The impact of merit-pay systems on the

work and attitudes of Mexican academics

Jesús Francisco Galaz-Fontes & Manuel

Gil-Antón

Higher Education
The International Journal of Higher
Education Research

ISSN 0018-1560

High Educ
DOI 10.1007/s10734-013-9610-3

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DOI 10.1007/s10734-013-9610-3

The impact of merit-pay systems on the work

and attitudes of Mexican academics

Jesús Francisco Galaz-Fontes • Manuel Gil-Antón

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The central purpose of this work is to present data that evaluates the impact and
perspectives of various merit-pay systems directed at Mexican academics. To this end a
brief description is provided of recent Mexican higher education evolution, including that
of merit-pay programs. It is proposed that faculty merit-pay systems, in the context of
several institutional performance-based funding programs, and of a general conditional
cash transfer approach to the distribution of public funding, have created a de facto supra-
institutional academic rank ladder based on the academic’s participation in the highly
prestiged and well-remunerated National Researcher’s System (SNI), and on the aca-
demic’s highest degree (HD). Data is presented showing that increasing SNI–HD ranks are
associated with less teaching, more research, stronger academic preference for research
activities and less institutional involvement. Several collateral negative side-effects of this
situation are highlighted and questions are posed in relation to the long-range pertinence of
merit-pay systems with the characteristics that are current in the case of Mexican higher
education.

Keywords Academics  Merit-pay systems  Academic work  Higher education  México

In its modernization process Mexican public higher education has embraced strategies
consistent with a globalized market perspective and the new public management approach
(Enders et al. 2009). Under these positions higher education and knowledge are seen as
economic commodities in a global market heavily controlled by universities in developed
countries (Marginson and Ordorika 2010), and the rationale for the distribution of public
funds changes from general transfers to public services, to focalized transfers targeting

J. F. Galaz-Fontes (&)
Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, Blvd. Castellón y
Lombardo Toledano s/n, Col. Esperanza Agrı́cola, 21350 Mexicali, Baja California, Mexico
e-mail: galazfontes@gmail.com

M. Gil-Antón
Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, El Colegio de México, Camino al Ajusco 20,
Pedregal de Santa Teresa, 10740 Distrito Federal, Mexico

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those actors that need or deserve them the most (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Villatoro
2005). Associated to evaluation and performance-based funding at the institutional and
program levels, faculty merit-pay programs are amongst the general strategies adopted
(Rubio-Oca 2006).
While it has been contended that merit-pay programs do not function at all in the long
run (Kohn 1994), it is commonly assumed that whatever impact they have it is because
they act largely at the individual level, both as a recognition for faculty work satisfying a
particular set of criteria and, at the same time, as an incentive to induce change in future
work. There is also an implicit assumption that such programs do not have, if properly
design and implemented, major dysfunctional side-effects for academics or for the insti-
tutions in which they work. However, irrespective of such considerations, the incorporation
of faculty merit-pay programs by an institution implicitly accepts that ‘‘normal’’ working
conditions, including particularly the motivational dimension of academics and the mon-
etary and non-monetary retributions associated to their work, are insufficient in promoting
a high-quality performance and commitment to the job. This perspective is particularly
troublesome, as academic work has been traditionally considered as being intrinsically
motivating (McKeachie 1979).
In the United States and in Canada the merit-pay strategy has been implemented in a
good proportion of higher education institutions and is seen, quite often, as part of the
normal state of affairs of faculty working conditions, particularly at institutions in which
faculty unions have a low profile. However, merit-pay income usually represents, in such
countries, a relatively small amount of faculty’s contractual salary, in the order of 2–4 %
increase at the most (Amey and VanDerLinden 2002; Grant 1998). As it will be observe
shortly, this magnitude factor is very different for the Mexican case.
Given the contemporary and global relevance of higher education and knowledge
(Marginson and Ordorika 2010) faculty work has become increasingly subject to public
scrutiny and regulation, including the setting up of faculty merit-pay programs. So, due to
the current need that many countries face for aligning their investment in higher education
and science and technology, evaluating faculty merit-pay programs becomes relevant and
can have strong policy implications, particularly for countries with developing higher
education, science and technology systems.
Merit-pay retribution schemes, it must be noted, are far from foreign to the academic
profession. The traditional academic ranks of assistant, associate and full professor are not
only landmark points of an academic career trajectory, but also constitute a merit-based
prestige and pay system (Altbach 1991). Ideally, this merit-ranking scheme system pro-
vides in its compensation dimension, from the starting rank, an adequate income for a
middle-class life that increases in each successive step upward; is implemented by a group
of competent peers that evaluates the academic merit of the faculty involved in the
evaluation according to procedures that are part of the governance structure of the insti-
tution and, finally, the time frame involved is long-termed in relation to the time-period
being evaluated, as well as to their impact on the professional status and income of the
faculty member involved.
In the case of Mexican higher education, in contrast to the situation previously depicted,
faculty merit-pay programs started to function in the 1980s over the background of a low
contractual income, were implemented by way of policies and procedures largely dictated
and controlled by federal agencies and institutional officials, and were short-termed in their
faculty income impact (Ibarra Colado 2001; Kent 2002; Ordorika Sacristán 2004).
There are various aspects of merit-pay programs, but in the case of Mexican academics
probably the most salient one is the fact that the income coming from them can represent

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more than half of a faculty member income (Ordorika Sacristán and Navarro Trujillo
2006). What happens under such circumstances? What happens when merit-pay programs
are not dependent, to a significant degree, upon the internal criteria of the institution that
directly hires a faculty member, but rather depend, partially or totally, of an external
governmental office? What happens when individual merit criteria externally determined
do not only influence individual merit-pay income, but also institutional public funding?
While these questions have been addressed on the basis of institutional case studies (e.g.,
Canales Sánchez 2001; Krotz 1993), there is still a significant gap in terms of using data
coming from national studies.
In this work we will put forward such questions in relation to Mexican academic merit-
pay programs which, taken together, can be conceived as a system. The work is organized
in three sections. While a brief description of the recent evolution of Mexican higher
education is provided in the first one, the ‘‘Faculty merit-pay programs in Mexican higher
education’’ section describes the main programs that constitute the Mexican faculty merit-
pay system. In this same section a summary of the research done around merit-pay pro-
grams in Mexico is provided. In the ‘‘The impact of merit-pay programs in Mexican
faculty’’ section results from a recent national survey on Mexican academics are used to
evaluate, in a general way the impact of merit-pay programs on faculty work, productivity,
academic preference and professional affiliations. Finally, some concluding comments are
provided.

Recent evolution of Mexican higher education

Mexican higher education has evolved substantially since the 1970s. Change has taken
place both at the quantitative and the qualitative level. At the quantitative level increments
in the number of students, institutions and faculty are well, if not always exactly docu-
mented (Gil-Antón et al. 2009). So, while in the early 1970s gross enrollment rate was
around 6 % relative to the 19–23 years group, by 2007 it had reached about 27 %. Behind
these relative figures the number of students attending higher education increased,
approximately, from 257 thousand to 2,623,367. Associated to this expansion, the number
of higher education institutions (HEIs) went, during the same period, from around 115 to
2,314. Finally, the number of faculty augmented from 25,000 to 279,886 (SEP 2008).
In addition to the above quantitative dimensions, Mexican higher education has also
changed along other more qualitative dimensions like student body composition in terms of
gender and socioeconomic status, type and geographical distribution of public and private
HEIs, and institutional and system-wide planning and administration (Rubio-Oca 2006).
At the core of the above changes it is possible to identify a new set of public policies
that have organized the relationships between the State and public higher education (Ibarra
Colado 2010; Rodrı́guez-Gómez and Casanova-Cardiel 2005). In the context of decreasing
public financial support evaluation, accountability, efficiency and performance-based
funding are now central concepts in the way Mexican higher education is managed and
coordinated (Ibarra Colado 2001; Mendoza-Rojas 2002).
Because the expansion of higher education during the 1970s demanded a huge incre-
ment in the number of faculty, these were frequently incorporated into permanent positions
independently of their usually fragile academic profile. So, for example, around one-third
of all new faculty hired during that expansion period did not have a licensure degree, and

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nearly another 50 % only had such a degree (Gil-Antón et al. 1994).1 With the economic
down-turn of the 1980s the Mexican State faced a higher education system in which faculty
had serious limitations in their professional profile and, additionally, were severely
underpaid, as by the mid 1980s faculty salaries have shrunk to around 40 % of its previous
levels (Gil-Antón 2002; Martı́nez della Roca and Ordorika Sacristán 1993).
While financial and quality issues facing Mexican higher education and its academic body
were accruing, it was the economic situation that was most evident and, in the context of the
country general situation, most urgent to attend. In the early 1980s, Mexican authorities faced
a dilemma in terms of approaching such situation by increasing, overall, faculty income and,
at the same time, creating conditions for substantially fostering academic work and/or, on the
other hand, creating programs directed at high-level academics in order to save their income
situation and, at the same time, send messages regarding what was considered an appropriate
profile and work amongst academics. Public authorities at the highest level, considering the
input of highly prestigious researchers (Bensimon and Ordorika 2006), choose to follow the
second option, and so it was that faculty merit-pay programs appear in Mexican higher
education, the National Researchers’ System (SNI, for Sistema Nacional de Investigadores)
being the first of its kind. It was expected to be temporary, but it was actually the seed for
future merit-pay programs. We know turn to them.

Faculty merit-pay programs in Mexican higher education

Mexican higher education public policies are currently characterized, at the federal level, by
evaluation, performance-base funding and increased transparency and accountability
(Rubio-Oca 2006). The core actors and components of higher education: students, faculty,
programs and institutions themselves, are now subject to various evaluation processes. The
association of evaluation to performance-based funding, however, introduces powerful
incentives for higher education actors to reach (or report only) performance criteria in order to
attain needed or expected levels of funding. In a situation in which Mexican higher education
is not characterized, in general, by a strong academic culture on the one hand and, on the other,
by effective transparency and accountability policies, the attainment of incentives through the
documentation of various indexes, rather than quality itself, has become the most important
criterion by which higher education performance is currently judged. Distinguishing between
quality and its indexes is not always easy, but the difference is important and can have far-
reaching consequences. Discriminating between the statement ‘‘a program is of high quality
because it is accredited,’’ and the assertion that ‘‘the program is accredited because it is of high
quality’’ can be for many only a game of words, but the underlying difference illustrates a
profound concern regarding the validity of the indexes used to evaluated something. This
situation, the tendency to equate the ‘‘real’’ institution with the indexes that describe it, has
made some higher education observers to speak of a ‘‘paper’’ university (Porter 2003).
In the case of the faculty there are four programs that affect them in a direct way. The
SNI already mentioned, the Program for the Improvement of the Professoriate (PROMEP,
Programa de Mejoramiento del Profesorado), Academic Bodies (ABs) and, finally, insti-
tutional merit-pay programs (IMPPs). On the other hand, program accreditation at the
licensure level, the National Graduate Program Register (PNPC, Padrón Nacional de
1
The licensure degree is the Mexican equivalent to a non-graduate bachelors degree. However, the
licensure degree is closer to a first-professional degree, as it emphasizes professional practice, as the name of
the degree testifies to.

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Posgrados de Calidad) and the Integral Program for Institutional Improvement (PIFI,
Programa Integral de Fortalecimiento Institucional), are non-faculty evaluation programs
with funding implications for the institution in which faculty work. In these programs the
profile of the faculty, particularly that of full-time, is most relevant and influences, beyond
a base-level funding, additional funds critical to the development of the institution at
question.
Two of the above programs, SNI and IMPPs, provide faculty with additional personal
income for the time period in which the academic is part of such programs. PROMEP and
ABs, on the other hand, provide funding for infrastructure and complementary support for
research-related activities (e.g., computer equipment and travel expenses). SNI is a
national program run by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT,
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologı́a) that evaluates a faculty member on the basis of
his/her research productivity and awards a monthly scholarship depending upon the level
(out of four) in which his/her performance locates him. In addition to its personal income
impact, it has become increasingly important for securing research funds. A central aspect
of SNI is that the evaluation that supports the program is done by highly-recognized peers,
so it is the most prestigious of these programs. The income provided by the mentioned
scholarships, although maintained along 3 years and even more, is not permanent, and the
level of it can be reduced depending upon the evaluation performed at the renewal of the
scholarship.
IMPPs, in contrast to SNI, are programs run at the institutional level. Although some
HEIs provide extra funding for their programs, their financial support comes largely from
the federal government. Also, although the rules and provisions under which these pro-
grams operate are dictated by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Secretarı́a de
Hacienda y Crédito Público), it is not uncommon to find HEIs making adjustments to these
programs in response to their particular realities (e.g., Cordero Arroyo et al. 2003). As
stated, IMPPs also provide additional personal income, although, when compared to SNI,
on the basis of shorter time periods.
PROMEP is a national-program that provides individual faculty with a one-time only
fund, while ABs provides support to groups of academics to improve their quality or ‘‘level
of consolidation’’ (Urbano-Vidales et al. 2006). Such funds are labeled and are usually
used for equipment, infrastructure and research-related activities. The participation in these
programs, however, has become increasingly important to HEIs as faculty’s involvement in
them influences powerfully licensure program accreditation, and PIFI considers it in an
important way in its evaluation scheme. Additionally, CONACTY, has started recently to
consider it as a factor in the decision of awarding research funds to a particular academic.
Accreditation of licensure programs has an important funding consequence for the
programs and institutions involved. For a HEI having its programs accredited is of the
outmost importance, as this factor is heavily considered by PIFI, a program with definitive
funding consequences for the institution. As it would be natural to expect, the character-
istics of the faculty, including its amount relative to the number of students attended, is
highly important for licensure programs to attain accreditation.
PNPC is one of CONACYT’s core programs and its main purpose is to increase the
quality of graduate programs. Being positively evaluated in such program implies, among
other things, the availability of scholarships for students of the program in question, so
PNPC does have strong funding consequences for the program. A central aspect evaluated
by PNPC is the profile and performance of the faculty involved in it.
Finally, PIFI is a performance-based funding program run by the Undersecretariat of
Higher Education of the Ministry of Public Education (Rubio-Oca 2006). At the center of it

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are the concepts of academic capacity, defined by faculty’s characteristics (highest degree,
membership in SNI and PROMEP, and the ‘‘consolidation’’ level of the academic bodies in
which they participate), and academic competitiveness (licensure and graduate programs
accredited). PIFI includes other aspects of the functioning of a HEI (administration and
infrastructure, to name two more). PIFI has become central to institutions to the extent that
public-funding based on student enrollment and academic plant is kept barely at a survival
level, and additional financial resources are contingent upon performance, at least at the
level of the reports handed into the undersecretariat, in this program.
Although created at different moments and with varying rationales, over the course of
the last decade all of the above policies and programs have been dealt in an increasingly
coordinated manner. Higher education researchers, in noticing such trend, have devoted
considerable attention to the evaluation of such policies and programs (e.g., Dı́az Barriga
and Pacheco Méndez 1997; Ordorika Sacristán 2004). In the case of academics research
has focused on the organizational, market and political rationale behind their use (e.g.,
Ibarra Colado 2010; Ordorika 2004), on the impact of faculty merit-pay programs (e.g.,
Dı́az Barriga 1997; Rueda Beltrán 1999), and on the operational aspects of merit-pay
systems (e.g., Cordero Arroyo et al. 2003). Ordorika and Navarro Trujillo (2006) have
called procedural the research dealing with the last two categories, and substantive the
research focusing in the first topics.
While there is evidence that by building institutionally appropriate criteria it is possible
to recognize both research and teaching (Cordero Arroyo et al. 2003), there is also a
general consensus that merit-pay systems promote a powerful segmentation of the faculty,
an individualistic perspective to academic work, simulation of substantive work and other
non-productive side effects (Ordorika Sacristán and Navarro Trujillo 2006) and, finally,
such programs are seen as reflecting a new way by which the state is controlling faculty
work, which is much more attuned with a business environment and a market approach to
higher education and knowledge in general (Bensimon and Ordorika 2006).

The impact of merit-pay programs in Mexican faculty

Having described the network of faculty merit-pay programs that are currently in function
in Mexican higher education, as well as the research literature around them, we will now
analyze their impact in Mexican academics. To this end we will use the data gathered in a
national faculty survey carried out during the 2007–2008 academic year. The survey was
done in the context of The Changing Academic Profession international project (Locke
et al. 2011). The data used here pertain to 1,775 FT faculty members representative of all
types of HEIs (Galaz-Fontes et al. 2009), as now days all Mexican HEIs, including private
one, can be said to have been influenced by the public policies already described.
Although there are various merit-pay programs targeting Mexican FT faculty, they are
all oriented, in general terms, in the same direction: high disciplinary habilitation, which
has been made equivalent to the attainment of a graduate degree, ideally a doctorate; a high
performance level in research, which has been interpreted in terms of a good publication
record in well-respected journals and publishing companies, and finally an acceptable
teaching activity, which has been measured essentially by the number and level of courses
attended and, to a lesser extent, students’ opinions. The assumption is that the new profile
and productivity characteristics of FT faculty will make them do a better job both in
teaching and research. Besides the significant additional income that these merit-pay
programs represent for individual faculty, which in itself is a powerful incentive for them

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to abide by the rules of such programs, HEIs are also financially rewarded, mainly by PIFI
but also by PNPC, if they report that their academic staff is making progress along the lines
specified by federal programs like SNI and PROMEP. In this way there is a high level of
congruity regarding the particular kind of changes among the faculty that the described
programs are promoting.
Merit-pay programs have channeled a considerable amount of resources since this
meritocratic movement started in the early 1980s with SNI. Under such circumstance, it is
only natural to ask about the impact that such initiatives have had in FT faculty and the
work performed by them.
The impact of faculty merit-pay programs can be documented in various aspects. In
terms of one of its central purposes, these programs have been shown to have promoted a
significant increment in academics’ highest degree (Grediaga Kuri et al. 2004; Urbano-
Vidales et al. 2006). As shown in Table 1, in 1992 50.4 % of all FT faculty reported
having, at the most, a licensure as their highest degree (Gil-Antón 1996). At the same time,
only 11.9 % reported holding a doctorate. Closer in time, as the number of FT faculty
increased from approximately 47,000 to 75,863 from 1994 to 2005 (SEP and ANUIES
1997), in 2007 the percentage of FT faculty reporting a licensure as their highest degree
had decreased to 24.8 %, while the corresponding figure for a doctorate degree increased to
33.5 %.
This change in FT highest degree, involving thousands of academics, has been obtained
in two ways. In the first place, by FT faculty already working in higher education taking
advantage of institutional professional development opportunities supported by federal
funds (PROMEP, CONACYT) and by faculty’s own initiative. While in 2007 24.8 % of
the surveyed faculty reported having a licensure degree (see Table 1), 61.7 % of all the
surveyed academics reported to have entered the academic profession with a licensure
degree (see Table 2). This change in academic profile speaks of the fact that a considerable
percentage of Mexican faculty continues their formal professional development while
already working FT at a HEI (Padilla 2008).
Secondly, the federal government has, through various programs and initiatives, pro-
moted the hiring, into a FT position, of academics with a graduate degree. Identifying FT
faculty according to periods in which they occupied their first FT/HT appointment in a
HEI, Table 2 shows that until 1990 almost three of every four new hires had a maximum of
a licensure degree, and that such figure diminished up to 38.3 % in those entering the
academic profession since 1999. At the same time, new hires with a master and with a
doctorate increased, for the first and last period considered, from 16.3 to 37.5 %, and from

Table 1 Highest degree of Mexican full-time faculty in 1992 (NT = 609) and 2007 (NT = 1,775)
Highest degree Years

1992 (n = 605)a 2007 (n = 1,769)b

Licensure (up to) 50.4 24.8

Masters 37.6 41.7
Doctorate 11.9 33.5
Total 100.0 100.0

Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

a
1992 International Survey of the Academic Profession
b
2007 The Changing Academic Project

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Table 2 Full-time faculty by highest degree in first full- or half-time appointment, by period of entry into
the academic profession (percentages) (NT = 1,775)
Period of entry into the n Highest degree in first FT/HT contract Total
academic profession
Up to licensure Masters Doctorate

Up to 1982 331 75.8 16.3 7.9 100.0

1983–1990 358 73.7 21.8 4.5 100.0
1991–1998 340 63.5 24.7 11.8 100.0
1999–2007 413 38.3 37.5 24.2 100.0
Total 1,442 61.7 25.7 12.6 100.0
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

7.9 to 24.2 %, respectively. The appearance of SNI in 1984, which was the only merit-pay
program in place up to around 1989, at which time institutional merit-pay programs started
to appear, is not closely associated to an improvement of the profile of faculty entering the
profession. The improvement in Mexican academics’ highest degree is clearly evident in
the period 1991–1998, when SNI, IMPPs and professional development opportunities
(PROMEP) were already functioning. SNI, focusing on high-quality research, is still rel-
evant for around 20 % of all FT faculty, while IMPPs and PROMEP are targeted, at least in
principle, to all FT faculty.
Having documented that Mexican academics’ degree credentials have improved since
various merit-pay programs are functioning in parallel, it is now relevant to assess the
impact of these same programs on academic work. To do this, however, we will first
categorize Mexican faculty according to their participation in SNI, the most important
merit-program currently in place, and by highest degree, a factor which was signaled by
several external reports to be a definitive weakness of Mexican higher education (OCDE
1997) and, congruent with such appreciation, has been a central component of merit-pay
programs.
The income and prestige relevance of faculty merit-pay programs in Mexican higher
education is such that, beyond institutional careers categories (the traditional assistant,
associate and full faculty positions), we will speak of a national academic rank hierarchy,
the SNI-Degree ranking, that can be identify first, by whether an academic is a SNI
member, and second, by its highest degree, since highest degree is closely related to its
participation in institutional merit-pay programs and PROMEP. Both SNI and IMPPs
provide to academics, it must be remembered, additional individual income on a monthly
regular basis.
With such logic in mind a SNI–Highest Degree (SNI–HD) academic ranking of Mex-
ican faculty was created. Rather than using participation in institutional merit-pay pro-
grams as a second criterion for this new academic ladder, highest degree was used because
it is more stable than participation in institutional merit-pay programs and, as well, because
its reference is quite clear and not dependent upon working in a particular HEI, similarly to
what happens with participation in SNI. Additionally, highest degree constitutes a quite
good proxy for participation in institutional merit-pay programs, as these place a strong
emphasis on faculty’s academic credentials. So, it is contended that the proposed SNI–HD
categorization is intuitive, understandable and simple in the context of Mexican higher
education. Tables 3 and 4 show the details behind this rank categorization of Mexican
faculty.

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Table 3 Distribution of FT
Highest degree National Researchers’ System Total
Mexican faculty according to
(SNI)
their membership in the National
Researchers’ System (SNI) and No Yes n %
their highest degree, SNI-HD
rank (NT = 1,775) Up to licensure 327 7 334 19.7
Graduate studies, 765 14 779 45.9
up to masters
Doctorate 240 345 585 34.4
Total 1,332 366 1,698
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico.
National database, 2009 % 78.4 21.6 100.0

Table 4 Categorization of FT
SNI—highest degree ranks n %
Mexican faculty according to
their membership in the National
Researchers’ System (SNI) and Non-SNI Licensure 327 19.3
their highest degree, SNI-HD Non-SNI Masters 765 45.0
rank (NT = 1,775) Non-SNI Doctorate 240 14.1
SNI Members 366 21.5
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. Total 1,698 99.9
National database, 2009

One way to validate this SNI–HD ranking is to analyze faculty’s participation in merit-
programs other than SNI. Table 5 shows that there is a high correlation between successive
SNI–HD ranks and participation in IMPPs and, at the same time, in PROMEP. This can be
interpreted as evidence that merit-pay programs and its criteria, more than institutional
rank categories, are now organizing faculty’s work and, at a more general level, regulating
their academic career.
Associated to participation in merit-pay programs is the personal income issue. As
Table 6 shows, significant difference in total income for each successive SNI–HD rank are
readily observed. While there is a 26.9 % difference in mean contractual income between
the ‘‘lower’’ and the ‘‘higher’’ SNI–HD ranks, which could actually be label as low in the
context of developed countries, that difference increases up to 1,750.4 % between those

Table 5 Mexican FT faculty participating in various incentive programs, by faculty’s rank in the SNI-HD
(National Researches’ System and Highest Degree) ranking order (NT = 1,775)
SNI—highest degree rank Institutional merit-pay program PROMEP, Program for the
Improvement of the Professoriatea

n % n %

Non-SNI Licensure 326 32.8 97 1.0

Non-SNI Masters 760 53.3 385 33.0
Non-SNI Doctorate 240 60.8 110 58.2
SNI Members 366 72.7 113 84.1
Total 1,692 54.6 705 40.7
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009
a
Only FT faculty working in public state institutions have been considered in this program, as it has been
mainly targeted at such institutions (Urbano-Vidales et al. 2006)

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Table 6 Approximately mean monthly income (US dollars in fall 2007) from various sources, for FT
Mexican faculty, by faculty’s SNI-HD rank (NT = 1,775)
SNI—highest n Income source
degree rank
Contract Merit-pay Total Percentage of incentive relative to
income programs incomea total income

Non-SNI 318 1,609 119 1,921 6.2

Licensure
Non-SNI Masters 751 1,784 323 2,399 13.5
Non-SNI 237 2,224 606 3,073 19.7
Doctorate
SNI Members 330 2,042 2,202 4,433 49.7
Total 1,636 1,866 703 2,814 25.0
a
Total income is not equal to the addition of contract and merit-pay income, as total income includes other
sources in addition to those specified in this table
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

same ranks when only income from merit-pay programs is considered. The percentage
difference in total income, 130.8 %, is by no means extreme under international standards,
but the source of the difference yes. Table 6 also shows that income from merit-pay
programs represent, on average and relative to total income, and advancing from the lower
to the highest SNI–HD category, 6.2, 13.5, 19.7 and 49.7 %.
The above figures are disproportionally out of range when speaking of ‘‘incentives,’’
particularly seen in the context of income contribution of merit-pay programs in the United
States, where they were first implemented (Amey and VanDerLinden 2002). Except for the
Non-SNI Licensure category, income from merit-pay program constitute an excessively
high percentage of their contractual salary. The income stratification shown is probably the
main reason why the upper SNI–HD ranks can be considered responsible for pulling
faculty to advance in this career ladder defined, essentially, by research and highest
degrees.
Having documented a supra-institutional faculty ranking system that is increasingly a de
facto career ladder due to its very powerful impact, is this career ladder related to other
dimensions in addition to income? More specifically, is there a relation between the SNI–
HD ranking and the academic work performed by Mexican Faculty? One way of answering
this question is by observing the relationship between faculty’s distribution of their time
and their SNI–HD rank. As it can be observed in Table 7, the higher the SNI–HD rank, the
less teaching and the more research is reported by faculty: from 24.4 to 15.2, and from 4.2
to 20.3 h per week devoted, respectively, to teaching and research. Service and adminis-
tration, on the other hand, are also done less by SNI members, although the difference with
their non-SNI colleagues in not as big.
What this data show is that the SNI–HD ranks reflect, essentially, a research-centered
recognition and incentive system. Given the natural demand of time by research activities,
it is only natural, then, to observe a decrement in teaching activities (which actually occurs
both in terms of time devoted to classes and time invested in additional teaching activities)
and, to a lesser extent, a decrement in time devoted to service and administration. Given, in
general terms, the local nature of teaching, service and administrative activities, it is clear
that the incentives described here are pulling faculty into research and, with it, are moving
away faculty from their teaching and institutional dynamics. Congruent with this

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Table 7 Mean weekly hours devoted to various activities by faculty according to their SNI-Highest Degree
rank, when classes are in session (NT = 1,775)
SNI—highest degree rank n Academic activity

Teaching Research Service Administration Other Total

Non-SNI Licensure 283 24.4 4.2 1.8 9.5 4.3 44.2

Non-SNI Masters 687 23.5 7.4 1.8 9.0 4.2 45.8
Non-SNI Doctorate 224 21.3 11.8 1.8 8.1 4.1 47.2
SNI Members 335 15.2 20.3 1.3 6.3 4.2 47.3
Total 1,539 21.5 10.2 1.7 8.4 4.2 46.0
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

‘‘cosmopolitan’’ (Gouldner 1958) interpretation, it has been documented that SNI members
tend to become highly international, increasingly capitalizing on their international aca-
demic capital (Didou-Aupetit and Gérard 2010).
Associated to the time distribution previously presented, Table 8 shows, as it would be
expected, that research products increase with SNI–HD rank, which also reflects more time
devoted to research. So, research products move from 2.3 products during the past 3 years,
to 5.9, to 10.8 and finally to 17.1 for faculty in the ranks of, respectively, Non-SNI
Licensures, Non-SNI Masters, Non-SNI Doctorates and, finally, SNI Members. At the
same time, and as it would also be natural to expect, ‘‘productivity’’ in teaching at the
licensure level varies inversely with research productivity, at least in terms of the mean
number of students attended (118, 109, 79 and 40 students for each superior SNI–HD
rank). At the graduate level, however, students attended increases with SNI–HD rank,
although this increment is not as big nor as clear than that at the licensure level. It is quite
interesting to observe that neither Non-SNI Doctorates and SNI Members concentrate their
teaching efforts, in terms of students attended, at the graduate level.
Once again, the data presented reinforce the idea that the SNI–HD ranking constitutes a
career ladder that emphasize research versus teaching, even at the graduate level. Given the
significant pull that the incentive systems represent in terms of the income associated with

Table 8 Students attended at the licensure, masters and doctorate level during current academic year, and
academic publications in last 3 years, by SNI-highest degree rank (NT = 1,775)
SNI-highest degree rank Students attended at different levels during current Academic productsa in
academic year last 3 years

Licensure Masters Doctorate

n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean

Non-SNI Licensure 279 118 300 0 300 0 267 2.3

Non-SNI Masters 694 109 712 5 724 0 711 5.9
Non-SNI Doctorate 222 79 226 12 229 3 237 10.8
SNI Members 344 40 346 10 349 3 364 17.1
Total 1,539 91 1,584 6 1,602 1 1,578 8.6
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009
a
Index built by adding directly the number of academic books authored, books edited, journal papers, book
chapters, research monographs and conference presentations reported for the last 3 years

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them, two questions arise. In the first place, what will happen to teaching if the described
merit-pay programs are successful in pulling the majority of all FT faculty, particularly
those that are highly competent, away from teaching. In the second place, what is the
message received by those that have a preference for and concentrate in teaching, par-
ticularly faculty with a doctorate degree that either do not do research or do some, but do
not reach a research productivity level that allows them to enter the SNI program, that is, to
advance in the SNI–HD career ladder?
In addition to being related to teaching and research activities, the SNI–HD rank is also
quite orderly related to faculty’s teaching vs. research academic preference. Specifically,
preference for teaching, whether primarily or in combination with some research,
decreases as SNI–HD rank increases, starting at 83.0 for Non-SNI Licensure faculty, to
8.3 % for SNI members (see Table 9). At the same time, research preference, also
exclusively or in combination with some teaching, begins at 17.0 % for faculty at the Non-
SNI Licensure rank, and ends up at 91.7 % for SNI members. Looking at the total figures it
is evident that Mexican faculty are somewhat more teaching oriented (54.8 vs. 45.2 %),
something consistent with the teaching tradition in Mexican higher education. However,
Tables 7 and 8 can be interpreted to show that the economic benefits associated with
research are such that they have been pulling academic work and apparently also hearts, in
that direction. What Table 9 adds is the possibility that the superior SNI–HD ranks are also
impacting faculty’s academic preference.
In addition to the relationship between merit-pay programs and faculty’s teaching and
research, such programs also appear to promote a disengagement of academics in insti-
tutional governance, a situation that has already been signaled by previous research (Dı́az
Barriga 1997; Canales Sánchez 2001). Table 10 shows that, while IMMPs are seen as
having a positive impact on faculty’s professional development, particularly by those in the
two upper ranks of the SNI–HD career ladder (60.5 and 70.4 % for, respectively, Non-SNI
Doctorates and SNI members), the opinion for the case of the SNI program is even more
favorable from the perspective of those that participate in it (85.9 %). On the other hand,
involvement in institutional governance is only recognized by a minority of the same
groups of faculty as having been facilitated by IMPPs (35.5 and 30.6 % for, respectively,
Non-SNI Doctorates and SNI members) and by SNI (22.7 %).

Table 9 Distribution of Mexican FT faculty along a teaching-research preference scale, by SNI-HD rank
(percentages) (NT = 1,775)
SNI–highest Regarding your own preferences, do your interests lie primarily in teaching or in research
degree rank
n Primarily in In both, but leaning In both, but leaning Primarily in
teaching toward teaching toward research research

Non-SNI 311 36.0 46.9 15.4 1.6

Licensure
Non-SNI 743 21.9 47.9 27.2 3.0
Masters
Non-SNI 241 10.8 30.7 51.9 6.6
Doctorate
SNI Members 361 0.8 7.5 70.9 20.8
Total 1,656 18.4 36.4 38.1 7.1
Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

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Table 10 Percentages of FT faculty, by SNI-HD rank, that agreed/strongly agreed with statements relative
to the influence of institutional merit-pay programs and the National Researchers’ System on faculty’s
professional development and involvement in institutional governance (NT = 1,775)
SNI-highest degree rank This program has impacted positively This program has facilitated my
my professional development involvement in institutional
governance

Institutional National Institutional National

merit-pay Researchers’ merit-pay Researchers0
program System program System

n % n % N % n %

Non-SNI Licensure 201 59.7 NA NA 153 37.9 NA NA

Non-SNI Masters 563 56.3 NA NA 474 38.6 NA NA
Non-SNI Doctorate 162 60.5 NA NA 138 35.5 NA NA
SNI Members 291 70.4 340 85.9 219 30.6 251 22.7
Total 1,217 60.8 455 70.5 984 36.3 345 20.9

So, while IMPPs are seen as influencing positively academics’ professional develop-
ment by faculty in all ranks, SNI is also seen in that way by most SNI members. However,
nor IMPPs, nor SNI, are seen as promoting a larger involvement in institutional gover-
nance, which, by the way, is relatively small to begin with. These results can be interpreted
as showing that as a faculty member advances in SNI–HD rank, he/she will be more
involved in his/her professional development, which will be increasingly related to
research, and be less involved in teaching and, at the same time, also less engaged in
institutional governance. In this context, is the SNI–HD ranking an appropriate academic
rank structure for faculty working in a HEI that is still growing and developing itself? What
happens to institutions when their core human resource become less and less involved in
relation to its mission, if this happens to be a teaching one?
As it is commonly found in other contexts, Mexican FT faculty report high levels of
disciplinary affiliation; around 80 % of them expressed a very high level of it (see
Table 11). However, SNI members reported the least very high affiliation in respect both to
their institution (64.7 %) and to the specific unit in which they work (51.8 %). These
results, together with those of Table 9, could be explained by a tendency for academics in
the higher SNI–HD ranks to see their immediate work environment mainly as a platform
for the work that will allow them to obtain economic benefits from the institution and, even
more, from the federal program that supports SNI. These dispositions are most probably
associated with a diminished tendency to be part of institutional life (Suárez Zozaya and
Muñoz Garcı́a 2004).
Results presented thus far show that merit-pay programs are economic and prestige-
wise important to Mexican faculty. On the basis of such importance we contend that their
upper categories have constitute themselves, more than the higher levels of institutionally
defined faculty ranks, as the reference points of a supra-institutional faculty ranking sys-
tem. Additionally, because both the faculty and the institution receive additional funds
when faculty advance through the SNI–HD ranks, there are strong incentives for both,
faculty and institutions, to put aside substantive issues related to the academic work being
done, as well as to the quality of it, and pursue in a more or less direct way the formal
attainment of the criteria that can facilitate the incorporation of faculty to the higher
positions of the SNI–HD ranking. Although no quantitative research has been done

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Table 11 Percentages of FT faculty, by SNI-HD rank, that reported that their affiliation to their discipline,
unit of assignment and institution, was very important (NT = 1,775)
SNI—highest degree rank Affiliation reference

Discipline Unit of assignment Institution

n % n % n %

Non-SNI Licensure 319 81.2 321 70.4 322 79.5

Non-SNI Masters 758 85.4 756 68.6 759 80.5
Non-SNI Doctorate 239 79.1 239 56.9 240 67.1
SNI Members 361 83.4 363 51.8 360 64.7
Total 1,677 83.2 1,069 63.7 1,681 75.0

Source: CAP Survey, Mexico. National database, 2009

directed specifically around ‘‘uncomfortable’’ actual practices that are said to be used to
advance in the SNI–HD ranking, there is common talk among academics of the following
(e.g., Acosta-Silva 2004; Bensimon and Ordorika 2006; Dı́az Barriga 1997).
• Credentialization of graduate training. Accepting a graduate degree without consid-
eration of the overall quality of the institution awarding it, whether national or from
abroad, or of the particular program. At some universities even presidents have
explicitly expressed to the faculty in their institution that the issue is for them to obtain
a higher degree, that the institution or program does not really matter, and that this
should be done as soon as possible. Who wins with such a perspective? The faculty
wins additional income because usually a higher degree means a better position in the
IMPP, as well as becoming a PROMEP member (this program requires a masters
degree at the minimum). But having faculty with higher degrees also allows the
institution to present better numbers in the PIFI formats that they provide each year (or
each 2 years since recently) and, with it, obtain more funds. Faculty with higher
degrees also facilitate licensure program accreditation and incorporation of graduate
programs into the PNPC, and both of these are highly appreciated by PIFI, which
means, once again, more funds for the institution.
• Academic simulation. IMPPs do not normally consider only the highest-degree of the
faculty that apply to be part of them. Instead, academics are requested to perform a
diverse number of activities related to teaching, research and service. More precisely,
what faculty are required is to submitted paper evidence that they have performed such
activities. Because submitting the paper evidence provides points in the process of
competing for the higher levels of merit-pay programs, faculty speak of these as being
point-gathering activities. So, while activities that do not generate points are put aside,
it is said that there is an increasing tendency for the authorship of conference
presentations and journal papers, to reflect the organized activity of groups of
academics helping each other to add more points to their merit-pay program
application, rather than being the reflection of substantive academic collaboration and
development.
• The creation of a pseudo academic market. While obtaining a doctorate and attaining a
Non-SNI Doctorate rank can be questioned on the grounds previously presented, the
SNI rank could be considered more truly meritocratic, as highly regarded peers
evaluate not only the records, but at times also the products that faculty submit in order
to be considered to enter this federally funded and operated merit-pay program.

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However, because institutions are also evaluated considering how many of their faculty
are SNI members, it is not uncommon to know of university editorial houses providing
facilities for SNI members to publish. In some cases there are even institutional
programs that openly express that their objective is to provide a means through which
SNI members can publish their research products. In and of itself this initiative should
not generate any concern, but the issue arises when examination of the published
reports shade doubt on the review and editorial process. So, instead of an academic
market there is an exchange of academic products built around personal and
institutional subsidies (Ordorika Sacristán 2004).
• The erosion of the profession and its institutional involvement. As already mentioned,
the central merit-pay programs are individually oriented. Such fact, together with the
diminished institutional involvement reported, work against the development of strong
academic communities that are, at the same time, genuinely involved in the
improvement of their institutions.
While there is data that bears on the influence of merit-pay programs on faculty profile,
work and some attitudes, the appearance of non-intended strategies and dynamics that
work against the notion of academic merit and collegiality and collaboration has been
mainly commented on the basis of qualitative studies done in particular public universities
(e.g., Acosta-Silva 2004, 2008). It is still necessary to address additional questions: to what
extent are such practices actually happening? To what extent this ‘‘reality’’ is working
against the consolidation of a ‘‘genuine’’ academic work and culture?

Concluding comments

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, Mexican faculty merit-pay programs can be
seen as conditional cash transfers. As with them, it is very important to distinguish, on the
one hand participation in such programs and, on the other, the attainment of the programs’
goals. Has participation in these programs contributed to faculty’s commitment to their
institution? Do more publications mean increase quality? Having more academics with
doctorate degrees improves teaching?
The data and reflections presented are consistent with the proposition that faculty merit-
pay programs, together with other performance-based public policies, are pulling away
highly qualified faculty from teaching into research, diminishing their involvement in
institutional governance and, probably more important, are generating practices detri-
mental in the long run for academic work and Mexican higher education in general.
When merit-pay, in a context such as Mexican higher education, represents such a high
proportion of faculty’s income, then academics behavior will tend to accommodate to the
system, even when such accommodation runs counter to the spirit and functionality of the
institutions in which they work. It is natural to expect and find, as it has been suggested,
‘‘working to the indicators‘‘or simply and bluntly stated, simulation and, at the extreme,
corruption. The contingencies for institutions, academics and governmental offices all
point in the same direction; the structures under which incentives are awarded become
highly important and require significant amount of resources. We are in the process, if not
there yet, of paying more for the broth than for the meatballs.
The merit-pay systems currently in place in Mexican higher education, of which those
related to faculty are central, are so pervasive that they are becoming the real regulators of
higher education in general and, in particular, of academic work. In this process, faculty,

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despite having a stronger academic profile, are running the danger of loosing its soul to the
market, while institutions are getting increasingly used to being a way station for public
policies design at the federal level.
Is the answer to the situation depicted to eliminate performance-based funding in
general and, particularly, faculty merit-pay programs. Given the way Mexican HEIs cur-
rently function, there would be a significant disorientation and disorder if such alternative
was put into action in a draconian way. Many institutions, as well as many faculty
members, could find it difficult to work in the absence of the resources and atmosphere that
such programs have created. As an alternative, leadership at the system level should start
(or intensify) its analysis of how to fade away these programs and bring into the forefront
competent and committed faculty and higher education institutions with a clear sense of
their work and its social relevance.

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