National Identity Complexities. Genesis of Russian-Ukraine Conflict

National Identity Complexities:
Genesis of Russian-Ukraine Conflict
Subhash B*
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has dealt another blow to the world which was
slowly recovering from the impact of Covid-19. Global economies were just
beginning to make a turnaround, hoping to recover from supply chain disruptions
and boost trade activities. However, the Ukraine crisis dealt a blow to trade activities
by creating a food and energy crisis. Moreover, this war has put more pressure on
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European economies, especially
Germany, which are majorly dependent on Russian supplies of gas and oil. This
paper provides an in-depth analysis of the genesis of the Russia-Ukraine crisis from
the question of national identity complexities in Ukraine’s nation-building process.
It covers all the major events in the bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine
until invasion and provides an in-depth analysis of what led to this impasse.
Nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. There
will be famines and earthquakes in various places.
–Mathew 24:7
Introduction
The current Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to a worldwide geopolitical debate. Many
scholars have different views and perspectives pertaining to this conflict as to who
should be blamed. Is it Russia or Ukraine or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)? However, if looked at from the historical perspective, one can perceive that
the current conflict has a strong base in national identity crisis leading to geopolitical
flashpoint between Russia and Ukraine. On the other hand, the West led by the
United States has only aggravated the conflict.
Ukraine was part of Russia from 1922 to 1991. Post the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991 along with
other Soviet Union countries who aspired to be an independent nation. Ukraine had
been clamoring for change and wanted to establish a state based on liberal ideology.
However, the historical baggage, i.e., the cultural affinity with Russia has had an
impact on the nation-building process of Ukraine.
* Research Associate, The IUP Publications, Hyderabad, Telangana, India. E-mail: subhash@iupindia.in
National Identity
© 2022 IUP Complexities:
. All Rights Reserved. 7
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has a long history of cultural and ideological
moorings. Ukraine is strategically located between Russia and the European Union
(EU), sharing borders with both. On the eastern side of Ukraine, it has two regions
Luhansk and Donetsk, combined together to form a region called Donbas. Donbas
is strategically important to Ukraine and is agriculturally prosperous and industrially
well-developed. But Ukraine being part of the erstwhile Soviet Union has deep-rooted
social and cultural ties with Russia and a majority of its population speak Russian
as their native language, especially in the eastern region of Ukraine. On the west
side, Ukraine shares its border with EU and has more western influence, but
predominantly Russian influence is high across the country. However, based on these
border affiliations, eastern Ukraine claims to be pro-Russia and the western side is
pro-West and wants to be more liberal. Thus, the country has been torn between
east and west influences while trying to establish a national identity of its own.
However, Kravchuk’s and Kuchma’s regimes gave priority to inclusive nation-building
rather than one based on ethnicity and culture.1
The aim of the study is to provide an in-depth analysis of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). Therefore, the study analyzes all aspects of the conflict—in particular the
national identity complexities. It also provides an analysis of how the Russia and
Ukraine undercurrents, exploited by NATO and the West, led to the invasion.
The study is based on secondary sources such as books, theses, research papers,
newspaper articles, Foreign Ministry websites and news channels. However,
pertaining to the national identity conflict, the study is entirely based on Shulman’s2
research as he has dealt with the national identity conflict in Ukraine. Also,
Feklyunina’s3 studies covered the role of Russia’s soft power strategy in persuading
Ukraine to remain within the ‘Russian World’.
Literature Review
It would not be wrong to declare that Russia did not accept the political independence
of Ukraine and the territorial loss of Crimea and Donbas, both being strategically
and politically important. However, many scholars have different perspectives about
the current conflict and some view this conflict through the lens of historical past
while others claim that this is due to the events in the Ukraine region with Russia
annexing Crimea and civil unrest in the Donbas region. If we go back to 1991, when
Ukraine became a sovereign nation, it was struggling to define its national identity.
According to Shulman,4 two versions of national identity are prominent today: an
1
Stephen Shulman (2004), “The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine”, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 35-56.
2
Ibid.
3
Valentina Feklyunina (2016), “Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian World(s)’”,
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 773-796.
4
Shulman (2004), op. cit.
8 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2022

ethnic Ukrainian national identity and an eastern Slavic national identity. Therefore,
Ukraine was struggling to find answers to questions like: To what extent is the
Ukrainian nation to be conceived in political and territorial terms? To what extent
is the Ukrainian nation to be grounded in ethnicity and culture? These are the central
topics of debate in contemporary Ukraine.
Therefore, a lot has been going on in the past 30 years of Russia-Ukraine
relationship. Ukraine was dreaming about building the nation on democratic
principles embracing the West. In fact, the first president of Ukraine was elected on
the basis of democratic principles. On the other hand, the Ukrainian government
aimed at maintaining the state’s sovereignty and continuing relations with Russia on
the basis of equality.5 Although officially Russia recognizes the independent Ukrainian
State, a majority of Russians do not recognize Ukraine as an equal partner and do
not consider the State as a full-fledged nation.6 Russia views Ukraine as a part of
its own orbit (area of influence) and would want Ukraine to maintain closer ties.
Therefore, a new entity called Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed
on December 8, 1993 as a successor to the erstwhile USSR and for further
cooperation among the now independent states and it was supported by Russia,
Belarus, and Ukraine. However, there was lack of coordination within the entity and
no efforts were made to make it a success. The Russian top brass were disappointed
when they realized that the CIS did not become, as hoped, the successor to the Soviet
Union, headed by Russia.7 Sakwa and Webber8 criticized the setting up of CIS and
felt that it failed to integrate the erstwhile Soviet Union’s successor states in any
meaningful way.
Meanwhile, in 1993, Russia emphasized Moscow’s commitment to developing the
newly established CIS into an effective organization ‘based on the commonality of
interests’. Yet, it was rather vague in clarifying what this ‘commonality of interests’
actually implied. It did, however, stress that Russia ‘would not pay for building the
relationship by agreeing to unilateral compromises against its own interests’.9 On
the other hand, Ukraine has been leaning towards the West and trying to collaborate
with NATO and the US. Even the NATO and US were keen to have closer ties with
Ukraine. This became evident when the then US President Bill Clinton visited Kiev in
1995 and President Leonid Kuchma surprised most observers by telling that “he
5
P Burkovs’kyj and O Haran’ (2010), “Konflikt und Kooperation, Die Ukraine und Russland, Eine
Beziehungsdynamik”, Osteuropa, Vol. 60, Nos. 2-4, pp. 331-349; and V A Smolii (Ed.) (2004), Ukraina
i Rosiia v Istorychnii Retrospektyvi, Vols. 1-3, Naukova Dumka, Kyiv.
6
Andreas Kappeler (2014), “Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past and Competing Memories”,
Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 107-115.
7
Ibid.
8
Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber (1999), “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998:
Stagnation and Survival”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 379-415.
9
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2002 [1993]), “Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi
Federatsii”,in T A Shakleina (Ed.), Vneshnyaya politika i bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossii, 1991-2002,
Vol. 1, pp. 17-50, Rosspen, Moscow.
National Identity Complexities: 9

believed NATO would be a guarantor for stability in Europe, and that Kiev was no
longer against NATO enlargement.10 On the other hand, Russia is refusing to distance
itself from Ukraine.
As Putin summed it: “These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own
mistakes made at different periods of time. But these are also the result of deliberate
efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity. The formula
they apply has been known from time immemorial—divide and rule. There is nothing
new here. Hence the attempts to play on the ‘national question’ and sow discord
among people, the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of
a single people against one another”.
Because all the independent states were once part of the USSR, Russia could have
taken some steps to have closer ties with CIS, especially Ukraine. However, one
cannot completely blame Russia because other member countries also could have
shown interest in improving relations. However, Ukraine had no intention of staying
within the Russian orbit. Russia has been trying hard to desist Ukraine from going
pro West. Because, politically and geo-strategically, Ukraine is important to Russia.
In fact, its identity and international policy preferences and national security are very
much aligned with Ukraine.
Conflict of National Identity in the Process of Nation-Building

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many countries declared independence
despite the fact that culturally and linguistically, they were linked with Russia. The
postcolonial desire to recreate national identities can facilitate solidarity, play a
positive role in state-making and form a basis for popular participation in politics.11
Also, the official discourses of both Leonid Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations
gave priority to the building of an inclusive, civic nation rather than one based on
ethnicity and culture. Likewise, these administrations enacted policies that gave
citizens of all ethnic backgrounds equal political and economic rights. And even ethnic
Ukrainian nationalist discourse usually stressed on inclusive conception of
nationhood and one that treats ethnic Ukrainians and Russians equally in the political
and economic spheres.12 However, since Ukraine attained independence from Soviet
Union, the big question of national identity has dominated the study of Ukraine
politics and society.13 The question of national identity remains a dichotomy. Because
its ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions are unclear and need a better
understanding to settle political disputes over what sort of policies should a country
10
Tor Bukkvoll (1997), “Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Cooperation”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 28,
No. 3, pp. 363-374, Sage Publications, Inc.
11
Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson et al. (1998), Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands:
The Politics of National Identities, p. ix, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
12
13
Taras Kuzio and Paul D’ Anieri (2002), Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine, pp. 103-129,
Praeger, Westport, CT.

adopt concerning language and culture. Some scholars believe that Ukraine’s
domestic divisions in terms of regional, ethnic, and language undermine the goal
of nation-building. According to Smith et al.,14 the challenge was how the newly
emerging entities would go about creating convincing identities for themselves and
their citizens. It was perhaps a foregone conclusion that Russia would inherit the
lion’s share of the symbols and the history of the USSR and the Tsarist Empire; on
the other hand, it was unclear what resources nation-builders in the 14 border states
would have to draw upon. What new tensions would arise out of the choice of
symbols and myths, and which old ones would be exacerbated, or alternatively
suppressed? Which of the heady mix of religion, language, ethnicity and homeland
would come to the fore in any given region?
This conflict continued and many scholars have stressed the problems and
difficulties of Ukraine in nation-building, yet it ignores the growing consensus among
Ukraine elites about the parameters of nation-building. According to Kuzio15, the
elites’ consensus on nation-building involves five elements, viz., state building, border
and territorial integrity, federalism and regionalism, civic nationalism and national
building and consolidation. According to Shulman16, civic national identity is stronger
than ethnic national identity, and on most measures the Eastern Slavic national
identity complex is stronger than the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex.
With changing times, the national identity complex has been taking deep roots
and exacerbating the conflict. Hence, slowly a conflict began between eastern and
western parts of Ukraine. Eastern part of Ukraine stresses that Ukraine belongs to
all and historically, its culture, language, ethnically are rooted in the erstwhile USSR;
and the western part argues that both are different. Supporting this argument,
Kiryukhin17 pointed out that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, identity problems
turned out to be more important than the problem of establishing democratic
institutions. It is clearly evident from the discourse prevalent amongst the Ukrainian
national intelligentsia. Since the proclamation of independence, debates have been
focused on self-determination between the West and the East, national memory and
history, religion, and culture but not human rights. The arguments have continued
as to whose identity should be projected as the main identity.
Western Ukraine Argument

The ethnic Ukrainian national identity is based on the notion that Ukrainian ethnicity
and/or ethnic Ukrainian culture and language should be the dominant integrating
14
Smith et al. (1998), op. cit.
15
T Kuzio (2002), Ukraine: State and Nation Building, Routledge, London and New York.
16
17
Denys Kiryukhin (2015), “Roots and Features of Modern Ukrainian National Identity and Nationalism”,
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/19/roots-and-features-of-modern-ukrainian-national-identity-and-
nationalism/

force in the Ukrainian nation-state. Elites proposed that ethnic Ukrainians, as the
numerically dominant and titular group, should hold a special status in Ukraine.
Further, they said Ukrainians are the primary indigenous people (korinnyi narod) in
Ukraine. Russians and other minorities (with the exception of the Tatars and Karaim
in Crimea) do not have deep historical roots in Ukraine as do Ukrainians, whose
sole homeland is the Ukrainian State. These ethnic group characterize the historical
relationship with Russia as a sort of colonized and colonizer roles, detrimental to
their language and culture. Further, they argued that Russification has created
unnatural division in Ukraine, especially among ethnic Ukrainians, who want their
culture and language to be the core around which the Ukraine nation-state should
be built.18
Meanwhile, the ethnic Ukraine nationalists among the elite argue that there are
huge differences between Ukrainians and Russians and thus Russia serves as the
primary ‘Other’. In particular, these nationalists generally allege that Ukrainians tend
to be more individualistic, freedom-loving, democratic and tolerant than Russians.
They also contend that Ukrainian culture is part and parcel of European culture—
the Ukrainian ‘Our’. Further, they stressed their historical roots beginning with the
ancient ‘Kievan Rus’ State which is much of Ukrainian land that either maintained
close economic, political dynastic ties with Europe or incorporated into Central
European states, such as Poland and Austria–Hungary. As a result, the ideas of
western humanism, the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation allegedly
permeated into the Ukrainian worldview.19
Eastern Ukraine Argument

The Eastern Slavic nationalists make several arguments like Ukrainian and Russian
culture and history allegedly being very similar, and strongly support imperial
Russian and Soviet historiography’s interpretation of the common historical and
cultural paths followed by the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian people. Further,
they refer to it as ‘brotherly relations’ or ‘Slavic unity’ between Russians and
Ukrainians within Ukraine, on the one hand, and between Ukraine and Russia,
on the other. Moreover, the strong presence of Russian culture and language is
portrayed as something to be valued, celebrated and preserved—in contrast to the
views of most ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. The fact that a great majority of citizens
of Ukraine are Eastern Slavic and, to a lesser extent, Orthodox, assists the
promotion of this identity.20
18
Stephen Shulman (2002), “The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity:
The Case for Slavic Integration”, in Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri (Eds.), Dilemmas of State-Led Nation-
Building in Ukraine, pp. 103-129, Praeger, Westport, CT.
19
Stephen Shulman (1999), “The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity”, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 1011-1036.
20

However, some scholars view Eastern European nationalism as heavily grounded
on ethnicity and culture and weakly grounded on civic factor. Beissinger21 argued
that the practice of Soviet ethno-federalism has produced in the new states of the
former USSR a legacy where ‘the political nation remains an artificial category’, and
there is a ‘widespread [ethnic] majority attitude that the state is essentially an ethnic
state’. Brubaker22 also thinks that in the new states of post-communist Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, ethno cultural understandings of the nation are
dominant. And Schöpflin23 wrote that a majority of groups in this region tend to see
the state as exclusively theirs.
Therefore, the conflict of this national identity majorly distinguishes these two
ethnic groups: Ethnic Ukraine nationalist and Eastern Slavic nationalist. The first
group claims that their core language is Ukrainian and culturally, historically they
are the indigenous people of Ukraine. The second group contends that they have
been part of Ukraine for centuries and thus are not minorities and mostly relied on
their common past and common origin and claim that both are similar. However,
Ukraine Nationalists contend that Ukrainians are the primary indigenous people in
Ukraine and have deep historical roots, and they view the Russian-Ukraine relations
as one of the colonized and colonizer. The spread of the Russian language was
accomplished by force (by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union), not by free choice.
Consequently, ‘Russian-speaking culture is not regarded by Ukrainophone
nationalists as having a legitimate historical foundation in Ukraine’.24
Complexities in Policy Preference

Despite this, the policy preference became a paradox in the nation-building process.
As Shulman25 describes, among elites, policy preferences in both the domestic and
foreign sphere are intimately associated with support for one or the other version
of ethnic national identity—Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic. This is because policies
are critical components of the national identity construction process. Domestically, an
Ethnic Ukrainian national identity requires that the state assign a special position to
Ukrainians and their language and culture. This entails some degree of preference
being given to Ukrainian language, history and culture by the government. Such
preferences perform a symbolic role in elevating ethnic Ukrainians to a special place
in the Ukrainian nation, but they also substantively increase the knowledge or use of
Ukrainian culture and language by the population of the state, in particular
Russophone Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. In the sphere of foreign policy, Ethnic
21
Mark R Beissinger (1997), “State Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State: The Soviet Legacy in Post-
Soviet Politics”, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Eds.), The End of Empire? The Transformation of the
USSR in Comparative Perspective, pp. 166-167, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY.
22
Rogers Brubaker (1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in Europe,
p. 105, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
23
George Schöpflin (1996), “Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Europe”, in Richard
Caplan and John Feffer (Eds.), Europe’s New Nationalism, p. 153, Oxford University Press, New York.
24
Smith et al. (1998), op. cit.
25

Ukrainian national identity requires an orientation placing priority on integration with
Europe and the US, as opposed to with Russia and the CIS. Again, the reasons are
both symbolic and substantive. Given that the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity posits
that Ukrainian culture is closely related to European culture, the symbolic erosion
of the boundary between Ukraine and Europe reinforces the European nature of
Ukraine. Likewise, by symbolically reinforcing the boundary with Russia and the CIS
by breaking ties, the alleged strong cultural distinction between Russia and Ukraine
is strengthened. Substantively, a Western orientation accelerates the diffusion of
Western culture into Ukraine—revitalizing ethnic Ukrainian culture—and impedes the
diffusion of Russian culture.26
Elites supporting an Eastern Slavic conception of national identity generally call
for a domestic policy that grants equal support to both Ukrainian and Russian
language and culture. Such a policy would symbolically reinforce the dual ethnic,
linguistic and cultural core supported by the Eastern Slavic identity. Additionally, it
would in fact maintain the strong position of Russian language and culture in
Ukraine, and thus the bipolar cultural and linguistic landscape. The Eastern Slavic
national identity also calls for a foreign orientation that places priority on ties with
Russia and the CIS, rather than with Europe and the US. Symbolically, such an
orientation underlines the alleged common history and culture of Ukraine and Russia.
An Eastern orientation would also promote processes of cultural diffusion from Russia
that can maintain the strong position of Russian language and culture in Ukraine.27
Hence, this conflict keeps dividing the people in Ukraine on the basis of language,
culture, history. People in the West show more interest in Western side and would want
to bring the reforms in accordance with the Western policies. But Eastern Slavic people
oppose the idea of framing western policies. Hence, the conflict continues and political
parties have been formed on the basis of this conflict, trying to hold the pulse of the
masses. Therefore, Ukraine became a geopolitical flash point to Russia and the western
world. Fundamentally, Ukraine has deep cultural, economic and political ties with
Russia. Since its independence, Ukraine has sought to forge its own path as a sovereign
state, while looking to align more closely with Western institutions, including the EU
and NATO. However, Kyiv struggled to balance its foreign relations and to bridge deep
internal divisions. A more nationalist, Ukrainian-speaking population in the western
parts of the country generally supported greater integration with Europe, while a mostly
Russian-speaking community in the east favored closer ties with Russia.28
Revolutions in Ukraine
Basically, revolutions are meant for a change either politically or economically. In a
similar way, revolutions have played a prominent role in bringing changes in the newly
26
27
28
Jonathan Masters (2022), “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia”, https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia

established country. They rightly denied the leftist ideology and wanted to build a
liberal state. Since independence, majorly two revolutions gained much importance
in Ukraine: one is the Orange Revolution and the other is the Maidan Revolution.
Besides these, there was a revolution called the Granite Revolution; that was the first
revolution started by a group of students and later it spread to other working groups,
but it was not recognized in the 1990s because of political crisis in USSR.29
Orange Revolution
The Orange Revolution was a series of protests and political events that took place
in Ukraine between November 2004 and January 2005. The protests were prompted
by several reports from foreign and domestic election monitors alleging that the
country’s 2004 presidential election runoff was rigged.30 In the immediate aftermath
of the run-off vote of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, which was claimed
to be marred by massive corruption, voter intimidation and electoral fraud, Kyiv, the
Ukrainian capital, was the focal point of the movement’s campaign of civil resistance
with thousands of protesters demonstrating daily.31 This revolution resembled the
Gandhian non-violent resistance highlighted by a series of acts of civil disobedience,
sit-ins, and general strikes organized by the opposition parties. The two men at the
center of the controversy were the then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was
backed by the Kremlin, and Viktor Yushchenko, an ally of the West. The Election
Commission had declared Yanukovych as the winner, despite strong condemnation
from US and the European Union, which considered the election to be illegitimate.
Russia, on the other hand, claimed that it had seen no evidence of election fraud.32
In response to the nationwide protest, the Ukrainian Supreme Court ordered a revote,
and in the reelection Yushchenko won by a significant margin. This election brought
more confidence in the West among the Ukrainians. But it opened up the deep-rooted
divisions in the country between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine. The east
Ukraine voters supported pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych and the West side
supported Yushchenko.
According to Kuzio,33 the Orange Revolution was also the most regionally divided
of democratic revolutions, with western and central Ukrainians dominating the
protests and eastern Ukrainians opposing the protests. The civic nationalism that
29
Mira Patel (2022), “Explained: Ukraine’s Many Revolutions in the Past Three Decades, Their Impact”,
February 26, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ukraine-invasion-russia-history-revolutions-
impact-explained-7789764/
30
Ibid.
31
Andrew Wilson (2009), “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004: The Paradoxes of Negotiation”, in
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-
Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, pp. 295-316, Oxford University Press.
32
Patel (2022), op. cit.
33
T Kuzio (2010), “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution”,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 285-296.

underpinned the Orange Revolution is rooted in Ukraine’s path dependence that has
made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted
the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine
by the Tsarist Empire. Therefore, the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned after
a Kiev court upheld a government lawsuit accusing the party of promoting separatism
and inter-ethnic conflict.34
Finally, this revolution ended with the election of President Yushchenko. It became
a turning point in the economic and political transformation of the Ukrainians. In fact,
this revolution sent a negative signal to the ruling governments of Belarus and Russia.
The Orange Revolution impacted Ukraine’s relations with its three key partners: Russia,
the US, and Europe. Russia and Ukraine, figuratively speaking, remind one of Siamese
twins. Russia historically has been, and will remain, Ukraine’s closest strategic partner.
It is especially important after President Vladimir Putin’s overt support for Yanukovych.
During the election campaign, Russia and Ukraine tried to mend fences and build new
relations based on mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and recognition
of Ukraine’s right to pursue closer relations with the EU.35 The Orange Revolution in
Ukraine in 2004-2005 marked a crucial turning point. The events in Kyiv were interpreted
in Moscow as a result of democracy promotion by EU and US.36
Orange Revolution led to the ouster of a pro-Russian leader. Meanwhile, the

state-owned Russian energy corporation, Gazprom immediately demanded Ukraine
to pay full market rates for its gas. However, when Ukraine refused to comply, Russia
restricted the flow of gas through the pipelines, leaving just enough to fulfil its
contracts with other countries in Western Europe. This move by Russia, besides putting
economic pressure on the pro-Western government in Kyiv, was also used as the basis
for claims that Ukraine was an unreliable gas transit country. This narrative thus
helped build support for a new pipeline named Nord Stream which directly channeled
gas from Russia to Germany.37
The relations between the two independent states were from the very beginning
difficult. Almost all issues have their roots in the imperial past.38
34
Luke Harding (2005), “Ukraine Bans Communist Party for ‘Promoting Separatism’”, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/ukraine-bans-communist-party-separatism
35
“Ukraine’s Foreign Policy After the Orange Revolution”, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ukraines-
foreign-policy-after-the-orange-revolution
36
Putin V (2007b), Interv’yu zhurnalu Taim, December 19, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/24735
Accessed on September 16, 2014.
37
Lt Gen Abhay Krishna (2022), “View: Root Cause of Ukraine-Russia Conflict”, March 4, https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-the-root-cause-of-the-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/
89807225.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
38
Kappeler (2014), op. cit.

According to foreign policy expert Markov39, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
was provoked by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in
Ukraine and Western-supported Ukrainian organizations. Markov claimed that
Russian political technologies were inferior to those of the West, and therefore the
Russian side lost the battle of influence. Hence, Russia should create its own NGO
networks abroad and provide financial assistance, knowhow in technologies and
strategies in order to increase its influence.40
Alter this revolution, there was an instant change in the Russian foreign policy
strategically and diplomatically.
Negotiating the ‘Russian World’

At the end of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine became a critical missing link and
Moscow struggled to persuade Ukraine to join its Union with Belarus and
Kazakhstan. And, Russian authorities were increasingly apprehensive of Ukraine’s
closer cooperation with the EU. Although Ukraine was not officially seeking NATO
membership (this aim was removed from its security doctrine in 2010), Moscow
remained acutely sensitive to the possibility of its membership. Overall, the Russian
authorities viewed Ukraine as exceptionally important not only in terms of Russia’s
economic and military security but also in terms of identity.41 In the late 2000s and
early 2010s, as Russia’s relations with the West were going through a series of crises,
Moscow began to pursue a more assertive policy in its neighborhood. This policy
aimed to stop any further erosion of its influence by preventing other actors, first
and foremost, US, the NATO and EU from encroaching into the ‘sphere of [its]
privileged interests’.42
The ‘Russian World’ was a strategic policy from the Russian officials to unite the
masses within or beyond the borders by infusing the feeling of common history by
digging the ‘common past’ and ‘common origin’ sentiments. Thus, it mainly included
Russian language, Russian culture and the common glorious past. Hence, the role
of public diplomacy in Russian foreign policy grew. There are two distinctive strands
of Russian public diplomacy: one, directed mainly towards Western states, and two
towards the former Soviet republics. Despite the rhetoric of mutual interests and high
respect for state sovereignty, the post-Soviet stand of Russian public diplomacy has
more in common with the Soviet practice of ‘active measures’ than with the soft power
of attraction commonly connected with public diplomacy. Russia’s current policy runs
the risk of eating away the soft power potential that Russia still enjoys in many post-
39
S Markov (2005), “Vokrug Zakona ob NPO Idet Zhestokaya Borba”, KM.ru, December 16.
40
Markov (2005), op. cit.; and I Romanov (2007), “NPO Poluchili Uslovnyi Srok”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
April 16.
41
D Molchanov (2002), Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations, College
Station, Texas A&M University Press, TX.
42
D Medvedev (2008), “Interview to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia”, NTV, August 31, http://
eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9768. Accessed on October 29, 2014.

Soviet states.43 To illustrate this approach, Feklyunina44 analyzed Russia’s relationship
with Ukraine prior to the 2014 crisis. In the late 2000s to early 2010s, Russia’s dominant
identity was increasingly associated with the idea of ‘Russia’s World’—an imagined
community based on the markers of Russian language, the Russian culture and the
common glorious past. Despite a significant increase in Moscow’s public diplomacy
activities in Ukraine around that time, those efforts did not and could not fundamentally
transform the psychological milieu in Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv because the
projected identity was inherently incompatible with one of the main identity discourses
in Ukraine and was only partially compatible with another. Yet, the theme of a unique
‘Russian World’ that extended far beyond Russia’s borders was certainly not new.45 It
had been discussed by Russian philosophers, sociologists and political scientists long
before President Putin picked it up in his 2007 address to the Russian Parliament.46
This concept has broad philosophical connotations and is much more expansive
than the term “compatriots.” While the latter is based on legal norms and definitions,
the “Russian World” is an idea defined purely on the basis of self-identification.47
Feklyunina48 analyzed that the ‘Russian World’ narrative was also energetically
promoted by the Russian media.
At times fairly incoherent, this narrative was based on four key points that were
repeatedly emphasized both at home and abroad. The first point was naturally
existing civilizational community, and native Russian speakers. Secondly, it included
the concept of common past and common origin. The third, Russian World
constructed a hierarchical relationship between Russia and other members of the
community. Finally, they projected collective identity and legitimized a particular
pattern of state–society relationship by emphasizing the distinctness of the Russian
World compared to the West. Despite this, the other side, that is the EU, came up
with the Wider Europe concept which is similar to the Russian World. The EU’s
narrative of a Wider Europe, for example, appealed to the idea of Ukraine’s historical
belongingness to Europe, and emphasized the normative superiority of the
democratic values associated with the European integration project, on the one hand,
and the promise of economic prosperity, on the other.49
43
Sinikukka Saari (2014), “Russia’s Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its Influence in Former
Soviet Republics: Public Diplomacy po russkii”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 50-66.
DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2013.864109
44
Feklyunina (2016), op. cit.
45
I Zevelev (2014), “The Russian World Boundaries”, Russia in Global Affairs, April-June, 2.
46
V Putin (2007a), “Address to the Federal Assembly”, http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/04/26/
1156_type63372type63374type82634_125339.shtml. Accessed on October 18, 2013; and
P Shchedrovitskii (2000), “Russkyi Mir: Vozmozhnye Tseli Samoopredeleniya”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
February 14.
47
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy
48
Feklyunina (2016), op. cit.
49
S White and V Feklyunina (2014), Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke.

This concept of Russian World became fuzzy as it clearly focused on ethnic Russians
and Russian language. Hence, the concept has been defined narrowly limiting to
only common past and common origin. However, the concept was received with mixed
feelings by the Ukrainians as it had given some inconsistency in its definition mainly
emphasizing on Russian language are ethnic Russians. Hence, Ukrainians believe
that their culture and language are radically different from Russia and argue that
they belong to Europe. The legacy of Russification, when the use of Russian was either
imposed or chosen as a strategy of social mobility, made it possible to combine the
use of Russian with an identity that was not Russia-centric.50 In response to this
concept, the Ukrainians have often been described as split between two competing
identities.51 According to Putin52: ‘without the values embedded in Christianity and
other religions, without standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia,
people will inevitably lose their human dignity’. The civilizational uniqueness of the
‘Russian World’ implied that it could not copy Western political models but needed
to seek its own path.
The identity conflict kept exacerbating. Moreover, this narrative was missing a
collective identity or an inclusive narrative, and West Ukraine believed that ‘Russian
World’ was exclusive for Russian language and Russian orthodoxy, and many a time,
there were claims of shared Interest and common understanding. Hence, ethnic
Ukrainians are more interested to be a part of a democratic world, irrespective of
their common background.
Political Fraternity in Ukraine

Since the disintegration of USSR, there have been many regional political parties in
Ukraine besides the Russian-backed communist political parties such as the
Communist Party of Ukraine. However, the Russian government tried to
instrumentalize the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking Ukrainians for political
purposes. In 1991, Kravchuk was elected as the first president of the independent
nation and he lost in the subsequent 1994 election and Kravchuk became the
president; and again in 1999, Kuchma was reelected as the President. During
Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2005), a number of opposition parties coalesced.53 In
2004, pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich was declared President but allegations of
vote-rigging triggered protests in what came to be known as the Orange Revolution,
forcing a re-run of the vote. A pro-Western former prime minister, Yushchenko, was
elected president54 who belongs to ‘Our Ukraine’ party and later in 2007 it became
50
D Laitin (1998), Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, NY.
51
52
V Putin (2013a), “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/
6007. Accessed on October 18, 2013.
53
https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Cultural-institutions
54
https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/world/story/heres-how-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-unfolded-since-
ussrs-disintegration-in-1991-323470-2022-02-22

‘Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense’ party, and he appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as
the Prime Minister, but after infighting in the pro-western camp, she was sacked.
Yushchenko promised to lead Ukraine out of Kremlin’s orbit, towards NATO and the
EU and stated that “I want to use this opportunity and pass the a word of thanks
from the Ukrainian people to the representatives of NATO member states who
supported their right to choose and contributed to the honest rerun of the voting.
Your support has helped the Ukrainian democracy to win”. His statement on the
alliance’s commitment to territorial integrity, political independence and democratic
development of Ukraine was made right in time. Undoubtedly, this statement
confirmed once again that the relations between NATO countries and Ukraine were
strategic.55 The question of the place of Ukraine between the EU and NATO on the
one hand and Russia and its political and economic allies on the other hand reflects
the historical fact of Ukraine caught between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Central
Europe. Official Russia harshly criticized the cooperation of Ukraine with NATO and
plans of a possible entry into NATO by Ukraine. In the presidential elections of 2004,
President Putin openly supported the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych. This
problem is of immediate importance as Russia exerted strong political and economic
pressure on Ukraine, while the EU demanded from Ukraine political and legal
reforms. Since 2005, there were regular disputes about the price of gas and the costs
for transit, and Russia used gas prices as a political instrument.56
However, from 1991 to 1997, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine was
not in the best of terms and went through difficult times. A majority of Russians do
not recognize Ukraine as an equal partner, instead consider it as something that
is provisional and artificial, which will hopefully unite soon with Russia and the same
has been carried on until 2010 elections. The presidential elections of 2010 brought
some comfort to the relationship with the election of Yanukovych as the President,
and he promised a dramatic improvement in the relations with Russia and took a
sharp U-turn on the policies pursued by his predecessor, Yushchenko, whose pro-
west and pro-NATO stance infuriated Kremlin.57 In this context, Medvedev stated that
Yanukovych’s electoral victory meant that the “brotherly ties” between Ukraine and
Russia could now be restored. He added that the venomous stand-off between
Moscow and Kiev, following the 2004 Orange Revolution, was a “dark streak”, and
was now over. Therefore, Yanukovych tried to balance his power between West and
East and Yanukovych indicated that he was ready to renew the lease on Russia’s
Black Sea fleet, which was to expire in 2017 and would be extended for 25 years
until 2042, and this announcement came after a meeting with the then Russia
President Dmitry Medvedev in Kharkiv, in eastern Ukraine. In return, Medvedev said
55
Viktor Yushchenko (2005), “Opening Statement”, President of Ukraine at the Meeting of the NATO-
Ukraine Council at the Level of Heads of State and Government, February 22, https://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2005/s050222e.htm
56
57
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/ukraine-russia-relations-viktor-yanukovych

Russia would offer Ukraine a discount on its gas bills: he said Moscow would slash
the price Kiev pays for 1,000 cubic meters of Siberian gas by $100 (£65) from its
current rate of $330, with a 30% discount if the price falls.58 Whereas his predecessor
Yushchenko had pledged to evict the Russians from their base in the historic Crimean
port of Sevastopol. He further assured that “Ukraine was not going to join NATO,
but it would work with NATO but not join it, Ukraine is a non-bloc European
country.”59 Finally Russia and Ukraine clinched a gas pricing deal. This initiative was
heavily criticized by the Ukraine nationalists as well as western nations and started
another big protest against pro-Russian governance.
Euromaidan Protest
Yanukovych amended Ukrainian Constitution (Article 111) regarding the provision
of president’s removal. This amendment created a negative perspective among the
masses as they felt this rule was similar to the Russian Federation and felt that he
would stay in power as long as he wanted. Besides, he was facing a lot of corruption
charges, and the media claimed that his family members benefitted a lot during his
regime, and by the end of 2012, his presidency approval rating fell, and in order
to salvage the situation, he needed to save his image and take some steps. In early
2013, he and his ministers took a bold step to sign the EU Association Agreement
(EUAA); immediately, he got significant support from the masses, and they felt that
this was a great opportunity for Ukraine’s economic reforms and conveyed the
message of moving away from the Soviet economic model.
Year 2014 is a very important one in the history of Ukraine. It was witness to
many issues and conflicts pertaining to the political, economic, domestic and
international policies. The west Ukrainians took to the streets in late November 2013
in Kyiv’s Independence Square and termed it as “the revolution of dignity.” The
primary reason for the protest was President Yanukovych’s rejection of a deal for
greater integration with EU, and taking a $15 bn bailout from Russia instead. Lots
of Ukrainians had wanted the EU deal, partly because they thought it would help
Ukraine’s deeply troubled economy, and partly because they saw closer ties with
Europe as culturally and politically desirable. The second reason was Ukrainians saw
Yanukovych as corrupt and autocratic and as a stooge of Russia. His decision to
reject the EU deal felt to many Ukrainians like he had sold out their country to
Moscow. Hence, the protestors quickly expanded their demands from “sign the EU
deal” to “Yanukovych must step down.”60 However, the country was going through
a tough phase with the protests on one side and the country’s looming debt
repayment and Russia’s pressure not to sign the deal on the other. Thus it was very
difficult for the government to salvage the situation. Therefore, Russia saw this as
58
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia
59
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/ukraine-russia-relations-viktor-yanukovych
60
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know

an opportunity for closer ties with Ukraine and promised Ukraine $15 bn in loans
and cheaper natural gas. Later, Putin said the price of gas supplies to Ukraine would
be cut by about one-third to $268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters, from about $400.
Besides, he announced Russia would convert $15 bn worth of its National Welfare
Fund, an emergency fund, into Ukrainian securities. In fact, Ukraine urgently needed
around $10 bn for looming debt repayments. The announced deal boosted the price
of Ukraine’s dollar debt, a sign of investors’ confidence.61
However, the protestors were wary of Yanukovych’s entering Ukraine into a
Russia-led Customs Union. In response to that, Putin clarified “we did not discuss
the issue of Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union at all”. Yet the protestors were
not convinced and wanted to know what had been signed. Even the White House,
meanwhile, said that any deal between Ukraine and Russia did not address Ukrainian
protesters’ concerns. In response to these, Yanukovych argued that signing the EU
Association Agreement at a summit in Vilnius would have dealt a huge blow to
Ukraine’s already troubled economy by limiting economic ties with Russia.62
Amidst this and to cool down the protestors’ anger, Yanukovych confirmed that
he obtained as much as possible from Putin while keeping Ukraine’s European
options open. “The meeting confirmed that the interaction between Ukraine and
Russia stands on a powerful basis and enjoys good prospects for further
development,” Yanukovych said. “Our negotiations culminated in us signing a very
substantial and broad package of agreements.” But the protests did not cool down
and entered January 2014, and Yanukovych attempted to put down the protest
violently. Despite this, on January 16, the government introduced repressive laws,
severely restricting civil rights and the right to protest. Russia backed Yanukovych in
the crisis, while the US and Europe supported the protestors.63 The protest turned
out be a political crisis in Ukraine and bloody clashes between the police and the
protestors ensued. On January 22, two protestors were killed and dozens injured,
and soon the protest spread to eastern Ukraine, a region that had supported
Yanukovych and wished closer ties with Russia. Besides, discussions continued
between Yanukovych and the opposition leaders, and Azrov put in his resignation
as the Prime minister. In February, hundreds of protestors were released from jail,
yet the opposition parliamentarians were rebuffed in their attempts to limit the powers
of the presidency, and the battle in the streets took a deadly turn. Again on February
18 and 20, the government forces attempted to reclaim the Square and more than
20 were killed and hundreds were wounded; 25,000 protesters who remained in
the Square ringed their encampment with bonfires in an attempt to forestall another
assault. Protesters in the western Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk seized
government buildings, and EU officials threatened sanctions against Ukraine unless
61
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-protests-yanukovych-moscow/25203138.html
62
Ibid.
63

the Yanukovych administration took steps to de-escalate violence.64 On February 22,
after President Yanukovych had fled the country, the parliament voted to oust him
and fresh elections were held. On May 25, Ukrainians elected Petro Poroshenko as
president and he was an EU supporter and organizer of 2013 Maidan Revolution.
But the conflict had taken a different path and it appeared that as long as Ukraine
attempted to join EU and NATO, a conflict was inevitable.
Russia Annexes Crimea

The ouster of Yanukovych led to fresh protests in Crimea and also in the eastern
Ukraine region where a majority were Russian-speaking and pro-Kremlin. Even Russia
felt that it had lost its puppet in Ukraine. A few days later, some Crimeans held rallies
to show support to the ousted president and, in some cases, to call for secession
from Ukraine and re-joining Russia. Bands of gunmen grew in numbers until it
became obvious they were Russian military forces who forcefully but bloodlessly
brought the entire peninsula under military occupation. On March 16, the Crimeans
voted overwhelmingly for their region to become a part of Russia.65 Ukraine
condemned it and claimed that it was a violation of international law. This election
results became a big issue, as the West saw the result as illegitimate as it was held
under hostile Russian military occupation with no international monitoring and many
reports of intimidation; it was pushed through with only a couple of weeks’ notice,
and it was illegal under Ukrainian law. Whether it was legitimate or not, Crimea had
effectively become a part of Russia. US and EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia
to punish Moscow for this, but there is no sign that Crimea will return to Ukraine.66
Putin cited the need for protecting the rights of Russian citizens and Russian ethnic
groups in Crimea and southeast Ukraine.67 The message was well received in
Ukraine’s pro-Russian east and south regions and they felt connected and
represented. This led to ethnic division in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and
violence started between Ukraine’s armed forces and separatists, and obviously these
separatists were backed by Russia, although Russia denied its involvement.68 The two
regions combined to form the Donbas region with two airports. Meanwhile, the rebels
shot down a Malaysian Airlines plane on July 17, killing 298 onboard, probably
accidentally. Fighting between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified, and
the rebels started losing; and, in August, the Russian army overtly invaded eastern
Ukraine to support the rebels. All this brought the relationship between Russia and
the West to its lowest point since the Cold War. Sanctions pushed the Russian economy
64
https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement
65
66
Ibid.
67
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
68
Roy Allison (2014), “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules”,
International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6, pp. 1255-1297, Oxford University Press.

to the brink of recession, and more than 2,500 Ukrainians were killed.69 The feeling
of disenfranchisement among eastern Ukrainians was growing and the rebels were
cashing in on local support. Both sides intensified the conflict by doubling weapons
and armed forces. Moscow denied military involvement, though both Ukraine and
NATO reported buildup of Russian troops and military equipment near Donetsk and
Russian cross-border shelling immediately after Russia annexed Crimea.70 The
incident of July 17, 2014 escalated into an international crisis with EU and US on
one side and Russia on the other, and Ukraine caught between the two. This led
to fresh agreements called the Minsk agreements.
Minsk Agreements
Basically, the aim of the agreement was to end the war in Donbas region and
therefore France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine came to an agreement to end the
war through the Minsk agreement. Minsk is the capital of Belarus, and on
September 5, 2014, the heads of the four countries came to an agreement to end
the war in Donetsk region. But the agreement failed and led to more ceasefire
violations, and a fresh agreement was signed on February 12, 2015 which was
called Minsk 2; even this failed because of the standoff between Russia and Ukraine.
Ukraine wanted a complete ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons and sought
full control over the Donbas region. And Russia wanted Donbas to be autonomous
and govern itself and manage its own affairs. Both sides disagreed on these
provisions and escalation continued, as the region is very important to both Ukraine
and Russia economically and strategically. Ukraine already lost Crimea and did not
want to give autonomous status to a part of its own region, which is rich in
agricultural land and industrially well developed. It contributes almost 40% to
Ukraine’s GDP and moreover it did not want Russia’s interference in its affairs
though the region, now under the control of pro-Russian rebels. If Donbas gets
autonomy, it will be governed by Russia because a majority of the people are
pro-Russia. Besides, Russia knew that if Ukraine became a stable state, it will resume
its interest in joining EU and NATO. Therefore, it strategically planned to keep
Ukraine entangled so as to divert its attention from moving towards NATO or EU.
Role of NATO and the US in Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The main aim of NATO was to contain the expansion of communism. Germany split
into West and East, West joined NATO. Erstwhile USSR established the Warsaw Pact
to counter NATO and East Germany joined the Warsaw Pact. In 1990, East Germany
withdrew from the Warsaw Pact following German reunification. The Warsaw Pact
dissolved in 1991 and “NATO had promised Russia that if it terminated the Warsaw
Pact, they would not include countries of Eastern Europe in the defense treaty that
were previously part of the Soviet Union”. However, NATO did not abide by the
69
70

promise and went on to include countries like Estonia, Poland, Romania and Latvia,
which were a part of the Soviet Union under the Warsaw Pact.71 Hence, the conflict
continues, and US and NATO established relationship with Ukraine, and Russia keeps
reminding NATO about the disbanding of Warsaw Pact.
Incidentally, Ukraine was an archrival of US during the Cold War. But after 1991,
after Ukraine became a sovereign state, the US started supporting Ukraine and
recognized it as a full sovereign state and established their relations after the election
of a democratically elected Ukraine President. Ukraine wants to bring reforms which
are closer to the Western ideology and more liberalized. Russia, on the other hand,
was observing Ukraine’s growing closer ties with the West and NATO. Hence,
Ukraine has been struggling to balance its foreign relations between Russia and
the West. To understand the role of NATO and US in Russia-Ukraine conflict, one
should go back to 1991. The dissolution of USSR and the end of Cold War led
US to reinvent its foreign policies in the region especially with the newly Independent
states like Ukraine that had undergone tremendous changes over the past years.
In 1991-92, dialogues and cooperation began between Leonid Kravchuk and
George Bush with the transition to democracy and the first president of Ukraine
elected democratically. Bush assisted Ukraine’s transition with an eye on
dismantling the country’s nuclear arsenal. In 1993-1994, Bill Clinton pressurized
Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state and sign a Non-Proliferation Treaty and
establish a Trilateral Statement between US, Ukraine and Russia to guarantee
Ukraine’s security. Thus, US and Ukraine turned their attention to other issues such
as the pursuit of NATO and EU membership.72
Ukraine had also sent its troops to Iraq in 2003 to appease US, yet most of the
Ukrainians did not approve this move; and most of the youngsters do not remember
their historical past with the Soviet Union and forced their leaders for closer ties with
the West. In 1997, a NATO-Ukraine commission was established to take this
relationship forward. In May 1997, Ukraine poll results indicated 37% respondents
were in favor of joining NATO and 28% were against.73 In 1999, NATO opened a
liaison office in Kyiv to help Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
and to support Ukraine’s defense reforms effort.74 Even Ukraine’s leadership made
several attempts to join NATO and various summits have been conducted to
strengthen the relationship. But Russia kept opposing this move and raising the
Warsaw Pact. Russia has been continuously condemning NATO expansion towards
East Europe. Despite this, the West was always in the frontline for Ukraine and even
71
https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/russia-ukraine-war-did-natos-
promises-of-warsaw-pact-provoke-moscow-in-attacking-kyiv-articleshow.html
72
R G Rodriguez, S Hays, T Henderson et al. (2016), “US-Ukraine Relations in the Post-Soviet Era”,
European Scientific Journal, Vol. 12, No. 10.
73
Bukkvoll (1997), op. cit.
74
Gordon B Hendrickson (2005), “The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and
Not Get Mauled”, December, Occasional Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States.

supported and funded Orange Revolution and Maidan Revolution; these two
revolutions brought to power pro-Western leadership in Ukraine who are more
interested in Western ideology and keen to join NATO.
Russia was constantly watching over Ukraine’s move towards NATO because
according to NATO, if a county is not “an alliance” but “a partner”, it means that
the country can join the group in the future.75 Russia considered Ukraine as a
strategically important border state with lot of similarities historically. In early 1997,
former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, told his counterparts that NATO’s
approval of Ukraine would traverse the “red line”. Even Putin pointed out on many
occasions that Western powers broke promises they made in the 1990s that they
would not expand “an inch to the East”. “They cheated us—vehemently, blatantly.
NATO is expanding”.76 NATO has not stopped expanding since the fall of the Soviet
Union, growing from 17 countries in 1990 to 30 today, several of which were once
part of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.77 In other words, Ukraine’s joining the NATO
means that Russia will share a risky long and perilous border with an institution it
considers a threat to its security.78 Also, many experts have opposed the idea of NATO
expansion, even George Kennan who was part of the creation of NATO in 1949,
in an interview with the New York Times, had said, ‘’I think it is the beginning of
a new Cold War. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will
affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this
whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the
Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves”.79
Although many are opposing the thought of NATO expanding towards East
Europe, yet NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest,
the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George Bush
administration supported it, but France and Germany opposed the move fearing that
it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO members compromised and
the alliance issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine
and boldly declared, “These countries will become members of NATO.” Putin
maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct
threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with
Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would
cease to exist.” The West kept funding pro-western candidatures to promote
75
https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/russia-to-continue-war-in-ukraine-
even-if-kyiv-agrees-to-not-join-nato-says-putins-ally-articleshow.html
76
https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-putin-western-leaders-nato-expansion/6392427.html
77
https://www.france24.com/en/russia/20220130-did-nato-betray-russia-by-expanding-to-the-east
78
Asmaa Elsherbiny (2022), “Europe on Fire: The Russo-Ukrainian War, its Causes and Consequences”,
h t t p s : / / w w w. r e s e a r c h g a t e . n e t / p u b l i c a t i o n / 3 5 9 2 4 5 8 9 6 _ E u r o p e _ o n _ f i r e _ -
The_Russian_war_on_Ukraine_its_causes_and_consequences
79
Thomas L Friedman (1998), “Foreign Affairs; Now a Word FromX”, May 2, https://www.nytimes.com/
1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html

democracy. Victoria Nuland, the US assistant secretary of state for European and
Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the US had invested more than
$5 bn since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves”.80 In 2013, during
the presidency of Yanukovych, the West and NATO lured Ukraine to join in EU, but
he rejected it and accepted Russian offer.
Therefore, NATO was primarily seeking its space in the conflict and wanted to
assure Ukraine during the civil unrest in the Donbas region. In response to that in
April 2016, NATO announced that the alliance would deploy four battalions to
Eastern Europe, rotating troops through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to
deter possible future Russian aggression elsewhere in Europe, particularly in the
Baltics. In January 2018, US imposed new sanctions on Russia’s nine companies
linked to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In October 2018, Ukraine joined US and
seven other NATO countries in a series of large-scale air exercises in western Ukraine.
The exercises came after Russia held its annual military exercises in September 2018,
the largest since the fall of the Soviet Union.81 The situation was worsening in Ukraine
and civil unrest was continuing in the Donbas region; and somehow the Poroshenko
administration had run the show till 2019 presidential election. Volodymyr Zelensky
took office on May 20, 2019, and since the Minsk agreements failed, he came up
with Steinmeier Formula to end the war. He tried to clarify Ukraine’s stand regarding
the Steinmeier Formula pertaining to the Donbas region election. First, he confirmed
that Ukraine agreed to hold local elections in the Donbas region but only under
Ukrainian law, and only after Russian forces are withdrawn and Ukraine regains
control of the state border: “There won’t be any elections under the barrel of a gun”.
In response to this, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters that Kyiv’s
approval of the Steinmeier Formula was a “positive” development, adding, “There
is no doubt that this is an important step toward implementing the earlier
agreements.” Further he added, “Hopefully, the implementation of the Minsk
agreements will continue, since this is the only way to resolve the Ukrainian conflict
in the country’s east”.82 However, opinion on this formula gained mixed response
in Ukraine and for the time being they exchanged the prisoners, but this agreement
remained unsuccessful. Later, the pandemic started and focus shifted towards the
national health issue. In September 2020, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved
Ukraine’s new National Security Strategy, which provides for the development of
distinctive partnership with NATO with the aim of eventual membership into NATO,
and it has increased its presence in the Black Sea and stepped up maritime
cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.83
80
John J Mearsheimer (2014), “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That
Provoked Putin”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5, pp. 77-84, 85-89.
81
Ibid.
82
Christopher Miller (2019), “Explainer: What is the Steinmeier Formula -- And Did Zelensky Just Capitulate
To Moscow?”, October 2, https://www.rferl.org/a/what-is-the-steinmeier-formula-and-did-zelenskiy-
just-capitulate-to-moscow-/30195593.html
83
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.html

Meanwhile, Putin ensured that Russia is now seen as an energy giant, becoming
the world’s third-largest producer of oil and second-largest producer of natural gas.
Hence it started increasing its trade deals with other countries like Finland, the UAE
and India in a manner that created sustained dependence on Soviet Union. Hence,
it began laying oil and gas pipelines called Nord Stream, which carries natural gas
from Northwest Russia through the Baltic Sea directly to Germany with the pipeline
handling one-third of all Russian gas exports to Europe, especially Germany, which
is dependent on Russian energy, and this became a big concern to US. Russia also
came up with a new pipeline called Nord Stream 2, which is an expansion of the
earlier Nord Stream, approved by the German government in 2018 and completed
in 2021. Its launch, however, faced regulatory delays due to pressure from the US
which was worried that if Nord Stream 2 started operating, they would lose the EU
energy market.84 In fact, Nord Stream 2 operation received a mixed response from
EU countries and some claimed it as a geopolitical strategy from Russia to break
up EU and devastate Ukraine, and finally US strategically stalled Nord Stream 2.
What Prompted Russia’s Aggressiveness?

Basically, a majority of the Russians did not want Ukraine to be an independent nation
and always treated it as a buffer state and had a strong feeling that any day it could
merge with Russia. This is evident from what President Putin while addressing
Federation Council members, declared: “Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient
Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other”, and millions of
Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so.
Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means.
But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s
rights and interests are fully protected. And also he claimed that “Some Western
politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect
of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front”.85 But Ukraine understands
this as an imperial plot against them and wants to be an independent state and
would like to establish closer ties with EU and NATO. Russia did not like this move
because essentially it is geographically positioned on the Black Sea, is an essential
Russian nautical center, and an area of great geographical significance, because
accessing the Black Sea gives access to the Mediterranean, which is fundamental for
trade purposes. If Ukraine gets closer to EU, it will be a great threat to Russian trade.
Hence, Russia did not want Ukraine to establish closer ties with EU or West. On the
other hand, relations between these two nations became awry with the involvement
of West and NATO, which was proved in the 2014 presidential elections. Ukraine
84
Lt Gen Abhay Krishna (2022), “View: Root Cause of Ukraine-Russia Conflict”, March 4, https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-the-root-cause-of-the-ukraine-conflict/
articleshow89807225.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
85
“Address by President of the Russian Federation”, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

did not want the interference of Russia in its national and international politics and
policies and wanted to be a democratic country rather than stay put in the communist
orbit. Ukraine, being aware of the ideological conflict between East and West and
ignoring their historical ties with Russia, wanted to establish a democratic nation,
which made Russia more obsessed and hence it annexed Crimea, then the protests
began in the Donbas region and Putin spoke in support of the protestors. Beside
this continuous civil unrest in the Donbas region, both sides armies have stayed put
on the border. Russia wants a guarantee from the West that Georgia and Ukraine
will not be admitted into NATO. Both countries have not agreed to Minsk or Steinmer
Formula, therefore there was a standoff that led to further escalation. After several
talks held between Russia, NATO and the US, there was no positive outcome.
Meanwhile, the Donbas region was faced with civil unrest and more than 14,000
people died in the fighting in the Donbas region between 2014 and 2021, the
bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.86
In October 2021, Russia began moving troops and military equipment near its
border with Ukraine, reigniting concerns over a potential invasion. The US intelligence
officials warned that Russia may be planning an invasion during early 2022. In
mid-December 2021, Russia’s foreign ministry issued a set of demands calling US
and NATO to cease any military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, to commit
against further NATO expansion towards Russia, and to prevent Ukraine from joining
NATO in the future. US and other NATO allies rejected these demands and warned
Russia they would impose severe economic sanctions if Russia invaded Ukraine. US
sent additional military assistance to Ukraine, including ammunition, small arms, and
other defense weaponry. Negotiations between US, Russia, and European powers—
including France and Germany—did not result in a resolution, hence, on February
24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.87 Many countries condemned Russia’s aggression
and imposed economic sanctions on Russia.
Discussion
Basically, the conflict began in the early stages of nation-building. Most of the experts,
prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea, tried to project this as a national identity
crisis that any country could face in the beginning of the nation-building process.
Also, Russia was insecure about Ukraine’s closer ties with NATO and EU. NATO
confirmed its enlargement process posed no threat to any country and was aimed
at promoting stability and cooperation, and building a Europe which is free, united
in peace, democratic with common values.88 Russia-Ukraine relations were especially
86
Jonathan Masters (2022), “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia”, April, https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia
87
88
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_ 49212.htm #:~:text=Bulgaria %2C%20Estonia%2
C%20Latvia%2C%20Lithuania,had%20participated%20in%20the%20MAP.

difficult during the first years of independence until 1997, when a treaty on friendship,
cooperation and partnership was concluded, and again during the presidency of
Yushchenko from 2005 to 2010. Since Yanukovych was elected as the new president
in 2010, the tensions had reduced, though not eliminated.89 Since 2014, the whole
scenario changed when Russia annexed Crimea and the Donbas region became a
region of continuous civil unrest and brought international attention.
Meanwhile, many experts have differing opinions as to why Russia invaded
Ukraine. Some say conflict between Russia-Ukraine is West-created, and Russia, as
a victim, was forced to react to NATO and EU’s expansionist policies, with concern
for its national security. In other words, it is one thing to say that US and NATO
were unwise in enlarging eastward, and to believe that this threatened Russia, it is
another thing to say that this caused or justified Russia’s militarily invasion of a third
country, that is, Ukraine.90 Further, Russian leaders were angry about NATO and EU
behavior and felt betrayed. And some experts opine that it is all about Putin’s foreign
diplomacy to bring back the former Soviet Union era, and for others, the conflict
is largely driven by Russian behavior towards Ukraine.
The trade route via Black Sea and Nord Stream 2 pipeline also became a part of
the conflict as NATO and EU kept supporting Ukraine to join them and wanted to
stall Russia’s trade with the West. While Russia wants Donbas to be an autonomous
region, Ukraine wants Donbas to remain under its control. Hence, the war between
two countries became inevitable.
Conclusion
The current conflict in Europe began because of the national identity crisis among
Ukrainians during the nation-building process. Since the beginning, Ukraine lacks
a strong sense of national identity; with its east-west internal division, it has been
struggling to project a particular identity as the core national identity. Hence, it
became a challenging task for Ukraine to unite the people on a particular basis,
with the east and the west having different takes on the same. In fact, with the
involvement of Russia and NATO in the Ukraine conflict, the cause of the conflict has
been exposed, and it can viewed as an ideological conflict between Russia and NATO.
Thus, Ukraine became a zone of war. On the other hand, the Donbas region has
been fighting for its sovereignty amidst the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The
NATO-imposed sanctions on Russia do not seem to have any impact, and in fact
reflected negatively on NATO, especially Germany, as most of its energy requirements
come from Russia. The world on the whole is paying a heavy price economically for
the conflict.
89
90
Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri (2018), “The Causes and Consequences of Russia’s Actions Towards
Ukraine”, June 16, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/06/16/the-causes-and-consequences-of-russias-actions-
towards-ukraine/

The paper elucidates that in the process of nation-building, divisions on the basis
of language, culture, ethnicity, and ideology are inevitable. And, with holding on to
a particular identity strongly, conflict is also inevitable. Russia and Ukraine should
solve their disputes diplomatically without mediators to end the war and put the world
economy back on track.
Bibliography
1. Janmaat J G (2000), “Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy
and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population”, KNAG. University of
Amsterdam, https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=d45dfbcc-e5ad-4c39-a882-
aacdf29082dc
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), “Concept of the
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf 1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d
9002b1c38!OpenDocument. Accessed on October 29, 2014.
3. Putin (2013), “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6007
4. Riabchuk M (2007), “Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why Ukraine is Trapped
Between East and West”, in S Velychenko (Ed.), Ukraine, the EU and Russia, Studies
in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London, https://doi.org/
10.1057/9780230287037_4
5. Vladimir Putin (2021), “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, July
12, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
Reference # 55J-2022-10-01-01

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National Identity Complexities:

Genesis of Russian-Ukraine Conflict

8 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2022

National Identity Complexities: 9

Conflict of National Identity in the Process of Nation-Building

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Western Ukraine Argument

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Eastern Ukraine Argument

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Complexities in Policy Preference

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Orange Revolution led to the ouster of a pro-Russian leader. Meanwhile, the

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Negotiating the ‘Russian World’

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Political Fraternity in Ukraine

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Russia Annexes Crimea

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Role of NATO and the US in Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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What Prompted Russia’s Aggressiveness?

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