killed are the smaller fish
and are not attracting international press.
I heard a report that some people from Makerere and some people
in the Ministry of Culture were picked up recently . I don't know
what has happened to them so far, but I have no doubts in my own
mind, Mr. Chairman, that the killing has not ended.
Mr. Kintu. Mr. Chairman, if I could add on that.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you for your valuable contribution here today,
you are excused ,Mr. Kyemba.
Mr. KYEMBA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. KiNtu . The reports we are receiving from Nairobi indicate an
increase in the flow of refugees from Uganda to Nairobi at aa rate of 50
refugees a day. Another report I have received is from my own district
of Masaka whereby the killing has intensified recently . One Moslem
trader was killed by his competitors and Idi Amin blamed it on the
Christian population of Masaka district.
I have known some of those people who have been killed. I used to
teach school there. There is no doubt killing has not stopped. The only
thing that is not showing isthat they arenotbig-name Ugandans any
more. They are small people that are being butchered every day who
don't make it into the international press.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Russell, what do you understand to be the official ex
planation for the disappearances of the population there ? You said
you did not personally see any of this. But I am sure that, on the other
hand, you heard about all ofthese things. I am sure it came up in con
versations you had with President Amin and other officials there.
What is their explanation for these things ? They are not denying
that it happened, are they ?
Mr. RUSSELL. I cannot speak for the Government.
Mr. Diggs. I understand that.
Mr. RUSSELL. What I am saying is that in whatever discussion that
was held in that vein it generally reflects or goes somewhat like this :
that theattacks, simplyput, are a reaction to those who would attempt
internally to topple the Government.
 49

Mr. Diggs. What about the expulsion from Uganda of the Asians ?
At the time that move was apparently widely supported in the Ugan
dan community because of what was perceived tobe the economic ex
ploitations of the Ugandans by Asians.
Mr. RUSSELL. I was in East Africa in 1972. The first time that the
attempt was made to remove the Asians from East Africa I was in
Kenya. One of the things that was explained in Kenya, Tanzania, and
Zambia was that the Asian community controlled a disproportionate
level of the economy in East Africa as a whole, and that most of the
Asians in East Africa did not accept either Kenyan, Ugandan, or Tan
zanian citizenship while living in and reaping the benefits of those
countries .
The request was, as I understand it, that they seek Kenyan , Ugandan,
Tanzanian citizenship which they refused to do. In fact, the expulsion
of the Asians in Uganda was not originally Amin's idea, but was sug
gested also by Obote who was there prior to Amin. Presently there
are many Asians in Uganda who took citizenship. In fact, on our
first trip we interviewed quite a number of these Asians. If the com
mittee is interested in hearing and seeing what these people said, they
can get that tape from the People's Communication Network in New
York from Bill Stevens and Elaine Bailey of that group . The response
that we received during these interviews wasthat they sharedthe con
cern that the President of Uganda had regarding the continued control
of the middle income level of the economy which did not allow the
indigenous African access.
Mr. Kintu. Mr. Chairman, if I could make a comment on that.
The question of the Asians in Uganda is a complicated issue. There
are two categories of Asians, Mr. Chairman. Those who held foreign
citizenship were expelled together with those Asians that held Ugandan
citizenship.
Two weeks ago when I was in Florida I ran into an Asian who
holds Ugandan citizenship and was expelled from Kampala. He had
a home 5 miles from Kampala and I have his name here ; Gregory
Saral. He lives in Orlando, Fla., as a refugee.
Mr. Diggs. I would alsolike to get your comment Mr. Kintu, on this
whole question of a boycott. Now, the resolution before this subcom
mittee calls for this. And, in view of what has been said here, the
question is how do you monitor compliance ? Would it be possible for
President Amin to produce false certificates of origin and engage other
circumventions of a boycott ? In other words, are we just talking about
an exercise here whose purpose could easily be thwarted, given the
nature of society ashas been described here ?
Mr. KINTU. Mr. Chairman, the legislation now pending before Con
gress are effective only when taken in their full context. Boycotting
coffee alone is not a solution because we see an interrelationship of
American companies supporting this regime in various ways. One,
coffee companies ought to be stopped from buying Ugandan coffee.
American airplane companies; namely, Page Airways, which is sup
porting him by airlifting Ugandan coffee to Djibouti and overseas
ports shouldbe stopped through this legislation. American pilots and
mechanics who are flying and repairing these airplanes will automat
ically be barred from this kind of activity. Also the American com
 50

panies which are selling such sophisticated equipment like Harris

Corp. in Melbourne will be stopped from this kind of participation.
That is the only way you can bring to halt the whole mechanism of
smuggling coffee out of Uganda by Idi Amin to American consumers.
We have to put a stop to this blood money.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Pease, you had a question.
Mr. PEASE. Thank youvery much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct a question and a comment ortwo to Mr. Rus
sel and in doing so I want to say that even though I disagree with the
viewpoint which he has expressed I am grateful to him for being will
ing to appear on this panel.
As the chairman indicated, it is not easy to find people to come and
defend Idi Amin given the media coverage which you mentioned in
your testimony. And I think it is valuable for us to have your view
point here.
I listened to and read your testimony very carefully and again want
to give you credit for not saying more than you observed yourself.
And you did not say that Idi Amin's hands are clean . You said you
did not observe anything. And I think you made that distinction
rather carefully .
I assume that you are aware that killings have gone on , that there
have been murders and don't deny that. I would be curious to know
what your own personal feelings are about the estimates, 100,000, 150,
000, 300,000 Ugandans killed in thelast 7 years. Do youfeel that they
are totally exaggerated, untrue, half that amount or twice that amount
or what ?
Mr. RUSSELL. I think it was Mr. Derwinski or someone who asked
the question earlier of Mr. Butler, how do you know how many people
there are in jail. And the answer was, we have no special way of know
ing. I use that to say to you that it seems to me that 300,000 people
would be an exaggeration. I don't know how many, but for 300,000
people to be killed - break that down into the number of years and
see how many people have to be killed daily. I think whatyou have
would be aconstant burial or, yes, one body after the other floating
down the Nile, and there would be no way — not for 10 weeks — 5 weeks
the first time, and 5 weeks the second time traveling throughout the
country — that we would not have seen one body which an alligator
did not eat. We did not see any of those.
If the numbers were 300,000, 150,000 — but that is not my argu
-

ment — I say to you very basically that I do not know—I do not even
question some of the statements made either by Mr. Kyemba or Mr.
Kintu in terms of the killings. I am not privy to that information.
But I believe, as I said earlier, that it is an exaggeration solely from
what I saw and, second, that what we are witnessing is in fact an
internal struggle. I keep repeating that because the language that
emanates from these distinguished gentlemen reflects that.
One final comment in the same vein . Mr. Butler said in his remarks
that between 1973 and 1976, if my memory is correct, that there were
approximately 80,000 people killed .
Now, if I also heard Mr. Kyemba, he was at that time Minister of
Health' in Uganda. Now, if his interpretation of what took place in
Uganda was accurate, then he also was participating in a government
that was killing people at that rate . So I would suggest also in the same
 51

way they move the question of a trip to Uganda as paid for by the
Ugandan Government, we also look at the merits of their statements
based on their own language, their own implications and their own
interpretations.
All I can ask is that this committee take the President's invitation
and go and see for yourselves. Don't listen to my statement. Don't lis
ten to anyone else. Just check it out yourself andcome back and see
whether or not you see bodies floating down the Nile.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Russell, I only wish in regard to your comments
about Mr. Kyemba that he were still here to comment on them. My
point really is regarding your testimony that while it was carefully
and narrowly drawn and you did not state more than you could see, it
seems to me that it rather begs the question.
I think it is conceivable that youcould justify 100,000 deaths in a
civil war but there is not a civil war goingon in Uganda. There never
has been. There has not been any kind of open warfare. These have
been people pulled out of their homes and out of automobiles and
taken away by the State Research Bureau and I was interested in your
testimonythat you seemed to stress two things while we have the justi
fication of the Amin regime.
One was the figures, the atrocities had been exaggerated by the
Western press and I ask in that situation whether if the figure were
100,000 deaths or 200,000 whether it really makes any difference,
whether there is any less murder ? An analogy, Nazi Germany during
World War II. If there had been 3 million Jews killed instead of 6
million, would that have made it any less of aа Diaspora ?
Your other point seemed to be there is a selectivity going on. We are
not expressing the same kind of outrage about South Africa and
Rhodesia. The chairman pointed out very well, I think, there is a good
deal of concern amongmembers of this committee about South Africa
and Rhodesia as well. So it is not a singleminded attack on Mr. Amin
that we are undertaking.
As I say, I appreciate your coming but I do think that your testi
mony was very carefully and narrowly drawn, and it does not in any
waymitigate or argue against the United States taking a standin the
name of humanity to try and stop the killing that is going on in
Uganda.
Mr. RUSSELL. Could I respond briefly to your first statement ?
If I understand you correctly you said there is in Uganda no civil
war per se. Am I understanding you correctly ?
Mr. PEASE. Yes.
Mr. RUSSELL. If we listened earlier from the mouth of Mr. Kyemba,
he argued that there is a division between the Acholi and the Langi.
He suggested also that the people who are supportive of President
Amin are the Nubians.
If that is correct, what then would you say is occurring, if it is not
an internal struggle where one leadership cadre receives its support
from its prime ethnic group or tribe, as you would call it, and the
other does the same ?
So I am suggesting that the distinction is fine. It is a very fine dis
tinction that is made. Whether it is a civil war, I cannot say, but I am
suggesting technically it could be viewed in the same vein . You are
 52

right when you said that my testimony was within certain limits be
cause I only want to state what I saw and what those who went with
mesaw , and I makeno pretende of saying anything else.
I just ask you to look at that within thosetightly framed parameters
to be certain that I am understood and my position is understood.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Russell, I appreciate that and I would say only in
conclusion , Mr. Chairman , that a contention that 100,000 deaths or
200,000 or 300,000 are justified on the basis of a civil war which does
not appear apparent to any impartial observer is very difficult to
understand .
Understandably, if Amin's regime is toppled those who have been
responsible for killing tens of thousands of people had better get
out of Uganda in a hurry, but that does not constitute civil war as far
as I am concerned.
Thank you verymuch.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Buchanan,do you wish to question ?
Mr. BUCHANAN . No ; Mr. Chairman, except I thought perhaps Mr.
Butler and Mr. Kintu have some response to the gentleman from Ohio's
question, but I have nothing further.
Mr. BUTLER. We have had a great deal of experience on the question
of economic sanctions and human rights. Frankly, we have not con
cluded ourthinking on the question of whether or not economic sanc
tions actually can improve the human rights situation in a given coun
try of the world. Our whole position on the amendment and the U.S.
position in international financial institutions on loans for develop
ing countries is all under very heavy consideration atthe present time.
I can say that there is no empirical evidence available to us where
economic sanctions have been applied that it made any difference what
soever in the conduct of a givengovernment. One of the few exceptions
that could be argued is Rhodesia and even there we are not sure
whetheror not the sanctions really brought about fundamental change
or that change came about because of many different pressures brought
on that Government.
So on the overall question of whether or not aa cutoff of economic aid,
investment programs, et cetera, or economic boycotts further human
rights in a given situation we are not too sure . It could be that a move
such as thatcould result in furtheroppression and more repression by
a given government depending on the nature of its power and the abil
ity to stay in power by brute force. It is somethingthat has to be con
sidered very deeply and sensitively by the Government before it is
enacted.
Mr. Diggs. I am always concerned, however, about that kind of eval
uation of the effectiveness of boycotts. Boycotts are as American as
lettuce and grapes and they have great psychological impact, in addi
tion to having some other effects that one can't so readily see. There is
no question in my mind that it will continue to be used as a technique.
I thinkthat it would be appropriate for me to note at this time that
today the chairman of the full committee received a reply from the
Department of State to our query as to their views on the resolution
which would prohibit the export to Uganda of goods subject to con
trol under theExport Administration Act. The Department is opposed
to it. The Department recognizes its purpose but goes on to conclude
 53

that in its view the legislation would not contribute to the redress of
the abuses. They willbe testifying before these subcommittees at a
later date.
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I don't want you to get me wrong. I
think boycott is a very strong view that can be used for purposes of
moral indignation and also can be used to enhance the reputation of a
given government in a foreign policy thatcould be beneficial toa gov
ernment. I am not detracting from that. I am merely stating there is
no empirical evidence that it would actually bring about a change in a
given situation. We would like to think that way but we have not been
able to substantiate that point.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, on the subject of boycotts, as I said
in my testimony, I would disagree with the boycott against Uganda
right now because, as I said earlier, I think it is selective.
To press the point a little further, it would seem to me that when
we talk about boycotting those where there is disregard for human
rights and where there is murder, whether 100,000, 150,000, or what
have you , one must ask why there is no boycott talked about for the
SovietUnion, for example, why no boycott is talked about for Chile.
So I am suggesting very simply that it seems to me very selec
tive. I may be wrong on that, but I am saying that the point that
you make as to whether or not a boycott would be effective is not
the question. The question is whether or not one should or ought to
use a boycott ata means of interfering, in my view, in the internal
struggleof an independent sovereigncountry.
Mr. Diggs. Well, thegentleman makes aa good point.
I would like to ask Mr. Russell again whatever happened to
the Ugandan Government's effort to gain the support of black Ameri
can support movement for Uganda. I can remember when Roy Ennis
went over. I can remember Idi Amin's offering dual citizenship. I
can remember a certain amount of excitement in some circles within
the black American community that reflected some of the views that
you have expressed here ; namely, that Amin was being singled out
and so on. That seems to have died down. I don't know whether it has
died out or not. I don't know whether you at one time were affiliated
with Roy Ennis, your Caribbean compatriot. Whatever happened to
that effort ?
Mr. RUSSELL. I think the best way to answer that, since you place
it in terms of our Caribbean compatriot, I would suggest that those
of us who were active in the early fifties, sixties, and seventies, view
that as part of the African Diaspora. So it is no special allusion to
the Caribbean. It is my view that much of the energy of the move
ment as a whole as it related to the civil rights struggle, and black
power, and blackconsciousness, for aa sundry of reasons has not moved
any further. I think you , as well as I, are aware of some of the
causes for that.
In terms of dual citizenship, II can tell you that during our last trip
toUganda the President spokeof not changing his view on that possi
bility. There are a number of people who believe that Idi Amin is
being unfairly singled out: When we check on some of the radio
programs in New York City — when David Lampbell, for instance,
opens the phone — most of the blacks that respond have no difficulty
 54

in viewing what the media says about Idi Amin generally as un

true. They remember what was said about Malcolm X, and what was
said about King. There is no real black movement in the United
States in a strict sense to support either Kaunda or Uganda at this
moment in history.
Mr. Diggs. Let me ask the same sort of question of Mr. Kintu. The
Uganda national movement which was founded in Lusaka to regroup
most of the exiles, what is the status of that ? Is it effective or is it just
a letterhead kind of organization ? Is your committee a member of
this group ? Are there any other such groups elsewhere?
Mr. KINTU . Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Uganda, Inc. was set
up in the fall of 1973 when many Ugandans were still on the other side
of the fence like Mr. Kyemba.
Since then, many Ugandans have attempted to organize similar
groupswithout much success.
The Uganda Nationalistic Movement which was formed in Zambia
in August of last year, followed similar lines ofdiscussion and feeling
on personal greed , tribalism and ideology. We all share one view : that
is, we condemn Idi Amin's genocide.
Somehow Ugandans have demonstrated a great disagreement on a
united action . My personal feeling is that as long as the world is led
to believe that “ big name” Ugandans who are interested in their non
existing positions will organize the rest, Idi Amin will rule for an
other 20 years. Our committee is making steady progress. We are
united on principles and in action. We have endured time and we shall
win.
Mr. Diggs. How about Ugandan exiles in the United States; stu
dents, for example ? What measures are being undertaken to facilitate
access to educational institutions or employment for them or to sup
port when they run into financial problems? And are you aware of
any special difficulties that exiled Ugandans might have had in ob
taining political asylum in the United States ?
Mr. KINTU . Mr. Chairman, I am quite aware of the problems
Ugandan exiles have here in the United States. You might recall sev
eral years ago when we introduced the program of bringing young
Ugandans to American colleges and universities. We made a lot of
publicity of this program . Wewantedto be offered earmarked scholar
ships by different colleges across this land so that we could fit in
qualified Ugandan refugees. These students would eventually recon
struct Ugandaafter Amin is gone. We have not been well supported by
private or public institutions for reasons unknown to me.
Another problem Ugandan exiles have suffered here in the United
States is the negligence of the State Department in our suffering. I
have personally taken up this matter. I have been through it. There is
no officialstatus of Ugandan exiles in the United States.
We are - I hope — tolerated as aliens. To my estimate that is a step
above being an illegal alien . We have not been recognized as refugees.
They say that each applicant for asylum will be considered on a
case -by -case basis by theState Department.
Now, this is a very cheap way of looking at the issue. We are left at
themercy of Idi Amin and the I.N.S.
There are at least 500 Ugandan refugees here. I call them all refu
gees because I know they can't return to Uganda safely. Many of those
 55

young men have no specific evidence they could bring before thetable
such as “ I was a former Minister of Health" or " I was Commander of
the Air Force” or I was this, that or the other. But we know that if
they return to Uganda they could be potential victims of execution
because of their education, long stay inAmerica or Christianity.
I say to you, Mr. Chairman , one young lady I was well associated
with — we taught in the same schoolin Uganda beforewe both came
to America for education — we met here in America . She went back
and was killed when she was teaching at Makerere University. Many
of us fall in that category .
You can be aa well-educated Ugandan. You go backhome and get a
job in Government and the next thing you getkilled like this woman
was. If she had stayed in New York I am sure she would be alive now.
I would hope you could use your influenceto the administration
and ask President Carter or the Secretary of State to make a ruling
about the status of Ugandans in the United States because they are
desperate, without official status. They cannot get jobs because they
have to have permission. We don't want to be illegal aliens. We don't
want to workwithout permission, and yet we have to work to earn a
living. We ask that this be changed.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much. This has been a most interesting
beginning. I am sure that after this series of hearings has ended
the contribution of today's witnesses will play a major role in our
deliberations.
The joint subcommittees stand adjourned .
[ Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the hearing adjourned .]
 UNITED STATES - UGANDA RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington , D.C.
The subco mmitt ees met at 2 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser ( chairman of the Subcom
mittee on International Organizations) presiding:
Mr. FRASER. Today we begin the second day of hearings on the situ
ation in Uganda and implications for U.S. foreign policy. Testimony
of the first day of hearings detailed the gross human rights violations
that have taken place in Uganda since Gen. Idi Amin seized power
there in 1971. The widespread killings and brutal acts of repression
have reportedly led to a breakdown of law and order in the country.
In disassociating itself from such practices, the United States
closed down its Embassy in that country and cut off all assistance to
Uganda. It is worth noting that our leverage in Uganda is consider
ably less than in other countries that have committed grievous human
rights violations. Nevertheless, it is important that the world com
munity, including the United States, condemn the brutal repression
under which the Ugandan people have suffered.
International organizations, including United Nations organs and
the Organization of African Unity have been much too reluctant to
take action against many of those governments where consistent pat
terns of human rights violations have taken place. This appears to
result from the desire of member nations to protect their political or
economic interests. Failure to take action against Uganda is no
exception.
At today's hearings we will closely examine U.S. policy with respect
to the economicandpolitical natureof United States-Uganda relations
and explore policy options for the future. In light of recent reports
of private training of Ugandan pilots and the nature of our economic
relations with Uganda, legislation has been introduced proposing vari
ous measures by which the United States can help pressure the
Ugandan Gvernment to end its repressive actions.
We are happy to hear testimony from: Mr. William C. Harrop,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,Department of State ;
Mr. Rauer Meyer, Director, Office of Export Administration, Depart
ment of Commerce; Mr. Max Miles, Country Marketing Manager for
Africa, Bureau of Export Development, who is accompanying Mr.
( 57 )
 58

Meyer; and Congressman Donald Pease, who has been keenly inter
ested in developments in Uganda and the author of legislation calling
for certain prohibitions in our relations with Uganda.
I would like to yield now to the gentleman from Washington , Mr.
Bonker.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman , I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the Chairman of the African Subcommittee, Charlie Diggs, for
his gracious remarks on my behalf during a colloquy in our hearing
yesterday. I trust there was full agreement with the views of our
Ugandan witnesses that tyranny andoppression must befought where
ever it exists, and cannot be rationalized on the basis of the skin color
of either theperpetrators or the victims of this suffering. I also share
with many ofmy colleagues a feeling that our country needs very much
to be more consistent in applying its human rights policy in Africa.
Consistency does not necessarily mean identical approaches must be
used for every country, but it does mean measuring our human rights
commitment through action, not just public appeals and quiet
discussions.
The central question before us today is, what should the United
States do in aa situation where violations of human rights are so egregi
ous that extraordinary measures may be required ? The question is as
much a moral as a political one. For even if taking thesteps that Con
gressman Pease and myself suggest does not lead to IdiAmin's fall
from power , does not the United
States have aa moral responsibility to
disassociateitself completely from a government which displays such
blatant contempt for the sanctity of human life ? I am aware of the
possibility that by restricting trade and taking strong diplomatic ac
tions on human rights grounds, we may be establishing a precedent
which can come back to haunt us in the future. But I wonder if it is
not worth the risk .
I think I am being generous in saying that until recently the U.S.
Government has been very lax in taking steps within its authority to
discourage activities beneficial to the Government of Uganda. Based
on information supplied to me by staff, the following is apparent:
( 1 ) The United States has been providing Ugandan Government
officials with training which is highly useful in strengthening and
implementing the system of brutal repression which prevails in
Uganda today.
(2) The U.Š. Government has been remiss in devoting little attention
to monitoring contracts between U.S. civilian contractors and the
Government of Uganda and scrutinizing the credentials of Ugandans
coming into the United States.
(3) The Government of Uganda ( GOU) has made a mockery of
U.S. visa procedures through the abusive practice of representing
members of Amin's personal execution squad, the State Research Bu
reau, and Ugandan military officials, as students traveling under civil
ian passports to receive technical training in the United States. Also in
several cases, A - 2 visas — for government officials — were issued to
Ugandans with no investigation concerning their background and po
tential uses of training received in the United States upon return to
Uganda. Most visas have been granted to these Ugandans through U.S.
consul in Nairobi, who as best we can tell, has been extremely coopera
 59

tive in processing Ugandan visas. In several cases visas were issued the
same day they were applied for.
(4) The Uganda mission to the U.N. in New York and the Ugandan
embassy to the United States in Washington have been deeply involved
in this effort, and have helped to protectthe cover of Ugandan officials
while receiving training in the United States.
( 5 ) Several U.S. companies have worked closely with the Ugandan
Government in Kampala to negotiate and carryout training programs
with potential military application. There is evidence indicating these
companies are aware that the participants intheir training programs
are notsimply students sent by private Ugandan commercial interests.
( 6 ) Consequently, the United States is acting in a way which is
totally inconsistent with its policy concerning human rights and its
policy of withholding aid to the Government of Uganda.
There seems to be an emerging consensus that the United States
should do more in addressing the intolerable situation which prevails
in Uganda. I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses today
concerning what thepreferable optionsare at this point.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonker. That is a clear
statement.
I will turn now to our first witness, William Harrop.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. HARROP, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

Mr. HARROP . Thank you , Mr. Chairman. I have a relatively brief

statement. With your indulgence I will read through it quickly and
then will be happy to answer any questions you would like to put to
me.

At the outset, let me establish one point about which I believe there
can be no doubt or dispute : The U.S. Government deplores the rec
ord of massive violations of fundamental human rights in Uganda.
This record of violations has been documented by such respected orga
nizations as the International Commission of Jurists. We must and
will continue to make clear our opposition to and abhorrence ofsuch
flagrant disregard of fundamental human rights and denial of basic
human dignity . I believe that this view reflects the sentiment of the
Congress as well as the basic values and orientation of the American
people.
While we may occasionally differ as to the form in which our
shared attitude is best expressed, I presume that there need be no
debate over the fact orthe sincerity of our basic premise that human
rights conditions in Uganda are a source of deep concern to the
United States.
U.S. relations with Uganda have been both limited and cool ever
since 1973. In that year a number of problems led successively to the
termination of our Peace Corps and AID programs and ultimately
to the closing of the American Embassy in Kampala and the with
drawal of all U.S. official personnel. Factors which prompted our
official withdrawal included persistent internal security problems in
the country, increasing operating difficulties for American programs

25-826 0 - 78 - 5
 60

and personnel, and repeated public threats against Embassy officials

and other Americans in the country by highUgandan officials. The
abrupt expulsion of the U.S. Marine Security Guard responsible for
the protection of the Embassy jed to the final decision to withdraw
our remaining personnel and close the Embassy in November of that
year. Since that time, American interests in Uganda have been repre
sented by the Federal Republic of Germany which has maintained an
Embassy in Kampala.
Under present circumstances, we have no reason to consider the re
establishment of a U.S. presence in Kampala, nor would we do so
unless our overall relationship with Uganda were to improve con
siderably. A prerequisite for this would be a fundamental improve
ment in human rights conditions in Uganda.
The Ugandan Government has continued to maintain a small Em
bassy in Washington , currently headed by a Second Secretary as
chargé d'affaires. In keeping with the nature of our relations, the
Department maintains working level contacts with the Embassy as
necessary to conduct official business. No higher level of representa
tion would be necessary or appropriate at present.
When we withdrew our Embassy from Kampala in 1973, we also
advised private U.S. citizens to depart, based on the same concerns
over unsettled conditions and threats against Americans that affected
our official programs and personnel. This guidance remains in effect
and has been periodically reiterated to those concerned. In addition,
we have issued travel advisories cautioning American travelers
against visiting Uganda — whether for business, pleasure, orany other
purpose. Nevertheless, we have no authority to prevent Americans
from traveling to Uganda or torequire Americans resident in Uganda
to leave, and somewhat over 200 Americans still reside there. Approx
imately a third of these are missionaries; just under a third are pro
fessional and technical personnel working under a variety of inter
national and private auspices ; the remainder includes students, visi
tors, some dependents of Ugandans and others. The continued pres
ence of these Americans in Uganda and our concern- and responsibility
for them is a factor which we must take into account in all our
decisionmaking regarding Uganda .
We continue to deny bilateral U.S. assistance to Uganda, in accord
ance both with executive branch policy and with recent legislation.
Moreover, U.S. representatives to international development banks are
under instructions to oppose and vote against loansto Uganda.
Although private commercial trade with Uganda has continued,
Uganda does not currently benefit from U.S. programspromoting
trade and investments. Neither Eximbank nor OPIČ have been active
in Uganda since 1973, and Uganda's exports have not been made eligi
ble for general tariff preferences (“GSP ” ).
Further, we do not and will not licensé exports to Uganda of items
on the munitions list ; we believe such exports would be manifestly in
compatible with our human rights concerns and interests. We also
review other exports to Uganda from the human rights perspective,
and in cooperation with the Department of Commerce deny exports
which would in ourestimation contribute directly to continued human
rights violations. This would include, for example, the sale of heli
 61

copters or other such equipment to the Ugandan security establishment.

În response to the discovery last fall that Ugandan police personnel
were in this country undergoing commercial helicopter training (with
out the Department's advance knowledge ), we instituted a new pro
cedure under which visa applications by officially connected Ugandans
and other representatives of Uganda must be referred to the Depart
ment for review .
This procedure enables us to prevent travel by Ugandans to the
United States such as that of the helicopter personnel which would be
incompatible with our human rights interests. (On these same grounds.
we also made extraordinary efforts to bringabout the early termina
tion of the helicopter training program , efforts which were at least
partially successful.)
Overall, then , our bilateral relations with Uganda are highly re
stricted, most specifically with respect to matterstouching fundamen
tal human rights. Within the international community we have also
expressed our concerns over Uganda's human rights situation. We
strongly supported efforts at the United Nations Human Rights Com
mission meeting in March of 1977 to bring about a full examination
and discussion of Uganda's human rightsproblems, in the hope that
such attention would lead to amelioration of conditions within Uganda.
Similarly, we welcome the introduction of a resolution on this subject
by the Nordic States, who have shown considerable interest in the prob
lem , in the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee in December,
and the informal agreement which resulted from this discussion that
the issue will be given serious consideration at the upcoming 1978 ses
sion of the Human Rights Commission. We have made clear through
out our hope that the Ugandan Government would cooperate with such
efforts ; we continue to hope that this will be the case.
Finally, it is our policy to provide humanitarian assistance to ref
ugees from Uganda, both through contributions to the U.N. High Com
missioner for Refugees and through special assistance ( such as in the
education field ) where particular needsare identified.
As you know, a number of proposals have been made for additional
U.S. actions with respect to Uganda. These proposals include barring
U.S. trade with Uganda, closing down the Ugandan Embassy in Wash
ingtonand placing travel restrictions on Uganda's representatives to
the U.N. and prohibiting Ugandan aircraft from landing on U.S. ter
ritory. Frankly, it is the administration's view that these proposals go
farther than is advisable at the present time.
With respect to a trade boycott, we believe that the imposition of a
unilateral exportand/or import embargo on Uganda would be neither
advisable ror likely to be effective. The United States is committed to
the principles of free trade, as incorporated in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Whenever these principles are set aside, their
overall authority as protection for our worldwide trade interests is
undermined and others are encouraged to take similar actions. This is
potentially harmful not only to the United States but to the world
economy generally. Additionally, in the absence of any significant in
ternational participation or support — which is highly unlikely under
present circumstances — we believe that such a boycott in the case of
Uganda would not be effective.
 62

U.S. imports from Uganda consist almost exclusively of coffee, and

given the present high price of coffee in world markets Uganda could
readily find other outlets for its coffee now sold to the United States.
As to U.S. exports to Uganda, which have been very modest in value
in recent years, Uganda could very easily find alternative sources for
these products.
Nor do we favor breaking relations with Uganda and closing the
Ugandan Embassyin Washington or otherwise placing special, restric
tions on the Ugandan diplomats in this country. We do not view the
maintenance of diplomatic relations with another government as im
plying approval of that government's policies. Except in the most un
usualcircumstances, we do not favor severing the communications link
provided by diplomatic representation. This is why, when we closed
our Embassy and withdrew our personnel from Kampala in 1973, we
did not characterize this step as a break in relations and did not require
the Ugandans to close their Embassy in Washington. The continued
presence of a small Ugandan Embassy here has provided a useful
direct communications link, especially in emergency situations such
as the February 1977 events when the Ugandan Government tem
porarily barred Americans from leaving
Uganda.
As toimposing travel restrictions on Ugandan personnel accredited
to the United Nations, basic U.S. practice has been to restrict the
travel of foreign personnel in this country only in instances where
those governments have placed similar restrictions on American diplo
mats. This is not the case with Uganda. Such restrictions would also
go against the spirit of our obligations as host country for the United
Nations. We are aware of allegations that Ugandan personnel in Wash
ington and New York are engaging in improper activities directed
against Ugandan exiles in the United States. We have no concrete
evidence that this is the case, but if specific problems of this sort were
identified, we have more direct methods of rectifying this type of
situation than through the imposition of generalized (and difficult to
enforce ) travel restrictions.
Finally, as to landing rights of Ugandan aircraft in the United
States, we do not believe that the purposes for which Ugandan air
craft have landed in this country raise general problems from the hu
man rights or foreign policy perspectives. However, these flights are
subject to standardcustoms and immigration inspection procedures,
and we would of course consider appropriate remedial action should
it be determined that these flights are being used for purposes incon
sistent with U.S. law or policy .
To summarize, our policy toward Uganda is one of consciously dis
tancing the United States from human rights violations in that coun
try, denying Uganda U.S. products and facilities which would in our
view directly contribute to continued human rights violations, and
encouraging more concerted international attention to this situation .
We believe that this is the most active, realistic and effective approach
available to us under present circumstances.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would now welcome your questions.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much. We will proceed with the re
mainder of the witnesses and then come back to questions.
The next witness is Mr. Rauer Meyer, Office of Export Administra
tion, Department of Commerce.
 63

Mr. MEYER. Thank you , Mr. Chairman. I have a rather brief state
ment which with your permission I will read .
Mr. FRASER . You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF RAUER H. MEYER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. MEYER. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to testify
for the Department of Commerce on U.S. trade policy toward Uganda
and on the proposed bills to prohibit exports to Uganda. Stanley
Marcuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Industry and Trade is un
able to appear because of a previous commitment that has taken him
out of town. The Department's interest in the subject of today's hear
ing arises from our general responsibilities for promoting exports and
for administering restrictions on exports pursuant to the Export Ad
ministration Act.
It will, I believe, be useful to describe briefly the character of U.S.
trade with Uganda. Historically this trade has involved imports of
coffee and exports of machinery and transport equipment, miscellane
ous manufactured goods, food and food preparations. In 1976 and 1977
our trade comprised exportsof $6 million and $ 14 million and imports
of $ 107 million and $ 248 million, respectively. The more than doubling
of the dollar value of imports in 1977 reflected the sharp increase in
world coffee prices in the period . Principal U.S. exports in 1977 were
telecommunications equipment, cereals,and agricultural machinery.
Coffee accounted for virtually all of U.S. imports from Uganda. U.S.
purchases of Uganda coffee in turn accounted for 6 percent of total
U.S. coffee imports. In 1976 Uganda made 50 percent of its total pur
chases from Kenya, 15 percent from the United Kingdom, 9 percent
from West Germany, and 4 percent each from Japan andthe United
States. Leadingpurchasers of Uganda’s exports were United States,
33 percent ; United Kingdom , 21 percent ; France and Italy, 6 percent
each .
Present trade policy towards Uganda is to review all validated li
cense export applications in order to prevent the export of U.S. goods
that could contribute directly to continued human rights violations.
We consult with the Department ɔf State on each of these applica
tions. We do not engage in the promotion of exports to Uganda. On
the other hand, we do not interfere with normal commercial exchanges.
We have denied applications for aircraft under this policy and have
issued licenses for telecommunications equipment for the enhancement
ofcommunications between Uganda and the outside world.
Exports of items subject to validated license control represented 65
percent by value of total exports to Uganda in 1977. These involved
principally telecommunications equipment. The remaining exports
were made up of general license commodities, that is, commodities for
which no specific prior written authorization is required from the De
partment of Commerce before export is made. These items are widely
available in Western Europe and Japan. Regarding U.S. trade policy
toward imports from Uganda, the United States is a member of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) and subscribes to
GATT obligations to administer import restrictions in a nondiscrim
 64

inatory manner. There are no controls on U.S. imports from Uganda

otherthan those which apply to imports from allother sources.
H.R. 9252 would amend the Export Administration Act to prohibit
exports of all U.S. goods to Uganda. The Department of Commerce
defers to the Department of State on the overall question as to whether
it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to impose a total
embargo on exports to 'Uganda. This Department, however, believes
that it would not be in our commercial interest to restrict exports that
do not havea significant relationship to the military or internal secu
rity capabilities of Uganda. If aа determination were to be made that
additional restrictions on exports, even an embargo, were in the for
eign policy interests of the United States, sections 3 and 4 ( b) of the
Export Administration Act of 1969 already provide ample authority
to do this.
We believe it would be preferable to rely on such existing authority
ratherthan enacting blanket prohibitions,as has beenproposed by the
subject bills. Under existing authority, when it is in this country's in
terest to remove or modify an export embargo, the administration
would have the flexibility needed to act expeditiously, rather than
being required to seek explicit legislative modification for amended
controls.
In addition , we note that in other instances in which the United
States has restricted exports because of the human rights policies ofa
foreign government, we have restricted exports only of those goods
which could be used to suppress human rights of the population. This
policy permits continued U.S. influence in the country while making
clearourdispleasure with its human rightspolicies. Finally, Uganda
could easily frustrate a unilateralembargo by shifting its trade from
the United States to other countries. We therefore question the effec
tiveness of an absolute prohibition on exports to Uganda.
H.R. 9253, H.R. 9254, and H.R. 9526 would prohibit U.S. imports
of coffee and other commodities from Uganda. It is the position of the
Department of Commerce that an official boycott or embargo or
Ugandan exports instituted unilaterally by the U.S. Government
would be inconsistent with our international obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT ).
The basic principle of GATT, and one which the United States
strongly supports, is that trade restrictions should not discriminate
among GATT members. While there are provisions for exceptions
to the rule, none applies at present to the case of Uganda, which is a
GATT member. Since no officially recognized international body has
imposed sanctions against Uganda forits human rights violations,
a Ú.S. boycott of Uganda product could also set a dangerous prec
edent for GATT members to apply trade restrictions for other less
clear-cut political reasons.
Moreover, an effective boycott of Uganda exports, primarily coffee,
would require the collaboration of major importers of Ugandan prod
ucts and we have no reason to believe that other countries would par
ticipate in sufficient numbers to create an effective boycott. Therefore,
a U.S. boycott of Ugandan products may only redirect these products
to alternative markets.
Thank you for the opportunity to explain U.S.trade policy toward
Uganda and to comment on proposed legislation.
 65

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Meyer.

Mr. Miles, you don'thave a separate statement ?
Mr. MILES. No.
Mr. FRASER. We will turn to our colleague, Congressman Pease. We
are delighted that he is here to give us a presentation. He is one of the
distinguished and effective members of our committee. So we are look
ing forward to his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD J. PEASE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer
testimony. You and Congressmen Diggs and Bingham are to be com
mended for having the compassion and concern to convene hearings
on Uganda. To the best of my knowledge, these hearings are the first
systematic review of United States-Ugandan relations since Idi Amin
came to power 7 years ago. We know what has happened in the interim .
I am tempted to speak at length about Amin's tenure as “ Life Presi
dent” -how he has managed to reduce one of Africa's most promising
countries and most vibrant societies to ruins. However, mytask is to
persuade you that we should discontinue the support Amin derives
from our country. I will confine my remarks to evaluating arguments
in opposition and in favor of economic sanctions against Uganda.
It is said that Amin is an African problem to be dealt with by Afri
cans. To argue this point is to ignore reality. While there is little
doubt that Amin is a source of anguish and embarrassment to black
African leaders, only a few like Nyerere and Kaunda have repudiated
him. Sometimes it is hard to understand why.
More importantly, many black African leaders are hesitant to de
plore the slaughterin Uganda for fear of being criticized for human
rights violations themselves. The OAU doctrine of noninterference in
the internal affairs of a member nation provides an easy out for a
threatening dilemma. The only hope of Africans dealing with Amin
lies in their recognition of what much of the rest of the world has
already concluded — that Amin is a. specialcase—as is South Africa.
It is said that what Amin has presided over in Uganda is repre
hensible to the world community—that his genocidal policies are
crimes against humanity and deserving of United Nations sanctions.
Yet, Uganda has escaped internationalpressure like the arms embargo
leveled against South Africa last fall. The United Nations has failed
to come to grips with Amin's reign of terror. To expect otherwise
demonstrates bad arithmetic and blind faith.
The 49-member African bloc has frustrated any discussion of
Uganda. Last March, the African bloc joined forces with other Third
World and Communist countries to block an investigation of human
rights in Uganda by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Little
more than 6 weeks ago, the African bloc once again led the way in
tabling the Nordic Resolution censuring Uganda. Those who would
have us do nothing about Uganda are content knowing the U.N. Com
next
mission on Human Rights might include Uganda on its agenda
month.
Amin has cowed the OAU and the U.N. This obscures the fact that
the West, particularly the United States, has the real power to affect
 66

events in Uganda. Increasingly , Amin sustains his hold on power

through coffee sales to the United States and a few of our allies. Rul
ing out military force, it is through economic clout that we can best
influence conditions in Uganda —as is the case with South Africa . Let
us examine the arguments put forth by theState Department and the
Commerce Department to justify continued U.S. commercial support
forItAmin' s regim
is said e.
that econo mic sanctions against Uganda would have only
a symbolic effect — that recent history has demonstrated that sanctions
-

don'twork. Most of all, it is said, sanctions against Uganda would be

toothless without the cooperation of other states. So the argument
goes.
What about symbolic gestures ? The State Department asks us to be
content with resolutions of disapproval, the closing of embassies and
the recalling of ambassadors, while the slaughter in Uganda continues.
If these gestures have more than symbolic value, it is lost on me. More
over, to dismiss a coffee boycott ora trade ban as being of merely sym
bolic significance fails to take into account the direct relationship be
tween American purchases of Uganda's coffee and Amin's murderous
regim e. s Uganda is not like Rhodesia or Cuba, and parallels should
Amin'
not be drawn . Whether Amin would fall from power if he lost his
coffee revenue from the west is an open question , but the impact upon
him would be severe . Given what is known about the scale of official
murder in Uganda and Amin's nearly total dependency on coffee rev
enue, the burden of proof is upon those who would do nothing. Finally,
I reject the notion that our decision to impose sanctions on Uganda
must await a prior commitment of our allies to follow suit. That
notion has the familiar ring of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is
just as much reason, if not more, to believe that aU.S. coffee boycott
or trade ban could serve as a catalyst for international action to hasten
Amin's downfall . In fact, since the U.S. buys the lion's share of
Ugandan green coffee, it is all the more appropriate for us to take the
first step to bring economic pressure to bear upon conditions in
Uganda .
Another argument for continuing our commercial trade with
Uganda statesthat economic sanctions undermine the integrity of the
GATT agreements. “ The United States must honor its long-standing
commitment to free trade,” we are told , “ A Ugandan coffee boycott
or trade ban would set a bad precedent for our trade policies."
Let me say at the outset that I think unrestricted free trade
worthy objective. However, to suggest the GATT agreement is sacro
sanct and inviolable is misleading . Yes, it is true that adopting eco
nomic sanctions against Uganda would constitute a GATTviolation.
But there already exists ample precedent for the United States and
other countries to act, when they see fit, on trade matters regardless of
GATT obligations.
The Commerce and State Departments make much of our strong
support for GATT's nondiscrimination clause. However, the historical
record since GATT's inception in 1948 contradicts this assertion. Here
are but a few examples.
In the early 1950's, the United States dropped most - favored nation
status for Czechoslovakia — a clear violation of article I of GATT.
 67

Even though Czechoslovakia complained, the GATT members retro

actively approved the move.
Again , in the early 1950's, the Netherlands complained of U.S. vio
lations of GATT with respect to trade barriers for dairy product im
ports. Tothe best of my knowledge, this matter remains unresolved.
In 1960, the United States unilaterally cut off trade with Cuba.
While Cuba never complained to GATT, the violation occurred none
theless. Either this decision was wrong or some principles outweigh
free trade. In this instance, “political principles.'
Also in 1960, we were successful inpersuading the OAS to approve
economic sanctions against the Trujillo regimein the Dominican Re
public for its attempted intervention in Venezuela.
Please don't get me wrong. I am not seeking to justify economic
sanctions with Uganda on the shaky reasoningthat it has been done
before. I just want to emphasize that such a move would hardly be
unprecedented.
There is something much more basicabout the free trade argument
that bothers me. It is rooted in the notion that the dynamics of inter
national economics and international politics are separate and distinct.
I do not argue that, on balance, it does not serve our national interests
to try to maintain this distinction. However, our fervor for free trade
rhetoric sometimes tends to delude us into forgetting that economic
and political motives are frequently intertwined. " Free trade” becomes
a principle of convenience to be used to avoid having to make tough
decisions in the most trying circumstances, namely Uganda and South
Africa. In thecase at hand, once the feasibility of economic sanctions
against Uganda is dismissed on free trade grounds, our options for
coping with Amin are drastically reduced. We are expected to ener
gize an international moral consensus against Amin ina world undis
tinguishedby moral scruples. If we leave the door open to continued
commercial trade with Amin, we neutralize our realpower over him
and werender ourselves political eunuchs.
The history of our international trade in the past 30 years suggests
that we have been willing to forgo our GATT Obligations under cer
tain circumstances. The exceptions have sometimes been rooted in prin
ciple and sometimes not. I am suggesting that in the case of Uganda,
not unlike South Africa, there are higher principles involved than
blind adherence to free trade dogma.
If we adopt sanctionsagainst Uganda ,we would be establishing a
new principle in our tradepolicies. We will indicate that we recognize
limits of decency beyond which other governments may not go in their
treatment of their own citizens. We will demonstrate that in special
cases the Congress will use its authority to insist upon corporate re
sponsibility where it may otherwise be lacking. If we continue to look
the other way regarding U.S. commercial support for Amin's regime,
we leave the door open to the Hitlers, Stalins, and Amins of the future
1
to exploit us in the name of “ free trade . "
|
What about the argument that economic sanctions would hurt the
very people most in need of help — the Ugandans ? This notion reflects
a basic misunderstanding of the manner in which coffee is grown and
marketed in Uganda. Most Ugandan coffee is sold under Amin's aus
pices through the central structure of the Ugandan marketing board.
1

1
 68

The Government ( Amin ) confiscates the coffee when it is harvested and

the Ugandan coffee growers seldom , if ever, get paid for their crop.
You have already received testimony detailing the pittance that grow
ers receive when paid.
Seasoned international cynics and other opponents of sanctions argue
that the Soviets, the Libyans, or others will fill the void created by a
coffee boycott. This is a hypothesis worth testing. What do we have
to lose ? I cannotsay for certain that these countries will not buy Amin's
coffee for their own consumption or resale, but I think it is unlikely.
The Soviets' allegiance to Amin is not unqualified, and certain costs
would have to be accepted in comingto Idi Amin's rescue. But what
if the Soviets do purchase the Ugandan coffee ? At least, it would be
Soviet - rather than U.S. dollars — paying for the Soviet arms that
Uganda receives.
We all know what has happened to coffee prices in recentyears. It is
reasonable to ask what might be the effect of a Ugandan coffee boycott
on consumer prices in the United States. The answer from sources as
reliable as the foreign agriculture service within the Agriculture De
partment is not much. Since Uganda supplies only about 6 percent of
our annual green coffee imports, alternative supplies could be found
without much hardship. When pressed, a spokesman for the green
coffee association acknowledged that other supplies, even from other
African countries, could pick up the slack .
Finally, I come to the last major argument in opposition to economic
sanctions against Uganda — the impact upon Americans stillinside
Uganda. Frankly,this is the factor that concerns me the most. If any.
thing, Amin has demonstrated himself to be unpredictable. The only
real leverage Amin has with us is the well-being of the Americans
living in Uganda. As recently as last February , he reminded us of
their utilityas political hostages.
The potential danger in this regard was recognized as long ago as
1973 when the American Embassy in Kampala was closed and all
Americans were urged to leave Uganda. Since that time, there have
been repeated warnings to all Americans to leave. Recent warnings
have been transmitted through official and informal channels. Still
some Americans stay. The missionaries stay because of their dedica
tion to their cause and their unwillingness to leave Ugandans in time
of greatest need. Other Americans stay because there is much money
to be made. The point is that they allstay for personal reasons, and
are fully aware of the risks they assume.
We in positions of governmental authority must take seriously our
Government's responsibility to provide for the safety of the Americans
at home and overseas. Every reasonable effort should be made to in
sure the safety of Americans in Uganda. However, there is a point
beyond which individuals must assume responsibility for their per
sonal decisions. That point may have been reached in Uganda. I think
it has. We must ask ourselves if the presence of the Americans in
Uganda who are there of their own choosing will be the governing
factor in the whole of United States -Ugandan relations.
Having responded to the arguments for not taking a course of action
does not provide a rationale for acting .Let me set forth the main rea
sons why I am calling for a coffee boycott or trade ban with Uganda.
 69

We have seen examples of when the State Department and the Con
gress have endorsed deviation from our free trade commitments for
political reasons — the Cuban embargo and the Jackson-Vanik amend
ment in 1974.This suggeststhat we value some principlesmore highly
than free trade. I propose that we act upon a new principle: in special
cases involving governments characterized by genocide, we as a Nation
will take all steps to disassociate ourselves from those governments
including economic sanctions. Uganda is clearly a case of genocide
practiced as government policy — à special situation which justifies an
exceptional response .
Translated into policymaking, both the State Department and the
Congress will have to make difficult judgments about when to act in
special cases. No longer would it be possible to justify continued com
mercial trade with an Amin on the grounds that to do otherwise would
undermine free trade.
We could provide an answer and a course of action when someone
asks: " Are American coffee companies prepared to do business with a
genocidist like Amin or Hitler if the price is right?”
An objective evaluation of United States -Ugandan commercial trade
suggeststhat economic sanctions will hurt Amin and hasten his down
fall. He is uniquely dependent upon hard currency from coffee exports
to insure the loyalty of his mercenaries and, thereby, his survival.
Further, we should not underestimate the psychologicalimpactof a
U.S. boycott. In Africa in general and in Uganda, conditions will de
terminewhether Amin is perceived to be aa ruler with aa future or with
out a future.
A U.S. boycott could signal that Amin's days are limited. And even
ifa coffee boycott did not cripple Amin's holdon power , we could take

heart in knowing that our country would be using our economic lever
age against rather thanin support of Amin.
Many Americans believe that there is a double standard at work
withinour African policies. Defenders of theVorster government in
South Africa are fond of making this point. Whether this allegation
has any merit or not is of secondary importance to the fact that its
appealwould be quashed if we were to act more strongly against gen
ocide in Uganda.
Another argument in favor of a Ugandan coffee boycott or trade ban
is my belief that it could serve as a catalyst for responsible interna
tional action to hasten an end to Amin's reign of terror. Once the
United States has demonstrated a willingness to withdraw its commer
cial support from Amin , pressure can be brought to bear upon a few
of our allies — and it would take a few - to follow suit. A coordinated
boycott could have aa dramatic economic impact upon Amin's economy.
In addition to the reasons cited previously, taking action to disasso
ciate ourselves from Amin's rule is consistent with our Nation's com
mitment to justice, liberty, and respect for human rights. Our human
rights policy is so much empty rhetoric if we fail to act against whole
sale slaughter in Uganda.
Finally, we must dispose of the notion that morality must be di
vorced from our international trade polices in all cases . Otherwise, we
will face further dilemmas like the ones confronting us today in 1

Uganda and South Africa . By virtually any standard , conditions in

Uganda could hardly get much worse. Any semblance of a working
 70

economy has disintegrated . Standards of civil conduct have disap

peared. And as many as 300,000 Ugandans may have been slaughtered.
Perhaps Mr. Godfrey Lule, Uganda's former Minister of Justice
who escaped last spring, put it best in a plea to the U.N.: " For the
people of Uganda, there is no known behavior or code of conduct that
can guarantee personal safety from unwarranted arrest, torture, and
murder — fear engulfs everyone, high and low.”
The absence of effectiveaction from anywhere in the world reveals
the need for some country to demonstrate that it has the means and
the will to stand up against Amin's practice of internal genocide. We
have the means. It remains to be seen if we have the will.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we have heard this
afternoon an impressive recitation of cold, logical, business-like and
analytical reasons why the United States should not establish a Uganda
boycott.
But, Mr. Chairman , the American people do not react coldly, logi
cally, analytically where tens of thousands of innocent people are
being killed. They react with their hearts, and thank God that they
do. They will want to disassociate the United States in everyway from
a murderous regime. They will want to do whatever is possibleto end
the torture and the bloodshed. When all is said and done about free
trade, precedents, and GATT agreements, it comes downto this — a
trade boycott is the most effective means available to stop the carnage
in Uganda .
Mr. Chairman, about 2 weeks ago I happened to be in Israel and
visited Yad Vashem , the Israeli memorial to the holocaust per rated
by Nazi Germany . When I went through that impressive memorial
I becamemore and more aware of how many people had been killed
in Nazi Germany and the amount of mechanical and other work that
had to go into doing all of that. I kept asking myself how did the world
let that happen ? How did it go on ? Did the people in the United States
know about it ? One of my Israeli guides kept saying, “ They knew .
They knew ..” I pressed them on it as we got to the end . What it came
down to was that the American Government knew what was going
on in those death camps but the American people did not know I .
daresay that somebody justified using our resources in World War II
on other targets in other directions rather than intrying to rectify the
killing that was going on in those Nazicamps. I daresay that if the
American people had known, there would have been such an uproar,
such an outrage,that our Government would have found some way to
act early in the thirties, not at the end, to stop that killing of 6 million
people.
We know now and the American people increasingly are learning
about the killing, the genocide that is going on in Uganda. I believe
that the American Congress responding to the American people will
act on Uganda.Thank you verymuch.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Pease, for your statement which I find
persuasive.
We have had I think in international law the doctrine of humani
tarian intervention by a country in extraordinary circumstances. My
feeling about Uganda is that there is a system there that abuses human
rights. It is an irrational, almost a nonsystem , a breakdown of law and
order that probably would justify our departure from our regular
 71

norm of accepting ordinary trade as a base line for contact among

nations. I find myself in agreement. I really believe that we will
have difficulty living with our consciences if we say that we have no
responsibility.
Chairman Diggs.
Mr. Diggs. Don Pease's testimony was a very eloquent conclusion to
a most interesting panel. I don't think anyone can disagree with the
principal points that he made. I am sure that his response to the con
ventional arguments that have been heard in this case will have an
influential effect upon the joint committees.
If you have started the question period, Mr. Chairman, I have a
couple that I would like to ask .
First of all, just for the record I would like to indicate that more
than two heads of state have spoken out against the Uganda situa
tion. In addition to Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda the heads of state
of Liberia, Ghana,Botswana have spoken out against Idi Amin as has
the African press. II have referencesin my hand here that, without ob
jection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record, critical
references indicating that these activities have not gone unnoticed and
have not gone without some kind of response.
Mr. FRASER. Without objection we will make those part of the
record.1
Mr. DỊggs. Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the Commerce
Department to give us specific information about the exports to
Uganda. The witness from the Department has just referred to these
items in general terms. Coffee accounted for virtually all of the U.S.
imports from Uganda. The Department knows specifically what
companies in the United States are involved in this trade traffic. We
have a list here, apparently from customs sources, listing by category
various trade items that have come in from Uganda. We believe that
information is available as to the specific firms which import these
items. May we have a commitment from the Commerce Department
to provide that information for the record ?
Mr. MEYER. I shall take the request back , Mr. Diggs, and the De
partment will address an answer.
Mr. Diggs. Are you aware of any problem in getting that informa
tion for the record ?
Mr. MEYER. There are certain confidentiality requirements imposed
on information that detailed.
Mr. WHALEN . Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Diggs. I yield .
Mr. WHALEN . Why ? What are the reasons for these confidential
amount requirements ?
Mr. MEYER. To protect what is essentially proprietary information.
The Export Administration Act, for example, has a specific section
that obligates us to maintain the confidentiality of information re
ceived from business sources .
Mr. WHALEN . Is that true in every instance ? If I wanted to know
what is imported from a country , why, by whom, I could not get that
information as a Member of Congress ?
Mr. MEYER. The Bureau of Census does publish import and export
statistics. They do not publish , however, company names associated
1 See article from “ New African " in appendix 3.
 72

with those figures. The information that the Bureau uses comes from
proprietary sources. In other words, the exporters and importers are
identified for the Bureau and those companies have been assured con
fidential treatment.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure about exports of U.S.
equipment to Uganda but in terms of imports we have alist of all the
coffee imports by company, by amounts, for 1975, 1976, and 1977. We
will be happyto supply that to the committee .
Mr. Diggs. I think it would be helpful. In addition , I would like to
see the citation to which the gentleman from the Commerce Depart
ment refers that would prohibit him from providing the committee,
in its official capacity, the information that we request.?
Mr. Diggs. I have just one question to the Department of State, a
very simple and fundamental question. What is the difference between
your position here on Uganda and your position on South Africa ?
Mr. HARROP. I think probably the question of the U.S. reac
tion to human rights problems in various situations in various coun
tries is one that really has to be looked at from country to country. I
think we are interested in moving forward to bring about change and
improvement all over the world wherever the situations arise. I think
the circumstances of the case vary from place to place. At the present
time I think that the judicious application of international pressures
is more feasible in South Africa than it is in Uganda, however much
the problems of Uganda, the cruel behavior of the regime there may
cry out for action. I don't think that the people would want us to hold
in abeyance action on human rights in situations where progress seems
possible pending progress in the less tractable cases.
We are reacting to the problem in both countries in different ways
and I think we are trying to influence the situation in both countries.
We have in Uganda aa combination of tyranny and anarchy that has
led to widespread violence and atrocities, many of which were detailed
in your testimony yesterday. Many lives have been lost.
South Africa has institutionalized racism , violated fundamental
rights of political and social participation by the overwhelming ma
jority of the population. I don't really know that there is any way we
can compare the two. I am not sure they are essentially comparable. It
is аa. different type of problem and I think has to be addressed in differ
ent ways .
The policies we are taking toward Uganda are perhaps not accu
rately defined or defined by implication as a sort of business as usual
kind of circumstance . I think we have taken rather clear actions to dis
associate the United States from the repressive activity of the regime.
We have cut off all aid, we have limited our trade and we look at it
with very special scrutiny to make sure nothing we export to this coun
try is going topossibly support the regime, questionsof limitations on
visas, on travel, international activities, our support for the
Mr. Diggs. If the gentleman will suspend momentarily — I am sure
this could take up all the afternoon - we know what you have done
1 See appendix 4 .
2 The subcommittees subsequently received the information requested in a confidential
form under the provisions of section 7 ( c ) of the Export Administration Act as amended
by Public Law 95-53. This statute provides that export license information is to be
furnished upon request to committees and subcommittees of Congress of appropriate
jurisdiction , but thereafter the information can be made publicly available only if the full
committee determines that the withholding thereof would be contrary to the national
interest.
 73

with respect to Uganda. You have not answered the question as to why
you have closed down the Embassy in Uganda because of these repres
sive activities and you have not losed down, or reduced, the diplo
matic mission in Pretoria. I am sure you are not trying to say that
repressiveness in South Africa is any less odious than in Uganda. In
Uganda one faces a problem of an individual rather than a system
because these repressive measures were not in evidence prior to Idi
Amin's assumption of power.
The repressive incidents in South Africa have been going on since
1948 andeven before. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that we ought to
get the Department to give us their most definitive answer, not this
generalized, precooked answer that has just been read to us out of a
briefing book. I think the Department ought to be made to be as
definitive as it can, citing examples, I would like to have a compre
hensive answer as to what is the difference in their response to the
repressiveness of these two countries. I can't really see us coming out
of this committee with a resolution on a matter of this type that only
zeroes in on Uganda.
I think the point has been well made about Uganda, but I think
an amendmentwould be in order to include South Africa ; and there
fore the Department needs to be responsive to the comparative facts
of this matter.
Mr. FRASER. Would you care to elaborate in writing? I think the
chairman is suggesting that perhaps a more detailed written response
would be appropriate.
Mr. HARROP. Yes; we will be glad to provide a written statement
on the difference between our policies toward South Africa and to
ward Uganda.
[The statement referred to follows :]
COMPARISON OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD UGANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Uganda and South Africa are very different situations from the perspective
of human rights. One involves a combination of tyranny and anarchy which has
led to widespread loss of life ; the other involves institutionalized , systematic
racism which has resulted in the prolonged denial of political and social rights
to the vast majority of the population . Both situations are abhorrent, but each
is different and little purpose would be served by an attempt to compare them
in absolute terms. Similarly, U.S. policies in each situation are determined in
dividually, based on all the factors involved including the historical background
of the situation and our ability to exert constructive influence. Individual as
pects of these policies may not be strictly comparable. Nevertheless, we believe
that in their totality both sets of policies are appropriate to the situation in each
country and to our own interests and objectives including the promotion of
respect for fundamental human rights.
The following is a description of U.S. Policies with respect to Uganda and
South Africa in the fields indicated :

DIPLOMATIC CONTACT
Uganda . — The U.S. Embassy in Kampala was closed in November, 1973,due to
internal security problems in the country, increasing operating difficulties, threats
against Americans by high Ugandan officials, and the expulsion of the Embassy's
Marine Security Guard by the Ugandan Government . Reopening of the Em
bassy would only be considered if there were a substantial improvement in
C.S.-Ugandan relations, one prerequisite for which would be a fundamental in
provement in human rights conditions in Uganda.
Uganda maintains a small Embassy in Washington headed by a Charge
d'Affaires. The Department maintains working level contacts with the Embassy
 74

as necessary to conduct official business. A higher level of Ugandan representa

tion would not be appropriate or necessary at present, but the Department be
lieves the Embassy provides a useful communications channel, especially in
emergency situations such as occurred in February 1977 when American resi
dents of Uganda appeared to be in danger.
South Africa . — The United States and South Africa maintain a full range of
diplomatic relations. Each country has an embassy in the other's capital. These
embassies are headed by resident ambassadors. In addition to our embassy in
Pretoria, we have consulates general in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg.
There are South African consulates in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and
New Orleans. We favor the continuation of diplomatic relations with South
Africa as a channel for encouraging the South African Government to change
its racial policies.
AID
Uganda.Bilateral U.S. economic assistance to Uganda was terminated in
1973, due to operating difficulties including a hostile attitude on the part of the
Ugandan Government. Resumption of an assistance program would not be con
sidered unless there were a fundamental improvement in human rights conditions
in Uganda.
U.S. representatives to international development banks are under instructions
to oppose and vote against loans by these organizations to Uganda.
South Africa . - South Africa , a developed country , has never received U.S.
development assistance .
TRADE / INVESTMENT
Uganda . - No exports of munitions list items are permitted to Uganda. Other
export license applications are reviewed from the perspective of human rights,
and licenses are denied where it appears that the export could contribute directly
to human rights violations, as in the case of helicopters or other such equipment
for the Ugandan security establishment.
Uganda does not benefit from U.S. programs promoting trade and investment.
U.S. direct private investment in Uganda has remained static at approximately
$ 3 million since 1971. ) Neither Eximbank nor OPIC has been active in Uganda
since 1973 (although $1.6 million in OPIC insurance issued prior to 1973 remains
in force, as does the underlying Investment Guarantee Agreement signed in 1965 ) .
Uganda has not been made eligible for general tariff preferences ( " GSP ” ) .
South Africa . - Export license applications for South Africa are reviewed from
the perspective of human rights, and in cases where it appears the export could
contribute to human rights violations, the license is denied . All U.S. exports to
the police and military forces are prohibited, and the United States adheres
firmly to the United Nations mandatory embargo against arms sales to South
Africa. Virtually no other exports of items on the munitions lists are permitted
to South Africa ; only non -military equipment to the civilian sector can be ap
proved, and all such applications are carefully reviewed on a case -by - case basis.
Our trade policy with respect to South Africa is designed to express in con
crete terms our strong disapproval of apartheid and to avoid giving an appear
ance of closeness to the South African Government. The United States does not
take part in trade promotion events in South Africa involving substantial and
readily identifiable government participation and sponsorship. The Export
Import Bank has not granted direct loans to South Africa since 1964. Under cur
rent policy Eximbank is permitted to guarantee bank and other private loans
for South African purchases of U.S. goods and services and to provide short and
medium term insurance on private U.S. financing of U.S. exports. As of Novem
ber 30, 1977, Eximbank's exposure in South Africa amounted to $ 202.9 million .
Under our present policy the Commodity Credit Corporation ( CCC ) of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture is permitted to extend loans to facilitate South African
purchases of U.S. agriculture and livestock exports. Over the past twelve years,
the United States has neither encouraged nor discouraged U.S. investment in
South Africa . Direct private investment stood at nearly $1.7 billion at the end
of 1976 .
TRAVEL

Uganda.-All visa applications by Ugandan officials or others traveling on be

half of the Ugandan Government must be referred to Washington for review prior
to visa issuance. This procedure enables the Department to prevent travel to the
 75

United States by Ugandans for purposes which might be incompatible with our
human rights interests ( such as training in fields with security applications,
etc. ) .
Due to the unsettled conditions persisting in Uganda, since the closure of the
American Embassy in Kampala in 1973 Americans have been advised against
traveling to Uganda or taking up residence there, and Americans residing in
Uganda have been advised to leave . In light of recent incidents in which com
mercial airliners flying over Uganda have been intercepted and forced to land
for inspection , the Department now also recommends that travelers avoid flights
transiting Ugandan airspace.
South Africa . - Like most other foreign visitors, South Africans need to obtain
a visa to enter the United States. In the event of a visa application by a high
ranking military or police official, the application must be referred to Washing
ton for review prior to visa issuance. Similarly , South Africa requires U.S.
visitors to that country to have a visa . The U.S. Government does not discourage
private American citizens from visiting South Africa.
However, the United States since 1967 nas not permitted port visits by U.S.
Navy ships for operational purposes or shore leave, due to South Africa's abhor
rent racial policies. It was decided that U.S. Navy visits to South African ports
will take place only in emergency situations.

INTERNATIONAL

Uganda . - The United States is working actively, in conjunction with other

concerned governments, to encourage more concerted international attention to
the human rights situation in Uganda. The U.S. has strongly supported pro
posals within the United Nations system , particularly in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission , calling for a full investigation of human rights con
ditions in Uganda. There has been progress in this direction . The U.S. will con
tinue to support investigations and ameliorative steps.
South Africa . — The United States, in conjunction with our Western allies, is
striving to achieve a progressive transformation of South African society, in
part through international action. The United States supported the resolution
calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa at the UN Security
Council last November. Furthermore, over the years we have supported con
structive resolutions in the UN General Assembly aimed at directing interna
tional attention to racial discrimination and other human rights violations in
South Africa . The United States will continue to support measures that would
be effective in ending racial discrimination and granting full political rights to
all South Africans.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Meyer.

Mr. MEYER. May I elaborate very briefly on my answer to Con
gressman Diggs?
I did not mean to state a departmental position that we would or
wouldn't . I was merely trying to identify certain problems we had.
When I cited the Export Administration Act I should have noted
that last June аa revision in the act specifically authorized the transfer
of confidential information protected by that act to the Congress, to
committees of appropriate jurisdiction for the purpose of committee
work. So, insofar as that particular statute is concerned and depend
ing on the span of time that your request would cover, Mr. Diggs, it
would be possible under that statute to supply the information .
Mr. Diggs. Thank vou, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Whalen .
Mr. WHALEN . Thank you, Mr. Chairman . Before asking questions
I would like to make two observations. First, Mr. Harrop, on page
6 of your statement you indicated that the United States is committed
to the principle of free trade. Had you been a witness to House pro
cedures earlier today, I think you probably would have had to retract 1

that statement. I am not sure that we any longer abide by that prin

25-826 0 - 78 - 6
 76

ciple. You will read details of the floor debate on free trade in the
paper tomorrow .
Second, with respect to Congressman Pease, I was very moved by
your statement. I think you perhaps unwittingly may have introduced
a new term which will find its way into our legislative restrictive
language. Heretofore we have used the phraseology “gross violations
of human rights.” One of the problemsI have had, and many of us
share this, is how gross is “ gross” ? You have used the term " genocide”
which obviously is the worst kind of human rights violation. This
may be a special category set aside for the denial of aid or direct trade.
I am interested inthe mechanism of the coffee trade, Congressman
Pease . Perhaps you could just elaborate a little bit. How is it that 5
percent or so of our coffee imports come from Uganda ? Do our coffee
firms go directly there to buy ? Do they buy in an international market ?
How does that operate ?
Mr.PEASE. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Whalen, my understanding is
that the American coffee companies deal in New York City with the
Ugandan Coffee Board which markets all Ugandancoffee. It is a
Government agency which markets Ugandan coffee. American com
panies purchase coffee from whomever they can, based on quality and
quantity and price, and they have traditionally, over the last several
years, included some Ugandan coffee in the mix of their total
purchases.
Mr. WHALEN. Is there some special quality attached to Ugandan
coffee, its taste, its price ?
Mr. PEASE. It is not a quality which is unique to Ugandan coffee.
There are other sources of supply within Africa for the same type of
robusta coffee. It is an inexpensive coffee . It is not a very expensive
kind but it is not a special quality. On the other hand, most coffee
that you buy in the store is a blend, a variety of kinds of coffees, some
South American , some African . Most of the coffee companies do like
to put a small amount in.
We found in our investigation that there are no major brands of
regular coffee which do not contain some Ugandan coffee .
Mr. WHALEN . I think you answered my next question, then, that
all of our major brands have to some degree Ugandan coffee.
Mr. PEASE. Yes.
Mr. WHALEN . If those firms were denied the ability to purchase
from Uganda, those purchases representing about 5 percent of the
total, would this in any way cause prices to increase, in any way ad
versely affect the marketability of their products ?'
Mr. PEASE. I will answer that in two ways. The Foreign Agricul
ture Service of the Agriculture Department to whom we addressed
that question said that it was ofthe opinion that there would be no
noticeable effect on American coffee prices, retail prices, as a result of
a trade ban against Uganda.
Second , we wrote letters to all of the U.S. importers of Ugandan
coffee and asked them about their attitude toward a boycott, about
how it would affect them. The answerthat we got back from several
of the major companies was : We are looking for guidance from the
Congress. If you tell us not to buy coffee from Uganda, we won't buy
coffee. It is no skin off our nose but we don't want to be the first ones
if our competition doesn't .
 77

The National Coffee Association, to which most of these purchasers

belong, wrote to us and asked specifically for congressional guidance.
They don't want to form a policy themselves for fear of getting in
volved not only in foreign policy but also in antitrust violations.
Mr. WHALEN. Thank you , Mr.Chairman .
Mr. FRASER. Mrs. Collins.
Mrs. Collins. Mr. Chairman , I want to address my question to our
colleague; but I wonder if he wants to go now for the quorum call.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, if Mrs. Collins has questions to other
members of the panel, I could run over but I can miss the vote, too.
It makes no difference.
Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
First of all let me commend you for drawing a parallel between
Uganda and South Africa. Both are special cases in the legacy of
human rights violations. Both are cases involving moral principles
transcending commercial principles of free trade and both require
some response that goes beyond lip service to our commitment to
human rights.
While I am talking about this South Africa situation I want to
associate myself with the remarks of Congressman Diggs who has, I
think, veryclearly pointed out the feeling of most people regarding
the need not to handle the situation in Uganda in and of itself alone.
There are others who certainly have tried boycotts against other
countries; namely , South Africa. It is my understanding that there
has been a significant increase in the volume of Ugandan coffee im
ported by the United States this year. How would you account for
that increase ?
Mr. PEASE. Well, there are two things you have to measure the in
crease by. One is in tonnage and one is in dollar value. The increase
in imports in dollar value has been very dramatic in the last couple of
years because of the worldwide increase in coffee prices. But there
has also been an increase, a more moderate one, in tonnage, of imports
in the United States. I have no particular significance to attach to
that. I think it is probably the ordinary working of the market,
Congresswoman Collins. Coffee importers are looking for coffee to
buy and they happen to buy somewhat more from Uganda. I do not
think there is anyparticular significance one way or another.
Mrs. COLLINS. Do you know if there is a special quality to Ugandan
coffee that is not found in coffee from Tanzania or Kenya ?
Mr. PEASE. I am not an expert on the qualities of various kinds of
coffee. There are other African nations which do raise coffee which has
the same qualities as Ugandan coffee. Whether there are in Tanzania
I am not sure.
Mrs. COLLINS. Let me ask a question of Mr. Harrop .
Mr. Harrop, on page 4 of your testimony you say the administration
reviews exports other than munitions. Among such items are heli
copters that contribute directly to human rights violations in Uganda.
I happen to be very interested in what is being exported because there
are exports goingto other countries that could be used for military
purposes. Given this consideration , can you tell me why the adminis
tration continues to grant export licenses to South Africa for civilian
1 This letter appears in appendix 2.
 78

aircraft, particularly when such aircraft could be used for military

purposes ?
Mr.HARROP. I think I would answer that, Congresswoman Collins,
by drawinga distinction between the nature of the recipient in the
two cases. We know that the purchaser in Uganda of civilian aircraft
is in fact the Government and these aircraft are in fact used by the
Government in furtherance of its system, security system. Not to go
into great detail about that, the aircraft are used for special imports
of luxury goods which are used as incentives for some of the security
personnel in Uganda.
Mrs. COLLINS. Isn't it true that South Africa has power to national
ize aircraft in South Africa for whatever purpose they want and
that those same aircraft could be used for military purposes?
Mr. HARROP. That is true. We understand it is possible for the South
African Government to nationalize aircraft although the aircraft are
sold to commercial users or private users for commercial and private
purposes.
Mrs. COLLINS. Are we saying we trust South Africa more than we
do Uganda to adhere to the rules ?
Mr. HARROP. No ; it is just that we know what happens in one case.
In the other case it is a possibility that could occur.
Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you very much .
If it could be shown that our Government is not capable of monitor
ing and controlling the end use put to such aircraft do you think
the administration would then deny the export license to South Africa
for planes and paramilitary
Mr. HARROP. If the U.S. Government were able ?
Mrs. COLLINS. If the U.S. Government finds it is not able to control
or monitor the use of planes and other paramilitary weaponsthat are
going to South Africa, do you think that then our administration
would be willing to deny export licenses for these items?
Mr. HARROP. I am afraid I am not ready to answer that question
precisely.
Mrs. COLLINS. Would you have the answer, Mr. Meyer ?
Mr. MEYER. I can answer in this fashion. We do distinguish in our
review of applications between end uses. We will deny in one case ; we
will approve in another case. If it becomes evident to us that an end
user for which we authorize an export has not abided by his statement
of intended use and the equipmenthas gone elsewhere, that is aa critical
factor in our licensing and would be аa critical factor in further licens
ing. Whether it would lead to a total cessation of licensing for a
product such as aircraft would depend entirely on how widespread
the practice of diversion was.
Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you very much , Mr. Chairman .
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Diggs.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of other
questions.
I would like for the Commerce Department spokesman to elaborate
on the reference made to the foreign policy interest of the United
States insofar as it affects the imposition of additional restrictions
upon U.S. exports to a particular country. What constitutes these
foreign policy issues ? I think that we ought to get a very clear state
 79

ment on that. There isa reference also in the Department's testimony

to exceptions to the rule of nondiscrimination in trade as it relates to
membership in GATT. There are provisions in the GATT for excep
tions. None apply at present in the case of Uganda which is a GATT
member. I would like to know just what theseexceptions are.
Mr. HARROP. If I could answer the first question, Mr. Diggs, the
Department of Commerce refers applications to the Department of
State for advisory judgment on foreign policy interests. The Secretary
of State reaches that judgment. In the case of Uganda that we are
discussing the Secretary of State has reached the judgment that the
support the repressive
export of equipment which appears to directlyrights
activities of the regime against the human of the people of
Uganda is not in the foreign policy interests ofthe United States and
on that basis has advised the Department of Commerce against issu
ance of the license on foreign policy grounds.
Mr. Diggs. What was the form of communication ? Was this an
informal conversation or is there a communication to that effect ?
Mr. MEYER. If I may, Mr. Diggs. When we receive a formal appli
cation from an American firmthat we think raises foreign policy
questions we refer that application, the substance of it, formally to
the Department of State and we solicit that Department's advice and
recommendation.
Mr. Diggs. This is all in writing ?
Mr. MEYER . Yes, sir.
Mr. Diggs. Might we have those communications ?
Mr. MEYER. There again, Mr. Diggs, you are dealing with specific
transactions and without saying yesor no toyour question, the same
problem of confidentiality arises which I would liketo get back to the
Department to consider.
Mr. HARROP. I think I can clarifythat aa little bit, at least from our
point of view, Mr. Meyer. As we understand the provisions of the Ex
port Administration Act which apply here the executive branch is en
joined from commentingon specificcases although if the congressional
committee with appropriate jurisdiction , such as of course your own,
wishes to make a specific request, we would be pleased to provide that
information for you on a confidential basis.
Mr. Diggs. Then with the permission of the Chair we make that
request formally.
Mr. FRASER. I am sure there is no objection by the committee. We
would appreciate having that response .
Mr. MEYER. May I ask over what period of time would you like that
information ?
Mr. Diggs. We will get back to you on that.1
Mr. FRASER . Mrs. Collins.
Mrs. COLLINS.May I just raise oneother point regarding the aircraft
and helicopter sales. Is it possible that Uganda citizens can purchase
aircraft and helicopters ?
Mr. HARROP. Wehave not in fact addressed that question, Congress
woman Collins. I think we would probably be very reluctant on the
1 A record of export license applications dating from 1971, President Amin's first yearin
power, was subsequently requested and received by the subcommittees on a confidential
basis.
 80

grounds that private citizens would probably not be private citizens for
this purpose in Uganda, to go along with that request. It has not come
up .
Mrs. Collins. Can you tell me how you monitor the end use of this
equipment ?
Mr. HARROP. In the case of Uganda there have been very limited sales
to Uganda over the years. We know, because we can follow the few air
craft involved , what purpose they are put to . It is a relatively simple
matter.
Mrs. COLLINS. How do you monitor end use in South Africa ?
Mr. HARROP. In the case of South Africa the applications are made
fora specific commercial or private use and we havenot had any reason
to doubt that they have beenused otherwise.
Mrs. COLLINS. You haven't had any reason based on your monitoring
system ?
Mr. HARROP. I do not know to what degree there has been special
surveillance of those aircraft.
Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. FRASER. I guess we will need to take a recess now . I understand
not only is there a voteon now but there is likely to be another vote
immediately following. If that proves to be the case we will be back in
about 15 minutes.
[Whereupon a brief recess was taken .]
Mr. BONKER [ presiding ]. The subcommittees will reconvene.
Mr. Harrop, the other subcommittee members will return as soon as
they have voted. I have been asked to proceed with questions.
As you know there are a variety of bills which have been introduced
concerning the Ugandan situation. They range from a simple con
demnation all the way to total economic and political sanctions against
that country. Despite the effectiveness of each approach , in yourstate
ment you seem to focus on arguments why we should notproceed any
further. I am interested in exploring ways in which the U.S. Govern
ment may be assisting directĪy or indirectly the Amin regime. This
is setting aside economic sanctions and whatever diplomatic sanctions
that we can apply at this time.
Now we had somefirsthand information from people who have been
directly involved who tell us that 20 Ugandans are receiving pilot
training at a flight training school at Vero Beach, Fla., that they all
have received so -called scholarships from the Ugandan Government.
They are all cadets and majors in the Ugandan Air Force. We even
have the names if it will help the State Department.
In 1976 there were approximately 20 Ugandans receiving similar
training in Scotland but they were asked to leave England after
demonstrations against their presence occurred in that country, and
after Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with Uganda. In
addition there are 20 or 30 Ugandans receiving training in Melbourne,
Fla., on satellite communications through the Harris Co. There are
at least five Ugandans receiving training in mobile communications
through the Harris Co. in Rochester, N.Y.
All of these Ugandan trainees, based on information we have, have
received their visas through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and all have
civilian passports. Apparently the procedure followed is that a junior
 81

official from the Ugandan Government flies to Nairobi with an official

request for a visa on behalf of a person and brings along the passport.
Inseveral instances visas were granted the sameday and without any
inquiry into the background of those individuals, or the precise train
ing that they were about to undertake in the United States.
Mr. Harrop, my question is : Are these activities really going on ?
Is the State Department apprised of them ? If so, whatdo you an
ticipate doing about it, particularly with the visa procedures in the
U.S. Embassy office in Nairobi ?
Mr. HARROP. Mr. Bonker, I think there is a legitimate criticism
that can be raised about the visa procedures which were in existence
up until early this fall. We had a situation in which visas were
granted, most frequently through our Embassy in Nairobi, to
Ugandan citizens, both public and private , who wanted to come to the
United States for a variety of training programs. These are pro
cedures which are carried out worldwide on a relatively pro forma
basis. There is no reason to exempt the individual applicant.
When it came to our attention that a large group was in fact in
Texas in the helicopter training that you referred to,we reviewed this
situation and imposed a new set of procedures worldwide, whereby
whenever a request is made for aа . Ugandan visa by a government official
for purposes which appear to raise some doubt as to whether or not
they might in fact have a relationship to the security structure or the
police apparatus ofthe regime, our counsel is required not to issue the
visa but to ask Washington for an opinion and guidance on how to pro
ceed. This is now in effect. We have in fact turned down a number of
visas of this sort since that time. We are quite satisfied that this is
now working pretty well .
Mr. BONKER. So this procedure applies in Florida, New York, as
well as Texas ?
Mr. HARROP. Yes; it applies everywhere.
Now in the case of the group training on the telecommunications
business, that relates to a major contract of an American firm , Har
ris Corp., for the installation of a communication satellite system for
commercial communications in Uganda. We have very carefully re
viewed that system and have interviewed a number of officials of the
company. We are satisfied that this system is not directly related to
the police or other government security communications of Uganda
which are in fact carried on through other means. For that reason ,
since we are not in favor of an outright trade embargo toward
Uganda, we are not inclined to prevent the training relating to the
Harris contract.
Mr. BONKER. What about possible Ugandans who are here under
various circumstances that may indeed be members of the notorious
State Research Bureau of the Uganda Government ?
Mr. HARROP. I think probably what I could say to that, Mr. Bonker,
is that it is possible always that officials here attached to the Em
bassy in Washington or to the mission to the United Nations could
be from other branches of the Ugandan Government rather than
foreign office and could have diplomatic passports and could be mas
querading as diplomats when they are not. We don't have evidence
that that is the case. I think as long as we do permit these missions to
 82

exist it would be difficult for us to be completely certain at the time

of applicationthat the diplomat was in fact a diplomat. Wedo how
evercheck such records as we have about individuals. Where we find
that is the case we willtake action and not grant a visa.
Mr. BONKER. Do you have a way of determining whether or not
people who are serving here under various visas are indeed members
of the State Research Bureau ? If we don't have an Embassy within
the country how is it possible for us to make that determination ?
Mr. HARROP. It is difficult, in fact. We could not be dead sure. The
fact that we have no record of an individual would not certainly be
an assurance . Our records are not that extensive on individual
Ugandans.
Mr. BONKER. One of the bills before this committee would advocate
closure of the U.S. Embassy and restricting movement of Ugandan
personnel whoare in the country , prohibit importsalong the lines that
Congressman Pease has advocated, prohibit entry for study and train
ing and also prohibit entry for purposes of pilot training. Are you
categorically opposed to all those provisions? Several of them are
referred to in your statement.
Mr. HARROP. In fact in the case of pilot training we arenot now
issuing visas for that as a matter of policy and have turned down a
number of these in that category since we put in the new procedures
I mentioned a moment ago.
On the closing of the Embassy or the mission, we really as a matter
of general policy do not regard diplomatic recognition as being any
form of approval of the regime. In fact specifically when we pulled
our people out of Kampala and closed our office in 1973 we did not
break diplomatic relations. We have found in the case of Uganda that
it is useful for us to have this communication link through the rela
tively lower level of officials of the Ugandan Embassy here. It was in
fact particularly useful to us during the time that Americans came
under pressures in Uganda.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Harrop, can you think of any other circumstances
where the United States has closed down an Embassy in a country and
withdrawn its personnel, but allowed that country to maintain an
Embassy and personnel in our country ? It seems like a rather unusual,
if not unprecedented, situation.
Mr. HARROP.I believe there are precedents, Mr. Bonker. I cannot
think of any offhand. I will be glad to look that up for you.
[The following statement was subsequently received for inclusion
in the record :]
PRECEDENTS WHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS CLOSED ITS EMBASSY AND WITH
DRAWN ITS PERSONNEL FROM A COUNTRY BUT ALLOWED THAT COUNTRY TO MAIN
TAIN AN EMBASSY AND PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES
A direct precedent for our action in the Ugandan case in 1973 was our action
under very similar circumstances in the Congo ( Brazzaville ) in 1965. In both
situations, unsettled local conditions and a hostile attitude on the part of the local
government led us to conclude that it was impossible to operate a U.S. Embassy
safely and effectively. In both instances we closed the Embassy and with
drew all official U.S. personnel, without breaking diplomatic relations or demand
ing that the Embassy of the other country be withdrawn from Washington. In
the case of the Congo ( Brazzaville ) , the Congolese Government on its own initia
tive then closed its Embassy in Washington and moved all its Embassy personnel
 83

to its UN Mission in New York . The Congolese Government also stated that it
considered its diplomatic relations with the United States to be suspended. The
Ugandan Government did not take such action in response to our closing of our
Embassy in Kampala .
Our actions in both of these cases are consistent with our general opposition
to breaking diplomatic relations except as a measure of last resort.
Mr. BONKER. This legislation also would prohibit landing rights of
Ugandan aircraft in this country and also prohibit all aircraft having
potential military application , at least owned by the Government of
Uganda. Would you have any particular problem with those two
items ?
Mr. HARROP. On the aircraft landing question, the air regulations
normally provide that an aircraft coming into the United States for
noncommercial purposes may in fact enter our air space and land with
out requiring special permission. It must however alert the customs
and there is an immediate application of normal customs and immigra
tion services to that and control on that aircraft.
I might add that we don't have any evidence that any of the aircraft
coming into this category have in fact served the purposes which you
suggest, that you would want to be stopping. We have had some in
stances of very close customs scrutiny of some of these aircraft and
immigration scrutiny to make certain what their purposes were. Un
less we had someindication thatthey were being usedfor undesirable
purposes we would hesitate, I think,"to set a precedent against normal
freedom of international air traffic.
Mr. BONKER. In sum what you are saying is that the legislation
proposed by Congressman Pease to impose economic sanctions is either
unnecessary or would prove ineffective. The legislation to close the
Ugandan Embassy or to restrict movement of Ugandan diplomats, or
tootherwise impose any other sanctions or restrictions on Ugandan
Government officials, is either unnecessary or covers things that you
have already addressed.
So what you are saying to the committee is that the official position
of the State Department is that the Congress should not take any
action on this matter and that the State Department is relatively con
tent with its existing relationship with the Government of Uganda
If that is not the stated position, it is at least the implicit position
of the State Department. Could you tell this committee what State is
prepared to do to register more vigorously and effectively our indig
nation and opposition to the atrocities of the Amin regime ?
Mr. HARROP. Yes ; I shall be glad to do that. I will say at the outset
that your description is correct, by implication, yes, that we do feel
that some of the measures we are now taking are disassocating the
United States from activities that we find repugnant in Uganda. I can
outline some of the things we are doing, some of which we have imple
mented in recent months. We feel that we are adhering to our policy
of disapproval of Ugandan human rights behavior. We don't think
that the additional proposals which the committee is considering are
advisable. We feel that by our policies on trade, our policies on ex
ports, our policies in regard to visas for entering the United States,
the care that we are taking to support activities in international
forums which would scrutinize human rights activities, that we are
 84

already establishing a posture which is understood to be very much

disassociation and disapproval of what goes on in Uganda.
Mr. BONKER. Has Great Britain officially broken her ties with
Uganda ?
Mr. HARROP. Yes ; that is correct.
Mr. BONKER . Has it imposed any economic sanctions as well ?
Mr. HARROP. No ; not to my knowledge. There are no economic sanc
tions imposed by the United Kingdom .
Mr. BONKER. In several months past, this committee, indeed the
entire House, voted on a resolution to condemn recent activities in
South Africa. Would the State Department also oppose a simple res
olution of condemnation of atrocities in Uganda ?
Mr. HARROP. I think it would depend on the terms of the resolution.
I don't think that the State Department would be inclined to oppose
a resolution which drew attention to the views of the American people
and of the Government and the Congress on the behavior of the Amin
regime toward hisown people.
Mr. BONKER. This is a very difficult issue because if this Govern
ment is going to promote human rights policies, attempt to voice its
concern , and try to back that concern with some form of action, and
we are reduced to total ineffectiveness in dealing with probably the
greatest example of human rights violations of this decade, I am not
sure we can be at all effective in promoting human rights around the
world .
Thank you, Mr. Harrop.
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all I would like to compliment our colleague from Ohio
for the excellence of his statement and for his great concern for peo
ple who aresurely oppressed. I want to thank you personally .
Second, I want to make a comment on an article carried in this
week's Newsweek entitled “ Idi Amin's New Leaf.” The reporter,
James Pringle, says in part and I quote :
After seven years as a world pariah and thirteen unsuccessful coups or assassi
nation attempts against him, Field Marshall Amin , 52, is still on the scene and
larger than life. Although his blue uniform bristled with medals and decorations,
Amin took pains to portray himself as a man of peace. The man who ordered
the execution of an archbishop and the massacre of the Langi and Acholi peo
ples promised to turn over a new leaf. “This is the year of peace, love, unity and
reconciliation ," he cooed . " I have no bad intentions from now onwards. I want
to be very friendly to the entire world community ." He did spoil things a bit
with a slip of the tongue as he kept repeating : “There are no human rights in
Uganda ." I assume he misspoke himself and meant to say there are no human
rights problems.
After several years in power Amin appears to have realized finally that he
cannot take on the whole world and win. Foreign residents believe that his
trusted British adviser, Robert ( Major Bob ) Astles, has calmed him down, even
to the extent of persuading the mercurial Ugandan that he should stop sending
goofy telegrams off to world leaders whenever he is in the mood. Foreign resi
dents also say that they are experiencing less harassment.
Now I gather that the thesis is that Idi Amin proclaim thathe has
turned over a new leaf and his adviser has advised him to and he may
have done so. I wonder if each of you would comment on that ?
Mr. HARROP.. Yes, sir. I am sorry that Congressman Bonker just
stepped out because although there is no way to really be sure of Idi
 85

Amin's motives or really how far he is going in this way, I would

like to thinkthat some of the attention which has been paid publicly
to his behavior in this country and internationally, but I think pri
marily in the United States, and some of the actions that the Ū.S.
Government has taken and certainly some of the discussions that he
anticipated in these hearings, and the fact that punitive action such
as the bill introduced by Mr. Pease which is pending, I would like
to think that these things had an influence and that he is trying to at
least show some responsiveness to this kind of pressure. It is awfully
hard to know how far, to what degree his actionis going to follow this
kind of declaration.
I think you could only welcome the sensitivity it shows to interna
tional disapproval of the way he has been behaving. There is possibly
some argument to be made that the fact there is a Damocles sword
held by Mr. Pease over his head may be a very moderating influence
on him. I might add that, possibly, while the sword is hanging up
there, it may have more impact than if it were to fall and he would
then be an innocent victim who would want to retaliate and not feel
hehad quite the same motivation to prove that he was improving.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. PEASE. I would like to thank my colleague for his kind com
ments. This has been a matterof great interest to me for some time.
I have spent muchtime on it. Yesterday I asked the question ofHenry
Kyemba specifically about whatis the portent of this new leaf of
Amin. Hisreply as the record will show was that in his opinion Amin
is incapable of turning over a new leaf, that whatever he is talking
about now is cosmetic, is the result of a feeling that he is under some
duress and it would definitely be temporary. He is only awaiting the
time when international pressure is off him temporarily, to resume.
Beyond that I think there is some question of culpability on the part
of Amin for the past murders of his regime. We have seen going on
right now in Germany the last of the war crime trials from the 1940's.
I think there is a strong parallel between Idi Amin and Hitler.
Whether or not he reforms in the future, I think he needs to be held
accountable for what hehas done in the past.
Mr. BUCHANAN . Thank you.
That is all, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. CAVANAUGH ( presiding ]. Mr. Harrop, on page 4 you state,
“ Moreover, U.S. representatives to international development banks
are under instructions to oppose and vote against loans to Uganda." I
wonder if you could be more specific in thatregard. Does that mandate
cover all of our participation in international financial institutions,
including the IMF ? At what point in time did that mandate originate
and through what process ?
Mr. HARROP. The IMF would not be included , Mr. Cavanaugh, in
that restriction. We have regarded the IMF in its role as the guardian
of the stability of international currency and monetary transactions
as being an institution which we have hesitated to employ for human
rights purposes.
The restrictions — I am not sure how long - it came up last fall dur
ing the discussion of the foreign assistance appropriations legislation.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . What do you mean, it came up ?
 86

Mr. HARROP. The executive branch committed itself not toapprove

or not to vote for loans from international financial institutions to a
number of countries ,including Uganda.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . How is this handled as a matter of structure ? Does
the Secretary of State issue a directive ? Is it an Executive order ? Is
there some instrument setting out this command and the basis upon
which a decision was arrived at ?
Mr. HARROP. I believe there was correspondence between the execu
tive andlegislative branches. I can check that for you, sir. The voting
of the United States in the international financial institutions, the
development banks of thevarious categories, is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of the Treasury. There are interagencycommittees
which give instructions through Treasuryto our representatives. There
are standing instructions to vote against Uganda .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . You do not know the other countries that were
involved ?
Mr. HARROP. I don't have them in my head . I can provide that for
you.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . If you could provide that for the record in addition
to the official memo ormandate or instruction to thoserepresentatives
of those institutions as well as a list of all the institutions to which it
applies and all the representatives to which it applies, I would ap
preciate that and request that it be included in the record of this
proceeding.
Mr. HARROP. Yes, sir.
[ The information follows :]
INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S. REPRESENTATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS REGARDING LOANS TO UGANDA

The policy of the administration on this question was set out in President
Carter's letter of last October to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations of the House Appropriations Committee. A copy of the letter is
attached . In this letter, the President stated his intention to instruct U.S. Execu
tive Directors in the international development banks to oppose and vote against
loans to seven countries mentioned in House amendments to the fiscal year 1978
foreign aid appropriations bill then under consideration in the committee. Uganda
was one of these seven countries. The others were : Angola , Cambodia , Cuba, Laos,
Mozambique and Vietnam .
The international development banks to which this policy applies are : The
World Bank Group ( IBRD , IDA and IFC ) , the African Development Fund, the
Asian Development Bank and Fund and the InterAmerican Development Bank.
( The International Monetary Fund, to which the U.S. also belongs, is not affected
by this policy .)
U.S. Executive Directors of the international development banks were sent
copies of the President's letter enunciating this policy, and thus are aware of
their responsibilities in this regard. Additionally , instructions to the Executive
Directors regarding all individual loans are provided by the Secretary of the
Treasury , who receives advisory recommendations in each case from an inter
agency committee known as the National Advisory Council.
The Natonal Advisory Council is also aware of the President's policy state
ment regarding loans to the seven countries, and whenever a loan to any of
these countries comes before the Council for consideration would advise the
Secretary in accordance with the President's statement. No new loans for
Uganda have yet been presented for consideration in any of the affected institu
tions since the establishment of this policy.
 87

THE WHITE HOUSE ,

Washington , D.C.
Hon . CLARENCE D. LONG ,
Chairman , Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington , D.C.
Secretary Blumenthal has informed me of your constructive efforts to achieve
a successful resolution of the problems posed by the amendments to the foreign
aid appropriations bill restricting the use of U.S. contributions to the interna
tional development banks.
I deeply apreciate your helpful suggestions and the role you have played
thus far in steering this vitally important legislation through the House.
As I stated in our meeting last Friday, I fully agree with you and your col
leagues in the House that U.S. assistance through the banks must take full
account of the human rights policies of recipient countries. Accordingly, I will
shortly sign into law the recently passed authorizing legislation for U.S. partici
pation in the international development banks which require that the U.S.
representatives to the banks oppose loans to gross violators ( except where those
loans are directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs
of citizens of such countries ) .
Additionally, as we discussed earlier, I shall instruct the U.S. Executive Di
rectors in the banks to oppose and vote against, throughout fiscal year 1978, any
loans to the seven countries mentioned in the House amendments. Our representa
tives will also oppose and vote against loans for the production of the three
commodities where such production is for export and could injure producers in
the United States. You may be certain that I shall closely watch and review the
lending practices of the banks during this fiscal year.
For the longer run, I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury, in con
sultation with the leadership and appropriate committees of the Congress, to
undertake a thorough study of how the whole range of U.S. objectives, including
the type envisaged in these amendments, can best be pursued in the banks. I
would expect that the results of this appraisal could help guide our efforts for
fiscal year 1979 and beyond in partnership between the Administration and the
Congress .
I would hope that these steps would enable the House to avoid adopting any
of the restrictive amendments, previously passed , in the final foreign assistance
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1978.
I appreciate your support and counsel on these critically important issues con
fronting our foreign policy .
Sincerely,
JIMMY CARTER.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . You don't know if South Africa was among those ?
Mr. HARROP. South Africa is not among those countries.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Harking back to Mr.Diggs' question,, the problem
that I have with my colleagues' legislation is theflip side of the prob
lem that I have had for a year with the administration's human rights
policy. The administration has not been effective in articulating its
policy in terms of how it would apply in the specific. The disturbing
feature of Mr. Pease's legislation is that it applies in a special manner.
How does that then impact on our generalrelations or our relations
with other countries with other variations of offensive conduct, other
governments. Could you explain why South Africa was not included
in this proscription and why Uganda was ? What are the elements that
provide the foundation for our proscribing participation in multina
tional and development banks inUganda and not proscribing that for
South Africa.
Mr. HARROP. If I could take a moment, sir, I would like to describe
two things. My associates have refreshed me on the origin of this
specific mandate, voting against Uganda. This was in fact imposedby
the Congress in looking at the appropriation funds in appropriation
 88

legislation. In negotiations with the executive branch a list of seven

countries was placed in this category. The seven countries were
Uganda, Vietnam , Laos, Cambodia , Cuba, Angola, and Mozambique.
That is the origin of that. South Africa receives no foreign assistance
from the United States and would not be eligible for concessional loans
from these international institutions anyway. So I think the inclusion
of South Africa in this particular list would not come up for that
reason .
On the question of the votes of the American representatives on
loans coming up before the international financial institutions, we have
a structure in the executive branch
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Excuse me. Does this include the World Bank ?
Mr. HARROP. Yes ; in the executive branch there is a committee
chaired by Deputy Secretary Christopher, of the State Department,
which reviews on human rights grounds every pending loan or facilita
tion being offered by one of the international institutions as well as
American direct bilateral assistance, and reaches a judgment as to
whether on human rights grounds we should approve or disapprove
such assistance to other countries.
The Christopher committee and the resulting instructions from it,
I can assure you, would vote strongly against any consideration, which
has never comeup to my knowledge, of any kindof concessionary help
to Uganda. It has not come up for the reason there is already an in
junction against them from the Congress.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Again it is your policy not to apply this to the
IMF, whether it be Uganda or any other country.
Mr. HARROP. Wehave not applied this criteria to the IMF because
we believe IMF's role in stabilizing international currency is so im
portant for a variety of economic reasons that it is not appropriate
to apply these criteria there.
Mr. ČAVANAUGH. In fact we have applied contrary criteria, if recent
reports are correct, thatwewere the primary promoters of $ 450 million
of IMF loans to South Africa in 1976 and 1977.
Mr. HARROP. I don't know that the United States was the primary
mover. As a matterof policy we would not in the case of South Africa,
any more than in the case of Uganda, vote on human rights grounds
against IMF solicitations.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Do I understand that IMF loans do not even
undergo a review process for human rights ?
Mr. HARROP. That is correct.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. On page 7 I was struck by what appeared to me to
be an inconsistency. You state at the top of the page
Whenever these principles are set aside, their overall authority as protection
for our worldwide trade interests is undermined and others are encouraged to
take similar actions. This is potentially harmful not only to the United States but
to the world economy generally. Additionally, in the absence of any significant
international participation or support — which is highly unlikely under present
circumstances — we believe that such a boycott in the case of Uganda would not
be effective.

I understand that to mean that if we were to impose a boycott it

would encourage others to take similar action. If we were to impose a
boycott and others would not take similar action, it would fail. Have
I misunderstood those two sentences ?
 89

Mr. HARROP. What we were suggesting is that we did not believe

others would join us in imposing a boycott against Uganda. We do
believe that if we were to impose a boycott against Uganda it would
not be an effective pressure against Uganda because others would pur
chase the exports which we do not purchase.
However, the fact of our imposing a boycott on political or human
rights grounds in this fashion we think might be used by other coun
tries to impose similar boycotts in violation of the GATT which would
cause us to have difficulties. In other words, even though it would not in
itself be an effective pressure we think that others might be encouraged
to do the same thing.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . With regard to Uganda ?
Mr. HARROP. In other cases. In regard to Uganda we do not think
we would be joined.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Is it the policy of this administration never to uti
lize economic strictures for human rights reasons ?
Mr. HARROP. I don't think I could make as sweeping a statement as
that.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. What is the policy ? Under what circumstances is it
within the realm of consideration ?
Mr. HARROP. In the case of Rhodesia I think that would be a good
example of a case in which the United States did impose very rigid
economic sanctions and a trade boycott under a United Nations manda
tory resolution . So ithad the effect oflaw and we went along with that.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Is it the policy of the United States not to impose
strict trade restrictions on a unilateral basis ?
Mr. HARROP. I think I wouldhave to plead a lack of expertise on this.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. It is not. Because we do impose unilateral restric
tions with regard to Cuba and Vietnam. The basis of the trade restric
tion with Vietnam is not related to human rights, is it ? What is the
basis of the trade restriction with Vietnam ? On what basis is that
policy judgment maintained ? Is trade with Vietnam a threat to the
national security ?
Mr. HARROP. It was imposed under the Trading With the Enemy Act
which I suppose would be regarded as national security grounds, yes.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . We consider Vietnam to be a state who, if we were
engaged in tradewith it, would imperil our national security.
Mr. HARROP. If I may respectfully suggest, Mr. Cavanaugh , the
question you are asking about other embargoes or boycotts of this kind
might better come up on the ninth whenyou will be discussing em
bargoes in general and we will have a witness better equipped on eco
nomic matters and Asia who can best answer .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I think for me human rights are at the heart of
this judgment and indeed of many other judgments. While I shared
with many other Americans great enthusiasm for the President's pro
nouncement on human rights and I think his forthrightness in the area
of human rights has done much to raise the level of the atmosphere
and enthusiasm around the world, I think the administration has been
deficient in terms ofarticulating specific principles which we will apply
to other governments around the world.
I think there is danger if we continue that and if we observe the
administration espousing human rights in the general context and
 90
opposingany initiatives that may originate and have originated in
the specific context, saying that while we do aspire to a general im
provement in human rights around the world we cannot ensnarl our
selves with policy commitments that might be involved in achieving
them in specific references, I think we are not able to do that because
this administration has not told the Congress or the American people
what the principles are that govern these judgments and they should
be articulated in a manner that can be understood. So I don't under
stand your opposition here today.
Mr. HARROP. I believe there is now about to be delivered to the Con
gress, if it has not already been, a report by the new Bureau of Human
Rights in the State Department which outlines the actions that the
administration has taken on international and human rights and the
framework within which we are doing that. I think that may serve to
answersome of your concerns.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Unless my colleagues have further questions, I will
recess for 5 minutes.
[A brief recess was taken. ]
Mr. CAVANAUGH. The committee will come to order .
Mr. Meyer, you make references in your statement to sections 3 and
4 of the Export Administration Act. You make the point that there is
existing authority in the Export Administration Act to cover this
circumstance. That again has reference to my earlier concerns as to
what the standard is.
My recollection of the Export Administration Act is that it applies
to those instances where the national interest is affected. Do you think
that Uganda would fall within such adefinition or possibly fall within
such a definition ? Does a country which engages in gross violations
of human rights, perpetration of atrocities on its own populace, fall
within the definition of the national interest of the United States
under the Export Administration Act ?
Mr. MEYER. Mr. Cavanaugh, if I may, the act talks somewhat more
precisely. The phrase " national interest” is not the point. The act au
thorizes controls for national security reasons "and to the extent
necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United
States and to fulfill its international responsibilities.” It was that
particular authorization that I was referring to.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. The point then is that there is sufficient broadness
within the act to cover almost any circumstance and certainly to in
clude the circumstances that I have just described , if the judgment
were made that it was in the national interest and it served our for
eign policy objectives.
Mr. MEYER.If the State Department were to come to that conclusion
and so recommend to us that certain controls to be imposed as neces
sary to further significantly the foreign policy, there would be an
adequate statutory basis for doing that.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. It is your interpretation of the act that it was
intended by the Congress to cover such circumstancesas that in which
you would encounter aa situation of gross violations within a sovereign
state, gross violation of human rights within a sovereign state ?
Mr.MEYER. I think you are asking me in a way to make aa foreign
policy judgment.
 91

Mr. CAVANAUGH . Your statement is that adequate authority exists.

I am now trying to ascertain what you meant by that statement,
whether that adequate authority would cover the circumstance that I
think is at issue here, the circumstance we don't have to label the
Uganda situation but a circumstance in which a foreign sovereign
state is engaged in gross violations of the human rights of its
population .
Was that circumstance foreseen by the Congress in drafting the
Export Administration Act and section 3 ?
Mr. MEYER. I think historically the situation which you describe
did not exist at that particular point in time as a significant problem
that warranted and prompted the Congress to employ this language.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. The problem has existed for a good long time. The
concern may not have.
Mr. MEYER. Yes ; I think the Congress intended that when the au
thorities responsible for determiningthe foreign policy of the United
States considered it appropriate to impose controls on exports, they
would acquaint us withthat judgment and we would have a necessary
and legalbasis for implementing it. If the Department of State were
to come to us tomorrow with its judgment, with its recommendation,
that certain controls were necessary to further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States, there is no question in mymind but that
we would have the legal authority to impose those controls.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Thank you. You also state on page 5 :
Since no officially recognized international body has imposed sanctions against
Uganda for its human rights violations, a U.S. boycott of Uganda products
could also set a dangerousprecedent for GATT members to apply trade restric
tions for other less clear cut political reasons.
Does the United States currently administer under the act trade
restrictions against any countries not officially under sanction by rec
ognized international bodies ? If so, what are those instances ?
Mr. MEYER. I am not sure I understood your question fully. Let
me say that I do not believe that any of our controls at the present
time contravene any of the GATT provisions..
Mr. CAVANAUGH. On page 3 at the top you say , “Exports of items
subject to validated license control represented 65 percent by value of
total exports to Uganda in 1977.” Then at the bottom of the page you
state, “ This Department, however, believes that it would not be in
our commercial interest to restrict exports that do not have a signifi
cant relationship to the military or internal security capabilities of
Uganda.” My understanding of validated license commodities was
those that had some relationship to military or security interests. Is
that not a correct interpretation ?
Mr. MEYER. It is a correct interpretation that commodities which
are under validated license control have a potential for being used
in a militarily useful way. We, however, review specific transactions
from the standpoint of the nature of the equipment, and the intended
user, and issue licenses when the transaction is proper.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I find your statement in somewhat of a contradic
tion . If 65 percent of the total exports to Uganda fall within this
validated license category and yet you say that they don't have any
significantrelationship to the military or internal security, that is not
in conflict ?

25-826 0 - 78 - 7
 92

Mr. MEYER. No, sir , I don't think so.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. Will you elaborate ?
Mr. MEYER. The equipment in question, the telecommunications
equipment, which constituted the bulk of the exports in value in 1977,
went to a civilian type satellite communications network that did not
have features that would make it particularly useful for military
purposes. Furthermore, the Ugandan military and internal security
forces have their own separate system . We felt, therefore, that we
could authorize that system , because it would not be diverted, and
contribute significantly to the military capabilities of Uganda.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Have you verified that that has been the result ?
Mr. MEYER. To the best of my knowledge we have had no informa
tion which would suggest that our expectations in that regard have
been unfulfilled.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. You have not been able to verify it, though ? No
information is not a verification .
Mr. MEYER. I am sorry. I am not in a position now to tell you of
my own knowledge that we have checked and here is how it is being
used . But the very nature of the equipment I think gives us reason
to believe that it does not lend itself to use by the Ugandan military
and would not be diverted for that purpose.
Mr. CAVANAUGH.Mr. Harrop, some of the Ugandan exiles who have
been active in the United States against Aminhave expressed concern
about possible retribution against their families in Uganda. Does the
State Department have a concern in this regard and does the State
Department have any positive way in which to respond to that
possibility ?
Mr. HARROP. I think that is a matter of very real concern ,
Mr. Cavanaugh, where a visitor to the United States,taking advantage
of our Bill of Rights and free speech provisions and speaks out, feels
that his relatives may be jeopardized. I feel we don't have the ability
to protect those relatives in Uganda if that were to come about. It is
a matter of concern to us.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Cavanaugh, might I ask if the State Department is
willingto express that concern to the Government of Uganda ?
Mr. HARROP. To express concern
Mr. PEASE. That there will not be retribution against the families
of Uganda exiles in the United States who speak out against the Amin
regime?
Mr. HARROP. Let me take that under advisement, Mr. Pease. I think
that is a possibility.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Will you submit in writing for the record the de
tails of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Ugandan refugees ?
Mr. HARROP. Yes ; we will do so .
[ The information follows :]
U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO UGANDAN REFUGEES
Our present yearly contribution to United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ( UNHCR ) is used, in part, to provide maintenance for Ugandan
refugees.
In addition, on February 2 President Carter signed a Presidential Determi
nation making a $ 750,000 U.S. grant for assistance to African refugees, of which
 93
$ 250,000 will be provided to the UNHCR in support of their proposed 1977–78
programs for assistance to Ugandan refugees in Kenya. The U.S. grant will cover
approximately 20 percent of the UNHCR's initial estimate of the total costs of
these programs. The grant is drawn from refugee emergency funds appropriated
under the Foreign Assistance Act and managed by the Office of Refugee and
Migration Affairs of the Department of State.
We have also instituted a program of facilitating the entry of Ugandan refugee
students into the United States, primarily for university -level study.
Finally, we are also currently considering additional recommendations made
by Ambassador Clark in his report on the overall refugee situation in Africa .
Many of these proposals would require us to come to Congress for additional
monies, since the Southern African Special Requirements Fund , which includes
money for refugees, does not cover those in East Africa .

Mr. CAVANAUGH. That concludes my questions. I would be remiss if

I did not commend any colleague, Mr. Pease, as other colleagues have,
for his excellent statement and presentation before the committee
today. I think you were extremely eloquent beyond even your normal
high capabilities and you have earned my admiration and respect and
I commend you for your presentation .
Did you have any further comment, Mr. Pease ?
Mr. PEASE. I thank you , Mr. Chairman.
I would like to add just a couple of points in response to some of the
information which has been brought forth by questions.
I was very much interested in Mr. Whalen's pickingup of the dis
tinction that I make between gross human rights violations and geno
cide. As my friends in the State Department know from their long
correspondence and discussion with me, I did not enter easily or lightly
into the decision to attempt to impose an economic boycott against
Uganda. I finally did so, being able in my own mind to make a dis
tinction between Uganda and other nations around the world that
practice human rights violations and to make that distinction on the
basis of genocide. I think thatit is without contradiction that Amin
has been practicing genocide. To me that is a legitimate, defensible
distinction which we in the committee and the Congress can make.
On another point, the authority of the executive branch to impose
controls under the Export Administration Act, I am not sure, as I
think the chairman is not sure, whether the authority really does exist
or not in this sort of situation. But clearly thatauthority isnot lightly
to be exercised , considering the testimony we have received today.
Frankly that is why there is a bill in Congress to impose a boycott
on Uganda. As I said before , the Congress and the people of the
United States do not always deal in legalities and formalities. They
speak from the heart when they are aware that gross killings are going
on. I would hope very much that the committee will act on my legisla
tion in that spirit.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I have a question with regard to the issue of effec
tiveness. Certainly the example of Cuba would be one that would lead
one to believe that these types ofeconomic activities are not effective.
We have attempted to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically.
At the time that that action took place Cuba was a good deal more
within the shadow of American economic influence , dominance of
American economic influence. Certainly it appeared they could not sur
vive economically without trade, not only with us but, as we attempted,
throughout the hemisphere, and yet they did and have for more than
 94
10 years. In light of that experience by this country I would like to
have your expression as to why you feel that we would be more suc
cessful in this instance.
Mr. PEASE. For a couple of reasons. In the first place I think Cuba
is a pretty good analogy. Cuba, I daresay, would not have survived
boycott efforts on our part had it not been for the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union had a very great stake in Cuba for military as well as
economic reasons and Ithink it was the massive amount of support
from the Soviet Union which to a large degree negated the effect of
our boycott efforts. Presumablyif theSoviet Union were willing to
make the same kind of effort in Uganda, the Soviets could thwart our
efforts in this regard. Uganda is basically a one-crop country right
now. It didn't start out that way but Amin hasrun the economy of
that nation into the ground so that now coffee is the only viable earner
of foreign exchange.
We purchase about 33 percent, as has been stated, Great Britain
about 21 percent. If we add two other nations that the Commerce De
partment mentioned, we are up to 66percent of Amin's total foreign
exchange. If we were able to dobetter Ithink we would because there is
already in existence in the Parliament of the United Kingdom a group
lobbying for just this kind of economic boycott by the United King
dom . I think we could have a great impact in the absence of someone
like the Soviet Union coming in and buying the coffee crop with no real
intention of using it. I think the possibilities of that are limited. Beyond
that I think that Idi Amin stands largely isolated in the international
community and a very strong purpose of boycott legislation is psycho
logical as well as actual. Idi Amin is going to be viewed as having a
future or not having a future by the Nubian mercenaries who keep him
in power. At the point when they decide that he does not have a future,
that they decideto evacuate a sinking ship,he is finished. I think that
as much as anything else is a good reason for us to try to hasten that
day with a boycott ofhis coffee.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Thank you.
There are a coupleof other questions to which we will request an
swers on the record. What countries still provide economic assistance
to Uganda ? What is themagnitudeof this aid and what kind ofproj.
ects are covered by it ? How many Ugandan exiles are in the United
States? What pressures are beingundertakento facilitate their access
to educational institutions or employment and to grant them political
asylum ?
Would you be so kind as to provide us with answers to those questions
on the record .
Mr. HARROP. Yes ; we will.
[The information follows :]
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO UGANDA

In the absence of a U.S. Embassy in Uganda, we do not have direct informa

tion on economic assistance by other donor countries and organizations to Uganda .
However, we are providing to the committee for its information a copy of the
latest ( May 1977 ) report prepared by the Resident Representative of the
United Nations Development Programme in Uganda on development assistance
to Uganda. This report shows that in 1976, 10 bilateral donors and 14 international
organizations provided economic assistance to Uganda. The bilateral donors
 95

were : China (PRC) , Cuba, Egypt, France, Germany (West), Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Libya , and the USSR. The international organizations included various UN
bodies ( e.g. UNDP, WHO, FAO , UNICEF, etc.) , the OPEC Fund and the European
Community. The majority of the specific projects were in the technical assistance
field. The only major capital assistance provided during the period, according to
the report, was $25.5 million from Libya ( capital for a joint investment company
in sugar, transport and cement production ) , $ 10 million from Iraq ( sugar and
cotton rehabilitation ), $ 4 million in balance of payments support from the OPEC
fund, $1.8 million from the European Community for export earnings stabiliza
tion and small Japanese capital inputs in three new enterprises.
The report notes a comparative drying up of foreign loans and grants -in -aid
to Uganda during the period , and efforts by Uganda to replace traditional West
ern donors of technical assistance by new donors from the Arab world . '

UGANDAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES

We do not have precise information on the number of Ugandan exiles presently
in the United States. The U.S. Government does not classify foreign nationals in
this country according to whether they consider themselves exiles from their
country of origin . However, on the basis of the number of asylum requests
processed by the Department of State over the past three years ( 120 ), it can
be assumed that at a minimum the number of Ugandan exiles in this country
exceeds 100, in addition to 1500 Asian Ugandans resettled here in the early
1970's. According to INS records ( 1977 statistics based on the requirement that
foreigners report their address to the INS each January ) , there are at least
1,000 Ugandan nationals in the United States of whom some 600 are permanent
residents and the remainder temporary visitors (such as students, etc. ) . Many
of these individuals may not consider themselves exiles or refugees, but this
figure would establish an upward limit of approximately 1,000 for the Ugandan
exile community .
Ugandan refugees cannot presently qualify for the special refugee immigrant
visas made available under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which are
currently limited to refugees from communist countries and certain countries of
the Middle East. ( The State Department endorses proposals that have been
made in the Congress to eliminate these restrictions.)
However, Ugandan refugees can be admitted to the United States under the
Attorney General's special authority to parole foreigners into this country under
extraordinary circumstances. This authority was used to admit 1500 stateless
Asian Ugandans to the United States as part of an international effort to re
settle the some 50,000 Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972. A small number of
recent Ugandan refugees ( approximately half a dozen over the past year ) have
been admitted under the same authority, in most cases in order to reunite
families.
In addition , some Ugandans already in this country for other reasons have
sought asylum here. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) does
not maintain statistics on asylum cases by nationality , but in many ( not all )
cases the INS asks the Department's opinion on such applications and our records
indicate that we reviewed some 120 applications from Ugandans over the past
three years. Even where these applicants have not qualified for asylum under
the terms of the applicable UN protocol, in most instances they have been per
mitted to remain inthis country pending a change of conditions in Uganda and
none have been forcibly returned to Uganda.
Any Ugandan who has entered this country under parole procedures or who
has been granted asylum or otherwise permitted to remain here pending a
change of conditions in Uganda is authorized to accept employment here or en
gage in any other lawful pursuits, including study. In some cases individual
refugees have reported difficulties in securing employment consistent with their
qualifications and desires, due in large part to the generally tight job market in
this country at the present time. Some Ugandan students have had problems
financing their continued studies. The Department does not provide special as
sistance in locating employment opportunities for Ugandan refugees ( or refugees
of other nationalities) , nor do we provide special assistance to Ugandan refugee
 96

students beyond the program of facilitating entry into the United States de.
scribed in response to a previous question. There are, however, private voluntary
organizations in this country which provide placement and other assistance to
Ugandans as well as other refugees. It is not our judgment that the problems
being encountered by Ugandan refugees in this country are significantly differ
ent or more difficult than those faced by other immigrant or refugee groups here.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Thank you . Your presentations have been ex
cellent and helpful to us. The subcoinmittees will stand in recess until
2 p.m. on February 9 when we will receive more detailed explanations
of the administration's overall policies and justifications.
We are adjourned .
[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m. the subcommittees adjourned, to recon
vene at 2 p.m., Thursday, February 9, 1978.]
 UNITED STATES - UGANDA RELATIONS .

THURSDAY , FEBRUARY 9, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANLZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington , D.C.
The joint subcommittees met at 2 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn
House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the
Subcommittee on Africa ) presiding.
Mr. Diggs. The subcommittees will come to order. Mr. Bingham ,
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade, was to have chaired this meeting. Unfortunately, he is ill, but
without objection, we will insert his opening statement in the record
at this point.
[Mr. Bingham's opening statement follows :]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
This hearing is the third in a series devoted to a careful analysis of U.S.
economic and political relations with Uganda . We have heard testimony from
Members of Congress, administration, and private witnesses confirming the
Ugandan Government's severe disregard of human rights. Trade and diplomatic
relations between the United States and Uganda offer several foreign policy
options to deal with Uganda's repressive regime. Legislation pending before the
subcommittees ( H.R. 9252, H. Con. Res. 394, H. Con . Res. 426 ) proposes a com-,
plete trade embargo of Uganda, as well as other possible sanctions. The adminis
tration, however, has testified that it opposes the use of an embargo in this case .
Today we examine the administration's position in the context of the use of
economic sanctions in other situations — particularly, our very limited embargo
of South Africa, and our total embargoes of Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and
Cambodia. What general foreign policy principles underlie these seemingly in
consistent uses of economic sanctions ? What can we learn about the effective
ness and foreign policy side effects of economic sanctions which might be instruc
tive in determining what we should do with respect to Uganda and South Africa ?
What technical and legal problems have arisenin our recent experience with the
use of economic sanctions that might also arise with respect to the use of such
sanctions against African countries ?
The subcommittees look forward to answers to these and other questions.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Julius Katzis Assistant Secretary of State for Eco
nomic and Business Affairs. He has submitted testimony in advance,
( 97 )
 98

under the rules of the joint subcommittees, and he may proceed in

summary form , if he wishes.
Without objection, his entire advance statement will be placed into
the record.

STATEMENT OF HON . JULIUS L. KATZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Katz. My statement is rather brief. If you would permit me,
Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to read my full statement.
Mr. Diggs. The gentleman may proceed.
Mr. Katz. Thank you, sir.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to consider ques
tions relating to proposals for an economic embargo against Uganda
in the context of U.S. experience with embargoes against other coun
tries. As you have requested in so doing I shall comment on U.S. policy
with respect to economic sanctions in general and review the purposes,
history, effects, and current rationale of embargoes now in effect, in
cluding those against Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea.
Before commenting on these specific points, I would like to emphasize
that the administration is greatly concerned with human rights viola
tions in Uganda. We oppose a broad, unilateral U.S. embargo against
that country. But we are expressing our concern in other ways.
Now to get back to your questions, starting with the one on U.S.
policy concerning economic sanctions. Both the executive and legisla
tive branches of the U.S. Government have made clear in numerous
ways the importance of minimizing restrictions on international trade.
Such a policy has contributed significantly to the growth of the eco
nomic. political, and military strength of our country. This basic
philosophy has served us well. Therefore, we believe trade restrictions
of any kind are not to be entered into lightly.
An economic sanction is generally regarded as an action toward
another nation intended to force it into a desired course. It might take
the form of a trade embargo, lesser forms of restrictions on trade, or
withholding loans. Prospects of effectiveness are increased through
multilateral action . But it is often difficult to reach international agree
ment on the application of sanctions. And even internationally agreed
sanctions may not change the policies of the targeted country.
A broad embargo is the most restrictive form of economic sanction
and therefore most harmful to trade interests. Economic sanctions,
especially a unilateral embargo, should be imposed only where there
are extraordinarily serious reasons for doing so.
The United States has, of course, believed thatembargoes have been
justified in certain exceptional circumstances in the past . Chief among
these are armed hostilities. Most past U.S. embargoes, including
several still in effect, have been instituted for this reason.
During the Korean conflict,we imposed an embargo against North
Korea. Similarly, during the Vietnam war we embargoed trade with
Communist controlled portions of that country. This embargo was
extended to all of Vietnam,and Cambodia , when the Communists took
over complete control in 1975.
The embargo against Cuba came at a time when Cuban actions
presented a serious threat in the Western Hemisphere.
 99

In other situations, we have imposed embargoes as a result of United

Nations Security Council findings under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. Thus, the UnitedStates is participating in multilateral Rho
desian sanctions and in a United Nations agreed mandatory prohibi
tion of the sale of munitions to South Africa.
For many years, we have restricted the export of strategic goods
and technologies to countries threatening our security. Together with
other NATO countries and Japan, we have prohibited the export of
items which would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of the U.S.S.R. other Warsaw Pact countries, and the Peo
ple's Republic ofChina which would prove detrimental to our security.
I have touched on the original purposes and history of embargoes
still in place. Now for a few words on effects and current rationale.
The economic effects of embargoes prohibiting virtually all U.S.
trade with Cuba, Vietnam , Cambodia , and North Korea have been
limited. This has been in part because other countries have not joined
us in restricting trade.
The effect on Cuba was relatively greater than on the East Asian
countries because of the proximity of Cuba to the United States and
the extent of economic ties before the revolutionary government came
to power;
Cuba lost aа . major market for its sugar but the U.S.S.R. took up
most of the slack. Cuba and Vietnam have been deprived of spares for
equipment previously imported from the United States. U.S. trade
with Cambodia and with North Korea was not significant even before
the embargoes.
In the case of Rhodesia, the embargo has been accompanied by sanc
tions evasion by SouthAfrica, and earlier byPortugal's African colo
nies. The Rhodesians have also concentrated on the development of
indigenous industry since the imposition of sanctions. Controls on
exports to South Africa and to theU.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact coun
tries, and the PRC are not designed to have an economic impact.
The political effects of these embargoes have also been limited . In
some cases, a targeted country changed its internal or foreign policies
in the wrong direction . For instance, Cuba and Vietnam moved closer
to the U.S.S.R. following imposition of the U.S. embargoes, although
they probably would have done so even in the absence of our trade
restrictions.
The embargo of Cuba may have helped to contain the spread of
Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere ; but this proposition
cannot be proven or disproven.
In the case of Rhodesia, however, there is strong evidence to suggest
that the adherence to U.N. sanctions by most nations coupled with the
strains imposed by an ongoing guerrilla war have seriously damaged
the Rhodesian economy and significantly influenced developments
there. Restrictions on exports of strategic items to the U.S.S.R., its
allies, and the PRC have had only the modest impact of somewhat
slowing the transfer to them of advanced Western technology.
The subcommittees have asked for a statement on the current ra
tionale for the embargoes still in effect. I shall attempt to respond by
describing conditions under which it might be wise toremoveexisting
embargoes. The circumstances which prompted imposition of some of
 100

them have changed somewhat over the years. However, it would be

irresponsible to discard them on that basis alone. Ending an embargo
is a dramatic action with significant policy ramifications.
For example, in the case of Cuba, full normalization of trade and
diplomatic relations hinges in our view upon Cuba's willingness to
address, among other issues, compensation for American citizens whose
property was expropriated by the Cuban Government and restraint
in Africa.
In the case of Vietnam , we are prepared to end the embargo at such
time as normal diplomatic relations are established and Ambassadors
are in place. Cambodia does not seem to be interested in considering
whethera similar arrangement might be possible there. Continuing
North Korean intransigence makes any accommodation unlikely in
the near future.
In all four of these cases, controls on the export of strategic items
would be continued for national security purposes even if other con
trols were removed . Whether or not to remove these other controls
inevitably becomes a question of foreign policy, which should take
the totality of our relations with the targeted country into account.
With respect to Rhodesia and South Africa, the United States is
complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions on sanctions. Uni
lateral United States controls against South Africa going beyond U.N.
resolutions consist ofrestrictions on exports to the police and the mili
tary aimed at dissociating ourselves from their apartheid -motivated
repressive measures.
There has been no development which would warrant discontinuing
the strategic embargo against the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and the
PRC.
What is the relevance of all this to Uganda ? As I said at the outset,
it is our view that sweeping economic sanctions, particularly em
bargoes, should be entered into only under extraordinary circum
stances. As was stated by the Department's witness at the February 2
session of these hearings, it is the administration's view that the taking
of such a step with respect to Uganda atthis time is not likely to be
effective, particularly given the improbability of endorsement of or
participation in such a move by the international community as a
whole.The United States is neither a unique nor an essential source
for Uganda's imports. Coffee is Uganda's principal export and
Uganda would have little or no trouble finding other customers for
the coffee it now sells to American firms.
Does this mean that we should do nothing in the trade field to show
our displeasure with human rights violations in Uganda ? No. It is
quite proper for us to prohibit the export to Uganda of items which
could reasonably be used to repress the people of that country. This
we are doing.
It is also quite proper for us to encourage increased international
attention to the human rights situation in Uganda, including inter
national pressure on the Ugandan Government to improve its human
rights performance, as we are also doing. But we do not believe that
itwould be wise to impose aa unilateral enıbargo on Uganda.
Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Secretary:
Mr. Secretary, when the administration proposed a total embargo
in connection with Vietnam and Cambodia, in May of 1975, the De
 101

partment testified before the Congress that the purpose of that action
was to enable us to assess the new regime. And they went on to say
that it was not an economic sanction to be used to pressure Vietnam
or Cambodia to take any particular actions that the United States
might favor.
Is that still the case ?
Mr. Katz. Mr. Chairman, my understanding of that testimony in
1975 was that we were denying Vietnam the benefits of trade with
the United States while our future relationship with them was unde
termined. We pointed out then that a satisfactory accounting for miss
ing -in -action did not require a quid pro quo such as lifting the trade
embargo.
Our position is today that we are willing to remove trade restric
tions as soon as normal diplomatic relations are established and am
bassadors are in place in the respective capitals.
Leading up toour present situation was Vietnam'sacceptance of the
Woodcock Commission and its commitment to provide аa satisfactory
accounting of missing-in -action . It is safe to say that the removal
of trade restrictions, which would mean access to spare parts, petro
leum technology and private investment technology, is a genuine in
centive for Vietnam.
I believe that this position, then, is a reasonable one and an under
standable one.
Mr. Diggs. Does that not really sound like a wait and see kind of
a policy, Mr. Secretary ? We are really continuing to use sanctions in
Vietnam , to elicit certain actions from the Vietnamese before remov
ing them. Is that not much different than the criteria that you set
forth in your earlier testimony about why we proposed sanctions and
continue sanctions in different circumstances ?
Mr. Katz. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that is fair.
Mr. Diggs. You mentitoned one thing. Could you tell us what other
actions you are waiting for the Vietnamese to take before sanctions
would be lifted ?
Mr.Katz. I do not think that itis a wait and see policy. I do freely
concede that the rationale has shifted . As I indicated , in a number
of cases, the present rationale may not be the same one that existed
at the time that the sanctions were imposed ,but in the case ofVietnam ,
it is not a wait and see policy. There have been periodic discussions
with the Vietnamese about the normalization of relations. Certain
steps have been taken, by them and by us.
It is a progressive movement. We would like to see those steps ac
celerated ,but we think, in the absence of a resumption, the absence of
a normalization of our relations, that it would not be in our interests
to remove the trade measures at this time.
Mr. Diggs. That is what makes it difficult to establish credibility in
administration policy on this matter. In your earlier testimony you
talked about threats to our security and how sanctions can only be
imposed under the most extraordinary of circumstances. Yet we find
that the circumstances — at least, according to your response involving
Vietnam — are really not the same as they were when sanctions were
originally imposed .
This administration , in its actions, has indicated a willingness to
broaden its perceptions on Cuba, yet there is still an embargo .
 102

Therefore, it is difficult for us to really pinpoint what the policy

is. It seems to be made on a case -by-case basis.
That is what makes the testimony of the administration difficult to
defend under these circumstances.
As has been broughtout here, we closed up our Embassy in Uganda
and yet, when youtalk about even reducing the diplomatic mission
in Pretoria, you say that that is inconsistent with our policy of open
communication.
Do any of the countries against which we presently have economic
embargoes constitute what you call a threat to national security of
the United States under the terms of the Export Administration Act?
If not, what is your legal authority to initiate these embargoes ?
Mr. Katz. Mr. "Chairman, I think that we need to distinguish be
tween the various situations. Let me say that I recognize the problem
that you have in tryingto find consistency and to avoid the apparent
conflicts. But I think that the elements of consistency are really in
calculation of U.S. interests. Each of these situations are somewhat
different, and I did make the point, in my opening statement, that the
reasons for maintaining an embargo, ora trade measure, may not be
the sameas those that originally gavecause to the action.
There are circumstances thatchange, and the calculations of U.S.
interests may change, and attitudes in the United States including
attitudes in the Congress are certainly relevant in this connection.
With regard to your specific question, you asked about whether any
of the countries represent threats to our security and I think that has
to be seen in the context of the use of export controls. The authority
for the exercise of export controls is in the Export Administration
Act, which requires that the President limit exports ofstrategic sig.
nificance in situations where this might be a threat to U.S. security.
Additionally, there is authority in that act to withhold exports for
reason of foreign policy and it is that authority that has been used
to withhold certain exports, for example, from South Africa.
Mr. Diggs. Let us assumé, Mr. Secretary, that we suddenly found
it in our interests to impose an embargo. As you know , one of the first
things that is done under those circumstances is to freeze assets .
Is the Department aware of the existence ofany assets — any U.S.
bank accounts, investments, other property , in thename of Uganda
or, for that matter, in the name of South Africa ?
Mr. Katz. I do not have that information at my fingertips,
Mr. Chairman, but I am sure that there is information available. I
would assume that there is far less in this country in the way of
assets of Uganda than there would be in the case of South Africa.
Mr. Diggs. Do you have access to that information ?
Mr. Katz . I would have to investigate.
Mr. Diggs. You would have access to information regarding the
assets of foreign countries here in the United States, would you not ?
Mr. Katz. I think we would have access to it. I am not clear,
Mr. Chairman, whether it is regularly collected in the first instance.
Mr. Diggs. We would like to have it for the benefit of our records.
That is what I am getting at.
Mr. Katz. May I respond for the record , Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. Diggs. Yes ; as long as we have an understanding that you will
exert your best efforts.
 103

Mr. Katz. Yes, sir, I will certainly do that and let you have what
ever we have.
[ The information requested follows:]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington , D.C., March 20, 1978.
Hon . JONATHAN B. BINGHAM ,
Chairman , Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Com
mittee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington ,
D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : I am responding to that portion of your February 15
letter to the Secretary requesting details of all known assets of the Government
and/or nationals of South Africa in the United States.
International Financial Statistics, the monthly publication of the Interna
tional Monetary Fund, stated that South African claims on 'the United States
totalled $ 246 million in October 1977, the most recent month for which statistics
were available.
As part of its benchmark survey of foreign direct investments in the United
States, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce re
ported that, as of the end of 1974, there were 11 affiliates of South African
companies in the United States with the direct investment position of parent
firms totalling $ 5 million. These affiliates held assets of $ 31 million and had
sales of $25 million. There are legal restraints which bar the Department of
Commerce from releasing to Congressional committees information on specific
South African investments in the United States collected under the authority of
the Census Bureau .
The Department has already provided information on Ugandan assets in the
United States in the form of an insert in the record of testimony by Assistant
Secretary Katz before the Subcommittees on February 9. I am repeating this
information for your convenience .
Data on Ugandan assets in the United States is not collected regularly or
frequently. The latest figures available show U.S. institutions' short and long term
liabilities to Ugandans as $ 43 mililon as of December 1976. We have no informa
tion on Ugandan direct investment in the United States.
I am sending identical letters to your fellow Subcommittee Chairmen who also
signed the February 15 letter .
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Diggs. Some people say that the imposition of an embargo forced
Cuba to expropriate American property .
Do you think that an embargo of Uganda or South Africa would
raise a similar problem ? Would you anticipate an expropriation of
American property under those circumstances ?
Mr. Katz. In the case of Uganda, I do not think that that is a prob
lem. I think that U.S. assets there are very small.
My understanding is that American investments probably donot ex
ceed$3 million . They would be much larger in South Africa. I do not
have any way of predicting what the reaction of the Government there
would be to economic sanctions by the United States.
I think in the case of Cuba, Mr. Chairman, the policy of expropria
tion was not related to sanctions. Expropriation may have preceded
my : 'ecollection is thatthe expropriation came in advance of the imposi
tion of an embargo. Certainly it is a part of the economic philosophy
of that Governmentto take private properties. I am not sure that the
same situation would hold in the other countries.
Mr. Diggs. To what extent might the threat of expropriation be in
hibiting with respect to any position that we might take ? In Uganda,
 104

you said we were only talking about $ 3 million, but if you are talking
about South Africa you could be talking about $ 3 billion.
Are you suggesting that there might be some correlation there ?
Although, all things being equal, therewould be less hesitancy with re
spect to a Ugandan embargo because of the size of the assets, as
opposed to the sizeof U.S. assets in a place like South Africa ?
Mr. Katz. No ; that was not the intent of my response but only to
point out
Mr. Diggs. Would that have a bearing — even though you did not
intend it that way - realistically ? One ofthe reasons, for example, that
our cousins in Britain have such a problem with sanctions is because
their trade involvementin South Africa is so much larger than ours.
Mr. Katz. I have no firsthand knowledge, but my judgment is that
it certainly must be a factor in their thinking.
Mr. Diggs. So it is natural to follow that up, that there are factors
beyond morality that enter into our policy considerations ? Is that
what you are saying ?
Mr." Katz. I think national interests encompass many factors, of
which morality is certainly an important one, Mr. Chairman , yes.
Mr. Diggs. Öther factors in that context can be more important?
Mr. Katz. They are to be taken into account. I would not want to
weigh the relative merits of one factor versus another, certainly in
the abstract.
Mr. Diggs. Another alleged effect that is often talked about is that
the victim - Cuba, for example — could become dependent on an inter
est that is inimical to our interests.
Cuba, for example, becomingmore dependent upon the Soviet Union,
and thereby increasing Soviet influence in this hemisphere.
Do you have an assessment of the likelihood of that happening in
Uganda, particularly in view of the Soviet presence in the region ?
Is that a consideration ?
Mr. Katz. In the case of Uganda, I do not believe that a unilateral
U.S. embargo would significantly increase their dependence on the
Soviet Union, or other socialist countries, because the immediate effect
would probably be to shift their trade to other Western countries.
If there were
Mr. Diggs. You would not anticipate, if we took the leadership in
this matter, that other Western countries, as you point out, will follow
us ?
Mr. Katz. I think that will be unlikely. Our estimate is that it would
be unlikely that other countries would join in an embargo.
Mr. Diggs. What are these estimates based on ? There are so many
places where you can get coffee. Is there something so special about the
Uganda brand of coffee ?
Mr. Katz. No, sir. Coffee has been in relatively tight supply in the
last year to 18 months, but I do not think it is a question of the presence
appraisal on the part of those countries on the
it is anaction
of coffee as of
effectiveness such .
We have had consultations and discussions with other countries. It
is not our impression that they would move toward any kind of an
embargo at this time.
Mr. Diggs. We have had problems, as you know , implementing our
embargo to Rhodesia. One of the reasons, as you have already pointed
out, is that certain countries have not cooperated.
 105

How do you identify a commodity like coffee ? How can we enforce

an embargo when it might be sold to other countries and perhaps inter
mixed with other coffees and that sort of thing ?
Mr. Katz . It would indeed be a problem , Mr. Chairman . The coffee
bean itself is certainly not identifiable and in fact, even now I under
stand there is a fair amount of Ugandan coffee that sifts across the
border of Kenya .
We wouldrequire — if we tooksuch a measure,we would require that
coffee from Uganda would not be imported and traders would be re
quired , under U.S. law , to certify the origin of the coffee to the best of
their ability. But if it were rebagged in a third country without the
knowledge of the U.S. importer, it would present problems in
identification .
Mr. Diggs. Is that a major consideration in the administration's
position :the difficulty of enforcing such an embargo?
Mr. Katz. I would say that the question is somewhat broader in
terms of effectiveness. Even if there were no violation of U.S. law,
even if there were not circumvention by disguising the origin, what
would take place over time is a rearrangement of trade with some im
mediate dislocation, but over time, it would tend to get sorted out. We
would not import Uganda coffee. We would buy some substitute coffee,
perhaps, in the shortterm, having to bid up the price slightly.
The Ugandan coffee would then find its way toWestern Europe or to
other placesin the world and supply lines would merely be rearranged.
That, we think, suggests that an action of this kind would be of very
limited effectiveness in terms of trying to make the point that we seek
to make.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Solarz ?
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katz, I have to tell you that Í started out when these hearings
began with what I thought was an open mind on what weought to be
doing about this problem. The more I hear and listen to the adminis
tration witnesses testifying against the legislation which is before us,
the more I am convinced that we ought to proceed to the proper en
actment of this legislation.
Some of the arguments that have been offered in opposition to these
proposals strike me as probably absurd , downright ridiculous.
Let me ask you, sir, did you prepare your testimony by yourself, or
was this a product of some interagency committee ?
Mr. Katz. It is my testimony.
Mr. SOLArz. I understand you are probably in a very difficult posi
tion being obligated to defend a policy that is very difficult to reconcile
with our other economic policies. It strikes me as being essentially
without justification .
You say in your testimony that we ought to only impose embargoes
under extraordinary circumstances, a proposition that I find com
pletely compatible with my ownviews.
Do you not think, sir, that the slaughter of over 100,000 innocent
people in a country, with every prospect that more innocent victims
willbe sacrificed in the days and weeks and months — and hopefully not
years ahead - constitutes extraordinary circumstances ?
Mr. Katz. Yes.
 106

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think

Mr. Katz . Not necessarily one that would make wise the imposition
of an embargo in this particular case.
Mr. SOLARZ. You would concede that it does constitute an extraordi
nary circumstance ?
Mr. Katz. Yes. It has resulted in our taking certain measures and
expressing views.
Mr. SOLARZ. We were told by another administration witness that
one ofthe reasons that we should not impose such an embargo is that
it would violate our obligations as a signatory of the GATT Treaty.
Yet we do, do we not, have an embargoagainst Cuba, which is also a
member ofGATT ?
Mr. Katz. Yes. I am not sure whether Cuba is. I am told that yes,
they are.
Yes, there are circumstances in which we might take action. Of
which,the Cuba action was clearly a security action. There is provision
in GATT for taking such action for reasons of national security.
That, Mr. Chairman - I am sorry , Mr. Solarz — that is certainly a
factor to be taken into account. It is not an overriding consideration.
Mr. SOLARZ. Does ourembargo against Cuba constitute a violation
of our obligation under GATT
Mr. Katz. No.
Mr. SOLARZ. It does not ?
Mr. KΑΤΖ . Νο .
Mr. Solarz. Why not ?
Mr. Katz. It was imposed for security reasons. Whether that is the
precise reason at this time, one may argue.
Mr. SOLARZ . Whatever the reasons were originally, nobody is
seriously suggesting continuation of the embargo is related to our
security?
Mr. Katz. No one has said that. It is not, Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. It is not ?
Mr. Katz. I have not said.
Mr. Solarz. Do you think it is ?
Mr. Katz. The administration has not taken the position that the
continuation of the embargo is not for security reasons. I can see that
one may argue the case, but Cuban behavior in the recent past, and
currently, is at least somewhat ambiguous in this area.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that the behavior of the Cubans is more
troublesome than those of the Ugandan Government ?
Mr. Katz. No ; I am not drawing comparisons, or trying to compare
one with the other.
Let me try to set your mind at ease, Mr. Solarz. It is not my posi
tion, or, I believe, the position of the administration that theremay
not be circumstances that would make an embargo justifiable. We
have not foundthat an embargo at the present time would accomplish
what we would hope to accomplish.
I made clear at the outset that we abhor the situation there. We have
tried as hard as we can to distance ourselves from that regime. We
have withdrawn our diplomatic mission . We discourage, actively dis
courage, Americans from traveling there or staying there. We do not
encourage trade. We do not facilitate trade in any way.
 107

We deny exports that may in any way be related to the deprivation

of humanrights.
The question before us, therefore, is not one of our attitude toward
the regime and whether we ought to express our attitude in the strong
est possible way, but the question is whether an embargo in present
circumstances with this country, given what that would produce in
terms of effects, is itaa worthwhile thing to do ? Our conclusion is no.
Mr. SOLARZ. We will get to that in just a second,Mr. Katz.
Have you ever read a book titled "While Six Million Died ” ? 1
Mr. Katz. No, sir.
Mr. SOLARZ. Í suggest that you might want to read it. In fact, I
suggest that some of your colleagues in the Department might want
toread it. It tells the treacheroustale of an action on the part of the
State Department during the years when Hitler was going about his
work, massacring Jews.
I regret to say that a lot of the puerile rationalizations that have
been offered in opposition to this legislation in the last few weeks
sound disturbingly similar to many of the rationalizations that were
offered for not doing anything then.
We all know what isgoing on there. The question is, what are we
going to do about it.
You questioned the effectiveness of the coffee embargo, or an embar
go against Uganda, which basically would mean an embargo on their
exports of coffee to this country. I donot know that everybody, cer
tainly not the sponsors of this legislation, believe that this, in and of
itself, is guaranteed to topple Amin from his throne.
But would the establishment of such an embargo, in your judgment,
strengthen Amin's position ?
Mr. Katz. No, sir.
Mr. SOLARZ. It would not.
Is there not at least a remote possibility that the initiation of such
an embargo could set in motionforces which could ultimately result
in removal of Amin, or at least send the signals to those elements
within Uganda that are concerned about what is happeningthere that
there are powerful nations elsewhere in the worldwho share their
concern and to which they can look for sympathy?
Might not it possibly, remotely, conceivably, contribute to the elimi
nation of one of the great moral abominations of our time?
Mr. Katz. Mr. Solarz, our judgment is that that likelihood, or that
possibility, is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.
Mr. SOLARZ. We were told by previous witnesses that if we em
bargoed the export of Ugandan coffee that they would have no trouble
selling it to the other countries which currently purchase Ugandan
coffee , thereby creating a situation where, in effect, they were not being
penalized. Is that youropinion as well ?
Mr. Katz. Yes; it is.
Mr. SOLARZ. Are you aware, Mr. Katz, of any efforts on the part of
the State Department to enter into discussions with the other major
importers of Ugandan coffee, the United Kingdom , the Netherlands,
Japan, West Germany, and France, to see whether there would be any
1 " While Six Million Died : Chronicle of American Apathy," Arthur D. Morse, New York ,
Hart Publishers, Inc. , 1975.

25-826 0 - 78 - 8
 108

receptivity on their part to a collective embargo against Ugandan

exports?
Mr. Katz. Mr. Solarz , I stated earlier that it is our conclusion,
based on the discussions that have taken place, that there would be no
support for such a collective action.
Mr. SOLARZ. Have discussions taken place with each of those
countries ?
Mr. Katz. I cannot say that it has taken place with each of them,
but it has certainly taken place with some of them .
Mr. SOLARZ. Which ones ?
Mr. Katz , I know that there have been discussions with the United
Kingdom . There have been discussions in the multilateral forum of
the Human Rights Commission . In 1977 there was a proposal for an
investigation of the Human Rights situation in Uganda that did not
prosper.
There was substantial opposition there. The Human Rights Com
mission is meeting again at the present time. I understand there may
be some further consideration .
Mr. SOLARZ. I gather thatwe have not had any bilateraldiscussions
with France about the possibility of an embargo against Uganda ?
Mr. Katz. Wemay have had.
Mr. SOLARZ. You are not aware of any ?
Mr. Katz. I am not specifically aware of them .
Mr. Solarz. I gather you are not aware of any bilateral discussions
with West Germany or with Japan or with the Netherlands. That
leaves only one country which you are sure we have had bilateral dis
cussions with — the United Kingdom .
Can you tell us what our British friends said about their desire for
Ugandan coffee
Mr. Katz. I do not think that I can characterize their views in detail,
but I would be glad to respond for the record, Mr. Solarz, on those
cases where we had that discussion .
[ The information requested follows :]
STATEMENT ON VIEWS OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
SIGNIFICANT TRADE RELATIONS WITH UGANDA
We have discussed the question of trade restrictions against Uganda at various
times in recent months with representatives of a number of other Western
countries which have significant trade relations with Uganda, including the
United Kingdom , West Germany and France. As previously indicated , it has been
our conclusion on the basis of these discussions that none of these governments
is prepared to undertake a coffee boycott or other sweeping trade restrictions
against Uganda at this time. Of the countries mentioned , only in the United
Kingdom does there appear to be any significant popular or legislative support
for such a move ; the United Kingdom , of course, has cut its official ties with
Uganda and has actively pressed for international action on the Ugandan human
rights situation. The Governments of West Germany and France still maintain
a presence in Uganda and continue to provide some economic assistance for
humanitarian as well as long -term developmental purposes in addition to main
taining active trade relations. We particularly doubt that these governments
would agree that a Western trade boycott against Uganda would be the most
effective method of advancing overall Western interests in Uganda at present.
With respect to international action, we are hopeful that the current meeting
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva will result in
agreement on a full investigation of Uganda's human rights situation. We
 109

have been actively consulting with other members of the Commission towards
this end ( as we did in 1977 when a similar proposal was made but unfortunately
failed to attain majority support ) . However, it is clear that there does not exist
at present a sufficient international consensus to support action -oriented proposal
regarding Uganda such as multilateral trade restrictions.
Mr. SOLARZ. Your view, as I gather it, is that a unilateral American
embargo against Uganda would not produce the necessary political
effects. Do you think it is possible that an embargo against Uganda by
several of the countries that currently constitute the major importers
ofUgandan goods might have such an impact ?
Mr. Katz .I thinkthat it would certainly have a greater effect, a
greater effect than zero, than would be the case if we did it alone.
But I think there would still be questions of effectiveness because of
the problem of smuggling which the chairman and I discussed while
you were out of the room .
Mr. SOLARZ. Is it not possible that our ability to persuade other
countries to join in such multilateral effort would be significantly
enhanced if we first initiated our own embargo as a way of demon
strating the credibility of our own commitment on this issue?
Mr. Katz. In my judgment ? No.
Mr. SOLARZ. You do not believe it would make any difference at all ?
Mr. Katz. No, sir.
Mr. PEASE. Would the gentleman yield ?
Mr. SOLARZ. I would be happy to yield to the author of this
legislation .
Mr. PEASE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to ask
Mr. Katz, in light of his answer just now , what the argument of the
Carter administration has been for the United Statesclosing down
the Clinch River as a way of inducing other nations to follow our
need to get away from nuclear proliferation ?
Mr. Katz. I am not the world's greatest authority on Clinch River.
I am not even the State Department's greatest authority on Clinch
River. But I do not really think that the situations are comparable.
You know , we have had some experience with embargoes as my
statement makes clear, and I can recall personal involvement in efforts
to persuade some of our friends and allies to join with us, and not
even embargoes, but in support of American efforts where we thought
our security was involved, such as Cuba and Vietnam .
Not only were we not wholly successful, in many cases we were not
even very much successful, and we had all kinds of problems
trying to enforce our own regulations with respect to American sub
sidiaries in other countries.
So that I am not very surprised with the reaction that we have
gotten in this particular case.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Katz, one of the things that puzzles me about the
administration's position here is this. I do not understand why the
significance of our trade relationship with Uganda is so great as to
justify the position that we ought not to impose an embargo, given
the fact that there is at least a remote possibility that it might be help
ful in removing this man from office.
It is clearly not related to the viability of our own economy. We are
not depending on Ugandan coffee for our economic survival. We do
 110

not need any bases in Uganda to defend ourselves against the interna
tional Communist menace.
Given the enormity of the evil which is occurring in that country,
why not try this ?
I agree that it probably will not work . I suspect, if we announced
the embargo tomorrow , à year from now Idi Amin would still be
there. But what would we have lost in the process ?
Iassume that we can get thecoffee somewhere else.
Mr. Katz. I cannot really describe fully what we would have lost,
but there are some considerations that have gone into this decision.
There is the question of whether it is desirable to remove all contact.
There is the question of certain Americans that are still in that
country .
Now, I know there is the point made that those people have chosen
to stay there despite our efforts to persuade them to leave, but they
are Americans who are still there. And I think that that has to be
weighed against the consideration of effectiveness.
It seems to me that I would want, personally, to have at least some
feeling of remote purpose in the action that we are taking. It seems
to me that the only purpose that would be served by such an action
would be a demonstration. It would have a demonstration effect.
We would be taking another measure to express our displeasure.
I do not reject that as an action , but I think that it has to be ex
amined in the context of what we think we can do and want to do
with respect to this.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do we have the authority to order these Americans in
Uganda to leave the country ?
Mr. Katz. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do we have the authority to say to them that if they do
not leave,their passports will be taken ? I gather we have the author
ity to prohibit Americans from going to other countries in the world
without approval of the State Department.
Mr. Katz. I do not think so . I do not think the Constitution would
permit it.
Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you another question.
Mr. Katz. I might say, Mr. Solarz, even if they were ordered out,
or if we could legally revoke their citizenship, there still would be
human beings there.
Mr. SOLARZ. Suppose we establish such an embargo — you may have
already gone over this with the chairman — is there any practical
way to maintain such an embargo if Uganda did not sell itscoffee to
other countries who would then , in turn , re -export it to us ? Is there
a way of distinguishing Ugandan coffee from other coffees ?
Mr. Katz. No, sir. As I explained earlier, if we adopted such a
measure it would be against the law to import. Anyone who normally
did so would be in violation of the law.
But, as a practical matter, if it were taken out of a bag that said
“Uganda" on it and put in another bag that said some other country,
there would be no way of verifying the country or origin.
Mr. SOLARZ. Of course, we could make it illegal, but it would be
difficult to enforce for those reasons.
Mr. Katz . Yes.
 111

Mr. SOLARZ. That is a problem .

Let me say in conclusion, Mr. Katz — maybe you can respond to this,
and then I will yield to my colleagues on the committee that if we
had no embargoes on other countries, I could see a case being made
as a matter of principle that this is somethingwe ought not to do.
There areotherwaysof expressing our concern . But thereality of the
situation is that we have embargoeson several other countries — for
whatever reasons they were originally established — which today, in
my judgment, constitute far less ofa problemin terms of our human
rights concerns than Uganda. The only possible exception might be
Cambodia .
The argument that the administration has been using goes by. the
boards. I just think, speaking now as an individual, that there are
situationsin the world which are so beyond the pale, which are so
morally deplorable, which are so dangerous to international con
ceptions of a just order, that it literally justifies almost any action
short of war which we might undertake, and I think the situation in
Cambodia is one of them and I think the situation in Uganda is
another.
In light of what is going on there, it is senseless for us to oppose
the imposition of an embargo when we have embargoes on other
countries which , as bad as they may be, are nowhere near as bad as
Uganda and do not, in any significant sense whatsoever, constitute a
threat to the security of our Nation.
The position of the administration with respect to this legislation
becomes morally and politically untenable. I just think that, as re
mote as the possibility may be, that this would produce the results
that we want, that so long as there is even the remotest of remote pos
sibilities that we ought to be willing to take that chance.
It seems to me that we pay a very small price, economically and
politically, for doing so . The only argument that you have advanced
that makes any sense whatsoever is that it might potentially create
problems with 200 Americans that are still there in spite of all the
warnings that we have given them to get out.
Frankly, as much as I care about these Americans, I care equally,
if not more so, about the millions of Uganďans whose lives are in
jeopardy because this fellow is still in powerand as this legislation
works its way through the Congress, they will have ample notice of
the extent to which its actual passage may create problems for them
and ample notice that they had better get out soon.
I wager you, sir, that if this legislation were to pass the Congress,
the President of the United States would veto it only at the risk of
making his whole human rights policy look like total and utter hy
pocrisy. I am convinced, in fact, that if the legislation passes we will
ħavea bill signing ceremony in theRose Garden of the White House
at which my friends Pease and Diggs and some of the others who
have been involved with this will begiven pens for the signing.
He would not dare veto it.
I think it is really unfortunate, if not shameful, that the administra
tion is in the process of trying to persuade us to reject this legislation.
I think this is a profound moral issue. You talk about human rights in
countries with .a violation of human rights constituting a lack of free
 112

dom of the press and puttng some people in jail, elimination of parli
aments, all of which we deplore, but notto do this thing in a country
where over 100,000 peoplehave been killed in cold blood I think is
really outrageous.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, for going on but it is a matter about which
I feel very strongly.
Mr. Diggs. Would Mr. Pease yield to the gentleman from Nebraska?
Mr. PEASE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would Ihave some questions and I
must leave to catch a plane at about 3:45. Presumably he will be
finished .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I intend to be brief.
Mr. Katz, I have to associate myself with the sentiments of
Mr. Solarz and commend him for his eloquence in this regard.
Mr. Katz. Sir, I would like to say that I associate myself and the
sentiments of the administration with Mr. Solarz, too.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. I think that Mr. Solarz has pinpointed the precise
problem that disturbs me, certainly at this point in this administra
tion. I sharealsoyour reluctance — I think you make a strong point - a
policy consideration here of the appropriateness of economic embargoes
to accomplish either political or humanitarian objectives. I think that
there is aa seriousquestion whether it should be used . Certainly we have
used it inappropriately and ineffectively in the past.
But frankly, I do not understand the human rights policy of this
administration other than to have an appreciation, and a profound
appreciation, for the tremendous change in sensitivity around the
world that the pronouncements of the President have caused .
I think the President's sensitivity has also resulted in significant
change in the past year of the attitudes of many governments toward
their peoples, and how they treat their domestic populations. I think
that now the time has come, or even past, when this administration
must transmit those sentiments of the President into comprehensible
policy. And I have spent today, a full day, encountering opposition
of the administration, as we have all encountered oppositionof this
administration, to all specific proposals involving development of
policy regarding human rights and its specific application .
It is now to the point that I think theadministration is in jeopardy,
as Mr. Solarz has noted, ofgenerating within the world population , as
well as theCongress and the American people, a feeling of hypocrisy
with regards to the issue ofhuman rights.
It seems to me that, unless this administration is able to translate
the very lofty sentimentsof the President into somespecificand con
crete policy proposal for the development andapplication of American
foreign policy that you will, indeed, end up doing more damage than
good through an empty mouthing of aspirations of improving the
human condition around the world .
All your presentation to the committee today has beenan apologia
for why we should do nothing instead of aa definition ofpolicy in terms
of what we should do, of what and how we can use the great power
and influence that we do have. I continue to praise the sentiment of
the administration with regard to human rights.
But is it the policy of this administration that economic sanctions
are never appropriate ?
 113

Mr. Katz. Mr. Cavanaugh, first, let me say that I think I am getting
a bum rap. I was asked to testify, not to what we should do about
Uganda, but rather, to one specific question, or a series of questions,
related to the use of an embargo, an economic embargo, in Uganda
Mr. CAVANAUGH. My question addresses that.
Mr. Katz [continuing ). To discuss that in the context ofembargoes
elsewhere . I triedtodothat as honestly and as fully as I can. The
question of what do we do to Uganda, with respect to Uganda, I do
not think can fairly be characterized as a do -nothing policy.
There wastestimony before, I believe,these same three subcommit
tees last week by Ambassador Harrop in which he outlined in great
detail what we were doing and were not doingwith respect to Uganda.
Again, I want to be as responsive as I can,but my testimony really
is related to the utility of the embargo and to discuss this in the con
text of embargoes we have used elsewhere in the world . What my testi
mony says is that we have used embargoes and other trade sanctions
for different reasons at different times, and when an embargo is in
effect, or trade sanction is in effect on occasion, the justification
changes, or at least thereason forremoval, the reason for imposition
remains the same, but the reason for removal may have to be seen in
the context of the broad relationship .
The most persuasive argument against an embargo in the case of
Uganda, to my mind , is really one of what is it that you hope to ac
complish, what is it likely to accomplish, and what might be the other
effects of it.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Perhaps I am soliciting from you , or attempting
to solicit first some more general understanding of what the admin
istration's policies are,to go from the generalto the specific. I am one
of those who are hopeful when we hold Presidential elections, change
administrations, that we change policies, that we do not go through
that exercise for no purpose if the Americans want a change in
direction .
So I do not saddle this administration with the justifications for
Cuba, Vietnam and all of those that occurred before them . What I
would like to understand right now is what is the administration's
policy with regard to economic embargoes. Are you against them under
all conditions or only under those conditions which apply to the human
rights considerations ?
Mr. Katz. No, sir. I think, in general, we do not like trade restric
tions, as I have said . We think that they should be employed only in
extraordinary cases. Each case ultimately must be looked at on its
own merits.
I can conceive of circumstances where such an action might be called
for and as I indicated, with respect to Mr. Solarz's sentiments, I
certainly share them . And I have full respect for his position. I even
conceded that one possible justification for an embargo might be to
demonstrate politically what your view is, but I think that considera
tion has to be weighed against the other interests and other elements
in the particular case.
Let me assure you that the position on this matter ,on the matter of
an embargo with respect to Uganda, was not lightly considered. It
was considered with great care. And it is a position that the adminis
tration has taken after weighing all of the considerations.
 114

Mr. Diggs. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Pease ?
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much , Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity very much. I appreciate the sentiments expressed by my
colleagues today.
Mr. Katz, I would like to go back to Clinch River for a moment.
Is it, or is itnot true that the administration fully supported by Secre
tary Vance before this committee last year, stated that the reason why
we had to cancel out on Clinch River was that we needed to set an
example, if we expected to have any hope at all of convincing other
nations to follow suit ?
Mr. Katz. I am sorry. I do not have any firsthand knowledge of
that,but I accept it. If you say that is what he said, then I am sure that
thatis what he said.
I think there were some other considerations in the Clinch River
decision , but that may well have been one of them.
Mr. PEASE. It certainly was one of them , yet you tell us, in your
opinion, that it would not do us any good to unilaterally conduct a
boycott against Uganda, because the other five nations, France, West
Germany , Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which
do a lion's share of Ugandan business, would not follow suit.
Mr. Katz. Yes; that ismy judgment.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would hope that the
State Department could provide us with some rationale for that
inconsistency .
[ The following information was subsequently provided :]
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION INTENT IN DISCONTINUING THE CLINCH RIVER
BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM

The Administration's intent to discontinue the Clinch River breeder reactor

program is a dramatic symbolic gesture designed to demonstrate our commitment
to nuclear non -proliferation . An embargo on trade with Uganda would also be a
symbolic gesture. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two
situations. Were we to impose a unilateral embargo on Uganda there would be
little likelihood of international support. Conversely, there is considerable inter
national support for our non -proliferation efforts.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Katz, you cited some past history of whether the
United States violated the letter or spirit of the GATT agreements,
most of them on national security considerations.
In 1960, the United States persuaded the OAS to impose economic
restrictions against the Dominician Republic for their movements in
Venezuela. Do you know why ?
Mr. Katz. I will supply itfor the record.
[ The information requested follows :]
STATEMENT ON ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

At the request of the Government of Venezuela , the American foreign ministers

meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica, in August 1960 decided to sever diplomatic
relations with the Dominican Republic, and halt arms sales to that country.
Venezuela charged that the Dominican Republic had directed an attempt to
assassinate the President of Venezuela in June 1960 .
Following the decision of the foreign ministers, a seven -nation committee
met to consider further action and recommended to the OAS that limited eco
 115
nomic sanctions be imposed on the Dominican Republic. The vote January 5,
1961 was 14 to 1 ( Dominican Republic ) with six abstentions. On January 20, the
U.S. carried out the OAS recommendation by embargoing shipments of oil, oil
produets, trucks and spare parts to the Dominican Republic .
Thus, the U.S. was acting to implement an internationally agreed sanction ,
imposed in response to a perceived threat to the peace and security of the West
ern Hemisphere.
Mr. PEASE. In 1960, we dropped most favored nation status for
Czechoslovakia , in violation of article I of GATT. Were they a secu
rity threat to the United States at that time ?
Mr. Katz. That was done in respect to legislation requiring us to
do it, and we secured aa waiver of GATT for that action .
Mr. PEASE. You would be willing to respond, then, to a mandate
of Congress ?
Mr. Katz. We would not only be willing, we would have to .
Mr. PEASE. Now , you talked a lot about the effectiveness of the em
bargo. I would like to examine that in some detail.
You say that your experience has been bad in trying to persuade
other nations to follow our lead in embargoes. Have we ever approached
other nations about following our lead on the basis of human rights
concerns ?
Mr. Katz . I do not know that that has been a specific element in
the other cases. Those were security -based cases, as Iindicated. I have
agreed to supply for the record information with respect to Uganda.
Mr. PEASE. Is it not true that in almost every other case when we
approached other nations that it has been, as you say, security -based,
but basically on the basis of the United Statesbeing opposed to world
communism , and not that Korea, in and of itself, or Vietnam , was a
direct threat to our security ?
Mr. Katz. I do not think it was on the basis of world communism .
It was a threat to the security of the United States ; in the case of
Cuba, it was a threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere.
Mr. PEASE. You say that if the United States imposed a boycott, you
do not think it would be effective, presumably because we only buy
about 34 percent of Uganda's total coffee crop ?? The United Kingdom
buys 21 percent, France, West Germany, Japan and the Netherlands
another 20percent , 22 percent, 23 percent. So that if five nations,all
stalwart allies of ours, and friends, were to cooperate with us, that
would cut out 73 percent of Uganda’s current market.
Would that be enough, in your opinion, to make the boycott
effective ?
Mr. Katz. Not necessarily. It would certainly increase, removing
those markets. Certainlyit would increase the impact on the country,
assuming that the boycott were effective in termsof actually keeping
it out of those consuming markets — that is, assuming that it was not
smuggled elsewhere.
Of course, there would be the possibility of other markets to which
it could flow. Coffee is not an identifiable product. It is produced by
some 42 countries .There are different grades, but Ugandan coffee is a
robusta coffee produced throughout Africa.
If the principal importing countries embargoed it, it might flow to
other countries . It is not a huge amount.
 116

The other question is, of course, even if you made it effective, would
that necessarily produce the effects that you want in terms of change
of policy, or might it actually make the situation worse ? The situation
might be more repressive as the Government went to a siege economy.
Mr. PEASE .Mr. Katz, I think we need to be reminded of the point
that Uganda is a special situation, that the proceeds of the coffee sales
do not flow into the general Ugandan economy but rather to the Re
search Bureau and the Army and the police who keep Idi Amin in
power. Without that revenue, and his ability to keep those security
people happy, the chances are he would not be around to repress
anyone.
Now , I do not know whether you are aware of it or not, but there
is within the conservative party, I know, in Great Britain, a move
ment already underway to put the conservatives on record as support
ing a boycott of Uganda.
I do not know what contacts you have had with the Government,
but it may be that we parliamentarians have to work through our col
leagues in British, German and French Parliaments to express the
will of the people, despite the foreign offices of those nations; as we
may have to dothat despite our own foreign office.
Has the State Department considered , in looking at the effective
ness of the boycott, at the psychological factor, the fact that, at some
point, the Army which is maintained by money and luxury goods
from coffee sales, at some point the Army may decide that Idi Amin
does not have a future anymore, and it will not necessarily take the
actual cutoff of coffee proceeds, but the reasonable assurance that that
will happen in the near future ?
We all know that psychology plays a part.
Mr. Katz. Again, I do not know how to say it differently than I
have said on several occasions. We do not think that the economic
impact of an embargo by the United States is likely to be effective.
Nr. PEASE. Not even in psychological terms?
Mr. Katz. Not for very long. The history of other embargoes is
instructive.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, onefinal question.
I would like to turn now to the question of whether the State De
partment thinks that it is ever justifiable to impose an embargo, in
effect, through disassociating the United States entirely from another
nation, irrespective of consideration of effectiveness ?
Forexample,I think of Nazi Germany, which was referred to by
my colleague, Mr. Solarz, before. If, in the 1940's, Germany had not
attacked France or Britain or the United States or anybody else , but
just decided on the policy of eliminating all the Jews withinGermany,
would we have considered , do you think, that it might be worth our
while to just wash our hands entirely in every way, shape, and form
of that Nazi regime ?
Mr. Katz. I do not think that it is particularly useful for me to
speculate about what might have been, but let me say, as I said previ
ously, that I could conceive of circumstances where we might decide
to embargo for reasons, for any number of reasons, including the rea
sons stated here.
 117

But I think that it has to be looked at in terms of what the overall

effect is and looked at in the full context of the situation that we are
considering
Having done that in the case of Uganda, we come out negatively,
I can well understand why you thinkit is the thing to do. I respect
your position, Mr. Pease.
We just do not believe, looking at the total situation, that it is the
action that is appropriatein this particular circumstance.
This is not washing our handsor turning our backs on the situation
there. We think the situation there is absolutely reprehensible, and we
cannot find words that are strong enough to describe our feelingsabout
the situation, and it has caused us to take some actions, but we do not
think that a total economic embargo at this point would be the right
thing to do.
Mr. PEASE. Does the State Department use the term " genocide" for
what is going on in Uganda ?
Mr. Katz . I do not know that we have used this term . It is not one
of my fields of expertise. I think it would come close. As a layman, I
would say that there are suggestions of genocide; yes.
Mr. PEASE. You said before that you could conceive of some situa
tions where the United States might lay aside considerations of how
effective an economic boycott might be and just on general principles
dissassociate ourselves from other nations.
Can you give me some examples of what those situations might be,
in your own mind ?
Mr. Katz. Well, I do not know that it is useful to talk about hypo
thetical situations, but there have been times where we have either
broken relations or withdrawn representation from countries when we
knew that that was probably notthe most useful thing to do over the
long term , severing relations that conditions become so intolerable you
just cannot stay any longer.
Again, let mesay we did not automatically decide to oppose your
bill, Mr. Pease. It was not a knee - jerk reaction. It was something we
analyzed and thought through carefully and we have come down
on the other side.
Mr. PEASE. While I appreciate that very much , that time and effort
involved was put into it, I am not terribly reassured that, after all
the time and effort and thought, you came out where you did.
Mr. Katz. I understand.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I will not make a summarizing speech.
I think that my position is clear and the Department's position is
clear. I do appreciate the testimony of Mr. Katz, and your indulgence.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Buchanan ?
Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman . I apologize to our wit
ness for not being here for the entire hearing because of conflicting
responsibilities.
I hanpen to know that our witness, Mr. Chairman, is an experienced
and effective and highly respected Assistant Secretary of State who
does have substantial expertise in this area.
Yet, it seems to me — and I am constrained to say this. You might
comment if you wish — that, in matters of foreign policy, it is the
President, ultimately, who decides.
 118

Julius Katz, although he is high ranking in the Department of

State, could not come before these subcommittees to testify for some
thing that was not the President's policy.
I am not asking you to comment.I am not trying to put you on the
spot. What I am saying is that it occurs to me that if we want the
support of the Department of State on this kind of thing that we
have to go beyond the Department of State to get it. I know that
people like this Assistant Secretary do have input. An ambassador
has input on foreign policy. But something of the magnitude of a
unilateral embargoagainst a nation, it has to be within the President's
province.
Mr. Secretary, you may comment or not comment, as you wish .
Mr. Katz. I thank you for your comments. Again, I will say that
our position on this matter was not lightly considered .
Mr. BUCHANAN . It is the Department's position ?
Mr. Katz. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUCHANAN. All I want to say to my colleagues is that I do
think that if we want the support of any departments of government
on anything of this magnitude, we should go to the President.
I have no further questions.
Mr. Diggs. One followup question. I can recall, as I am certain
that my colleagues on the committee can recall,that when the original
resolution directed at a similar situation in South Africa was first
introduced by Congresswoman Cardiss Collins, it had two parts to it:
One was to register protests against the leaders of that country, and
the second went on to resolve that economic sanctions be imposed.
There were people on the committee who thought that there may be
problems on the floor with the economic sanctions part of it. The
administration sent word that they would supportthe protest part of
it, but the sanctions part, they had a problem with.
Against that background, Mr. Secretary, if this resolution came out
of the joint subcommitteesas the Collins resolution did, registering
protest, and at the same time urging the President to take whatever
further steps he could take within the context of our interest and our
capacities as he saw it, would the administration be in favor of the
Pease proposal ?
Mr. Katz. Mr. Chairman, I do not know that I can answer that.
Mr. Diggs. Are you opposed to the whole Pease proposition or one
half of it ?
Mr. Katz. I think we would probably need to see thetext.
Mr. Diggs. The text would be the same as the South African resolu
tion , with which you are familiar, which passed the Congress with
only 54 votes against it.
Ár. Katz. We would certainly be willing to consider that, Mr.
Chairman .
Mr. Diggs. What is the difference ?
Mr. Katz. I think my problem is that I am not familiar with the
language, andI feel a little hesitant.
Mr. Diggs. Counsel was advising you in the back . Heis familiar with
the language. He knows exactly what I am talking about.
If we report it out of this committee the same resolution that we
reported out before with respect to South Africa and just substitute
 119

the word “ Uganda ,” Counsel understands what I am talking about,

would you foresee any problem in administration support for that?
Mr. Katz. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not have expertise on
that subject here today. I would like to respondfor the record,if I may.
[ The following information was subsequently provided :]
STATEMENT OF POSITION ON PROPOSED RESOLUTION
In the absence of a request for the Department's comments on a specific
resolution which could be submitted to the inter -agency clearance processes,
it is not possible to give an official Department or Administration position.
However, the Department's initial reaction to the resolution along these lines
submitted by Congressman Mathis on November 2 , 1977, was positive. Congress
man Mathis' resolution reflected the same general concerns and objectives as
the Department's policies and therefore would not appear to raise problems from
our perspective.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Solarz ?
Mr. Solarz. Thankyou very much, Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Katz, first of all, let me apologize ifanything I said in any way
suggested anything personal to you.You do represent, as you say, the
Department. The point of view that I was talking against was really
inopposition to that policy rather than anyone personally.
Mr.Katz. I understand that. No offense.
Mr. SOLARZ, I have heard great things about you, I really have.
We havenot had a chance to work together. I would not want anything
that I said to leave in your mind, oranybody else's mind, the implica
tion that I, in any way, associate you personally with the policies
which I found objectionable.
By and large I support the administration in most things. Occasion
allyI do differ,andthis happens to be a matter in which my feelings
runvery strongly .
You have said that the administration has given this position very
careful thought.Can you tell us exactly whowasinvolved in making
this decision ? Was the Secretary of State himself involved ? Was it
up to the level of the President ? Was it done at the bureau level ?
How was it handled ?
Mr. Katz. It was done primarily through the preparation of staff
studies in the Department, which were contributed to , or reviewed and
compared by, the relevant organizations, relevant bureaus, including
my bureau and the bureau of African affairs.
It did go to the top of the Department. I cannot say it went tothe
Secretarypersonally, because I think he may have been away. I just
do not know for a fact whether he did. Certainly if he did not, the
Acting Secretary did. And in accordance with the normal procedure,
our legislative report went to the Office of Management and Budget
and it was referred to the National Security Council, so that it had
full considerati on .
Additionally there were meetings that I participated in myself on
the subject.
Mr. SOLARZ. In line with the observations made by our colleague,
Mr. Buchanan, it is fair for us to assume that the policy position you
expressed today is expressed not only with the full knowledge of,
but also with the approval of, the White House ?
Mr. Katz. Yes, sir.
 120

Mr. SOLARZ. This is the President's policy ?

Mr. Katz. That is what I normally understand by the administra
tion view.
Mr. SOLARZ. If it is — and obviously it is , I think it is a really sad
commentary on the human rights policy of President Carter.
Let me ask you, does the administration have the existing authority
to establish such an embargo on its own, or would you need legislation ?
If Jimmy Carter was born again and decided that he really was
morally obligated to do something, could he do it tomorrow , or do
we have to call the Speaker and say, get the Pease bill out of com
mittee right away. Weneed to move on it.
Mr. Katz. I do not think that we would have the authority to
embargo imports. Under the recent amendment of the Trading With
the Enemy Act, he would need the declaration of a new emergency
and I do not think the conditions for an emergency would exist. I
believe that we would have to have legislation. I suppose that we do
have full authority to control exports.
Mr. Solarz. Under the Export Administration Act, you are propos
ing a Trading With the Enemy Act?
Mr. Katz. We have full authority on withholding exports and we
do withhold exports — not all exports, but we withhold essentially
military items.
Mr. ŠOLARZ. You do not need national security justifications to with
hold exports ?
Mr. Katz. We have a foreign policy authority. We can make rec
ommendations to the Department of Commerce. With respect to the
imports,the only authority would be the revised Trading With the
Enemy Act. It would require the declaration of a new emergency and
we do not think that the conditions would be such to justify that kind
of an emergency .
Mr. SOLARZ. In order for us to embargo Ugandan exports, legisla
tion would be needed ?
Mr. Katz . Yes, sir.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do I understand you, in your previous testimony, to
havestated that the adoption of this embargo would not result in any
way in strengthening Amin's position ?
Ńr. Katz. I do not believe so, although conceivably it could lead to
more repression. Whether that is strengtening or not, I would say no.
Mr. SOLARZ. It is really hard to imagine how things could getmuch
worse, and if they did get much worse, it is unlikely they would be the
result of our embargo. Maybe they will get worse, but it is likely to
get worse for the same reason that they have already gotten bad.
Basically it would be your position that if we adopt this embargo
it is likely to produce a worsening situation ?
Mr. Katz. I said - again , let me be clear — I do not think I said it
would strengthen his position. Whether the situation would be worse
or not, I think one would speculate.
Mr. SOLARZ. Are you prepared to tell usthat, in your judgment,it
is utterly inconceivable thatthe adoption of this embargo could result,
in one fashion or another, in the weakening of Amin's position and
possibly result in his removalfrom power ?
Mr. Katz. I have been in this business too long not to have learned
the lesson, never to say never. As I indicated previously, I think - 1
would estimate the probability is so low as to really be nonexistent.
 121

Mr. Diggs. If the gentleman would yield, I am inclined to speculate

also along those lines, because the dinosaur has already opened one
eye. I have before me here an invitation transmitted through the
Ugandan Embassy here inviting Members of Congress to visit Ugan
da.This invitation, which just came in from the President of Uganda,
said in effect that it would be most difficult for us to even hold these
hearings unless we had updated information. According to the invita
tion we ought to come over there and see the true picture.
He has never invited us over there before, but I think he is begin
ning to react.
Without objection, I will enter this invitation into the record at this
point.
[The invitation follows :]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ,
Washington , D.C., February 3, 1978.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER : As requested by the Embassy of Uganda , I am conveying
herewith the message contained in the attached diplomatic note inviting Members
of Congress to visit Uganda.
Sincerely ,
DOUGLAS J. BENNETT, Jr. ,
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.
Enclosure : Diplomatic Note dated February 2, 1978 .
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
The Embassy of the Republic of Uganda presents its compliments to the De
partment of State and has the honour to communicate the following message
from the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the United States Congress
in which there is an invitation to Members of Congress to visit Uganda . The
text is as follows :
“Information has been received through news media that Foreign Relations
Committee of Congress is presently discussing Uganda. It will be most difficult
for Congress to discuss meaningfully and usefully matters concerning Uganda un
less it has correct and up -to -date information . It is the Uganda Government
view that at present Congress does not have a correct and true picture of events
in Uganda because most of the information at its disposal is emanating from
press reports whose representatives are non -resident in Uganda.
They use rumours created by exiles who in many case have committed offences
such as embezzling public funds before leaving the country. Other exiles are
malicious politicians who have failed to achieve their ambitions and have now
become international professional refugees, therefore, the Uganda Government
would wish to use its good offices and hereby has the pleasure to invite Mem
bers of Congress to come to Uganda and see for themselves the peace and tran
quility which exists in this country contrary to the blatant lies which the enemies
of Uganda are propagating. The Government and people of Uganda would be
happy to receive a delegation from the Congress of the United States of America
who will have the opportunity to visit the whole of Uganda.
It may interest Congress to know that today , Uganda is in the process of
democratising, has a national forum which consists of representatives from all
districts of Uganda and their decisions and recommendations are the basis of
Government's policy and actions.
Finally, when and if a Congressional Delegation comes to Uganda, they will
see for themselves that the Government of Uganda has the highest respect for
the rule of law and human dignity.
Highest consideration."
The Embassy of the Republic of Uganda avails itself of the opportunity to
renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration .
WASHINGTON, D. C. February 2, 1978.
Mr. SOLARZ. I must say , Mr. Chairman, I am fascinated that such
an invitation has arrived. I ask the Chair whether it would be possible
if a delegation was sent over there to investigate this situation first
 122

hand and the author of the legislation, Mr. Pease ,goes with us,
whether we could take a contingent of the Capitol Police along in
order to make certain that the delegation returns so that we could
report our findings to the committee.
Mr. Diggs. Either that, or have the cooperation of the Israeli Gov
ernment to rescue us.
Mr. SOLARZ. Let me say, the best way to get the Capitol Police is
to bring Mr. Pease and the way to make sure that the Israelis will be
there to help is to take me, particularly if it is before the foreign aid
bill comes up later on in the year.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say — I do not want
to cast any aspersions on the Capitol Police, but I think I want the
U.S. Marines along.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I was going to say, if the gentleman would yield ,
I am not going to volunteer, because you might decide a Republican
would make a good sacrificial lamb.
Mr. Solarz. In that case, Mr. Buchanan, we would invite someone
from your party other than you.
Mr. Katz, have you considered the possibility — this may be a very
strange argument — that John Vorster's best friend in Africa is Idi
Amin, that, in a sense, if Idi Amin did not exist, John Vorster would
not be there.
The very existence of Amin, on the one hand, enables Vorster to
say to his own people that things could be ultimately catastrophic for
us if we yield power, and also allows sympathizers and supporters of
the South African Government in our own country to argueagainst the
kind of strong action which may be necessary to bring the South
African Government to its senseson the grounds that it would be an
exercise in hypocrisy for us to take action against South Africa while
not taking action against Uganda.
In thissense, the passageof this kind of legislation might facilitate
the adoption by theCongress of the kinds of measures against South
Africa which might ultimately enable us to avoid the impending cata
clysm in that country.
Mr. Katz. No ; I have not considered that.
Mr. SOLARZ. Let me just say inconclusion, Mr. Chairman,now that
we have gotten such an invitation — we bantered a little bit about
how we ought to respond to it — I hope it is something that we will give
serious consideration to .
I, for one, would be prepared with other members of the committee
to go there - assuming, of course, that we were in a position to go
wherever we wanted, to see whomeverwe wanted , andarrangements
could be made to enable us to establish for ourselves precisely what
the situation is.
I do not frankly think that the facts are much in doubt. I think they
have been established beyond a shadow of a doubt.
But I do believe that it is possible that a congressional delegation go
ing in there would lendmore credibility tothe case.
Mr. PEASE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would just suggest
that a much more meaningful invitationwould be for President Amin
to invite into Uganda the International Commission of Jurists, or
 123

Amnesty International, or other well -known international human

rights organizations who are much better prepared, by training and
experience, to get to the heart of the matter, than a congressional
delegation that might stay, at most, 4, 5, or 6 days.
Mr. Katz. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that we would agree with that.
Wewould hope that the Ugandan Government would agree to receive
the Human Rights Commission .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Secretary, your testimony has been very useful and
we sincerely thank you for your contributions to the committee's
deliberations.
Mr. Katz. Thank you very much,Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. The Chair will now call for a 10 -minute recess.
[A brief recess was taken .]
Mr. Diggs. The joint subcommittees will come to order.
We are pleasedto welcome our colleague from Texas, Mr. Mattox,
who has submitted testimony to the subcommittees on this subject.
He may proceed in whatever way he chooses.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM MATTOX , A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Mattox. I will attempt to be as brief as possible. I would ask

the consent of the subcommittees, and I assume that the Chair has
granted that consent, to submit my written statement for the record,
and other attachments thereto .
Mr. Chairman , I think that my statement is rather lengthy so I will,
as much as possible, skim through portions of it, but I wouldlike to
address myself to several issues that have been raised by the last
witness.
Ithink that I first would say,as I have in the recent past hada good
deal ofcontact with the State Department on the matter of Uganda,
that I have found the State Department to be very courteous, very
polite,very capable but very slowmoving. And, frankly, it took a good
deal of effort to get much response out of the State Department.
Most of the testimony that I have just had the pleasure of hearing
indicated the same type of very cautious and very slow-moving
action .
The State Department policy, if there be a policy, I think is in
consistent, as it relates to a number of countries. I was interested, in
listening to the previous testimony, where it was said that the embargo
would not accomplish our purpose. I am not sure exactly what our
purpose is, and it is difficult for me to conceive of a circumstance under
which we could have a more profound example of the need to take
more explicit action toward another nation short of entering into
somekind of military conflict.
I have found that a friendly peace -loving civilization is being
mugged in the streets of our world community, and we have sat idly
by and watched the decimation of untold numbers of human lives. I
beg to differ with the State Department when they say we have taken
some meaningful action. I appreciate the example that Mr. Solarz
gave comparing our response in this situation to our notice of the first
manifestations ofgenocide in Nazi Germany which ultimately lead to
the destruction of 6million citizens.

25-826 0 - 78 - 9
 124

I have had the unusual experience of finding that the American

people have a good deal of resentment toward that human being and
toward his continuing in power. I had thisexperience inmy ownback
yard. On November 7, I read in the morning paper with some aston
ishment that there were 24 noncivilian personalfrom Uganda training
in thenorth Texas area to be helicopter pilots and technicians. It con
cerned me even more when the telephone calls started coming into my
office. We started checking to see what explanation there might be. The
State Department indicated that the Ugandans were in the country
legally ; they had violated no lawsand had obtained visasthrough the
normal visa process. State acknowledged, however, that it was making
changes in the process affecting future visa issuance to Ugandans.
After checking with the State Department, before I felt it was
proper for me to take any action, we contacted the CIA in an effort to
make a determination ofwhether this training of Ugandan personnel
in thiscountry was a result of trainingCIA operatives who may have
slipped back into the country under the guise of being sympathetic
with Uganda ,and with the Idi Amin regime.
We were told that such circumstance did not exist and that the CIA
had no objection to our taking whatever action might be necessary to
attempt to get the Ugandans out of the country .
We found that the description of those individuals was that they
were the police, air wing. After attempting to check out what the
police, air wing, was, we made a determination that those individuals
were, in effect, the military personnel of that country.
At a later time, after actually talking with the individuals who were
training the Ugandan pilots in this country, one of the principal train
ing agencies freely admitted that they were military personnel and
that they were in this country training forthe purpose of flying heli
copters and using them in actions against their own people.
This is something that we learned later that was freely admitted,
but I think it goes very much to the heart of the matter.
When we confronted the American companies about training these
personnel, they said, it is not our responsibility to set the foreign
policy of thiscountry. If our State Department is going to make a
decision for these individuals to come into the country, then we feel
that we have a right to train them.
We started an effort to get the Ugandans out of the country. After a
good bit of pressure, we were told that we would not be able to get them
out rapidly, that it would take a deportation proceeding, which would
go through a lengthy appeals process, and perhaps the individuals
would complete the training before we could ever finish the proceeding:
That was the first reason given. The second was based on a fear of
endangering the Americans that were still in Uganda. And I think,
frankly, thelatter fear was the one I had the mostconcern about.
It concerned me as I talked to the personnel who were training these
individuals, some of these lower echelon personnel. There was the
unusual circumstance where they said, we have two choices. We either
train them or we quit our jobs.
Ithinkthat itwas a mistake when our State Department did not
immediately ask for these individuals to be sent out of the country, not
just ask, but actually take steps to revoke their visas — appellate process
 125

or no appellate process — I think that is the action that should have

been taken .
It would have given a clear signal around the world that we were
not going to tolerate this type of situation .
The possibility of endangering the American missionaries and other
civilians in Uganda caused me great concern , because I think I had
some fear of the possibility of one morning waking up and being
blamed for the mass slaughter of 250 Americans. I do not think that I
should havebeen put in that position.
I think that it was necessary for our State Department to have
already established consistent policies that would have kept that possi
bility from takingplace.
What convinced me to go on further was that I had the privilege
and the honor of talking with a great numberof people who have been
in the country, both missionaries and Ugandan citizens who were in
exile in this country. Particularly the missionaries urged me to con
tinue whatever actions would be necessary to cut off trade, to exclude
Ugandan citizens from this who were training for military purposes
or suppressive actions against their own people.
They encouraged us to continue. They said if we were still in the
country we would still have the same opinion and they said that the
missionaries and those 250 Americansthat are still in the country still
maintain that opinion, that we should take whatever action necessary
to overthrow that government in effect.
I think, frankly, thatsome of them would prefer that wetake mili
tary action. What worried me considerably from listening to some of
the grotesque examples of Idi Amin's bloodthirsty power was the fact
that the missionaries truthfully do not believe thateven if we take some
of the actions we are talking about that any improvement would result.
Amin has killed off anybody he can determine has leadership ability
through the secondand thirdechelon below him.
Anytime there is an individual who has any power that might be
exerted in an independent and responsible manner, he is eliminated
from power.
But they asked, and they encouraged us, to take whatever action
might be necessary, to see that Idi Amin is removed from power.
The State Department ultimately took some action and we ultimately
were able to get those Ugandans out of the country, but skipping over
in my statement what was accomplished by our actions, I would like
to go to one thing that was very important.
When we were looking into this situation, we found that there were
a number of other communities in this country where the Ugandans
were being trained, frequently for military purposes, that would be
used against the people of Uganda.
Wefoundthat Idi Amin's personal jet was in Savannah, Ga. We
found that Page Airwaysin New York was giving a vast amount of
assistance to Idi Amin . We found that the communications satellite
and ground support equipment from the Harris Corp. in Florida was
providing extensive assistance, and we found other examples.
A moment ago, I think it was the chairman who asked, were there
other kinds, were there Ugandan assets in this country ?
I suspect that if these subcommittees were to look , it would find a
great number of Ugandan surprises in this country. And I think
 126

the public is entitled to have a full hearing on this matter, and I

would ask that the chairman of this committee hold further hearings
and at the time call before you the corporations of this country who
are continuing to do business with Idi Amin's government. I think
it would be advisable to look into not only theirdomestic operations,
but the business they do through their foreignsubsidiaries.
I believe you will see thata great deal of the military equipment
used by Idi Amin's government is being supplied by American com
paniesthrough their foreign licensees. It is well worth taking the time
of this committee to have those hearings in an effort so that the
American public will know what has taken place.
I know that Senator Church has called for similar hearings in the
Senate. I would hope that he would conduct those . I would hope that
you would come to our area in Texas and make a determination as to
what kind of military training has been taking place there, in rela
tionship to not only Uganda, but to other countries. We should also
consider technical training with a military support potential.
One thing that I would point out is that there has been a good
bit of concern expressed about possible reprisals against American
people in the country.
Mr. Chairman, I think you reviewed those possibilities in noting
the invitation that we have received from Idi Amin for a congres
sional visit to Uganda.
Since attempts were made to remove the Ugandan pilots we have
not had repression but we have had what in effect is an opening up
of relationships there.
I think, frankly , it would be worthwhile to , in some form , follow
up upon his invitation.
I do not know whether we could trust the man enough to even sug.
gest that we might get back safely. I am not sure. I think that would
be something for this committee to look at.
I have been very concerned about theinconsistencies of the State
Department, and if there ever was time for us to take action, I think
that now is the time.
Thank you.
[Mr. Mattox' prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON . JIM MATTOX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to testify and I commend the
Subcommittees for their timely attention to United States Uganda relations and
policies.
Gentlemen , a peaceful friendly civilization is being mugged in the streets of
the world community and we cannot sit idly by and watchthe wanton, senseless
destruction of from 150,000 to 350,000 lives without lifting a finger to help. The
sickening accounts of atrocities committed by Idi Amin and his band of blood
thirsty thugs are well known, including accounts of Amin's boasting that he
has eaten human flesh on several occasions and noting that it tasted “ salty.”
I do not wish to dwell on these descriptions, as I think they are well known
to my colleagues on this Committee and have been referred to previously in these
hearings.
Mr. Chairman, I have firsthand knowledge of how abhorrent these conditions
are to the citizens of this country and of the expressions of outrage that our
people are capable of when it is found that the government of the United States
is actually aiding and abetting Amin in carrying out his purposes.
 127
My unique experience with Uganda and Idi Amin occurred on the very door
step of the 5th Congressional District of Texas and affected my constitutents
directly.
On November 7, 1977 I was shocked to read from the morning paper that 24
non - civilian personnel from Uganda were alleged to be in the United States for
training as helicopter pilots and technicians. Although the helicopters in pos
session of the Idi Amin regime were sold before 1971 as non -military aircraft,
the only thing making them non-military is that the guns have been removed .
Coinciding with these revelations in the press , my office received a consider
able volume of mail from the Dallas -Fort Worth area — where the training was
taking place - indicating absolute abhorrence that Amin's military personnel
were being trained in some of the best of American technical skills right in our
own community .
My office began immediately to find out what was actually happening and what
the explanation might be. Initially, this was a very frustrating and diffcult
process. First contacts with the State Department informed me that, in essence ,
the Ugandans' presence was merely the result of a standard visa policy. While
steps were being taken to change that policy, I was assured that nothing illegal
had occurred and that no State Department assistance had been provided to this
group of trainees. Nevertheless, they were here and they were being trained .
Whether an error of omission rather than commission, I was informed that
nothing could be done to send Amin's military personnel home. While their visas
listed them as “ police, air wing," it is well known that only Amin's military
forces have the helicopters.
I don't know how many of my colleagues would like to respond to the kinds
of demands I had received from back home by saying your government admits
a mistake, but nothing can be done about it ; the trainees will have to be trained .
I was given two reasons from the State Department why nothing could be done :
( 1 ) There was no quick and easy method for deporting the military personnel of
à dictatorial regime without the possibility of a lengthy appeals process ; and
( 2 ) I was advised that we should do nothing to upset Idi Amin because of the
possible danger to Americans still in Uganda.
I hope it will never be the case that our citizens are left with only the options
of quitting their jobs or else training the technical support crews for a band of
international butchers, made more effective by the training they receive.
I still question the first reason for not taking action — that of not wanting to
exercise the legal remedy that is in place. Regardless of the appeals process,
had we taken action to revoke the visas it would have put the United States on
record as being against the training and sent a clear signal to the world that
we are willing to do whatever is necessary to terminate it. I also believe that
this country should not be coerced into cooperating in a reprehensible action
simple because the statutes do not address this specific problem in an effective
way. However, these are problems which come under the purview of another
committee where I hope they will be receiving additional attention at an early
date.
The second reason offered for not taking further action to expel Amin's forces
caused a number of sleepless nights and some of the deepest soul searching I
have ever gone through . Had there been a firmly established national policy in
place that the State Department was committed to and willing to act on , the
consequences would have been the shared responsibility of all our citizens. But
had Amin responded to the actions of a single congressman who was visibly de
manding the trainees' expulsion , the windfall of any possible retaliation could
have been blamed entirely on that congressman .
Although I have never been very susceptible to the politics of appeasement,
I must confess that it was primarily the assurances I received from former mis
sionaries to Uganda which caused me to continue to press forward in demanding
the expulsion of the trainees. We have been in touch with a number of former
missionaries and residents of Uganada . Their advice has been that we should
continue to put pressure on Amin to either end his tyranny or end his rule as
soon as possible . They have said that by giving in to Amin's threats, more lives
would eventually be lost because it would leave him with virtually unlimited
freedom to continue his policies of extermination.
This is a highly courageous position for them to take, which I am told is also
the feeling of many of those still in Uganda, but as I have said, their safety
has caused me the greatest concern . Unfortunately, it is our government's lack of
 128

a consistent and firm policy in dealing with such cases that can tempt a con
frontation by someone like Amin who might view the termination of training
of his personnel as a direct personal affront wherein he had been singled out
for special treatment.
At this point, Mr. Chairman , I would like to insert into the hearing record a
copy of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service transcript of Kampala radio
given to me by the State Department on November 21, 1977 wherein our attempts
to terminate the training operations in Texas were met with a direct threat
from Amin saying that American missionaries were being carefully scrutinized
and that a " striking force” was "ready to strike."
[ Text of radio broadcast monitored by the U.S. State Department ; delivered to
Congressman Jim Mattox, November 21 , 1977- Washington , D.C. ]

AMIN WARNS AMERICANS AGAINST ANTI -UGANDAN ACTIVITY

( Kampala Domestic Service in English , 20 November 1977 )
Life President Amin has directed the Uganda satellite station in Arua to
Record all the events which are now taking place in connection with Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat's current visit to Israel. He specifically directed the
station to record President Sadat's attendance of prayers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque
in Jerusalem, his meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, and when he will be
laying a wreath at the spot where 6 million Jews were killed by the Nazis. The
program will be shown on the Uganda TV later this evening.
Field Marshal Amin said that he received the news about President Sadat's
visit to Israel just after completing his tour of the western province. While in
the province Al Hajj Amin addressed various regiments of the Uganda armed
forces, the police, prisons and local askaris. He warned them that there is a big
sabotage already organized by the American imperialists. The field marshal
pointed out that the American government has confiscated our helicopters, which
had been paid for, and Ugandan students in the United States have been told to
return home. They have been threatened to harm and even bomb various Ugandan
Embassies abroad, which has caused a big threat to all the Ugandan personnel
abroad, particularly the permanent missions.
Dr. Amin said he is taking the matter very seriously and has already con
sulted various international organizations abroad to defend Uganda. He said
that the orgniztions which fight for freedom and are always ready to combat
any reactionary terrorists anywhere in the world have assured him of their
response should the situation go worse.
Life President Amin disclosed that six American intelligence organizations
are already in action against Uganda , and they include the FBI and the CIA.
They were at the verge of confiscating Uganda's second Boeing 707, which she
bought from ( not discernible ) Ltd. They have also mounted a very big campaign
by ( word indistinct) malicious propaganda in their TV, radio and Zionist papers
in the United States against the government and people of Uganda.
Life President Amin said that the American government is being fed with
such information and propaganda by the Ugandan exiles who are wanted in
Uganda dead or alive to answer criminal charges. Such information is being fed
to them by people like the former minister ofhealth , who stole a lot of money .
He defected while attending a conference in Geneva. He ran away with funds
intended for building a military hospital at ( not discernible - looks like
" Mbuya " ) and funds given by the Libyan government of constructing health
Centers in Koboko, Karanoja , Ankole, Buganda, Bukaga, Mutukila and others in
the western region .
They are also fed by the former Minister of Justice, who similarly defected
while attending a conference in Geneva . This one stole money belonging to print
ing press which he uses to print government books and others from schools and
hospitals.
Another one in the group is the former Uganda Ambassador to France, who
ran away with all the Embassy funds and for which he is wanted in Uganda to
account for.
Another one is the former attorney general in Obote's government, who ran
away with a lot of money for setting up various organizations for the disabled .
Life President Amin disclosed that all these people are spreading malicious
propaganda in order to cover up their crimes and unless the American Govern
 129

ment opens up its eyes it is bound to be deceived and blinded even more by such
people. It is for this reason that the Uganda government is now making it
absolutely clear to the American Government that such people are wanted in
Uganda to stand trial and answer for all criminal charges against them. They
are being hunted and are seriously wanted dead or alive back in Uganda .
He said these people include the former high commissioner to Britain, who
also stole a lot of money and property belonging to the Uganda high commission
in Britain . He is among those wanted dead or alive to face a military tribunal.
The Uganda Government has therefore warned the American Government,
particularly the President, Jimmy Carter, and his puppet Ambassador, Andrew
Young, who seem not to know the situation as yet, never to pronounce such
malicious propaganda. He said that it is unfortunate that he has refused to fall
prey to American imperialism because he is not the type of leader the Americans
would have liked ( as heard ). He cannot easily be corrupted and not be a puppet
to their imperialism . He does not believe in big money like leaders in oil-produc
ing countries. He would rather remain poor but defend the interests of his people
and therefore will never be in the pocket of the American imperialists. Dr. Amin
has strongly warned all members of the Uganda Intelligence Network, including
the ( HSA ) , to keep a close eye on all the Americans within the country or
abroad before he takes serious action on the United States.
Field Marshall Amin has already carried out an intensive inspection of all
the American missionaries in Fort Portal. He told the special intelligence (words
indistinct ) including the striking force to be ready to strike any time. He
warned that if any harm was done to any Ugandan, including those in our
missions, the Americans will suffer more because there are only a few Ugandans
in the United States compared to the Americans here. The life President said he
was kept informed day and night about all American activities through Amer
ican Intelligence and other networks.

[ Mr. Mattox' prepared statement continues : ]

I did , however, continue my insistence that the training be terminated and
the Ugandans be expelled. To accomplish what Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs William C. Harrop referred to in his testimony as
"extraordinary efforts to bring about the early termination of the helicopter
training program ," required a tremendous investment of time and effort by my
staff and me. While I do not recommend such long and involved forays into
foreign policy by a freshman , not a member of this Committee, there are times
when extraordinary circumstances require an uncompromising stance. The re
sults of literally thousands of phone calls, meetings, telegrams and letters are
these :
( 1 ) Action by the Department of Transportation - approved by the State De
partment — refusing to issue FAA certification to the Ugandan trainees. Since
this was the end objective of their training and because of the international
prestige attached to these certifications which allow access to the world's air
ports, the refusal to certify sends a clear message to all that we are no longer
cooperating in the training of Amin's henchmen in Texas.
( 2 ) The turning back at the border of two additional Ugandan military per
sonnel who had been issued visas and were scheduled to participate in the
training.
( 3 ) Direct personal assurances from the State Department that 40 more
Ugandans, who had contracted for helicopter and technical training in Texas
this year, will not be allowed into the United States. It should be noted that the
State Department was apparently not aware that this additional training had
been scheduled with a private company.
( 4 ) The establishment of a more flexible operating posture by the State De
partment in dealing with cases where American firms refuse to respond to legiti
mate questions raised by people in the communities where they do business.
This amounted to the State Department's calling the bluff of those companies
who had been privately urged to terminate the training in the national interest,
but who were publicly supplying misleading and erroneous information to the
press, the public and Members of Congress. This is, in fact , the recognition of
extenuating circumstances and a willingness by the State Department to tailor
policies to fit those circumstances.
( 5 ) Blocking the sale of three additional helicopters to Amin.
( 6) A greater awareness of our relations with the Amin regime and a greater
opportunity to develop policies that will address similarproblemsin the future.
( 7 ) A renewal of faith in government by the citizens of my district where they

1
 130

have been able to see that their government is sensitive to the moral implications
of such dealings with a tyrannical government.
Unfortunately, in the process of helping to secure these actions, we developed
information that there are other communities in our own country where similar
technical support activities are still going on . Our office was the first to learn
that Amin's personal jet, together with eight military personnel, was in Sa
vannah, Georgia, where it frequently receives maintenance and technical modifi
cations. Amin has also received extensive assistance from Page Airways in New
York, as well as electronics, communications satellite and ground support equip
ment from the Harris Corporation in Florida.
Mr. Chairman , the public is entitled to know the full facts behind these oper
ations and how extensive our support role is for the Amin regime. I strongly
recommend that this committee call witnesses from those companies which have
a formal commercial arrangement with the current government of Uganda where
the goods and services have a military application. I also suggest that the
relationship between our American based firms and their foreign licensees be
looked into in this regard .
It is worthy of notice that the threatened reprisals against missionaries has
not occurred , but rather Amin has seen fit, since the termination of the heli
copter training in Texas, to invite the press into Uganda in an attempt to
demonstrate his devotion to the cause of human rights.
Mr. Chairman, there is much more that I could add regarding our relations
with Uganda. With your permission I would like to include in the record of these
hearings two press accounts of our experience in Texas which give a more com
plete description of some of the events I have only briefly mentioned .' I urge this
committee to continue these hearings our first obligation being to provide the
American people with a complete accounting of our dealings with Uganda.
I was gratified to learn last week that Senator Frank Church has called for
similar hearings on the Senate side. I would also like to let it be known that
Senator Church was of immense help to me and my staff in dealings with these
problems in Texas. It was in large part the leverage of his position as Chairman
of the Foreign Economic Policy Subcommittee and the strength of his well
known personal commitment to human rights that we were able to get straight
answers and accomplish much of what we set out to do.
As a cosponsor of the Pease bills calling for economic sanctions against the
Amin government, I urge the advance of this legislation into law. The very able
Congressman from Ohio has shown a deep personal commitment to improving
the lot of those now suffering under a tyrant. I think Congressman Pease has out
lined a course that this nation can be proud of in light of our growing deter
mination as a nation to support the cause of human rights around the world .
Mr. Diggs. Well, I thank the gentleman for his contribution, and
may I commend him for the efforts that he exerted in uncovering the
link between U.S. private entrepreneurs and Uganda.
Your recommendation about calling in some of these companies to
testify is well taken, and that ison the agendaof the joint committees.
One of the things that I noted, Mr. Mattox, is that you voted for the
resolution that I referred to earlier on South Africa, the South African
resolution that, in effect, put ourGovernment on record in opposition
to similar practices in South Africa, but did not get into the economic
sanctions aspect of it.
There was some speculation that if economic sanctions had been part
of the South African resolution, it might not have passed.
I wonder, within that context, what you feel about it. If the South
African resolution had an economic sanction proviso in it, would you
have been able to support it ? And on the other hand, if a resolution
comes out of this committee which does not have economic sanctions
but registers the strongest approach and leaves it up to the President
1 See Congressional Record ,Jan. 4 , 1978, p. E7537 : “ Forty More Ugandans Contracted for
Pilot Trainingin the United States," by Lee Roderick, reprinted fromtheDekalb( Illinois)
Daily Chronicle, Dec. 6 , 1977 ; " Who Cares About Idi Amin ?" by Lee Roderick, reprinted
from theOregon City (Oregon ) Enterprise Courier , Dec.12, 1977.
 131

to pursue whatever prerogatives are at his disposal, what would be

your feeling about that?
Mr. Mattox. I think that I could support both of those propositions,
Mr. Chairman . I think that there is,without a doubt, a need for us
to back up our humanitarian principles around the world . It has
always been said to me that you judge somebody by their actions and
not by their words, and we are pretty good at putting forth some
words.
If we could take strong action right now, if we had taken stronger
action afew
. years back we would nothave to worry about precipitating
thepossibility ofkilling the American personnel there.
We asked the question, let's say Idi Amin tomorrow decides he is
going to murder 250 Americans. What are we going to do then ?
I have town hall meetings in my district. I am going to hold some
this weekend and talk to them about this, because I think I know what
the people would say. They would say, send in the Marines.
If our State Department dilly -dallies around, that is exactly what
is going to happen to us. We will get ourselves in the middle of awar.
And I think if we took a good , hard, firm position, that would not
happen, whether it would be with South Africa or with Uganda.
Mr. Diggs. Well, the gentleman's points are well taken. I have been
in Uganda — I have not been there since the Amin administration
exceptin the airport en route to Kenya. I was there under a previous
administration several times when Idi Amin's predecessor was in
power . I can rememberthat right after the coup, there was, within the
State Department, at the senior level, optimism that certain practices
of the Obote regime would be altered under Amin, and that life in
Uganda would be improved. And, to my knowledge, there was not any
evidence of anything anywhere near what has been reported going on
there now .
So I think that our acceptance of the Department's views at that
time might suggest that there may have been some collusion, or cer
tainly that the transition did not take place in the face of any serious
opposition by the State Department.
So the kinds of judgments to which you refer, and the critical
comments that you make, are valid against that kind ofa background.
I certainly join you in hoping that the expressions that have been
forthcoming from the administration witnesses to date might be re
considered in the context ofthe mistakes of the past.
I, too, had some personal experiences involving constituents. One of
the largest enterprises in my district back home is the Stroh Brewing
Co. Peter Stroh is a descendant of the families of the Stroh Brewing
Co. He lost his life in Uganda since that time.
So I entered into these deliberations against a background that is
similar, in many respects, to yours. I was particularly impressed with
your comments about the attitude of U.S. entrepreneurs in those
countries.
think that part of the foreign policy problems that we have in
many areas is due to the attitude of these multi-national companies,
those whose.profit -motive appears to be the sole consideration .
And for these companies to suggest that policy that directs their
presence and their investment reposes on 21st and Street or at 1600
 132

Pennsylvania Avenue is, as you and Iwellknow, just nottrue. In many

instancesthere is not any contact at all between multinationals and our
diplomatic missions in making determinations as to whether or not
they invest, or certainly whether they remain in a given country.
So your point on that score is well-taken and, I think, reinforces our
anticipations of an interesting session with representatives of these
companies when they come in to justify their continued presence in
Uganda.
Mr. Matrox. I might say that when we wereattempting to getthe
FAA to refuse to give licenses to these Ugandan pilots and certify
them, that I was impressed to find out the real extent to which Ameri
can prestige is attached to our goods, our services, our licenses, and the
other products of this country. Most of these products sold to Amin
area result of our buying coffee from Uganda and giving them foreign
exchange.
And I truthfully believe when Idi Amin's personal pilot can brag
that he was trained at Forth Worth, Texas and he is an American
trained pilot and certified in America, in the United States, I think
that we are adding prestige to the individual and to his military forces
that Amin does not need to have .
Despite any other actions that will be taken , I know that we can
keep these militarypeople out of the country, and I thinkthat we have
got to stop them from coming in under the subterfuge of beingpolice
personnel, or whatever. Anybody can gerrymanderthe English lan
guage around to the point of describing somoneas something that they
are not , and I think that we have to be very careful about that.
But the prestige that we are giving Idi Amin's regime by continuing
to trade with him and providing American goods and services over
there is something that we have got to stop and I am very supportive
of this legislation. If this is not the right legislation, I think we have
to make what changes are necessary. I do not think a resolution will
do the job, though. I really do not.
Mr. Diggs. I thank the gentleman and can assure him that something
will be forthcoming from these joint hearings, that seek to meet the
objective that we both seek to serve.
Mr. Mattox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. Our final witness today is Mr. George Boecklin of the
National Coffee Association. He is president of that association and he
has submitted a prepared statement to the subcommittees. If he wishes
to proceed in summary fashion, he may do so, but he has the option
of following the complete text if that is his desire.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. BOECKLIN , PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
COFFEE ASSOCIATION OF U.S.A., INC., NEW YORK, N.Y.
Mr. BOECKLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman . My testimony is rather
brief and in as much as due to the extreme weather conditions in the
northeast I was not able to comply with your committee's rules to sub
mit the testimony 48 hours in advance, I could only get it here this
morning. I would like the privilege of reading it now in its entirety.
Mr. Chairman, my name is George Boecklin. I am president of the
National Coffee Association, a trade association representing coffee im
 133

porters and roasters and various associated companies in the United

States.
The National Coffee Association welcomes this opportunity to pre
sent its position with respect to the proposed economic embargo of
Uganda .
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that, while I have
no first-hand knowledge regarding the reported human rights viola
tions in Uganda, the board of directors of the National Coffee Associa
tion together with its members and its officers share the deep feelings
ofall decent people and considers such acts to be reprehensible.
In response to a number of contacts made with members of the coffee
industry by Members of the Congress and other interested parties, the
board of directors of the National Coffee Association held a special
meeting on November 29, 1977, to discuss the proposed legislation con
cerningthe economic embargo of Uganda.
It was the unanimous opinion of our boardof directors that the
adoption of any policy regarding trade with Uganda, or any other
country for that matter, would have to result from consideration of
many factors, and that only the U.S. Government would have access
to all such information concerning the foreign policy implications of
formulating and implementing a commercialtrade ban onUganda and
that only the U.S. Government should make foreign policy.
This view of our board of direotors is elaborated in the resolution
adopted by it at its special meeting on November 29, 1977, which I will
now read in its entirety, Mr. Chairman :
The National Coffee Association of USA, Inc., being an Association representing
the domestic coffee trade in the United States ;
Noting the fact that Uganda is a supplier of green coffee in the world market
and that Uganda and the United States are both parties to the International
Coffee Agreement of 1976 ;
Declaring that the violations of human rights occurring under the Ugandan
government of President Idi Amin are abhorrent and morally repugnant to the
Board of Directors of the National Coffee Association and have caused public
pressures on members to desist from purchases of Uganda coffee ;
Declaring that since only the U.S. Government has access to all the foreign
policy implications of a commercial trade ban on Uganda, we believe that only the
United States government is fully responsible to make the appropriate foreign
policy ; and
Declaring that the members of the National Coffee Association wish to avoid
any charges of antitrust violation arising out of any voluntary concerted action
in response to such pressures and that it is appropriate for the U.S. Govern
ment to formulate a policy with respect to purchases of Ugandan coffee which
would avoid such charges and apply equally to all domestic participants in the
coffee trade ;
Hereby Resolves that the Board of Directors of the National Coffee Associa
tion respectfully requests the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S.
Government to declare and implement a uniform national policy in the United
States concerning trade by private and commercial interests in the United
States with entities in Uganda.

At a meeting of the association's newly elected board of directors

1 week ago today, that resolution was unanimously reaffirmed and to
day thatresolution is the policy of the National Coffee Association.
Having stated the official policy of the National Coffee Association,
I will, in the balance of this testimony, try to respond to some of the
points raised by you, Mr. Chairman, in your letter requesting me to
appear at thesehearings today.
 134

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I wish to state that any statistical

data which the association has concerning the Ugandan coffee trade is
secured from published sources, particularly theInternational Coffee
Organization and the U.S. Department ofAgriculture.
Concerning the nature of the U.S. trade in coffee with Uganda,
Uganda conducts its trade in coffee exclusively through its coffeé
marketing board which is a government agency in Kampala. All
Ugandan coffee is purchased from the growers by the marketing
board at prices established by the marketing board. Preparation of
the coffee for export, including the hulling, cleaning, sorting, grading,
and bagging are performed by facilities owned and operated by the
marketing board.
The marketing board is the sole exporter of coffeeto alldestina
tions. It maintains branch offices in London and New York. The New
York office is the contact with the U.S. dealers. It receives bids from
importers and transmits them to the headquarters office in Kampala
for acceptance. All sales are on a free on board Mombasa basis.
To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, there is no U.S. coffee investment
or personnel involved in the coffee business in Uganda. I also know of
no joint production arrangements.
Concerning the potential impact on the U.S. coffee industry of a
unilateral U.S. embargo of all trade with Uganda, and on domestic
prices and export earnings of the Ugandan Government, it is very
difficult to predictwhat the impact of a ban on trade with Uganda
would be on the U.S. coffee industry. But it would appear that it
would cause some disruption initially since Uganda is an important
supplier of the robusta variety of coffee to the U.S. industry.
Robusta is a variety of green coffee that is distinguished by the size
and shape of its bean and by аa. flavor that is quite different from the
various Arabica coffees, which are produced mainly in the Western
Hemisphere. Virtually all Ugandan coffee is robusta.
There are 17 countries in Africa and Asia that produce robusta
coffee, totaling 16 million bags exportable. Uganda accounts for 18
percent of that total. In 1977, we imported approximately a million
bags of coffee from Uganda which was about 6.5 percent of our total
green coffee imports for the year.
If a trade ban with Uganda were adopted by the Congress , for a
period of time after the ban went into effect, there would probably be
a tight supply of Robusta coffee in the United States. However, Mr.
Chairman, Ugandan coffee would continue to be offered for sale in
Europe and other consuming countries and in greater quantities than
those markets usually buy since Uganda would seek to maintain its
level of foreign exchange income from exports of coffee. This, in turn,
would bring offerings of more coffee from other robusta growing
countries to the United States due to the greater selling competition in
those countries.
In some cases, coffee of the Arabica variety, produced mainly in
Latin America, could also be used in place of Ugandan coffee.
In other words, Mr. Chairman , as Iseeit, therewould be a change in
the distribution pattern as a result of a U.S. embargo ; more Uganda
coffee sold to other countries and more coffee from other producers sold
to the United States.
 135

Therefore, it is very difficult to predict what the effect of such a trade

ban would have on Ügandan export earnings except the very obvious
one thatthe country would be earning no U.S. currency,
It is also not possible for reasons cited above, to say what the effect
might beon domestic coffee prices in the United States.
Regarding thequestion of enforcing the ban on Ugandancoffee, this
of course would be the responsibilityof the U.S. Customs Service and
there could be a problem in assuring that Ugandan coffee did not enter
the United States labeled as the product of some other country.
As you know , Mr. Chairman, both the United States and Uganda
are members of the International Coffee Agreement, a treaty of 66
coffee producing and consuming countries.
Under the International Coffee Agreement the flow of coffee from
exporter members to importer members is tracked for statistical pur
poses by a system in which the certificate of origin is the principal
device.
The certificate of origin is validated by the exporting country at
time of shipment and the original is forwarded to the secretariat of the
International Coffee Organization in London. A copy is forwarded to
the importerto be presented to Customs attimeof entry . The copy is
then forwarded by Customs to the International Coffee Organization
secretariat for matching against the original to establish proof of
importation. Since theInternational Coffee Agreement came into
force on October 1, 1976, there have been no export quotas in effect
and, therefore, the collection of certificates of origin by importing
members is not mandatory but voluntary. The United States has not
sought the necessary legislative authorization to make the presentation
of the certificate of origin mandatory for entry.
However, importers in the United States frequently voluntarily
cooperate in supplying certificates of origin when they are available
at the time of Customs entry. This is done at the request of the State
Department.
Ás a practical matter, however, this voluntary cooperation is not a
complete solution to make the tracking system effective. This is so be
cause very often the certificatesof origin copies are late in reaching the
importeror are lost in transit, in which casethere is onlythe filling out
of an import form — this toois voluntary on thepart oftheimporter
which is very frequently not an adequate substitute for the certificate
of origin fortracking purposes.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, I fail to see how the International Coffee
Organization's certificate of origin could be used as an effective en
forcement tool fora ban on the importation of coffee from Uganda.
Under previous coffee agreements, the control of coffee movement and
the enforcementof export quotas proved to be aa most difficult problem ;
and unless there is absolute adherence to the system on a mandatory
basis by all exporting and importing countries, the system will not be
effective.
In conclusion , Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees, I
want to emphasize that should the bill creating a ban on trade with
Uganda be enacted into law, I feel certain the United States importers
and roasters would take all measures legally available to them to
comply with the law and would attemptto assure that coffee pur
 136

chased by them for reprocessing and sale in the United States did not
contain coffee beans from Uganda.
Thank you .
Mr. Diggs. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Boecklin. You have
come to your positionagainst a backgroundof considerable experience
in this field, and considerable expertise. The joint subcommittees have
a great deal of respect for your judgment, within that context.
You ended on a note that, of course, is reassuring to the joint sub
committees, namely that the coffee industry that you represent is pre
pared to comply with any congressional mandates, or executive
mandates.
I am certainly not surprised at that. But I assume that there are
entrepreneurs in your industry for whom you do not speak, and who
would exercise what they would consider to be their prerogatives to
circumvent such policy directives, as has been the case in the past. I
assume that you are not suggesting that everybody within the coffee
industry would adhere to the kind of pledge that you have made to us
today, is that correct ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . I, of course, cannot legally bind the members of the
National Coffee Association , but speaking from the background of
previous agreements when export quotas were in force andwhen cer
tain countries fulfilled their export quotas, and coffees then found their
way into other importing countries and were shipped as so - called
tourist coffees, the U.S. industry had a remarkably good, an excel
lent record, in terms of compliance with the rules and the law of the
land, and I would expect that this would be the case if this Uganda
legislation were enacted.
Mr. Diggs. Are you prepared to say flatly whether you are for or
against the resolutions that are pending? You said that you would
comply if they are enacted into law. This is reassuring. Are you for
this matter, or are you against it ? If you are for it, do you feel that you
have to have some kindof statutorybase before you could proceed to
withdraw from the market ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. The association itself, its board of directors, has not
taken a position for or against these bills, as explained, I think, in our
resolution . However, we definitely would have to have the enactment
of some law or some determination by the executive branch of the
Government before the coffee companies could legally attempt to re
strict their purchases of Ugandan coffee in view of the antitrust risk
that would be faced without such determination.
Mr. Diggs. That is an interesting judgment. Is that your own coun
sel's opinion, or does that represent some interpretation from Govern
ment sources ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. Mr. Chairman, it represents a number of counsels.
One, the association's outside legal counsel has looked at this matter
rather carefully, and to the extent that coffee companies would engage
in any form of аa. restriction of theirpurchases of Ugandancoffee in the
form of a boycott or semiboycott, there is a very clear indication from
counselthat this would poseserious antitrust risk.
Mr. Diggs. You say risk ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . Risk .
Mr. Diggs. That is their opinion ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . Yes, sir.
 137

Mr. Diggs. Is it based on some current discussions, or do you have a

legal commitment to buy coffee from Uganda ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . No, sir. I am saying that any conspiracy or any agree
ment among the coffee companies to desist from the purchase of
Ugandan coffee without its beingmandatory by U.S. law would pose
a very serious antitrust risk — and this is an opinion not only of our
own outside legal counsel for the association , but the legal counsel of
many of thecoffee companies themselves.
This has been apparently inquired into by one of the authors of the
legislation, Congressman RobertK. Dornan, who expressed in a. letter
to the chairman of our association that, “ I can appreciate your ap
>
prehension over any antitrust implications."
So it is recognized rather generally that there is a rather severe
antitrust risk and one that the coffee companies and the Coffee Asso
ciation feel that they should not be asked to take in order to apply
some measure of foreign policy.
This is a Government matter, sir.
Mr. Diggs. This is an interesting opinion. It might be self-serving,
also . I would think there should be some interpretation of that before
one reaches the conclusions that you have reached. Because, the other
side of the coin, as I pointed out, is that theassociation feels that it
has a legal commitment to continue to buy coffee from Uganda.
Are you saying that ? Do you really believe that you have a legal
commitment to continue buying coffee from Uganda ? That is rather
an amazing interpretation , I would think.
Mr. BOECKLIN . I did not say that .
Mr. Diggs. Is that not the other side of the coin ? You have to have
a statutory base not to buy, so you feel that you have a legal commit
ment to buy until it is reversed by some sort of statutorymandate or
some judicial interpretations.
Is that yourcounsel behind you ? I would prefer for him to comment
informally on this. This is not a court of law.
STATEMENT OF DONALD J. MULVIHILL, CAHILL, GORDON &
REINDEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. MULVIHILL. My name is Donald J. Mulvihill from the law firm
of Cahill, Gordon and Reindel. I do not think Mr. Boecklin was sug
gesting that the association had any obligation to buy coffee from
anyone. The association itself does not buy coffee; its individual mem
bers do. The individual members can make whatever judgments that
they wish, andthey can buy from whom they wish to buy coffee.
Mr. Diggs. Thatwas the pointthat I was trying to establish.
Mr. MulvIHILL. The point is that any suggestion that the members
of the association get together and decidewhat to do, we believe,
could be construed as a violation of the antitrust laws. We have rec
ommended that the subject not be gone into in any way by the associa
tion. That is our opinion, expressed to the association, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. Is part of the basis for that conclusion , counsel, based
upon an advisory opinion from the Justice Department ?
Mr. MULVIHILL . No, sir. We are relying on judicial precedents
which suggest that collective action which would constitute a boycott
 138

might well be a per se violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman

Act. There is precedent which suggests that.
It is my understanding that some inquiry, not by us, but I believe
by one of the Members of the Congress, was madeto the Justice De
partment and the response was that they did not give advisory opin
ions. However, I am led to believe — this is hearsay — that they did
suggest that there were indeed problems in the association's getting
together and discussing this matter of a boycott.
Mr. Diggs. Are you suggestingthat if they pursued this matter on
an individual basis that they would be subject to a similar risk ?
Mr. MULVIHILL. Not if they, on their own, made a decision to buy
or not to buy from a particular seller, completely disassociated from
the association activities. Then they can make whatever judgments
that they wish. I am not suggesting that there is any risk in that
from an antitrust standpoint, but it is clear that they must be very
careful and we have counseled the association to essentially stay out
ofit. Consistent with that, they passed the resolution.
Mr. Diggs. I think that it is important to establish the difference, be
cause if we had let the gentleman's testimony stand as he had de
livered it, we would not have had that differentiation in the record .
I think that we have established that these coffee companies have
no legal commitment to buyunless they sign a contract of some type
and that theydo have individual prerogatives.
What has been the indication in the industry, sir, about Ameri
can consumers' desire to purchase or not to purchase Ugandan coffee ?
Usually these decisions are made based upon consumer demand.
Is there an identifiable consumer demand for coffee from Uganda ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . No, I do not believe so. Ugandan coffee, Mr. Chair
man , is not, to my knowledge, sold unblended as a straight Ugandan
coffee, so that the consumer does not know whether he is buying a
blend that may contain some Ugandan beans or not.
I do not believe that there is any consumer demand for Ugandan
coffee per se .
Mr. Diggs. Does the industry feel any responsibility to evaluate
the effect of these purchases upon the Government or upon the quality
of life in Uganda ? Is there any compulsion to act voluntarily in re
sponse to what you have already described here as a rather horrendous
human relations problem in that country ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . I have not discussed with individual members of
the industry whether they internally are considering buying or not
buying, or whether they feel obligated to buy or not to buy. You
must remember that coffee is still in relatively tight supply in the
world and if there were to be a stoppage in the purchasing of Ugan
dan coffee, it would have to be on the basis of some governmental edict
or law that would make it apply equally to all companies in the
industry and that is expressed in our resolution.
Mr. Diggs. How do you purchase this coffee ? Do you get it from
the farmers themselves, or the Government, or does it all go through
the marketing board ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . As I stated in my testimony, the marketing board
is a monopoly, a complete monopoly, of coffee in Uganda. They buy
the coffee from the growers at prices that they establish. The growers
have very little, or no, say in the price that they get.
 139

They prepare the coffee, and through their branch offices in New
York and London they establish contacts with the coffee industry in
the consuming countries and sales are negotiated in that way.
The sole seller and sole exporter is theUganda Coffee Marketing
Board .
Mr. Diggs. Of course , there has been a significant increase. Is that
attributable to the overall increase in coffee consumption, or is there
any special reason why imports from Uganda have increased so
significantly ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. I think you are speaking of the value of the imports,
are you not ?
Mr. Diggs. Whatever measure the industry uses.
Mr. BOECKLIN . The value went up dramatically in 1977 over 1976,
1976 over 1975. That is merely a reflection of whathas happened to the
cost of green coffee in the world market.
There is no significant increase in the use of Ugandan coffee by the
world or by the United States.
There was, for a period of time, a virtual shutoff of shipments of
coffee from Angola whichput more pressure on other coffee-producing
countries in Africa to fill that void, but Angola has gradually been
coming back into the market, so that there is no reason to say that
Ugandan coffee is being used'in greater amounts by the world or by
the United States.
Mr. Diggs. Did you cover in your testimony a comparison between
the percentage of our imports from Uganda and our imports from
other parts of the world ? Something like 4 percent comes from
Uganda. Did yousay that, or did I get that from some other source.
Mr. BOECKLIN. I suppose with respectto the particular type of cof
fee that is grown, all Ugandan – I say virtually all Ugandan coffee is
Robusta. Seventeen states in Africa and Asia produce Robusta coffee,
for a total of 16 million bags, and Uganda accounts for 18 percent
of it.
In 1977, we imported approximately 1 million bags of coffee from
Uganda, which isabout 6.5 percent of our total coffeeimports.
Mr. Diggs. That means that we get 94 percent or so from other
sources .It is not an important importmarket ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. It is an important part of the Robusta segment of
the market, which is the particular kind of coffee that is grown princi
pally in Africa and Asia.
Considering the total world market, 6 percent, if there is a tight
supply, could be an important part.
Mr. Diggs. Robusta ? What kind of coffee is that ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. A type of coffee plant that produces a bean that is
different from the bean grown in the WesternHemisphere. It is used
for blending purposes.
Mr. Diggs. Did you cover in your testimony the money that your
members paid to this Government board in 1977 ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. No, I did not, but that is easy to obtain and I can
supply it to you for the record .
Mr.Diggs. You will supply that for the record ?

25-826 0 - 78 - 10
 140

Mr. BOECKLIN. Yes.1

Mr. Diggs. Since this is a Government monopoly, I guess that you
have no way of really knowing what happens to the money after you
turn it over to them ?
Mr. BOECKLIN. No, sir, we do not.
Mr. Diggs. Does it go into the general treasury of the Uganda
Government or does it end up in a Swedish bankaccount ? Do you
know ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . I have no idea , sir.
Mr. Diggs. One of the reasons I asked that question is that last week
we had testimony from a coffee grower from Uganda who is in exile
here in this country. He stated that less than $1 in $14 paid hy mem
bers of your association actually reaches the growers themselves. He
went on to say that these growers pay black market prices for their
own necessities.
Do you have any information on that matter ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . There are some statistics that I do not have at hand
released by the International Coffee Organization on prices paid to
growers. My recollectionof that is that Uganda is among the lowest
the price paid by Uganda to the growers is among the lowest of the
coffee producingcountries of the world.
The last figure for the period — I guess is was 1976 was about 18.5
cents a pound. I think it was 1976. There was another country that
paid in the same area. For Zaire, it was down around 14 cents, and
all of the other countries were higher.
That would be comparable against whatever the world price for
Robuesta was at that time. Again, I do not have that figure, but it is
quite a small percentage of the totalprice that Ugandan coffee fetched
in the world market.
Mr. Diggs. I recall seeing some statement, either in the press or
from other sources, that individual companies believe the Government
should not be in the business of selling coffee. I wonder whether or not
-

thisanti-Government intervention position was a factor in the delib

erations of your organization.
I do not know . Was the final resolution really fully debated ? Did
you feel among the group a sense that in the absence of some kind of
astatutory base, or judicial interpretation , that their hands were tied ?
Did you feel that they really wanted to do something, that they
wanted to come out of Uganda, thatthey wanted to stop buying, but
were handicappedby allof these considerations?
Mr. BOECKLIN . First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself
to your first comment. I must say I have not seen any statements in
the press along the lines that you just mentioned, and I certainly
would be interested in seeing them .
I would certainly like to see that.
Mr. Diggs. I took liberties, but I have seen statements making it
quite clear that they did not feel that the Government ought to be inter
fering with their marketing problem no matter what was going on
inside of the country .
Mr. BOECKLIN . I did not get that sense at all, Mr. Chairman.
1 The figure for the year 1977 is not presently available. The International Coffee Organ
ization (Statistics on Coffee) reports that for the year 1976, total earnings from exports
of coffee from Uganda totaled $298,148,000.
 141

Mr. Diggs. I would be delighted to have you correct me, to correct

that impression .
Mr. BOECKLIN . The sense that I got was yes, everybody, every rea
sonable, decentperson certainly considers those acts that were being
committed in Uganda to be absolutely abhorrent and reprehensible,
and it is clearlyspelled out in the resolution . It goes before all other
consideration .
But to the extent that the coffee companies were being pressured
individually to reduce their purchases of Ugandan coffee, individually
and collectively, I might say — the major coffee companiesand many
of the importers were being contacted — it was recognized that this
should be discussed by the association under the guidelines provided
by legal counsel for discussion. And it was very quickly decided that
this was the responsibility of the Federal Government and that the
coffee companies should not discuss it any further.
Mr. Diggs. What about other coffee importers? What can you tell
us about that, under the terms of the International Coffee Agreement?
Have there been other countries or individuals, who because of these
conditions in Uganda proceeded to withdraw from Uganda ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . I have no knowledge of that happening, sir.
Mr. Diggs. So no member of your association, on an individualbasis,
has exercised its prerogative to withdraw from the market ?
Mr. BOECKLIN . If they have, they have not told me. I have no
knowledge.
For competitive reasons, I might say, Mr. Chairman, if a company
decides to shift its buying policies, it probably does not announce it,
because it is a very competitive market, and if they did shift away,
they would probably keep it to themselves.
Nr. Diggs. Let me ask Counsel if she has any questions.
I guess that we should put this letter in the record here, addressed
to Don Pease from E. Hall & Co. I think that it is pertinent to our
discussions and particularly to the last point that I was trying to
make.
[The material referred to follows :]
E. A. KAHL & Co.,
San Francisco , Calif., November 15, 1979.
Hon . DON J. PEASE,
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,Washington ,D.C.
DEAR SIR : We reply to your letter of November 3, 1977.
In checking our records, we find that our last Ugandan shipment of green coffee
was well over a year ago. This has been a market function and not a prescribed
policy of our company in any way. The coffee business has been around for
hundreds of years before Amin and will most assuredly be here after Amin is gone,
and we do not feel that the people in the coffee business of Uganda should be
forced to starve because of one man.
We in no way condone economic sanctions of this type as it is our feeling that
sanctions create an enormous amount of ill will towards our country, and one day
we might be faced with economic boycotts ourselves, much to the detriment of
our trade balance. The coffee trade supports one -third of the economies of the
world and ranks only behind oil as a leading source of income.
Further, an economic sanction of this type would encourage smuggling of
coffees through Tanzania and Kenya , creating a black market of huge propor
tions. The honest producers of Uganda would be forced to abandon their farms
and this lapse in production would cause at least five years loss of crops, result
ing in bankruptcy for the small farmers.
 142

We hope that you will drop this idea of boycott and realize that the coffee
business is an honorable, traditional international entity that knows no political
boundaries. We encourage you to be extremely careful with any information
you publish about this sensitive subject, as the repercussions will be far reaching.
Allowing the industry to make its own decisions in this matter is the best policy
you could have. No business structure is ever rewarded for making the wrong
choice.
We thank you for informing us of your thoughts regarding Uganda.
Sincerely,
STEPHEN F. KAHL .

Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much. The subcommittees stand ad

journed .
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m.,the joint subcommittees adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
1
 UNITED STATES-UGANDA RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittees met at 3:40 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. ( chairman of the Sub
committee on Africa) presiding.
Mr. Diggs. The subcommittees will come to order.
This is the fourth hearing on U.S. policy toward Uganda. It is a
joint hearing involving the Subcommittee on International Organiza
tions, chaired by Mr. Fraser; the Subcommittee on International Eco
nomic Policy and Trade, chaired by Mr. Bingham ; and the Subcom
mittee on Africa, of which I am chairman.
We have heard the recitation concerning the abuses of power and
the repression occurring in Uganda under theadministration of Idi
Amin . What is the appropriate response for the Government of the
United States to make to the gross violations of human rights in
Uganda ? The administration has, before this body, questioned both
the desirability and the feasibility of adopting boycotts unilaterally.
Obviously the United States is not the only country that is concerned ;
the international community has expressed concern. The U.N. Com
mission on Human Rightsis considering Uganda during its current
session in Geneva. The United States isrepresented there by, among
others, Ed Mesvinsky, a former Member of Congress. Of course the
Ugandans are there. We will be following these deliberations with
great interest.
Our witnesses today should shed very useful light on this whole
matter. First, we will hear from Hon . Thomas Melady, Ambas
sador to Uganda from June of 1972 through April of 1973, who is cur
rently president of Sacred Heart University. Hehas had continuing
interest in Uganda since his assignment there and has written a book
on thesubject, “Idi Amin Dada : Hitler in Africa.”
We willthen call upon the chairman of the Uganda Freedom Union,
the Honorable G. Lukongwa Binaisa , a memberof the International
Commission of Jurists and Attorney General of Uganda under the ad
ministration of Milton Obote.
Let us call Ambassador Melady to the witness chair.
You may proceed, Mr. Ambassador, with your testimony.
( 143)
 144

You have submitted a statement to the subcommittees and if you

wish to summarize it, fine, however you want to proceed .
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PATRICK MELADY, PRESIDENT,
SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY, CONNECTICUT
Mr. MELADY. Thank you , Congressman Diggs.
I want to first of ali thank the committee for the invitation to be
here this afternoon. I prepared a short statement of two and a half
pages and I thought I would offer that and then be prepared to par
ticipate in any questions and answers later.
My name is Thomas Patrick Melady and I am presently the presi
dent of Sacred Heart University in Connecticut where I am also a
professor of political science. Previously I was executive vice presi
dent and professor of political science at St. Joseph's College in
Philadelphia
From 1969 to 1973 I was a U.S. Ambassador serving from 1969 to
1972 as Ambassador to Burundi. From June 1972 to September 1973
I was the U.S. Ambassador to Uganda.
Gentlemen, I am here to urge adoption of the legislation being
proposed by Congressman Pease. As the last U.S. Ambassador to the
government of Idi Amin , I have followed very closely, since my
return to private life, the situation in Uganda.
My wife Margaret, who is here with me, and I have coauthored two
books on the massive violation of human rights that have occurred in
Uganda since Amin came to power. They are “ Uganda: The Asian
Exiles ” and “ Idi Amin Dada : Hitler in Africa." We are pleased to
present copies of these books to the committee .
In my opinion Idi Amin is a confirmed brutal tyrant. Thousands
have suffered and died under his tyranical rule. It is the black people
of Uganda who have suffered themost. They will continue tosuffer
in my opinion aslong as he isin power.
I urge that all legal steps be takento help bring his rule to an end.
This includes the stopping of all trade with Amin. Americans in this
trade are giving him the means to continue the enslavement of the
Ugandan peoples.
The Uganda mission in Washington serves in my opinion as the
personal representative of the man who has endorsed genocide and
who practices it. How unfortunate that we allow the symbolism of this
tyranny to remain in Washington when at the same time Uganda
exiles report that the office spies on them and by informing Amin
of their actions subjects their relatives in Uganda to torture and
death.
In view of these facts and the fact that there is no U.S. diplomatic
presence in Uganda and in view of President Carter's commitment
to human rights, I urge that the U.S. Government close Amin's opera
tion in Washington .
The most important step in my opinion is for the President of the
United States to pursue every possibility to assure that the United
Nations investigates the massive violations of human rights in Uganda
and takes appropriate actions to end these violations. In my case my
 145

two books. " White Man's Future in Black Africa” and “ The Revolu
tion of Color,”" condemned the evil doctrine of apartheid . I, conse
quently, applaud the actions of the United Nations in regard to the
violations of human rights in South Africa.
But why haven't similar actions been taken in Uganda ? I must
raise the charge that the United States has not vigorously fought
the practice ofselective outrage at the United Nations. I speak as a
former senior adviser to the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General
Assembly and am distressed to see the double standard .
I urge this committee to take all actions that will influence the
United Nations to assume its responsibility in regard to the suffering
people of Uganda.
Some saythat Amin will change. I doubt this. There has been no
sign of repentance or remorse for the past killings — in fact, only
arrogant denials that there have been violations of human rights in
Uganda.
The only appropriate actions for a major power whose chief of
state has dedicated his country to human rights is to recognize
first of all the fact. Idi Amin Dada is a brutal tyrant who believes in
torture and murder and who practices these acts on his own people.
There are many authoritarian rulers in the world but fortunately
very few brutal tyrants. Let us recognize him for what he is — ă
murderer who is practicing torture and murder against his own
people.
Once this fact is recognized, we cannot ignore the situation. We
cannotbecause of our commitment to human rights so eloquently
set forth by a President in his inaugural address here in Washington.
Others might recommend unilateral intervention to end hisrule. This
in my opinion would be illegal and we should avoid this and all
illegal acts.
We should , however, carry out every act in our legal power to help
end the suffering of the Ugandan people. I, consequently, again urge
the adoption of the proposed legislation . It is morally right and
politically prudent for us to carry out these activities.
It wasonly a short time ago that a man from Munich was carry
ing out atrocities in Germany. The world in 1936 , 1937 and 1938
watched and hoped that the brutal tyrant, Hitler, would change. Some
Americans went there in 1938 and returned praising his government.
Even though their expenses were paid for by Hitler, not many then
questioned their praise. Hitler engaged a public relations firm to
" tell the story."
Now we have a new Hitler - and his name is Idi Amin. He, too,
has invited Americans to tour Uganda and, of course, he pays the
bills. Some have returned to praise him.
But, let us not repeat the errors of 1938. There is a new brutal
tyrant and his name is Idi Amin. I hope that the U.S. Congress
will take all appropriate action.
Thank you!
Mr. Diggs. Thank you very much .
We will proceed to the other two witnesses and then we will open
up for questions.
 146

Mr. Binaisa, who is coming tothe chair, is chairmanof the Uganda

Freedom Union, a member of the International Commission of
Jurists, and wasAttorney General of Uganda during the administra
tion of Milton Obote.
Without objection your entire statement, Mr. Binaisa, will be placed
in the record and it is hoped that you would be able to summarize your
13 page statment because we will soon be called to the floor of the
House to vote on several pieces of legislation.
STATEMENT OF HON . G. LUKONGWA BINAISA, CHAIRMAN ,
UGANDA FREEDOM UNION

Mr. BINAISA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman .

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, once again for having invited me to
this distinguished joint subcommittee hearing.
I am a former Attorney General of Uganda, 1962 to 1967, when we
obtained our independence from the British . I have a law degree from
King's College, London University, and the degree of Utter Barrister
of Lincoln's Inn, London, England. I am a Queen's Counsel and a
member of the Bars of England, Uganda, Kenya and more recently
the Bar of the State of New York. I am presently practicing law in
Mount Vernon , N.Y.
In summary, I would like the members of the committee to realize
that when they are dealing with Idi Amin they are dealing with a
dictator who has no respeet whatsoever for human life, who has no
ideology except his own survival, who sniffs danger whether imagi
nary or real like a wildcat and pounces on his victims with the
ferociousness of an African hyena.
When he came to power in 1971 he abolished all forms of repre
sentative government beginning with the national parliament. I am
going down to the local district councils and municipal councils. He
rules by presidential decrees and is answerable to no one except
himself.
He has constantly ignored the Court of Human Rights and our
Constitution which according to his decree was not abrogated by him
on paper but was completely ignored by him. The most important
human right of them all, the right to live, is no longer observed. If
you are alive in Uganda, it is a privilege granted by Idi Amin and he
can withdraw it without any notice.
He promised elections but the idea died with his declaring himself
President for life. Idi Amin's word is not to be trusted because he
thinks that he is capable of making everybody believe him no matter
how palatable his lies are because he puts onthe act of a simple un
educated African peasant who speaks a simple language from hisheart
rather than from his head and whatever he says ought to be believed
as gospel truth for he does not possess the sophistication to manipulate
a lie. This naivete on the part of the great nations like Britain has led
to untold suffering and loss of life to thousands of innocent Ugandans.
I urge the members of the committee to remember that this is one of
the few countries which elevated human rights to the sanctity of being
part of its constitution and therefore I wish that this country takes the
position to show by deed its disgust at what is happening in Uganda
 147

today by making it unlawful to import Ugandan coffee into this

country .
President Carter has often declared that human rights is one of the
main cornerstones of his foreign policy. Members of this committee
should remember that it is U.S. dollars, the proceeds of the
saleof Ugandan coffee, that have given Idi Amin his sinews of unre
lentless war against the unarmed civilian population of Uganda. Since
it is this country that is thechief customer of Ugandan coffee, it can be
said that this country is aiding and abetting Idi Amin in the ongoing
genocide he is committing every day in Uganda.
Some people think that trade embargoes of this kind hurt innocent
victims rather than the perpetrators of the crimes. It is argued that the
Ugandan peasant farmerswould suffer more and not Idi Amin and
his privileged troops. The truth of the matter is that the Ugandan
peasant cannot suffer more than he is sufferingalready. Coffee isbought
and exported by the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board. The Govern
ment agencies established by statute are a sole monopoly on coffee. All
members of the board are appointed by Idi Amin and accountable to
Idi Amin alone .
Since he abolished parliament in which the ministers administering
all Government agencies used to be accountable, it is Idi Amin and
nobody else who decides how the proceeds of coffee should be used . No
wonder they end up buying military hardware from the Soviet Union
and paying off Idi Amin's agents here and inother countries. While
some money is used to buy luxury goods and liquor for his troops, a
substantial amount is salted away in secret bank accounts in
Switzerland .
The lot of the Ugandan peasants has not changed a single bit since
the boom prices paid for Ugandan coffee. Life in the villages continues
to be more miserable than it has ever been with staggering shortages of
essential goods such as salt, sugar, washing soap , and the like.
Some of the peasants out of desperation tie uptheir coffee in small
bundles and take it across the border into Kenya but this again is met
by violence by Idi Amin's troops because it is only the army officers
who have the monopoly to smuggling. They themselves can smuggle
in and out of the country but nobody else should smuggle.
Some people argue that bills of this kind are always broken, that
businessmen will always find loopholes to surmount them . My answer
is so be it, let the businessmen risk the penalties for breaking the law
of the land, but let the conscience of the American people be free for
having stood up against tyranny by Congress using the legitimate
tool of legislation to register its stand for humanrights of their
fellow human beingsin Uganda. We do not expect the United States
to land Marines inEntebbe to fight against Idi Amin but we expect
the people of this great democracy to show their solidarity with us
in our stand against the most wicked and repressive regime in the
world today.
To me American businessmen who would like to continue doing
business with Idi Amin are merchants of death , more concerned with
their bank balance than with human misery, and do not represent the
true feelings of the American people as a whole. I am sure the people
 148

of this country would not mind paying 1 or 2 cents more for their cup
of coffee if Congress took the lead .
It is on record that the association of American coffee importers
[the National Coffee Association ] is ready and willing to follow the
leadership of Congress and the administration if only they were to
lead. What is happening in Uganda todayis no more an internal
affair of Ugandathan what took place in Hitler's Germany before
World War II.
Some people feel that it would be improper to pick out Idi Amin
fromamong all the repressive leaders the world over as an object of
U.S. legislation. They go on to argue that since Uganda is an African
country the packageought to include countries such as Rhodesia and
the Republic of South Africa. I submit that using such arguments
misses the point and only serves to confuse the issues. In Rhodesia one
is dealing with acountry whose de facto leaders committed treason by
their unilateral declaration of independence, thus runningaway with
a territory of Her Majesty the Queen of Britain. They have never
been recognized as truly independent by a single civilized nation in
the world . It is therefore submitted that it would be very wrong to
compare Rhodesia with Uganda which is an independent sovereign
nation with a seat in the United Nations. The comparison with South
Africa is equally unfortunate because it is an independent nation
where a minority white regime is engaged in an ongoing violation
of human rights of the majority ofits people. The majority, namely
the Africans, have no say in the political life of the country. This is
not the case in Uganda.
I would like to say some supporters of Idi Amin in this country
suffer from what I would call an ignorance syndrome which makes
them see Idi Amin only through the mirror of color discrimination and
makes them thinkthat the predominantly white owned and managed
Western press and media picks on Idi Amin because it looks at him
wth envy as a great African leader whose character ought to be
assassinated and thus hasten hisdown fall. They go on to suggest
that any black person opposing Idi Amin is aa traitor to the people of
the black race. My reply to such people is that their way of thinking
is a most undeserved insult to the intelligence of the people of Uganda
in particular and to all Africans in general.
Freedom fighters in Rhodesia have declared that what Idi Amin
is doing in Uganda is a setback to their struggle. Prominent African
leaders such as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania ;
Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia ; Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Pres
ident of Kenya ; Tolbert, President of Liberia ; Jawara, President
of Gambia ; Seretse Khama, President of Botswana and others have
all loudly condemned Idi Amin. Some of us are mature enough
to realize that somebody is not necessarily bad because he is white,
neither is he necessarily good because he is black. Evil is evil and
ought to be recognized for what it is and condemnedaccordingly.
Another argument against a trade embargo by the United States
is that this country should not act alone but should only act after
African countries through the Organization of African Unity have
taken affirmative action against Uganda or the United Nations has
passed a resolution as it did in the case of Rhodesian chrome. If
 149

Rhodesian chrome is to be cited as an example, it has no merit

because the United States until recently refused to honor the U.N.
resolution and, in fact,passed legislation permitting the importation
of Rhodesian chrome although recentlythat legislation was repealed.
Again in the case of Duba, the United States acted on its own initia
tive. All member states of the Organization of American States
did not first decide on affirmative action against Cuba before this
country took action. Even after it had taken action, countries like
Mexico refused to support the United States.
Another argument is that Idi Amin may make the lives of some
240 American missionaries still working in Uganda intolerable. I
fail to see merit in such argument. I shudder to think that this
great country can base its foreign policy on 240 of its nationals who
refused to follow the advice of the U.S. Ambassador to Uganda
4 years ago and chose to remain in thecountry.
Another argument is to the effect that relations of the United States
with black Africa countries would go sour if this country were to take
such action against Idi Amin's regime. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. This kind of action would, in fact, enhance the prestige of
the United States throughout black Africa. For one thing, most black
African leaders in east and central Africa - countries such as Tan
zania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana - refused to send delegations
to the OAU summit held in Uganda in 1975 under the chairmanship
of Idi Amin . To them Idi Amin is a great embarrassment.
As far as I can judge, the real reasons why some quarters do not
support the embargo is that where Africa is concerned the policy of
the State Department is still tied to the apron strings of British
African policy, the reason being that Britainas a trusted ally of this
country and former colonial power in Uganda knows Uganda better.
Since Britain is not taking action,it would be wrong for this country
to take unilateral action. After all, Idi Amin is a savage, murdering
other savages like him . Why should anyone take action when the
signals are that he will not harm any more British, Americans, or
other nationals of the civilized countries of Europe.
Added to this is that since Idi Amin does not espouse any political
ideology, particularly communism , he ought to remain supreme in
Uganda no matter how many Ugandans he murders. The big powers
have their hands full of problems on the horn of Africa , that is,
Somalia and Ethiopia, andare not willing to disturb the calm waters
of Uganda howeverdirty those waters may be.
There is no evidence to convince us that the refusal of the United
States to stand up and be counted in the cause of human rights in
Uganda will stop the war between Ethiopia and Somalia or will make
Somalia relinquish her claim to the whole of the northern province
of Kenya. The national flag of Somalia will still have its five stars to
indicate what has come to be known as Greater Somalia.
We cannot shut our eyes to the sons and daughters of Uganda who
have been brutally murdered by Idi Amin . Prominent among them
are Archbishop Janami Luwum , Anglican Archbishop of Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Mboga Zaire who was murdered together with
two of Idi Amin's cabinet ministers last February.
 150

Idi Amin like his friend Colonel Gaddafi, President of Libya, thinks
that he has a mission from God, with whom he talks on first name
terms, in his dreams to make Uganda a Muslim State. He has there
fore embarked on a big programof liquidating all leading Christians.
In a country such as Uganda where Christians form almost 90 per
cent of the entire population, the consequences of the program are too
terrible to contemplate.
The fear that if the bill is passed that Idi Amin would continue to
function because of Arab oil dollars from fanatics like Colonel Gad
dafi of Libya is without foundation because once Gaddafi realizes that
he is the only donor left he will certainly not continue alone for a long
time. The more moderate Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Ku
wait I am told are now moving very cautiously with their aid program
to Idi Amin because they have now come to realize how unreliable
Idi Amin is.
Finally, I appeal to Congress to rise up to the occasion and dis
charge a great moral obligation to their fellow human beings in
Uganda by passing this most important piece of legislation . Let us
remind ourselvesof the words of Franklin and Jefferson engraved on
a monument inVirginia : “ Opposition to atyrant is obedience to God .”
Mr. Diggs. Thankyou very much, Mr. Binaisa.
It is anticipated that we might have a vote in about a half hour so
I would like to ask Ambassador Melady to come forward so that you ,
Mr. Binaisa, and he might answer questions before that votebegan.
I am going to yield tothe gentleman from Washington, Mr. Bonker.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Melady, I appreciate your appearance before the subcommittees.
Mr. Binaisa, thank you.
You were the last Ambassador to Uganda as you pointed out in your
testimony so that you were involved in the closing down of the
Embassy in that country.
Mr. MELADY. Yes.
Mr. BONKER. And yet we have never really successfully closed the
Uganda Embassy here in the Capital. Do you feel that we should make
the diplomatic break with Uganda complete ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes. When we closed our embassy in Kampala we
didn't break relations. I feel that it is unfortunate we have allowed
the Uganda diplomatic mission to remain the charge d'affaires for
two basic reasons and one is because of the symbolism of that charge
d'affaires as representative of the chief of stateand I think the evi
dence is quite clear as to who he is .History can documentcases where
there have been previous chiefs of state who for overriding reasons
have been made an exception. I see no reason for this exception in the
case of Uganda. More recently in the last 2 years the exiles allege
I don't have any concrete, definite information but they allege — that
as a result of the charge d'affaires being here he sends information
back to Uganda about their actions and subjects their relations to
torture anddeath .
I think it is unfortunate that the U.S. Government is facilitating
that if the allegation is anything but true. I am pretty busy running
a university. I cannot check all of these things out but I have heard
it from a number of responsible and respectable Ugandans.
 151

Mr. BONKER. I appreciate your comments on that. I have introduced

a bill that is a little more extensive than Congressman Pease's that
deals with an export ban or a ban on the import of coffee from Uganda
and I think that is necessary legislation. My bill is more comprehen
sive in that it will result in the closure of the embassy here and also to
discontinue the indirect training of Ugandans who are coming here
under various visas to receive training, and many of them allegedly
are with the State Research Bureau and that confirms something which
you just offered .
The State Department's response to this legislation is their concern
about the 200 or so U.S. missionaries that are located in that country
and that really places them in aa moral dilemma about how to approach
this overall problem . How would you respond if we were to take
action that would ultimately result in the endangering of those lives ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes, I have thought about that considerably. I know a
number of missionaries that are still there . One of my last acts was to
get around the country of Uganda and under instructions from the
U.S. Government to advise them that it would be in their interest to
leave and to say it in various ways and that final time I was called
back in consultations in the spring of 1973, summer of 1973, under the
instructions of the Assistant Secretary of State. I called upon each
religious order or group and went to see the superiors and Iacquainted
each and every one about the danger, a good possibility they should
leave. As a result of that the number dropped from a little over a
thousand to this figure of around 200.
I know why they have stayed. They have stayed for very good rea
sons. I can recall one group who said to me : “Yes, you are right but
if we leave, the school closes. We have an obligation to the Ugandan
people.” So from a moral obligation I respect the fact they made that
decision . I cannot imagine any of them would want their presence to
compromise our posture and the necessity for a great power to speak
courageously and to take decisive action . I certainly recommend
nothing which would be haphazard.
I know the tensions that existed last year in February when Idi
Amin threatened the 200 Americans who were there but I think his
tory will not be very kind to us if we don't take decisive action. I
would urge again that despite the real moral dilemma for those mis
sionaries who operate the hospitals, the schools and so forth that at
this point I would think they ought to consider leaving. If they do
stay , they must be prepared to take the brunt that may occur from
a brutal tyrant.
We must say asa final point, Congressman , that in writing the sec
ond book my wife and I tried to document the number of white
people, if I can put it that way, who have been either killed directly
or indirectly under Amin's regime. We never really got the number
above 14. There were 16 or 17, it was certainly under two dozen as
opposed to a large number.
Mr. BONKER . Mr. Binaisa, I have two questions of you. The State
Department tells us that the economic boycott will have minimal
effect. You mention in your testimony that if we pass this legislation
there will be an uprising against Idi Amin in Uganda. It seems to me
if there is potential for an uprising in that country that it would exist
 152

irrespective of whether we pass legislation. What ultimate effect would

that have ?
The second question is that if Idi Amin has a hit list, you would
probably have a proper place on it. Have you been intimidated or
threatened since you have been in this country or have you known of
agents that are around who pose some danger for you ?
Mr. BINAISA. If I may answer that first , I live with that kind of
thing and I have been living with it since I came to the United States
but I think I owe duty to my country which I served so well for 5
years.
Mr. BUNKER. Let me be a little more specific. One of the concerns I
have is that possibly by maintaining in this country the Ugandan
Embassy, and by indirectly training some Ugandans, peoplein the
Embassy are harassing Ugandan exiles.
Mr. BINAISA. Of course .
Mr. BONKER. Now have you had any specific threats on your life?
Mr. BINASA. Myself only, I was only told of one once but directly
nobody has ever come to me with any direct threat. If I may add on
to that, as you know yourself very well that in international law an
envoy from a foreign country isfirst and foremost a representative of
the head of state who accredits him to that particular country. I for
one don't see anylogic in the head of state, a man like Idi Amin, should
be elevated to that kind of elevation of accrediting envoys to this
country because as you know sometimes people say that the State
Department would like to have a person of that kind in order to re
late to him or to keep the channels of communications open . But if you
remember the last incident in Kampala was the Saudi Arabia Am
bassador to Kampala, Uganda, who intervened on behalf of the 240
Americans. It was not the Uganda Charge d'Affaires who intervened
because Saudi Arabia at the time had a lot of influence on Amin and
therefore Amin released the people, he did not carry out his program .
But on the other hand, I didn't say in my written testimony that
there would be an uprising. All I said, if you got me correctly, was
that we do not expect the United States to send Marines to Entebbe but
we do expect theUnited States to do something which they can legiti
mately do withintheir own power given to themby Congress — I mean
-

powers given to Congress by the Constitution of this country. That is

all I amsaying
Mr. BONKER. Ambassador, just briefly have you or your wife ever
been threatened as a result of your service in Uganda ?
Mr. Melady. We have received threats. We don't know who they
are from . They have been on the phone and we have had to go to
such things as an unlisted number and to take other precautions but I
cannot come here and say who they are from . They have gone through
various periods. They were especially heavy in the fall up to around
Christmastime.
Mr. BONKER. Is this your book ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes.
Mr. BONKER. How are sales coming ?
Mr. MELADY. Well, the first edition I understand has been sold ; it
is in the second edition.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you , Mr. Chairman .
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Mr. Diggs. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN . Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
Ambassador Melady, inyour statement you indicate that you ap
plaud the action of the United Nations which was taken against
South Africa. O ,f course as we know, the action last fall initiated by
the Security Council relates only to arms sales. Would you approve of
further action by the Security Council along the lines of placing a
trade embargo against South Africa ?
Mr. MELAdy. I would say I would advocate doing that which is ef
fective. When I taught international trade, and I did teach the subject,
I am a free trade person — I mean that is my own thinking. I think
until about 1 year ago it was only the research that came up on the
importance of coffee to the Uganda economy and the way Amin con
trolled the money and it was not getting back to the people, approxi
mately $ 250 million going to the Special Fund and so forth.
I feel that an effective embargo could be definitely a major blow to
his source of money which is directly related to his ability to kill peo
ple. Previously in history embargoes,that is, against Franco, the thing
against Japan in the last years before World War II and more re
cently with regard to Rhodesia have not been that effective. The doc
trine of apartheid is an evil doctrine contradictory to our belief,it is
morally wrong and something must be done about it. Whether it
should be an embargo I am not prepared to say. I will applaud any
actions that will end that evil doctrine.
Mr.WHALEN, Mr. Binaisa, you state on page 1 that you fearlessly
defended the rightsof two Americans who were brutally murdered by
Idi Amin's troops. Would one of those be Mr. Stroh who was a re
porterfor the Washington Star ?
Mr. Binaisa. That is true. I appeared for 5 weeks in a judicial com
mission of inquiry representing Mr. Stroh who had a wife and two
children and after the inquiry he judged the report as castigating the
Uganda army for having been responsible. I filed suit to recover dam
ages for loss of dependency for the widow and I did recover .
Mr. WHALEN. In the Ugandan courts?
Mr. BINAISA. Yes. I did recover in an out of court settlement because
at that time Idi Amin was amenable to advice given to him by his law
officers and the publicity had already been so damaging to Uganda as
a country, the fact of the murders of two men, Nicholas Stroh, Jr.,
and Sedelwho was kind of an associate professor at our university in
political science, he thought it was time to make amends and they
made an out of court settlement.
Mr. WHALEN . Has it been determined that Idi Amin himself or
dered the execution of Mr. Stroh and his companion ?
Mr. BINAISA. From the evidence that wenton it was not determined
that way but there was evidence during that four week inquiry to show
that somebody received a message over the telephone between Kam
pala and Burundi to the effect that the lives of those two Americans
were to be done away with. You remember the story how they were
killed. The car was burned. They were buried first in a very shallow
grave and then somebody went and exhumed the bodies and they
burned the bodies and then they didn't know what to do with the car,
the carcass of the car. They took it some 180 miles from the scene and
 154

dropped in in a deep ravine where we found it. I was one of the party
that found that car.
Mr. WHALEN . Would both of our witnesses agree that Idi Amin's
government is guilty of genocide in Uganda ?
Mr. BINAISA. Detinitely; I dofully agree on this as I think, Congress
man, this is the main important thing. Whatever one may say, all other
governments which are repressive, there is no government to my knowl
edge which is bent on doing genocide of innocent unarmed civilians.
Mr. MELADY. Definitely ; he has approved genocide, he is practicing
it against his own people.
Mr. WHALEN . I think, Mr. Binaisa, you anticipated me. He approved
genocide, Hitler approved genocide. Would you not agree this far
exceeds any other kinds of human rights violations throughout the
world ?
Mr. BINAISA . That is my view because I have never seen acountry
where the civilians are sosubdued . There is not a single civilian up
rising which has been reported eversince April 25, 1971, and yet now
you ask us why is it that genocide still continues.
Mr. WHALEN . You were a member of Mr. Obote's government.
Mr. BINAISA. Yes.
Mr. WHALEN. I was in Uganda the day that he left for Singapore,
never to return . Would you give us a brief description of the civil
rights that existed, or perhaps didn't exist, under Milton Obote ?
Mr. Binaisa. Congressman, you touch ona touchy point because that
one was the exact reason why I had to resign. As Attorney General I
had been working from 1962until 1967 — the cabinet in 1966 I think it
was when they thought just out of the blue to enact a law called the
preventive detention bill. As Attorney General I administered the law,
it would have been my duty to pilot the bill through parliament. I
could not find myself doing that and that is why I resigned.
Otherwise, human rights themselves were really eroded in Obote's
time, there is no question about that, because at thetime Idi Amin took
over there were politicial detainees in the central prison and Amin ,
1 of the 18 points he gave when he took over was that he does not
believe in the past harsh treatment of arrestinganddetaining people
without trial for up to 5 years. This is why he ordered the release ofall
the political detainees who included Benedicto Kiwanuka who after
being released was appointed by Amin himself to be Chief Justice of
Uganda who had been the first Prime Minister during the time of our
internal self- government and he failed in the elections so Obote won
the elections and Kiwanuka is still leader of the Democratic Party.
Mr. WHALEN . I read Professor Mazrui's testimony and obviously he
will be given a chance later to respond to the questions submitted to
him but he did indicate that there has been a. breakdown in the society
in Uganda. Would you agree with that assessment ? Would you agree
that this was the course that was being followed at the time that Obote
left ?
Mr. BINAISA. No ; when Obote left, Obote had just clamped down
civil liberties by arresting and detaining those people he feared as his
political opponents but there was no complete breakdown of law and
order. What Obote did, which I think is prominent among other
things, was that he nationalized, he announced publicly that he was
 155

moving to theleft without giving anyone any chance at all, no notice

whatsoever. He just announced in a big football stadium that every
body was moving to the left and from thatday onall the workers in
thebus company were going to own the buses. I know that is so,
political rhetoric.
Mr. WHALEN . Yet the minorities were permitted to move freely in
Uganda in his government?
Mr. BINAISA.Definitely .
Mr. WHALEN . Thank you.
Thank you , Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you . Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Melady, did you have any prior diplomatic experience
prior tothe time you served in Uganda and Burundi?
Mr. MELADY. No.
Mr. SOLARZ. Who appointed you to the post ?
Mr. MELADY. President Nixon .
Mr. SOLARZ. What had your previous experience been ?
Mr. MELADY. I am a political scientist who taught political science,
specialized in Africa, wrote books on Africa, interracial relations. Í
was teaching at Seton Hall at thetime of my appointment.
Mr. Solarz. During the time that you were Ambassador in Uganda,
I gather these murders were going on .
Mr. MELADY. I beg your pardon ?
Mr. SOLARZ. I gather these killings were going on.
Mr. MELADY . Yes.
Mr. SOLARZ. And you must have been aware of them . Would you
tell us what you were saying in your cables to the Department in
terms of what you thought we should be doing about them, if
anything ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes ; I arrived there I think it was the day after July
4or July 5 and the first incident that concerned me was the expulsion
of the Asians. At that time I felt that there was a danger of a real
physical harm, including death , of a good number of Asians and I
submitted a variety of cables on that and suggested a variety of causes
of action to the U.S. Government and around the same time was the
statement of Amin concerning Hitler in which I got involved and
submitted various statements.
The first proof or establishment of deaths while I was there was
always circulated with rumors and what had happened was in mid
September and early October 1972. At the time of the invasion it was
also charged that the Americans and Germans were participating in
it and as a result of that a good number of Americans were arrested
and Germans. I was very busy at the time trying to get Americans
out of jail and during that time it became well established that a large
number of Ugandans, prominent Ugandans, had disappeared. I felt at
that time that Amin took advantage of the invasion and arranged for
the disappearance and liquidation of these Ugandans and I asked
permission to return to Washington to discuss that with the Depart
ment of State. I received that permission.
I think I returned in mid -October and I suggested a change in
my instructions at that time. I felt we were, in fact , dealing with

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 156

somethingmore than a dictator, than a brutal tyrant, and I sug

gested or I recommended then that we arrange for the phased with
drawal of the United States over a 6- to 9 -month period and that
I warn the Americans privately about the necessity of leaving.
Mr. SOLARZ. Other than recommending a kind of incremental dis
association of ourselves from the Ugandan Government, did you
recommend any positive actions such as an embargo on the Ugandan
goods which might conceivably have facilitated Amin's removal?
Mr. MELADY. No; I didn't recommend an embargo of U.S.-goods. I
did recommend the following: That as soon as we arranged for the
withdrawal of the Americans that we issue a public statement giving
the reasons for closing the embassy and in my final letter to the Secre
tary I recommended that he was a murderer, that he was engaging in
genocide and that we wouldnot have anything to do with them . The
recommendaiton was not followed. Indeed the official position given
was that it was dangerous for Americans which was true andthat
severaltelegrams to the U.S. Government were insulting.
Mr. SOLARZ. Let me just say I find your testimony tobe remarkably
refreshing and a welcome contrast to the testimony of some of the
people who have succeeded you in the Department with responsibilities
for Uganda. I don't know why it is that professional diplomatsare
incapable of recognizing the moral character of some of these politi
cal people, but this is quite essentially a moral challenge to our
country. My only regret really is that in 1938, as you very appropri
ately pointed out in your testimony, we failed to take the kind of
action we might have taken then which even if it would not have
resulted in the removal of Hitler might at least have restored the
moral credentials of our own country .
Whether or not this legislation would succeed in its objective
is one question, but there is no doubt that if it were to pass at least
we could hold our heads up and say that we had done what we
reasonably might be expected to do. On that point I would like to
ask both of you this question.
You both seem to feel that there is a reasonably good possibility
that the passage of this proposal would effectuate the removal of
Amin, and I would like to know on what basis you think that is
the case .
We have beentold, for example, that our imports constitute about
33 percent or a third of the sales of Ugandan coffee. Presumably they
would be able to find purchasers elsewhere. It is impossible, I gather,
to identify Ugandan coffee compared to other coffees so that it would
not be difficult for Uganda to sell the coffee to third parties who inturn
would sell it to us masqueraded as some other kind of coffee. Given
these considerations, what reason do we have to believe that this
would, in fact, make a difference or is it simply an exercise in moral
virtues, as it were ?
I wish both of you would answer.
Mr. MELAdy. Let me say that I originally had some question about
it. It was only when I saw the income of Idi Amin's government, and
second my wife and I went to London right after Christmas to see
what we could do with the private British people there and because
of our concerns.
 157

I would say that we are the major power. If we do this, we can

generate energies and England can be a people’s issue. Since this
book is out I get letters from various parts of the world about people
in Germany, people in Holland doing the same thing. We have to be
sure that we take every step to really keep the coffee out of here.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think there is a real possibility then that if we
took the first step that other countries might be persuaded to follow ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes.
Mr. BINAISA. I have to think what my friend Tom Melady says. I
fully agree with him and I would like to add that the steps we are
proposing are only meant to create a kind of situation within the coun
try. People who start asking themselves questions even within the
Armed Forces themselves, they would know that Idi Amin is losing
credibility ; he would not be able to stand again publicly in his arro
gant manner as when he went in the Watergate days advisingNixon,
advising Lord Snowden , andso on and so forth. They would have to
think hard and have a second look at themselves in the Army.
Mr. Solarz. One final question, Mr. Chairman .
In precisely these terms, do you think that there is a real possibility
that even if the embargo turned out to be a flop in terms of reducing
the sales of Ugandan coffee so that it didn't cost Amin any money
because they either sold it elsewhere orthey diverted it through third
parties to the United States — do you think there is a real possibility
that the mere adoption of this embargo would send the signal to the
military or to other forces within Uganda that the United States was
clearlydisassociating itself from Amin and that this in and of itself
might somehow catalyze latent forces of potential resistance in
Uganda to take action on their own ?
Mr. BINASA. Oh, yes. That is the very purpose of this legislation as
I see it. It has such a terrific moral value which could be transformed
all of aa sudden into action by the people themselves. Itis so important.
I don'tknow why some Department doesn't see this. I don't know .
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman , you are going to continue the hearing, I
gather.
Mr. Diggs. Yes.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Derwinski.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Binaisa , you made the point that from the time Idi Amin took
over through the coup that he has maintained very rigid internal con
trol and there has been no insurrection . Is this because of the sheer
repression, efficiency of that repression, or what ? Why is the popula
tion so cowed to absolute inaction ?
Mr. BINAISA . My feeling, Congressman , isthat first of all in Uganda
the privilege of having firearmshas always been a privilege eversince
the colonial days of the British, and nobody could just go into the
shop or store and buy firearms. So you can say that practically nobody
in Uganda is armed except the army. Thatis No. 1.
No. 2, the people in Uganda from the history of the country is one
ofthe few African countries that has been knownfor obeying estab
lished authority for generations even before the British came. They
found us in 1862 with a world centralized government, and this is just
 158

inherent of the people, they are obedient to established authority, but

if you add to that repressive measures of the kind that Amin is meting
out to thepeople, then you can see that nobody can really succeed ex
cept about 10 or 12 cases of attempts have been made on Idi Amin's
life by individuals and they have not succeeded. That was individuals
or groups of two or three, that is all. There has never been really an
organized uprising of people within the country who rise up and do
something for themselves.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Then the so -called invasion of the Obote forces
failed because of insufficient planning and the facts that perhaps Mr.
Obote himself isn't that popular in Uganda ?
Mr. BINAISA. It was very badly conceived to begin with. Whoever
planned it didn't know thesimplestthing about guerrilla warfare be
cause they moved in and they didn't even speak the language of the
area in which they arrived. I mean whenthey first gotinto Uganda,
they could not even speak the language. They were easily spotted by
the localpeasants who reported them to the local authorities, and those
who came with arms were easily surrounded, so it was a military
fiasco of the first degree.
Mr. DERWINSKI . Now one other point. In your prepared testimony,
you made a reference to the fact that 90 percent of the people are
Christian and yet Amin is carrying out what seems to be an elimina
tion of peoplebecause of religion. You almost went so far as to say
that Amin and his 10 percentof the population could almost wipe out
the other 90 percent.Would you be thatpessimistic ?
Mr. Binaisa. Well, not only that but it is just a coincidence, if you
may call it that, that both Christianity and development in this case
in Uganda go hand in hand, that in a sense because of the work done
by missionaries in Uganda it was mainly the Christians who also got
the economic development or who enjoyed the fruits of development,
and now the Muslims were not so well educated because no Muslim
missionary was interested in the general kind of education. So I am
not suggesting that he has 10 percent, he has got some people who are
working for him within the 90 percent, among the 90percent. Hehas
got money and from this country alone something like $400 million
from 1975 generally, so he hasgot a lot.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Dr. Melady, you told us that one of your last ac
tions as Ambassador was to warn the heads of various religious en
tities to leave the country, if possible. Of those that remained, is it
possible that in addition to clergymen who are motivated by their de
sire to serve, there might be some who for parctical purposes are
hostages ?
Mr. MELADY. I have no evidence of that. I do have clear evidence
that those who stayed, what they told me : “We believe everything is
right. This is tyranny but we have this little hospital and it is the
only hospital here.” It is the typical story. “ We have this school but it
has been closed.” When I spoke to their superiors, both Catholic and
Protestant, in this country they, too, repeated that and thev were not
going to force them. It was necessary for them to stay ; they had a
moral obligation to stay to help the people .
Mr. DERWINSKI. As a member of the congressional group that trav
eled to Africa in 1966, I recall that at the time there wasquite a Ca
nadian and British missionary presence in Uganda.
 159

Mr. MELADY. Yes.

Dr. DERWINSKI. Now have they by and large left or have they
remained
Mr. MELADY. I don't have the figures, but they have been reduced
significantly in number. Ours dropped from about 1,100 to 200. The
Canadians dropped significantly and the British very significantly.
Mr. BINASIA . 500 .
Mr. DERWINSKI. One last point, Doctor. You mentioned you were
there as Ambassador when Amin expelled theAsians who were basi
cally the shopkeepers and the entrepreneurs. What overall effect did
this have on the economy ? Were they in any way able to fill the gap
created, or how did you assess the economic impact ?
Mr. MELADY. Let's say the economy now is in shambles from the
standpoint of it averaging the people, and the sudden disrupture of the
middle class was one of the causes.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman , if I may continue.
Dr. Mazrui who will follow you gentlemen in his official statement
raises the question of whether or not the alternative to Amin istotal
anarchy. In other words, he obviously disavows the tyranny, he is op
posed to the policies of Amin , but he raises the question of whether the
alternative is the total breakdown of government and society. Would
you care to address yourselves to that ?
Mr. BINAISA. Congressman, I don't think so because the anarchy is
already there. If you mean by anarchy the kind of behavior of any
person who takes advantage of the breakdown of the usual norms of
behavior and he goes and does his own thing say 50 or 100 miles from
the city,that is already there. What I am saying is that Idon't think
there will ever be anyone in Uganda after Åmin who will be able to
function at the same level on the international plane or on the inter
national plane as Amin . I very much doubt it .
Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you feelthe revulsion against him would be so
great that a successor would be bound to bring back or restore ele
ments of human rights that have been wiped out ?
Mr. BINAISA. I think the people of all tribes, of all faiths, have
learned such abig lesson from the Amin reign of terror that nothing
of the kind will ever arise like Amin again . However, both members
who used to be members of our opposition party have told me, those
who managed to escape, they said, “ We have now learned our lesson .”
They are sure that a new generation maybe will never have that. I
don't think so.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Doctor Melady.
Mr. MELADY.Yes; I regard Amin as another Hitler, I cannot imagine
anything worse than Hitler or Amin. The Freedom House I think lists
62 countries or 67 that are authoritarian and on the scale of 1 to 10 in
the form of violating some form of very strict definition of human
rights, but of those 67 when you get down to chiefs of state practicing
genocide, advocating and approving it, we only come to one with the
possible record . I haven't any direct evidence on Obote's which was
pretty bad but not equaling this, and then in Kampala where it seems
to be more ofa committee that isdoing it.
So I would say that as a political scientist that we could conclude
that we might have an authoritarian government and not have the
 160

opposition party privileges that we have in this country but which are
not prevalent in the majority of countries, but I cannot see anything as
bad as what we currently have.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diggs. I have a general question that I would like to ask Profes
sor Mazrui before he testifies. As all three of you gentlemen know ,
there was a resolution before the African Subcommittee dealing with
South Africa. In its original form it not only registered a protest
against the violation of human rights in that country, asthis does, but
it also recommended sanctions against that Government. Only one -half
of that proposition was reported outof the subcommittee : the half that
registered protest. Rather than urging specific sanctions, the resolu
tion merely urged the President to take whatever steps he felt was con
sistent with the protest against the violation of human rights in that
country.
The question is, how can we report a resolution out of this committee
on Uganda ? As indicated by Mr. Bonker, his resolution is very com
prehensive, it goes further than the Pease proposition. How can we
report a resolution out of this committee that is different from the one
that was reported out on South Africa ?
I raise this question not because I have a problem with voting out a
resolution on Uganda that deals with sanctions per se as evidence of
our feelings about this whole matter. I am, however, interested in
knowing how you differentiate between human rights violations in
South Africa on the one hand, and Uganda on the other .
Ambassador Melady and Mr. Banaisa have referred to Idi Amin as
Hitler. As all three of you know, the head of state of South Africa,
John Vorster, was detained under house arrest during World War II
because he was for Hitler. Although John Vorster is not personally
engaged in directing physical violence in the same sense orto the same
extent as is Idi Amin , when we get into the questionof what is geno
cide can one differentiate between that occurring in South Africa and
that occurring in Uganda ?
Is genocideconfined to floating bodies up the Nile or does genocide
include subjecting an entire people, based purely on their physical
characteristics, to dehumanizing treatment? In South Africa the
uniqueness is that the genocide is based on race ; whereas in Uganda,
according to your testimony, Idi Amin has done it across the board.
Obviously, fewer white people have suffered than Africans. But at
least Amin has gone across the board ; he has not just picked white
people out, he has not picked out Asians, he has committed his
atrocities across the board .
I would like to get comments from the three of you on this, because
genocide, whetherUganadan or South African, must be at the heart,
in my view , of what is done by this committee in terms of this
resolution .
Mr. BINAISA. Mr. Chairman, this is obviously a difficult question be
cause particularly you have been a number of times to the Republic of ,
South Africa . I first read about you a long time ago when I was study
ing in Uganda. All ofus in blackAfrica,particularly we are opposed
to what is happening in South Africa andalso we got so manypeople
 los
ar
161

all over the world who are opposed, including this country, about what
is happening in South Africa.
There is a distinction and the distinction in my view is this : that
very foolishly the British in the South African Act of 1910 legally
gave South Africa power, handed over power to a minority govern
ment and ever since that day — in those days they had people like
General Smutz who were not so extreme but it was on that basis that
the African was their minority, took power and were dedicated
and committed to this apartheid system of government. I think that is
the only distinction.
But on the other hand there is no difference whatsoever for where
repression and gross violations of human rights are concerned, that
there is a difference between what is happening in Uganda for that
matter. You can even see Equatorial Guinea and the central Africa
empire and South Africa . I agree there is no difference at all.
The question as far as we are concerned , Mr. Chairman , is that here
you have a country that got its independence and was governed on a
kind of parliamentary democracy system and we came to be under the
dictator who won power by force of arms and who soon afterward de
clared that among his 18 points he would hold elections which he never
did. His response to that announcement was to declare himself Presi
dent for life.
Now I think that distinction lies there, that there is no way inthe
case of Uganda — there is no way that you are resigned to a situation
-

where there will never be an election of any kindat all because the
head of state is already President for iife. I think within that context
I would not like to go into the other matter, Mr. Chairman, which you
raised alia the question of the resolution on South Africa being am
putated and as you said only one-half of it going ahead because I don't
know much aboutit but I think I could support - I mean I support
Uganda because Uganda is an independent state which was not
granted the independence in a foolish way. The independence was
granted to us through democratic means. The independence was
granted to us — we the majority, we the Africans of Uganda — which
was not the case in South Africa in 1910.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Ambassador, would you care to comment ?
Mr. MELADY. I think I know the legislation you are speaking ofor
rather the program . We have several great evils in the world
one, Amin'sregime and secondly the reference to apartheid.. We have
to fight both of them . I think the strategy of fighting perhaps varies.
The commitment must be there for both . I think I have indicated
to you that it was only last summer that I sort of changed my mind
on the coffee thing. I was really not quite sure. I thought perhaps
there was some way to get that money. The peasants were getting
some. I see now there is adirect relationship between the coffee income
and keeping this man in power.
I think we need another unified approach to apartheid . In South
Africa there are two great evils that have to be fought. We see this
rather clearly. Maybebecause I feel some responsibilities as the last
Ambassador there, I would be saddened if because of this there seemed
to be general agreement on principle or if some progress got held up
because of various inter other political situations.
 162

I think we must speak forcefully. I think the strategy may vary

greatly. Idon't know all the legislation that you refer to but I covered
the New York versions of it so to speak. I would say I recommend
that the committee proceed with this. We must proceed with the
other. We have done a few things in the past that have not been
sufficient in regard to South Africa .
Mr. Diggs. Would you be in favor of sanctions against this apply
ing to South Africa also ? Would you be in favor of an amendment
that would include South Africa under the proviso calling for
sanctions ?
Mr. MELADY. I would be in favor of anything which would help
to bring about a change in the South African situation. Whether
an embargo on trade and so forth would do that I am not sure because
historically it has not been successful. That is why I was not quite
sure in the case of Uganda, Congressman, until I saw the relation be
tween the money on the oneproduct and the regime.
Mr. Diggs. Well, that is an interesting diplomatic dance, I am
afraid . That is all I can say, and I do say thatrespectfully,
You say that you are interested in such protests on Uganda as those
we made on South Africa which urged the President to take what
ever steps necessary to register our concern . Yet you are here in
support of the resolution before this committee which calls for a
pretty comprehensive program . It calls for shutting down the em
bassy, and it calls for traderestrictions.
We have been calling for deemphasizing ourdiplomatic missions in
Pretoria for years andnobody has said a word.Nobody has come up
here and appeared before the committee and supported that.
Mr. Diggs. I really have not gotten an answer out of witnesses that
to me really comes to grips with this kind of aa dilemma. People under
stand this thing conceptually but when it gets right down to it they
seem to put South Africa in a different category. They are not willing
to talk about shutting down the embassies and taking control as we
have already done in Uganda.
We talk abouteconomicsanctions against coffee in Uganda but they
somehow are not prepared to talk about economic sanctions as it re
lates to South Africa .
Will the gentleman from Washington proceed in my absence.
You havespecific questions for these gentlemen ?
Mr. PEASE. And you want to wait on Mr. Mazrui's testimony.
Mr. Diggs. Yes, I would like to be present when he renders his
testimony. I will be right back.
Mr. PEASE. I will keep going.
Mr. Diggs. Fine.
Mr. PEASE (presiding ]. Let me first do a couple of things that I
wanted to do administratively having gotten permission of the chair
man to do so .
Congressmen Derwinski, Lagomarsino, and Dornan have state
ments on the bill which they wish entered into the record. So without
objection — I see no objection — we will enter them into the record at
this point.
[ The prepared statements of Congressman Derwinski, Lagomar
sino, and Dornan follow :]
 163

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST UGANDA

For some inexplicable reason , the deplorable human

rights situation in Uganda continues to be ignored by
many in Congress and the international community . This

is especially startling in view of the fact that the

barbaric and ruthless actions of General Idi Amin have

been provoking worldwide media attention for some time

now .

As a member of the International Organizations

Subcommittee , I have been participating in a series of
hearings focusing upon the Ugandan human rights situation .
Testimony emerging from the inquiry indicates that as
many as 300,000 people may have been slaughtered by
General Amin and his equally savage henchmen .

What we are witnessing today in Uganda is genocide

on a scale so massive that many apparently cannot believe

it to be true . Believe me it is true , and to ignore this
 164

barbarism as we ignored the tribal genocide in Burundi

in 1972 calls into question our own morality and concern

for the most basic of human rights the right to life .

A number of Members seem to feel that there is

nothing besides issuing strong statements of disapproval
of General Amin's behavior that this country can
realistically do to stop the wanton carnage in Uganda .
Initially , I thought so too , but thanks to the creative

legislative efforts of our colleague , Mr. Pease , I now

think we can do something that may have a positive
impact on the internal situation in Uganda . Consequently ,
I have associated myself with his proposals .

Specifically , what Mr. Pease has done is introduce

three bills which , taken together , would establish a
trade ban against Uganda. Coffee is the bulwark of
the Ugandan economy . Almost 90 percent of Uganda's
export earnings come from that product . At least a third

of those earnings stem from U.S. coffee purchases valued

at better than $ 210 million . Consequently , the u.s. is

in a position to exert considerable economic leverage on
the Amin regime .
 165

Critics of Mr. Pease's legislation contend that a

U.S. trade embargo of Uganda will not have the desired
effect because Amin can easily find alternative markets
for his coffee . Maybe so , but I would like to think that

if the U.s. took the lead , others would quickly follow

suit . Congressman Pease points out that approximately
40 percent of Uganda's coffee export earnings are the
result of trade with such allies as France , West Germany ,
Japan , the Netherlands , and the United Kingdom . If they

joined the boycott , therefore , Amin's economy would be

disrupted so severely that the General would be forced

to face up to the harsh reality that his continuance

in power and Uganda's economic vitality are directly
linked to a marked improvement of the human rights picture .

Other opponents of Mr. Pease's proposals have

indicated that such legislative initiatives would set a

bad precedent and would be in violation of the free
trade principles we have recognized as a signatory to
the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs ( GATT ) . To

them , I respond that the precedent has already been

established . Special cases sometimes require special
 166

exceptions , and , in this regard , I remind my colleagues

that only last year Congress decided to ban the importa
tion of chrome from Rhodesia into the United States .

I could go on and on here and discuss extensively

the other reasons given for not banning trade with Uganda .
Suffice it to say , however , that although they are good
rationalizations for not doing anything , they all have a
hollow ring simply because they fail to take into account
the moral considerations that must now transcend all
others in our current relationship with Uganda . Mr. Pease's
legislative initiatives were motivated by those considera
tions and I strongly urge my colleagues to support them
as they represent the most effective means available for
bringing to an end the unbelievable atrocities presently
occurring in Uganda .
 167

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON . ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MR . CHAIRMAN , THE GENTLEMAN FROM OHIO , MR . PEASE ,

HAS INTRODUCED THREE PIECES OF LEGISLATION CONCERNING U.S.

TRADE RELATIONS WITH UGANDA WHICH I FEEL DESERVE SERIOUS

CONSIDERATION . ALTHOUGH I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG
SUPPORTER OF FREE TRADE , I BELIEVE THAT THE EXTRAORDINARY
SITUATION IN UGANDA JUSTIFIES THE PROPOSED MEASURES . GIVEN
THE IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE EXPORTS TO UGANDA'S ECONOMY AND
THE AMOUNT OF GREEN COFFEE WHICH THE U.S. IMPORTS FROM
UGANDA , A U.S. TRADE BOYCOTT OF UGANDA WOULD MOST CERTAINLY
HASTEN AMIN'S FALL FROM POWER .

THE REGIME OF TERROR , MURDER , AND GENOCIDE IN UGANDA

CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE . THE FLAGRANT ABUSES OF HUMAN ,
POLITICAL , AND CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED AND
WE ARE ALL WELL AWARE OF THE BRUTAL NATURE OF AMIN'S RULE .
SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT STALIN AND HITLER WOULD HAVE BEEN
PROUD OF IDI AMIN .

SOME EXPERTS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE PROPOSED TRADE BOYCOTT

WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE . PERHAPS IT WILL BE . HOWEVER , I BELIEVE

THAT THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION SERVES A BROADER PURPOSE THAT
GOES BEYOND DOLLARS AND CENTS . BY DRASTICALLY CURTAILING

OUR ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE AMIN REGIME , THE UNITED STATES
WOULD REAFFIRM TO THE WORLD ITS DEEP AND SINCERE CONCERN
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS . MANY OF THOSE WHO SUPPORTED THE BAN ON
IMPORTATION OF RHODESIAN CUIROME DID SO AS A GESTURE OF J.S.
 168

SUPPORT FOR MAJORITY RULE IN AFRICA . I SUPPORT THE PROPOSED

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST UGANDA IN THE HOPE THAT , NOT

ONLY WILL THIS ACTION SERVE AS A POTENTIAL CATALYST FOR

INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO END AMIN'S REIGN OF TERROR ,

BUT THAT IT WILL CONVEY TO ALL OUR CONCERN OVER THOSE NATIONS
WHO REFUSE TO IMPROVE THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION .

AS WITH ALMOST ANY COURSE OF ACTION , THE ECONOMIC

BOYCOTT OF UGANDA POSES POTENTIAL RISKS . HOWEVER , GIVEN
THE STRONG U.S. COMMITTMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS , IT WOULD BE
HYPOCRITICAL FOR AMERICA TO CONTINUE THE VERY ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP WHICH ALLOWS IDI AMIN'S REGIME TO EXIST . THE

SITUATION IN UGANDA HAS DETERIORATED TO THE POINT WHERE

IT CAN ONLY GET BETTER . I FEEL THAT A COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL
BOYCOTT OF UGANDA , BEGINNING WITH THE UNITED STATES , IS A
VITAL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF RESTORING CIVILIZED AND SANE

LEADERSHIP TO UGANDA .
 169

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON . ROBERT K. DORNAN , A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman , in the last decade there have been so few foreign poli
cy issues about which all Americans have agreed , it would at least seem to me
that we could reach a consensus about our obligation to the over eleven million
terror ridden Ugandans . The recommendations and actions of this Subcommittee

may well provide the catalyst .

What other issue can one think of that would prompt the Washington Post to
agree with this conservative Republican by editorializing : "We would not normally
endorse either internal revolt or external attack against an established govern

ment , but with Gen. Amin conventional restraints deserve to be taken off . " Yet ,

in the face of all Idi Amin's barbarism , mass carnage , and suppression of basic
human dignities , there are two institutions which do not abhor the Amin regime:
the Administration , which flounders in half -baked policy , and corporate America ,
which hides behind the convenient claims of " free trade " and " it's not my respon
sibility. "

With all due respect Mr. Chairman , many of us are used to the Administration's
floundering on foreign policy . But the attitude of the corporations is a little
more unusual . Permit me to share with the Subcommittee my experiences in dealing
with them.
During the past year , I have personally attempted to convince major American
coffee companies to agree voluntarily to halt their importation of Ugandan coffee
beans . As many of us are aware , U.S. Commerce Department statistics show that
from January 1975 to August 1977 , American coffee companies imported over $360
million dollars worth of Ugandan coffee--or one third of Uganda's export earnings.
 170

I might add that these figures are increasing and represent a sizeable chunk of
Uganda's overall GNP .
Noted exiled Ugandans , with whom I have met both here and in Kenya, inform
me that these American dollars are used by Amin to purchase , among other things ,
Soviet military equipment, hundreds of Mercedes and Fiats , executive aircraft ,
and helicopters . These dollars are also used to purchase expensive clothing ,
rich foods , high priced wristwatches , jewelry , and other costly trinkets to pay
off Amin's army officiers and his personal body guards , ( officially called the
State Research Bureau ) whose vicious and widespread murders are the mainstay of
Amin's power . Furthermore , these dollars are used to enrich Amin's own personal
fortune estimated to be between five and six million dollars . Almost none of this
money ever reaches those Ugandan peasants responsible for growing the coffee it
self . These oppressed peasants exist in spite of Idi Amin , relying upon small
fruit and vegetable plots to grow just enough food for survival .
1977 was an especially revealing year about the atrocities committed by Amin .
It was also the year in which I learned just how much money American companies
pour into Amin's government . So , on October 28th I called for a self imposed ban

on Ugandan exports . To these mighty , multi -million and billion dollar manufacturing
titans , I believe , this request was not a great one . However , the effect on the
Amin goverment would be significant . Let me give you some examples of the respon
ses I received : General Foods (Maxwell House , Maxim , Sanka , Yuban , Freeze
dried Sanka , Max -Pax , Brim ) : "( we ) have always diligently avoided taking political
positions . " , Proctor & Gamble ( Folger's Coffee ) : " one would be hard pressed to
differentiate in such matters" involving nations to boycott . , Nestle Company
(Nescafe , Taster's Choice 100% , Taster's Choice Decaffeinated , Decaf ) : " our
primary concern is to satisfy the needs of American consumers ." So much for

social conscience and corporate morality , Mr. Chairman . This lack of resolve
 171

allows Amin , who boasts of eating human flesh , to continue to fill his coffers .
I don't know what public these companies are talking about , but the coffee
drinking public that I've come across in the past year is wholeheartedly and
e ntirely opposed to the racist and hitlerian policies of the Amin regime . In
November , I held a press conference with former Ugandan Attorney General, G. L.
Binaisa , and denounced these firms for their dispassionate position . Again ,
the public's response was overwhelming.
To be sure , the public's outrage over trade with Uganda is beginning to
make its mark . On November 29th the National Coffee Association of U.S.A. , Inc. ,

a New York City based organization representing the domestic coffee trade , upset
over the adverse publicity their member firms were receiving adopted a resolu
tion requesting the "branches of the U.S. Government to declare and implement a
uniform national policy ...concerning trade by private and commercial interests in
the U.S. with entities in Uganda ." In my view , this marked an important first
step for the U.S. coffee industry in facing up to its responsibility for construc
tive participation . Yet , no sooner had the industry taken its head out of the
sand , when it quickly stuck it back in . Let me explain .

I recently requested permission to appear before the National Coffee Assoc

iations's Board of Director's meeting in Boca Raton on January 30th . My stated
and intended purpose was to share what I learned from former high ranking Ugandan
exiled during my trip to Nairobi early in January, and to suggest that the in
dustry pre -emptively strike by putting pressure on the Administration and the
Congress to act quickly in setting policy . My simple request was refused : their
agenda was "firm and complete and cannot be altered " , their position as expressed
in their November 29th Resolution remained unchanged , and their legal counsel ad

1
vised that "any further collective gathering of the members of the Association
to discuss the Uganda issue would expose the Board ... to anti -trust risks they
should not be asked to assume . " While in all their highly technical legalese

25-826 0 - 78 - 12
 172

they may be correct , I ask you , would President Carter risk such a headline as :
HUMAN RIGHTS PRESIDENT DIRECTS JUSTICE TO SUE COMPANIES FOR STOPPING TRADE WITH
IDI AMIN . It seems absurd to believe that this government would be irresponsible
enough to initiate anti - trust action .
Mr. Chairman , with the industry "stonewalling" in favor of congressional or
State Department action , emphasis has necessarily switched from voluntary encour
agement to enactment of boycott legislation . That is why I am so pleased you
have agreed to hold these hearings . I am a cosponsor of Congressman Don Pease's
three-part Ugandan Economic Boycott legislation , H.R. 9252 , and as I am sure you
know , Senator Lowell Weicker has sponsored identical legislation (s . 2412 ) in
the Senate. Legislation which the State Department opposes .
The public is beginning to question the alleged "needs " the coffee companies
purport to meet and are instead demanding to know why they continue to trade with
Idi Amin . Not all companies do so , for example , the president of Hills Brothers
Coffee told me that they stopped trading with Uganda in 1976. Why then do other
American companies continue to trade with Idi Amin ? It certainly is not their
concern over coffee prices . As we know , the U.s. Department of Agriculture re
ported that a trade boycott would have virtually no effect on American coffee
prices . What I am afraid it is , Mr. Chairman , is that these companies are
morally bankrupt. They lack the backbone , indeed the guts , to take a stand on
this utterly devastating and pitifully sad crisis in Africa .
What then , Mr. Chairman , is the excuse for our President ? He has not
hesitated to support sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa . Yet , he
ignores the brutual , genocidal murder of 400,000 black Africans . Not 100,000
or 200,000 but 400,000 men , women and children . This figure was divulged to me
when Ivisited Kenya in January of this year . At that time , I met with ten

young , astute , and incredibly bright exiled Ugandans. In what I had expected to
be a one hour meeting lasted for four and one half hours . These gentlemen ,
 173

members of Uganda's former "intellegensia" who have been purged from its bor
ders , recounted with sorrow and shame the barbaric rule which engulfs their
homeland . Frankly , Mr. Chairman , I can report to you that everyone of them
is ready to sacrifice his life'in any attempt to rid their beloved land of
this mass murderer , whom they described as "diabolical ."
Again , I ask , what is the Administration's position on Uganda ? Why does
the State Department admit that " A boycott would certainly be consistent with
the Administration's worldwide human rights commitment " and yet stands in
opposition to such boycott legislation . Perhaps the most disgraceful and
shocking of all the Administration's inaction is its conferring of diplomatic
recognition of Uganda by allowing a Charge d'Affaires office here in Washington
even though in 1973 we closed our embassy and consulate offices in Uganda.
Mr. Chairman , it is clear to me that we , as a nation , and as individuals ,
have an overriding moral obligation to withhold support from this diabolical ,
totalitarian regime . Let not the legacy of this generation of business and
political leaders who chose to close their eyes to Nazi tyranny until it
threatened all our freedoms and exacted from the flesh of mankind the staggering
total of over forty million dead . There is an Adolph Hitler in Africa and it
is time for the Congress , for this Subcommittee, to take the lead by imposing
punitive economic and diplomatic action against the government of Idi Amin .
Thank you Mr. Chairman .

1
 174

Mr. PEASE . Additionally, I have aa chart which I would like to enter

into the record which shows the growth or lack of growth in gross
national product, real growth rates for all 130 member nations of
the World Bank for two periods of time, from 1960 to 1975 and 1970
to 1975. It shows clearly that Uganda in the period between 1970 and
1975 lost real growth , droppedits GNP by4.5 percent over that 5
year period, the greatest loss of any of the 130 member nations of the
World Bank, which indicates to me the degree of mismanagement on
the part of Idi Amin of the economy of Uganda.
We cannot I think as a nation punish another nation or the ruler
of another nation for economic mismanagement. That is not a viola
tion of human rights but it hardly recommends Idi Amin and is
hardly any kind of a justification for the other violations of human
rights which he clearly is guilty of.
So again, without objection, I would enter that into the record .
[ The table follows :)
[From the World Bank Atlas for 1977)

GNP per capita

Real growth rates (percent)
Amount
Country (U.S. dollars ) 1960-75 1970-75

Kuwait . 15, 190 -2.9 -3.3

Switzerland . 8, 410 2.6 .7
Sweden . 8, 150 3.1 2.3
United States. 7, 120 2.5 1.6
Canada . 6, 930 3.6 3.3
Denmark. 6, 810 3.5 1.7
Norway.. 6,760 3.6 3.3
Germany, Federal Republic of . 6,670 3.5 1.9
Belgium .. 6, 270 4.4 3.9
France. 5,950 4.2 3.4
Netherlands. 5, 750 3.8 2.2
Australia.. 5, 700 3.1 2.4
Libya . 5, 530 10.5 3.9
Finland 5, 420 4.5 4.1
Austria . 4, 870 4.3 4.0
Japan . 4, 450 7.7 4.0
New Zealand .. 4, 280 2.0 1.5
Saudi Arabia 4,010 6.6 4.1
German Democratic Republic 1 : 3, 910 3.2 3.7
Israel 3 3, 790 5.2 4.0
United Kingdom 3, 780 2.2 2.0
Czechoslovakia 12 3, 610 2.7 3.0
Italy . 2,810 3.9 1.7
Spain . 2,750 5.7 5.1
Poland 12 2,600 4.0 5.8
U.S.S.R.12 2,550 3.8 3.1
Singapore. 2, 450 7.6 7.3
Ireland .. 2, 390 3.2 1.3
Greece .. 2, 340 6.6 4. 2
Puerto Rico.. 2, 300 4.2 .8
Venezuela . 2, 280 2.2 1.5
Hungary 12 2, 150 3. 1 3. 2
Bulgaria 12 2, 110 4.6 3.9
Trinidad and Tobago . 2,000 2.5 2.5
Hong Kong ... 1 , 760 6.5 4.2
Iran .. 1 , 660 8.1 13.3
Portugal. 1,570 6.9 4.5
Argentina 1,550 3.1 2.9
Yugoslavia 1,550 5.5 5.9
Uruguay . 1, 300 .5 -.3
Panama. 1,290 4.1 2.2
South Africa . 1,270 2.3 1.7
Iraq ... 1 , 250 3.3 6.7
Romania 4 . 1 , 240 8.3 10.2
Jamaica . 1 , 110 3.6 4.0
Lebanon 15 1,070 NA NA
Mexico .. 1,050 3.2 2.3
Brazil . 1,030 4.3 6.2
Chile . 990 1.3 -2.7
Costa Rica ... 960 3.4 3.7

See footnotes at end of table.

 175
[ From the World Bank Atlas for 1977]

GNP per capita

Real growth rates ( percent)
Amount
Country (U.S. dollars ) 1960-75 1970–75

China, Republic of 930 6.3 5.7

Turkey . 900 4.0 4.9
Algeria 870 1.8 4.3
Mongolia 12 860 1.0 2.3
Cuba 12 800 -.6 1.0
Malaysia . 760 4.0 5.3
Peru ... 760 2.7 3.4
Tunisia 6 730 4.1 6.9
Dominican Republic 720 3.4 6.6
Syrian Arab Republic 720 2.2 1.8
Nicaragua.. 700 2.4 2.5
Ghana 590 -.2 -.3
Ecuador 590 3.4 6.1
Colombia 580 2.7 3.9
Paraguay 580 2.0 3.3
Guatemala 570 2.4 2.8
Korea, Republic of 560 7.1 8.2
Rhodesia ... 550 2.4 2.8
Ivory Coast. 540 3.5 1.9
Congo, People's Republic of the. 510 2.9 4.3
Albania 12 510 4.5 3.8
Morocco . 470 1.9 3.0
Papua New Guinea 470 3.8 2.3
Jordan ... 460 1.3 1.9
El Salvador. 460 1.8 1.9
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 12 450 3.8 .9
Zambia .. 420 2.0 .9
Liberia . 410 1.8 .9
Philippines. 380 2.5 3.7
China, People's Republic of 12 380 5.2 5.3
Angola 1 370 3.6 3.2
Bolivia 360 2.5 3.4
Honduras 360 1.5 .8
Senegal.. 360 -.7 -1.1
Thailand . 350 4.6 3.6
Nigeria .. 340 3.4 5.3
Mauritania 320 3.8 2.6
Cameroon . 280 3.0 .5
Sudan 270 .1 3.8
Egypt, Arab Republic of.. 260 1.5 1.3
Togo ... 250 4.4 2.0
Yemen,People'sDemocraticRepublicof17 250 -6.3 -5.8
Uganda .. 230 1.0 -4.5
Kenya . 220 3.2 2.4
Indonesia 220 2.4 3.5
Central African Empire . 220 .4 -7
Yemen Arab Republic 18 . 200 NA 5.8
Sierra Leone 200 1.5 -.5
Madagascar 200 .1 -2.2
Sri Lanka . 190 2.0 1.1
Haiti . 190 0 1.5
Mozambique 180 2.0 -2.6
Tanzania io 170 3.0 2.9
Pakistan .. 160 3.3 .8
Lesotho 1 160 4.6 7.3
Afghanistan . 150 -. 2 2.1
India . 140 1.3 ... 5
Zaire 140 1.6 1.5
Guinea 130 .2 1.3
Malawi . 130 4.1 7.0
Niger 130 -1.3 -2.8
Benin . 130 -.3 -1.1
Chad . 120 -1.1 -2.0
Burma. 110 ..7 .9
Burundi... 110 2.7 -1.1
Somalia 110 -- . 3 -.2
Upper Volta 110 ..7 1.1
Nepal .. 110 .3 .7
Rawanda 100 .5 .2
Ethiopia... 100 2.0 .4
Mali . 90 ..9 ii
Bangladesh.. 90 -.6 -2.3
Lao People's Democratic Republic 1 11 90 NA -15.9
See footnotos at end of table.
 176

( From the World Bank Atlas for 1977)

GNP per capita

Real growth rates ( percent)
Amount
Country ( U.S. dollars ) 1960–75 1970–75

Bhutan 1 NA NA NA
NA NA NA

들들들
Cambodia .
Vietnam ... NA NA NA

1 Estimates of GNP per capita and its growth rate are tentative.
2 For estimation of GNP per capita, see Technical Note, p. 32.
3 Estimate of GNP per capita does notreflect the significant devaluation of the pound in November 1977. ,
4 This estimate is not comparable to those for theother centrally planned economies. It has been arrived at, following
the Bank Atlasmethodology,byadjustingofficialRomaniannational accounts data and converting them toU.S. dollars
at the effective exchange rate forforeign trade transactions, which approximates Leu 20 per U.S. dollar.
5 GNP per capita estimate is for 1974.
6 GNP per capita growth rate relates to 1961-75 .
7 GNP per capita growth rate relates to 1969–75.
8 GNP per capita growth rate relates to 1972-75.
9 GNP per capita growth rate relates to 1964–75.
10 Mainland Tanzania.
U GNP per capita growth rate relates to 1973–75 .
NA - Not available.

Number Population GNP (US $000 Average GNP

Growth rates 1 of countries (millions) millions) per capita (US $)

Less than 0 percent .... 40 177 62 350

0 to less than 2 percent.. 45 1 , 299 2, 433 1,870
2 to less than 4 percent. 48 984 2, 143 2 , 180
4 to less than 6 percent.. 23 1, 208 1, 200 990
6 percent and over. 26 238 249 1,050

1 Excludes Cambodia, Lebanon, and Vietnam in the aggregation.

Note: Due to rounding, the amounts in this table may not equal the amounts or aggregates of the figures appearing in
the regional tables. For geographical location of the countries listed, see regional maps.

Mr. PEASE. I also have correspondence that I have received from

several religious organizations in the United States endorsing specifi
cally the idea of aa trade boycott, a coffee boycott of Uganda as away
of improving the human rights situation in Uganda. They comefrom
the Nationaľ Coalition of American Nuns, the United Church Board
for World Ministries of the United Church of Christ, the Executive
Council of the Episcopal Church, the Church of the Advocate, B'nai
B'rith, and Clergy and Laity Concerned.
Without objection, I will also enter those letters into the record.
[ The letters follow :]
NATIONAL COALITION OF AMERICAN NUNS,
October 20, 1977 .
Hon . DON PEASE ,
House of Representatives,
Washington , D.C.
DEAR MR. PEASE : We wholeheartedly endorse your bill to ban Ugandan Com
mercial trade. Thank you for introducing this into legislation .
Our board of directors met this week - end and voted unanimously to support
you. Thank you and may your bill be successful.
Respectfully yours,
SISTER ANDREA LEE, President.
 177

UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES,

December 8, 1977,
Congressman Don J. PEASE,
1641 Longworth Building, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN PEASE : At the 168th annual meeting of the United Church
Board for World Ministries of the United Church of Christ, the Board of Direc
tors ratified the enclosed resolution calling for an end to American trade with
Uganda. The resoution should be of particular interest to you since our Board
specifically endorsed your legislation to ban trade with Uganda.
As a way of calling attention to the role of American trade in maintaining the
Idi Amin regime, we plan to distribute copies of the resolution widely through the
conferences and congregations of the 1.8 million member United Church of Christ.
Although we ourselves do not hold stock in any of the American companies im
porting green Ugandan coffee, we hope to put pressure on the companies to halt
their purchases by writing to the companies involved and through our participa
tion in the ecumenical Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility . There is a
strong likelihood that one or more of the denominations and orders belonging to
the Interfaith Center will file shareholder resolutions on the subject with the
public corporations involved .
Please let us know what we can do to further support your legislation .
Yours sincerely ,
HOWARD SCHOMER ,
World 188ues Secretary .
Enclosure .

DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA

VOTED that the following resolution on the banning of U.S. trade with Uganda
be adopted :
Whereas the United Church Board for World Ministries voted in 76 - UCBWM
23 that “ the defense and promotion of human rights is a priority of the Board"
because the “ respect for human rights lies at the very heart of the Christian
Faith ;" and
Whereas our brothers and sisters in Uganda are suffering daily under the
tyranical regime of President Idi Amin ; and
Whereas the deaths of an estimated 50,000 to 300,000 victims under Amin's
reign of terror have, in the words of President Carter, " disgusted the entire
civilized world ; " and
Whereas the United States closed its embassy in Uganda four years ago ; and
Whereas American companies continue to trade with Uganda, with the Ameri
can coffee industry alone buying one-third of Uganda's green coffee and account
ing for one -third of Uganda's total export earnings ; and
Whereas Uganda is almost exclusively dependent upon coffee exports to main
tain its balance of trade ; and
Whereas the balance of trade surplus is used almost exclusively to maintain
Idi Amin's army and Secret Police ;
Therefore the United Church Board for World Ministries :
1. Condemns the human rights violations by the present Ugandan government.
2. Calls on American companies doing business with Uganda to cease their
trade with Ugandan concerns .
3. Asks the President and Congress to take meaures to ban American trade
with Uganda, specifically supporting legislation introduced by Congressman Don
Pease that wouid prohibit imports and exports to and from Uganda .
4. Communicates this concern to the World Council of Churches so that it
may request similar action by the governments of other countries conducting
business with Uganda .
5. Requests the United Church bodies with investments in U.S. firms involved
in Uganda to press the management of these companies, through direct ap
proaches and where needed through shareholder resolutions, to cease trade with
Ugandan concerns .
 178
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH ,
New York, N.Y. , December 22 , 1977.
Hon . DONALD PEASE,
16.41 Longworth Building,
Washington , D.C.
DEAR MR. PEASE : I am enclosing a copy of the resolution adopted by the
Executive Council of the Episcopal Church at its meeting in Greenwich , Connecti
cut on December 8, 1977 in support of bills H.R. 9522, 9524 , and 9526 .
I am deeply appreciative of the cooperation we received from your office in
bringing these bills to our attention and in supplying the background informa
tion necessary to inform the Council about these vital matters. If it would be
possible to receive an occasional program report on the bills, I would be most
grateful.
This comes with all good wishes, with our thanks for your sensitivity to this
issue and for your action to rectify the wrongs being perpetuated .
Sincerely,
REV. DAVID B. BIRNEY,
Staff Officer, Overseas Personnel.
Enclosure.

Date : December 7, 1977.

From : National and World Mission .
Subject : Uganda .
Resolved, We believe that the government of Uganda is abusing human rights
in the treatment of many of its people, and we support the United States Govern
ment in its efforts to bring about just and humane treatment of all citizens of
Uganda .
Resolved , We particularly support those bills pending before the United States
House of Representatives ( H.R. 9522, H.R. 9524, H.R. 9526 ) submitted by the
Honorable Donald Pease of Ohio ;
Resolved , We further call attention to similar abuse on the part of other na
tional regimes, such as South Africa and Cambodia, and urge similar efforts by
Congress to bring an end to such abuse ; and be it further
Resolved; We support shareholders' resolutions which call upon corporations
importing coffee from Uganda to discontinue such imports until such time as
significant improvements are made in the treatment of the citizens of Uganda.
A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF BILLS H.R. 9522, 9524, 9526 BY THE REVEREND DAVID
B. BIRNEY, STAFF MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
To speak in support of bills H.R. 9522, 9524 , and 9526 sponsored by Congress
man Donald Pease is to acknowledge a two-fold bias : I have had the privilege
of living and working in Uganda as a theological tutor in the Anglican Church
of Uganda and as an elected member of such national boards as the Mental
Health Association and the Uganda National Council of Social Services. I
know the country and have great affection for it and its people ; secondly , as a
Christian, I am deeply committed to belief in a God who wills freedom for his
children - freedom in the inner man, freedom in the social structures of so
ciety which will permit and encourage the full exercise and development of their
humanity within the community of their fellow men. It is my deep conviction
that one of the prime functions of government is to serve this cause and to
strive against any force or power which could dehumanize its citizens.
As is the case with many younger nations, Uganda's early years were marked
by turbulence as the difficult task of uniting into one nation many peoples with
different cultures, languages, and traditions proceeded . National identity with
national symbols of status and power was sought, and potential leaders vied
with one another for national and regional leadership. Uganda became an arena
in which world powers sought influence and control for economic and related
advantages. Though not untouched by some of the same divisive forces opera
tive in Government, the Christian Chruch grew and fluorished from the time
of the arrival of the first missionaries over 100 years ago and over the years
has provided a measure of stability , unity and hope for the people, as well as
education and medical care. Many of the original political leaders were prod
 179

ucts of the mission schools . A visitor to Uganda in the late 1960's could not
help but be impressed with the development that had taken place within the
country, as well as with the high calibre of trained leadership in every sphere
of public and professional life, despite the reality that President Milton Obote
was employing desperate and repressive means to remain in power.
Today's Uganda stands in dramatic contrast. When Obote's chief of the army
seized control of the government in 1971, it was with the announced purpose of
redressing many of the evils and wrongs of the Obote regime. Those groups op
pressed by Obote were exhilarated by the change ; those groups loyal to Obote
began almost immediately to know that change meant oppression and brutality .
Since 1971, the army rule under President Amin has become one of terror and
anarchy spreading to all parts of the country and to all people. No citizen in a
position of leadership in whatever sphere of life is safe from his insatiable lust
for power. Human life, business and private property have been destroyed and
confiscated at the whim of a brutal and restless army. Persons and groups dedi
cated to serving purposes other than the best interests of Uganda and its citi
zens have joined President Amin in furthering his demonic reign .
Leading Ugandans who have not lost theirlives have fled to neighboring coun
tries and abroad ; the citizens who have remained behind live in constant fear,
increasingly dependent upon their land to sustain them as the economic in
frastructure in the land has collapsed .
In countless conversations with many refugees in Kenya, England and here, I
have been told repeatedly that any steps which could be initiated outside of
Uganda to return it to the people and to bring peace would work no hardship
upon those still in the country. What aid Uganda is receiving from outside
powers does not benefit the common man ; there is nothing left to lose except
life itself which daily becomes more of a reality as President Amin's rule is
strengthened by this aid. One of the more atrocious of President Amin's actions
has been that of ordering the murder of the Most Rev. Janani Luwum , Arch
bishop of the Anglican Church of Uganda, in 1977. The Church, long dedicated
to support of the government's plans for development, had become increasingly
vocal in its challenge of the government's activities, particularly as they related
to the denial of the human rights, dignity and freedom of the people. Follow
ing President Amin's seizure of power, clergy, theological students and army
chaplains of predominantly Christian tribes loyal to the former President, began
to voice concern about Army repression and brutality. With the murder of
the Archbishop, persecution of Christians throughout the whole of Uganda began
The Church in this Christian land is at present apparently viewed as one of
the last obstacles to the total control and power over Uganda by President
Amin , his foreign mercenaries and advisors.
In this repression and persecution , however, the government has created
martyrs and instead of weakening the Church's influence in the life of the
con
people, it has strengthened it. Ugandan refugees with whom I have had they
tact find it difficult to comprehend why the western powers, involved as
were in the development of their nation, and standing as they do for the
rights and dignity of each person , appear to have abandoned them in their
present plight. One issue repeatedly referred to is the importation of Uganda
coffee to the United States. The refugees have claimed that this coffee leaves
Uganda on American planes, flown by American pilots. Coffee accounts for over
80% of Uganda's export earnings, with purchases by U.S. firms accounting
for approximately 33 percent of the total. Income from these sales is used
for luxuries with which President Amin must keep his Army contented and
disciplined. It is the army that has automobiles and access to gasoline ; it is
the army that has ready access to meat, sugar an salt, denied to the common
man . It is my belief that without these items, plus countless others, President
Amin could not maintain what control he now exercises over the army.
In light of the realities of present day Uganda, coupled with the facts that
few Americans remain in Uganda whose lives could be placed in jeopardy, and
that coffee presently being imported from Uganda could be secured from count
less other nations, I am compelled to conclude with a question : Is the cessa
tion of imports from and exports to Uganda too high a price to pay on behalf
of 10 million Ugandans by a nation built upon and dedicated to the principles of
freedom and justice ? I believe not.
 180

THE CHURCH OF THE ADVOCATE ,

Philadelphia , Pa., February 13, 1978 .
Hon . DONALD J. PEASE ,
House of Representatives, Longworth Building,
Room 1641 , Washington , D.C.
SIR : As a member of the Committee on National and World Mission of the Ex
ecutive Council of the Episcopal Church , your Bill in its concern for just and
humane treatment in Uganda, calling for a prohibition of export and import of
certain goods, particularly coffee , between the U.S. and Uganda, was brought to
my attention and to the Council for action .
It was our recommendation that the Executive Council of our Church vote in
favor of the action called for by you in your bill. The action of Council was
favorable.
I write to you, therefore, both as a member of the Executive Council of the
Episcopal Church , as an individual who has visited Uganda and talked privately
with citizens there, as well as having had Ugandan exiles at my church to speak
to my congregation,
Although I was informed as most Americans about the reign of terror which
had become a way life in Uganda, it was not until the stewardess on the Ethiopian
Airline announced as we approached Kampala, that no newspapers, magazines or
other public publications could be taken into the country with us, that this knowl
edge was transformed into experience, an experience of fear .
I marveled as we ( Angelican delegates from the U.S., Great Britain , Germany
and Canada ) , sat for four days conferring with Bishops, Priests, and lay people
of the Province of Uganda about the mission of the church in that province. We
were required to limit our talks to the church and a work in a country, its
task , its calling, while carefully avoiding any reference to the conditions under
which it labored .
Finally, on the third day, a layman of the Ugandan Church invited me for a
drive, " to see more of the country ."
From the moment we were separated from walls and other persons, he began
to speak ; “ Father , " he said , “you don't know how terrible, you don't know the
terror that we live with from day to day in this country." He told me first
about Arch Bishop Luwum's brother who had been mutilated , next of all of the
Anglican Priests who were members of a particular tribe who also were wiped
out. He spoke of one of the wives of President Amin who had fallen into the dis
favor of the President ... mutilated . He said further ; " If you go to the Arch
O

Bishop's house, you will find many, many mothers and children . They are the
widows of slain priests whom the Arch Bishop is trying to take care of." There
are spies everywhere, and if you are suspected of anything whatsoever that they
feel is critical of the government, you are eliminated .
I have compressed into one paragraph a monologue of a man who was bursting
inside, who carried a burden , the same burden carried by millions of his fellow
citizens, the burden of living as though dead to prevent the ultimate fate, being
put to death.
On our last night in the country, I had the privilege, along with Episcopal
Bishop Brown of the church in Liberia, to have dinner with Arch Bishop Luwum .
He was a great man, a totally committed Christian . From time to time he said
he had visited President Amin, appealing to him on behalf of the people and the
country which he loved so deeply. He knew that this loving act could cause him
to be seen as an enemy, but for him, a love that is not expressed was tantamount
to being alive but not living ; for him to refrain from trying to save for fear of
losing one's own life was to lose it anyway. He tried to counsel his President.
He tried to save his country. Arch Bishop Janani Luwum was assissinated .
Frequently I have been asked for assistance by families in the Philadelphia
area who are considered enemies of the government and cannot return, and
through the joint efforts of our own Epicopal Church , the Immigration and
Refugee Program of the National Council of Churches, we have interceded on
behalf of these families to the Immigration and Naturalization Services to find
ways of accommodating them in our country. I am pleased to say that we have
foud our Government to be both sympathetic and helpful in these situations.
Finally, Congressman Pease, it is my belief, based on first hand observation
in Uganda itself as well as from conversations with Ugandan citizens in America ,
that there is blatant and even barbarous suppression of human beings and their
rights by the Ugandan Government of its citizens.
 181
That our Government has a responsibility which must transcend geographical
and national boundaries to strive for human rights wherever they are being
denied, and that your bill which would serve both to express how strongly we
believe in these rights as well as to diminish the power of this evil force is one
which is in keeping with the church's mission, has the official support of the
Executive Council of the Episcopal Church .
Sincerely yours,
Rey . PAUL M. WASHINGTON .

[ News release from B'nai B'rith ]

B'NAI B'RITH ENDORSES UGANDA TRADE EMBARGO
WASHINGTON . - B'nai B'rith has given its unqualified support for a proposed
trade embargo against Uganda , urging Congress to enact legislation submitted by
Rep. Don Pease of Ohio .
David M. Blumberg, B'nai B'rith's president, said in a statement that although
the 500,000 -member organization regards an embargo " as a last-resort weapon to
be employed in only the most extreme cases,” Idi Amin's Uganda qualifies as such
a case " by any yardstick ."
" Its mad -dog hostility to all codes of civilized behavior and its singularly brutal
policies toward its own people require responsible nations to take appropriate
action against it, ” Blumberg stated .
The United States imports 33.6 percent of Uganda's coffee, accounting for one
third of the African nation's total export earnings.
“ Halting these sales can bea persuasive form of pressure on the Amin regime,”
Blumberg said .
“ There must be a point at which a nation's internal affairs becomes the business
of all nations, and that point has long since been reached with Uganda .”
“ America , ” Blumberg declared, " should stop subsidizing Amin .”

CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED,

New York, N.Y., November 14, 1977.
Congressman Don J. PEASE ,
1641 Longworth Building,
Washington , D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN PEASE : I am responding to your letter to Rick Boardman,
the Director of Clergy and Laity Concerned, regarding legislation you have in
troduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to establish a trade ban with
Uganda. As the coordinator of CALC's Politics of Food Program it is appropriate
for me to respond to your request for assistance in building a broad base of sup
port for your legislation.
I strongly affirm the legislative action you are taking. It is very significant that
you are making a very clear connection between trade and human rights, and you
are correct in your assessment that " a U.S. trade ban is appropriate as well as
morally necessary if the U.S. is to remain credible as a defender of human
rights."
I have alerted our network of 44 local chapters of your legislation and will be
visiting several of them between November 26 and December 26. I would appreci
ate if you or a member of your staff could call me before the 26th of November
and give me the number of the bill you have introduced .
In your letter you state that “the time has come for the Congress to end the
substantial role that U.S. companies are playing in maintaining Amin's power.”
While I will encourage our local chapters to mobilize their constituency in sup
port of your legislation , it may be that we can be most helpful by putting pressure
on the U.S. companies directly involved in importing Ugandan coffee. This is con
sistent with CALC's history as an organizing network. I would appreciate if you
or members of your staff would send me information on the names of companies
involved and the nature of their involvement.
I would also like to meet with you and / or members of your staff after having
had a chance to speak with members of several of our local chapters. Most any
time during the second or third week in January would be convenient for me. If
this looks possible please let me know so I can arrange my schedule accordingly.
 182

I would appreciate an opportunity to talk with you about your specific legisla
tion , and I would also like to share some information on CALC's Politics of Food
Program which you may find interesting .
Sincerely ,
JACK NELSON,
Politics of Food Program Coordinator.

Mr. PEASE. Finally, a question arose earlier about the fate of Amer
ican missionaries still in Uganda and what role they ought to play
in the determination of American policytoward the regime of Idi
Amin. The State Department has in my view placed distressingly
great emphasis on the possible repercussions on American mission
aries there. In an effort to find out the attitude of the American re
ligious orders which do have missionaries in Uganda we wrote letters
back in January to all of the religious orders which do have mis
sionaries in Uganda.
We have received replies back from several, at least two or three,
of the orders who ask that their replies be held confidential possibly
because of repercussions on their members. Several others did not
and the replies that we got both on the record and off the record indi:
cate that the orders do not believe that concern for their missionaries
in Uganda ought to be a consideration in the determination of United
States foreign policy. I will quote from two letters which I will enter
into the record.
One says :
I do not think that the State Department should use the missionaries in
any way as a pawn to stress their point in United States/Ugandan relations.
The presence of missionaries should not affect in any way U.S./Ugandan poli
tics or commercial relations.
Another one says :
It is our point of view that the Congress might well proceed with whatever
legislation it deems advisable from the standpoint of our country and inter
national consideration without the presence of the missionary being the deter
mining factor.

Without objection, I will enter those letters into the record as well.
[ The letters follow :]
FAITH OF AFRICA ,
Plainfield, N.J. , February 11, 1978.
Hon . Don . J. PEUSE,
Member of Congress,
Longworth Building, Washington , D.C.
DEAR MR. PEASE : I am in receipt of your letter of January 26th regarding
the presence of White Father personnel in Uganda, and I will do my best to
answer your questions.
( 1 ) To my knowledge, the State Department has never asked us to withdraw
our men from Uganda. Even if they had asked us, we would not have with
drawn them . We have been in Uganda for over 100 years for plainly religious
reasons and we have never been involved in politics. Our men have preferred to
remain with the people and help them to live through the difficult moments of
life. We have never been ones to wave the flag and be deported , so that we could
make the headlines.
( 2 ) From my answer in question ( 1 ) , you have the reasons why missionaries
consider risks as a normal part of their daily lives. If we are to bring the true
spirit of Christ to these people, we must not abandon them .
( 3 ) I do not think that the State Department should use the missionaries
in any way as a pawn to stress their point in United States /Ugandan relations.
 183

The presence of missionaries should not affect in any way U.S./Ugandan politics
or commercial relations.
( 4 ) We will never agree to withdrawing our men for political or commercial
reasons.
( 5 ) Our men on the spot have the power to decide their own movements and
make decisions for their own lives . It would not be possible nor advisable for
me to influence them in one way or the other.
I think from these answers you can see how missionaries have managed to
survive in in Africa for over 100 years, and this is the policy which we will
continue to maintain .
Yours sincerely ,
Rev. JOHN JOE BRAUN , W.F.,
Provincial, White Fathers — U.S.A .

FOREIGN MISSION BOARD

OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION ,
Richmond, Va ., January 31, 1978.
Congressman Don J. PEASE ,
1641 Longworth Building, Washington , D.C.
DEAR MR. PEASE : It was kind of you to write relative to your concern for
missionary personnel in Uganda. I have discussed your letter with Dr. Davis
Saunders, secretary for our mission work in East Africa .
Actually , our missionary staff in Uganda is very small, consisting of only two
couples at present.
In keeping with long - standing policy of our board, missionaries in Uganda
have repeatedly been assured of their freedom to make decisions at any time
concerning their departing from or remaining in the country. They are given
assurance of full support from our board in implementing those decisions.
From time to time, they have withdrawn from the country during periods of
special tension and have returned to their work when it seemed advisable.
Missionaries of our board devote themselves to ministries of Christian witness
and service and do not become involved in the political affairs of the country in
which they serve.
It is our point of view that the Congress might well proceed with whatever
legislation it deems advisable from the standpoint of our country and inter
national consideration without the presence of the missionary being the
determining factor.
Sincerely ,
BAKER J. CAUTHEN .

Mr. PEASE . Now while we await the return of Chairman Diggs and
testimony from Mr. Mazrui who has been waiting very patiently, let
me proceed with Dr. Melady and Mr. Binaisa and firstof all thank
them as the chief sponsor of this legislation for their very excellent
testimony today and the work that they have done over a period of
some months and years to alert the American citizens and indeed
those of other nations as well to what is going on in Uganda and to the
need for action by the United States and the world community to stop
that carnage. It has been very , very helpful.
I would like to concentrate for a bit on genocide as what I feel is
the distinguishing characteristic of Uganda which justifies what
would otherwise be considered unusual economic action directed
against another nation . I think both of you gentlemen have previously
said that you do see genocide as a distinguishing characteristic.
I am sorry that the chairman is not here. I gather while I was
absent he was discussing South Africa and the question there and I
would just make the point that genocide is not being practiced in
South Africa. There is systematic repression of people on racial
grounds which I deplore and I have been willing and ready and have
participated in legislative responses which would seek to curb South
 184

Africa. However, I see genocide as something different. I would like

to fight the battle on the basis ofthat genocide in Uganda.
It occurs to me that if this bill were to pass ordering sanctions
against Uganda that it might well be used at some later point as a
precedent for action against South Africa using a somewhat different
basis; namely, racial repression, as the rationale for a trade band
against South Africa. I guess II just would like to ask you gentlemen
ingeneral whether you do see that kind of distinction between South
Africa and Uganda and whether that in your mind justifies a differ
ence in treatment at least for the moment toward those two countries
so that we might hopefully proceed with this bill.
Mr. MELADY. I think ,Congressman, the definitions on genocide
might vary but there would be general agreement that genocide is the
systematic elimination of peoples, and by elimination we mean
physical death. There are a few sociologists who attempted to enlarge
that description in regard to cultural genocide but the classical defini
tion is the elimination of peoples and by that we mean death to them
belause of their being grouped in a certain religious or ethnic
background .
I charge that genocide is going on in Uganda — that is, the elimina
tion through death of peoples because they constitute a potential
opposition to Idi Amin. I applaud the action by our President in plac
ing human rights as the cornerstone of our foreign policy and aa lot of
the written signs then and perhaps we suffer little by varying concepts
of human
rights.
When I visited India in 1975 I was asked by a distinguished daily
newspaper if I could do something in particular to get into the viola
tion of human rights. I recall I was concerned in India. They were
certain New Delhi could not exist. There were several thousand to
prevent the defection. I thought this was quite bad. I certainly would
not want to live there but after my Uganda experience I could not
quite see it as a violation of human rights but I come back and found
that others felt that.
I think there may be disagreement as to whether human rights
would include the right to have an opposition party, eventhe right to
be guaranteed against preventive detention. I think it probably would
but I think there would be some who would disagree with that.Ithink
we are in general agreement from all peoples, allcultures, all religions
that the right to be free from arbitrary murder is a fundamental right
and particularly the right to be free from a systematic carnage
planned by a chief of state.
Now we have that clearly in Uganda. There is some growing evi
dence that we may have it in Equatorial Guinea but I cannot submit
that. I have not studied that. There is clear evidence from what I
have read that that exists in Cambodia . There is no evidence that the
systematic killing of large numbers of people is going on in any other
country in the world.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Binaisa.
Mr. BINASA. I think, Congressman , another distinction which has
to be drawn, I pointed this out to Chairman Diggs in a rather awk
ward manner but to clear the air, the way I look at it and the way most
of black Africans look at it, I suggest, is this : They consider the ques
 185

tion of South Africa and Rhodesia as colonial situations. They con

sider that South Africa, for instance, is legally occupying what we
know in Africa as Namibia in South -West Africa.
They also consider that the Rhodesian whites who unilaterally de
clared their independence also did it illegally but at the same timethey
think thatthe whites who have been occupying 80 percent of all the
irrigable land in South Africa are colonialists. They cannot be part
and parcel of the country just in the same way as the Ugandan Afri
cans are part and parcel of a country known as Uganda.
I mean the way I look at it as an African nationalist, I look at it
this way. I look at the way the Romans occupied Britain for about
400 years and in the end after 400 years the British kicked out the
Romans. The same way the Ottoman Turks occupied a big stretch of
the Balkans in Europe. For 150 years it did not prevent the Greeks
from gaining their independencein 1830 or 1820.
You see, this argument the whites in South Africa are using that,
oh , we have been there and we went there in April 1658, to me as an
African nationalist that does not cut much ice because even if they
went there in 1658 the Africans have never allowed them to be there.
They went there and through the barrel of their guns they took over
the place and have governedit ever since then.What's more,the British
made another mistake. As imperialists by law of the English parlia
ment they gave power in 1910 to these colonialists.
Therefore, the situations surely can't be the same because all Afri
cans agree that we cannot today in Africa launch a confrontation
until first of all Namibia in South -West Africa gains its independence,
Rhodesia gains its independence and then therewill be only one colo
nial area in Africa and that will be the so -called Republic of South
Africa which Africans don't even call the Republic of South Africa ,
they know it as Zambia. So this again shows the protest. We have
never agreed to this and therefore I think it is wrong to sort of go on
reasoning backwards and then reach a country which rightly orwrong
ly was granted independence properly, legally, by a British parliament
sittingin 1910.
Mr.PEASE. The OAU has not been very forthcoming in its criticism
of Uganda and Idi Amin. I gatherbecause of the OAU policy of not
wanting to interfere in the internal affairs of a member nation some
of us feel that the credibility of the OAU would increase substantially
if the OAU would take note of what is going on in Uganda. We fur
ther felt that the OAU case or the case of black African nations
against South Africa would be considerably strengthened if they
would show a willingness to act against Idi Amin, a gross violatorof
human rights in Uganda. Do youthink there is any validity to that
line of reasoning ?
Mr. BINAISA. Yes and no because people on the other hand tend to
judge the OAU on a completely different standard because the OAU
was only founded in 1963. I mean if you compare the OAU and the
Organization of American States which is a much older body and you
examine the achievements of the Organization of American States,
I think the OAU comes off very well because it is a body that was
founded by newly independent states who have not really even fully
assimilated the total meaning of independence because, you see, we in
 186

black Africa are mainly concerned with the consolidating of nothing

but sovereignty.
We are proud of our new achieved independence. It is only after
say 10 yearsthat we are now beginning to talk about development. On
the one hand you see the flag -raising ceremony as my friend here will
bear me out. This was something very great for every nation inAfrica.
We are mainly concerned with that. Therefore, even in the OAU char
terwe don't spell out so much. Apart from spelling out in the first
10 I think thereare about 10 major points, major pillars on which the
OAU was built in the charter.
We don't even go into economic development. We are mainly con
cerned with trying to say to everybody, please don't touch us, we are
independent and sovereign.Therefore the period it has takenthe OAU
to do anything is so small that not so much criticism should be leveled
at this state in 1978 for a body which was only founded in 1963 and
ever since then, mind you, has been adding on to its membership al
most every year.
You see, it is not a body that was founded by so many nations but
the nations have also themselves been changing—not only changing
their names but even changing their numbers. You see, that has been
the hitsory of the OAU. In 1963 in Addis Ababawe were something
in the twenties. Now we are 49. Therefore, I think I agree with you.
Whereas I agree with you on the pointthat it may serveas an example,
I think it is rather unfortunate to compare the OAU because the
moment you compare the OAU, then what comes to my mind is the
Organization of American States who have also been doing nothing
because it is also you know, they have never really likened America
with the United States itself.
Mr. PEASE . OK. If there were to be an investigation of human rights
violations inUganda, one possibility for conducting them would be
the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Another possibility
might be the International Commission of Jurists of which you are
a member if I understand.
Mr. BINAISA. Yes.
Mr. PEASE. Do you have any feelings which might be the more ap
propriate body to conduct an investigation of human rights violations?
Mr. BINAISĀ. I think if the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights were to go into Uganda or be permitted by Idi Amin to go into
the country they should go with the International Commission of
Jurists ,at leasta delegation of the ICJ, because we in the Interna
tional Commission of Jurists have made three studies, all of which
have been published. We took evidence as you may see from the open
letter of Wakhweya, the Foreign Minister of Uganda, which was also
published under the auspices of the ICJ. I don't believe that the
U.N. Commission for Human Rights alone would be all that effective
because to begin with on two occasions they have disagreed with one
another among the nations as you remember. Now if on this third
occasion they agree, I would suggest that they should contact the
Secretary General of the ICJ in Geneva to ask him for a delegation of
some of the promiment members of the ICJ. Of course not me, as
you know I cannot go, however much I may love to go. There are so
many other member jurists of this body who could go and enter into
 187

Uganda and make their findings because they have got something
along which to go — they have gotthree reports.
Mr. PeasE.
PEASE Dr.Melady,did you wish tocomment on that?
Mr. MELADY. I do believe that the evidence is very clear now that
there are massive violations of human rights. There is a sustained
genocide in that Idi Amin is personally responsible for that. However,
do feel it would be a step forward to be an adjudication ,to plan legal
ways to end it, for an appropriate body to go there. I would think that
appropriate body could give protection to people like Mr. Binaisa and
others to know the situation , to be part of it. (Laughter.] Under the
International Commission of Juristswho can be part
of it.
Mr. BINAISA. The witch doctor tells me otherwise. [Laughter.]
Mr. PEASE. What would happen if an international party like the
ICJ was invited to go to Uganda and did go and its report said :
Our study team was there 4 months and we conclude that there were massive
killings in Uganda, genocide did occur, but during 4 months that we were there
we could detect that nothing happened , that the government was on its good
behavior.

Mr. BINASIA. You mean this goes before the bills is passed.
Mr. PEASE. Yes.
Mr. BINAISA. Would this be as a condition precedent? I didn't
understand you properly — maybe.
Mr. PEASE. Well
Mr. BINAISA. Are you suggesting that allthese visits on this parley
with Idi Amin in Kampalawould be a condition precedent to the bill
being introduced ?
Mr. PEASE. No ; I am not. From my point of view I would like to
press ahead with the bill anyhow. I guess the question is if a study
group like the ICJ determined that there had been gross violations
in the pastbut none during the 4 months that they might be studying
it, do you think we could conclude from that that Idi Amin had turned
over a new leaf and that when the Commission left there would not
be killings in the future ?
Mr. BINAISA. Well, to begin with, Congressman, I would not agree
that if the ICJ and the U.Ň. Commission for Human Rights were to
go to Uganda as a condition precedent to the bill because I submit that
we haveenough evidence before this committee and before the world
community , the international community , to prove about these very
gross violations of human rights, to prove them. They have been
proven .
Mr. PEASE. Well, II agree with you. I don't think it ought to be a
precondition .
Mr. Chairman , what are we voting on now ?
Mr. Diggs. The B-1.
Mr. PEASE . I think I better go.
I have asked without objection that these things be put in and I will
just give them to thereporter.
Mr. Diggs ( presiding ].All right.
Let us call Professor Mazrui. If you, Mr. Binaisa, and you , Ambas
sador Melady, will remain, we have some other questions for you.
Professor Mazrui is a professor of political science at the University
of Michigan and the Center for Afro - American Studies at Ann Arbor.

25-826 0 - 78 - 13
 188

He is a Kenyan who was on the faculty at Makerere College for 10

years. He has written numerous articles, served in many other capaci
ties relating to African matters and brings to the witness chair a most
respected background.
Without objection, your statement will be entered into the record
in its entirety . You may proceed to summarize or make your presenta
tion in whatever way you wish .
STATEMENT OF ALI A. MAZRUI, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Mr. MAZRUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Originally Iwas goingto present the statement just in myown name
but certain colleagues, scholars in a project called world order models
project - Institute for World Order, New York, N.Y. — which is con
cerned with international action in relation to moral values, some of
my ideas were discussed with these scholars and they indicated that
they would like to support the position I have indicated in my
testimony.
I will just read passages selectively and in relation to the theme be
fore us.
Sanctions imposed by a powerful state against a weak country or
the government of the weak country on moral grounds have in my
opinion to pass the following four tests :
1. The test of consistency. What are the chances of the powerful
state imposing similar sanctions against other countries for approxi
mately comparable violations of morality ?
2. The test of relevance. Are sanctionsthe most appropriate method
of dealing with evil? For example, if the problem in the offending
country is anarchy rather than tyranny, would sanctions against the
chaotic regime help the situation or merely aggravate it ?
3. The test of sacrifice. How much of a cost does the powerful state
itself sustain when imposing the sanctions? If the sanctions are ap
proximately cost free, is there reason to believe that the decision would
have been different had it required a genuine sacrifice by the powerful
state ?
4. The test of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Is the powerful state
merely committed to punishing theoffending country or government
Or is there also a commitment to help rebuild what was destroyed once
the moral offense or the offending regime has been removed ?
The testimony then proceeds to examine the situation in Uganda
and then to draw policy conclusions for the United States in thelight
of the above four tests of moral credibility.
Now my position of interpretation with regard to the situation in
Uganda isthat it is not a straight case of tyranny whereas in the case
of South Africa I believe it is. You are dealing in South Africa with
an entrenched political system that has embarked on an immoral
course. In the case of Uganda you are dealing with a very brutal
tyrant but at the same time you are dealing with a relatively anarchic
situation.
My estimate would be that from about 1974 in the second half to the
present day more people have died in Uganda as a result of the anarchy
 189

than as a result of the tyranny. The tyranny I simply define as

centrally directed force whereas in the case of anarchy a kind of de
centralized violence. Now the two affect each other and they aggravate
things within each other.
I would also suggest, Mr. Chairman , that the anarchic rot began
fairly early under the Amin regime. I remember very clearly in the
early days one day having girlstudents coming to our house. They
came at just about curfew time. My wife and I looked at each other
and said : I wonder why ? Do they intend to spend the night here?
Once we arrived at that surmise we then observed the ethnic composi
tion of the girls — they were all either Langi or Acholi. It latertrans
pired that the night before some soldiers had broken into Mayer
Stewart Hall which is a hall of residence for girls at Makerere Univer
sity and had demanded Langi and Acholi girls to take out for rape.
Two were taken out. One escaped, the other one pleaded that she had
period and was released .
The following night these girls who belonged to the same ethnic
groups were seeking refuge in one of the professor's homes, in this
case my own. I telephoned the president of theuniversity or the vice
chancellor and I said there were Langi and Acholi girls in my home
but who was protecting all the rest ? He said , “ I will try and contact
Amin ."
He contacted Amin and Amin sent us his best soldiers to try and
control the situation and keep out potential rapists. Now what did that
tell us ? Something that Amin had done as a past act of his tyranny
which was to announce the Acholi and Langi right from thebeginning,
had led to the beginnings of the anarchic rotsuch thatsoldiers were
taking initiatives on their own so thatLangi and Acholi girls are
free for the take as you can get them . This was in the very first few
weeks.
Now I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that what has happened since
then, it has got worse and worse and that a substantial section of the
brutality that is taking pļace is done by either individual soldiers or
even ordinary citizens against each other because an enormous collapse
has taken place. In the case of killings of very prominent people there
is definitely a case of tyranny. That is Amin orchestrating the murder
of a president of aa university or of an archbishop or of a minister .
Only the other day I was talking to a Ugandan student I had taught
and her brother had just been killed at a roadblock . This was clearly
a case of the anarchic situation . Her brother was not politically signifi
cant at all. So it is a factor to bear in mind that much of what is
happening may not simply be handled by removing Amin because
there is .a reconstruction factor that is required .
In my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I mention six scenarios for re
moving Idi Amin . I regard his removal as a precondition for the
recovery of the society but it is not a sufficient condition. It may be a
necessary condition but it is not a sufficient condition for enabling
Uganda to recover .
Now the six scenarios, one is just an assassination . Several attempts
have already been made and until now they have not been close enough .
Second would be an actual coup that overthrows — not that removes
 190

just Amin in an assassination but also the primary basis of power and
the group that controls Uganda at the moment.
The third scenario is a major social revolution, an uprising by a
people brutalized beyond the bounds of patience and moderation and
turning initially against petty dictators in their own localities before
it escalates into a national overthrow .
The fourth scenario is another invasion of Ugandan exiles and
their supporters from the outside world. The numbers of exiles have
increased since the fiasco of 1972 and it is conceivable that some train
ing by a select group very well done confronting a rabble of an army
could have more of an impact than was feasible with that very inept
and inefficientundertakingwhich was tried outin 1972.
The fifth scenario is prolonged guerrilla warfare within Uganda
partly sustained materially and morally from outside.
The sixth scenario is an economic blockade and other forms of inter
national sanctions. Uganda's most important neighbor is Kenya, and
Kenya has disproportionate power to exert the stranglehold on
Uganda. The embargo which was imposed with regard topetroleum
going to Uganda in1976 was one of the clearest points to crisis that
Amin had experienced for quite a while but unfortunately Kenya is
unwilling to take the risk because while it is true that the prolonged
cut of oil to Uganda could create divisions within the armed forces of
Uganda and potentially the collapse of Amin and his supporters,
before he falls he mightdecide he would like to bomb Nakuru or
Mombasa and the Kenya Government is not prepared to do that. Now
outside east Africa there are possibilities of other countries to take
action and this is where the United States comes in under the sixth
scenario.
Now some of the actions, Mr. Chairman, may have been taken
already according to testimony presented which I have not had a
chance to look atbut other forms of actions that are being contem
plated in my opinion would only acquire moral credibility if they were
accompanied by other forms of decisions simultaneously. So I'would
suggest, supposing decisions were being made about Uganda, they
should be accompanied by one or more of the following additional
decisions.
One is the issue of whether there should be simultaneous action
against South Africa against the issue of the simultaneous announce
ment of comparable economic measures against the Republic of South
Africa. I think anything short of that would create doubts about
American moral sincerity in handling this particular problem in
Africa - doubt among large numbers of Africans but also large num
bers of Americans and especially among large numbers of black Ameri
cans. Why should economic sanctions be regarded as relevant when
dealing with the black dictator Amin, when dealing with the most
institutionalized system in human history of apartheid .
Second, as a possible additional move simultaneous announcement
of specially generous measures for the relief of Uganda refugees in
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Europe, North America, and elsewhere.
Some of them are living as considerable indigents at the moment and
some of them are still living in political insecurity.
Third , simultaneous announcement of American commitment to
an international effort toward the reconstruction of Uganda economi
 191

cally, politically, and educationally upon the restoration of civilian

rule and free elections in the country.
Fourth, simultaneous announcement by the United States of its
readiness to start negotiationswith the Organization of African Unity
in search of a joint charter of human rights comparableperhaps to the
Atlantic Charter which was drawn up between Roosevelt and Church
hill well more than 20 years ago. The charter on human rights would
allow for a joint committee to monitor human rights in both Africa
and the United States. The American side would be particularly con
cerned with the rights of minorities. Thecooperation would assure
Africa and the rest of the world that the United States is not merely
concerned with passing judgment on others in the field of human rights
but is prepared to allow others to pass some kind of judgments on
America's own performance.
With regard to the status of the Uganda Embassy in Washington,
I think cutting it down to size would tome make sense provided once
again there is compensatory action simultaneously and again punitive
action that singles out the Uganda Government in the world full of
violations of human rights must be accompanied by compensatory
action in favor of the Ugandan people which could include commit
ment to those that are scattered around the world in difficulties at the
moment.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I return to the nemesis of residual anarchy
in Uganda. What should constantly be borne in mind when dealing
with Uganda is that the problem is no longer just Amin but a general
normative collapse.
When the lightswent out one night in New York Cityin the summer
of 1977, a normative collapse occurred in sections of the population.
There was greed and looting, wantonvandalism, reckless plunder, and
sheer aggressivity. A mere mechanical lapse in the supply of electricity
let loose the demon of anarchy in America's largest city.
Well, the lights have gone out in Uganda. Norms and values culti
vated over generations have come abruptly to an end. The nemesis of
anarchy hascast its shadow over a society that once laughed and made
merry .
When the tyrant is dead and buried , the anarchy may still remain
in Uganda .
Mr. Chairman, it is because of these considerations that the United
States must not simply think in terms of destroying the tyrant ; it
must also think in terms of rebuilding the nation of Uganda. Com
mitment to any punitive action against Amin must beaccompaniedby
a dedication to the reconstruction of the society which produced him.
It is easy enough to preach human rights; it is far more difficult to
practice human partnership.
It is only in the light of these considerations that the four criteria
of moral credibility might at least be approximated — the test of con
sistency , the test of relevance when sanctions are being taken, and the
test of sacrifice that the United States is prepared to bear a cost so
that it is no sanctions on the check and fourth the test of rehabilita
tion and reconstruction.
Thank you , sir.
[Mr. Mazrui's prepared statement follows :]
 192

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALI A. MAZRUI, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA :

IS IT A CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ?

PREFACE

Sanctions imposed by a powerful state against a weak

country , on moral grounds , have to pass the following four
tests :

(i ) The Test of Consistency :

What are the chances of the powerful state

imposing similar sanctions against other
countries for approximately comparable
violations of morality?

( ii ) The Test of Relevance :

Are sanctions the most appropriate method of
dealing with the evil ? For example , if the
problem in the offending country is anarchy
rather than tyranny , would sanctions against
the chaotic regime help the situation or merely
aggravate it ?
( iii ) The Test of Sacrifice

How much of a cost does the powerful state

itself sustain when imposing the sanctions?
If the sanctions are approximately cost- free ,
is there reason to believe that the decision would
 193

Preface - 2

have been different had it required a

genuine sacrifice by the powerful State?

( iv ) The Test of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Is the powerful state merely committed to

punishing the offending country or government ?

Or is there also a commitment to help rebuild

what was destroyed once the moral offense or

the offending regime has been removed ?

Let us first examine the situation in Uganda , and then

draw policy conclusions for the United States in the light
of the above four tests of moral credibility .
 194

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGIITS IN UGANDA :

IS IT A CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS?

By Ali A. Mazrui

President Idi Amin Dada of Uganda has become almost a paradigm

of tyranny There is widespread consensus that at least a hundred
thousand people have been killed in Uganda since Amin captured
power on January 25 , 1971 . Ominous disappearances are almost a
daily occurrence . And torture in prisons and detention centers
are the order of the day .
And yet is this a case for international sanctions ? Will

an initiative by the United States against Uganda ameliorate or

aggravate the misery that has afflicted the poeple of that country .
Let us begin with basic elements about the Ugandan situation
before we examine the policy implications involved .
Tyranny versus Anarchy
Is it possible to exaggerate the role of Amin in the
tragedy of Uganda? It is important to remember the ancient
distinction between tyranny and anarchy . How much of the anguish of
Uganda is due to the tyranny exercised by Idi Amin ? How much of
it is by now a consequence of sheer anarchy and normative collapse?
Tyranny involves centrally-directed force ; anarchy entails
decentralized violence . The two processes could reinforce each
other . Governments scared of what appear to them to be anarchic
trends could get more tyrannical . On the other hand , groups

which are dissatisfied with the credentials of a government, and

are unwilling to concede it legitimacy , could destabilize society
as a whole . A third possibility is when groups take advantage
of either governmental weakness or general erosion of public
morality - and create even further arbitrariness and insecurity in
the society at large .
The precise balance between tyranny and anarchy in the Third
 195

World as a whole varies from country to country . In Uganda the

tyrannical factor has by far been the more publicized , partly

because of the flamboyant personality of Idi Amin and his capacity
to attract international notoriety . But in fact by 1977 Uganda
has become as much a case of sheer decentralized violence as a
case of purposeful tyranny .
This is not to deny the argument that many of the more
publicized murders were indeed centrally-directed , often instigated
by Field Marshal Idi Amin himself . The murder of Chief Justice
Kiwanuka in 1972 , the murder of Vice-Chancellor Kalimuzo of Makerere
University in the same year , and the murder of Archbishop Luwum in
1977 along with two Cabinet ministers , were almost certainly ordered
by Idi Amin himself .

But far less publicized are the far more numerous cases of
wanton decentralized brutality of individual soldiers " executing "
a man behind a dance-hall in order to " inherit " his girl friend
for the night , or of civilian criminals wearing army uniforms on loan
from real soldiers as a strategy of extorting money . On balance
many more people must have died , or been mutilated , in Uganda as a
result of decentralized violence than in response to purposeful
brutality by the regime .
This is not a defense of the regime . Afterall , a government

which is incapable of preventing such lawlessness should in any

case abdicate and let others try their luck in restoring decency
and order .

But when we are trying to understand the real causes of

violence in a society , it is not enough to focus on the bizarre
brutality of a single individual , no matter how powerful . It is temp
ting to reduce all causation to the personality of Idi Amin .. But

just as it is simplistic to attribute the birth of Protestantism to

the constipation of Martin Luther , so it is simplistic to
 196

attribute the collapse of decency and order in Uganda to the

reported venerial difficulties of Idi Amin .

The personalistic approach to the study of Uganda's recent

history has been aggravated by the fascination that Amin commands in
the international mass media . He emerges as a conductor orches
trating a bizarre symphony of shrieks of pain , signs of despair , and
thuds of fatal finality .
A related obstacle in the effort to understand what is going
on in Uganda is the problem of assessing the reliability of the
news which comes out of Uganda .
One item of news in 1976 illustrated this issue dramatically
for this writer . This was a bad story about Uganda which became
one more " Amin " headline item in the world press . In August 1976
it was reported that a massacre of students had taken place on the
campus of Makerere University in Uganda . The report was detailed .
It included the precise place where the massacre took place (on
Freedom Square in front of the Main Adminstration Building ) ; the
approximate number of casualties ( at least one hundred and conceivably
up to eight hundred ) , the details of other brutal atrocities (mut
ilation of breasts of girl students ) , the usual sexual assaults
( soldiers raping girl students ) , etc. , etc ..
I was in Kenya when this story broke in British newspapers ,
I flew to Dar es Salaam . I had dinner the same week with the
former president of Uganda , Dr. Milton Obote , at his residence
in- exile in Tanzania . (Obote was the man Idi Amin overthrew ) .
Also at Obote's dinner was the British journalist mainly responsible
for the story of the "massacre " on Makerere campus . I expressed
puzzlement at the dinner over the apparently exclusive nature of
such a news " scoop " . A massacre in front of the main building of
the only university of a country , situated in its capital city ,
 197

seemed unlikely to remain unnoticed to all but British observers .

Even the Kenya newspapers , next door to Uganda , seemed to be citing
only British sources . Obote and Martin assured me of the veracity
of the story .

The following Sunday Martin's weekly newspaper in London ,

The Observer , carried a further confirmatory story about the
" massacre " on campus in Uganda . It was written by Martin .
The whole story was carried world-wide by Western networks .
My wife first heard the story from her car radio . It was a story on
a local Canadian broadcast . She was so disturbed by the news and
by its likely impact on me that she immediately put through a
trans -Atlantic telephone call to me in Dar es Salaam to check out
the story and find out how I was taking it . (We had both lived on
Makerere campus for about ten years ) .
Since then I have checked out the story meticulously , receiving
confidential evidence from about fifteen witnesses who were on campus
on that day . The witnesses were of six different nationalities
ranging from Ugandan to West German . I am now completely satisfied

that there was no "massacre " on Makerere campus in the first week
of August 1976 . There was indeed an " invasion " of soldiers ,
seemingly invited by the university authorities theṁselves in the
face of student unrest . The soldiers did get out of hand and
started beating up students , kicking them , injuring them with
rifle butts . But nobody was killed . And apparently no girls
were raped , let alone mutilated . In short , there was no " massacre "
in the sense of killings .
David Martin of The Observer probably sincerely believed his
1 story . But his first story was datelined Lusaka in Zambia , and
his second came from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania . Martin had never

1
 198

been to Uganda since Amin took over power in 1971 . Yet one bad

story by a sincere but mistaken British journalist captured the

attention of much of the world press . And no retraction or correction

has ever been made by The Observer since then .

Clearly there is enough brutality committed by Idi Amin without
our inventing fictional instances as well . The man is guilty enough
to qualify for the most torrid recesses of hell . Yet one lurid

error by a British journalist was enough to misinform the world .

The " information gap" was playing games with both the obscenities
of an African tyrant and the credulousness of the rest of the world .
What a journalist reports from his own experiences in Uganda
in the earlier part of Amin's rule may be solid . What he attempts
to reconstruct from second -hand accounts outside Uganda can be
basically plausible . David Martin is critical of the evidence .
But we should bear in mind that both Martin and the rest of us are
caught up in the contradictions of " the information gap " under a
military tyranny . Is Amin as bad as the international press
portrays him? Precisely because Amin is a tyrant we may
never know for certain . David Martin was reporting from Zambia
about Uganda partly because he simply could not do it within Uganda .
He would have been killed on Amin's orders anytime he chose to
arrive in Uganda not least because of his prior anti - Amin
reports , let alone his book , General Amin .
Amin's brutal control of the media in Uganda - including the
execution of some editorial personnel of Uganda television and of the
Luganda newspaper , Munno denies the tyrant even the mitigation of
some of his own offenses . The " information gap " has at times
earned him worse publicity than he deserves - though he does
deserve a lot of negative coverage all the same .
 199

Scenarios for Amin's Removal

Since the misery of Uganda is due to pois tyranny and
anarchy , the elimination of Idi Amin would not by itself
necessarily restore civilized standards to Uganda's government
or restore happiness and prosperity to its people . But such

an elimination of the incumbent tyrant must be the starting

point of any change . Amin himself is beyond reform and beyond
redemption . Whatever else needs to happen to the country to help
it on the path towards recovery , the Dudu of Dada must be removed
from the nation's blood stream ,

a
"Dudu " is , swahili word for bacteria , as well as for stinging
" creatures" .

There are a number of possibilities . One is merely an

assassination of the man himself without an accompanying change of

government . nin's henchmen would kill . indiscriminately immediately
after the event , but the regime which follows could still be an
improvement . The precedent of Zanzibar since the assassination

of Sheikh Abeid Karume gives reason for hope . The regime as a

whole remained in power , and some of those allegedly implicated in
the leader's assassination have been killed . But Aboud Jumbe ,

Karume's successor , is a more moderate and more civilized leader

than Karume . It has made a good deal of difference to the quality
of life in Zanzibar ,
The Zanzibari case lends credence to the assumption that

a single person could be a critical variable between tolerable

conditions and an intolerable situation . And yet the larger the
society the less likely would it be that a single person could
count for so much . Uganda is fifty times the size of Zanzibar .
 200

A Ugandan equivalent of Aboud Jumbe , succeeding an assassinated

Amin , would face much tougher obstacles to the restoration of
normality than the man on the Isle of cloves had to face .
But even a moderate difference in Uganda is worth striving for .
An assassination can be carried out by a single brave individual ,
civilian or military , Ugandan or non-Ugandan .
A second scenario would be one in which the main basis of
Amin's power in Uganda ( " Nubi " and all ) was overthrown . Para

doxically this requires either a split in Amin's own armed forces

or massive arned intervention from outside . The former is more

likely than the latter as matters now stand . There have in

fact been periodic splits in Uganda's armed forces since 1971 , but
the pro - Amin faction has always won so far .
A third scenario is a major social revolution - an uprising
by a people brutalized beyond the bounds of patience and moderation .
There was an element of such a popular uprising in Zanzibar in 1964 ,
though that was an eruption arising out of centuries of discrimination
rather than out of any significant brutality by Sultan Jamshid's
government before he was overthrown in 1964 . The chances of such
a popular uprising in Uganda are not high but they cannot be
discounted . Even a people long cowed and maltreated is capable
of re -discovering the ominous courage of proclaiming : " Enough
is enough ! "
A fourth scenario is an invasion of Uganda by Ugandan exiles
and their supporters from the outside world. If the invasion comes

from across more than one border (e.g. from both Kenya and Tanzania ) ,
and is well organized , well armed and well planned , it might stand
a better chance than did the 1972 invasion of pro -Obote elements
from Tanzania . But however chaotic Uganda's armed forces may be ,

invaders from outside would still face serious difficulties .

 201

A fifth scenario is a prolonged guerrilla war within Uganda ,

partly sustained materially and morally from outside . This would

probably be a slow process - gradually weakening the regime and

dividing it against itself while at the same time raising the
consciousness of the masses and mobilizing them for solemn
resistance to petty tyrants in their own villages and localities
from day to day .
The sixth scenario is an economic blockade of Uganda . Kenya's
role would be vital in this , The application of an " oil embargo "
on Uganda by Kenya in July and August 1976 revealed dramatically
Uganda's vulnerability as a landlocked country . It also revealed
how a prolonged embargo of that kind would sooner or later force
much of the rest of the Ugandan army to turn against Amin in a bid
to reopen channels of vital supplies .
There was a risk in 1976 that Amin would declare military
hostilities against Kenya . But how long could he fight a war
without petroleum ?
Yet the question still remains whether Kenya would be prepared
to risk the bombing of Nakuru or Mombasa even if Kenya was assured
of final victory a month later . Would it be too big
a price to expect Kenya to pay on its own for the goal of ridding
the world of Idi Amin ?

Some commentators have touched on one or two of these scenarios

in their writings , but without exploring their full implications .
Some have seen their mission more in terms of raising the con
sciousness of the world about the evil of Amin than in terms of
plotting for his overthrow , To that extent theirs is a cry of
political mobilization rather than a strategy of military operation .
But even mere denunciation deserves to succeed precisely as
a mobilizational critique of a special case of tyranny .
 202

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The sixth scenario is the one most relevant to the issue of

whether or not the United States should itself impose sanctions on
Uganda , What should America do?

I. Militarily -Relevant Forms of Cooperation

It is relatively easy to reach a decision on forms of cooperation

which directly strengthen Amin's military and coercive machinery .
Such cooperation , where it still exists , should be terminated forth
with . Fortunately the United States has been moving in that direction
in any case . Further action may be needed to terminate any remaining
training arrangements for paramilitary Ugandan personnel . Any

residual trade in militarily relevant vehicles and spare parts should

also be investigated and terminated .
II . Cooperation in Education
There is evidence already that Ugandans (both refugees and those
still technically resident in their home country) are finding it
increasingly difficult to get visas to study in the United States .
The relevant authorities in the United States must have begun to infer
that every Ugandan admitted to the United States is a potential
applicant for political asylum and permanent residence .
The inference is understandable , but the apparent evolving
discrimination against Ugandans on visas is still immoral .
The American visa authorities are caught up in a dilemma . On

the one hand , those Ugandans who are in good standing with Idi Amin
are more likely than others to go back home upon the completion
of their studies , On the other hand , those Ugandans who have run
away from home are looking for jobs and asylum in other lands . If

the United States does not want to encourage a brain drain , it should
give priority to Ugandans in good standing vith Idi. Amin . But if
 203

the Carter Administration follows the logic of its crusade for

human rights it should give priority to those who are running away
from Amin's tyranny .
In fact , the United States should not discriminate against
either category of Ugandans . It is absurd to assume that Ugandans
who have found it necessary to run away from home are necessarily
morally superior to those who have decided to remain with their

families and try to survive as best they can . The great majority of
Ugandans still live within Uganda . If they have sons and daughters

qualified for education , why should these be regarded as less worthy

than the sons and daughters of emigrés and exiles?
Those who remain behind in Uganda are not necessarily defenders
of the regime ( even if they are forced to say so in public ) .

People resign themselves to tyrants for a variety of reasons -

ranging from loyalty to their families to sheer opportunism .
On the other hand , people go into exile also for a variety of
reasons . Some are inspired by moral revulsion , and can no longer
collaborate with a tyrannical system . Some are frightened - and
scramble for safety . But there are also some that are opportunists
taking advantage of international sympathy at a given moment in time .
The United States should not enter into the business of dis

criminating between Ugandan students who appear to be in good

standing with Amin and those who appear to be reluctant refugees,
No liberal democratic government has the machinery to measure and
balance sincerity against opportunism in such situations , without
sacrificing its most sacred values of privacy and individuality .

25-826 0 - 78 - 14
 204

III Special Aid for Refugees

But the United States is in a position to make extra efforts
in assistance on behalf of both refugees and of those countries
who have extended special hospitality to them . The largest numbers
of Ugandan refugees are in ( a ) Kenya , (b ) Tanzania , ( c ) the United
Kingdom and (d ) Zambia , probably in that order of numerical mag
nitude .

Through the United Nations Commission for Refugees , the

United States should render additional assistance to relief efforts
in Kenya , Tanzania and Zambia especially , Eligibility for assistance

should also be broadened to include allowances for settling down given

to newly arrived professionals, as well as subsistance allowances
given to the truly destitute .
In the field of education the U.S. Agency for International
Development (A.I.D. ) should make available to the Association of
African Universities scholarships to enable Ugandan refugees to study
in other African countries . Thus Ugandan student refugees in , say ,
for example
Tanzania could ſeither study at the University of Dar es Salaam or go
to Ibadan University in Nigeria under joint sponsorship by A.I.D.
and the Association of African Universities .
IV Trade Embargo

Should the United States stop buying , say ,Ugandan coffee?

A trade embargo by the United States on Uganda could only gain
legitimacy if it was accompanied by at least two of the following
mea sures :

(1) Simultaneous announcement of comparable economic measures

against the Republic of South Africa . Anything short
of that may create doubts about American moral sincerity
both in Africa itself and among large numbers of Black
 205

Americans . Why should economic sanctions be regarded

as relevant when dealing with a black dictator ( Amin )
but not relevant when dealing with the most institutionalized
!
racist system in human history ( apartheid ) ?
( ii ) Simultaneous announcement of specially generous measures
for the relief of Ugandan refugees in Kenya , Tanzania ,
Zambia , Europe , North America and elsewhere .

( iii ) Simultaneous announcement of American commitment to an inter

national effort for the reconstruction of Uganda economically ,
politically and educationally upon the restoration of civilian
rule under free elections in the country .

( iv ) Simultaneous announcement by the United States of its

readiness to start negotiations with the Organization of
African Unity in search of a joint Charter of Human Rights ,
comparable to the Atlantic Charter between Franklin Roosevelt
and Winston Chruchill more than twenty - five years ago .
The Charter on Human Rights would allow for a joint committee
to monitor human rights in both Africa and the United States .
The American side would be particularly concerned with the
rights of minorities . The cooperation would assure Africa
(and the ' rest of the world ) that the United States is not
merely concerned with passing judgment on others in the field
of human rights , but is prepared to allow others to pass
judgment on Anierica's own performance .
'v ) Status of Ugandan Embassy in Washington
In more symbolic terms , the United States would be justified
if it decided to reduce the Ugandan Embassy in Washington
to a Consulate in charge of economic affairs , educational
needs of Ugandan students and residual areas of cultural
 206

exchange . But again any punitive action that singles

out the Uganda government ( in a world full of violations
of human rights ) must be accompanied by compensatory
action in favor of Ugandans as a people .

A decision to reduce the Ugandan Embassy to a Consulate should

be accompanied by a decision to render greater help to Ugandans
in North America generally , of both African and Asian extraction .
This would involve cooperation with the government of Canada , which
has extended hospitality to hundreds of Ugandans of Asian ancestry .
Some of these have done well in Canada . Others are still destitute .
Greater efforts by both Washington and Ottawa could help the destitute
with assistance in such fields as (a ) loans for business enterprise
or initiation into new occupations, ( b ) educational opportunities
for younger members of their families, (c ) loans for the
purchasing of homes where appropriate .

CONCLUSION : The Nemesis of Residual Anarchy

But what should constantly be borne in mind when dealing with
Uganda is once again that the problem is not just Amin but general
normative collapse .
When the lights went out one night in New York city in the summer
of 1977 , a normative collapse occurred in sections of the population .
There was greed and looting , wanton vandalism , reckless plunder ,
and sheer aggressivity . A mere mechanical lapse in the supply of
electricity let loose the demon of anarchy in America's largest
city .
 207

Well , the lights have gone out in Uganda . Norms and values
cultivated over generations have come abruptly to an end . The

nemesis of anarchy has cast its shadow over a society that once
laughed and made merry .

When the tyrant is dead and buried , the anarchy may still
remain in Uganda .

It is because of these considerations that the United States

must not simply think in terms of destroying the tyrant. It must

also think in terms of rebuilding the nation of Uganda . Commitment

to any punitive action against Amin must be accompanied by a
dedication to the reconstruction of the society which produced
him . It is easy enough to preach human rights . It is far more

difficult to practise human partnership . Uganda is one compelling

test-case for the United States .
 208

Mr. Diggs. Thank youvery much for a most constructive contribu

tion to the committee's deliberations.
Ambassador Melady, you indicated that many of the missionaries
that you knew whenyou were there are still there.A lot of people are
confused about this issue of missionaries. Why despite all of the urg
ings do they still remain ? Could you tell us something about those mis
sionaries that you know , and why despite all of these things going on
all around them, they insist upon staying at such great risk ?
Mr. MELADY. Yes . When I arrived there wereabout a thousand
missionaries or missionary- related people — missionaries and the lay
people working at their schools, hospitals, and other activities. After
I received my instructions in late October, early November 1972,
set out in my calls on missionaries doing it in a variety of ways and
urging them to leave, pointing out the various dangers without giving
a good hint that the American Embassy would probably be closed.
That number fell to when I left I think it may have been almost
300. I think it may have fell to about 240 or 250. So therefore, Con
gressman, a good number did leave but some, as you pointed out,
did remain and some of those that are still there I knew.
I can relate their staying in most cases fell in the category of
recognizing the dangers, recognizing the tyranny, but feeling theyhad
an obligation to people. I won't name the geographicareas to identify
the missionaries, but they would normally say : We have had the
secondary school for 15 years and if we close it, there won't be one.
This medical service, if it closes these people willsuffer. We are going
to stay with the people.
When I returned in the final months and I was in Washington for
consultation, I received new instructions to call on the heads of the
organizations here in the States which I did and some of them told
me they recognized the dangers but they felt they had an obligation
to stay .
Mr. Diggs. I remember the gentleman from New York opening up
an interesting line of questioning earlier about your previous exper
ience. I would like to pursue that. In Burundi there has also been a
situation characterized as genocide, a tribal genocide. How do you
differentiate between that situation and the situation in Uganda ?
Mr. MELADY. I listened very carefully to Dr. Mazrui's paper and I
certainly want to read a copy of it . I felt you had the explosions that
occurred while I was therein which a large number of Hutu peoples
were killed. Whether it was in aa deliberate planned effort by the chief
of state or whether the result of the historical alienation between the
Hutus and the landowners and the nonlandowners is something on
which there are various comments but I think no one has claimed or
established that the chief of state personally directed and played a
major role. That is why I think the Uganda thing is different from
the tragedy of Burundi where the chief of state, unlike the chief of
state here, has played a major role in directing the atrocities and the
genocide.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Binaisa, you made reference earlier to the profits
from coffee sales finding their way into Swiss accounts. Do you have
any concrete evidence of this or is that just speculation ?
 209

Mr. BINAISA. No, Mr. Chairman ; I don't have any concrete evidence
I mean to present to the committee but I know forcertain that ,
Mr. Diggs. I assume you meant the Swiss accounts of Idi Amin
himself.
Mr. BINASA . Yes ; I did. The money was earmarked for building
schools and all that from the Saudi Arabians and I am told that it was
not applied to be used or it had been sort of granted. This hasannoyed
the Saudi Arabians that now it is only Libya that is aiding Idi Amin
with money, not Saudi Arabia or Kuwait any more.
Mr. Diggs. I wasinterested in the references to internal security
system in Uganda. You, Mr. Binaisa, are a former Attorney General
of that country .
Mr. BINAISA. Yes.
Mr. Diggs. Does the system of criminal justice in Uganda lend itself
to the continuation of human rights violations whether Idi Amin is
the head of state or not ?
Mr. BINAISA. I don't think so. The reason why I don't think so is
that Idi Amin himself by decree has emasculated the system of
criminal justice, the administration of justice. He has taken away the
ordinary powers of the courts by establishing military tribunals which
are presided over by unqualified army officers. There people just briefly
appear for about 5 minutes and then the sentence of death is pro
nounced by a firing squad .
I agree up to a point with my friend here Professor Mazrui that
anarchy does existbut I don't agree in the proportions the professor
gives it in his testimony. I think a greater part of it is tyranny and
just only a very small part of it is anarchy because traditionally our
people in Uganda have always been renowned,well known for obeying
established authority. They have always found it very difficult to take
a man's life.
You see, when you look at the number of cases of people, the army
officers going out to whole villages in a mass and killingeverybody in
the village, I don't call this anarchy. What I call anarchy, as he de
scribed it in his testimony, is one man taking the law in his hands and
stopping a man on a bicycleor in a car, taking him outor ifyou want
to steal his wife or his girlfriend he shoots him . That I call anarchy.
It is a question of degree whether you would think of it in terms of
tyranny or anarchy.
Mr. Diggs. Professor, I was particularly impressed with your con
sideration of corollary actionshere, your concern that if the committee
is going to take such actions they must be mindful of the impact upon
the peoples who were really not responsible for these matters. You
made a recommendation, for example, to increase funds to the Ameri
can Association for African Universities for Uganda students.
You may know that the administration is requesting$ 550,000 for the
Inter -African scholarship program for fiscal 1979. Nothing is pro
jected beyond that. I don't know whether you or the organization with
which you identify, the World Order Models Project, has researched
this matter and identified a specific amount that you think might be
earmarked for aid to Uganda students.
Mr. MAZRUI. Not a specific amount as such. I went on the trip to
three of the major centers of Uganda refugees last year, and they are
 210

in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, and they have problems already

with regard to young Ugandans seeking an education and not getting
scholarships to universities in those societies but who could behelped
if there was a program that facilitated that kind of undertaking.
Second, there has been a shrinking of opportunities for Ugandans
overseas because I do believe it is getting tougher. It is never articu
lated as such but sometimes those countries are balancing out things.
If this particular student is coming with approval of his government,
he must be a collaborator ; therefore , why should we support him.
If he is not coming with the approval ofhis country, then he must
be a potential political refugee and therefore would be landed with
someone applying for asylumvery shortly.
So I detect, sir, some pernicious trend which affects the young
Ugandans universally. Every week I get dozens of letters from differ
entpartsoftheworldfrom youngUgandans. There is a pernicious
trend which hits at them in either direction. Either they aresuspected
of collaborating with the regimebecause theyare not political refugees
as if it is immoral to remain behind. Since the bulk of Ugandansare
right there, we cannot adopt a situation that only those of us who have
had to scramble out of Uganda have a moral search here.
So a young man who is not especially political and has been given
the go-ahead by the Amin regime is totally wrong that his education
should suffer because he is not identified as a fighter against the
regime. So it is partly because of those considerations that I think an
effort to facilitate alternative opportunities for Ugandans would be
one of the compensatory measures that ought to be invoked to balance
out the retributive actions contemplated in the legislation .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am a little bit unclear about the nature of the killing process which
is underway in Angola. To what extent are those who are being
slaughtered, being slaughtered essentially for tribal or political rea
sons or to what extent is it completely random ?
Mr. MAZRUI. In Uganda ?
Mr. SOLARZ. I am sorry. In Uganda.
Mr. Mazkur. Well, let me give you my estimates, and then my col
leagues can supplement if you will agree .
There are definitely some political motivated killings that take
place and some are orchestrated from very high, but there are in
stances where in a dance hall someone in uniform wants that girl to
dance with, someone else questions it, there is an execution half an
hour later behind the dance hall. There are instances of people who
are not soldiers who are sold uniforms by soldiers because once you
wear it, it is itself a point of entry to influence and power. There are
instances of people who are sold guns by soldiers andkill accordingly .
So I think there is a good deal of killing that is privately motivated .
Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.
Mr. Melady .
Mr. MELADY. I hold Idi Amin responsible for the chief of state. In
doing the research for this book , we had to cut down on the number
of pages, that is the way the books are. My wife came across more
than I did on the literature of the Americans who went over to Ger
 211

many, either the public relations people or the professors. There is a

distressing amount of literature that didn't want to say that Hitler
was a killer - it was alienation against the Jews because they had done
various things, and there were various sociological reasons givenfor
it. Hitler was a killer in 1938 , it was known. I think aa killer is a killer.
Mr. SOLARZ. But in terms of the question I asked , the answer in terms
of Nazi Germany was it was not just random people who were being
killed. It was Jews or gypsies or Communists, people who fell into
some category into which they fell. I am just trying to get a sense of
the feeling in Uganda. Do the people who get killed fiit into some
recognizable category and thus are killed because of a membership in
the category or do those people get killed for idosyncratic reasons
someone wanted someone's wife, another one was upset because some
body didn't cross the street and that sort of thing ? What is your judg
ment on that ? Even if it is the latter, it does not mean that Amin is
not responsible. I am just tryingto understand it.
Mr. MELADY. My understanding is there are those that have been
killed in the circumstances that the press has indicated . I have been
present at a dance hall when that happened during mytour there. The
African structure of murder is the responsibility of Idi Amin and I
callhim responsible for the structure.
Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, but what about in terms of who is being killed ; is
it being done idiosyncratically or it is being done by categories?
Mr. MELADY. Present or potential opposition, presentor potential
power to harm Amin.
Mr. Solarz. If it is idiosyncratically, it does not make it any better.
Mr. BINAISA. I agree with Professor Mazrui. I have also seen cases
where there was one colonel who looked at the glass in a bar which
had been brought to him . It looked dirty and he called for the barmaid
and the barmaid came. Well, she was frightened to death because she
just went to apologize . She knelt down to apologize and this man just
took out his pistol and executed the girl there and then on the spot.
But you see, this man who did it was in uniform . The question is, you
go to where the garb of power is in Uganda. Once you are in that garb
of power, as the professor says, some of the soldiers may sell the
uniform .
Mr. Solarz. So most of the killing is not of a tribal character ?
Mr. BINAISA. No. Whoever is in uniform has the license
Mr. SOLARZ. To kill ?
Mr. Binaisa. To take away human life.
Mr. SOLARZ. But the people whose lives they are taking away are
not members of a particular tribe ?
Mr. BINAISA. It is across the board.
Mr. MAZRUI. Across the board .
Mr. BINAISA.Say in 1976.
Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. Chairman , I would like to be able to continue this
but I also would like to be able to make the vote. Are you going to
adjourn ?
Mr. Diggs. I am trying to find out what the vote is. I am not quite
sure .
Mr. SOLARZ. Could I come back from the vote and continue it even
if you are not able to make it yourself? I just need about another 5 or
10 minutes if that is OK with you gentlemen .
Mr. PEASE. I will come back, too .
 212

Mr. Diggs. I think we can wrap this up pretty quickly if the patience
of you gentlemen holds out.
This is the rule for the bill. The subcommittees will stand in recess
until 6:20.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken .]
Mr. Diggs. The subcommittees will resume their sitting.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I realize the hour
is late and I will try to be relatively brief but the matters we do have
under consideration are of such significant moral import that I do
think it is important to finish this lineof inquiry.
I want to come back to the question of who is getting killed and why
they are getting killed. Let me give you an example. In Democratic
Kampuchia, asCambodia is now known, the estimates are that some
where perhaps in the vicinity of a million peoplehave been killed by
the Khmer Rouge regime since the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975. When
you ask the people who are following this closely, “Who are the people
getting killed ? " They tell you that by and large the people who are
getting killed are people connected with the OCM regime, people who
served in the army of the Lon Nol government, people who held
official positions in the government bureaucracy, andintellectuals. An
intellectual was anyone who turned out to have a seventh grade
education .
Now of course above and beyondthat there were idiosyncratic kill
ings of people who may have said something that displeased the
government or what haveyou but clearly most of the people who were
getting killed were being killed because they were in certain categories
that were considered hostile for one reason or another to the interests
of the regime.
What I am trying to get at is in Uganda to the extent that you can
make any estimates, are the people who were getting killed getting
killed because they are viewed as hostile to the interests of the govern
ment, perhaps because they are peopleofinfluence or people of educa
tion or people who belong to a particular tribe other than the one
which Mr. Amin belongs to, or are they getting killed in a sense com
pletely at random for reasons that have nothing to do with whether
or not they are a threat to the regime but have muchmore todo with
whether they simply crossed someone who is licensed to kill?
Can any of you answer that question ? I mean so far as I am con
cerned killing is killingand one is not better than theother but I think
it is important for us to have a sense of how this is working.
Mr. MAZRUI. There are two communities that carried much of the
brunt of the genocide factor. I don't think the term “ genocide” applies
to the whole of Uganda but I believe it has relevance in describing the
fate of the Acholi and to some extent the fate of the Langi.
Mr. SOLARZ. Those two tribes suffer disproportionately ?
Mr. MAZRUI. That is right.
Mr. SOLARZ. Presumably because — what was the source of hostility
to those two tribes ?
Mr. MAZRUI. Well, in the case of the Acholi, that was the largest
group represented in Obote's army and had a reputation as exception
ally good soldiers, so to some extent there was an element of insecurity
 213

on the part of Idi Amin . In the case of the Langi, that is the com
munityfrom which Milton Obote came so it was Obote's tribe. At the
time he took over power he bracketed them together.
In those days I was still ina position to attempt official influence and
it seemed to me a mistake and dangerous that he should have bracketed
them . The reason why I thought so was the Langi on their own he
would not really be afraid of but for the presumed alliance with the
Acholi. On the other hand as regards the Acholi, he could have rallied
them behind him if he had tried harder.
Mr. SOLARZ. How many tribes are there in Uganda and what per
centage of the population belongs to these two tribes ?
Mr. MAZRUI. These two tribes are relatively small and they are in
the north of the country. In the case of the Acholi — correct me if I am
wrong , Godfrey — there are about 700,000 at the most and in the case
of theLangi about 400,000.
Mr. Solarz. What is the overall population ?
Mr. MAZRUI. 10 million .
Mr. SOLARZ. So about 10 percent of the population belongs to these
two tribes.
Mr. MAZRUI. Right.
Mr. SOLARZ. And presumably that leaves plenty of people who
would be left to be killed even assumingthose two tribes are the ones
that bear a disproportionate percentage of thelosses.
Now you makea point that a lot of the killing is really a function
of the anarchy developing. To the extent that there is any truth to
that, the fact remains thatthis is an anarchy which is being organized
or at the very least sanctioned by Amin himself who serves to
legitimize it by investing his henchmen with the authority to engage
in these indiscriminate killings and that while he may not be personally
aware of every murder which takes place in the country and in the fact
that many of them may take place for reasons that have nothing to
do with his own political interests that nonetheless he presides over
a system in whichthis is permitted and probably even encouraged and
that therefore if he could be removed there is real reason to hope that
a successor leadership would be able to impose a measure of control
and stability over the country there by bringing these indiscriminate
killings to an end. Is that a fair assessment of the situation ?
Mr. Mazrul.In a juridical sense you are quite right that a head of
state has to be held responsible for the governmentor for the break
downs that take place in the society, so in the juridical or legal sense it
is true he is responsible for what is happening in Uganda and if he is
incapable of protecting people he ought not to be there.
Mr. SOLARZ. I am suggesting thathe is responsible for it in more
than that kind of abstract juridical sense. I am suggesting that he is
responsible for it in the sense that he is aware of what is going on,
that he sanctions and encourages it because he sees this as a way of
maintaining his power, that it is not the situation where there are
indiscriminate killings going on of which he is unaware and of which
he is simply unable to control - he is aware of it, he chooses to permit
it to continue because he feels that the existing situation serves his
interest.
Mr. BINAISA . Yes.
 214

Mr. SOLARZ. In that sense I think he is much more than jurisdically

responsible. At the end of World War II we hung the Japanese Gen
eral Amacheta on the grounds that his troops committed atrocities
thousands of miles away from his command headquarters and his de
fense was that he was unaware that it was going on. We took the posi
tion that even if he was unaware of them , and there was good reason
to be unaware of them, that nonetheless he had the command responsi
bility and should have known about it and should have done some
thing about it. I am not suggesting that General Amin is a General
Amacheta ; he knows what is going on, he is encouraging it and in that
sense he is responsible for it. Do you disagree with that ?
Mr. Mazrui. Marginally I disagree in the sense that he knows about
it. I agree that he knows about it. Heencourages it. I would not put
it necessarily that he has no special will to attempt to stop it. Is he in
complete charge of his rebel army ? I disagree with the suggestion
thathad he wanted to stop it he would have done so in terms ofcontrol
because I don't think he had the control.
Mr. SOLARZ. You don't think he has the ability to bring it to an
end ?
Mr. MAZRUI. No.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think his successor would have the ability ?
Mr. MAZRUI. A successor would stand a chance .
Mr. SOLARZ. Why wouldn't Amin be able to if he wanted to ?
Mr. MAZRUI. Well, he has not.In my terms he is a kind of demolition
generalbut he is not a builder, he is not a coordinator, he is not an
inspired conciliator so he does not have the skills.
Mr. SOLARZ. All three of you gentlemen obviously know him
personally.
Mr. BINAISA. Yes.
Mr. SOLARZ. You have met him, you have seen him in action ?
Mr. BINAISA. Yes.
Mr. Solarz. I am not asking for a clinical definition but do you
consider him to be insane or do you consider him to be albeit a mur
derer nonetheless someone who is a rational human being, under
stands what he is doing, can differentiate right from wrong and
someone who we consider to be not insane ? In other words, is what he
has done or permitted to be done a function of extreme mental illness ?
Mr. BINAISA. No ; I for one, Congressman, don't think that Amin
is insane at all. For instance, there are some instances as when there
was fear for the 240 American missionaries when word went to him
that the consequences might well be bad for him and he retracted his
steps. Well, that is not the kind of act of an insane man. Why didn't
he go ahead ? He changed the venue and then he told them he would
meet them at the airport but once things became so hard for him he re
tracted his steps. Sohe is not insane at all. I think he is fully responsi
ble for all his acts.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do the other two witnesses share that view ?
Mr. BINAISA. He is shrewd. He knew what he was doing. He
threatened me.
Mr. SOLARZ. Physically ?
Mr. BINAISA. With the Americans. I saw him use threat intelligently
done. Shrewdly done is the word. I am not a psychiatrist but I hold
Amin responsible for all his actions.
 215

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you think the impactonAmin would beif this
legislation passed ? What would his reaction be ? What actions, if any,
would it be likely to elicit from him ?
Mr. MELADY. Well, I have a rather clear feeling and my feeling
was — and I have tried to use reconciliation and suggest I found it
totally useless. He recognizes one thing — brute power. This would be
a blowto his economy and may help to ameliorate the situation.
Mr. SOLARZ. But what do you think his reaction would be to the fact
that this embargo would beput in place ? Would he dismiss it ? Would
he attempt to evade it ? Would it bother him ?
Mr. MELADY. He is already responding in regard to the publications
attempt for the new leaf and the peoplethat hehas hired to propagate
the new leaf. Nothing could be any worse than it is now. I think it
will be a blow and itmay start theprocess of bringing him down.
Mr. BINAISA. My view is, as I stated earlier,it isone of those contrib
utory factors toward creating a situation inside the country, even
inside the army, of bringing him down. It isjust a contributory factor.
However, in percentageterms it will contribute as a matter which is
open .
Mr. SOLARZ. Why isn't is possible for a Ugandan liberation front or
whatever else it might be called of exiles to be organized that could
attempt to infiltrate the country and try to bring this regime down ?
It seems to be done everywhere else.
Mr. Binaisa. He is always screaming that each oneof us is responsi
ble for that kind of thing but we are not. What has happened before,
as you might have read in the papers, is that about 10 attempts have
been made by individuals whichhave not succeeded.
Mr. SOLARZ. How many Ugandan exiles are there?
Mr. BINAISA. All told | There must be now about 50,000 in Kenya,
Tanzania.
Mr. SOLARZ. How do you explain the fact that these terrible, terrible
things are happening to your country and you have thousands upon
thousands of people in exile and despite a tradition in our times of
taking up arms against oppression that the Ugandan refugees and
exiles have not consciously attempted to do just that ?
Mr. Binaisa. How do I explain it ?
Mr. Solarz. Yes; the Zimbabwean people took up arms against the
racist regime of Ian Smith which, however bad it was, strikes me as
being infinitely more enlightened than the regime of Idi Amin.
Mr. Binaisa. Uganda is not so easy . As you know , there was an at
tempt in 1972 that flopped because of lack of planning, and who
knows. I have not been there for someyears. I don't know whois fully
responsible for the various attempts that have so far been made with
out any success .
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman , just one final observation and that has
to do with the argument of Mr. Mazrui about the need for consistency
in dealing with thiskind of problem . I am all in favor of consistency.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I am introducing legislation which I am
privileged to note you consponsor calling for the establishment of pro
hibition on investments in South Africa so I believe very strongly we
ought to do that and I think perhaps very persuasive tactical argu
ments can be made that that bill and this bill might perhaps advance
 216

simultaneously through the congressional process in order to precisely

make it clearthat we are dealing with tyranny in different kinds of
countries and we feel an obligation to respond to both but I don't know
that I would want from a philosophical point of view to make our
ability to deal a blow against racism in South Africa contingent upon
our ability to simultaneously deal a blow against Idi Amin in Uganda
any more in the final analysis than I would want to make our ability
to get rid of Amin contingent on our ability to deal a blow against
apartheid in South Africa .
I think maybe our chances of accomplishing both would be en
hanced if we could do it together but if it turns out that political prob
lems develop along the way whereby we can move one but not the
other, I would hate to see us frozen into a position of immobility. If
fundamental evil and immorality exists in one country, I don't think
that we can escape from our moral obligation to deal with that evil
and immorality because we are unable forwhatever the reasons may be
to simultaneouslydealwith aa different evil and immorality somewhere
else because that is a formula for moral paralysis and inaction.
The fact is that there are many evils and immoralities in the world
but for a variety of reasons which we need not go into now. It is
simply impossible to deal with everyone consistently and simultàne
ously, so if we took the position that the only way we can proceed
against one is to proceed consistently against the others, we would
end up doing nothing. So if we can gosimultaneously and consistently,
by allmeans let's do it and you will certainly havemy support but in
the final analysis I will not oppose legislation designed to deal with
one evil situation simply because we were not able to get comparable
action somewhere else .
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Pease.
Mr. SOLARZ. I think maybe Professor Mazrui wanted to answer
that.
Mr. Mazrul. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just to respond to that. I
think I agree with you that there is a risk of moral paralysis in situa
tions where you demand you must do all or you do nothing but I think
in the case of the South African and Ugandan situation I can see
myself if I was operating as a legislator in a Western country agree
ing tosupport sanctions that are against South Africa but not against
Uganda and not regarding that as a contradiction for a Western
country becauseit is a tremendous leap.
But a situatiin where sanctions are invoked against Uganda but
not against South Africa would, according to my perception, imply
not just any kind of inconsistency but the type of inconsistency which
borders on lacking moral credibility. Among the major reasons is that
you are dealing on one side with a system which started in 1948 with
the victory of the national party in South Africa and has a highly
structured system ofrepression since then and in the case of Idi Amin
you are talking about a phenomenon of the 1970's.
Now in a Western country since 1948 this is at the youngest. If you
assume apartheid started with the national party, you can push it
much further back. It started in 1948 and no sanctions have been
taken. On the contrary, the level of Western investment in Africa for
so long was so overwhelmingly in South Africa so when you are
 217

assessing consistency it is true it does not have to be viewed in this case

as against that case. You add additional variables and among them
is precisely that any sanctions going through Uganda before economic
sanctions against South Africawould sound morally invoking double
standards but sanctions against Uganda either simultaneously with
sanctions against SouthAfrica or after sanctions against South Africa
had been invoked would achieve much greater moral intelligibility.
Mr. BINASA. Mr. Chairman, on that point is where I differ from
my friend here on the question of the whole South African situation .
I still contend that South Africa is a colonial situation whereas in
Uganda we are not dealing with acolonial situation . I fail to seewhy
the long occupation by white people of that area should be considered
just because they have been there for a very long time ; therefore, it
means that it is their country.
I compared with the British the Romans in England and the Otto
man Turksin Greece — theywere there for 150 years.The Greeks never
gave up. This is how I distinguish the question of the purely colonial
situation of South Africa where we don't even win in Africa, don't
recognize it as South Africa, call it Tanzania and as we call South
West Africa Namibia . So these are colonial situations.
I regard the whites are Africans as colonialists such as the British
settlers were in Kenya and therefore I think it was just foolhardy of
the British to grant legal independence in 1910 to the Union of South
Africa by act of Parliament in England. Now we cannot go that far
back so I will talk about the Uganda situation as it is because for one
thing here we have a tyrant who depends for his survival on the huge
amounts of coffee this country is buying. At least in the South African
situation you have to consider so many variables, so many problems,
which in Uganda you have only got to consider withdrawing your
dollars from aiding and abetting Idi Amin.
Mr. Diggs. Mr. Pease.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman , I will try to be brief. I am acutely aware
of the lateness of the hour and the forebearance of our witnesses and
the fact that Ambassador Melady's daughter has abirthday today
and this is hardly a good way to celebrateit. So I will try to be brief.
Following up on the line of questioning that my colleague from
New York raised , would Mr. Mazrui in order to achieve his test of
consistency feel that the economic sanctions levied against South
Africa and Uganda if they were done simultaneously haveto be paral
lelsanctions— in other words, the same sanctions or could they be a
different sort of economic sanctions ?
Mr. Mazrul. They could be different but in some intelligible way
comparable and something which hurts the regime they are being ad
dressed against.
Mr. PEASE . Well, I am very happy to have you say that because I
think some of us are interested in doing just that but we recognize the
domestic political facts of life which are that we probably cannot
politically impose the same kinds of sanctions against South Africa
at this time that we can against Uganda and to insist that they must
be the same and go forward either in the same bill or along parallel
cracks, one not passing unless the other one does, is to say for the time
being anyhow that we cannot act against Uganda and what is going
 218

on there. It seems to me that when we have two great evils to deal

with — indiscriminate murder in Uganda and the apartheid in South
Africa — that there is an element of moral repugnance if we wait for
the political domestic support for both when action for one — namely,
Uganda — is clearly within our grasp .
I guess the question that I askmyself is how many years of genocide
is it worth and how many thousands of Ugandan lives must be sacri
ficed while we are awaiting for domestic politics to allow parallel action
or at least exactly parallel action to be taken against South Africa
as well ?
Mr. Mazrui. I can understand that exactly parallel action need not
in fact reflect the realities because the two societies are very different
and the relationship between the United States and the two countries
are different so I can understand why there might be important dif
ferences but a decision by this country to invoke that kind of action
against South Africa could be an important breakthrough in a situa
tion where until now there has been massive resistance to that kind of
action. Presenting it together as a packageto the world , I think since
they are both being done for moral reasons have enforced the morality
of the two decisionsand that is why Iwas hoping that either be done
together or the southern African think should come first.
Mr. PEASE. I have heard reports that Idi Amin , a Muslim , is trying
to turn Uganda into a Muslim state although it started out with only
5 percent of the population being Muslim. Are these reports accurate ?
Do you have any idea ?
Mr. MAZRUI. Well, do you want to start, sir ?
Mr. BINASIA, No ; you start sir.
Mr. Mazrul. I think it is becoming increasingly true. In other
words, there is a situation of a classic case of a kind of self-fulfilling
prophecy. Here is aa country which by the time Amin captured power
was already much more sectarian in its politics than almost any other
country in Africa. There was a high sensitivity to sectarian issues and
people were conscious. The Catholics and Protestants were conscious.
Any time you make a major appointment of a job, people have identi
fied the sectarian identity of the individual. So Amin comes into
power and for a while, in fact, he was going to try and play the game
of the great conciliator of the contending religious factions within
Uganda and his initial moves included getting all the denominations
together, having his government ministers share sectios of inter
denominational discussions. He attempted to unify the Angelicans
who are toned rather bitterly. He attempted to unifythe Muslims.
SoAminfor a while was the creator ofan ecumenical Uganda where
people of different denominations would live together but that kind
of Amin was operating first in a highly sectarian society and
second, given that sectarian society from a minority base and before
long the difficulty of thatsituation, of that predicament began to put
pressure on the viability of his approach.
Second, he is, in any case, a crude man without the sophistication
to push through a policy of that kind in a logical manner and so there
are major breakdowns of favoritism .
Third, sometimes there were issues confused as to religion and as
a result of the confusion we are enforcing religious questions. The best
 219

case is the murder of the archbishop. Was he killed because he was

Angelican or was he killed because he was Acholi ? He was one of the
last two or three most prominent Ancholis remaining in Uganda. Two
of them were killed almost at the same time. Now if he was killed
partly because of ethnic reasons, then clearly it is a strict sectarian
country but the reaction to that in turn has aggravated the sectarian
tendencies. So what I am saying is whereas previously it was much
less true that Amin was trying to create a Muslim Uganda by 1977–
78, the trend is in that direction.
Mr. BINAISA. I will add just one thing, that he even went to the
extent of creating a kind ofministral religion and then he was doing
whatthe professor has been saying but in the end he went to Lahore
in 1974 and applied for world membership in the world brotherhood
and Uganda was admitted. Itis ironical that Uganda was admitted
with only about 10 percent Muslim population.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you .
I would like to thank you for those answers and also for the testi
mony. I think I previously thanked Mr. Melady and Mr. Binaisa.
I want to thank Mr. Mazrui. I thought your testimony was very
scholarly and very helpful in getting us to focus on the refugees and
the need for rebuilding Uganda after Amin. I do appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, I want to express my gratitude to you for your
patience in chairing the very long hearing and in holding four excel
ſent hearings I think on the subject of Uganda from my point of view
as the sponsor of thislegislation. We have had a very broad exposition
of the issues involved in Uganda and Idi Amin and much of that is
due to your leadershipand I do appreciate it.
Mr. Diggs. I thankthe gentleman .
My compliments to the witnesses.
The subcommittees stand adjourned.
[ Whereupon , at 6:50 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned , to re
convene at the call of the Chair. ]

25-826 0 - 78 - 15
 UNITED STATES- UGANDA RELATIONS

THURSDAY, APRIL 6 , 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham , chairman of the Sub
committee on International Economic Policy and Trade, presiding.
Mr. BINGHAM . This hearing of the three subcommittees, the Sub
committee on Africa, the Subcommittee on International Organiza
tions, and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
and Trade,will be in order.
This is the fifth in a series undertaken to assess U.S. political and
economic relations with Uganda and policy options for the future.
Legislation pending before the subcommittees — H.R . 9252, House Con
current Resolution 394 , House Concurrent Resolution 426, and other
bills - proposes a complete trade embargo and other possible sanc
tions to deal with the evidence of Uganda's severe disregard for hu
man rights.
We have scheduled for today a series of witnesses from private
industry, but first we havethe unexpected pleasure and opportunity
to hear from Hon. Mark Hatfield, senior Senator from the State of
Oregon and a sponsor of the Senate legislation to impose economic
sanctions on Uganda.
I know the industry representatives will appreciate our desire to
extend the privilege to be the first witness to Senator Hatfield. We
welcome you, Senator. Proceed in anyway you see fit.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK 0. HATFIELD , A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OREGON

Mr. HATFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this op

portunity to testify before your subcommittee and the other distin
guished members of this committee. I also would like to thank you
for providing me with this opportunity to speak immediately.
We are engaged in other international affairs on our side, namely
the Panama Canal Treaty, so I will have to return promptly. But I
would like to submit for the record, if I might, two comments made
by myself and one by Senator Weicker who is the chief sponsor of
the resolution inthe Senate. These comments are calling for a boycott
on the import of Uganda coffee .
(221)
 222

Mr. BINGHAM . Without objection, that will be put in the record.

Mr. HATFIELD. I know there are many questions that are raised in
any suggestion of a boycott. I have historically more or less veered
away from boycotts because so frequently rather than hitting the
target at which they are aimed they usually end up being imposed
that is, the full impact ends up being imposed - upon the poorest and
the weakest within thatcountry orsociety.
But I think there are distinctions to be made in this particular
boycott and these are the distinctions that I see. First of all, I think
we have to recognize that about 90 percent of the Ugandan people are
on subsistence farming. Consequently, they are now basically attempt
ing to keep body and soul together with that kind of agriculture.
We know that at one time Uganda had a number of important crops,
but coffee seems to be about the only surviving major cash crop that
finds its way into the international marketplace. As a consequence ,
we find that Idi Amin's reign of terror — and no one, I believe, can
deny that is the best characterization of this regime— is founded, and
its political base is resting, upon this cash crop. As you know, the
political structure is primarily based upon à mercenary soldier
composition.
It is estimated that perhaps between 12,000 and 20,000 Sundanese are
acting as the mercenary soldiers of this regime who are taking their
orders from Amin. These are mercenaries, basically illiterate, who
have little discipline, who are administering what they consider their
form of retribution at the ends of their pistol and with other weapons.
They have to be paid off, Mr. Chairman, every week or 2 weeks or
whatever it might be. I do not know exactly what the time schedule
is, but anymercenary base of this kind has to have its loyalty secured
every payday. As a consequence, Amin recognizes that he has to have
this kind of cash income.
Last year it is estimated — or 1976, rather — about one-half billion
dollars of such coffee found its way into the international market.
This is legal coffee. There is some smuggled coffee as well. It repre
sented one-half billion dollars, but the coffee farmer received only
about 10 percent or less than 10 percent of that cash. So the farmer is
not reallyderiving much benefit as a grower.
Some noncooperating farmers have been captured. And our records
show that those who have been captured have been shot. Some have
challenged the Amin government by cutting down their trees. They,
too, have been shot. I cannot tell you the extent of the horror.
I would like to suggest to this committee to — if it has not already
avail itself to our former or last American Ambassador Melady. He
has written a document outlining some of the more gory details of
what happened in Uganda as further testimony to this reign of terror.
Mr. BINGHAM. If I might interrupt, we had Ambassador Melady as
a witness.
Mr. HATFIELD. I am glad to know that. I shall avail myself of the
record to read his testimony.
Consequently, we have a unique situation here as it relates to a
boycott exercising harm against the poor of the country.
1 See Cong. Rec. , Jan. 23, 1978, p . S 256, Statement by Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. ;
Apr. 3, 1978, p 4592, “ Uganda ” ; Apr. 6 , 1978, p. S 4907 , “ Atrocities in Uganda
Copies are retained in subcommittee files.
 223

Another reason I feel this is important to the United States is

that this boycott would be unique. Because of the single crop status
we are in effect indirectly and directly holding up this regime. We
are bearing it up because we are importing today about one -third of
his export. The United Kingdom has about 20 percent. If you include
France, Japan, and the Western powers, it represents over 70 percent
of Uganda's total export.
Yet, at the same time that only represents about 5 percent ofour
import. The impact upon our own domestic consumer would be
minimal.
I feel very strongly, Mr. Chairman, that this is the vulnerable point
in Amin's armor. Last Friday the newspaper media was having a
somewhat slow news day. They carried rather prominently the news
that I was going to make the statement on the floor of the Senate on
Monday calling for this boycott.
Now , this is only a reiteration of the boycott because Senator
Weicker and I cosponsored this in January, but it received no atten
tion on our side due to the preemption of thePanama Canal issue.
I made my statement on Monday. On Tuesday Amin invited Sena
tor Weickerand me to come to Uganda to see for ourselves that what
we have come to believe is not true. Of course, this is erroneous on
his part,I believe, in that he has refused Amnesty International, and
he has refused United Nations human rights groups that wanted to
go into Uganda to directly verify some of this information.
I feel that that kind of immediate reaction to two U.S. Senators
from rather small States indicates that he sensed immediately that
we had struck the vulnerable point in his whole political structure.
This encourages me to press for this kind of boycott on the part of
the American people.
Now, the National Coffee Association, as I believe you know, has
responded to Congressman Peace's letter and indicated that they feel
the Governmentof the United States has to set the policy, and has the
constitutional responsibility for that. But in this interesting resolution
passed by the coffee association they did not raise one statement of
protest or a negative response to Congressman Pease and his proposal
for a boycott .
I know this afternoon you are going to hear testimony from in
dustry and industry will probablypresent you with some very im
portant data. I assume that they will argue at least two points.
They will argue that we are possibly endangering the lives of
Americans in Uganda. As you know , Congressman Pease wrote a
letter to the some 75 or 80 Americans withreligious connections or
religious missions in Uganda, alerting them to this proposal of the
boycott.
He received a response from about 40 or 50 percent of the letters he
sent out and in these letters there were no negative reactions to his
proposal. In fact, he received affirmation and encouragement by a
number of them.
I understand we have about 100 other people in Uganda today who
are engaged primarily in business enterprise. Mr. Chairman, I think
that those who are there realize probably more vividly than anyone
 224

else what is going on in Uganda. I think this should be a signal to

American business that we have to ask the question of how much the
flag should protect foreign development.
Í am not here today to argue that historical question that has been
before us so frequently. I am only here to say to you today that in
every instance where we have had ultimate breaking of relationships
with countries either leading to war or countries that were practicing
such obscene things that revolted the American conscience, we have
had the pleading of Afro -American enterprise to not break relations.
You can go back to World War II and find the same arguments were
made about Germany an the Third Reich. All I am saying is this
should have been a signal long ago to American business that they
would be threatened from withinby a regime which is obviouslyso
totally amoral and immoral that they were never secure there under
that kind of regime to begin with, and they had no guarantees. Surely
they must have the conscience that I know American business has,
and the certainty that ultimately our Government would become aware
of this kind of practice and would urge their removal.
I have no empathy with American business persons today in Uganda
who plead the cause of not doing anything to disturb the status quo
merely because they wantto maintain their business enterprise. To me
that is totally amoral and borders on being immoral.
Second, there is the argument, that if we withdraw or have some
kind of severing of relationships, as Congressman Bonker's resolution
would call for, we would drive them to the arms of the Russians.
Well, this has been used as an argument everywhere in the world
to blackmail us for foreign aid and everything else.“ If you don't give
us foreign aid we will go to the Communists.” I do not buy that
argument.
I still think there is a moral base to this system of government, and
a moral base to American free enterprise, and it is such that I do not
think we can any longer support this kind of regime by our business
relationships.
What I would like to say as far as the Russians are concerned is that
they have shown a great propensity to supply outmoded equipment,
particularly military equipment, to small powers if they get into
political difficulties with Western powers.
But , in this case, there is an exception . This calls for cold, hard
cash. I do not think you will find in the record of Russian aid, cold ,
hard cash of this magnitude being easily dispensed as is implied by
those who would argue that such a boycott would drive them into the
arms of the Russians.
The Russians are also aware of world opinion. There is no basic
logic or orientation guiding this madman. He is a syphilitic , insane
man , and I do not think you can interpret the ideologyof this kind of
regime.
I do not think that even the Russians, with all of their own foul
practice of violating human rights, would want to take on the inter
national label of "savior of Amin ” —and that is certainly what our
propaganda millscould crank out easily.
Ithink, also, that even the Russians see they have to look at how
such regimes fit into their global strategy. They have to have alter
 225

natives if they are going to accept a regime such as this. They have
to be able to dominate it,they have to be able to dictate to it and make
it a puppet or make it dependent in such a way hat it becomesa puppet.
This man is not rational by whathe has done, cutting off the arm of
his wife, having the children come in to view the body of their mother,
having heads smashed with hammers and the intestines pulled out of
the ripped bellies of people hehas made prisoners.
This is not a sane man. Therefore, I do not think we can assume
that the logic of some of these things would be consistent with a nat
ural political basis.
So,Mr.Chairman, I again welcome the opportunity to be here. I am
grateful for this committee's attentiveness to thisissue. I am hope
ful that Congressman Pease's and Congressman Bonker's legislation
and resolution will be approved by this committee.
I do not think they are incompatible. I think they complement one
another and I want to commend your leadership in this particular area
and urge you to continue on . I want to asure you we shall try to mobil
ize the Senate to do likewise as soon as we can dispose of this over
whelming issue that we now have before us.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much, Senator, for your very elo
quent statement. I just have one question to ask you.
The matter has often been raised that we cannot consider an embargo
against Uganda without considering possible action against South
Africa. And that question poses itself with particular intensity, I
think , in view of the fact that the general community of black African
states has not recommended or taken action at this time against
Uganda.
What is your view of that question ; what is your view of whether
we should move toward comparable action against South Africa, and
if not, why not ?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think we have recognized already
that there is a great difference between Rhodesia andSouth Africa.
We have taken different steps in relations to Rhodesia than we have
with South Africa. We approved a United Nations' boycott of Rho
desia and we supported it in effect because we felt that was the best
instrument to use to express our concern about human rights in
Rhodesia .
We have not yet undertaken that kind of action in South Africa . I
think we must, therefore, recognize each one of these entities as a dis
tinct problem and recognize that there are differences as well as
similarities.
With all of the discrimination, with all of the lack of full citizen
ship given to South African blacks, I think we have to recognize
that there is not the kind of murderous, bloodletting, reign of terror
that exists in Uganda.
I think in Rhodesia we can make progress dealing with people who
are at least rational. Even though we may disagree with their political
positions and viewpoints, we can move because we have diplomatic
relations, we hạve the United Nations, we have other groups that are
moving with us .
Uganda is a different situation. I strongly and publicly condemn
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for nottaking action. To
me it is the height of hypocrisy. It is racism in reverse .
 226

Because Amin is black , I would think that they would be even more
concerned about the kind of terror against the fellow black people and
especially the students, professional people, business people, and the
educated people.
That iswho he has aimed most of his terror against. But regardless
of OAU inaction , I do not think it excuses our inaction. Therefore,
I would say , let us take each case on its own individual character and
move with whatever is the best instrument we can employ.
Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Whalen .
Mr. WHALEN . Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted
to extend our welcome to the distinguished Senator from Oregon. I
just have one question, Senator Hatfield.
The move that is being proposed by yourself and by Congressman
Bonker and Congressman Pease, it seems to me, is more political than
economic . Certainly, it will have its economic effect, but I believe that
what we are attempting to do here is to register a concern or revulsion
at what is taking place in Uganda.
That being the case, should we go a step further and recommend to
the administration that we withdraw completely our diplomatic recog
nition of that state, sever all ties ? If we do not, it seems to me we are
asking the business community to do something that we in the Gov
ernment are not willing to do ourselves. I would appreciate any com
ment you might have.
Mr. HATFIELD. I would not fault that procedure at all.
I would support it. But, Congressman Whalen, let me only distin
guish or delineate the thrust of your observation from my own in this
way .
We are dealing really not with a political issue as much as we are
dealing with a human rights issue which I think transcends even the
political differences. When we talk about the human rights issue it
seems to me we have to , first of all, identify what the human rights
issue is in terms of the imposition of terror on the people whose rights
arebeing demeaned and destroyed.
Now, when we identify that—and Congressman Whalen , in many
arenas today we have not even publicly or otherwise identified that
officially or unofficially. I am amazed at the number of people who are
totally unaware of what has been going on in Uganda — but, once we
identify it then I think we have toviewthe methods by which we can
influence change. We have taken one direction in Chile . We have taken
another direction in Argentina, another direction in Korea and Iran.
I am suggesting thatwhat we are going to find in Uganda is so
unique, because of the total insanity of this policy, that we have to seek
the most immediate and vulnerable point in his whole regime, and
money
that is .
And, it is strictly money because that is the base of his political
structure because it is based on mercenary soldiers.
That is why I feel this would be the most immediate way of dealing
with Amin because he could care less whether we have political rela
tionships if he is getting the money.
The point is, we have to take the most immediate action and let each
one then follow in sequence. Take the economic boycott, take the
political action and move right on . But I would suggest this, by his
 227

own reaction as of yesterday, that it indicates we have struck the most

vulnerable point in his whole regime.
Mr. WHALEN . I just want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, the comment
that I made previously. I am not suggesting that we allow, once dip
lomatic relations are broken , our business firms to continue to trade
with Uganda. I am just suggesting that inasmuch as we are making a
moral judgment, it would seem to me to be more consistent if we also
indicated that the Government should terminate its relationships as
well.
Mr. HATFIELD. I understand the point and I would agree with the
Congressman in most circumstances. But, you see, we have not taken
that with mainland China. We are trying to establish economic rela
tionships and we already have political relationships.
At the same time we do not approve of their political regime or
ideology, but in this instance we canunanimously say we disapprove of
the political regime and the economic realm seems to be theoptimum
channel to use to reach that end.
Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Bonker.
Mr. BONKER . Thank you .
Senator, you honor us by your presence and your expression of con
cern about what has become a very important issue to those of us on this
committee. I join the chairmanin thanking you for an eloquent state
ment and plea for some action by the Congress to end our support of
the Amin regime.
What is most perplexing is how we now have a new administration
that is so deeply pledged to human rights, to advancing the cause of
human rights throughout the world, and yet when we are faced with
themost blatant violation ofhumanrights,an administration spokes
man comes before this committee and says they oppose legislation
which would impose economic sanctionson the Government of Uganda.
I wonder if you were the President whether you would find yourself
in the same unforunate circumstances ; you would have to advance a
policy that is consistent and rational and predictable and whether
despite how you felt personally about the issue - institutionally it
would be almost impossible to either advance sanctions or be effective
in bringing an end to the violence and bloodshed in that country, or
any country for that matter.
Mr. HATFIELD. Congressman Bonker, I find it difficult to try to pro
jectmyself into that impossible situation .
Mr. BONKER. Use your imagination.
Mr. HATFIELD . You forget that I am part of the minority in this
country . I would only say to you that Ihad a little bit of the same
amazement when I introduced an amendment on the Senate side to súp
port thePresident in his seeking for adjudicating the rights of human
beings where they are being denied.
The amendment called for the same measures as the House amend
ment, to call upon our representatives in the international monetary
organization to vote against grants to those countries which consisť
ently violate human rights except for those funds that go directly to
the aid of the poor people of such country.
The White House opposed that effort on our part in the Senate. I do
not think the President is at all in any way disagreeing with our con
 228

cern as we have expressed it in thesevarious actions or in your resolu

tion. I think probably there is more basically an institutionalproblem
here of mentality, that somehow the Congress is desiring participation
in these actions that only the President under the Constitution is
charged with administering.
I am almost sounding like an apologist for the President — but, I do
want to say I feel that it is probablymore on the basis that the execu
tive branch of the Government feels that foreign policy should be
under their jurisdiction to wait for when they want to apply action,
when they want to push an issue or when they want togo light on it,
because — they havetheoverall foreign affairs responsibility.
By the same token , I think thereis a mixture of powers in this
system whereby the Congress does play a role in foreign affairs, by
appropriations, by confirmations, by approvalof treaties and so forth .
So, I think we are within our scope ofacting and it is a policy that
supports and supplements an existing policy ,well enunciated by the
President for which I think history will give him the most distinction.
I want to urge him on ,encourage him .
Mr. BONKER. We have seen some of that ; the United States today
is providingtechnical assistance to over 70 Ugandans in various
Beach. Millions of
facilities inRochester, New York, and Daytona
dollars worth of sophisticated communications equipment is being
provided to the Ugandan Government. According to one staff study
that we have,mostof the Ugandan officials receiving training as pilots
and communication specialists are members of the Ugandan State
Research Bureau which is the infamous arm of the government com
mitting most of the violence.
ThePease legislation deals specifically with economic matters. The
bill that I have introduced and Congressman Pease also supports is
much broader ; it goes beyond economic sanctions. We propose to close
the Ugandan Embassy here in Washington, D.C., to restrict the move
ment of Ugandans that are associatedwith the Amin government ,to
prohibit entry for study and training from Uganda, to prohibit pilot
training which is ongoing, prohibit landing rights and prohibit all
equipment having potential military application or on theother hand,
by the Government of Uganda.
In other words, we are trying to take a more comprehensive ap
proach and impose not only economic but political sanctions as well.
Do you see legislation of this scope having a favorable response in
the U.S. Senate ?
Mr. HATFIELD. Iwould think so. I am wondering though how the
White House would respond to this. Again, it is so comprehensive and
I would support it certainly with my vote and statements of support.
I am not sure I have not gotten asounding from the White House.
This is extensive. It is a very comprehensive action relating to foreign
policy and again, based upon my previous comments, the White House
might feel that was going too far unless you have a signal — I am not
sure I could predict the results.
But, I do feel in a simple resolution dealing with an economic boy
cott we are not quite as much into the whole matter of such profound
foreign policy as your resolution. But that would not be up for me to
determine. That isup to the White House.
 229

I would only say I would enthusiastically support it on the Senate

side.
Mr. BỌNKER. I have one final question.
Mr. BINGHAM. We have to proceed under the 5 -minute rule. We
have so many witnesses.
Mr. BONKER. Thankyou, Senator.
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Cavanaugh.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. I would yield my time to my colleague.
Mr. BONKER. You have extensive relationships with the Christian
community. One of the most compelling arguments against this legis
lation is that it would endanger the lives of the 200 or so missionaries
that are in Uganda.
In your opening statement you responded to Congressman Pease's
response to that argument. What is your personal feeling about Ameri
cans who are in Uganda, and Amin's capacity and reputation for
dealing in his own way with representatives of this government?
Mr. HATFIELD. Congressman Bonker, yesterday I had a visit in my
office by the former Minister of Health in the Ugandan Government,
an Anglican Bishop and others had fled Uganda.
Already the word is back that the meaning of the statements on
the floorof the Senate had reached the people ofUganda through
British Broadcasting System , as well as through Voice of America.
And , it was uniformly positive, it was uplifting to the people of
Uganda who are so under this heel of oppressionthat there was this
interest expressed on the part of American officials and they were
enthusiastic in urging continuation of this effort.
Bishop Kivengere, who is a friend of the United States as well as
mine, carried the message of suffering to many circles in this country.
And again, without exception, there has been a positive feedback from
the people in Uganda wanting to see the United States and the Western
Powers put the pressure on in some way to relieve them from this
nightmare.
Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Cavanaugh .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . The question that concerns me most about em
bargoes is the selective application of sanctions. As I understand — I
missed your opening remarks— but, you feel that is the best method
to develop policy on a selective basis and certainly I would realize
that variances in circumstance have to be accommodated, but it seems
to me that we go down a very dangerous road if that is the corner
stone of our policy in dealing with distasteful regimes, that we only
deal with them individuallyand each time the Congress will set a
new standard.
It seems to me we should set some minimum standards that the
world can understand and that are predictable and that are rational
in universal application . We should determine for ourselves what it
is in the Uganda situation that is so obnoxious to us as to justify
this action and make that a standard of law in terms of how all the
other countries can anticipate the United States will react when that
standard is violated .
If we determine that Uganda has practiced genocide we will then
proscribe trade from those nations that practice genocide.
But, today, of course, we have one standard for Cuba, one stand
ard for Vietnam — which I assume we carry on not because there are
 230

threats to our national security but out of vengeance from the fact
that we have had an unpleasant military and political result in that
country.
We ought to, if we are going to be responsive and comprehensive,
analyze those situations and do something about all of them . From
my point of view I do not know that we can make the distinction
asto what is effective. We ought to live by some rule of law and under
that philosophy it seems to me clearly South Africa would be as ob
noxious an offender of our standards as is Uganda. They should
be treated equal if we are going to pass judgment on them . We should
not pass judgment in terms of what is effective but what is the U.S.
standard with regard to how it deals with other countries.
It is for that reason , although I commend the underlying sincerity,
that I have had difficulty coming to grips with treating each ofthese
cases on an individual basis without a clear understanding of what is
theunderlying standard .
Could you briefly articulate for me what you feel our standard
should be ?
Mr. HATFIELD . Congressman Cavanaugh, you certainly put your
finger on a very profound question that has confronted this country
ever since our beginning. How do we relate to a world that does not
have the same political ideology or value standards as we have. I do
not think the world has had a grand design since Henry the IV. Per
haps the Russian Government today has the most comprehensive basic
design of any nation. It is totally self-serving, but that stems from
their value standards, their value systems as well.
We find ittolerabletodeal with an autocrat, or a dictator, when
it serves a military, political, or economic objective that this Nation
feels is important.On the other hand, we can get very pious and self
righteous about some penny-and-dime dictator or where there is not
an economic, political, or military goal that we have or where they
do not fit into an important one of the United States.
I suppose it is the world we are dealing with rather than the world
we would like to create. And, we have to deal with that world . No one
is about ready to impose any great sanctions upon the Shah of Iran.
The Shah of Iran is a keystone to our whole Mediterranean area of
defense and our oil in the Middle East.
By the same token , we do not want to get into a condemnation of
President Park of South Korea or Ferdinand Marcos of the Philip
pines, andwe could name many others, Tito of Yugoslavia. We could
even justify the Russian regime as long as we want to play it against
the Chinese or the Chinese regime as long as we want toplay it against
the Russians.
Congressman Cavanaugh, we have not even had equal appliction of
humanrights under the Carter administration across the board, so I
am not sure Congress can create this. I am only saying that when we
have such an extreme case of such genocide as exists in Uganda, for
us by our action or inaction to support it, to continue letting it grow
and prosper, I think is unconscionable.
That does not solve the many abuses in other regimes of the world ,
but we should take action where we know action can be taken and be
effective. And then we should try to develop a grand design for foreign
policy, but that is not part of our task at this moment.
 231

Mr. BINGHAM. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Ireland.
Mr. IRELAND. I have no questions.
Mr. Winn. I have no questions.
Mr. PEASE. I have no questions.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much for your time, Senator. We
appreciate your thoughts.
We will now proceed with our industry witnesses. I do want to
express my appreciation and that of the subcommittee members for
the responseswe have had and the willingness to appear here today.
We have 12 witnesses scheduled .
It is the Chair's proposal to hear them in panels. As you know, we
have heard from a number of administration and private witnesses
and also Members of Congress. We are interested in the nature and
extent ofyour companies' trade with Uganda, particularly as it im
pacts on the political, social, and economic conditions ofthat country.
What responsibilities do your companies feel they have in this re
gard ? What would be the effect upon your companies and their em
ployees of implementing the various foreign policy controls outlined
in the pending legislation ?
I know that someof you would like to make at least part of your
statements in executive session. We do notat the moment have a quo
rum of any of the subcommittees concerned. I expect wewill have one
momentarily, at which time we can take aa vote on going into executive
session , which we will do at the close of the public testimony of all of
the witnesses.
I would like to remind you that section 7 ( c ) of the Export Admin
istration Act provides for classification of certain kinds of business
information, but also provides that Congress shall not be denied in
formation which it deems necessary andproper for carrying out its
legislative responsibilities.
The subcommittees' members will note that this section contains
procedures for the release of such classified information if the full
International Relations Committee deems it in the national interest
to do so. That is a matter which the subcommittees will undoubtedly
want to review and assess after these hearings are completed.
We do now have a quorum of the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade.Iwill entertaina motion at the appro
priate time so that we can go into executive session .
Mr. IRELAND. I so move.
Mr. BINGHAM . Under the rules we have to have a record vote. The
staff director will call the roll.
Mr. MAJAK . Bingham ?
Mr. BINGHAM. Aye.
Mr. MAJAK. Ireland ?
Mr. IRELAND. Aye.
Mr. MAJAK . Fowler ?
Mr. FOWLER. Aye.
Mr. MAJAK. de la Garza ?
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Aye.
Mr. MAJAK . Cavanaugh ?
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Aye.
Mr. MAJAK . Findley ?
 232

[ No response.]
Mr. MAJAK . Whalen ?
[ No response .]
Mr. MAJAK . In this vote there are five ayes and zero nays.
Mr. BINGHAM . The motion is agreed to.
As our first panel, then , I wiĩl ask Mr. Andrew J. Schroder, vice
president of General Foods Corp., Mr. John Lankester, division man
ager, buying department of Proctor and Gamble, representing the
Folger Coffee Co., Mr. John C. K. Buckley, vice president of pur
chasing for Nestlé, and Mr. Paul Miller, president of the Hills
Brothers Co., to come to the witness table.
I welcome you gentlemen . Thank youfor your appearances. Will you
present yourstatements and then submit toquestions as a panel.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. SCHRODER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GENERAL FOODS CORP .
Mr. SCHRODER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees,
my name is Andrew J. Schroder, and I am vice president of public
affairs for General Foods Corp.
We welcome thisopportunity to present our position on theproposed
sanctions against the Government of Uganda.Contrary to what Sena
tor Hatfield said in his assumption about our position, we will not be
pleading that trade with Uganda be permitted to continue.
Let me first, however, comment on our usageof Ugandan coffee.
Both on a worldwide basis and for its domestic U.S. coffee business,
General Foods in recent years has obtained about 11 to 13 percent of
its total green coffee requirements from Uganda. This producing
country is a major source for Robusta coffee — a type of green coffee
bean constituting about 30 percent of the total world coffee supply
and having unique flavor and yield characteristics. Robusta coffee is
grown in sections of Africa and Asia.
Uganda has become a more important world source for Robusta
coffee since the deterioration of Angola's coffee production caused by
the civil disorders within that country. In calendar 1974, the last
representative year before Angola's civil unrest turned into a full -scale
civil war, Angola exported some 21 percent of the world's Robusta
coffee. In calendar 1977, however, Angola’s exports amounted to only
7.5 percent.
Over the years , we have purchasedUgandan coffee for domestic use
either directly from the Uganda Marketing Board or indirectly
through U.S.brokers. During our fiscal year 1978 which just ended
April 1, we obtained approximately 78 percent of our Ugandan cof
fee through purchases from U.S. brokers and about 22 percent through
direct transactions with the Uganda Marketing Board. For reasons
that will be more apparent from my later testimony, we purchased
somewhat less Ugandan coffee during our fiscal 1978 year than in the
past year, and a higher percentage of this lesser quantity came
through U.S. brokers .
We have no firsthand information regarding the importance of our
trade either to the Ugandan Government ortothe general population
of that country. We have no operations in Uganda,and to the best of
 233

my knowledge, none of our U.S. employees has ever visited that coun
try. Nevertheless, it is apparent that its ability to sell coffee in the
world coffee markets has been important to the Government of Uganda.
Its coffee exports reportedly generate a very high percentage of its
foreign trade revenues.
Testimony has been given to these subcommittees at prior hearings
concerning the Ugandan coffeegrowers receiving little, if anything,
for their crops. Our only information about this situation comes from
material distributed by the International Coffee Organization which
operates under the auspices of the United Nations.
This material indicates that Uganda's prices paid its growers in
April 1977, the most recent month for which such figures have been
published, averaged 27.29 cents per pound - higher than the 15.05 cents
per pound paid by Zaire to its growers but lower than the prices paid
to growers by such other major Robusta producers as the Ivory Coast,
32.89 cents per pound, and Cameroun,35.63 cents per pound. Ob
viously, we are not in a position to confirm the accuracy of this data.
The effect upon General Foods and its employees of a termination
of trade with Uganda would depend upon the manner in which such
an embargo wasimposed. Robusta coffee has been in extremely tight
supply and, contrary to the impression that you may have received
from testimony at a prior hearing, Angola has not yet returned to its
position of being a major, reliable producer of Robusta coffee. There
fore, we estimatethatcompletely eliminating Ugandan coffee fromour
U.S. production facilities could raise our costs for Robusta coffees
by as much as 5 to 10 cents perpound in view of the resulting reduction
of Robusta coffee supplies that would be available to the U.S. market.
Obviously, if any one company were to impose an embargo against
Uganda, these increased costs would inure to its competitive disadvan
tage. On the other hand, were a termination of Ugandan trade to be
promulgated as aresult of U.S. foreign policy, increased costs would
be sustained by all U.S. coffee businesses with the likelihood that these
higher costs in whole or in part would be passed along to U.S.
consumers .
Nevertheless, in your determination of whether trade sanctions
should be imposed against Uganda, these considerations, while rele
vant, may notassumeprimary importance.
Needlessto say, we deplore the disregard of human rights by the
Ugandan Government as widely reported. We strongly believe, how
ever, that actions and decisions governing our country's relations with
foreign countries must be the province of the U.S. Government. As a
matter of policy, General Foods assiduously refrains from making
unilateral decisions as a business corporation which might be contrary
to established U.S. policy. This policy is based upon ourfundamental
realization that, as a business corporation, we do not and cannot have
all the facts at our disposal to determine the propriety of such foreign
policy issues as sanctions against foreign countries. Were corporations
to make such judgments unilaterally, they would be in a totally un
tenable position since their decisions could cause severe international
repercussions due to background factors of which they have no
knowledge.
We are asked by sincere, well -intentioned individuals, including our
consumers and stockholders, whether General Foods is not under some
 234

complusion to act voluntarily in response to areported gross disregard

of civil rights in a country such as Ūganda withwhich we do business.
In response, we state that there most certainly is a compulsion upon
this corporation and its employees to act.
As General Foods employees, we can become sufficiently concerned
about this matter to join with other U.S. citizens who are petitioning
our FederalGovernment to bring increasingpressure against the Gov
ernment of Uganda, and we have so acted. Furthermore, as a business
corporation , when faced with a reported gross disregard of human
rights in a foregin country with which wehave contractual relation
ships, we should be particularly sensitive to the behavior of that for
eign country's government as a trading partner, and we have been in
this case .
Some months ago, we requested a meeting with the State Depart
ment to review the expressions of concern received from our publics
concerning Uganda and to determine the likelihood of a modification
in U.S. foreign policy regarding trade with Uganda. On November
18, 1977, three ofour senior officers GeneralFoods president, its sen
ior vice president and general counsel, and the president of our U.S.
coffee business - met with the Deputy Secretary of State and the
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs. While we
appreciated the State Department's willingness to meet with us on this
occasion, our meeting most certainly did not appear to produce agree
ment concerning therespective roles of business corporations and the
State Department for establishing trade embargoes against foreign
countries.
The letter which we have attached to my testimony was sent to the
State Department following this meeting. You will note that this
correspondence states our strong belief that our Government, and not
industry, has the obligation to determine whether trade with Uganda
should or should not be continued.
[ The letter referred to follows :]
GENERAL FOODS CORP .
White Plains, N.Y., November 29, 1977.
Hon . WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER,
Deputy Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY : On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I wish to
thank you for meeting with us at our request on November 17. We are also grate
ful to your associates.
As we expressed to you at our meeting, we do not feel that American corpora
tions should determine the foreign policy of our country. This clearly must be the
responsibility of our Government, and our obligation, as responsible corporate
and individual citizens, is to comply with our Government's policy in this regard.
We continue to deplore, as you do, the apparent lack of respect for human rights
in Uganda. Needless to say , however, there could well exist in this matter influ
ences, conditions and consequences that we are either unaware of or can only
surmise and are loathe to judge. We, therefore, continue to feel that it is our duty
and obligation, not only to our Government but also to various other affected
publics, to continue to seek policy guidance from our Government in connection
with this most sensitive issue.
We firmly believe that it is our Government's obligation to provide such guid
ance and to communicate it in clear, unequivocal language applicable to all U.S.
corporations. Thus, all domestic businesses should be advised whether trade with
Uganda should or should not be continued. I eaving such a decision to each indi
vidual business corporation to be made on an ad hoc basis places these businesses
in the untenable position of knowing full well that their individual decisions
 235

might trigger international repercussions due to background factors of which

they have no knowledge.
I again express my gratitude to you and your colleagues for the attention that
you gave us a week ago last Thursday.
Sincerely ,
Ross BARZELAY, President.

Mr. SCHRODER. Effective in December, due to questionable trading

behavior by this trading partner, we canceled our purchase contract
with the Uganda marketing board. We are now satisfying our needs
for Robusta coffee through direct purchases from the Ivory Coast and
from U.S. importers and brokers who by their contracts may deliver
many types of Robustas, including Ugandans. On the other hand, we
strongly believe that our actions should not include total trading
embargoes against a foreign country unless and until that policy
determination is made by our Federal Government.
Congressman Don J. Pease testified before the members of these
subcommittees on February 2. Congressman Pease's testimony on that
occasion referred to " special cases”that could warrant deviation from
our Government's free trade commitments.
He concluded that both the State Department and Congress will
have to make difficult judgments about when to act in theseinstances.
We suggest that if such " special cases” are to be identified, only the
State Department and / or Congress have the requisite competence to
perform this task.
We continue to urge the State Department and/or Congress to es
tablish uniform trade policy with Uganda. Industry's obligation is to
abide by the Government's decision in this complex matter. As you
determine whether economic and other sanctions should be imposed
against the Government of Uganda, you must determine whether such
sanctions will be effective and whether such sanctions even if effective
perhaps could cause the innocent people of Uganda to suffer even more.
These determinations are beyond the competence of any business
corporation. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that within our form of
Government the State Department and Congress are the appropriate
forums to give consideration to these concerns as well as others of per
haps even greater importance of which we similarly would have no
knowledge.
Therefore, this corporation stands ready to comply with our Gov
ernment's decision and will be glad to provide any further insights we
can to assist your deliberations.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you , Mr. Schroder.
May I suggest that the ensuing witnesses attempt to summarize
their statements and avoid repetition of what has been said before.
It may be possible for some of you to associate yourselves with the
statements that have been made by previous witnesses. There are a
number of you and I know you do not want to be here all afternoon .
Next, we have Mr. John Lankester, representing the Folger Coffee
Co.

STATEMENT OF JOHN LANKESTER, DIVISION MANAGER, BUYING

DEPARTMENT, THE PROCTER & GAMBLE CO.
Mr. LANKESTER . Thank you , Mr. Chairman . I will try and make my
remarks very brief. Mr. Chairman , my name is John Lankester.
25-826 0 - 78 - 16
 236

From mid-1969 until April 1 of this year, I was manager of green

coffee buying for the Folger Coffee Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Procter & Gamble Co. While I presently have buying management
responsibilities in another area of Procter & Gamble, I am theperson
most familiar with our purchases of Ugandan coffees.
Folger markets two established coffee brands, vacuum and instant
Folger's. Vacuum Folger's is sold throughout the United States, while
instant Folger's is sold in an area comprising approximately 60 percent
of the United States population.
Folger has used Robusta -type coffees from Uganda in its products
at lowlevels for a number of years. To be specific during the last 3
years, we have purchased Ugandan coffee beans in the following
quantities :
In our fiscal year, which is July to June, 1975–76, we purchased
237,000 bags at a value of $23 million. We purchased in 1976–77,
201,000 at a value of $ 48 million. For the first 9 months of 1977–78,
98,000 bags were purchased at a value of $24 million .
We have purchased Uganda coffees either through U.S. coffee
dealers or through the U.S. office of the Uganda Coffee Marketing
Board. We do not have employees located in Uganda. As a result, we
have no firsthand knowledge of the political situation in Uganda, or
the actions of the Ugandanleadership.
We, like other Americans, have followed news accounts of the
atrocities and denial of human rights perpetrated by Idi Amin on the
citizens of that country and we are appalled by such degradation
and abuse.
It is our company's view that only the properly constituted gov
ernmental authorities in the executive branch and Congress can de
cide whether a boycott on imports of Ugandan coffee into the United
States is the proper way to respond to such violations of human
rights.
Trade boycotts of nations obviously have far- reaching foreign
policy implications. Private companies such as ours simply do not have
access to the kind of information needed to assess and decide this
extremely complex issue. Nor do we feel it is properfor us to try and
preemptthis Nation's position by private actions of our own.
The State Department and Congress are equipped to obtain the
necessary information and to reach sound judgments that are in the
total national interest. We believe that the issue of a Uganda trade
boycott should beresolved by this kind of congressional inquiry. Only
in this way is it possible that all the questions will be properly
weighed.
To illustrate, we understand that over 200 American citizens are
still living in Uganda. We do not have adequate information to assess
what effect a boycott would have on them.
Based upon our knowledge of the world green coffee business, it
may be helpful to your committee to have our view on the impact that
a U.S. ban on the importation of Uganda coffee would have on our
company and the American consumer as well as on Uganda.
Uganda is one of many countries which grow Robusta coffees.
Traditionally, Uganda exports about 17 percent of the total Robustas
 237

shipped to the world and only about 5 percent of all the types of
green coffee that are exported.
Since we use relatively few Uganda Robustas, we expect that in the
event of a ban on imports of Uganda coffee we could switch to other
sources with little difficulty. We would not anticipate that such action
would have a significant effect on our business or, for that matter, on
the price of our coffee to American consumers.
America purchases about one-third of Uganda's coffee exports. Since
there is a market for Robustacoffeesthroughout the world, a ban on
Uganda coffee by the United States alone would be unlikely to have a
serious impact on Uganda. Such a boycott would merely cause a redis
tribution of Uganda coffees to other consuming countries and the re
sultant void would be filled by Robusta coffees produced elsewhere. In
our view, it would take the combined action of all of the important
coffee -consuming nations throughout the world for a boycott to curtail
Uganda revenues from coffee.
I appreciate the opportunity to present my company's position and
hope it will be helpful in your deliberations. Naturally, the Folger
Coffee Co. will fully support, both in letter and spirit, whatever official
trade policy the U.Š. Government adoptstoward Uganda.
Mr.BINGHAM . Thank you much , Mr. Lankester.Wehear now from
Mr. John C. K. Buckley, of Nestles.
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. K. BUCKLEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF
PURCHASING , THE NESTLE CO., INC.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you , Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportu

nity of speaking before the three subcommittees represented here
today. Inaccordance with your request to be brief, Mr. Chairman , I
think the statement has, in fact, been circulated. I will be brief and just
hit the highlights.
I find I have a lot in common on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, with
my competitors. The basic situation has indeedbeen covered essentially
by them. The Nestle Co. is not involved in the ground coffee busi
ness. We only manufacture soluble coffees and our share of the U.S.
market in overall terms is approximately 10 percent.
We import Uganda coffee both from the Uganda Coffee Marketing
Board, which is a state trading organization , and also through U.S.
dealers who trade in the coffee market.
In the past, Nestle had long-term, renegotiable purchase contracts
with the Uganda offee Marketing Board . The last of these contracts
has expired and Nestle is proceeding on an ad hoc month -to -month
basis. In the past 3 calendar years our purchases from Uganda have
varied between 15 and 30 percent of our total purchases, the quantity
depending upon the quality, availability and price of competing
coffees.
Coffee trade for Uganda is clearly their primary source of foreign
currency. On the other hand, since coffee is still in relatively short
supply, we believe Uganda would have little difficulty in selling its
purchases, in our opinion ,
coffee elsewhere and the impact of the U.S.
is therefore negligible.
 238

The cessation of purchases of coffee from Uganda would only have

a significant impact if there were not only a U.S. boycott but a world
wide boycott.
We believe supplies could be found elsewhere but the effect of a
boycott could be tocreate a political vacuumin that part of the world.
And I think, bearing in mind Senator Hatfield's comment, I think
that vacuum would arise whether or not Idi Amin is still in power so
that the possibility exists of the United States losing whatever con
nection it has with that part of the world and other countries inter
ested in increasing their influence in central and eastern Africa moving
in to fill the vacuum .
As long as the termination of trade with Uganda was nationwide
in the United States, we would not expect the effect on our company or
its employees to be very great. It is true that because we would have
to substitute other coffee beans, there might be a slightly different
taste to our products anda slight increase inthe cost ofthese products.
In our opinion, neither of these results would have a significant impact
on our sales.
We note that even ifthe United States decided to discontinue trade
with Uganda that the provisions of GATT, and possiblyother treaty
obligations, raise questions regarding U.S. policy overall.
We, as a commercial entity , do not feel we are competent to com
ment on these wider aspects of the Ugandan situation . If other coffee
consuming countries didnot establish similar purchasing policies, the
economic conditions in Uganda would be very little changed, and the
possibility of reprisals in one form or another on the people of Uganda
we believe still exists.
Thank you verymuch ,Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BINGHAM . Thank you very much, Mr. Buckley.
Mr. Paul Miller of Hills Bros.

STATEMENT OF PAUL J. MILLER, PRESIDENT, HILLS BROS.

COFFEE, INC.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also try to make my
remarks very brief.
Hills Bros. has been requested to appear before the distinguished
subcommittees today to respond to four specific questions and to com
ment on three measures pending before the subcommittees. We would
first like to turn to those four questions.
1. What is the nature and extent of our trade with the Government
of Uganda ?
From the commencement of my tenure as President of Hills Bros.
in June of 1975 to date, Ugandan coffee has represented less than 3
percent of Hills Bros. total coffee requirements. Thus, Hills Bros.'
usage of Ugandan coffee has been extremely minimal in the past 3
years and even less in the past year - less than one-half of 1 percent.
By way of general information, the two most important and widely
grown speciesof coffee are Arabica and Robusta . Arabica coffees are
grown principally in the Western Hemisphere in South and Central
America. Brazil , Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico are
the leading producers of Arabica coffees. Robusta, on the other hand,
 239

is grown in areas of Africa and Asia. Uganda, along with Angola,

Ivory Coast, and Indonesia, is one of the major producers of this
variety of coffee.
Hills Bros. relies principally upon international coffee brokers,
agents, and importers in our buying ofgreen coffee. Thus, Hills Bros.
purchases of Úgandan coffee were primarily accomplished through
these brokers, agents, and importers ,who had independently pur
chased the coffee directly from the Ugandan Government. Conse
quently, Hills Bros.' trade involvement with the Ugandan Govern
ment is virtually nonexistent.
The second question posed by the subcommittees is, what is our
assessment of the impact and value of this trade upon the Govern
ment of Uganda and further, upon thegeneral population of Uganda ?
In the past 3 years Hills Bros.' purchases of coffee directly from the
Ugandan Government was less than 400,000 pounds, the cost of which
was less than $ 500,000.
The portion of the coffee exported from Uganda and the amount of
money our business represents in relation to the total income of
Uganda is obviously insignificant. Our trade with Uganda, the green
coffee we purchase from Uganda,is in ouropinion a very minor por
tion of the total exports from Uganda. Thus, although we cannot
gage the impact of ourtrade on the country of Uganda or upon the
general population of Uganda, it appears to us to be relatively mini
mal.
Turning to the third question, thesubcommittees have asked us to
consider or to assess the political and social situation in Uganda and
talk of any particular responsibilities we have with respect to the
situation.
As I have mentioned before, we work primarily with international
coffee brokers, agents, and importers. We have had very limited con
tact with the Government of Uganda and that contact has been ex
clusively through the New York office of the Coffee Marketing Board
of Uganda. Therefore,we have no firsthand knowledge of the political
or social situation existing in Uganda and all of our information con
cerning the present situation in Uganda is derived from secondary
media sources. As aa human being, I am obviously concerned about the
reports I have read dealing with the situation in Uganda.
However, it has been our position that an official commercial boy
cott of any nation is the province of the U.S. Government, not of one
company or a group of competing companies. Accordingly , Mr.Chair
man, should the Congress or the President impose a trade embargo
on anytrade or commercial relations with Uganda, you can rest as
sured that Hills Bros. will respect it to the fullest extent. Under no
circumstances will Hills Bros. ever violate knowingly the laws or es
tablished policies of the United States ; and should Congress or the
President, through any law. Executive order, or proclamation, estab
lish a trade embargo with Uganda, I can assure you thatHills Bros.
will follow the letter and the spirit of any such official Government
action.
The fourth and final question thatthe subcommittees have asked
us to address is what would be the effect upon our company and its
employees of a termination of trade with Uganda ?
 240

As I mentioned earlier, we only utilize a very small amount of

Ugandan coffee. Thus, the financial impact on our company should
trade with Uganda be cut off will be very negligible. We can make up
our supply shortage from other countries of the world.
Thus, we would not have to cut back ouroperations due to the pre
clusion of Ugandan coffee. Also, since we do not have any employees
in Uganda, we would not have to shut down any operations there.
The only effect would be aa termination of future purchase solicitations
that we might have from the coffee marketing board of Uganda.
Thus, in response to this last question, the effect of a termination of
trade with Úganda should be very negligible to the company and its
employees.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BINGHAM . Thank you, gentlemen . This concludes the panel
that deals with the coffee trade and I think it is logical that we should
have questions now dealing with those matters. I recognize Mr.
Ireland .
Mr. IRELAND. No questions, but before the gentlemen move on I
want to say for the record that I am sure others are impressed with
the attitude that each of you has expressed beginning with the articu
lation by the gentleman from General Foods.
I think that it is quite gratifying to allof us in this day and age of
everyone throwing bricks at each other. I compliment you. I think it
is extremely good .
Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Fowler ?
Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Ireland beat me to the punch . I associate myself
completely with his remarks since he is far more eloquent than I, but
I also want to thank the gentleman for understanding the policy im
plications from our end and for the spirit in which you have given us
your testimony.
Thank you ,Mr.Chairman .
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Schroder, in your statement you said there were
stockholders and others who felt that perhaps you should act volun
tarily in response to the atrocities we know about in Uganda, and
that you have become sufficiently concerned about the matter to join
with citizens who feel our Federal Government should bring increas
ing pressure on the Government of Uganda.
Do you feel that our pronouncements on human rights and our in
dignation about what is happening in Uganda issufficient, or do you
feel that more substantive action is called for to have any effect over
the deteriorating political and human rights situation there ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Congressman , we really do not know the answer to
that question . We do not know whether the imposition of trade sanc
tions against Uganda is the right decision or not, to be very frank
about it.
We do know we have neither the knowledge nor the right to make
that decision ourselves. Frankly, we are very willing to help either
you or the State Department make that decision on the best knowl
edge base that you can assemble. We really do not know .
Mr. BONKER. There are occasions that the Ugandan Government
sells their coffee at artificially low prices. This would probably con
tribute to higher prices if you were to seek your coffee elsewhere. Has
that been your experience ?
 241

Mr. SCHRODER. No, sir, it has not been our experience thatUganda
coffee is underpricing the world market. The reference I made in my
testimony to an increase in cost that we would sustain if we were
unable to purchase Uganda coffee has to do with the fact that in that
case we would be forced to buy the Robusta that we would need from
secondary sources.
We would have to buy primarily from European markets on the
assumption that they were still trading with Uganda and what we
would then be doing would be buying surplus Robusta coffee that
would be in European markets and, in effect, paying an additional
transportation cost to get that back into this country. That is how
the increased cost comes about.
Mr. BONKER. My mother-in -law is anxious to begina personal boy
cott of Ugandan coffee. She was informed it would bevery difficult
because all of the coffee is mixed in such a way that by the time it
comes out in the marketplace there is no way one can really determine
whether the coffee comes from Latin America or Uganda. Is that
true ?
Mr. SCHRODER. It is very difficult to tell. That is exactly right, and
someone else mentioned earlier that Robusta coffee, includingUganda
coffee, is a more important ingredient in soluble coffee.
Mr. BONKER. Where else do they make available Robusta coffee ?
Mr. SCHRODER . Robusta coffee would beused according to taste in
many coffee products and again taste in blends is something that all
of us are very squeamish about talking about in public with the highly
competitive forces that we have present in our coffee industry.
You would find some Robusta really is used in virtually all coffee
products. But, it would be used particularly significantly in soluble
coffee.
Mr. BONKER. Thank you , Mr. Chairman .
Mr. BINGHAM. Justfor clarification , by soluble coffee you refer to
what we usually call instant ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BINGHAM . Are there any other questions?
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I did have some questions.
First, of Mr. Schroder, canyou describe, Mr. Schroder, for the mem
bers of the committee the nature of the Ugandan Coffee Marketing
Board behavior which led you to cancel your purchase contracts with
that Board ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Yes, sir. Back in October of 1977 this last fall, we had
a situation in the green coffee market which is not unlike the situa
tion we have today, a very , very volatile situation, and at that time the
Uganda Marketing Board, as was their contract right, set a price for
the delivery of coffee to us.
Thereafter they made .a decision to sell significant amounts of their
coffee to the trade at lower prices. Now, reasonable and customary
trade practice in that case , Congressman, would have called in our
opinion for them to reopen that contract and afford us, too, the oppor
tunity to buy those supplies at that lower cost.
They did not do that. They insisted upon their contractual rights
in this volatile period and we really had no certainty that that situa
tion might not occur again . So, what we did was avail ourselves of the
60 -day cancellation privilege in our contract, and in effect, in Decem
ber that contract wascanceled.
 242

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much .

We know that coffee money which is provided to Amin through our
purchases is of little benefitto Ugandan coffee growers. I have some
figures put out by the Minister of Finance of Uganda in a conference
on the 16th of June, 1977, which states that theUgandan coffee farmers
get 14 cents per pound when they get paid by the Ugandan Coffee
Board .
We also know that the Soviets and the Arabs commonly demand
hard currency for arms and other supplies. And, we know further that
Amin derives 90 percent of his hard currency from coffee exports.
This seems to suggest to me that there is a direct linkage between
the coffee purchasesand the support needed to keep Amin in power.
I do not think you would dispute this. And, you have stated in your
opinion the making of foreign policy should be the responsibility
of the Congress and the State Department.
Do you see any reason why the Congress should not act to recog
nize the relationship between coffee and Amin's hold on power and take
steps to stop that unfortunate chain of events ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Are you directing that to me ?
Mr. PEASE. You or anyof your colleagues.
Mr. SCHRODER. I really cannot say again exactly what the right
decision is here, Congressman, but certainly that would be among the
considerations in my mind if I were in your shoes.
Mr. PEASE . Thank you .
I would like to ask your comment and perhaps the comment of your
colleagues. You have stated uniformly, all four of you, that you do
not feel it is up to your companies to make decisions about whether to
trade with another country or not. The position that I have taken
regarding our Nation's relations with Uganda is that there comes a
time when the deprivation of human rights is so great that we simply
need to disassociate ourselves as a nation in every way from that
regime.
Now, you have said essentially you are passing that decision off to
the State Department and to the Congress. In your dealings with
other companies and all of your corporations do deal with other
companies, let's say domestically — do you apply standards that you
do not do business with some companies based on their own corporate
practices, that you just prefer not to do business with a company be
cause it exploits its own workers or because it continues other prac
tices with which you do not agree ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Congressman, I do not think we as business corpo
rations make determinations as to whom we deal with and whom we
do not based solely upon our judgment of others' morality. I think,
however , as I indicated in my testimony, that when, in fact, there is
that kind of reported behavior regarding a trading partner , it raises
atremendous amount of sensitivity as we proceed in our trading rela
tionship with that other party.
For business reasons therefore, there can easily be a situation where
we terminate a trading relationship, again not because of a desire to
impose a moral sanction, but because we concluded that their probable
trading behavior is such that we simply do not want to continue to
have a relationship with them .
 243

Mr. PEASE. Is it correct then, what you say is that you do not inject
moral considerations in any of your business dealings with other
companies ?
Mr. SCHRODER. We do not as such make a determination solely upon
our judgmentof others' morals.
Mr. BUNKER. Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. PEASE. I would be happy to.
Mr. BONKER. There seems to be lack of a moral imperitive in the
international business community as it relates to things like pay
ment of bribes and relationships with other countries. Not to put you on
the spot, but what if things were to become as severe as we experienced
in the early 1940's or late 1930's when Nazi Germany was coming into
power. Would the businessman's pragmatism lead him to continue to
dobusiness,and put aside the moral imperitive ?
Mr. SCHRODER. Congressman Bonker, I would really hope that if we
ever had that type of situation again, that I would be back here doing
exactly what I am doing today. And, doing just exactly what we did
with the State Department in November. We are here reminding you
of yourresponsibility to make a decision. And, we are trying very hard
to provide you with as much information that we have at our disposal
which you could perhaps make use of in arriving at what the right
judgment is. So, I feel very good aboutwhat we are doing in this case.
Mr. IRELAND Will the gentleman yield ?
I might point out I would hate this moment to pass and I was im
pressed by Mr. Schroder's testimony—I would hate this moment to
pass to have anyone who reads our testimony or listens to it to have the
feeling that either the gentleman's corporation or the others did not
exercise their business in a normal and ethical way. I think his de
scription of the dealings with the coffee market — as I understand it
the corporation in this case — reacted very strongly to a direct
relationship .
When the ethics of the situation did not seem proper they cancelled
their dealings and went on 60 days notice. I think it would be wrong
for us in the Government to expect these corporationsto react to activi
ties of other governments that do not directly touch them .
And, I think Mr. Schroder has a very good point, to remind us of
what our responsibility is here, much as they took the initiative and
cancelled the agreement when they were being treated unfairly. And,
I think we have a very strong responsibility to act one way or the
other as he has reminded us.
Mr. PEASE. Could I ask Mr. Buckley and perhaps representatives
of the other companies whether they have taken any similar actions to
that of General Foods in relation to their connection with he Ugandan
Coffee Board. Do you still have regular contracts with them? I think,
Mr. Buckley, you said Nestles wasnow on an ad hoc basis. For what
reason did you go on an ad hoc basis ?
Mr. BUCKLEY. Our long -term contract expired , Mr. Pease, and we
decided that it was preferable to go on to a month -to -month basis. We
have no contractual arrangements as things stand with Uganda Coffee
Marketing Board.
Mr. PEASE. Was that on the basis of their business practices or did it
relate at all to what is going on internally in Uganda ?
Mr. BUCKLEY. No, sir, it is on the basis of the generaleconomic situa
tion in the coffee market.
 244

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other questions, but

we also have many other witnesses. I wonder if I might ask the wit
nesses if I could submit some questions to them and have them respond
directly to the committee at some later point. Would you be willing to
do that ?
Mr. IRELAND ( presiding ]. Gentlemen , is that agreeable ?
Thank you gentlemen. We will call on you later .
Mr. de la Garza, did you have some questions?
Mr. DE LA Garza. Since my colleagues have already asked questions,
I have no questions except to make a statement, that I am very happy
to see that the committee is taking this opportunity to look at the
Uganda situation and I am very happy to see some of my colleagues
interested at last in what is going on in Uganda.
I had some friends who were business people in Uganda who were
not black , who had to leave their country only with the clothes they
were wearing when they left. I could not seem to get anyone in Con
gress interested for several years. It seemed we were picking countries
selectively where we put our force on human rights and rights of indi
viduals and apparent]y we were not doing it across the board.
I had no success or very little success every time I mentioned Uganda.
So, I would like to commend our chairman and the members who
finally have come around to express an interest in what has happened
in Uganda for quite a few years.
I am very glad to join with you now and see what we can do to al
leviate not only the suffering of those who remain in Uganda, but
all of those that were forced to leave and whose possessions were taken
over and who were treated as less than human beings by being dis
possessed of all their earthly belongings and pushed out.
So, Iwelcomemy colleagues whojoined inthis effort.
Mr. IRELAND. Gentlemen, we will talk to you at a later date.
I would ask now from the International Technical & Industrial
Trade Co., Mr. Robert Danning ; the A. M. General Corp., Mr. James
H. Drum ; from the Harris Corp., Mr. Jim Stanton ; from Grumman
American Aviation Co., Mr. Corwin Meyer ; from Lockheed Corp.,
Mr. Alexander H. Lorch.
Mr. Meyer is unable to attend. Representing Grumman will be Mr.
John P. Innes. Mr. Danning is not with us from International Tech
nical & Industrial Trade Co. As Mr. Bingham said, going from the
order on the sheet here, we will ask Mr. Drum if he would begin.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. DRUM, VICE PRESIDENT FOR GOVERN
HARRIS CORP.1

Mr. DRUM . Mr. Chairman and members of the three subcommittees

represented , I am James H. Drum , vice president for government
affairs of A. M. General Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of American
Motors.
Today I am appearing in response to your request to Mr. Gerald C.
Mevers to testify at this hearing, which is considering the facts of
major import and export transactions with Uganda. I am the desig
nated representative to appear at this hearing and express our views
with respect to the legislation proposals pending before these sub
committees
 245

As requested in your letter of March 17, I will respond to the

questions in the order they were asked.
No. 1, the nature and extent of our trade with the Government of
Uganda is minimal. In April 1977, we respondedto a request from the
Minister of Defense of Uganda to ship one M151A2, 4x4 , 14 -ton
tactical truck. It was a direct sale to the Government of Uganda.
In accordance with current regulations, we applied to the Depart
mentof Commerce for an export license, which wasgranted on June
20, 1977. An amendment for spare parts to support this vehiclein the
field was issued July 5, 1977. The vehicle in question was shipped on or
about July 1 , 1977.
Approximately 3 months later, in response to another order from
the Minister of Defense, an export license was requested for one
M151A2, 4x4, 14 -ton tactical truck , and one M35A2, 6x6, 21/2 -ton
tactical truck with replacement parts. This license was issued shortly
thereafter, but was never utilized .
No. 2, the assessment of the impact and value of our trade upon
the Government of Uganda and the general population is negative.
No. 3, the assessment by our company of the political and social
situation in Uganda is negative.
No. 4, the termination of trade with Uganda would have no effect
upon our company or its employees.
This concludes our testimony. I am prepared to answer any ques
tions regarding my testimony. Thank you very much.
Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Drum . If we may proceed through
this, we will have questions at the end, so I call now on Mr. Stanton of
the Harris Corp.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES V. STANTON, LEGAL COUNSEL,
HARRIS CORP.1

Mr. STANTON . Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am James V. Stanton of the law firm of Ragan and Mason,
Washington, D.C., appearing on behalf of Harris Corp., pursuant to
your subcommittee's letter of March 17, 1978, requesting testimony
from Harris International Telecommunications, Inc., regarding the
legislative proposals concerning the Government of Uganda.
Harris Corp. is engaged primarily in the manufacture and sale of
electronic communications equipment and systems and printing equip
ment. Annual sales for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1977, were
approximately $650 million. Harris International Telecommunica
tions, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Harris Corp.
Harris exported fromthe United States about $ 200 million of goods
and services during the 1977 fiscal year, and exports have been increas
ing. Harris and its subsidiaries have about 16,000 employees in this
country, about one-third of whom are engaged in producing for ex
port. Employees overseas are for the most part engaged temporarily
in installation, service and maintenance activities related to equip
ment and systems produced in and exported from the United States.
1 James V. Stanton served as a Member of Congress from 1970 to 1977 as Representa
tive of the 20th District of Ohio. During this time he served as a member on the Select
Committee on Intelligence, Government Operations Committee, and the Public Works and
Transportation Committee.He has been a partner with the law firm of Ragan and Mason
in Washington, D.C. since 1977.
 246

The nature and extent of Harris Corp.’s trade with Uganda con
sists of production and installation of satellite earth stations and a
mass communication system . Harris was introduced to this business
as a result of successful completion of a similar system for a neighbor
ing African government.The contracts in Uganda are withthe Public
Telephone Co., covering telephone usage, and with the Ministry of In
formation covering television and radio broadcasting. The system is
designed to be nationwide and is now partially in operation ,but has
not yet been completed. The portion of the system already in opera
tionis, accordingto our observations, being used for general commu
nication purposes. The communication system includes primarily In
telsat standard B -type Earth stations; Harris standard Domsat do
mestic -type Earth stations; standard Harris VHF commercial tele
vision broadcast stations; HF and VHF radio communication equip
ment both fixed site and portable; power generation and installation
equipment ; antenna towers; equipment shelters; and miscellaneous
spare parts.
Harris Corp. believes that the impact of this programuponthe gen
eral population of Uganda and the Government is favorable. The value
of this trade can be best understood in light of President Kennedy's
statement inviting :
All nations to participate in a communications satellite system in the interest
of world peace and closer brotherhood among the peoples of the world .
The ultimate result will be to encourage and facilitate world trade, educa
tion, entertainment, and many kinds of professional, political, and personal dis
course which are essential to healthy human relationships and international
understanding .
In response to your query as to our company's assessment of the
politicaland social situation in Uganda, we personally know of the
news reports coming from Uganda concerning many atrocities. How
ever , Harris Corp. has had neither the opportunity nor any basis for
making any corporate assessments of thatnature.Our people who work
in Uganda are primarily technicians who remain there only for the
purposes and the period which their work requires. The nature of their
work does not give them any special opportunity to be involved in
political or social situations by which they could reasonablymake any
such assessments. Our employees report that they are treated well, and
have not been subjected to any improper treatment.
The effect upon Harris Corp. of any termination of trade with
Uganda might be very significant if the existing program were inter
rupted prior to its completion . The company has no assurance of fur
ther major contracts in Uganda, however, normal spare parts orders
and maintenanceare usually required for communicationssystems.
In addition, adverse effects of such termination could be very sub
stantial with respect to business of Harris Corp. and other
American companies with Africa as a whole. The company's business
with Uganda was suggested by the government of a neighboringnation
which is friendly to the United States. It was entered into with the
approval of the U.S. Government. The equipment is not of a military
nature, it is available equally from other sources in a variety of
European nations and Japan, and the system is designed to produce
communications for developing nations to be operated commercially
 247

or under Government ownership on a peaceful basis. Refusal by the

U.S. Government to allow American companies to supply such equip
ment and systems, without a uniform standard applicable to other
nations as well, must necessarily lead governments of other African
and developing nations to question whether American companies will
be reliable suppliers. Any action which would prevent completion of
existing contracts would have particularly serious consequences for
future relations by the Government of the United States and business
of American companies with African nations other than Uganda.
Interruption of the supply of parts and maintenance for equipment
and systems already installed could also severely impact the American
suppliers of such equipment. Since this type of nonmilitary equip
ment has been provided in the past to developing nations pursuant
to policies of the U.S. Government, and withexpress approval of our
Government, any future inability to provide parts orto maintain
existing systems would inevitably deprive the people of Uganda and
of other countries of the benefitsof the system their Government will
have already purchased. It will make it far more difficult for Amer
ican companies to sell similar systems to other nations.
We respectfully submit this testimony in answer to your inquiries
made in the March 1978 letter.
Mr. BINGHAM ( presiding ]. Thank you, Mr. Stanton. It is a pleas
ure to welcome back a former colleague.
Mr. STANTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman . If there are any ques
tions ,I would like to indulge, gentlemen — I have a commitment in the
U.S. Senate and I would be happy to answer any questions but I have
another hearing to go to or I wouldbe glad to respond for the record.
Mr. BINGHAM. Are the other members of the panel pressed for time ?
Ifnot I will entertain questions at this time of Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Bonker ?
Mr. BONKER. I have several questions. I, too, would like to welcome
a former colleague before the panel. Mr. Stanton, we have a staff
report that goes into considerable detail about training activities
involving the companyyou represent and Ugandans.
I wonder if you could tell the committee how many, if any, Ugan
dans have you trained thus far or are you presently training ?
Mr. STANTON. I do not have the numberof Ugandans on the satel
lite equipment that were trained , but I would be glad to furnish it
for the committee.
Mr. BONKER. For the record, based on the information we have, we
know of between 20 and 30 Ugandans training in Melbourne, Fla ., on
satellite communications equipment through the Harris Co. At least
five Ugandans are receiving training in mobile communications at the
Harris trainingfacility in Rochester, N.Y.
Practically all of these people arereceiving Government of Uganda
scholarships. Several of the individuals claim that they are part of
the Ugandan military and perhaps two individuals work directly
for the State Research Bureau.
Do you have any knowledge of these allegations or assertions ?
Mr. STANTON. No, I have no knowledge of it.
Mr. BONKER. The problem is that based on information we have,
many of the people who are being trained by your company or the
 248

company you represent, are indeed members of the Ugandan military

or the State Research Bureau. Many of them are being trained to
operate pretty sophisticated equipment.
Mr. STANTON. Mr. Bonker, Congressman Bonker, we have been en
couraged by President Kennedy and members of this Government to
provide a satellite communication system around the world and it
seems to me that if you provide asatellite communication system , and
somebody buys it then they don't buy it just for the purpose of having
it. They buy it for the purpose of using it.
You have to train the people inorder to use it and that seems
reasonable. Now I do not know the exact details of the number of
people,but I would be glad to get it.
Mr. BONKER. I think we should clear up the items that have been
presented to us. We have been in contact with former Ugandans,
those who are now in exile who were on this training program , and
they feel the training that they and others have received really con
tributed to the military sophistication of the State Research Bureau .
Mr. STANTON. It is our understanding — and Congressman, Harris
Corp. is very sensitive to the use of its equipment — during the course
of approval we have had discussions with the State Department. We
have discussions frankly with Congressman Pease, because there were
some questions regarding this contract after it was executed and, very
frankly, it was then subsequently approved by the State Department
and we have been sensitive to it, but it is a communication system and
I would point out to you that because of this communications system
being in effect, the Senator who testified earlier here today was able
to hear of news as to what was occurring in Uganda and, I believe, it
is a directrelationship to this communication system which was in
stalled by Harris Corp.
Mr. BONKER. You do train Ugandans, but you just do not have your
finger on the number ?
Mr. STANTON. We train anybody in the satellite communication
equipment that we sell because that is part of thecontract.
Mr. BONKER. I will submit to you as counsel for the Harris Corp.
these questions and then you can respond to them .
Mr. STANTON . Thank you.
[Mr. Stanton subsequently provided the following information :]
With regard to the Committee's inquiries as to number of students and places
of training the following is submitted. There were 16 students in Melbourne from
June 23 to November 5, 1977. Five additional students arrived June 24 , and de
parted November 5, 1977. Five of the students left Melbourne for R. F. Com
munications July 21 and remained there until November 5. Of those 5, one left
directly from Rochester and went back to Uganda. The other four returned to
Melbourne and departed on November 5 with the others. Four late entries from
Uganda to Melbourne arrived August 13, 1977 and departed November 4. Five
additional students arrived in this country September 18, came through Mel
bourne to Rochester to attend one class in Rochester. They departed from Mel
bourne to Uganda after the COMSAT launched around October 2. There were 7
students in Quincy from August 13 to November 5, 1977, who also departed
through Melbourne . A total of 37 students came into the country and 34 re
turned to Uganda. Of the 25 who entered the Melbourne training course only 22
returned, 3 defected .

Mr. BONKER. One last question. What is the neighboring country ?

Mr. STANTON . Nigeria .
 249

Mr. BONKER. Thank you.

Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Pease ?
Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome also to our
former colleague.
Mr. Stanton, are there any conditions under which the Harris Corp.
would decide not to do business with a government like Uganda ?
Would there be any conditions of, say, repression that would be so
severe that the corporation would decide not to do business at all ?
| Mr. STANTON. Yes, there would be, Congressman. Harris Corp. is
a very moral company. It tries to enter and do business with people
who hold high ethics and high moralstandards.
But we believe and advocate to the Congress of the United States
that they do, as Congressman Cavanaugh suggested earlier in this
hearing , adopt a uniform standard applicable to all nations so we
do not have to act individually after a contract is in execution .
I sincerely appreciate the fact I was able to come to you and dialog
with you on the fact that we were in the middle of a contract, and be
'cause of that, there was going to be a judgment made after the fact
and I appreciated the courtesy that wasextended to us by the Congress
of the United States and by the State Department.
But yes, we look to the Congress of the United States and urge the
Congress of the United States to adopt a high moral, ethical stand
ard but apply it to all nations so we do not have to make individual
and unilateral judgments in the business community after the fact.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I just point out that the judgment, the
standard we are trying to establish in this case — at least that I am
makes a distinction on the basis of genocide rather than other forms
of human rights violations.
I think that is a standard that is fairly easy to draw and one that
most people would appreciate as being a much greater magnitude than
imprisonment or torture or whatever else.
Mr. STANTON. If I may, Mr. Chairman . Congressman, you do appre
ciate the fact that we have to have a uniform standard and it can only
come from Congress and the administration .
Mr. PEASE. I appreciate that. How many employees of your corpo
ration do you have in Uganda now ? Do you have any idea ?
Mr. STANTON. Again, it would be a guess but I would say approxi
mately 20.
Mr. PEASE. Does the corporation have any concern , any worry about
the physical well-being of their employees there ?
Mr. STANTON. Yes. We have concern about the employees of our
company in every part of the world where they are, and we are a
large exporting firm and we are in touch with them, and as I indicated
1 in our testimony, we have had no difficulty with the employees and
they have indicated they have been treated with respect during their
stay in Uganda.
Mr. Pease. One last question, Mr. Chairman.
You said that none of the equipment or training that the Harris
Corp. has provided will be used for paramilitary purposes or to
strengthen Amin's hold on power ?
Mr. STANTON. Well, I would say that communication or communica
tion equipment obviously can be used by whoever can control it. But
Il

11

1
 250

the fact of the matter is that for years the policy of the U.S. Govern
ment has been to open up communications.
We have dealt with Russia and with the Iron Curtain countries
on the basis of training to get communication to those people so that
people can make a judgment for themselves. We believe that in pro
viding communication systems we are allowing the people of the
world to make a judgment as to how to govern themselves.
We recognize the problems that are contained within certain coun
tries such as the one you are addressing today. But that does not, none
theless , say we should bury all communication systems for fear that
they might be used in amanner we do not anticipate.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Mr. Stanton, you have stated that Harris Corp.
is a very moral, ethical corporation, and then you say on page 3 of
your prepared testimony that “Harris Corp. has neither the oppor
tunity nor any basis for making any corporate assessments of the
>
political and social situation in Uganda.”
How can you be a moral corporation not capable of making mora
judgments ?
Mr. STANTON . We make individual judgments and I have to say
that when we entered into the contract, you know , the basis of wha
you are indicating, Congressman, was not a fact. This contract ha
been in existence for some time.
I am aware, as are other Americans, of the news reports cominį
out of Uganda and we have got to say that we do not approve of any
act of genocide or any act that is committed in violation of humai
rights of people. Yet we ask and come to the Congress of the United
States to ask for the same thing that you have recommended, and
that is a uniform standard applicable to all countries so that the
business community can look at those countries and deal with them
accordingly.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. That is fine. You are saying you are never capable
ofmaking that kind of judgment about anypolitical power.
Mr. STANTON . Oh, no. We are capable of making it, but we had
no basis for making it when
Mr. CAVANAUGH. You have 20 people in Uganda ?
Mr. STANTON . Yes, and we have a contract to complete
Mr. CAVANAUGH. More people than the U.S. Government has in
Uganda ?
Mr. STANTON . Well, we have a contract that was approved by the
U.S. Government.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . My point is that you have corporate access to
information relative to the political and social situation in Uganda,
do you not ?
Mr. STANTON. No ; we are not querying our people as to the social
and political situation. These are technicians. We are asking them
if they have been disturbed . They live in a compound, they live in
an area — they do not have social contact . They are not out in the
streets of Uganda.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I am trying to get some understanding. Do you
never feel it is appropriate for the corporation to make those kinds
of judgments ?
Mr. STANTON. Oh, yes. We do not have I said in the statement
we do not have the basis for making them .
 251

Mr. CAVANAUGH. In what circumstance is it appropriate for you

to make a judgment on the political and social circumstances of a
client state ?
Mr. STANTON . You make a judgment on the basis of facts that come
to you. I am indicating we do not have any facts that have come to
the corporation. I can give you an individual judgment.
Mr. ČAVANAUGH. Somehow I am not appreciating what you are try
ing to communicate.
Mr. STANTON. What I am indicating to you, Congressman, is the
fact that, what my testimony indicated ,thatwe have not had the basis
on which to make the judgment that you ask me to make because we
do not have the facts other than the news releases which are not direct
facts to the corporation .
Mr. CAVANAUGH. But you indicate your corporation is capable of
making those judgments on occasion.
Mr. STANTON . We make them all the time.
Mr. CavaNAUGH . Could you describe to me those circumstances ?
What I cannot understand is how you are not able to do it in the
case of Uganda, but you indicate that the corporation is capable of
making those judgments in other instances.
Mr. STANTON. I did not say we were not capable of making judg
ments in Uganda. I said we did not have the facts on which to make
it. We are not out soliciting the opinions of the technicians that are
there .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Have you ever made such judgment?
Mr. STANTON . We make judgments like thatevery day.
Mr. CavanaUGH. Would you give me some examples of those
instances ?
Mr. STANTON. Someone who has a record of dishonesty, we do not
do business with them because of that track record . That is a moral
judgment.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . You found Idi Amin to be an honest
Mr. STANTON. No; we are not making a judgment in that area.
Mr. CAVANAUGH.. If my time has notexpired, I wish it would.
Mr. IRELAND. In this case, would the gentleman from Nebraska
yield ?
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I will yield .
Mr. IRELAND. Let me pursue as fresh fodder for this moral judg
ment, in one point at the end of your testimony, Mr. Stanton, you say
that “ Cutting off this trade with Uganda will make it far more dif
ficult for American companies to sell similar systems to other
nations."
Now, am I to understand in this judgment process that you are
saying to us that that is a higher valueon whichwe should make our
decision, hoping that you accept the idea that this is a Government
decision to be made, not a private enterprise decision to be made ?
I assume by the waythis is phrased, that to youandthe people that
you represent,this is a higher value; that is, the value that it will make
it more difficult for American companies to sell similarsystems to other
nations, that that is a higher value than a moral judgment value on
what is taking place even in the limited scope that Mr. Pease
addresses ?

25-826 0 - 78 - 17
 252

Mr. STANTON . No. Let me say that we would like a. moral judgment
value applicable to all nationsand a standard by the Congress of the
United States. And we are here today
Mr. IRELAND. In the meantime— we seem to always, as people get
into corners about this kind of thing, they always come out , " Let's
keep on, anything, any transgression untileverybody is painted with
thesame brush ." And that seems to be what we run and hide behind .
In the moral judgments that you make, does that make what is
going on any more palliatable to you ?
Mr. STANTON. Absolutely not.We are not approving what is going
on . We are not concurring in it.
We are indicating to you very clearly and to the Congress of the
United States that we endorse a standard, a high standard
Mr. IRELAND. But only if it is applied across the board to every
body in the world , that is what you are telling me. The other side of
that argument is that unless it is applied to every country across the
world, that any instance of it in an isolated fashion is OK , right?
Mr. STANTON. No ; we are not saying that, Mr. Ireland. What we
are saying is that we do not like to be judgedafter the fact. After we
are into a position of entering into a contract, we do not want some
one to come in and say “You have to terminate the contract because we
have found this fact, this fact and this fact to be so ."
Mr. IRELAND. At the same time you are saying in your testimony it
has vast implications to the future because you say “ It is far more
difficult to sell similar systems to other nations in the future.”
Mr. STANTON . Let me say as far as the contractual relations are con
cerned, if you want to give a standard for the Ameican business com
munity — and I think there should be a governmental standard — then
lay it down uniformly so that we understand it.
Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman , that completes Mr. Cavanaugh's 5
minutes.
Mr. BINGHAM. I just have one specific question. I think we should
have the answer in the record .
When was the contract entered into that you have been describing ?
Mr. STANTON. I will get the date. I do not have the exact date . I
will submit it for the record.
Mr. BINGHAM . Do you have the year?
Mr. STANTON. I think it is a 3- or 4-year contract. I will get you the
date.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony.
Mr. John Innes of the Grumman American Aviation Co.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. INNES, CORPORATE LEGAL COUNSEL,
GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORP.

Mr. Innes. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is

John Innes. I am corporate legal counsel for Grumman American
Aviation Corp., Savannah , Ga. I am appearing on behalf of Mr.
1 Mr. Stanton later provided this information : The exact date of the first contract
( Tr-176) was April 17, 1977.
 253

Corwin Meyer, the president, who is unfortunately unable to be here

today because of sickness.
[Mr. Innes proceeded to read the following letter of April 4, 1978 ,
from Corwin H. Meyer to Congressman Bingham .]
Grumman American Aviation Corporation submits the information and com
inents below in response to the letter of March 17, 1978, by the Committee on
International Relations of the Congress of the United States on the question
oi trade and commerce with the Government of Uganda .
In March 1974, the Government of Uganda purchased a Gulfstream G - II air
craft from Airjet Corporation, a corporation not affiliated with Grumman. Since
delivery of the aircraft to Uganda, Grumman American as the aircraft manu
fàcturer has received orders from Uganda for parts and equipment, and has
otherwise made its services available for support and maintenance of this air
craft in the same manner as it supports all Gulfstream aircraft in current
operation .
In the period 1976 through the present, Grumman American has exported
$ 54,655 of parts to the Government of Uganda. In the period of 1974 through the
present the aircraft has returned to the United States seven times and has pur
chased a total of $ 627,899.31 of materials, services and labor through Grumman
American . Of this amount above, $ 279,004.25 was spent on labor of employees of
Grumman American . In addition the vendors to Grumman American expended
a portion of their income on wages for their employees .
The Gulfstream II aircraft is a commercial aircraft used as private transporta
tion by various leaders around the world including many chiefs of state and
heads of corporations. We have included copies of materials that best de
scribe and depict the aircraft for your information ."
Grumman American does not feel the extent of its trade has any impact or
value upon the Government or people of Uganda. Neither does Grumman Amer
ican feel that it, through its trade, sales and subsequent support of the aircraft
it sold have particular responsibilities with regard to the political and social
situation in Uganda.
The effect upon Grumman American Aviation Corporation and its employees,
and its vendors and their employees of a termination of trade with Uganda
could be great. This company sells aircraft globally in competition with other
manufacturers both domestic and foreign . If United States trade with Uganda
were terminated and the civilian aircraft of Uganda could not be serviced and
supported because of the foregoing, and denial of entry and landing rights in
the United States, a condition hazardous to flight could develop. In the event
such conditions developed and a head of state or his guests were to be injured
or perish, the impact on future sales of aircraft would be obvious.
For the foregoing reasons Grumman American does not feel it is in its best
interest or those of its employees for the United States to stop its support
and service of the commercial/ civilian aircraft sold to the Government of
Uganda ,
Since our transactions with the Government of Uganda have been so minimal,
as outlined above, I trust that this letter will satisfy your requirement for in
formation and make any personal appearance unnecessary.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Innes. Before turning to Mr. Lorch ,
could you clarify one statement in your letter ? You say that, “ In the
period of 1974 through the present the aircraft has returned to the
United States seven times and has purchased a total of $627,000 of
materials, services and labor through Grumman American."
I just do not understand that statement. What do you mean " the
aircraft has *** purchased ” that amount ?
Mr. INNEs. It is like returning your car to the automobile dealer
for service you buy.
Mr. BINGHAM. The amount expended for servicing the plane ?
1 Copies of these brochures are retained in subcommittee files.
 254

Mr. INNEs. Yes.

Mr. BINGHAM. What was the original price of the plane ?
Mr. INNEs. We sold the aircraft to Air Jet Corp., for $5 million.
Mr. BINGHAM. I understand that Mr. RobertDanning, president of
International Technical and Industrial Trade, has arrived. I will call
on him shortly.
Next will be Alexander Lorch .
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER H. LORCH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRES
IDENT, LOCKHEED -GEORGIA CO. , AND VICE PRESIDENT, LOCK
HEED CORP.

Mr. LORCH . I am Alexander Lorch , executive vice president, Lock

heed -Georgia Co., and vice president, Lockheed Corp. I am pleased
to appearbefore your committee today concerning U.S. trade with
Uganda. I understand your interest in the Lockheed -Georgia Co.,
relates to our Commerce Department application regarding the ex
portation of aircraft operational and maintenance manuals , which I
am prepared to discuss.
Lockheed's trade with the Government of Uganda could be charac
terized as insignificant.
In early 1974, Lockheed routinely asked both the Departments of
State and Commerceaboutthe possibility of receiving an export license
for either a C-130 Hercules airplane or its commercial version, an
L - 100, for delivery to Uganda .Both departments responded nega
tively. About a year later, Lockheed was informed that it might ex
plore the possibility of selling a commercial L - 100 to Uganda . Lock
ħeed briefly considered the matter but took no further action.
On October 11, 1974 , Lockheed routinely sold a commercial L - 100–30
to Alaska International Air, Inc. ( AIA) which had previously pur
chased and was using other L -100's in its operations. At the time of
sale of this aircraft to AIA, Lockheed had no knowledge of any inten
tion by AIA to resell it. AIA had no obligation to inform Lockheed
of itsintention with respect to the airplane; however, in June 1975,
AIA informed us thatit was attempting to resell the aircraft but did
not identify its potential customer. In any case, Lockheed had a firm
contractual obligation to deliver to AIA which it did on July 29, 1975.
We subsequently learned that AIA resold the airplane to Page Air
ways which in turn resold the aircraft toUganda Airlines. There was
no contractual or any other agreement between Lockheed and Page
Airways or Uganda Airlines regarding this airplane. Lockheed was
approached by Page to authorize transfer of the airplane warranty
to the user, but such authorization was not given as Lockheed had no
obligation to do so.
In the fall of 1977, Lockhead received a call from a representative of
Uganda Airlines in Miami requesting permission to fly the Ugandan
airplane from Miami to Lockheed's plant in Marietta for repairs. We
understood the airplane was being worked on by a repair shop in
Miami and that the request was made because the shop was unable to
repair a certain item required by the Ugandan representative. This
request was brought to the attention of the President of the Lockheed
Georgia Co., who, because of his belief that close business ties with
Uganda were inappropriate, declined to provide the repair service as
it was not a safety of flight repair.
 255

Lockheed was asked directly by Uganda Airlines and by Page Air

ways to provide a field service representative but for employeesafety
reasons, both requests were declined.
I have learned, however, this is not entirely correct. We did make a
proposal to Page Airways which they did not accept. Lockheed also
declined a Uganda Airlines request to provide flight training in
Marietta .
The Commerce Department has recently approved a service center
agreement between Lockheed and Sabena Airlines which provides for
Sabena to furnish drop -in maintenance for any L - 100 and to furnish
planned maintenance for L - 100's belonging to certain countries. While
Uganda is not one of the countries approved for planned maintenance,
it is not precluded from receiving unplanned or “drop -in ” maintenance
from Sabena. Lockheeddid recently respond to a purchase order from
Sabena's purchasing office in New York for a total of $ 35 worth of
spare parts which Lockheed understood was for use on the Ugandan
aircraft pursuant to the Lockheed /Sabena Service Center Agreement.
Lockheed supplied routine service bulletins regarding the aircraft to
Page Airways in New York at their request. Because of certain cur
rent product liability litigation against it and other aircraft manufac
turers, Lockheed is very aware that any aircraft accident related to an
operational or safety of flight maintenance problem can result in law
suits, based in part on failureto provide proper maintenance and other
technical data for the aircraft. Consequently, for this and humanitar
ian reasons, Lockheed felt compelledto transmit adequatemaintenance
and operational data relating to aircraft safety directly to anyone
known to be operating one of its aircraft. To discharge this respon
sibility, Lockheed's Engineering department requested approval to
transmit such data to known users of our aircraft, hence, Lockheed
recently made applications for approval to transmit such information
to Uganda Airlines along with several other foreign operators of the
L - 100 airplane. The applications were approved by the Department of
Commerce with respect to each of the other foreign operators except
Uganda Airlines which application is still pending. This application
isnot an indication that we have made any current proposal to Uganda.
We have not made any current proposal and have no intention ofmak
ing one.
With respect to the question of termination of trade with Uganda,
we do not believe that it would have any significant impact on our
business. However, we would be concerned about any situation where
government policy would prevent communication of updated mainte
nance and operational data relating to the safety of flight of a com
mercial aircraft manufactured by Lockheed .
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal remarks.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much. The final memberof this panel
Robert Danning, president of International Technical & Indus
is Mr.
trial Trade Co. Mr. Danning.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT K. DANNING , PRESIDENT, INTERNA
TIONAL TECHNICAL & INDUSTRIAL TRADE CO .
Mr. Danning began his career with this firm as a marketing specialist and sales
representative. Prior to joining International Technical & Industrial Trade Com
pany Mr. Danning served as a distributor for REI Industries and for several
 256

years was a senior programmer / systems analyst and corporate programming in

structor for Doubleday & Company.
Mr. Danning received his B.A. in International Studies from the University
of New Mexico and his M.B.A. specializing in international financial and corpo
rate management from Adelphi University .Mr. Danning has done graduate work
at Hofstra University, received the Diplôme from the Faculté des Arts et Sciences
at McGill University, been a National Science Foundation Scholar in Economics
at Southern Illinois University, and trained in computer programming and man
agement techniques at International Business Machines Corporation ( IBM ) .
Mr. Danning holds membership in many organizations including Phi Beta
Kappa , The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi, The Academy of Political Science
of Columbia University, The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
The American Judicature Society, The Atlantic Council of the United States, the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and the National Association of
Eagle Scouts .
Mr. Danning is a Priest in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter - day Saints
and is active in the Boy Scouts of America and in civic and community affairs.
Mr. DANNING. Mr. Chairman , I am pleased to be able to enter these
formal remarks into the record .
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Danning, I notice your statement would take
quite a bit of time to read. I would appreciate your summarizing it.
We will incorporate the entire statement into the record . We are run
ning late and we still have another panel to hear from .
Mr. DANNING. International Technical & Industrial Trade Co. is
engaged in trade with Uganda. We could summarize our company's
operation by saying we are an exporting and importing firm .
Whereas we deal with Uganda, we deal on an export basis.We deal
both with the private andGovernment sectors. We have sold a wide
variety of products including technical manuals and books, automo
tive parts and tires, paints, musical instruments, electronic testing
equipment, and intra -bank telecommunications systems and trucks.
All of these, except a few of the musical instruments, have been manu
factured in the United States.
Now, most of the remarks in my formal statement deal with the
question of foreign trade policy with respect to Uganda and in general
with respect to the rest of the world, since Uganda is not really all that
separate in the context of many other countries of similar situation.
What I say is that it behooves us to try to open doors rather thanto
close them if we are to affect the type of policy changes in countries
such as Uganda that we wish to see.
For example, we have found historically thatif we promoted trade
and cultural, educational, and political ties and communication con
tacts between various countries, we can have a much greater positive
influence on their internal affairs than if we close the doors. We have
used this type of policy and we found it to be effective all over the
world .
We have a specific example with the Soviet Union and with opening
the door to mainland China. We use this policy extensively in Latin
America all the time. Wefound it to be a very workable policy.
As of this point, my understanding of the overall trade with Uganda
is that it is not very significant vis -a - vis our country. This does promise
to change rather dramatically in the next two decades, if we maintain
an open door policy on trade, such as a policy similar to what we have
already.
 257

Some generalobservations as to the place of Uganda as it relates to

our current trade policy with that country. Uganda is quite definitely
an emerging nation. It is an underdeveloped nation and as such it
exhibits allthe characteristics one would expect of such a country
a localized agrarian economy, a sharp economic class distinction where
few have wealth for luxuries, underdeveloped intra -country transpor
tation facilities, a growing modernistic transformation of the major
population center ( Kampala ) complete with high -rise buildings and
modern conveniences, and a government still in the birth -pangs of
" settling -in ” after assuming the reins of power.
In fact, Uganda is hardly unique in these political and socioeconomic
attributes of a new emerging nation : similar conditions are found
widespread. We see them throughout the world with countries that
we actively do trade with and with which we have no thoughts of
cuttingoff trade because it is not in the best interest of our own coun
try both business-wise and from a currency earnings viewpoint and
also importantly from our own foreign policy and State Department
viewpoint.
I do not see Uganda as materially particularly very different. It is a
very young nation in this respect. It has not come as far as many other
countries, for example,in South and Central America.
I have had many contacts with Ugandans, both students in this
country and those who hold Government positions and with those
who are owners in the private business sector and those who are em
ployees in the private sector. They have shared with me, confidentially
and freely, theirviewpoints on their country.
I find surprisingly that they are quite aware of the restrictions in
their country. They are hoping for a lessening of those restrictions,
and they do see thelessening of those restrictions coming in time. They
are all very patriotic. Therefore, their viewpoint is important for us
to take note of. They see that as trade develops and more and more
contact between our country and theirs ensues that the restrictive
practices of their government will in time abate.
I have also found that Ugandans are basically quite pro-Ameri
can — they look up to our country. Let us put it this way. They are
quite impressed with our technology and basically with our system of
government and with things American .
They have, despite the relationship between our country and Uganda
in the past few years, a favorable outlook toward the United States
which is very much intact. This may be somewhat of a surprise to
some committee members.
This basic pro -Americanism is an asset to those in the business world
who wish to do trade with Uganda in both the private and the govern
ment sectors. It is certainly an asset for our foreign policy if we wish
to use it. Wehave to anticipate that during the next decade or so there
are going to be changes in governmental figures. There are going to be
some lessening of tension .
There are many signs that this is coming about internally as the
Government of Uganda feels more secure with itself. This has been
the traditional way of progress in most underdeveloped countries
where a new governmenthas taken over in troubled times and instills
itself and tries to gain the respect of its citizenry.
 258

In summation, I would say that our present foreign trade policy is

the correct one to use. It is shown to be historically workable. It pro
motes our foreign policy objectives. It may not work in Uganda and
elsewhere on the dramatic visible level, but it does work on a gradual
progressive albeit somewhat uneven level of progress in this country
to meet our foreign policy objectives.
I think this policy is one we should continue using. We are obvi
ously not talking about exporting strategic and military items. We
are talking about all those items which are presently allowed for ex
port to countries such as Uganda. Some of those items do not need
an export license. Some of them do need formal approval by the
Department of Commerce and in certain very isolated situations
approval of the Department of State and Department of Defense.
The current policy as we have it in place now is very workable.
I believe it willserve our country's best interests to promote the type
of attitudes and governmental policies within Uganda that we wish
to see come about.
I believe if we turn around and restrict such trade, we will find
just like we have with other countries — that we will be limiting our
ability to affect the changes wewant to see.
We could add some general observations. Our trade with Uganda
is now quite limited . Though it may hurt to varying extents some
U.S. firms that do have commerce with that country, to end trade with
Uganda will not materially have any effect that we can logically fore
see for the U.S. business community.
Ending such trade will not materially affect Ugandan policy. Ugan
dans have been buying a great deal of merchandise from Germany,
Japan, England, and elsewhere.
Because of our strained relationship in the past few years with
Uganda, trade is only now just beginning to be meaningful. Uganda
is quietly opening up its doors and being pro -American . We have in
a sense a dychotomy between this quiet, businesslike trading attitude
and the formal, more strained governmental position between our
countries.
I definitely think our way of approach is to continue the way we
have been . It is a positive approach . It doesnot put wrong pressures
or undue pressures on the Government of Uganda. It does not jeop
ardize our own security and our own position in this country. It helps
meet very definitely our own companiespolicy objectives.
[Mr. Danning's prepared statement follows:]
 259

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT K. DAWNING, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL

TECHNICAL & INDUSTRIAL TRADE Co.

April 6 , 1978
Honorable Gentlemen of the Committee on International Relations :
International Technical & Industrial Trade Company has actively solicited trade
with Uganda on both a governmental and non - governmental basis for a number of
years. This trade is now becoming substantial and promises to grow sharply in
the next half decade . We have sold a wide variety of products including technical
books , automotive parts and tires , paints , musical instruments, electronic testing
equipment, an intra - bank telecommunications system , and trucks , all of these .
products , except for some of the musical instruments, having been manufactured in
the United States of America . Currently the government of Uganda and private Ugandan
trading firms rely on our company to arrange for the manufacture and sale of the
best products the U.S. market has to offer . (Ugandans have a very high opinion
of the technology and quality of V.S. products , and this is an opinion we , as a
U.S. firm , seek to promote . )
To date , overall trade between Uganda and the United States of America is still
extremely limited in quantity and dollar value as compared to many other countries
the United States trades with such as the countries of Western Europe or Latin
America . This is one reason that relatively few U.S. firms are now engaged in
trade with Uganda . Currently u.s. -Uganda trade cannot be said to have a vital or
significant effect on either the government of Uganda or the general population
of Uganda , although one could argue that coffee exports to the U.S. via the
Ugandan Coffee Marketing Board do have a positive effect on those Ugandans engaged
in coffee farming and on Ugandan government revenues . It is worth noting , however,
that such coffee is fairly easily sold anywhere on international markets .
The import of U.S. -Uganda trade on the general population of Uganda promises to
change dramatically in the next two decades if trading privileges between the
United States and Uganda are not restricted . A good deal of such trade will
probably be a substitution of u.s. made products for merchandise made in and
imported into Uganda from Germany (West ), Japan , and England . Such substitution
can be expected tooccur in products as varied as pharmaceuticals, heavy machinery ,
and large-scale building construction .
Politically and socio-economically Uganda is still an emerging nation in the
" underdeveloped world " and exhibits all the characteristics one would expect
of such a country - a localized agrarian economy , a sharp economic class distinc
tion where few have wealth for luxuries , underdeveloped intra-country transporta
tion facilites , a growing modernistic transformation of the major population
center (Kampala ) complete with high-rise buildings and modern conveniences , and
a government still in the birth -pangs of "settling-in" after assuming the reigns
of power . In fact , Uganda is hardly unique in these political and socio- economic
attributes of a new emerging nation : similar conditions are found widespread in
most of Africa , Asia , parts of the South Pacific , and also in a general sense ,
although development is further advanced , in Central and South America .
 260

Historically the United States has found it beneficial to conduct and foster
trade with such emerging and underdeveloped nations. Gradually via such trade
some of the socio -economic disparities are mitigated and class attitudes changed
and the restrictive influence of government relaxed as the economic health of
the country improves and economic , health , and transportation benefits are more
evenly spread throughout the country . There is no reason to assume that this
transformation will not occur in Uganda , and indeed it already has begun . ' The
real question before us , then , as a nation and as policy -makers is how we can
foster in Uganda such a transformation of a growing economic wealth more widely
distributed and a relaxing of restrictive governmental influence . The answer is
not , as some suggest , to restrict or cut off trade , but rather to promote trade
and , as a national concomitant , increased contacts on all levels between
and our
country and Uganda. Only trade and communication break down barriers, pave the
way for the kind of good transformation of an underdeveloped country that we are
talking about and want to encourage . This policy of promoting trade and communica
tion has been utilized over and over again in our foreign relations with success
and its opposite with deleterious effects . We as a nation cannot hope to aid the
change into a modern , free society of another nation without bringing interdependence,
economic foremost , but also educational, cultural, and political , between our
country and the other . Consistently we have found this policy to work , sometimes
with a rather dramatic effect , but usually on the gradualand uneven basis one
would expect. This policy is working in South and Central America , Africa , the
Middle East and Asia , Eastern Europe , and in the island countries of the South
Pacific . Our current policy vis - à - vis the Soviet Union , Mainland China , Korea ,
Taiwan , Yugoslavia , Rumania, Iran , Nigeria , Venezuela , just to mention a few countries
as examples, is based on increased trade and political and cultural contact , not
an abridgement of contact between our nation and another . And let us not forget
the example of Japan . What is it that tends to promote and safeguard the trans
formation in Japan? It is first and foremost economic , namely trade . Economic
trade is the single consistently most effective way on a long -term basis to promote
the transference of our national ideal.s of freedom and equal opportunity .' Economic
trade serves as the powerful and solid underpinning, if you will , of the trans
formation of other nations into economically healthy , modern , and free and
responsible societies that is our national policy objective .
The historical lessons are clear and therefore from these lessons our policy with
regard to Uganda is clear . Let us as a nation promote trade , educational, cultural,
and political contact with Uganda . Now , does this mean that we as a nation are
to be blind to injustice and abridgement of freedoms in Uganda or elsewhere ?
Certainly not . We should never condone inhumanity wherever we find it . But
promotion of trade and other contacts with Uganda or elsewhere in similar
situations does not purport to condone injustice. Rather it opens doors to
lead the way to a lessening of such injustice . Right now young Ugandans are
training in our universities to become economists, engineers, architects , and
doctors . I have talked freely and on a confidential basis to some of these
students and to other Ugandans that have visited our country . The changes we
seek to see in Uganda will come , inexorably. Our ideals have been , are , and are
being instilled , in a natural and inevitable manner , in those of Ugandan
citizenship . It is vital that we continue to leave the door of communication
open if we wish to see the changes in Uganda we hope for .
 261

Our current trade policy with Uganda is correct and viable . Trade is not to be
impeded where products of non - strategic and military nature are involved . This
policy serves our country's national interest and assists Uganda in its development
Our current trade policy with Uganda is responsible , humanitarian ,
and workable . It will garner the benefits we as a nation desire from it .
Now , as a company , International Technical & Industrial Trade Company has held
discussions of ways and projects to directly assist on a small and short - term
basis and on a large and long - term basis the economic development of Uganda
through both the governmental and private sectors . These project are now in the
beginning formulative stages . Should any one of them become reality , their impact
on the local citizenry will be highly benefical . We as a company , though , can
only proceed with and encourage discussions with Uganda on these projects which
meet our national foreign policy objectives if our current international..trade
policy is not abridged . As a U.S. company we seek to be a good ambassador of our
country and to quietly promote in our trading practices and in our private
discussions our country's high ideals . As a company active in trade with Uganda
we see a real possibility to help influence events positively and on a humanitarian
basis in Uganda and to serve our country's interests . The current foreign trade
policy of the United States of America with respect to Uganda will let our company
assist in meeting these objectives .

Respectfully submitted to the Committee on

International Relations for insertion in
the Congressional Record ,
International Technical & Industrial
Trade Company
Cobertoriton
Robert K. Danning ,
President

1
1

|
 262

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Danning. I would like to ask you
two orthree specific questions. Can you give us an idea of the magni
tude of your exports to Uganda ?
Mr. ÞANNING. We are probably not the largest company in this
trade. We have done in trade approximately about $ 1 million last year
with that country. If certain proposals do go through, this may be
increased several times this coming year or in years to come. We do
expect an increase.
Mr. BINGHAM . About what proportionof that is with private firms
in Uganda ? What proportionis withthe Government?
Mr. DANNING. Themajority of it, the vast majority of it. Over
three -quarters of amillionwould be with a corporation of the Govern
ment of Uganda. Specifically, we have dealt with the Uganda Com
mercial Bank in modernizing their facility and their building as well
as giving them the ability to communicate between their branches. We
have not dealt with the Ministry of Defense or other departments.
We have dealt with the banking community that is a nationalized
branch of Ugandan Government.
Mr. BINGHAM. Have you personally visited the country ?
Mr. DANNING. No, I have not. This is something that may be com
ing up this year or next year. There has been talk about it. It is ex
pected an invitation to visit will be issued when some of these systems
are finally in place. I have not been formally a visitor. I have asked
many questions of those who have come herebecause it is in my own
interest personally. It is alsoof interest to my firm to know the business
climate in which we are dealing.
I do have a Ugandan agentwho does represent our company's inter
est. He acts as asales agent. He also does business with other countries
around the world, but uses us for the U.S. market.
Mr. BINGHAM . Is that a Ugandan firm ?
Mr. DANNING. It is a Ugandan firm , yes.
Mr. BINGHAM . Ugandan national ?
Mr. DANNING. A Ugandan national runs it. He has been in business
since the beginning of the seventies.
Mr. BINGHAM . Do you have any contacts through your represent
atives with Idi Amin personally ?
Mr. DANNING. No, I have not.
Mr. BINGHAM . Have you had contacts through your representa
tives ?
Mr. DANNING. My sales agent has met and had interviews with Mr.
Amin. He does know several of the chief ministers that are close to
Amin and has talked with them . He has met on many occasions with
many lesser ministerial personnel.
Mr. BINGHAM . Mr. Lorch, I am interested to know , were you notified
in 1975 why the State and Commerce Departments had apparently
changed their position with regard to your selling the L - 100 to
Uganda ?
Mr. LORCH . Do you mean 1974 ?
Mr. BINGHAM . You said in 1974 you inquired about export licenses
and the response was negative. A year later, apparently the position
had changed .
Mr. LORCH . I have no idea.
 263

Mr. BINGHAM. I am very much interested in a statement you made

that the president of Lockheed -Georgia Co. concluded that close busi
ness ties with Uganda were inappropriate and declined to provide a
repair service asit was not a safety of flight repair.
Can you give us any information about that decision ? Was that
based on business considerations, on moral considerations, on the fact
that this might not sit very well with the U.S. Government, or what ?
Mr. LORCH . I think it was some of both , of the first two. He felt per
sonally that it would not be good business to do business with Uganda.
Anytime you bring a foreign aircraft into your facility, you run the
risk of receiving a lot of criticism from varioussources as to why you
have to be working on that particular aircraft. He felt that it was not
in the interest of the companyto service this particular airplane.
I am sure that it would have been all right with the Government. The
airplane was in this
country.
Mr. BINGHAM . Have you had problems previously in sending out
routine manuals to other countries ? You indicate your application to
the Department of Commerce to send out manuals for the Uganda
Airlines is still pending. That would indicate some problem .
Mr. LORCH . I know of no other instance where we have had a
problem.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you. Mr. Cavanaugh .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . I think I will pass to Mr. Pease .
Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman . I do have some questions.
First of all, a question for Mr. Lorch and Mr. Innes.
Has either of your companies had any role in arranging for
Ugandans sponsored by the Government to receive flight training in
the United States ?
Mr. LORCH. We have not. We specifically declined to provide that.
quali
Mr. Innes. The pilots of our aircraft are already very highly
fied regardless of where they come from in the world. Because of the
sophistication of the aircraft, we do provide initial training to every
company pilot or head of state pilot when the aircraft is purchased.
We are not training pilots, per se, as starting out withinitial flight
training. We are type certifying these pilots in this particular aircraft.
This was done when the aircraft was purchased in 1974.
Mr. Pease. As I understand it though, the aircraft wasnot purchased
by the Government of Uganda but by a third party ; is that correct ?
Mr. INNES. We sold the aircraft to the Air Jet Corp. who sold it in
turn to the Government of Uganda.
Mr. PEASE. When the Air Jet Corp. sold the aircraft to the Govern
ment of Uganda, did you then provide flight training on that particu
lar aircraft to the Ugandan pilots ?
Mr. INNEs. Yes ; when the aircraft was delivered to the Government
of Uganda, we did provide flight training for those pilots. It is pass
through. If you were to buy one of our aircraft and resell it to the
chairman, we would passthrough that flight training to the chairman's
pilots.
Mr. PEASE. As I understand it, Air Jet was really a sales agent?
Mr. INNEs. Yes ; Air Jet was a sales agent.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.
 264

Now, Mr. Danning, I have a couple of questions for you. What is

the percentage of your total business which is represented by business
with Uganda ?
Mr. Danning.It is quite a large percentage at this point.
Mr. PEASE. What would you guess ?
Mr. DANNING. I would guess approximately 50 percent, 40 to 50
percent. We are specializing in that area.It is a new market.
Mr. PEASE. How many other nations do you do business with ?
Mr. DANNING. Well, we have a large importing business also.
Mr. PEASE. How about exports ?
Mr. DANNING. We do export items on call to different nations,
but we have not done anything in the volume that we have for Uganda
at this point.
Mr. PEASE. You say 50 percent of your total volume. Is that your
total volume of imports and exports?
Mr. DANNING. Yes; that is total.
Mr. PEASE. What would be the percentage of your export business
which is represented by business with Uganda ?
Mr. DANNING. It would be, let us say, about 40 percent.
Mr. PEASE. It would be 40 percent ?
Mr. DANNING. Yes. It is quite large at this point.
Mr. PEASE . You said 50 percent of your total business is with
Uganda.
Mr. DANNING. I misunderstood the question as you were phrasing
it. You were trying to get a delineation between how much exporting
is done to Uganda vis- a -vis the rest of the world ?
Mr. PEASE. No ; I am sorry. Let me rephrase it. What percentage
of your export business is exports to Uganda ?
Mr. DANNING. Approximately around 40 percent of the total of
all business. About 50 percent of all business is on the export side
of the ledger.
Mr. PEASE. Do you have among your export items items which
could be considered luxury goods ? It is our understanding that Presi
dent Amin keeps the people in the Army and the State Research
Bureau happy by paying them very well and also by furnishing them
with luxury items, jewelry, furs, liquor; that sort of thing.
Do you export items such as that ?
Mr. DANNING. No ; we do not. We have not been asked to . Until
this point, we have only exported practical capital items. In the main ,
that would be the vast bulk of it, for example, the intrabank tele
communication systems to tie together the whole country—all the
branch banks for their commercial banking system that the popula
tion would be dealing with.
Mr. PEASE. Is there anything of a military nature or a paramilitary
nature among your exports ?
Mr. DANNING. We have never exported anything of a military
nature. I understand at this point it would not be permitted either.
Mr. PEASE. How do you ship the items to Uganda ? What carriers
do you use ?
Mr. DANNING. We usually use airfreight if the items are not too
bulky. We have used steamship lines if we are dealing with motor
vehicles.
 265

Mr. PEASE. We are going to have witnesses from Page Airways.

Do you ever use Page Airways?
Mr. DANNING. No. On air cargo, we have used Air France or
Sabena since they fly down that way.
Mr. PEASE . You have aninteresting theory that when a nation like
Uganda is involved in gross violations of human rights, our proper
response is not to reduce trade with them but to increase trade with
them.
Is that a correct summation of your position ?
Mr. DANNING. Let me put it into the proper context. Inmy remarks
that you have before you, you will find — and I specifically bring this
out - that we are not to condone injustice of any form . I do not see
that an allowance of trade under formal conditions is such a condona
tion. If it is, we are then faced with a situation whereby we are going
to have to be consistent. We would have to cut off trade or vast quanti
ties of trade with many, many nations around the world. We have
found, as I said, historically that this is not in our national interest
both in terms of our economic interest and in terms of our State
Department and congressional international relations policy interest.
I amtrying to bring that larger context into this discussion because
I feel it is a valid context. It is a valid way of understanding the
Ugandan situation because Uganda, although it hits the headlines,
every so often very dramatically, it is hardly unique in some of the
injustices that are alleged to it.
We have many other nations that have been considered violators of
human rights. We have found that we can speak out against these
violations. We can say what our position vis-a -vis their country is.
We do not condone these violations, but we have found that we have
to continue to trade quietly and to continue working for increased
contact on a cultural and educational level.
Those things do flow together. If we cut off all trade, we can expect
not to see and influence the Ugandans who come over here for their
educational training and whoare exposed to our country and who
enjoy being here. I have talked to some of them and they are quite
happy with our country. Yet, they wish to go back and improve their
country which is the important point. They are patriotic Ugandans
believing in the betterment of their country.
Such contacts that we now enjoy would probably also go by the
board if we were to terminate trade. We would be hurting our objec
tives if we did so. I think we have found the same situation in other
countries.
Mr. PEASE. Mr.Danning, you say we have found the same situation
in Uganda and Uganda is far from unique. The reports are from
Uganda, from reliable sources, that somewhere between 150,000 and
300,000 people have been killed in Uganda, not in military actions,
in the last 6 years. The term “ genocide” has been applied to Idi Amin's
regime.
What other countries of the world that you are familiar with have
a record of genocide?
Mr. DANNING . I think two very large ones that we now are trying
to encourage opening up trade doors with. These countries are main
 266

land China and the Soviet Union that have vast records on a far
larger scale.
There are other countries that have records that at certain points
in history, and in the not too distant past, that were not very savory.
I am not an expert on what has happened in Uganda. I do not know
howaccurate those figures are. I haveheardwildly fluctuating figures.
I have heard personal testimony from Ugandans that such viola
tions, severe violations of human rights including death, have been
evidenced , but not in the numbers that have been alleged .
This does not mean that those numbers are incorrect. I do not know .
What I find isthat there seems to be a lessening of such types of — if we
want to call them atrocities or gross violations, as times goes on and
the Government feels more secure with itself.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Danning, we have had testimony that the president
of the Lockheed Corp. made the decision that he really did not want
to do business with Idi Amin .
What would it take to convince you not to want to do any busi
ness with aa customer such as Uganda? If you had evidence that there
were 10,000 people a month being killed , would that lead you to want
to disassociate yourself from that regime or would you still want to
continue business with them ?
Mr. DANNING. I would say, to answer the point of your question,
if things become so chaotic and so atrocious there is certainly a point
where my firm certainly would not do business with that country. Prob
ably business relationships would be totally in kind of a panic. Ob
viously, if my country's trade position and policy was that we were
not supposed to do business with that country, we would not.
What I have seen though is that because of the types ofarticles we
are dealing with, that rather than hindering the country's investment,
rather than not being of benefit to the country in ourinterest, we are
gradually being able to open up doors, to be heard quietly in our own
country's interest. These investments in capital goods are helping
Uganda.
I dobring out in my statement that we have begun talks on the sub
ject of economic investment. This really deals with John Doe citizen
and would really help such a. citizen. Some of these are small projects.
Some deal in a much larger scope of things.
We are trying to gear theefforts of our proposals toward basic
economic investment for the citizens of Uganda. We have steered
clearly away from anything that could be considered frivolous, and
obviously anything of a military nature, that could be used in viola
tion of the citizens .
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much, Mr. Danning.
Mr. CAVANAUGH (presiding] . Mr. Lorch and Mr. Innes, I just would
personally like to commend you and your corporations for the sen
sitivity that you have indicated with regard to this issue. You do
offer some encouragement for those of uswho feel that government
is not the sole repository of moral judgment and, in fact, all of us
share that responsibility .
I think it is a responsibility that extends beyond the personal level
to the corporate level and which is capable of being exercised .
 267

You indicate here that some improvement in that or sharing of that

view exists in corporate America. I think you should be encouraged to
continue that sensitivity.
Mr. Danning, I am not sure I can extend that statement to you.
Mr. DANNING. I realize I am taking an unpopular position with
many of the members.
Mr. Cavanaugh. The trucks that you supply, could you describe
those ?
Mr. DANNING. They are of the Brinks type that are used in our
own banking system for the protection of valuables and currency.
Mr. CAVANAUGH .How many ofthose?
Mr. DANNING. There are six of such trucks that have been exported
so far .
Mr. CAVANAUGH . At what cost are they ?
Mr. DANNING. They are a few hundred thousands dollars. It is in
in the record of the Commerce Department. They have granted an ex
port license for that. The Department of State has also been in that
granting, for the Department of Commerce needed formal permission
from the policy arm of our Government. They have given such permis
sion, and as trade policy currently stands, such permission is supposed
to be given. The trucksare not of military value. They are useful only
against handguns. They have no military value whatsoever.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Who are they manufactured by ?
Mr. DANNING. They are manufactured by Moore & Sons of Mem
phis, Tenn. , which is the major manufacturer of such customized
trucks in the United States.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Who is your primary competitor among American
importer-exporters for Ugandan business ?
Mr. DANNING. I do not know if we have any direct competitor as
such. I have indicated we are an import-export trade firm .We are not
a manufacturer. We are more of an arranger, a go -between between
the American business and foreign business on the export side. We do
not manufacture anything.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. I understand that. However, in terms of being the
middleman for Uganda, do you have any American competition ?
Mr. DANNING. Certainly we must, but I do not know what that com
petition is. I have not comehead to head withit. Let us put it that way.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. Do you feel you have the inside track in terms
of -
Mr. DANNING. I have no idea. To be honest, I have no idea whether
we have the inside track or not. I know we have done business with
a cordial relationship in a businesslike manner andthat our company
is thought of favorably among certain officials in Uganda. We have
dealt with them forthrightly but also in the context of our own trade
policy.
Mr. CAVANAUGH. So you do not ask any indelicate questions?
Mr. DANNING. In private conversation with Ugandans, many,many
things have come up. I just indicated some of those things. So things
are not beingput underthe rug by even Ugandans themselves.
I feel that I am coming to a much more balanced viewpoint on the
subject and this is not to minimize any of the wrongdoing that have

25-826 0 - 78 - 18
 268

gone on in that country at all. They are obviously of personal concern

to me and of concern to many other people who are citizens of our
country .
Mr. CAVANAUGH. You indicate you feel Uganda — in your state
ment – is basically the same as any other developing country. You also
find no difference between Mr. Amin and other leaders of developing
countries.
Mr. DANNING . Mr. Amin is an exceptional example of something
that we do not — he is far to more one side than many, many other
leaders. He has done things on a larger and grander scale.
Some of the types of things he has done we are not pleasedwith at
all in terms of his style of doing things and those who work for him .
Let me give some other observations now that they come to me. Some
of those that I have met deal with government ministries. I have
heard from Ugandans themselves that many of those who are in gov
ernment working ostensibly for Mr. Amin's regime take libertiesbe
yond what Mr. Amin personally has condoned at the time.
That is not to say he does not give tacit approval afterward. I do
not know , but I heard in many instances supposedly that others are
overzealous and have gone too far to the consternation of some of
those who were in charge of them. There are, like in many govern
ments, both hawks and doves within the regime. There is a juggling
among these people andpositions. Sometimes things would come toa
pitch and the hawks will get to the fore. At other times, things will
moderate down.
What I hope will come out of these hearings is a policy that would
encourage those doves to have a chance to come to the fore rather
than to encourage the hawks to remain on the top or to encourage
situations in that country which would put the hawks in the more
favorable position .
To make it very clear, I have definitely been told that Mr. Amin
himself has not authorized all of these things, that there are other
people who take license upon themselves to do them . Without official
authorization they are then done.
This does not condone them . It does not make them right, but it is
a situation of a young country at times in turmoil in certain specific
regions.In other regions there is complete peace.
Mr. CAVANAUGH .Let me say I think you are totally and completely
deluding yourself. From my point of view, it is a very sad delusion.
I hope you can escape the consequences of it .
Thank you for your testimony today.
We do have a vote. We will return then with Mr. Galerstein , Mr.
Madigan, and Mr. Morgan.
TWhereupon, a briefrecess was taken.]
Mr. BINGHAM (presiding] . The subcommittees will resume their
session. I want to apologize to our remaining witnesses for keeping
them so long. We did not anticipate that we would spend almost an
hour with Senator Hatfield . We appreciate their patience.
The final panel is Mr. George Galerstein , chief legal counsel for
Bell Helicopter; Mr. Michael Madigan, legal counsel, Page Gulf
stream : and Mr. Gerald Morgan, Jr., legal counsel for Ronair.
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Galerstein.
 269

STATEMENT OF GEORGE GALERSTEIN , CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL,

BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON
Mr. GALERSTEIN . Thank you, Mr. Chairman . My name is George
Galerstein. Iam chief legal counsel for Bell Helicopter, Textron ,and
I appear before you in response to your request of our president,
James F. Atkins, that a representative of Bell Helicopter , Textron,
inform this subcommittee of our trade with the Government of
Uganda, our views regarding that trade, and any views that we may
have with respect to the legislative proposals pending before this sub
committee regarding the Government of Uganda.
As a guide in formulating our testimony you have requested that
we address the following questions on the nature and extent of our
trade with the Governmentof Uganda, and our assessment of the im
pact and value of this trade upon the Government of Uganda. Other
questions were relating this to the general population of Uganda, the
assessment of our company of the political and social situation in
Uganda , and any particular responsibilities we may have with respect
to that situation. The last was what would be the effect upon our com
pany and its employees of a termination of trade with Uganda.
Our limited trade with Uganda falls into three categories: The sale
of helicopters and spare parts; technical assistance in the maintenance
of these helicopters; and pilot and mechanic training.
As indicated, we have not sold a helicopter to Uganda in approxi
mately 7 years, the last sale taking place in 1971. The purchasing
agency was the Uganda Police Air Wing. In the year 1969 we sold
what we identified as model 206, civil aircraft, quantity of one, value
of $ 115,000. In 1970 we sold another model 206, quantity of one, $ 127,
000. In 1971 we sold two of the model 206's, one of model 205, also a
civil aircraft, and four of model 212, also civil aircraft. The total value
of our sales over those 3 years, and all the helicopters that we have, I
believe, ever sold to the government is for a quantity of $ 3,549,600.
Spare parts deliveries in support of these helicopters over the past
10 years have amounted to less than $1 million.
Following an accidentin 1977 to one of Uganda's model 212 heli
copters, the BHT regional sales manager was requested by the Govern
ment of Uganda to visit Kampala to discuss the procurement of a re
placement helicopter, at which time a purchase agreement for a model
214 helicopter was entered into by Uganda.
Department of Commerce export administration regulations do not
require the issuance of a specific validated export license in order to
export a model 214 transport helicopter, commercially certified, to the
Uganda Police Air Wing. This sale and export to Uganda could have
been made under the G -DEST category which is a blanket export
license for Department of Commerce listed commodities and countries
which include Uganda and the certified model 214 helicopter. However,
because of the sensitivity of the human rights issue, Bell did apply to
the Department of Commerce fora specific validated export license.
We were informed by letter from the Department of Commerce, dated
November 10, 1977, that the sale of this helicopter under present condi
tions would be inconsistent with the U.S. worldwide human rights
commitment and that it would not be in the national interest to ap
 270

prove the application. Accordingly, Bell informed the Government of

Uganda that the sale of the helicopter could not be made and prepay
ments were refunded. Concurrently with the application for export
license for the model 214, Bell had made application for an export
license for a model 212 helicopter to Uganda in anticipation of a
possible sale. That application has also been withdrawn. There are no
pending applications for export license by Bell for the sale of Bell
helicoptersto Uganda.
With regard to training, in the early 1970's, in connection with the
sale of the above helicopters, some Úgandan pilots and mechanics
were trained at the Bell Helicopter FortWorth facility. Late in 1977,
Uganda contracted for refresher trainingcourses for 10 pilots and
11 mechanics at the Fort Worth facility. There are no Ugandan per
sonnel presently being trained by Bell Helicopter Textron at Fort
Worth,or elsewhere,and there are no plans for any such training.
With regard to technical assistance, on a few occasions over the past
10 years Uganda has contracted for aa technical representative or in
structor pilot stationed in Uganda to assist in the maintenance of the
helicopters and the establishment of safe operating procedures. There
are presently no Bell personnel in Uganda and there are no plans for
anysuch personnel to be assigned to Uganda.
We do not consider that we have any individual qualified to com
ment on thematters
involving the impact and value of ourl trade upon
the Government of Uganda or upon the general population of Uganda,
or to provide an assessment of the political and social situation in
Uganda, or to comment on the legislative proposals pending before thi
subcommittee.
However, we are able to offer comments concerning the particular
responsibilities that Bell Helicopter may have with respect to the
political and social situation in Uganda.
We recognize and accept the burden of what has been identified as
social responsibility that rests with every business organization, as
it does with every individual, in a democratic society. This thought is
not recent with us but has been a prevailing attitude in the Textron
organization , of which we are a part, as long as I can remember.
However, it is not possible to discuss an organization's responsi
bilitieswith respect to social and political conditionsin a foreign coun
try in isolationand apart from the foreign policy of the U.S. Govern
ment, which necessarily subsumes these matters within its foreign
policy. The primary responsibility of Bell Helicopter Textron, as it is
with all U.S. organizations, is to support the U.S.Governmentand its
foreign policy, in the hope and belief that it is a policydesigned and
constructed by Congress and the executive branches of the Govern
ment to improve conditions, as viewed on a long -term basis, both 'here
and abroad.
Accordingly, it is our conviction that we must act in support of
U.S. foreignpolicy as it is implemented through legislation and related
rules and regulations, which are certainly ably administered by the
Department of State through the Office ofMunitions Control, and by
theDepartment of Commerce. It is our belief that absent total abdica
tion of responsibility by Congress and the executive branch of the
Government, a condition that we find impossible to imagine, we are
 271

obliged, indeed compelled , to measure our responsibility to social and

political conditions in a foreign country in this manner. To do other
wise, that is to measure ourresponsibility with respect to conditions in
a foreign country such as Uganda solely by the limited view and opin
ion that we may have of those conditions, would contribute, in our
opinion, to a form of foreign policy anarchy which would certainly
not serve the best interests of the United States. In addition, if we are
correct in our opinion, as we believe that we are, that U.S. foreign pol
icy is dedicated to the improvement of conditions on a global basis,
then it would not serve the best interests of most people throughout
the world .
Finally, as we have previously notified you, and as is obvious from
the relatively limited trade that we have had withthat country, termi
nation of trade with Uganda would have little effect upon Bell Heli
copter Textron.
Thank you for your attention.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you , Mr. Galerstein .
We will next hear from Mr. Madigan of Page Gulfstream .
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MADIGAN , LEGAL COUNSEL, PAGE
GULFSTREAM , INC.
Mr. MADIGAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and dis
tinguished members. My name is Michael Madigan. I am a member of
the law firm of Akin, Gump, Hauer and Feld here in Washington and
as such serve as legal counsel for Page Gulfstream .
I am appearing heretoday in response to the subcommittee's request
that a representative of Page Gulfstream answer certain questions
posed by the subcommittees in correspondence to Page Gulfstream of
March 17.
Page Gulfstream is a subsidiary of Page Airways, Inc., which is a
small company headquartered in Rochester, N.Y. I might add paren
thetically at this point that Page Gulfstream is a subsidiary of Page
Airways along with the Airjet Corp., which was mentionedin earlier
testimony.
Both are subsidiaries of Page Airways, which, unlike its name, is
notan airline but is rather a smallmarketing company that engages
in the resale and sale of airplanes. Page's business also includes land
based operations, such as the one atNational Terminal here where
private planes land and the company provides maintenance on the
planes and those types of services.
While we are honored to be asked to comment upon legislative
proposals to impose economic and other sanctions against the gov
ernment of Uganda, we believe we are poorly equipped to participate
in any meaningful discussion on these pieces of legislation. For ex
ample, we would not feel qualified to address important issues at
tendant to this legislation such as free trade or the availability of
alternative markets. Nevertheless, we have endeavored herein to re
spond, as best we are able, to the questions posed in your letter to us
of March 17, 1978 .
All of these legislative proposals are concerned with the present
government of Uganda and the possible termination of all diplo
 272

matic, commercial , and military relations between the United States

and the country of Uganda . Generally speaking, the three measures
call for the severance of all relations — whether they be diplomatic
or commercial - between the United States and the country of Uganda.
One bill, H.R. 9552, calls for an amendment to the Export Adminis
tration Act of 1969. The amendment, if adopted, would prohibit the
exportation of any materials or supplies, including technical data
orother information, subject to the controls of the Export Admin
istration Act to the country of Uganda. The other two legislative
measures are House concurrent resolutions and would express the
sense of the Congress with respect to the government of Uganda and
relations between the United States and the country of Uganda. More
specifically, we understand the resolutions to call for thetermination
of all trade between Uganda and the United States , whether it be
the exportation of American products to Uganda or the importation
of Ugandan products to the United States.
As described below, while Page has done business with Uganda in
years past, at present we have very little trade with Uganda. Thus,
imposing a limitation on exports to Uganda through amendment to
the Export Administration Act would have little effect on our
company.
Withrespect to the questions posed in the subcommittees ' inquiry,
we noted in our response to the subcommittees filed on March 22,
1978 , that our tradewith Uganda in 1977 was approximately $ 57,000,
which represented the sale of spare parts for an L - 100 aircraft pre
viously sold to Uganda. That aircraft was described in prior testi
mony today by other witnesses. We also noted that in addition to
these sales of spare parts, Page presently provides crewsto operate
and perform the maintenance upon the L - 100 aircraft. We under
stand that this aircraft is being utilized to carry nonmilitary freight
between Uganda and countries with which it trades.
We note , however, that Page has recently exercised its rights under
this service contract to terminate that agreement and to withdraw
its crews in accordance with theterms ofthe contract, if not sooner.
That, Mr. Chairman, comprises Page's present trade with Uganda.
Turning to the second question posed by the subcommittee, you
have asked us to assess the impact of this trade upon Uganda, the
value of such trade to Uganda and the value and impact of such
trade upon the general population of Uganda. Becauseour company's
involvement with Uganda at present is not substantial, the impact
upon Uganda of its total termination would not appear to be great.
Turning to the second question posed by the subcommittees, you
The third question that we have been asked to respond to is, What
is the assessment of your company of the political and social situation
in Uganda, and any particular responsibilities you may have with
respect to that situation ?
Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, not being political observers of the
Government situation in Uganda, we are not in a position to formu
late an assessment of the political and social situation in Uganda
and can offer no opinion regarding it. We have, of course, read in the
newspapers various storiesof tragic happening in Uganda, but we
possess no firsthand knowledge of any suchevents.
 273

The fourth and final question that the subcommittees have posed to
us is, What would be the effect upon your company and its employees
of a termination of trade with Uganda ?
As we indicated in our March 22 letter, termination of trade with
Uganda by our Government would have no effect upon our company
orits employees, with the exception of the small amount of spare
parts business discussed above. Should trade be terminated between
Uganda and the United States, the impact upon our company of this
cessation of activity would be minimal.
[The letter referred to follows:]
 274

Les
FECT!
MCAORMM3ITT0E1E9ON7OA9YL
ATI
INTERN NS
PAGE GULFSTREAM, INC. RELATIO
EXECUTIVE OFFICES: 1265 SCOTTSVILLE ROAD . P.O. BOX 1132 · ROCHESTER, NEW YORK 14603 • 1716) 322.129 ZELEX: 97-9208,
P.O. BOX 16291 • INTERNATIONAL AIAPORT • SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78246 • ( 512) 828-8159 TELEX: 86-1430

March 22, 1978

The Hon . Charles C. Diggs, Jr. , Chairman , Subcommittee on Africa
The Hon . Donald M. Fraser, Chairman , Subcommittee on International Organizations
The Hon . Jonathan B. Bingham , Chairman , Subcommittee on International Economic Policy & Trade
Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington , D.C. 20515
Gentlemen: -

Reference is made to your letter of March 17, 1978 concerning the business relationship that might
exist between this Company and the Country of Uganda .
Please be advised that for the past few years, this Company has done little or no business with Uganda
other than to supply some spare parts for aircraft sold sometime in the past.
The total volume of the parts business for the year 1977 was approximately $57,000.00 .
In addition , Page does provide the crews to fly a Lockheed L100 , which is being utilized to carry
non -military freight between Uganda and Countries with which it trades . It is well to note , however,
that under the terms of the contractural arrangement, this Company has elected to advise the Government.
of Uganda that it will withdraw its crews in accordance with the terms of the contract or a maximum of
90 days from the issuance of a letter dated March 9, 1978 or sooner if possible .
The termination of trade with Uganda by our Government would have no effect obviously on our Company
or its employees with the exception of a small amount of parts business mentioned earlier.
I don't believe a personal appearance could add any more to what has been stated above and I respectfully
request that if you find this information to be adequate, that you advise as to the necessity of one of
the Page people appearing on April 6th .
Sincerely ,
PAGE GULFSTREAM , INC .

Gerald G. Wilmot
President
 275

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you and your distinguished colleagues may

be assured that should the Congress enact and the President approve
legislation prohibiting trade with Uganda or should the President
issue an Executive order or proclamation asking that trade with
Uganda cease , Page Gulfstream would faithfully abide by the dic
tates of such legislation. Under no circumstances would Page trade
with Uganda ifit were prohibited by the laws of the United States.
The company would observe not only the letter but the spirit of the
law as well.
Mr. Chairman , we hope that this modest information will be of
assistance to the subcommittees and we hope that we have responded
to the questions adequately. We have tried to do so. If there are further
questions we can answer, we will do our best to assist the subcommittees.
If we are not able to answer those questions, we will be happy to
obtain that information for the subcommittees.
In summary, Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues, our com
pany's business with Uganda isnot very large. It has been described
in the testimony today as involving in the past a sale of a Gulfstream
II aircraft manufactured by and sold jointly with the Grumman Corp.
to Uganda and the sale of the L - 100 aircraft referred to earlier.
We are now terminating all business and particularly the service
contract. We do have a concern that we are able to do this so that the
crews and their families located in Uganda may be able to make,
arrangements for theirsafety, et cetera.In that regard, we share the
rn expressed by Congressman Pease earlier in the hearings for
the orderly termination of such events. We hope that that can be
accomplished. There are often communication problems with Uganda
as there are with many African countries.
We noted in the paper the other day that apparently President
Amin follows what happens in this country. He is aware of con
gressional hearings, particularly those held in public.
The newspaper reported 2 days ago that after the President returned
from his trip to Africa, Mr. Amin announced he was forming a human
rights commission in Africa. So I think he does followwhat happens
here in this country . Our only concern is that we are able to terminate
our operations there so that everyone may be taken care of safely and
that no problems arise with respect to that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CAVANAUGH ( presiding ]. Thank you, Mr. Madigan.
Now, Mr. Morgan, do you have testimony you can submit in written
form ?
Mr. MORGAN . For open session, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Yes.
Mr. MORGAN . I have a short statement I would be prepared to make
if you would like me to do so.
Mr. CAVANAUGH . Go ahead, Mr. Morgan.
STATEMENT OF GERALD D. MORGAN, JR ., LEGAL COUNSEL,
RONAIR , INC.
Mr. MORGAN . Rather thanreading the statement, I might sum
marize it. My nameis Gerald D. Morgan , Jr. I am a partner in the law
firm of Hale, Russell, Gray, Seaman & Birkett. I am appearing before
 276

you today on behalfof Ronair, Inc. Ronair is a small company engaged

in the business of selling and leasing aircraft.
Uganda Airlines presently operates a used Boeing 707 owned by
Ronair. This aircraft was supplied to Uganda Airlines in April 1977.
It is operated under sublease . Ronair has no direct contractual rela
tions with Uganda Airlines. Ronair has leased the aircraft to a Swiss
company that has subleased it to Uganda Airlines.
In each of the leases, there is an option to purchase. The purchase
option was exercised in September 1977. The U.S. Government was
informed of the lease and the sublease at the time they were entered
into . The Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA ), in a formal regu
latory proceeding, granted Uganda Airlines exemptions from some
technical requirements of the FAA regulations and found that it was
in the public interest to do this to facilitate the lease transaction in
favor of Uganda Airlines.
The aircraft is registered under the laws of the United States. Be
cause of that, it has to be operated and supported by U.S.-licensed
personnel. There are some U.S. citizens in Uganda who support the
aircraft. These people are employed by the Swiss lessee and sublessor,
whose name is Zimex Aviation, Ltd.
The aircraft has been usedby Uganda Airlines to carrycattle, food
stuffs, other miscellaneous civil cargo from the United Kingdom to
Uganda. It has also been used in a passengerconfiguration to carry
pilgrims between Uganda and Saudi Arabia. It has no military use.
It carries no military cargo.
Given the civil use of the aircraft ininternational air transport and
giventhatthisis the only transaction that Ronair has ever had involv
ing Uganda, Ronair does not feel that it would be appropriate for it
to comment on the political and social situation in Uganda. Ronair
looks to the U.S. Government to set foreign policy andto decidewhen
normal commerce in items such as civil aircraft should be prohibited
on the grounds of foreign policy. Ronair does feel that any pro
hibitions, of course, should be applied prospectively.
Ronair has no present plans to lease or sell further aircraft to
Uganda Airlines. Therefore the effect of the proposed legislation on
future activities of Ronair would be very unclear. The effect of the
proposed legislation on this particular aircraft is also a little bit
unclear to me but perhaps further study can solve that problem .
That completes my remarks, Mr. Chairman .
Mr. BINGHAM (presiding ). Thank you, Mr. Morgan. We have your
statement here. Do I understand this statement can be inserted in the
record ?
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, that statement contains quite a bit of
material that I would like to reserve for executive session if there are
any questions about it. I do have a shortened form of the statement
that I have just delivered and it could be inserted in the public record
without any problem .
[Mr. Morgan's prepared statement follows :]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD D. MORGAN , JR. , LEGAL COUNSEL, RONAIR , INC.
My name is Gerald D. Morgan, Jr. I am a partner in the law firm of Hale
Russell Gray Seaman & Birkett, attorneys for Ronair, Inc. I am appearing before
you today on behalf of Ronair in response to the Committee's written request
of March 17.
 277

Ronair is a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of selling and leas

ing aircraft. Uganda Airlines presently operates a used Boeing 707 owned by
Ronair. This aircraft represents the only business transaction that Ronair has
had involving Uganda.
Ronair leased the aircraft to a Swiss company in April, 1977 for a two -year
term , subject to an option to purchase. The lessee, whose name is Zimex Aviation ,
Ltd., simultaneously subleased the aircraft to Uganda Airlines, also subject
to an option to purchase. Ronair informed the U.S. Government in writing of both
the lease and sublease at the time they were entered into. The U.S. Federal Avi
ation Administration, in a regulatory proceeding, determined that it was in the
U.S. public interest to grant an exemption to Uganda Airlines from certain
technical requirements of FAA regulations, in order to facilitate the transac
tion. The aircraft is registered under the laws of the United States and is oper
ated and maintained by U.S.- licensed personnel, including some U.S. citizens
who are based in Uganda and who are employed by Zimex .
In September 1977, Uganda Airlines and Zimex exercised the purchase options
granted in April 1977, and paid the purchase price.
The aircraft has been used by Uganda Airlines since April 1977, to carry cattle,
foodstuffs and other non -military cargo from the United Kingdom to Uganda and
to carry pilgrims for the Hadj between Uganda and Saudi Arabia .
Ronair does not believe that it would be appropriate for Ronair to express an
opinion on the political and social situation in Uganda. Ronair looks to the U.S.
Government to set foreign policy, and to decide when normal commerce in civil
aircraft and other items should be prohibited, on grounds of foreign policy. Ron
air does believe that it is appropriate to apply any new policy prospectively. Ron
air has no present plans to lease or sell further aircraft for use by Uganda
Airlines. The effect on Ronair of any termination of U.S. trade with Uganda
would therefore be unclear.
Thank you very much .
Mr. BINGHAM. As I indicated earlier, after other questions we will go
into executive session and dealwith the remainderof your testimony.
Are there questions of Mr. Galerstein or Mr. Madigan ? Mr. Pease.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much , Mr. Chairman. Mr. Madigan , you
are from Page, right, sir ?
Mr. MADIGAN . That is correct.
Mr. PEASE. You have a letter from Mr. Wilmot, who is president of
Page Gulfstream , is that correct ?
Mr. MADIGAN . Yes, Congressman Pease ; a letter of March 22 in
response to the subcommittees' letter of March 17.
Mr. PEASE. He states that, “ Page does provide the crews to fly a
Lockheed L - 100 being utilized to carry nonmilitary freight between
Uganda and countrieswith which it trades." Can you tell the subcom
mittees where that airplane flies and what its cargo is ?
Mr. MADIGAN. I am afraid that I can't provide toomany specifics on
that. I certainly could obtain that information for you . It is my under
standing that it flies to a number of different countries and that its
cargo is various commercial-type goods.
Mr. PEASE. It is my understanding that there is a so-called whisky
shuttle between Kampala and London which carries luxury goods from
England to Uganda for the supportof the state research bureau and
the army and the police in Uganda.Would this aircraft that Page Air
ways flies be used for that purpose, do you know ?
Mr. MADIGAN . I don't have any information with respect to that.
The aircraft is owned by the Uganda Airlines, and the Page sub
sidiary merely provides the crew who fly the airplane and the main
tenance personnel who take care of the airplane.
As I mentioned earlier, Page has exercised its rights under that
agreement to terminate the agreement, and that is a matter of some
concern to us.

!
 278

Mr. PEASE. I believe you said you can and will provide us for the
record information about the destinations and the cargo .
Mr. MADIGAN. Yes, sir.1
Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much. Has your company or any of
your flight crews ever been engaged in airlifting coffee out of
Uganda on behalf of the Ugandan Government ?
Mr. MADIGAN. I am afraid I don't know the answer to that ques
tion, either, Congressman Pease, but I will be happy to obtain that
information for you. It was my understanding that the matters dis
cussed today were going to concern the view of the company toward the
effect of the proposed legislation upon the company's business; but
I wouldbe happy to try to obtain that information for you.
Mr. PEASE . I would appreciate that. Is there an executive vice
president of Page Gulfstream named Charles Hanner ?
Mr. MADIGAN . Yes, there is.
Mr. PEASE. Are you aware of what I think is correct, that he has
been designated by Idi Amin as an Honorary Ambassador for the
Ugandan Government in the United States and he functions as a
contracting agent on behalf of the Ugandan Government ?
Mr. MADIGAN . That is a two-part question.
I know that Mr. Hanner is an employee of the company. I am
not sure what his exact title is. I will check for you the question
with respect to his acting as a contracting agent; but he is employed
by the company, Page Airways, not by the Government of Uganda.
Mr. PEASE. It strikes me a little odd that — if it is correct if
Page Gulfstream , Inc. “ has done little or no business” —to quote
Mr. Wilmot — with Uganda, that a vice president of the company
would be designated as Honorary Ambassador for the Government.
Does Mr. Hanner get involved in other business on the side, do
you know, besides his responsibilies with Page ?
Mr. MADIGAN . I do not know what Mr. Hanner does on the side.
I do not believe so.
Mr. PEASE. My information is that Mr. Hanner also manages
construction contracts for the soon-to-be opened mission building
to the United Nations in New York. Would you be in a position to
verify that for us ?
Mr. MADIGAN . I could try to obtain that information for you.
Mr. PEASE. You do not know offhand ?
Mr. MADIGAN. No. I know there is another company that I believe
is involved in that it is involved in the construction of that building,
I believe.
Mr. PEASE . Would that be the Wilmorite Corp. ?
Mr. MADIGAN . That is correct ?
Mr. PEASE. Wilmorite ? Does Wilmorite come from Mr. Wilmot's
name ?
Mr. MADIGAN . I do not have any personal knowledge of that, but I
would think that is a likely explanation .
Mr. PEASE. And that company does have the construction contract
for the Ugandan Mission Building in New York City, is that correct ?
Mr. MADIGAN . I believe so.
1 Answers to these four subsequent questions of Mr. Madigan by Congressman Pease
appear in appendix 10.
 279

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Madigan, it seemsto me that Mr. Wilmot, the presi
dent of your company , is a little ingenuous when he claims in his
letter thăt Page Gulfstream has had very little to do with Uganda
over thepast several years , when a vice president of his company is
named Honorary Ambassador and when apparentlya subsidiary of
Page Gulfstream has the construction contract for the Uganda mission.
Ithink it would be helpful to the committee if you could submit,
again for the record, all of the dealings which PageGulfstream or its
subsidiaries or any of its principalofficers has had with Uganda.
Would you be willing to do that ?
Mr. MADIGAN . Certainly. I think there is some misunderstanding
about the letter from the subcommittees and what it requested. It was
interpreted as requesting what the present business was and what the
impact upon that business would be, if the legislation pending was
enacted .
We will be happy to provide whatever information you seek.
Mr. PEASE. That is fine and I appreciate it would be difficult for
you to come up offhand with information which was not asked for
specifically in the letter. I very much appreciate your willingness to
provide it for the record .
I have a question now for — at least a querry — for Mr. Galerstein.
One of my colleagues, Congressman Mattox, is very much interested
in the past relationships between Bell Helicopter and the Ugandan
Government. Would you be willing to secure answers for him to some
questions he might submit in writing ?
Mr. GALERSTEIN . Certainly .
Mr. PEASE. I have a closing statement, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Pease's closing statement follows :]
CLOSING STATEMENT OF HON . DONALD J. PEASE

Now that we have concluded the fifth hearing in a series on United States
Ugandan relations, I again want to compliment Chairman Bingham and his
colleagues, Chairmen Diggs and Fraser, for conducting what I consider a very
informative set of hearings. What we have learned is disheartening and shocking,
but I am hopeful that we will have the strength and compassion to move forward
to a markup of legislation in the near future.
I have noted inrecent weeks that the State Department has been emphasizing
a couple of new arguments in a continuing litany to forestall meaningful congres
sional action designed to end U.S. commercial support for Amin .
It is said that no word has been received of on-going killings and atrocities in
Uganda in recent weeks, the implication being that Amin is trying to turn over
“a new leaf” and that human rights conditions may be improving.
I am skeptical and I do not think we should be tricked into deferring action
on the basis of conjecture and speculation from the State Department. Given what
we know of Amin's reign of terror based upon testimony we have heard, the
burden of proof is upon the State Department to justify inaction .
But we don't have to rely upon the State Department to prove their case. In
February, at the same time the State Department was asking us to believe Amin
is capable of redemption, the State Research Bureau arrested and murdered
Justice SSebuggwaawo of the industrial court, Uganda's most esteemed appellate
labor agency . Also, in early February, Bishop Adrian DDungu of the Masaka
region and seven Ugandian priests were arrested and brutally beaten . To amelio
rate this situation, Amin later apologized to the Bishop and gave him a dinner.
As of late, the State Department has also been counseling us to listen to the
advice offered by a high -ranking delegation of Kenyan government officials who
visited Washington a few weeks ago. According to the State Department, the
1 Congressman Mattox's questions and Mr. Galerstein's answers appear in appendix 5.
 280

Kenyans cautioned that the U.S. should not try to isolate Amin with a coffee
boycott or by any other means. It is now said that we should heed the Kenyans
advice since they are part of the East African community.
Certainly, I agree that the Kenyans' counsel should be carefully evaluated .
Their proximity to the issues before us dictates that we listen to them . However,
it would be a mistake to assume the Kenyan government's motives are as straight
forward as we would be led to believe.
There can be no doubt that the Kenyan economy is benefitting from the demise
of the Ugandan economy. Because the suffering of the Ugandan people and
their need for basic goods like sugar and soap is so great, the Kenyan markets
have profited . We should not overlook the trade angle when assessing the Ken
yans' suggestions.
Moreover, I have learned from several sources whom I consider reliable that
several ranking officials in the Kenyan government are heavily involved in
Ugandan coffee smugglng and black marketeering in basic commodities. No doubt
some of these people are profiting personally from the suffering of the Ugandan
people. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable to me that one of the primary rea
sons we do not hear many horror stories out of Uganda these days is because
that information may be deliberately suppressed by the Kenyan Government as
part of its calculated rapproachment with Amin that we have recently witnessed .
It is not my purpose to denigrate the motives of the Kenyan Government.
However, we would be remiss to ignore the fact that there are many motives
upon which they may be acting.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, while the committee room is being
cleared, I have a number of documents that I would like to submit for
this subcommittee record if the chairman would be willing to accept
them .
Mr. BINGHAM . Yes. Without objection,in accordance with our usual
practice the subcommittee staff will examine the documents to see to
what extent it is practical to include them in the printed hearing
record I
. f not, they will be retained in the hearing file.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chirman , I would like to submit for the record a
newsitem that should be of interest in our deliberations. Last Monday,
April 4, a UPI news service item quoted a speech by President Amin
on the threat of a coffee boycott.
[ The new service item follows:]
NAIROBI (UPI) .- President Idi Amin today condemned American moves to
organize an international boycott of Ugandan coffee and invited Members of
Congress to visit his country.
Amin is worried that bills in Congress banning U.S. imports of Ugandan
coffee his major source of foreign exchange would have a disastrous impact
on his regime.
To ease U.S. criticism of his government, Amin Monday announced the creation
of a human rights commission to safeguard the rights of Ugandan citizens, some
250,000 of whom have reputedly died or disappeared during his rule.
Amin met today with black American students touring Uganda and, according
to the official Kampala Radio " comdemned a move by some U.S. Senators to im
pose a ban on trade with Uganda.” 1
Mr. PEASE. I am also submitting for the record a brief five -page
memo provided to me by the Committee on Uganda, Inc., which details
the manner in which coffee production and marketing has been changed
to provide Amin's government with total control . It is a thorough
analysis that, in my judgment, goes a long way toward debunking the
notion that a coffeeboycott would be a hardship on the Ugandan
coffee growers . The author is the son of a Ugandan coffee grower still
living in Uganda .
[ The memo follows:]
1 Copyright permission granted by the United Press International.
 281

MEMO BY REMIGIUS KINTU, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMITTEE ON UGANDA, INC.,

ARLINGTON , VA .

Agriculture production--particularly coffee-- constitutes the

most important sector of the Ugandan economy . About 90 percent of the
population of Uganda depends upon agricultural production for a livelihood .
For years coffee has been the leading cash crop in Uganda . Coffee
production is handled overwhelmingly by rural peasant farmers who farm
small plots of land averaging between 4 and 10 acres . The share of coffee

has increased to almost 90 percent of export earnings--an increase of about

25 percent between 1972 and 1976 alone . This dramatic increase has been

due to a significant decline in cotton exports and the recent large hike

in international coffee prices . To understand the destruction of the local

coffee farmer by Amin it is necessary to first understand the system . Anin
usurped .

Marketing of Coffee

Ugandan farmers have traditionally marketed coffee either through

their growers cooperatives or through private merchants--individual
businessmen--who purchase coffee from farmers at competitive prices that

do not undercut the minimum price established by the government each year .
After making their purchases , the merchants sell the produce to curing

factories where the crop is cured , graded , then sold to the government
Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) . The CMB is a government - owned trading
company which has a virtuci monopoly over the sale of Ugandan coffee abroad .
 282

Farmers who are members of the cooperatives sell their produce

to the organizations at a price equal to or above that established each
year . The coffee is then transported to the cooperative union , an asso
ciation of cooperatives in a district , to be cured , graded and sold to

the CMB for final sale to consumer countries . It is important to

realize that the majority of Ugandan farmers belong to and manage their

own cooperatives . Among the services they provide are adult education ,
farm improvement and marketing techniques consultations as well as
distributing dividends and arranging credit for capital improvement .
The price of coffee is set by the Minister of Marketing and
Cooperatives , Mr. Mustafa Ramathan , at the beginning of each coffee
season . This ofiicial has so many powers that it is accurate to say he

runs the CXB , despite there being an officially " independent " board
whose membership is appointed by the minister . Farmers have no repre

sentation on the Board . In creating the CMB it was originally hoped that

coffee prices could be stabilized so as

to protect farmers from wildly
fluctuating international prices . To accomplish this a sinking fund was

established from which money could be drawn to prop up coffee prices at

a reasonable level .

Financing Coffee

Cooperatives and private merchants arranged credit lines with their

banks during the coffee season . Commercial banks in turn were always

prepared to meet the heavy demand for cash which was used to pay farmers.
Cooperative unions likewise reimbursed cooperatives immediately after the
sale of coffee to the ginneries .
 283

Amin and Coffee Farmers

Since taking power , Idi Amin has systematically eliminated the

participartory rights of Ugandan coffee farmers in the marketing of their
He started by destroying the cooperatives , leaving them to exist
in name only . He accomplished this by accusing elected officials of
corruption and then firing , killing or exiling most of them .
simply disappeared . Through Minister Ramathan , Amin began planting Nubian

agents in every management position of the cooperative unions of the

country . He appointed a trusted Muslim to the chairmanship of the CMB ,

Mr. Swaibu Museke , and filled positions on the Board with army and Nubian
collaborators . In short , the government has taken over the cooperatives .

Private businessmen who competed with the cooperatives did not

escape this treacherous crackdown . Charged falsely with corruption or
hoarding consumer goods , many were exiled or disappeared . A significant
number of the private merchants were Indians who were expelled in 1972 .
Business property belonging to them was given to Amin's mercenaries in
return for their loyalty . Amin has specifically singled out Christian
businessmen and killed 400 of them in Masaka in 1977 .
At the same time , he has forced foreign owned banks out of rural

areas and replaced them with branches of the Uganda Commercial Bank . Not

only has this action enabled him to increase his control over the sources
of foreign trade , but it has also effectively crippled commercial banking
activities in the country . The economy has collapsed partially because
of Amin's use of all foreign exchange earned from coffee sales overseas
to finance his army . He has begun to issue vouchers , which we have learned
are worthless , instead of cash as payment for the farmers' coffee .

25-826 O - 78 - 19
 284

This saves hard currency for his mercenaries and arms suppliers . When

farmers complained about the situation , soldiers were called in to

answer the complaints by murdering farmers . Amin's agents , who are well

placed in the cooperatives, are able to effectively terrorize farmers

throughout the country . They report those farmers who refuse to sell

their coffee to the government .

Amin has effectively taken over all the mechanisms which have
traditionally assured growers a role in the decision -making process and
fair rate or return on their sales . Under the present corrupt structure

Amin diverts all coffee money to government coffers , where it is used to

keep his henchmen loyal and the opposition terrorized .
 285

Mr. Pease. For the record, I am submitting that portion of the

official budget speech of the Ugandan Finance Minister relating to
agriculture . This speech was delivered last June. In it the Ugandan
Government acknowledges that there has been at least a 37 -percent
decline in coffee production from 1974 to 1976. The decline continued
last year.
I would like to submit for the record documents forwarded to me
by the American Association for the International Commission of
Jurists detailing the scope and authority for implementation in
Uganda of a system of forced labor. Among other things, this infor
mation details that Amin in December of 1975 authorized creation of
a brutal forced labor system as a solution to the unemployment prob
lem resulting from thegovernment's mismanagement. Pursuant to the
Community Farm Settlement Decree of 1975 , any unemployed able
bodied person of the apparent ageof between 16 and 40 and any person
of or above the apparent age of 12 found begging or wandering with
out visible means of subsistence who was unable to render a satisfac
tory account of himself could be forced into labor and resettlement on
a community farm.2
Mr. BINGHAM. We will proceed then into executive session in accord
ance with the prior decision of the subcommittee. All presons not
authorized will please kindly leave the chamber.
[Whereupon , at 5:25 p.m., the subcommittee moved into executive
session .]
1 A copy of the budget_speech delivered at theUganda International Conference Center,
Kampala , on Thursday , June 16, 1977, by theMinisterofFinance, is retained in subcom
mittee files.
2 A copy of the Community Farm Settlement Decree of 1975 is retained in subcom
mittee files.
 UNITED STATES -UGANDA RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY , APRIL 26 , 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE,
Washington,D.C.
The subcommittees met in open markup session at 2 p.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
( chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa ) presiding.
Mr. Diggs. This afternoon the Subcommittees on International
Economic Policy and Trade, International Organizations, and Africa
are meeting to consider measures pending before them relating to
Uganda. Specifically I refer to H.R. 9252, which was introduced by
the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Pease, to amend the Export Admin
istration Act of 1969 which prohibits exporting to Uganda of goods
subject to control under the act ; House Concurrent Resolution 394,
which was introduced by Congressman Mathis of Georgia and which
denounces acts committed by President Amin which suppress the ex
pressionof political thought and violate the rights ofindividuals,
urging President Carter to take effective measures against the Gov
ernment of that country ; House Concurrent Resolution 425, which
was introduced by the gentleman from Washington , Mr. Bonker, to
gether with Mr. Pease, and provides that the President should im
plement measures to discourage activities which benefit the Govern
ment of the Republic of Uganda.
The members of the joint subcommittees are familiar with this
issue. We have held five hearings on this subject during which testi
mony was presented by some of our colleagues in the House and the
Senate. Wo have had former Ugandan cabinet officers, refugees from
Uganda, representatives of the Departmentof State and Commerce
and of the International Commission of Jurists. We have had people
from the business community and academics. Our purpose this after
noon is to discuss the various measures before us to decide which
should be marked up and reported to the House International Rela
tions Committee.
The Chair is prepared to call a recess. I would like to consult with
Chairman Bingham on that. Will the gentleman agree to declare a
recess to a time certain ; 2 : 15 or 2:30 , perhaps.
Mr. BINGHAM. 2:15 will be better for me.
Mr. Diggs. The Chair is prepared to declare a recess until 2:15, if
that will suit the convenience of the other members of the sub
committees.
(287)
 288

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, before you do that, just a point of

inquiry. Is it your intention to basically have a discussion today of
the various proposals before us or do you intend to proceed tofull
markup ?
Mr. Diggs. I was prepared to proceed to markup. We have the pro
posals before us. I am subject to the will of the joint committees.
Mr. SOLARZ. I just wanted to get the chairman's opinion. Can we
make it 2:20,Mr.Chairman ?
Mr. Diggs. The Chair declares a recess until 2:20.
[A brief recess was taken .]
Mr. Diggs. The joint subcommittee will come to order.
As soon as the gentleman from Washington is ready, the Chair is
prepared to call upHouse Concurrent Resolution 426 .
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to go ahead with con
sideration of House Concurrent Resolution 426.
Mr. Diggs. Without objection. House Concurrent Resolution 426,
introduced by the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Bonker, for him
self and the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Pease. A concurrent resolution
is called up for consideration, and without objection, the resolution is
considered read and the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Bonker, is
recognized in support of his resolution .
Mr. BONKER. I thank the Chairman .
The subcommittee has conducted hearings on the issueof imposing
political and economic sanctions on the Government of Uganda. The
testimony that we have received over a period of time indicates that
the oppression and atrocities of that Government have persisted and
warrant some kind of expression from this committee and the Con
gress. We should move affirmatively on legislation that is before us, to
instruct the President to take specific action to denounce the Govern
ment of Uganda and to move ahead with breaking of political and
economic ties with that country.
My colleague from Ohio, Mr. Pease, has pressed the issue of eco
nomic sanctions. We have received testimony ,as you know , Mr. Chair
man , from many of the representatives, the coffee companies and others
in the private sector who have engaged in economic relations with
the Government of Uganda. Most of the testimony has indicated that
while they are not in a position to make moral judgments, they cer
tainly defer to the Government to make these expressions and, as part
of our policy, take whatever action we feel is necessary in the best
interestof our Government.
My resolution is fairly broad. It includes not only the economic
sanctions that are part of the Pease legislation , but indeed moves
ahead to call on closure of the Embassyof the Republic of Uganda
in the District of Columbia.
Asthe subcommittees know , the Ugandan Government has closed
our Embassy in that country. Our resolution also would restrict the
movement of officials with the Ugandan Mission to the United Nations
to an area in and around the U.N. headquarters district and permit
entry into the United States only for those Ugandan officials essential
for carrying out legitimate representation functions at the United Na
tions. We have received testimony and we have staff reports that indi
cate any of the Government officials that come over here from Uganda
 289

representing that Government are indeed members of the infamous

State Research Bureau , which is Idi Amin's private security agency
and the one that is most noted for committing many of the atrocities
we have learned about.
Many of those officials are here in the United States receiving train
ing by private companies in communication equipment, pilot training,
and other related activities.
We just do not feel that, in view of the continuing problems in that
country, we should sanction and, indeed , support in various ways these
activities.
No. 3, the resolution would call upon the United States to refrain
from importing Ugandan products into the United States and prohibit
the exportation of all products to the United States from the Republic
of Uganda .
Four, it wouldprohibit entry intothe United States forthe purpose
of study or training of all individuals receiving scholarships from the
Government of the Republic of Uganda.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we have seen through staff reports that many
of the people who obtain their visas inneighboring Kenya to come to
the United States are here for more nefarious purposes. Some of them
arehere through acharade of scholarships and other government sanc
tioned programs. Many of these individuals are members of the State
Research Bureau and are receiving training which may help perpetu
ate the activities that have characterized the Amin regime.
Five, prohibit all Ugandans admitted to the United States as non
immigrant aliens frombeing trained in subjects having potential mili
tary application, including pilot training and aeronautical
engineering.
Much ofthe testimony we have had, Mr. Chairman, has dealt with
various companies in this country who have actually been sponsoring
these educational programs and have engaged in the kind of training
that could be used in a way to help the Amin Government. We have
had testimony that as many as 20 to 30 Ugandans have been receiving
training in Melbourne, Fla ., in satellite communications equipment
through the Harris Co. Also, the pilot training to which I referred
earlier, training Ugandans to fly advanced aircraft and so forth in
volve significant numbers of Ugandans.
Six, prohibit all aircraft leased to or owned by the Government of :
the Republic of Uganda and Ugandan interests from receiving land
ing rights in the United States. We now allow Uganda Airlines to fly
into the Melbourne airport at least once every 2 weeks to pick up
luxury items like cigarettes and the like. Thus far, we have not been
able to determine where in the United States the Uganda 707 or
C - 130's which we supplied earlier are serviced, or the frequency of
their landings in the United States.
Seven, prohibit all equipment having potential military or police
application leased to or owned by the Government of the Republic of
Uganda or Ugandan interests from being serviced or receiving main
tenance in the United States.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have a rather comprehensive reso
Jution which attempts to deal more effectively with activities ongoing
that represent supportive relations between our two governments. We

1
 290

believe the situation in Uganda is sufficiently severe to warrant not

only a condemnation but very specific action by our Government.
At this moment, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Ohio,
Mr. Pease, for further comments on the economic sanctions which are
incorporated in his resolution .
Mr. Chairman, I should also add I have received a letter from Con
gressman Mathis in support of my resolution, in favor of the one he
had introduced earlier and 13 members of this committee, as you know ,
had sent letters to you asking we proceed with markup on this par
ticular bill.
Mr. Diggs. The time of the gentleman is expired. The Chair will
recognize the gentleman from Ohio,Mr. Pease, on his own time.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my gratitude to
the Chair for that courtesy .
As the Chair knows, I am not a member of any of the three sub
committees which have jurisdiction over these bills and resolutions.
So I do appreciate the opportunity to comment. I will try to do so
briefly.
We have had now, Mr. Chairman, five hearings on the question of
economic sanctions against Uganda and on the conditions which call
for those sanctions. I think the case has been very persuasively made
in those hearings that conditions in Uganda are very bad ; that geno
cide is being practiced. From an economic point of view, the people
ofUganda could hardly be any worse off than they are now, dueto the
mismanagement of the economy by the Amin regime; and that the
ability of the Amin regime to stay in power is directly linked to the
importation of coffee from Uganda to the United States.
We now provide about 33 percent of the total foreign exchange
which Amin uses to keep his State Research Bureau and his army loyal
to him. And with Britain and four other of our friends in Western
Europe and Japan, we could account for 75 percent of the total export
earnings of thenation ofUganda.
It is our feeling that because of the genocide which has been prac
ticed in Uganda ,it is time for this Nation to disassociate itself in
every way from that murderous regime. And that, of course, is the
intent ofmy legislation.
To clarify for members of the subcommittees, we have before these
three subcommittees two matters, really. One is a ban on the export of
items from the United States to Uganda. That is a relatively small
amount; about $12 million per year. But the testimony that we have
heard has developed that there are some very sensitive items. Some
of the items which are exported are luxury goods used by Amin which
areparticularly important to Amin in keeping his armyand his secret
police loyal to him . I think it would be worthwhile for this committee,
and I would hope they would consider reporting out a ban on exports.
The ban on imports generally and the imports of coffee specifically
are in the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee, and are
not before the committee at this time. We have been concentrating
during the hearings on the Bonker - Pease resolution , House Concur
rent Resolution 426, which, as the gentleman from Washington has so
ably outlined, calls for a variety of actions against the Amin regime,
including calling upon the administration to support a total ban on
imports and exports.
 291

It is our feeling that House Concurrent Resolution 426 is very im

portant and, if reported by these subcommittees and the full committee
and passed by the House,that it will go a long way toward encourag
ing the administration to impose these controls.
As the chairman knows, a letter was circulated to members of the
subcommittees and 11 of the 20 members of the subcommittees signed
a letter specifically calling for markup on House Concurrent Resolu
tion 426. It is for that reason that I hope this resolution will be the
basis for the subcommittee's action today.
I again thank the chairman for his courtesy in allowing me to
participate.
Mr. Diggs. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Bingham , the chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, which has concurrent jurisdiction over
this matter.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to salute the gentleman from Ohio for his
initiative and his determination in pursuing this matter. There is no
question that the Amin regime is a despicable one and there is no
question that all of us would like to see it end.
I suppose there are some questions to how this could be accom
plished.Buta since we are not discussing a bill that embargoes imports,
but rather concurrent resolution which does not have the force of
law and which simply states that the President should do various
things, I do not have the reservations about precedent that I had in
connection with an actual embargo. I have worried about precedent
because in general, I have been opposed to embargoes. I have, at various
times, sought to have the embargo against Cuba and the embargo
against Vietnam lifted. I am concerned if we were to impose an
embargo against Uganda, it would not have a salutary effect in Africa
because the question would be, why is the action taken against a black
regime but no action is taken against the regime in South Africa.
I had understood, Mr. Chairman, that you might be offeringa
substitute resolution. I would like to see that. I do have some specific
suggestions to make with regard to House Concurrent Resolution 426,
butI can do those at the proper time. I do not think it would be appro
priate for me to outline those at the present time.
Mr. Diggs. I would like to recognize the ranking member of the
International Organizations Subcommittee, the other subcommittee
that has jurisdiction over this matter, for whatever comments he
would care to make in the absence of his chairman .
Mr. ROSENTHAL . I have nothing.
Mr. Diggs. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Whalen .
Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as I arrived late due to the
fact I had a statement to make on the floor, I think it is probably not
appropriate at this time for me to comment. I would like to pick up
the thread of the discussion a little better than I have at this point.
Mr. Diggs. Is the gentleman engaged in floor management of the
arms controlbill ?
Mr. WHALEN . No, I had another statement on the House floor. They
were just taking that up. I suspect this is a vote on it or a vote on the
rule.
 292

Mr. DIGGs. The Chair is prepared to declare a recess until 3:00

o'clock .
So ordered .
A brief recess was taken.]
Mr. Diggs. The joint subcommittees will please come to order.
We have present here Mr. Harrop, who was the principal adminis
tration witness during the hearings on this question and is prepared
to answer questions and make whatever other supplemental state
ments might serve the purpose ofthe joint subcommittees. Recalling
his testimony, the Chair would like to summarize actions that have
already been taken against the Government of Uganda by the United
States since 1973.
No. 1, we have withdrawn all embassy personnel. No. 2, we have with
drawn all Peace Corps volunteers and personnel from what was one
of our largest Peace Corps units. No. 3, we have placed a moratorium
on all Export- Import Bank activities. No. 4, we have withheld all
OPIC facilities and programs. No. 5, we have failed to grant gen
eralized trade preferences to Ugandan commodities. No. 6, we have
stopped exports of all goods on the U.S. munition list. No. 7, we have
denied all exports which would contribute to human rights violations
in Uganda, And finally, we have subjected to review by the State
Department in Washington all visa applications by Ugandan officials
or persons connected with the Ugandan Government.
The Chair would further like to observe that apart from reports
yesterday of what was characterized in the media as an automobile
accidentthat befell the Vice President, intelligence reports indicate
there has been a decrease in reports of deaths , disappearannces and
human rights violations in Uganda.
There are those who feel that any decision we take here today should
be based upon the extent to which our policy will have intended results,
and thereis serious question as to whether a coffee boycott that is uni
laterally implemented will substantially reduce foreign exchange
available to the Government. One problem here is that we may end up
purchasing Ugandan coffee from Kenya and Tanzania. And that par
ticular point was coroborated on my last trip to the Republic of
Kenya.
Also on that trip, the foreign minister pointed out — and this was
confirmed by our Ambassador there— that Kenya exportsmore coffee
than it produces, which suggests that there is a collusion either official
of unofficial that is taking place already. Obviously Kenya could not
export more coffee than it produces unless it was obtaining coffee
through some close by source .
Kenya and other African countries, despite all of these problems of
the past, have been trying to normalize relations with Uganda. The
foreign minister of Kenya, for example, who certainly isnot among
Uganda's fans, indicated this country believes it is better to have
representation there, and through constant prodding work with the
Government there in order to end the repression. To implement actions
against Uganda and not against South Africa, as has been pointed out
by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Bingham , could obviously be
viewed by most Africans as a demonstration of a racist bias, despite
the fact that perspective sanctions or sanction -related measures in
 293

volving South Africa are moving through other committees of the

Congress.
The gentleman from Nebraska, who is a member of the Banking
and Currency Committee, told me just before we resumed our sitting
that that committee passed the Eximbank prohibitions involving
South Africa by a yote of 28 to 15 just a few minutes ago. One option
that we have on Uganda is to allow the international processes to
work and hold the matter in abeyance pending the U.N. Human Rights
Commission report on human rights violations in that country. You
may recall that the President of Uganda agreed to permit such an
examination of human rights violations in the country.This is the first
time he has granted this permission . However, that trip has not been
set yet because there has been some controversy about who is going
to conduct the mission . It has been decided that Nigeria would pro
vide the inspection team. But the agreement regarding the person or
persons from Nigeria who would conduct this inspection has not been
completed.
Also, I think it should be pointed out that — and I am not suggest
ing anybody who is here with us today — there are many who sup
port a boycott against Uganda who are adamantly opposed to boy
cotts in other areas.
For example, some who support a boycott against Uganda oppose
the Arab boycott.This suggests that thewhole issueof the use of trade
embargoes does have some serious political implications. Another
question that arises is whether or not closing the Ugandan Embassy, as
suggested by the Bonker-Pease resolution , wouldserve any purpose.
Aside from the principle of universalism , II may be theonly person in
the room , certainly the only member in the room , who has been to the
Ugandan Embassy here. I do not think it is presumptuous to say that
I may be even the only one who knows where it is located. Therefore,
this gesture might notbe much more than a gesture of symbolism with
respect to their facilityoverthere in the American University.
When one considers that there are a couple of other countries which
are considered pariahs with whom we donot have normal relations,
and which havefar more extensive geopolitical implications - namely,
Cuba and Angola — then one wonders whether or not this might rep
resent overkill.
According to some reports ,things are getting better. I am not pre
pared to say that they are . I haven't been inside Uganda since the
Amin administration. I have met the gentleman twice ; in both cases in
his capacity as the Chairman of theOAU afewyears ago, first in
Addis Ababa, and then in New York City. But beyond the airport
stop that was unscheduled about a year or so ago, I have not been
inside and cannot attest to whether things are getting better or not.
But the fact of the matter is that despite all of the actions that the
administration has taken, as indicated by Mr. Harrop, there has not
been a total turnabout. That is the situation .
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman .
Mr. Diggs. I yield to the gentleman from New York , Mr. Rosen
thal.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman .
 294

I was reminded of the time you and I spent 2 or 3 days in Uganda.

I think it was a long, long time ago. It might have been 1965, when
President Obote was still administering that country.
I did want to offer a comment, with your permission, Mr. Chairman,
about the comparison of both resolutions, House Concurrent Resolution
426 and thesubsttiute that hasbeen submitted to the members on your
behalf which I know you intend to offer.
My own view, taking into account that I feel the situation in Uganda
is abominable, is that I would actively urge support for your resolu
tion, for yoursubstitute, because Ithink, with due respect to my col
leagues, the substitute is more artfully drawn and is more consistent
with traditional legislative practice. Considering the factthat a House
concurrent resolution cannot become law and is not intended to become
law but is intended to be an expression by the Members of the House
ofRepresentatives, in that sense it is very, very important.
I think if you read the whereas clauses in your proposed substitute,
it covers in full and forthrightterms all the concerns and considera
tions that all of us have. And, with your permission, I shall read it.
Whereas in recent years the Government of the Republic of Uganda has en
gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights ;
Whereas the United States holds such actions to be unacceptable and has
already taken certain measures to express its abhorrence of human rights con
ditions in Uganda ;
Whereas the United Nations Human Rights Commission has agreed to and is
currently preparing for study missions in order to investigate charges of viola
tions of rights in Uganda ;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Uganda continues to earn signif
icant amounts of foreign exchange from exports of coffee to the United States
and other countries ; and
Whereas repressive measures taken by the Ugandan Government have aroused
deep concern among Americans and throughout the international community .
Those are verybroad,very general, thoroughly encompassing state
ments and I think are the feelings of the members of the committee.
In terms of traditional practice in designing whereas clauses, I think
they more follow the accepted rule of thumb in terms of broad descrip
tion rather than the specifics.
In other words, if I had the same desire as Mr. Bonker and Mr.
Pease — and the fact is, I do — I would rewrite the whereas clause in
House Concurrent Resolution 426, and I think the product that I
would come up with is the whereas clause that you have in your sub
stitute.
So for that reason, I would recommend the adoption of the sub
stitute. Additionally , I think I may be a cosponsor ; I would have been
delighted to be a cosponsor of House Concurrent Resolution 426 be
cause I believe in the directions generally stated therein . But it is
not common practice to delineate in termsof specifics what that resolu
tion does in the seven numbered paragraphs of the resolving clause.
The resolving clause in your proposed substitute says as follows:
That ( a ) the Congress strongly condemns the gross violations of human
rights and other acts which suppress freerlom of political thought and violate
the rights of individuals which have been committed by Idi Amin and the Gor
ernment of the Republic of Uganda, and the Congress urges the President of
the United States to implement forthwith such measures as would effectively
 295

discourage United States support of the Government of Uganda in any way

which contributes to the repression of Ugandan citizens.
( b) The Congress urges the President of the United States to encourage and
support international efforts to investigate and respond to conditions in the
Republic of Uganda , including economic restrictions.
I think that is an all-encompassing resolution with the full force
and effect of the seven points of the Bonker -Pease resolution, albeit
without the specifics. If your substitute can be supported by the three
joint committees in unanimous fashion, it holds far more weight in
the public arena and with our colleagues in the House than to have the
divided support for House Concurrent Resolution 426 and for the
substitute.
Therefore, I would like to raise a question with my colleagues. Is
it not possible that we could all join together in support of the chair
man's substitute and move expeditiously and thus unanimously ?
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman .
Mr. Diggs. In order to get consideration of that — and I appreciate
the gentleman's observations, and I might add that there isno pride
of authorship here — the staffs were under instructions to find a way
of making a condemnation statement without getting into the other
kinds of problems generated by the Bonker- Pease appproach, but yet
meeting their concerns.
I think perhaps the way to get this before us so that we can take
some kind of action, is to offer it. I do offer it as a substitute for House
Concurrent Resolution 426 .
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solarz, with
respectto the pending business, which is the substitute.
Mr. SOLARZ . Thank you ,Mr. Chairman .
We have aa kind of peculiar problem today because, due to jurisdic
tional considerations, it was impossible to get before our committee
legislation which would have resulted in the establishment of an em
bargo on trade withUganda. Asa consequence of that, the authors of
this resolution, Mr. Bonker and Mr. Pease, came up with a resolution
expressing the sense of the Congress and that we ought to try to do
something about this problem .
Were it not for that jurisdictional roadblock , there is absolutely no
question that what we wouldhave before us would be legislation which,
if adopted,would have established an embargo on trade with Uganda.
I listened to what my good friend from New York had to say about
the substitute versus the original Bonker - Pease resolution, and I have
to respectfully say to him and to the other members of the committee
who might be thinking of supporting the substitute resolution that if
we learned anything during the half dozen or so hearings that this
committee conducted over the course of the last few months— which
some of us faithfully and religiously attended precisely because we
thought thiswas a very significant moral question — it wasthat thiswas
legislation that was designed not simply to register the protest of the
Congress and the country against the genocidal activities going on in
Uganda. It was not designed as a kind of moral copout. It was de
signed to set in motion forces, which hopefully could result in the
elimination of the man responsible for the 100,000 or more murders
which have taken place in Uganda. That man is Idi Amin. And if we
 296

learned anything during the course of those hearings, it was that what
was needed to depose Amin was not ritual expressions of outrage.
Everyone shares this outrage and the adoption of a ritual expression
will not even have the impact of a pebble dropping in the ocean , be
cause simply express our outrage with what Idi Amin is doing is like
coming out for motherhood on Mother's Day; that is about how much
news value it has.
We were told that the one way to get rid of this character was
through an embargo on trade with Uganda, given the extent to which
hispower rested on a political and military apparatus whose loyalty he
had obtained by buying it out with the foreign exchange he gets from
his tradeand coffee. Coffee constitutes 93 percent of all of theexports
of Uganda. One-third of those coffee exports go to the United States.
And there was a feeling, a hope, that if we established an embargo on
coffee, on trade with Uganda, that the potential loss in foreign ex
change to Idi Amin's government might sufficiently undermine him
and his capacity to buy theloyalty of the thugs who enable him to stay
in power , that he could somehow be deposed.
Now, some of the people in the State Department took the position
that it was unrealistic to expect a unilateral American embargo to do
the job . Frankly, I think they are probably right. But the fact of the
matter is, unless we take the initiative, we will never know whether
other countries that import Ugandan coffee will join us. I think it is
clear if most countries that import Ugandan coffee would join in such
an effort, that he probably would fall.
It seems to meit is something well worth trying. There is no guar
antee an embargo would result in his fall. There is at least a possi
bility it would. All I can say is, when I heard the witnesses from the
State Department giving usall sorts of fancy diplomatic reasons why
we shouldn't do it,I thought of nothing more or nothing less than the
pure rationalization of their colleaguesin the State Department why
we should not do anythingabout Hitler and the Nazis.
It seems to me any resolution which does not specifically refer to
the need for an embargo on trade with Uganda in effect misses the
whole point of the hearings whichwe held and the testimony of every
witness who testified in favor of doing something.
There were some people who said we should not do anything. But
those who wanted us to do something were unanimous in saying what
was needed was nothing more, nothing less, than an embargo.
I would, inconclusion, suggestthe following. I prefer the resolution
which was originally offered by the gentleman from Washington and
the gentleman from Ohio because it is somewhat more specific and
because it does, at its core and as the crux of it, have a clause urging
the establishment of an embargo on trade with 'Uganda.
If, however, it should turn out that the chairman's substitute is
adopted as the basic document off which we work, I would then plan
to offer an amendmentto add language to the resolving clause of his
resolution indicating that one of the measures which should be used
against Uganda is an embargo. And I would very much hope that if
it turns out a majority of the members prefer the chairman's sub
stitute because it is more elegantly worded, or for whatever reason
and insofar as it goes, I have no problem with it. I think that it
-
 297

would be very helpful if we could add, at the very least, somespecific

reference to an embargo, because in the context of the hearings we
held and in the context ofthe pressure and the thrust which has built
up behind this legislation, any resolution which comes out of this
committee which does not include a reference to an embargo will be
interpreted not as a victory for those who want to get rid of Amin, but
as a victory for those who would basically prefer we not attempt to do
anything which might result in his elimination.
Mr. Diggs. Would the gentleman yield ?
Does the gentleman have an amendment that he has prepared ? I
call to the attention of the gentleman the language that is in the
substitute ; namely, urging the President to encourage and support
international efforts to investigate and respond to conditions, includ
ing economic restrictions.
The words " economic restrictions ” may not be suited to the gentle
man's objectives. I would be interested in seeing his substitute
language.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman , I want to yield in a moment to my
friend from Washington, who I think has a parliamentary inquiry. I
think the resolving clause is a good clause. I have no problem with it.
The only difficulty is the economic restrictions to which the sub
stitute refers are in the context of international economic restrictions.
I think one of the things we learned in the hearings was that the only
hope for international action was by our first taking unilateral action.
So , as I think the chairman can see, the languagein my amendment
will a little bitearlier in thefirst resolving clause urge the President
to support and where possible toimplement such measures as an
embargo on trade with Uganda . It would not preclude him from
usingothermeasures, but itwould specificially indicate that that was
something that we ought to do.
Mr. Diggs.Ifthe gentleman would yield further.
I have looked at the gentleman's language, and I have no problem
with it. I am preparedto accept the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman , I have a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Diggs. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. BONKER. It is my understanding the chairman was going to
proceed with the concurrent resolution ,and at this point you want to
offer the substitute ?
Mr. Diggs. It has been offered .
Mr. BONKER. Was that with unanimous consent ?
Mr. Diggs. Unanimous consent is not required for that.
Mr. BONKER. I refer back to the leterthat was signed by 13 mem
bers representing the three subcommittees that we should proceed with
Concurrent Resolution 426 .
As I understand it, the chairman , at this point, is opening his sub
stitute for amendment ?
Mr. Diggs. With regard to parliamentary rules, that is the proper
way to proceed .
Mr. SOLARZ. I will offer my amendment at this point, if that is in
order, to your substitute.
Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman , once a substitute is adopted , no amend
ments would be in order.
 298

Mr. Diggs. It has not been adopted.

Mr. WHALEN. I think this is the appropriate time. I think Mr.
Solarz indicated
Mr. SOLARZ . Can the committee staff distribute the amendment to
the substitute ?
Mr. Diggs. The gentleman is offering his amendment ?
Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.
Mr. Diggs. It has been distributed .
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman , I think the amendment has been ex
plained during the course of my diatribe. I don't know that it is
necessary toadd any more. I am delighted you are prepared to accept
it. I think it strengthens it and makes it a much more acceptable
resolution .
Mr. Diggs. You were prepared to yield to the gentleman from
Washington .
Let me recognize the gentleman at this point.
Mr. BONKER. I think the chairman has responded. I directed my in
quiry about the parliamentary situation , and the substitute is now
before the subcommittees and is open for amendment. That is all I
was inquiring about.
Mr. Diggs. The question occurs on the Solarz amendment to the
substitute.
All those in favor, signify by saying aye ; opposed, nay .
The ayes have it.
Are there any other amendments ?
The vote now occurs on the substitute.
All those in favor of the substitute, signify by saying aye ; opposed ,
nay .
The ayes have it. It is so ordered.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I move the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. Diggs. The question now is on the substitute as amended .
All those in favor, signify by saying aye ; opposed , nay.
The ayes have it. It isso ordered.
Without objection, the substitute, as amended , is reported to the
full committee. I hear no objections.
The joint subcommittees stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the joint subcommittees adjourned , to
reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
 APPENDIX 1
LEGISLATION
95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 9252

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 22, 1977
Mr. PEASE introduced the following bill ; which was referred to the Com
mittee on International Relations

A BILL
To amend the Export Administration Act of 1969 to prohibit
exporting to Uganda of goods subject to control under that
Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled ,
3 That section 4 of the Export Administration Act of 1969
4. ( 50 U.S.C. App. 2403) is amended by adding at the end
5 thereof the following new subsection :
6 “ ( m ) No articles, materials, or supplies, including tech
7 nical data or other information, which are subject to control
8 under this Act may be exported to Uganda.”.
}
( 299 )

25-826 0 - 78 - 20
 300

95TH CONGRESS
1st SESSION
H. CON. RES. 394

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 2, 1977

Mr. Mathis submitted the following concurrent resolution ; which was referred
to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas the thousands of murders committed by Ugandan
dictator Idi Amin Dada have aroused deep concern among
Americans and within the world community ; and
Whereas all human and political rights are suppressed in the
Ugandan police state; and
Whereas the repressive acts of Idi Amin Dada are an affront to
basic human dignity ; and
Whereas the United States holds such actions to be unaccept
able : Now therefore, be it
1 Resolved by the House of Representatives ( the Senate
2 concurring ), That the Congress strongly denounces the above
3 acts committed by the dictator Idi Amin which suppress the
4 expression of political thought and violate the rights of the
5 individual, and urges the President to take effective measures
V
1

301

1 against the government of Idi Amin in order to register the

2 deep concern of the American people about the continued
3 violation of human rights by Idi Amin.
 302

95TH CONGRESS
1st SESSION
H. CON . RES. 426

.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DECEMBER 1,1 1977
Mr. BONKER ( for himself and Mr. PEASE ) submitted the following concurrent
resolution ; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas in recent years the Government of the Republic of
Uganda has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross viola
tions of internationally recognized human rights;
Whereas nearly four years ago the United States terminated its
foreign aid program and closed the United States Embassy
in Kampala ;
Whereas the Congress has indicated that no assistance ,should
be given to the Republic of Uganda through international
financial institutions ;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Uganda continues
to reap important benefits from sales of coffee to the United
States, from imported American technology with potential
military value, and from training in the United States of
Ugandan intelligence and military personnel;
V
 303

Whereas members of the Ugandan diplomatic mission to the

United States and members of the Ugandan delegation
to the United Nations have been involved in harassing
Ugandan exiles in the United States, especially those exiles
who are political opponents of Idi Amin, and have en- :
gaged in intelligence gathering on these individuals;
Whereas the United States can , consistent with its obligations
as the host for the headquarters of the United Nations,
limit travel within the United States by members of dele
gations to the United Nations and has done so in the past
to prevent improper activities within the United States;
and

Whereas continuing repressive measures taken by the Govern

ment of the Republic of Uganda have outraged the interna
tional community- and þavebeen condemned by the United
tionalcommunity
States on several occasions: Now , therefore, be it
i " Resolved by the House of Representatives (theSenate
2 concurring ), That the President should immediately imple
3. ment measures to discourage activities by the United States.
4. which would benefit either directly or indirectly the Gov
5 ernment of the Republic of Uganda. Such measures should
6 include and
, ji i is !

7
( 1) taking the necessary steps to close the Embassy
8
?,
of the Republic of Uganda in the District of ‫܃܃‬Columbia;
‫܃‬

9. (2 ) restricting the movement of officials, with the

10 : 1 , " . Ugandan mission to the United Nations toʻän areain and
11 around the United Nations headquarters , district and
12
permitting entry into the United States of only, those
 304

1 Ugandan Government officials essential for carrying out

2 legitimate representation functions at the United
3 Nations;

4 ( 3 ) supporting legislation that prohibits the im

5 portation of all Ugandan products into the United States
6
and that prohibits the exportation of all products of the
7 United States to the Republic of Uganda ;
8 (4) prohibiting entry into the United States, for
9 the purpose of study or training, of all individuals re
10 ceiving scholarships from the Government of the Re
11 public of Uganda;
12 (5) prohibiting all Ugandans admitted to the
13 United States as nonimmigrant aliens from being trained
14
in subjects having potential military application, in
15
cluding pilot training and aeronautical engineering;
16
( 6) prohibiting all aircraft leased to or owned by
17
the Government of the Republic of Uganda or Ugandan
18 .
interests from receiving landing rights in the United
19 States; and
20 ( 7 ) prohibiting all equipment having potential
21 military or police application leased to or owned by
22
the Government of the Republic of Uganda or Ugandan
23 interests from being serviced or receiving maintenance
24 in the United States.
 305

95ri CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. CON . RES. 612

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 9, 1978
Mr. BONKER ( for himself, Mr. PEASE, Mr. Diggs, Mr. FRASER, Mr. BINGHAM,
Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. WHALEN, Mr. BUCHANAN , Mr. HARRINGTON , Mr. ROSEN
THAL, Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. IRELAND, Mr. FOWLER, Mr. Cava
NAUGH, Mr. LEHMAN , Mr. McKINNEY, and Ms. MIKULSKI) submitted the
0 ;" following concurrent resolution ; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas in recent years the Government of the Republic of
Úganda has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross viola
tions of internationally recognized human rights;
Whereas the United States holds such actions to be unacceptable
and has already taken certain measures to express its ab
horrence of human rights conditions in Uganda ;
Whereas the United Nations Human Rights Commission has
agreed to and is currently preparing for study missions in
order to investigate charges of violations of rights in Uganda;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Uganda continues
to earn significant amounts of foreign exchange from exports
of coffee to the United States and other countries ; and
V
 306

Whereas repressive measures taken by the Ugandan Government

have aroused deep concern among Americans and through
out the international community : Now, therefore, be it
1 Resolved by the House of Representatives ( the Senate
2 concurring), That (a) the Congress strongly condemns the
3 gross violations of human rights, and other acts which sup
4 press freedom of political thought and violate the rights of
5 individuals, which have been committed by Idi Amin and
6 the Government of the Republic of Uganda, and the Con
7 gress urges the President of the United States to support,
g , and where possible, implement measures, such as an embargo
9
on trade with Uganda, which would effectively discourage
10 United States support of the Government of Uganda.
11 (b ) . The Congress urges the President of the United
12 States to encourage and support international efforts to in
13 vestigate and respond to conditions in the Republic of
14 Uganda, including economic restrictions.
 APPENDIX 2
LETTER TO HON . DONALD J. PEASE AND HON
Hon. ROBERT K. DORNAN
FROM GEORGE E. BOECKLIN OF THE NATIONAL COFFEE ASSOCIATION
November 29 , 1977
" Dear Sir :

I am writing to convey to you the position of the National

Coffee Association concerning your proposed legislation which
would establish a commercial trade ban with the Government
of Uganda . The Board of Directors of the Association has
unanimously approved the attached resolution .
Our Board of Directors believes that the membership of the
National Coffee Association , comprised of coffee roasters and
coffee importers, as well as allied industries, shares your
deep concern for the disregard of basic human values carried
on by that Government .
It is the consensus of our Board that our membership will
recognize that the contitutional responsibility for establish
ing United States foreign policy rests with the Government
and that they will support any determination by our Government
of policy on this subject . Our Board appreciates your
efforts to seek such a determination regarding trade with
Uganda. They are equally comforted by the realization that
this process will be concluded only after the consideration
of some information of which we would have no knowledge
whatsoever , including , quite possibly , issues of significant
national interest .

A copy of this letter and the enclosed resolution is being

sent to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Deputy Secretary
of State Warren M. Christopher .

Respectfully ,
( signed )
George E. Boecklin "

( 307 )
 308

" Resolution Adopted by the National Coffee Association of U.S.A. ,

Inc. Board of Directors on November 29 , 1977
The National Coffee Association of U.S.A. , Inc. being an Association
representing the domestic coffee trade in the United States;
Noting the fact that Uganda is a supplier of green coffee in the
world market and that Uganda and the United States are both parties
to the International Coffee Agreement of 1976 ;
Declaring that the violations of human rights occurring under the
Ugandan Government of President Idi Amin are abhorrent and morally
repugnant to the Board of Directors of the National Coffee Asso
ciation and have caused public pressures on members to desist
from purchases of Uganda coffee ;
Declaring that since only the United States Government has access
to all the foreign policy implications of a commercial trade ban
on Uganda , we believe that only the United States Government is
fully responsible to make the appropriate foreign policy ; and
Declaring that the members of the National Coffee Association wish
to avoid any charges of antitrust violation arising out of any
voluntary concerted action in response to such pressures and that
it is appropriate for the United States Government to formulate
a policy with respect to purchases of Ugandan coffee which would
avoid such charges and apply equally to all domestic participants
in the coffee trade ;

Hereby Resolves that the Board of Directors of the National Coffee

Association respectfully requests the Executive and Legislative
branches of the United States Government to declare and implement
a uniform national policy in the United States concerning trade
by private and commercial interests in the United States with
entities in Uganda . "
 APPENDIX 3
“ AFRICA'S PRESS SPEAKS OUT" 1
[ From New African, April 1977 ]

Africa's leaders ,with a couple of exceptions, have nothad

the courage or the human decency to speak out against the
atrocities in Uganda. But the African Press has not been
afraid to stand up for what it thinks is right.
At the timo of going to press only throó. ALL AFRICA CONFERENCE OF
'African hoadsof stato havo spokon out CHURCHES
on the ovonts in Uganda. " This situation of brutal suppression does
PRESIDENT SIR DAWDA JAWARA grave injustice not only to the people of
( Tho Gambia ): · Uganda but to all people of Africa in this
og vigorously condemn the massacre crucial moment in the history , of the
The Gambia will tolerate no violation of
human rights in the world..
GHANA GOVERNMENT.
PRESIDENT JULIUS NYERERE " This has created an embarrassment for us
(Tanzania ) :: all.“
We have been telling what has been going
on in Uganda forthe past sixyears .... Now THE WORLD (South African black
others are beginning to realise what is newspaper ):
going on there and it is time for me to shut " Africa must depose of Amin ... It is our
up . firm conviction that unless Africa takes a
stand against this man it will only continue
PRESIDENT WILLIAM S. TOLBERT to supply ammunition to the enemiesof the
( Liberia ) ; people's aspirations who will judge us all by
" I feel that an investigation is veryneces the acts of a man we all consider to be
sary .to satisfy world.opinion and eliminate" . debased . .
any doubt that the bishop met his untimely
death by foul means and it is my earnest
hope that the truthwillbe revealed .
BUT THE AFRICAN PRESS
WAS NOT SILENT:
DAILY NEWS ( Tanzania ) ;
" Luwum was shot twice in the chest by
President Amin ::.. the archbishop was
taken on arrest to Nakasero lodge where he
was handcuffed and led into a room to
meet Amin änd other officials. The officials
included the vice president and the
minister for defence Maj. Gens. Mustapha,
Isaac Lumango. Colonels Maliyamungu,
Tabaw , Maj. Farouk, Bob Astles, Police DAILY NATION (Kenya);
Commissioner , Obura ; and Deputy · Ali in " For how long will Africa and the world
Toweli...
The archbishop was asked to sign a community do nothing more than be a
spectator to the barbarous and ; indis
document admitting complicity in a plot to .
overthrow . the Amin regime. When he ; . criminate genocide in Uganda?
refused to sign the confession he is said to*: ; NIGERIA HERALD
have been untied and pinned down on the “ Black Africa may forfeit her moral legiti
** floor. He was undressed and two soldiers macy in condemning the dehumanising rule
took tuins whipping him while he con- , of lan Smith and John Vorster ..if we
tinued to " utter prayers. The prayers fraternise with the kind of Idi Amin ... a
reportedly incensed Amin" who angrily disgraceto the black raco .:3
shouted wildly in an extremely obscene ?
Janguage and struck the archbishop. WEEKLY REVIEW (Kenya):
Amin wentinto a monologue about his " If Amin expected the world to believe his
greatness telling Luwum that God had explanation he was disappointed. From the
empowered him to give the archbishop and . .very beginning the accident story met with
other church leaders the last warning.. scepticism ."
" Proceedings were interrupted for half
an hour at 7 p.m. to listen to the BBC news JEUNE AFRIQUE
and Focus on Africa. ...This was followed " It is a slow and systematic massacre of the
by bizarre, sacreligious and obscene activi- Ugandan People in tħe name of 'anti
ties during which Amin pulled out his pistol imperialism and the dignity of the black
.and shot tho archbishop twice in the man' ... certain African Jeaders - stoop
chest. themselves to these sinister exploits. A
1 Reprinted with permission.

( 309 )
 APPENDIX 4

IMPORTS OF UGANDAN COFFEE BY COMPANY, IN POUNDS AND DOLLAR

AMOUNTS, FOR 1975 AND 1976 COMBINED
The Folgér Coffee Company 53,811,587 lbs . $ 33,689,664
1

General Foods Corporation

(Maxwell house ) 45,794,743 lbs . $ 28,959,500

Saks International , Inc. 21,890,113 lbs . $ 14,460,883

ACLI Sugar Company 21,349,275 lbs . $13,389,339

!lestles Company 20,557 , 200 lbs . $ 15,065,396

J. Aron & Company , Inc. 9,528,617 lbs . $ 6,269,498

Coca Cola Company - Foods Division 8,985,044 lbs . $ 6,014,825

Hills Brothers Coffee , Inc. 8,232,308 lbs . $ 5,416,468

Woodhouse , Drake , and Carey 8,024,816 lbs . $ 5,189,582

S. Jackson and Son , Inc. 6,060,695 lbs . $ 5,053 , 416

E. R. Camilleri & Company , Inc. 5,925,138 lbs . $3,272,818

Carson H. Simon & Company 5,181,735 lbs . $ 2,320 , 826

Gill & Duffus , Inc. 4,655,131 lbs . $3,653,417

JB Company 4,056,555 lbs . $ 2,978,655

Geo . !em . Rueff , Inc. 3,763,838 lbs . $ 2,329,304

Carl Borchsenius Company 2,515,764 lbs . , $ 2,086,684

Lonray , Inc. 1,878,957 lbs . $ 1,520,122

P. H. Bellingall , Inc. 1,595,186 lbs . $ 968,702

G. 4. Saks , Inc. 1., 435,707 lbs . $ 708 , 365

Socomex Coffee , Inc. 1,241,626 lbs . $ 811,839

Volkhart Brothers , Inc. 1,116,903 lbs . $ 757 , 201

Van Ekris and Stoett , Inc. 888,985 lbs . $ 842,783

Loretz & Company 697,447 lbs . $ 292,921

Spracue and Rhodes Commodity Corp.. 676,596 lbs . $ 762,554

(310)
 311

Page Two

Alan L. Grant Rubber 530,373 lbs . $ 260,478

Hoyt , Shepston , & Sciaroni 446,747 lbs . $ 299,412

William L. Marshall Coffee

Company 228,227 lbs . $ 166 , 264
1

E. A. Kahl & Company , Inc. 222,111 lbs . $ 171,025

Mitsui and Company , U.S.A. Inc. 217,858 lbs . $ 175,376

Behring International , Inc. 216,622 lbs . $ 249,115

-Procter & Gamble Company 794 lbs . $ 397

Bill Potts & Company 300 lbs : $ 450

-Parent company for Folgers

 APPENDIX 5
STATEMENT WITH QUESTIONS FOR BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON ,
SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM MATTOX

Mr. Chairman , I deeply regret having been unable to attend the

hearings on April 6 , 1978 in which representatives of Il corpora
tions responded to questions regarding their dealings with
the Idi Amin government in Uganda . My presence was required at
that time in the Budget Committee's critical mark- up session where
1 was in the process of introducing a resolution as its primary
sponsor . .
I wish to commend the Subcommittees for their attention to condi
tions in Uganda and to what we might do to halt the terrible carnage
being committed against the people of that formerly productive and
peaceful country , particularly the Christian population .
Mr. Chairman , I appreciated the opportunity to submit testimony
to these Subcommittees on February 9, 1978. At that time I was
most anxious to see that those who have been leading the thrust of
our involvement commercially and militarily with Idi Amin have the
opportunity to explain their actions before an appropriate hearing .
It is gratifying to note that you have seen fit to do just that .
There have been many unanswered questions regarding the training
of Idi Amin's military personnel in my own community in Texas . 1
made a very intensive effort to seek out those answers on a personal
basis with officials of Bell Helicopter Textron last November . Un
fortunately , the responses offered by Bell at that time were less
than enlightening and in some cases appeared to be less than candid .
As documented in my earlier testimony , it was no less difficult for
representatives of the media to get forthright statements from those
involved .

One reporter from Scripps League newspapers asked a question re

garding subcontracting relationships between Bell and Acme and Oak
Grove flying schools -- a question I had previously directed to Bell-
only to get two contradictory responses. This was not a minor
point . Bell's Washington D.c. vice president , Warren Rockwell , had
over a month to think about this particular between the time my
office asked the question and the time Scripps League newspapers
asked the same question .

Mr. Chairman , we frequently hear it said that the course of our

foreign policy goes astray because no one speaks up at the critical
time , that nobody asks the hard questions . For those corporate
officials who may resent the necessity of responding to such in
quiries as these , the point needs to be made that it is the Congress
which , under our Constitution , has been charged with the responsi
bility of asking pertinent questions . If the Congress will not develop
an accurate and understandable record of the facts in this matter ,
who will ? The Congress and the American public cannot be expected
to make correct decisions without correct information .

(312 )
 313

I would also like to point out that there is a lot more to keeping this
country strong and prosperous than gross receipts and increased
sales . We must not allow our people's higher ideals to be tortured
to death by a twisted logic that would construe any questioning of
corporate conduct as an attack on the free enterprise system .
Most corporate executives today subscribe to the notion that business
ethics mean_more than just conformity to the law . According to the
Caterpiller Tractor Campany's WORLDWIDE BUSINESS CONDUCT , the
law is the floor . " Ethical business conduct should normally exist at
a level well above the minimum required by the law . " I think a fair
standard that could be used in situations such as the ones we are
considering with regard to Uganda would be the code suggested by
the Quaker Oats Company :

A reasonable and practical standard of ethicsl behavior

in business decisions and actions is that which would
not be embarrassing to you , your family , or our com
pany if it were revealed publicly and , more fundamen
tally , that behavior which would seem right to those
who live by the best standards and moralities .

I noted with interest some recent press reports that Bell Helicopter
Textron and Page Airways were both being investigated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for their sales practices abroad .
of particular interest was an account that Page Airways did not
report to their stock holders any of that company's dealings with
the Idi Amin regime.

My questions to Bell last November were met with blanket assurances

that nothing illegal had transpired . As unconvinced as I was then
that compliance with simple legal technicalities was the only relevant
issue , I am similarly unconvinced today that no further investigation
is needed to see if any attempts were made to circumvent the law .
Whether or not there was a direct violation of the law , it appears
there was purposeful action to thwart United States foreign policies ,
not the least of these policies being a commitment to human rights .
A flagrant disregard for direct appeals from the State Department,
explicitly made in the national interest , compels Congress to legis
late in areas where most well - intentioned citizens would expect
personal discretion to suffice . Any corporation which attempts to
turn discretion into license , requiring an act of Congress before re
sponding to its government's appeals , must bear responsibility for
the inevitable result-- increased government regulation of the busi
ness sector .
I would like to include in the record at this point some of the
documents relating to our efforts to terminate the Ugandan pilot
training last November which include Bell's responses to questions
asked at that time .

The questions I now wish to have answered by Bell are these :

1- Are any Ugandnas presently being trained at any Bell facility or
by any Bell employees or subcontracting agents?
2 What is Bell's relationship with the Acme and Oak Grove flying
schools ?
 1

314

3 Referring to Mr. Galerstein's testimony of April 6 , 1978, when it

was stated that Bell does not consider that it has any individual
qualified to comment on the matters involving the impact and
value of Bell's trade upon the government of Uganda , does this
not create a false impression if it is meant to imply that Bell's
sales agents do not have knowledge of the value , either polit
ically or militarily , of the product they sell ?
4
Does Bell ordinarily , either through its own employees or con
tract agents , provide any information to prospective clients
concerning local or international political conditions which might
be affected by the strategic use of Bell helicopters?
5 in the course of a sales presentation to any Ugandan government
representatives, have Bell's sales representatives ever described
how Bell helicopters might be used to meet Idi Amin's specific
needs, either in terms of a possible internal uprising or in rela
tion to Uganda's national defense ? ( 1 mean this question to cover
any such information that might be euphemistically presented ,
but , nevertheless , covers the same basic substance . )
6 What role did Bell play in helping Ugandans secure their visas
into the United States for helicopter training ?
7- Does any facet of Bell's sales promotion include any promises of
help in securing visas into the United States for helicopter flight
or technical training?
8 What was Bell's basis for referring to the Ugandan trainees pre
sent at Bell's facility last November as "police , air wing ? "
9 Do Bell's employees or agents who have worked in Uganda have
any knowledge of how the Bell helicopters are used by Idi Amin?
For example, could these employees tell whether or not the heli
copters are being used for civilian humanitarian purposes , as was
implied by representatives of the Oak Grove flying school, or
whether they are being used by the military to help suppress
the civilian population of Uganda? Would such information be im
portant to the directors of Bell ?

10- To what extent has the United States government cooperated in

the development of the Bell Model 212 and 214 helicopters?
11 - How many Bell Model 212 and 214 helicopters have been sold to
the United States Department of Defense as of January 1 , 1978 ?
12- Is it any help in promoting the sale of these helicopters for Bell
to be able to arrange flight training through the Acme School of
Aeronautics when Acme's promotional literature. ( on page 6 ) re
fers to an instruction program " adjusted to your special needs, "
or promises ( on page 1 ) " the quickest , easiest way to pass both
of your FAA mechanical written exams," or offers training (on
page 14 ) in "military competency ? "
13- Have any of Bell's agents or sales personnel ever distributed any
of Acme's flight instruction literature to prospective buyers of
Bell's helicopters?
 315

14- Referring to the chart on page 2 of Mr. Galerstein's testimony ,

would Bell also indicate for the record the quantity and value of
helicopters and spare parts that have been sold to Uganda in
the same period of time through any of Bell's foreign licensees
( including Bell -Agusta ) through which sales profit or revenue
was derived for Bell Helicopter Textron ?
15- in Bell's prepared testimony , reference was made to a helicopter
accident in 1977. Could Bell provide additional information about
the circumstances of that accident, such as how it happened and
what the helicopter was being used for at the time?
16- Has Bell trained , or arranged training , through any of its sub
contractors or agents , for any Ugandan mechanics who would
then be able , as a result of such training , to repair airframes
or other portions of Bell manufactured helicopters that might be
damaged by gun fire or other military action ?
17- Under the training paragraph on page 4 of Mr. Galerstein's
testimony , reference is made to refresher training for 10 pilots
and Il mechanics . Is the aggregate total of 21 Ugandans an ac
curate reflection of the number of Ugandan government personnel
which Bell assisted in securing training in the United States
since Idi Amin came to power in 1971 ?
18- Does that figure ( referred to in the previous question ) of 21
Ugandans include the three Ugandans who sought training at
Bell's subcontractor , Avco - Lycoming of Stratford , Connetcicut ,
but were denied that training by the Department of Defense on
national security grounds ?
19- Have any Bell employees or contract agents , through Bell Heli
copter Textron or any of its foreign licensees or subsidiaries ,
ever serviced or flown any Bell helicopters, owned by the Ugan
dan government or any Ugandans, during , or in connection with ,
any military , para-military or " police action ? " If so , would Beli
please describe such circumstances in detail ?

25-826 0 - 78 - 21
 316

JIM MATTOX / GWA / 1030391

NOVEMBER 10 , 1977
WASHINGTON , D.C.
HONORABLE BROCK ADAMS
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DEPARIMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
400 SEVENTH STREET , S.W.
WASHINGTON , D.C. 20590

DEAR SECRETARY ADAMS :

IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT A NUMBER OF UGANDANS ARE RECEIVING TRAINING FROM
PRIVATE FIRMS IN THIS COUNTRY AND ANTICIPATE CERTIFICATION AS AIRMEN BY THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION . CERTIFICATION BY THE FAA IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED STATUS
WHICH CAN ONLY BENEFIT THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE CURRENT UGANDAN REGIME OF
TERROR UNDER DI AMIN IF HIS POLICE FORCE AND OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN
THIS COUNTRY COMPLETE THEIR TRAINING AND RECEIVE CERTIFICATES .
IN LIGHT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S STRONG STAND FOR THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHIS
AND THE VICIOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIMAN DIGNITY WAGED BY THE CURRENT REGIME IN UGANDA ,
IT SEEMS TO ME COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POLICY TO , IN ANY WAY, AID AND
FURTHERTHE INTENTIONS OF THE UGANDAN DICTATOR .
FURIHER , THE EFFORTS OF OUR STATE DEPARIMENT AND THE OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED IN
SEEKING A SPEEDY RETURN OF THE UGANDANS TO THEIR HOME WITHOUT THE BENEFITS OF AMERICAN
EXPERTISE , TRAINING AND IMPLICIT AID CAN ONLY BE HASTENED IF CERTIFICATION BY THE FAA
IS NOT A POSSIBILITY .
THEREFORE , I REQUEST THAT YOU UTILIZE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 602 OF THE FAA
ACT, ALSO STYLED 49 USC 14-22 PAR . B, AND GIVE ADVANCE WORD THAT NONE OF THE UGANDANS
IN THIS COUNIRY RECEIVING TRAINING AS PILOTS , MECHANICS OR ANY OTHER AVIATION - RELATED
CAPACITIES WILL NOT RECEIVE THE DISTRED CERTIFICATION BY THE FAA . MY REQUEST IS MADE IN
REFERENCE TO ALL MEMBERS OF ANY UGANDAN ARMED FORCES WHO HAVE THE INIENT TO RETURN TO
UGANDA AND SERVE THE REGIME OF IDI AMIN , AND , SPECIFICALLY, TO A GROUP OF 27 WHO RE
CEIVED VISAS TO ENTER THIS COUNTRY ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1977. I.WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE
YOU WITH A LIST OF NAMES IF NECESSARY .

JIM MATTOX, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 317

TRA
NSP
TMAERTML

ORT
NT

OF
DEP

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

UN

A
IC
IT

ER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

ED

AM

STATE OF
S

Honorable James A. Mattox

House of Representatives
Washington , D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Mattox :

I have carefully considered your telegram of November 10 , 1977 ,

in which you asked that I give advance word that none of the
Ugandan citizens receiving airman training in this country will
receive certification by the Federal Aviation Administration
( FAA ) . You believe that such an action on my part would be
consistent with this Administration's stand on human rights .

This Department fully supports The President's position on

human rights . I have now been advised by the Deputy Secretary
of State that it would be in furtherance of United States
foreign policy objectives if , in the case of the specific
group of Ugandan helicopter pilots and mechanics to which
your telegram has reference , the statutory discretion to
prohibit issuance of airman certificates were exercised .

Accordingly , pursuant to Section 602 of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958 , the FAA will not issue airman certificates to
that group of Ugandan personnel.
Sincerely ,

Broch
Brock Adams
laurs

+
 318

[ From the Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1977 ]

U.S. SEEKS END TO UGANDA PILOT TRAINING 1

CU.S.
( Seeks End to Uganda Pilot Training
tacted the American firms and " reit.
Asociated Press
The State Department said yester
day it is trying to halt the training of
Ugandan pilots in the United States
.by urging U.S. firms to voluntarily
end Ugandans' training.
“The process of revoking the visas
takes longer than the training itself,"
State Department spokesman Hod
ding Carter III said in explaining
why the government does not revoke
the visas and order the Ugandans
to leave the country . He said the
training , believed to involve several
dozen Ugandans at various sites, is
scheduled to end by the close of the
year.
Carter said the department has con
erated our request that these pro
grams be ended . " He said the depart
ment believes that " certain steps are
being taken or will be taken by some
companies. We are not certain what
other firms will do ."
The spokesman said a refresher
course being taken by a dozen Ugan
dan pilots at the Bell Helicopter
School in Fort Worth, Tex ., ended
last Friday,
He said other training programs
are being conducted at two aviation
schools in the Dallas- Fort Worth area ,
Oak Grove and ACME , and at the
Lycoming Division of AVCO in Con
necticut.

1 Reprinted with the permission of the Associated Press.

 319
[ From the Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 3, 1977]
FAA TO WITHHOLD U.S. CERTIFICATION FROM UGANDANS TRAINING AS PILOTS 1
FAA to withhold U.S. certification
from Ugandans training as pilots .
By ROY E, BODE
Timos Herold Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - The State Depart
ment said Friday the Federal Aviation
Administration has agreed to withhold
certification of Ugandans training as he
licopter pilots and mechanics in Texas, a
decision that may end their American
study.
Richard Moose, assistant secretary of
Slate for African affairs, said one of the
schools providing instruction under the
auspices of Bell Helicopter has now
agreed to halt the program . The other
has not yet contacted the government.
Executives of the Bell subcontractors
the Oak Grove Flying School and the
Acme Flying School, both near Fort
Worth – could not be reached for com ..
ment late Friday.
Although lack of FAA certification :
would not prevent the Ugandans from
engaging in aviation in their native
country , Moose said the subcontractors
had , informally indicated that they
would drop the students if the govern .
withheld such accreditation .
Rep . Jim Mattox, a Dallas Democrat
who has sought discontinuance of the
training programs, has scheduled a
news conference today to discuss what
was described as “an important develop
ment. "
1 Reprinted with the permission of the Dallas Times Herald .
Mattox and other critics are disturbed
because the Ugandans are apparently
members of Ugandan dictator · Idi
Amin's police force. Amin has perpet
uated his regime with a reign of terror
and reported genocide.
A Siate Department press spokesman
said the FAA was asked to withhold
certification for the students on " politi
cal grounds."
“ We think training these people is in
consistent with our support of human
-rights throughout the world , ” he said .
“ We cannot forceably end the training
programs, but we have taken this step
to encourage their discontinuance . " ;
Bell was providing training at its
plant and through the subcontractors as
part of an agreement involving the sale
of helicopters to the East African nation
in 1971.
Since the present program came to
national attention several weeks ago,
the government has taken other steps
aimed at restricting commerce with
Amin . Last week, the State Depart
ment's office of munitions control de
nied export licenses to Bell and the
Boeing Co.
Bell had planned to sell three helicóp
ters to the Ugandans, and Boeing in
tended to sell a Boeing 707. Resolutions
calling for a suspension of American
trade with the country have also been
1
STRIP IN
 320

[ From the Dallas Morning News, Sunday, Dec. 4, 1977 ]

UGANDAN PILOTS ' TRAINING IN FORT WORTH SUSPENDED 1

Ugandan pilots' training

richep in [from
GetSter
Sunday,December4, 1977] CheDallas Morning Newey?
in Fort Worth suspended **This training is not likely to said. "All they do is react. They never
By BARRY BOESCH
The training of nine Ugandan pilots improve their skills as mechanics,” plan ahead."
at a private Fort Worth airport has Shoemate said. “ I would assume they He refused to blame the Carter
been terminated following a written would probably terminate (the administration ,however, saying Carter
reqiiest from theU.S. State Department program )." has not had enough time to transform
and notification from the Federal Avia The Ugandan mechanics were the StateDepartment to his policies.
tion Adminis tration d
ihat it hasrefused expecte to complet e their trainin g in Spinks and Shoemate also criticized
to certify the training. U.S. Rep . Jim a week to 10 days, Shoemate said . the handling of theUgandan affair.
Mattox said Saturday.
M.H. " Pappy " Spinks, owner of Oak SPINKS SAID the Ugandan pilots had " I RECEIVED notification from the
GroveAirport, confirmed Saturdayhe completed their ground schooltrain State Departmenthatthey were mail
refused
dans tocontinue
after trainingbythehand
Mattox delivered Ugan- ingand
a their FAAwerein
writtenthe
testsprocess
when oftaking
the noti ingthe written request,"Spinks said .
" I don't see why we're spending our
written request from the State Depart. fication came. tax money for our congressmen to play
ment. The pilots would have undergone mail carrier," he said, referring to
! Spinks said be notified the Ugan- about nine hoursofflightchecks Mattox personal delivery of the
dans Friday afternoon. “ They were not before they took their FAA flying test, request.
surprised ," he said . Spinks said. " The State Department request
Spokesmen for Acme School of Aero- Employees at the hotels where the clearly says it has no official or legal
nautics atMeacham Field in Port dans Ugandans are staying said the Ugan- grounds ( 10 order cessation of
Worth , which received similar notices, had not checked out nor indi- training )." Shoemate said . “ All they'd
said it would continue training six cated any plans,to leave. have to do is revoke their visas or initi
Ugandan mechanics, if they wished to Mattox said the FAA never has, ate the revocation and that would be a
receive the instruction . exercised its power to refuse certifica- signal to cease training.
Foy Shoemate, manager of the tion to foreign pilots until the Ugandan " But they're asking us to implement
school, said he received the State situation. foreign policy on our own volition,"
Department request from Mattox and
separate notification from the FAA The East Dallas congressman said Shoemate said..
The State Department rejected the
"late Friday afternoon . " he is drafting legislation to bar citizens idea of revoking the Ugandans visas
of foreign countries thathave a history ! because of the lengthy legal process of
SHOEMATE SAJD the FAA notice of " continuous violation of human deportation .
came too late to notify the Ugandans rights " from training in the United Mattox said he has joined in spon.
Friday . States. soring a resolution introduced by two
The Ugandans had been undergoing HE SAID the North Texas region has other congressmen to close Uganda's
the currenttraining to help themgain become a "centerof trainingforfor embassy in the United States. The reso
PAA certification. They completed eign pilots of many countries who have lution was introduced last Thursday by
Night andBellmaintenance
grams at training
Helicopter two pro continuouslyviolatedhuman rights."
weeks ago. Reps. Don Bonker.D -Wash ., and Don
Mattox said the handling of the Pease, D -Ohio.
The FAA's
Ugandans eliminates to certify
refusal the reason the
for Ugandan situation by the State Depart The resolution should receive a
them tocontinue training at Meacham ment is “ symbolic." hearing sometime shortly after Con.
Field , Mattox said at a news confer- " Our State Department has no con- gress resumes session in January.
ence . sistent policy on these matters," he

1 Reprinted with the permission of the Dallas Morning News.

 321

Bell Helicopter TEXTRON

Bell Helicopter Textron Post Office Box 482

Division of Textron Inc. Fort Worth ,Texas 76101
(817) 280-3221
George Galerstein
Chief Legal.Counsel 12 May 1978

Congressman James A. Mattox

U.S. House of Representatives
Room 707
House Office Building , Annex #1
Washington , D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Mattox :

As promised , I am providing you with written answers to the

questions that you have submitted to Bell Helicopter Textron .

First , however , to put the situation of last November , from

which our apparent differences evolved , in proper context , let me
review the situation as it developed :

Shortly after a crash of one of Uganda's Model 212 helicopters ,

we received a request from the Government of Uganda for a Bell
representative to visit them to discuss the purchase of a replace
ment helicopter and the further training of their pilots and
mechanics . The Ugandans had investigated the accident and had
determined that the cause was pilot error , from which arose con
cern that their pilots and mechanics needed additional training and
updating . These pilots and mechanics had been originally trained
in countries other than the United States . The Ugandans expressed
the desire for training that would enable their pilots and mechanics
to obtain licenses from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
in the belief (correct , in our opinion) that such trained pilots
and mechanics would provide the greatest degree of flight safety .
Bell submitted a Purchase Order for a Model 214 helicopter
(replacement for the crashed helicopter) which was accepted by
Uganda and advance payment was subsequently received . We applied
to the Department of Commerce for a license to export this heli
copter to Úganda . Concurrently , we prepared a training schedule
 322

which would enable the Ugandan pilots to obtain FAA licenses . Bell
Helicopter does not provide this type of training (we provide only
what is identified as " transition " training . This type of training
teaches a pilot how to fly a different model helicopter from the
ones he has already learned to fly , but does not involve obtaining
an FAA license) . For this reason , arrangements were made for the
Ugandans to take part of their training at Acme and Oak Grove Flight
Schools which offer flight training for FAA licensing . The schedule ,
including dates , cost and content , was submitted to Uganda and
accepted , and the Ugandans arrived at Bell on the scheduled start
date .

1
Shortly thereafter , the matter attracted national attention and
you had several conversations with our President , James F. Atkins ,
regarding discontinuance of the training . You will recall that Mr.
Atkins told you that we would do whatever the United States Government
directed us to do . Mr. Atkins then had conversations with an official
of the U.S. Government. Mr. Atkins stated to him that Bell was per
fectly willing to discontinue training of the Ugandans if that was
actually the desire of the United States Government , and he requested
a directive to that effect . That directive was not forthcoming.

In November , 1977 , we received notice from the Department of

Commerce that the license to export the Model 214 was not approved ,
whereupon we advised the Government of Uganda that the sale could
not be made and returned the advance payment .
In your statement you note that there have been many unanswered
questions regarding the training of Idi Amin's military personnel
in your own community in Texas . You state that you made a very
intensive effort to seek out these answers on a personal basis with
officials of Bell Helicopter Textron and that the persons were less
' than enlightening and in some cases appeared to be less than candid .
You also observe that you have received two contradictory responses
regarding subcontracting relationships between Bell and Acme and
Oak Grove flying schools .

As you know , I was not involved in your previous discussions

with Bell , and it would serve no purpose for us to here rehash the
questions you asked and the answers you received in an attempt to
determine whether the responses were contradictory , less than candid
or less than enlightening , although , in any event , I am certain
that they were not intended to be so . Let us put that matter behind
us and , as I have stated , we will answer your questions as honestly
and forthrightly as possible . There will be no attempt to hide or
avoid direct response .
 323

Again , before answering your questions , in the interest of

improving communications and understanding between us , permit me to
take the liberty of responding to the statement that accompanied
your questions . You point out in your statement that :
"There is a lot more to keeping this country
strong and prosperous than gross receipts
and increased sales . We must not allow our
people's higher ideals to be tortured to death
by a twisted logic that would construe any
questioning of corporate conduct as an attack
on the free enterprise system ."

We agree with this entirely . I know of nobody in a position of

influence at Bell who would argue otherwise. Corporate conduct
should not be judged alone by gross receipts and increased sales
any more than political conduct should be judged alone by votes
and election victories . Corporate conduct , like political conduct ,
should and must be subjected to intense questioning that need not
be construed as an attack on the free enterprise system .
contrary , experience has shown us that questioning of corporate
conduct and the laws that have followed thereon , have contributed
in many cases to the health of the free enterprise system , and I
cite as examples the various anti-trust and anti - discrimination
laws .

All of this is , to us , evident . It is just as evident that

there can be honest differences of opinion with regard to the
manner in which corporate responsibility should be exercised
specifically , whether a corporation engaged in the important
national - interest occupation of the manufacture and sale of
aircraft , should follow the lead of the government as presented
by laws promulgated by Congress and the Administration and
implementing regulations of the Department of State , or should
act independently thereof , based upon its private considerations
and determinations. The issue is not simply the suppression of
human rights in a foreign country , although much of this in
various countries around the world , including what is reported
to have occurred in Uganda , is certainly unbearable and repugnant
to every one of us . There is also a genuine issue as to whether
these matters are best contested by each of us , person or business
organization, on an individual basis , following the dictates of
our social and moral views , or whether they must be contested as
a matter of declared national policy reflected in applicable laws
and regulations .
 324

As to Bell , you have stated , unfairly I believe , that :

"Whether or not there was a direct violation of

the law , it appears there was purposeful action
to thwart United States foreign policies , not
the least of these policies being a commitment
to human rights .

Certainly , you must concede that there is no established United States

foreign policy toward Uganda . While I do not criticize your call
to cease doing business with Uganda , U.S. foreign policy neither directs
nor calls for such a course of action . It is , in fact , opposed to such
a course of action . On this point , I refer you to the attached article
from the May 13 , 1978 issue of New Republic , entitled "Another Cup of
Coffee" ( attached hereto) which states :

( 1 ) that the House International Relations Committee has

watered the proposed legislation by Ohio's Representative Pease ,
which would stop all exports into Uganda , into a " pasty , nonbinding
resolution " , and

( 2) that the Administration opposes Representative Pease's

proposed legislation because it considers that " economics and politics
shouldn't mix " , and the United States " does not want to mix morality
with money , apparently for fear that other countries will start doing
the same" .

I listened with interest on April 6 , 1978 to the statement of

Congressman De La Garza of the Joint Committee, who welcomed his
fellow committee members to the fight against Idi Amin and , in so
doing , clearly chastized them for having ignored his pleas over the
past 5 or 6 years that Congress take some action against Amin . Where
was the United States foreign policy to which you refer ?
members of Congress purposefully thwart it by their inaction over
these 5 or 6 years? I think not - any more than Bell purposefully
thwarted it .

I also listened with interest to Senator Hatfield of Oregon

urge that coffee trade with Uganda be cut off , an action which he
contends would be the most effective action that could be taken
against the Amin regime . I heard one of the committee members
inform Senator Hatfield that an Administration representative had
testified in opposition to boycotting Uganda , and heard the Senator
explain this away on the grounds that the Administration probably
resented the Congressional interference with foreign policy ( if
true , consider the resentment that would be forthcoming against
" interference " by an individual or company ) , that the matter was
 325

indeed profound , and that the Administration had to consider its

military , political and economic objectives . In opposing what Senator
Hatfield characterizes as the most effective action that could be taken
against Amin , would you say that the Administration was purposefully
thwarting its own foreign policy? Again , I think not .

What is the point of all of this ? It is that while you may be

correct in your contention that helicopters and coffee should not be
sold to or purchased from Uganda , this is clearly not United States
foreign policy . While it may be the foreign policy that many of us
would like to see , it is clearly not present United States foreign
policy . Until Congress and the Administration make it our foreign
policy , which they certainly have the power and , according to many ,
the obligation to do , with one stroke of the pen , so to speak, it is
unfair to make industry a whipping boy over its absence . As I stated
in my presentation to the Joint Committee , United States foreign
policy must , in these matters , subsume the particular interest or
desires of business institutions and must lead the way , as it has
done in anti - trust matters , anti - discrimination , etc.
Further , your observation that :

"Any corporation which attempts to turn discretion

into license , requiring an act of Congress before
responding to the government's appeals , must bear
responsibility for the inevitable result -- increased
government regulation of the business sector " --

is not appropriate in a situation such as this where the overriding

issue is United States foreign policy with all of its ramifications
and where government leadership is not only advisable but is necessary
as the only effective means to pursue a desired end.. Nobody should
reasonably object to government regulation in a field in which it is
the only means of effectively dealing with the problem at issue .
I hope that you will accept my unsolicited and lengthy rejoinder
to your statement in the same spirit that I accept your statement - as
an expression of one who is concerned with the dignity of all human
beings no matter where they may reside , nor the color of their skin ,
nor any other factor .

Finally , I respond to your questions :

(1) Q. Are any Ugandans presently being trained at any Bell
facility or by any Bell employees or subcontracting
agents

A. No.
 326

(2) Q. What is Bell's relationship with the Acme and Oak Grove
flying schools ?

A. Acme and Oak Grove flying schools have no relation

ship with Bell other than as flight training
schools to whom we sometimes refer pilots for the
type of flight training that Bell does not provide .

( 3) Q. Referring to Mr. Galerstein's testimony of April 6 , 1978 ,

when it was stated that Bell does not consider that it
has any individual qualtified to comment on the matters
involving the impact and value of Bell's trade upon the
government of Uganda , does this not create a false
impression if it is meant to imply that Bell's sales
agents do not have knowledge of the value , either polit
ically or militarily , of the product they sell ?
A. My testimony to the effect that Bell does not
consider that it does not have any individual
qualified to comment on the matters involving
the impact and value of Bell's trade upon the
government of Uganda was not intended to create
any false impression . I cannot understand how
one can obtain from the question as posed :

"What is your assessment of the impact

and value of this trade upon the govern
ment of Uganda? Upon the general
population of Uganda?

and my answer :

" We do not consider that we have any

individual qualified to comment on the
matters involving the impact and value
of our trade upon the Government of
Uganda or upon the general population of
Uganda , nor to provide an assessment of
the political and social situation in Uganda ..."
the possibility of an intended implication that
Bell's sales agents do not have knowledge of the
value , either politically or militarily , of the
product they sell . This was not the thrust of
the question as anyone must reasonably conclude .
The question was concerned with broad economic
issues , not the obvious matter of whether Bell's
sales agents would know that helicopters may be of
value , politically or militarily , depending upon
 327

the way in which they are used . I might better

and more accurately have responded that the impact
and value of our trade upon the Government of Uganda
and upon the population of Uganda had been
insignificant .

(4 ) l. Does Bell ordinarily , either through its own employees or

contract agents , provide any information to prospective
clients concerning local or international political
conditions which might be affected by the strategic use
of Bell helicopters ?

Bell does not , either through its own employees

or contract agents , provide information to prospective
clients concerning local or international political
conditions which might be affected by the strategic
use of Bell helicopters . In the absence of a more
straightforward question , I must assume , in the con
text of this subject , that you are asking whether Bell ,
through its employees or contract agents , advised Idi
Amin on how he could better perpetuate himself in
power through the use of Bell helicopters . The answer
is NO .

(5 ) Q. In the course of a sales presentation to any Ugandan

government representatives , have Bell's sales representa
tives ever described how Bell helicopters might be used
to meet Idi Amin's specific needs , either in terms of a
possible internal uprising or in relation to Uganda's
national defense ? (I mean this question to cover any
such information that might be euphemistically presented ,
but , nevertheless , covers the same basic substance . )
" A. No.

( 6) Q. - What role did Bell play in helping Ugandans secure their

visas into the United States for helicopter training ?
A. None .

(7) Q. Does any facet of Bell's sales promotion include any

promises of help in securing visas into the United States
for helicopter flight or technical training?

A. No.
1

1
 328

( 8) Q. What was Bell's basis for referring to the Ugandan trainees

present at Bell's facility last November as " police ,
air wing? "

A. The basis for referring to the Ugandan trainees as

" Police Air Wing " was the fact that it was the
" Police Air Wing " of Uganda with whom Bell con
tracted and it was assumed that the trainees were
part of the organization with whom we had con
tracted .

( 9) Q. Do Bell's employees or agents who have worked in Uganda

have any knowledge of how the Bell helicopters are used
by Idi Amin ? For example , could these employees tell
whether or not the helicopters are being used for civilian
humanitarian purposes , as was implied by representatives
of the Oak Grove flying school , or whether they are being
used by the military to help suppress the civilian popu
lation of Uganda ? Would such information be important
to the directors of Bell?

A. Insofar as I have been able to determine from

Bell personnel who would be most familiar with the
manner in which these helicopters were used , they
were not aware and had never heard either from
-

other Bell personnel or Ugandan pilots or mechanics ,

that the helicopters were being used in military
operations , including the suppression of the
population . This is not to say or imply that we
know that these helicopters were not used for these
purposes ; they may have been . It is simply to
inform you that Bell personnel were not aware of
such usage .

At the time of the sale of the helicopters to

Uganda in 1971 , it was represented to us that they
would be used for the following purposes :

(a) Transportation of government officials

and- district officers to outlying villages
and communities .

(b) Ambulance and flood relief work ; to transport

doctors and medical services to otherwise
inaccessible remote areas . Accordingly ,
the helicopters were provided with stretcher
kits .
 329

(c) Assignment to the International Airport on the

edge of Lake Victoria for the purpose of rescue
work in the event of a crash of fixed wing air
craft using the airport . Accordingly , floatation
kits were provided for this purpose .

Information on the usage of the helicopters would be

important to the directors of Bell and could well
be a determining factor in whether the sale would
be made .

( 10) Q. To what extent has the United States government cooperated

in the development of the Bell Model 212 and 214 helicopters ?

A. The Models 212 and 214 were developed at Bell's

expense and were not developed in cooperation with
the United States government. However , although
there are many and significant differences between
the Model 212 and the UH - 1 (Huey) models developed
for the U.S. government , it is fair to say that the
Model 212 owes a good portion of its development
to our work on the various UH - 1 models .

( 11 ) Q. How many Bell Model 212 and 214 helicopters have been sold
to the United States Department of Defense as of January 1 ,
1978 ?

A. No Model 212 or 214 helicopters have been sold to the

United States government .

( 12) Q. Is it any help in promoting the sale of these helicopters

for Bell to be able to arrange flight training through the
Acme School of Aeronautics when Acme's promotional literature
( on page 6) refers to an instrument program " adjusted to
your special needs " , or promises (on page 7) " the quickest ,
easiest way to pass both of your FAA mechanical written
exams" , or offers training (on page 14) in " Military
competency ? "
A. None whatsoever .
 330

( 13) Q. Have any of Bell's agents or sales personnel ever dix

tributed any of Acme's flight instruction literature to
prospective buyers of Bell's helicopters?
A. Bell's agents or sales personnel have not ever
distributed any of Acme's flight instruction or
literature for the purpose of inducing the purchase
of Bell helicopters . However , in connection with
the training of Ugandan personnel last November to
obtain FAA licenses , literature of Acme was given
by Bell to the Uganda Police Air Wing .

( 14 ) Q. Referring to the chart on page 2 of Mr. Galerstein's

testimony , would Bell also indicate for the record the
quantity and value of helicopters and spare parts that
have been sold to Uganda in the same period of time
through any of Bell's foreign licenses ( including Bell
Agusta ) through which sales profit or revenue was
derived for Bell Helicopter Textron ?
A. According to our records which are provided to
us on a regular basis by the Italian firm of
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta under
the terms of our license agreement with them ,
Agusta sold 8 helicopters to Uganda in 1972 ,
1 in 1973 , and none since then .
We are not able to determine the extent of sales
of spare parts by Agusta to Uganda as it is not
reported to us by country . Although it does not
necessarily follow , since spare parts purchased
from either Bell or Agusta can be used on Bell
designed helicopters purchased from either , inasmuch
as Bell sold 8 helicopters to Uganda during the
period of 1969-1971 and spare parts sales by Bell
have amounted to less than $ 1 million , it can be
estimated that spare parts sales by Agusta to Uganda
were also less than $ 1 million. You should under
stand that our license agreements with Agusta
require them to adhere to all applicable U.S.
Department of State Regulations , including the
prohibition of sales to any country when so
directed by the Department of State .
 331

( 15 ) Q. In Bell's prepared testimony , reference was made to a

helicopter accident in 1977. Could Bell provide addi
tional information about the circumstances of that
accident , such as how it happened and what the heli
copter was being used for at the time?
A. The accident referred to in my testimony occurred
on July 14 , 1977. The pilot , a member of the
Uganda Police Air Wing , with one passenger , a
radio operator , was flying at night under severe
weather conditions , and crashed near the Akokoro
Mountains , West Acholi District . From the crash
evidence it appeared that the pilot may have been
attempting a landing or was making a low pass to
determine his precise position and was unaware of
his proximity to the ground . We were advised that
the cause was ruled as pilot error . We were not
provided with a copy of the "Board of Inquiry Report" .
The full extent of our information with regard to
what the helicopter was being used for at the time
is that it was on an " authorized mission " .

( 16) Q. Has Bell trained , or arranged training , through any of its

subcontractors or agents , for any Ugandan mechanics who
would then be able , as a result of such training , to
repair airframes or other portions of Bell manufactured
helicopters that might be damaged by gun fire or other
military action ?

A. Naturally, a mechanic that has been trained to work

on a helicopter will be able to make repairs , de
pending upon the extent of the damage , regardless
of whether the damage has been inflicted as a result
of civil or military action .

( 17 ) Q. Under the training paragraph on page 4 of Mr. Galerstein's

testimony , reference is made to refresher training for
10 pilots and 11 mechanics . Is the aggregate total of 21
Ugandans an accurate reflection of the number of Ugandan

25-826 O - 78 - 22
 332

government personnel which Bell assisted in securing

training in the United States since Idi Amin came to
power in 1971 ?

A. The total number of Ugandans which Bell has

assisted in training or securing training in the
United States since Idi Amin came to power in
1971 is 31 ; 17 mechanics and 14 pilots . This
includes the 10 pilots and 11 mechanics that
were here in late 1977 .

( 18) l . Does that figure (referred to in the previous question)

of 21 Ugandans include the 3 Ugandans who sought training
at Bell's subcontractor , Avoc - Lycoming of Stratford ,
Connecticut , but were denied that training by the Depart
ment of Defense on national security grounds ?

A. Yes .

( 19) Q. Have any Bell employees or contract agents , through

Bell Helicopter Textron or any of its foreign licensees
or subsidiaries , ever serviced or flown any Bell heli
copters , owned by the Ugandan - government or any Ugandans ,
during , or in connection with , any military , para -military
or " police action ? " If so , would Bell please describe
such circumstances in detail?

A. No ..

To the best of my knowledge and belief , these answers are

accurate and complete. If , at any time , you have knowledge to
the contrary , please advise me and , if you are correct , I will be
pleased to amend the answers accordingly . Also , if you wish
to have more information , please contact me .

Very truly yours ,

Wh
George Galers teinethin

[ From the New Republic, May 13, 1978 ]
ANOTHER CUP OF COFFEE 1
Another Cup of Coffee
Did you watch Holocaust and wonder anew how the
United States could have stood by and done nothing
while the Nazis destroyed the Jews ofEurope? Did you
wish that you had been old enough then, or powerful
enough or aware enough to have protested, to have
used influence, to have done anything to make your
government take action ? Well, the parallels are not
exact, as they seldom are, but right now innocent
people are being butchered regularly in Uganda.
Something between 100,000 and 300,000 people have
been killed since Idi Amin seized power in 1971. Your
government isn't exactly silent about this; it protests
Amin's " human rights violations" in all the proper
diplomatic forums. But the United States has a simple
and truly effective weapon that it could use against
Amin. We don't have to bomb Kampala, or send troops
or even employ a CIA assassination squad. All we have
to do is boycott Ugandan coffee. The Carter ad-
ministration is against a Ugandan coffee boycott. It has
its reasons, but so did the Roosevelt administration at
the time of the Holocaust.
Idi Amin is a member of a minority tribe and a
minority religion in Uganda. He has no popular
support. He rules by terror. He kills anyone he does not
like. His agents are army officers whose loyalty he
keeps by delegating to them the right to kill anyone
they do not like, but keeping them in guns and
ammunition and by bribing them with luxury items
bought abroad. This is Amin's vulnerability: he has so
completely wrecked the Ugandan economy that his
country's one source ofhard currency from abroad is its
coffee exports, which amounted to $750 million in
1977. Without these exports, Aminwould lose his chief
means of keeping his henchmen in line. There is a good
chance that an effective coffee boycott would spell the
end of Idi Amin.
Even a boycott by the US alone would have impact.
a
The United States is the largest importer of Ugandan
coffee, accounting for one-third of Amin's coffee
income. The other big buyers all are Western European
1 Reprinted with the permission of the New Republic.
333
nations, the largest being Great Britain. Some State
Department officials argue that a US boycott would not
be effective, since the Europeans would not join; and
that even if they did, the Soviet Union and Libya would
keep Amin propped up. Well, we find this no excuse at
all. The only way to get the Europeans to join a boycott
is to start one and shame them into joining. The US
boycott alone would give Amin a sharp jolt. If theSoviet
Union and Libya want to add to their reputations a
credential as the world's sole guarantors of Idi Amin, let
them. As matters stand, the United States in effect is
joining them.
It is hard for individual citizens to boycott Ugandan
coffee. It is used primarily as filler and as an ingredient
in instant coffee, and any brand might contain some of
it. In 1976 the two biggest purchasers were the Folger
Coffee Company and General Foods Corporation,
maker of Maxwell House. But the next two biggest
were Saks International Inc. and ACLI Sugar Com
pany, both of which are coffee brokers who sell what
they import to other companies. For аa boycott to be
effective, Americans would have to stop drinking
coffee entirely. But that does not make much sense,
since only about four percent of America's coffee comes
from Uganda. Any cup you drink might contain some
Ugandan coffee, but very little. That is why the
government should impose the boycott, and also why it
would be so easy. The price of coffee would not go up by
more than a few pennies a pound. There isn't even a
strong coffee lobby opposing the boycott. The chief
importers have told Congress they don't care if an
embargo is imposed; they just want a national policy
that will be imposed uniformly.
Representative Don J. Pease of Ohio has introduced
legislation to cut off coffee imports and also to stop US
exports to Uganda, which amounted to $14 million last
year, mainly for telecommunications equipment. The
Carter administration has opposed the Pease legisla
tion. Meeting jointly under the chairmanship of
Representative Charles Diggs, three subcommittees of
 >

334

the House International Relations Committee watered that it is up to public opinion to make them so. Surely,
Pease's bills into a pasty non-binding resolution calling there have to be limits to the amount of despotism ,
on President Carier to support economic measures brutality and oppression that this country and the
against Uganda . The full International Relations world can tolerate before taking action .Surely,Uganda
Committee is likely to approve this no-bite measure, has reached those limits. Some people will say that
but citizen pressure could cause the committee, or the South Africa has, too, or that the Soviet Union, or
House as a whole, to reconsider. Cambodia, or China justify equal sanctions. Perhaps
· The usual arguments against international economic they do. But these cases are more complex, or at least
boycotts for political reasons — that they don't work they are more controversial; and these are sturdy or
and that meanwhile they harm innocent citizens more independent economies that cannot bebrought down
than the offending government – don't apply in the easily or withoutmuch innocent suffering as a resultof
case of Uganda. Neither Carter administration officials a boycott. The fact that there is little we cando or
w

nor anti-embargo congressmen claim that Ugandan choose to do about the hard cases does not mean we
farmers would suffer more than Amin from a US should do nothing about the easy one. Let's start with
import cutoff. The Ugandan government buys - or : Uganda, then argue about the others at our leisure.
often seizes - coffee from the farmers and has a
monopoly on sales abroad. It is Amin who benefits from
coffee exports, and it is he who would be hurt directly
by the boycott
The administration's.. chief objection is that
economics and politics shouldn't mix.. As aa State
Department official put it, " Boycott actions are not
consistent with the principles of the General Agrée
ment on Tariffs and Trade, to which the United States
is committed as the basis for international commercial
relations. Whenever these principles are set aside, their
overall authority as a protection for our international
trade interests is undermined." The United States, as a.
world economic power, does not want to mix morality
with money, apparently for fear that other countries
will start doing thesame. This is a humbling argument,
to say the least.
Actually, the US government regularly makes two
exceptions to this rule. First, there are occasions when
Congress, the people and the executive branch are so
offended by a government's political philosophy that
commercestops being our first concern. Our boycotts !
against Cuba, Vietnam , Cambodia and Laos are
examples. Second, there are situations where the
United Nations says it is okay, as in the case of
Rhodesia.
Unfortunately, neither exception applies to Uganda
today. We will have to wait a very long time for the
United Nations to authorize sanctions against Uganda.
The UN majority is so possessed by anti-colonial
paranoia, so terrified of threatening third -world
solidarity, that it is willing to make a mockery of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although
some black African leaders publicly. abhor Amin, the
Africans as a whole are afraid to actagainst him, and so
the United Nations does not act either. Some figures in
the Carter administration and in Congress want to wait
for the Africans to take the lead in condemning Amin ,
but there seems little likelihood that will happen , ever.
At the moment, neither Congress nor the ad
ministration seems sufficiently aroused by the
butchery in Uganda tomake an exception to our free
trade principles. We submit that they oughtto be, and

1
 APPENDIX 6
FACTSHEET ON UNITED STATES - UGANDAN COMMERCIAL TRADE
Calendar Year 1976 :

The 0. s . imported 62,235 tons of green coffee from Uganda . The value
of the coffee was $176,747,400 computed from the International Coffee Organization
( ICO ) composite price .
The U. S. inported a total of 19,790,000 bags of green coffee in 1976 from
all over the world . of this total, approximately 942,955 bags were imported from
Uganda . This means that last year the U. s . got approximately 4.76 percent of its
coffee imports from Uganda .
In trade terms , the U. s . bought 33.6 percent of Uganda's coffee exports
in 1976. This represents 99 percent of the total U. s . imports from Uganda for last
year . In addition , 86 percent of Uganda's export earnings in 1976 came from coffee
exports. Thirty - three percent of Uganda's total export earnings in 1976 came from
coffee sales to the U. S.

Calendar Year 1977 :

The U. s . has imported 40,918 tons of green coffee from Uganda in the first
six months of this year , which is valued at $218,502,120 approximately (ICO composite
price ) .
There has been a significant increase in the volume of Ugandan coffee

imported by the u . s . this year . From January - June, 1976 , the U. s . imported
30,808 tons of green coffee from Uganda . In January - June , 1977 , the U. s . imported
40,918 tons . This represents approximately a 33 percent increase in Ugandan coffee
imports this year over the same period of time last year .

Trends :
Over the past seven years ( 1970-1977) the following things have been
happening :
1. Coffee exports have become a larger percentage of total Ugandan exports :
1970 - 58% 1974 - 66%
1971 -

59% 1975 - 76%

1972 61 % 1976 86%
1973 68 % Jan./Feb . 1977 - 93%

( 335 )
 336

Page Two

2. 0. s . imports as a percentage of total Ugandan exports has been growing, which

probably results from an increase in u . s . coffee imports of Ugandan coffee :
1971 - 22.34 1974 24.2%
1972 - 21.6% 1975 - 24.0%
1973 - 20.6% 1976 - 33.5%

3. Uganda's balance of trade improved significantly last year over previous

years due largely to an increase in U. S. coffee imports and a sharp rise in
coffee prices the world over .
Uganda's Balance of Trade : (millions of U. s . dollars )
1971 +44.3 .
1974 - +187.0
1972 - +148.4
-
1975 +167.2
1973 +203.1 1976 - +284.9

Summation :

U. S. coffee companies are now buying one - third of Uganda's green coffee
and providing approximately one-third of Uganda's total export earnings. The trends
cited above demonstrate that the situation is getting worse , not better .
Amin's hold on power is becoming more vulnerable to U.S. economic pressure .

It is Uganda's hard currency balance of trade surplus , much of it from U. s . coffee

imports , that permits Amin to import most of his military supplies and luxury goods
.

with which he maintains the support of his army and the dreaded State Research Bureau .
The following trade statistics show that a boycott organized by a few
countries could bring about real economic pressure ypon Amin .
Country-by -country Coffee Payments as Percentage of Total
· Export Earnings for Uganda in 1976
France - 6.1%

West Germany 3.5%

Japan 5.9%

Netherlands - 3.4%

U.K. 20.5%

U.S.A. 33.6 %

Total = 734

Sources : V. S. Census Burea , U. S. Department of Agriculture

U. S. Customs Service , International Coffee Organization
 APPENDIX 7
LETTER TO Hon. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM FROM A. H. MUNKENBECK ,
JR ., VICE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER, THE PERKIN -ELMER CORP .,
CONCERNING THE CORPORATION'S TRADE WITH UGANDA

April 4, 1978

Honorable Jonathan B. Bingham

Chairman
Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade
House of Representatives
Washington , D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Bingham :

This is in reference to your letter of March 17 to
Mr. Robert H. Sorensen, President of The Perkin - Elmer
Corporation , concerning proposed hearings by your sub
committee on April 6 on United States -Uganda relations .
As a result of discussions with a member of your staff,
Ms. Paula Belknap , it appears that the historical connections
between Perkin - Elmer and Uganda are so miniscule as to
make an appearance by Mr. Sorensen not very useful for your
deliberations .

The only reference that your staff mentioned or our

records show to business transactions involving Uganda is one
export license in August 1977 permitting the export from the
U. S. of one atomic absorption spectrophotometer with a
value of $ 19, 334. This instrument was in fact shipped in
December 1977 to the United Nations Processing Unit and
consigned to the Assistance to Geological Survey and Mines
Department in Kampala, Uganda. Presumably this was a
United Nations sponsored project and our transaction actually
took place with the United Nations purchasing entity in New
York.

In view of the foregoing, both Ms. Belknap and

I agreed that we should write you suggesting that there
was not sufficient connection between Perkin - Elmer and
Uganda for Mr. Sorensen to appear .

We trust you will agree with this opinion .

Sincerely ,
!
1.
West
llins ern
!!

A. H. Munkenbeck , Jr.

( 337 )
 APPENDIX 8
STATEMENT OF Hon . RICHARD L. OTTINGER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

As a strong supporter and cosponsor of , my colleague ,

Rep . Dease's bill to ban trade with Uganda , I would like to
commend the International Relations Committee subcommittees
for an informative series of hearings on U.S. - Ugandan re
lations which concluded on Friday , April 6 , 1978 .
hearings have made clear the need for immediate action to
terminate American support of Idi Amin's reign of terror .
It is frightful that American coffee imports provide
the largest share of Ugandan foreign exchange , accounting
for over a third of all Ugandan earnings . The tragedy is
that this money never finds its way into the hands of the
coffee growers , who are paid by Amin with seldom- redeemed
vouchers . Instead , the money goes directly to an arm of
the Ugandan government , providing the hard currency Amin
requires to purchase the guns and to hire the mercenaries
he uses to repress the growers and any others who may pose
the slightest opposition to his policies and regime .
The United States as the nation to which all countries
of the Western World look for guidance on human rights , civil
rights and the meaning of democracy must demonstrate in her
actions and policies the highest moral standards and values .
Therefore , Congress must act to cut the coffee connection
and stop providing Amin with the means to continue to repress
the people of Uganda . A trade ban would end this situation
of Americans providing , perhaps , the key props to maintain
a genocidal murderer in power .

It is incredible to me that the United States could

be the largest provider of funds in the world to a man described
as " The Hitler of Africa . " I support wholeheartedly Representa
tive Pease's forthright stand on human rights , and I hope his
colleagues on the International Relations Committee will take the
step which are within their grasp to terminate American trade
with Idi Amin .

( 338 )

2
 APPENDIX 9
LETTER TO CONGRESSMEN DIGGS, FRASER, AND BINGHAM FROM HON .
Dawson MATHIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE
OF GEORGIA, CONCERNING MARKUP OF LEGISLATION RELATING TO
UGANDA

April 26 , 1978

The Honorable Charles Diggs , Jr.

Chairman , Subcommittee on Africa
The Honorable Don Fraser
Chairman , Subcommittee on International Organizations
The Honorable Jon Bingham
Chairman , Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade
Gentlemen :

| understand that shortly three subcommittees which

you chair will be marking - up legislation pertaining to

Uganda . As you know , I have offered a resolution , H. CON .
RES . 394 which condemns acts committed by Idi Amin .
However , in as much as a resolution introduced by
Congressman Don Bonker , H. CON . RES . 426 , both addresses
the concerns expressed in my bill , as well as sets forth
specific measures which deserve earnest consideration , I would
suggest that Mr. Bonker's resolution be used as the basis for
mark - up .

At the same time , I would like to compliment you and

your subcommittees for moving forward with legislation on

Uganda at this time .

Sincerely ,

Sauson Mother
Dawson Mathis , M.C.
*

( 339 )
 APPENDIX 10
ANSWERS FOR THE RECORD FROM MICHAEL MADIGAN , LEGAL COUNSEL,
PAGE GULFSTREAM INC., TO QUESTIONS ASKED AT THE APRIL 6, 1978,
JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Can you tell the

committee where that airplane flies and what its cargo is?
rs
Answe The company's home office in the United States

does not receive reports as to the itinerary of the airplane

or its cargo , nor does the company possess itineraries of the
airplane or its cargo manifests . The company understands ,
however , that cotton , tea , coffee and heavy machinery have
been carried as cargo on that airplane . Uganda Airlines
dictates what the cargo will be and where it will be shipped .

ein
Quest It is my under
standing that there is a so -called " whiskey shuttle " between
Kampala
tapoday and London which carries luxury goods from England to
Uganda for the support of state research bureau and the army

and the policy in Uganda . Would this aircraft that Page Air
ways flies be used for that purpose , do you know ?
AsulitAs referenced above ,, our personnel in Uganda.
have no control over what cargo is transported in the air
plane ; they are directed by Uganda Airlines personnel as to

where to go , what to load , etc. Specifically , the company

has directed our personnel in Uganda to only transport civilian
cargo .

( 340 )
 341

t ions
Ques
Putere Stankeveer 1-125 ** Has your company or
any of your flight crews ever been engaged in airlifting coffee
out of Uganda on behalf of the Ugandan Government ?
s
Answerřf Uganda Airlines directed that coffee be flown
by the L- 100-30 , we are sure that the crews would have done so .
As stated earlier , the company understands that cotton , tea ,
coffee and heavy machinery have been carried as cargo on that
airplane .

iona
Quest
tiesing Resexdappel-
Records 1261. Are you aware of
what I think is correct , that he (Charles Hanner ) has been
designated by Idi Amin as an Honorary Ambassador for the

Ugandan Government in the United States and he functions as

a contracting agent
rd on behalf of the Ugandan Government ?
Answe The company is aware that Mr. Hanner had been

designated as honorary consul for the Ugandan Government in

the United States , but it was an "honorary " title carrying

no diplomatic weight or legal privileges . Mr. Hanner is an
employee of Page Airways , Inc. and as such may agree to
purchase items for the Ugandan Government , under the terms
of a Purchase Agreement between Uganda and Page . Mr. Hanner

has not participated as a contracting agent directly between

Uganda and suppliers nor has he ever signed any contract on
behalf of the Government of Uganda .
 342

ion
Quest
(teering Records Does Mr. Hanner

get involved in other business on the side , do you know ,

besides his responsibil
uo ities with Page?
m
Aas
No , to the company's knowledge .

ono
Questi
126 ) .
Hearing Record p26
, My information
is that Mr. Hanner also manages construction contracts for the
soon- to-be opened Mission Building to the UN in New York .

eeda position to verify that for us ?

Would you be in
Assam Mr. Hanner is an airplane salesman . He has

virtually no knowledge of the construction business so he

could not manage a construction contract , nor does he in this
case .
s
tion
Ques
(Hearing Recordp127 ) . Diaritmere
Does,(
Weight to Abenswerwilmoriteľ
1 g come from Mr. Wilmot's name?
iall .
Partially
n
Questio a
WedningRecord , p . 1-1277 And that company

does have the construction contract for the Ugandan Mission

Building in Newrs York City , is that correct?
e
Answ
Yes .
 343

tions
Ques
Hearingo Recordkapporter 127.28 ) . I think it

would be helpful to the committee if you could submit again

for the record all of the dealings which Page Gulfstream or

its subsidiaries or any of its principal officers has had

with Uganda . Would you be willing to do that?
AnswersPage Airways , Inc. and its subsidiaries sold

to Uganda a Grumman Gulfstream II in 1973 and a Lockheed

L- 100-30 cargo plane in 1975 . Page also sold to Uganda ground

support equipment, maintenance services , spare parts and

pilot training , other miscellaneous items , and personnel
services to operate the L- 100-30 airplane . In addition ,

Page sold Uganda a quantity of medical supplies . James P.

Wilmot is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

of both Page Airways , Inc. and Wilmorite , Inc. and the latter
company is presently constructing a building for Uganda in
New York City .