Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Issues not timely raised in the

proceedings before the lower court are barred by estoppel.—It has

been a long-standing principle that issues not timely raised in the
proceedings before the lower court are barred by estoppel. As a
rule, new issues can no longer be considered by the appellate
court because a party is not permitted to change his theory on
appeal; to allow him to do so would be offensive to the rules of fair
play, justice and due process.

Same; Same; Basic is the rule that it is the allegations of the

complaint and not the prayer that determines the basis of the
plaintiff’s relief.—Basic is the rule that it is the allegations of the
complaint and not the prayer that determines the basis of the
plaintiffs relief. In the same vein, the prayer will not be construed
as enlarging the complaint so as to embrace a cause of action not
pleaded therein. [Republic vs. Capital Resources Corporation]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions;

Demurrer to Evidence; A demurrer to evidence is a motion to
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.—A demurrer to
evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect
that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an
issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a
prima facie case.

Same; Same; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) has

consistently deferred to the factual findings of the trial court, in
light of the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the
demeanor and spontaneity of the witness in assessing the
credibility of their testimony.—In this regard, the Court
emphasizes that factual questions are not the proper subject of a
petition for review under Rule 45, the same being limited only to

questions of law. Not being a trier of facts, the Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below. For such
reasons, the Court has consistently deferred to the factual
findings of the trial court, in light of the unique opportunity
afforded them to observe the demeanor and spontaneity of the
witness in assessing the credibility of their testimony.

Same; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Demurrer to

Evidence; In a demurrer to evidence, it is premature to speak of
“preponderance of evidence” because it is filed prior to the
defendant’s presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a
demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without
the need of the defendant’s evidence.—In a demurrer to evidence,
however, it is premature to speak of “preponderance of evidence”
because it is filed prior to the defendant’s presentation of
evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to
expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the
defendant’s evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination
as to whether the plaintiff’s evidence entitles it to the relief
sought. [Republic vs. De Borja]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court
(SC) that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules is
limited in its scope — the Court may only entertain questions of
law as jurisdiction over factual questions has been devolved to the
trial courts as a matter of efficiency and practicality in the
administration of justice.—It has been repeatedly held by the
Court that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules is
limited in its scope — the Court may only entertain questions of
law as jurisdiction over factual questions has been devolved to the
trial courts as a matter of efficiency and practicality in the administration of justice. As
an arbiter of laws, the Court is not expected to recalibrate the
evidence already considered by inferior courts. More importantly,
to the extent that the evidence on record amply support the
factual findings of the trial court, such findings are deemed
conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. On this score
alone, the Petition, for raising factual issues, may already be
denied pursuant to the Court’s discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Judgments; Annulment of Judgment; The

remedy of annulment of judgment, embodied in Rule 47 of the
Rules, is extraordinary in character, and does not so easily and
readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final
judgments.—The remedy of annulment of judgment, embodied in
Rule 47 of the Rules, is extraordinary in character, and does not
so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by
final judgments. The grounds for a Rule 47 petition are: (i)
extrinsic fraud and (ii) lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud cannot
be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. On the
other hand, lack of jurisdiction means either lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Execution of Judgments; New Trial;

Under the Rules, execution shall issue upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom, if no appeal has been duly perfected. In
the same manner, a motion for new trial can only be filed within
the period for taking an appeal.—The Court agrees with the
position of petitioner Yap that she could no longer avail of the
remedies of new trial or petition for relief from judgment because,
as borne out by the records, she alleged to have become aware of
the RTC Decision on October 11, 2000 at the latest, at the time
when a writ of execution had already been issued. Clearly, the
remedies of appeal or new trial were no longer available to
petitioner Yap. Under the Rules, execution shall issue upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom, if no appeal has been
duly perfected. In the same manner, a motion for new trial can
only be filed within the period for taking an appeal. Under the
present circumstances, by the time petitioner Yap acquired
knowledge of the proceedings, the period for perfecting an appeal
had already lapsed. Likewise, the remedy of a petition for relief
was no longer available, considering that a writ of execution had already been issued as
early as May 22, 1998, which was
already more than six (6) months after petitioner Yap acquired
knowledge of the RTC Decision. [Yap vs. Lagtapon]

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Under exceptional

circumstances, as when stringent application of the rules will
result in manifest injustice, the Supreme Court (SC) may set aside
technicalities and proceed with the appeal.—Under exceptional
circumstances, as when stringent application of the rules will
result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities
and proceed with the appeal. In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, 550 SCRA
348 (2008), the Court recognized the broader interest of justice
and gave due course to the appeal even if it was a wrong mode of
appeal and was even filed beyond the reglementary period
provided by the rules.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for

Reconsideration; While it is a settled rule that a special civil action
For certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-
defined exceptions established by jurisprudence.—While it is a
settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the
respondent court; there are well-defined exceptions established by
jurisprudence, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved. [Philippine Bank of Communications
vs. Court of Appeals]

Remedial Law; Writ of Kalikasan; Writ of Continuing

Mandamus; There is a difference between a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the
person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only
available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or
omission.—The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on
standing, allowing the filing of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of
rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has been
confirmed by this Court’s rulings in Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102
(2014), and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), 776 SCRA 434 (2015). However, it bears noting that
There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental
damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a
writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who
is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.

Same; Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases;

Under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC),
the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or
provinces.—Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an
extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such
magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a
narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy
and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that
transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At
the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems
contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort
is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort
to this Court, it is ultimately within the
Court’s discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought
directly before it.

Same; Same; Requisites for a Writ of Kalikasan to Issue.—For

a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; 2. the actual or
threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and 3.
the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart
from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and
to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated,
the petitioners
failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful
act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right
to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Same; Writ of Continuing Mandamus; Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases; Rule 8, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases (RPEC) lays down the requirements for a
petition for continuing mandamus.—Rule 8, Section 1 of the
RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing
mandamus as follows: RULES 8 WRIT OF CONTINUING
MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.—
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such
right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that
the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall
also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

Same; Same; The petitioners failed to prove direct or personal

injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be
entitled to the writ.—The petitioners failed to prove direct or
personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents
to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had
been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real
party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Same; Mandamus; Mandamus lies to compel the performance

of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus
to act but not to act one way or the other.—The Road Sharing
Principle is precisely as it is denominated — a principle. It cannot be
considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province
of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and
the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act
one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must
be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or
act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be
directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.

Same; Writ of Continuing Mandamus; Continuing

Mandamus; Road Sharing Principle; Clearly, petitioners’
preferred specific course of action (i.e., the bifurcation of roads to
devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds
no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered
an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary
conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed or seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to
control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the
principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the
environment is best implemented.—At its core, what the
petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a
ministerial act, but a discretionary act — the manner of
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly,
petitioners’ preferred specific course of action (i.e., the bifurcation
of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and
Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing
Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it
to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the
necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for
seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the
executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive
issuance relating to the environment is best implemented.
Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the
executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or
executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of
discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of “gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority,” the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this
petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing
mandamus cannot issue. [Segovia vs. The Climate Change Commission]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Law of the Case

Doctrine; The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure
from a rule previously made by an appellate court in a subsequent
proceeding essentially involving the same case.—The doctrine of
the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously
made by an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially
involving the same case. Pursuant to this doctrine, the Court, in
De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees
Association (DLSUEANAFTEU), 679 SCRA 33 (2012), (DLSU)
denied therein petitioner’s prayer for review, since the petition
involved a single issue which had been resolved with finality by
the CA in a previous case involving the same facts, arguments
and relief.

Same; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction;

Generally, findings made in injunction proceedings are subject to
the outcome of the main case which is usually tried subsequent to
the injunction proceedings.—A preliminary injunction is in the
nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo during
the pendency of the main case. As a necessary consequence,
matters resolved in injunction proceedings do not, as a general
rule, conclusively determine the merits of the main case or decide
controverted facts therein. Generally, findings made in injunction
proceedings are subject to the outcome of the main case which is
usually tried subsequent to the injunction proceedings.

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary

Injunction; View that jurisprudence provides that in a
proceeding to determine whether to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction, the applicant must show that it has a clear legal right to be
protected and that the other party’s
act against which the writ is to be directed violates that
right.—Jurisprudence provides that in a proceeding to
determine whether to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction, the applicant must show that it has a clear
legal right to be protected and that the other party’s act
against which the writ is to be directed violates that right.
The Court, however, clarified that although a clear right
is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted
need not be conclusive or complete but need only be
a sampling to convince the court to issue the preliminary
injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case.
In more explicit terms, the applicant only needs to
show that it has the ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in the petition. Therefore, the issuance
of a preliminary injunction does not conclusively determine
the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts
therein. This is because a preliminary injunction is
merely an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo
and prevent irreparable harm until the merits of the
main case resolving the rights of the parties are
heard and decided.

Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Law of the Case

Doctrine; View that according to jurisprudence, the law of
the case doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.—
According to jurisprudence, the law of the case doctrine
means that whatever is once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. In other words, when an appellate court passes on a
question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question settled therein becomes
the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.

Same; Provisional Remedies; View that a court cannot take as

conclusive on the actual main case a mere incidental adjudication
on a provisional relief.—The ponencia supports its application of
the law of the case doctrine by citing Timbol v. Philippine
National Bank, 790 SCRA 57 (2016). While Timbol presents a
situation similar to this case, I, however, believe that the doctrine
was misapplied. At the risk of repetition, it is my view that a
court cannot take as conclusive on the actual main case a mere
incidental adjudication on a provisional relief. As above
illustrated, the context, evidentiary parameters, and issues
involved are simply different between the two proceedings. Moreover, from a practical
standpoint, a party can shrewdly avert
a full-blown trial on the main case’s merits by simply invoking the
law of the case doctrine after the issue on the propriety of an
injunctive relief has been finally resolved on appeal. In this
regard, the parties would not be accorded the benefit of
presenting their complete evidence under the rigors of a civil trial,
and courts would simply shortcut the adjudication process on the
basis of prima facie determinations. [Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) vs. Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASSI)]

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Office of the

Solicitor General; In appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court (SC), the authority to represent the State is vested solely in
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).—Based on the records, it
appears undisputed that Petitioner has no legal personality to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case. Rule 110, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates that all criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.
In appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court, the
authority to represent the State is vested solely in the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).

Same; Same; Same; Same; In criminal cases, the dismissal of

the case against an accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State.—In criminal cases, the
People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings before this Court.
Inasmuch as the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of
offenses, the interest of the private offended party is limited only
to the aspect of civil liability. It follows therefore that in criminal
cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Same; Same; Real Party-in-Interest; Settled is the rule that

“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest[,]” who, in turn, is one “who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”—To be sure, Jona’s personality
to even institute the bigamy case and thereafter to appeal the
RTC-San Carlos’ Order dismissing the same is nebulous, at best.
Settled is the rule that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest[,]” who, in turn,
is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Within
this context, “interest” means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. To be
clear, real interest refers to a present substantial interest, and
not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. [Bumatay vs. Bumatay]
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review
on Certiorari; It is fundamental that in a petition for review on
certiorari, the Supreme Court (SC) is limited to only questions of
law.—It is fundamental that in a petition for review
on certiorari, the Court is limited to only questions of law. As
specifically applied in a labor case, the Court is limited to
reviewing only whether the CA was correct in determining the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOLE Secretary. Thus, in Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto.
Tomas, 701 SCRA 589 (2013), the Court ruled: Our review is,
therefore, limited to the determination of whether the CA
correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the decision of the [Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE)], not on the basis of whether the latter’s
decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct. Whether
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion is not what is ruled
upon but whether it correctly determined the existence or want of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SOLE.

Same; Same; Same; As held in Telefunken Semiconductors

Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 565 (2000),
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great
respect when they are supported by substantial evidence and, in
the absence of any showing of a whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment, the factual findings bind the Supreme Court (SC).—In
this regard, as held in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees
Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 565 (2000), findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great respect when they are
supported by substantial evidence and, in the absence of any
showing of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, the
factual findings bind the Court. [Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU)]

Civil Law; Legal Personality; Capacity to be Sued; The

Supreme Court (SC), in Ventura v. Militante, 316 SCRA 226
(1999), declared that neither a deceased person nor his estate has
capacity to be sued.—A deceased person does not have the
capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally
states that “[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” Applying this
legal provision, the Court, in Ventura v. Militante, 316 SCRA 226
(1999), declared that neither a deceased person nor his estate has
capacity to be sued.

Same; Same; Same; There can be no doubt that a deceased

person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil
action as they lack legal personality.—There can be no doubt that
a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as
defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus,
when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no
longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil
suit for collection. As such, the complaint against him should be
dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action
pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a
complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who
cannot be a party to a civil action.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; In several occasions, the

Supreme Court (SC) has held that the trial court fails to acquire
jurisdiction over a defendant who was already dead at the time the
complaint was filed against him.—The RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person or estate of Anthony. Summons is a
writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him and service thereof is the means by which the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person. In the present case, no valid
service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could have been made,
precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint
against him and his wife was filed in court. In several occasions,
the Court has held that the trial court fails to acquire jurisdiction
over a defendant who was already dead at the time the complaint
was filed against him.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Courts cannot

grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party.—It is settled that courts cannot grant a
relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party. Due process considerations justify this
requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the
scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. In the present case, clearly, no issue
on, or prayer for, the dismissal of the entire case was made in the
Motion to Dismiss before the RTC and the corresponding CA
Petition. The sole issue presented was, and is, confined to the
propriety of the complaint being maintained as against Anthony
(or his estate) who was impleaded as an additional defendant by
virtue of the Amended Complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Due process considerations

require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings.—Courts cannot grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due
process considerations require that judgments must conform to
and be supported by the pleadings. The issue of the authenticity
of the handwritten receipts, and ultimately, which party is liable
for the debt, was never brought up to the CA — as indeed, these
are the very issues that the trial court is meant to address and
resolve. Determination of the same requires an examination of the
evidence of the parties in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Dismissal of the entire complaint, including the action against the
main defendant Gina, is thus utterly premature and erroneous.
All told, the complaint against the estate of Anthony, which was
impleaded as codefendant, should be dismissed. Any cause of
action arising from the herein alleged debt against the estate of
Anthony may be brought as a claim against said estate in the
proper settlement proceedings. However, the complaint against
the original defendant Gina should remain with the RTC for trial
on the merits. [Gaffney vs. Butler]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for

certiorari is a special civil action that may be resorted to only for
the limited purpose of correcting errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors of judgment.—Time and again, this Court has consistently
stressed that a petition for certiorari is a special civil action that
may be resorted to only for the limited purpose of correcting
errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment. In turn, errors
of jurisdiction proceed from grave abuse of discretion, or such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. In this Petition, such grave abuse discretion is
imputed to the Ombudsman.

Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; Under the 1987 Constitution, the

Ombudsman is mandated to investigate acts or omissions of public
officials or employees which appear to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.—Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
mandated to investigate acts or omissions of public officials or
employees which appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. Accordingly, the Ombudsman is vested with
investigatory and prosecutorial powers to fulfill its constitutional
mandate. The Ombudsman’s powers are plenary in nature,
designed to insulate it from outside pressure and influence.
Nevertheless, the plenary nature of the Ombudsman’s powers
does not place it beyond the scope of the Court’s power of review.
Under its expanded jurisdiction, the Court may strike down the
act of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
the Ombudsman, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
However, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to issue against
the actions of the Ombudsman, the petitioner must show that the
latter’s exercise of power had been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner. Such abuse of power must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information,
has been defined to constitute such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, thus: x x x
[Probable cause] does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. x x x In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. x x x (Emphasis in the
original omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed,
the determination of probable cause does not require an inquiry
as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
However, there is nothing in the Assailed Resolution and Order
which suggests that the Ombudsman dismissed the Criminal
Complaints due to PAO’s failure to offer such higher quantum of
evidence. [PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, petitioner, vs. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. TERENCIA S. ERNI-
RIVERA,]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Certiorari is

not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence as in
this case where the appeal was lost due to nonpayment of docket
fees.—Given that SMC resorted to successive Rule 45 and Rule 65
certiorari petitions to question the CA Decision and Resolution
and that the Rule 45 certiorari petition had already been denied,
the denial of the SMC Petition is in order because certiorari is not
and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence as in
this case where the appeal was lost due to nonpayment of docket
fees. [LOURDES M. PADAYHAG (or HEIRS OF LOURDES M.
PADAYHAG), petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
SOUTHERN MINDANAO COLLEGES, represented by its
President,]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; The Supreme

Court (SC) has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the
Philippines, 656 SCRA 331 (2011), that judges’ power to punish
contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for
retaliation or vindictiveness.—The Court likewise finds no merit
in Complainants’ allegation that respondent Judge Dela Rosa
should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act
of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the
internet. The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa’s act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent
tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a
prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The
Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, 656
SCRA 331 (2011), that judges’ power to punish contempt must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness. [Causing vs. Dela Rosa]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-party Claims; If the

third-party claimant’s evidence does not persuade the court of the
validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the third-party
claim will, and should be, denied.—Here, Tee Ling Kiat imputes
error on the CA by the simple expedient of arguing that he did not
personally need to prove that the sale of shares of stock between
Dewey Dee and himself had in fact transpired, as the duty to
record the sale in the corporate books lies with VIP. Such an
argument, however, fails to recognize that the very right of Tee
Ling Kiat, as a third-party claimant, to institute a terceria is
founded on his claimed title over the levied property.
Consequently, although courts can exercise their limited
supervisory powers in determining whether the sheriff acted
correctly in executing the judgment, they may only do so if the
third-party claimant has unmistakably established his ownership
or right of possession over the subject property. Accordingly, if the
third-party claimant’s evidence does not persuade the court of the
validity of his title or right possession thereto, the third-party
claim will, and should be, denied.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Money

Judgments; It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are
enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the
judgment debtor, and certainly, a person other than the judgment
debtor who claims ownership over the levied properties is not
precluded from challenging the levy through any of the remedies
provided for under the Rules of Court.—It is a basic principle of
law that money judgments are enforceable only against property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and certainly,
a person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership
over the levied properties is not precluded from challenging the
levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of
Court. In the pursuit of such remedies, however, the third party
must, to reiterate, unmistakably establish ownership over the
levied property, which Tee Ling Kiat failed to do. [Tee Ling Kiat vs. Ayala Corporation]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; It has been consistently held that a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only raise questions of law
as the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts.—It has been
consistently held that a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 shall only raise questions of law as the Court is not a trier
of facts. A factual question would necessitate the reevaluation of
the evidence submitted before the trial court. This is allowed in
the exceptional circumstance where the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of the facts. Such is the situation in this case. [Aliling vs. People]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of

Final Judgments; As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be
altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court,
be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.—As the Court held
in Bani: As a rule, “a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court,
be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. Any attempt on
the part of the x x x entities charged with the execution of a final
judgment to insert, change or add matters not clearly
contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments.” [Consolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. vs. Zaragoza]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; As a rule, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming those of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
are final and conclusive, and they cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court (SC) which has jurisdiction to rule only on
questions of law in Rule 45 petitions to review; Exceptions.—As a
rule, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are
final and conclusive, and they cannot be reviewed by the Court
which has jurisdiction to rule only on questions of law in Rule 45 petitions to review. The
Court in Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 (2016), reiterated that: A
question of fact requires this [C]ourt to review the truthfulness or
falsity of the allegations of the parties. This review includes
assessment of the “probative value of the evidence presented.”
There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before
this [C]ourt is the correctness of the lower courts’ appreciation of
the evidence presented by the parties. There are, however,
recognized exceptions where the Court may review questions of
fact. These are: (1) when the factual conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the
case in making its findings, which are further contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (10) when the CA’s findings of fact, supposedly
premised on the absence of evidence, are contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [Mendoza vs. Palugod, Sr.]

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction;

As defined by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts or require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.—As defined by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts or require the performance of a particular
act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction.

Same; Same; Same; Grounds for the Issuance of a Preliminary

Injunction.—As to the grounds for its issuance, a preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established that: (a) the
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; (b) the commission, continuance or nonperformance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) a party, court,
agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. [SM Investments Corporation vs. Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The

acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due
course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of
the court.—“[T]he acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as
the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute
discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so
only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of
discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or
(2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules
of Court or Supreme Court Circulars.”

Same; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum

Shopping; The issue of a counsel executing a certificate of non-
forum shopping has been settled in Suzuki v. de Guzman, 496
SCRA 651 (2006), where the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the
Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) dismissal of a petition
for certiorari because the certificate was signed by counsel and not
by the petitioners themselves.—The execution of the certificate by
petitioner’s counsel is a defective certification, which amounts to
noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum
shopping. This is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. The issue of a counsel executing a certificate of non-
forum shopping has been settled in Suzuki v. De Guzman, 496
SCRA 651 (2006), where the Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal of
a petition for certiorari because the certificate was signed by
counsel and not by the petitioners themselves. The Court ruled:
The Court also cannot accept the signature of petitioners’ counsel
as substantial compliance with the Rules. The attestation
contained in the certification of non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. The fact
that there are three peti-defective certification that is equivalent to noncompliance with
the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of
the petition.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules are not

to be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.—
Petitioner cannot simply ask the Court to liberally apply the rules
without providing any justification for it. His claim of
inadvertence is flimsy, not weighty and not persuasive as to give
it reprieve from the strict application of the rules. For indeed,
“[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
proportionate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.” [Racion vs. MST Marine Services Philippines,
Inc.]

Remedial Law; Appeals; Certiorari; Section 1, Rule 41 of the

Rules of Court (Rules) mandates that appeal is the remedy with
respect to a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case; and a petition for certiorari is unavailable if there is appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules.—The Court
totally agrees with the CA. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court (Rules) mandates that appeal is the remedy with respect to a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case; and a
petition for certiorari is unavailable if there is appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules. The petitioners filed
their Rule 65 certiorari petition before the CA on April 8, 2008
after they received a copy of the RTC’s Order dated December 28,
2007 denying their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on
February 7, 2008. By the time they filed their CA petition for
certiorari, the reglementary period to appeal the RTC’s Order of
dismissal of the petitioners’ Complaint to the CA had already
lapsed. In fact, their CA petition for certiorari was even filed a
day late, bearing in mind that 2008 was a leap year and the
period to file a Rule 65 certiorari petition is not later than 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules. Also, it is basic in remedial law
that an order of dismissal of the complaint is a final order which
is subject to appeal. [Medina vs. Lozada]

Ombudsman; Appeal from Decisions of the Ombudsman in

Administrative Cases; The Supreme Court (SC) held that “appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals (CA)
under the provisions of Rule 43.”—The first case on the matter
was the 1998 case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998),
where the Court held that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(RA No. 6770), which provides that all “orders, directives, or
decisions (in administrative cases] of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court,” was unconstitutional for it increased the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and
concurrence. The Court thus held that “appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.”

Same; Appeal from Decisions of the Ombudsman in Criminal

Cases; In Kuizon v. Desierto, 354 SCRA 158 (2001), the Supreme
Court (SC) stressed that the ruling in Fabian was limited only to
administrative cases, and added that it is the SC which has
jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an
incident of a criminal action.—Subsequently, in Kuizon v.
Desierto, 354 SCRA 158 (2001), the Court stressed that the ruling
in Fabian was limited only to administrative cases, and added
that it is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction when the
assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a
criminal action. Thus: In dismissing petitioners’ petition for lack
of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian v.
Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In
the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we
categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule
65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that
the present petition should have been filed with this
Court. x x x In Golangco v. Fung, 504 SCRA 321 (2006), the
Court voided a decision of the CA which directed the Ombudsman
to withdraw an Information already filed by it with a Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The Court in Golangco reasoned that “[t]he
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal or nonadministrative cases.” [Gatchalian vs. Office of the
Ombudsman]

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Liberal Construction; As

the court of the last resort, justice should be the paramount
consideration when the Supreme Court (SC) is confronted with an
issue on the interpretation of the Rules, subject to the petitioner’s
burden to convince the Court that enough reasons obtain to
warrant the suspension of a strict adherence to procedural rules.—
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that “[t]hese Rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.” Given the realities obtaining in this case,
the liberal construction of the Rules will promote and secure a
just determination of the parties’ causes of action against each
other. As the court of the last resort, justice should be the
paramount consideration when the Court is confronted with an
issue on the interpretation of the Rules, subject to the petitioner’s
burden to convince the Court that enough reasons obtain to
warrant the suspension of a strict adherence to procedural rules.
The Court is convinced with the explanations of Joanna for her
plea to relax the application of the Rules in her case. The Court
notes that, like BPI, the untimely filing of her PT brief was so far
the only procedural lapse that she committed. She had been
diligent in the prosecution of her cause against respondents, and
had not demonstrated a proclivity to delay the proceedings. As
she pointed out, several matters that would be taken up in the PT
hearing had actually already been accomplished in the PC. In
fact, even the trial dates had been agreed upon by the parties. In
turn, as Joanna correctly observes, respondents were themselves
not fully compliant with the Rules as observed by the RTC, and to
the Court’s mind, they will not suffer substantial prejudice if the
case is litigated on the merits. [Pimentel vs. Adiao]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; It is a basic

rule in remedial law that where an appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be
entertained; remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive.—It is a basic rule in
remedial law that where an appeal is available to the aggrieved
party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained;
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of
the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court
by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand,
a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based
on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule,
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. One of
the requisites of certiorari is that there is no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Jurisprudence has held
that where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground raised is grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper
remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.

Same; Same; Same; Under prevailing procedural rules and

jurisprudence, mere errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a
special civil action for certiorari.—Under prevailing procedural
rules and jurisprudence, mere errors of judgment are not proper
subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. Where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari. To emphasize, upon careful examination of the
instant Petition, it is apparent that Pfleider merely questions the
assailed Decision and Resolution, not on the basis of the CA’s lack
of jurisdiction to hear and decide Pfleider’s appeal, but merely due
to the supposed legal errors purportedly committed by the CA
when it decided to dismiss outright Pfleider’s appeal.

Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Under Section 2, Rule 41 of

the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a
judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction.—Under Section 2, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a
judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction: (a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is an
ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation
to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (b) If the issues raised
involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Corollary, under Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from
the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed, as issues purely of law are not reviewable by the said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of an RTC shall
be dismissed.
Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Appeals; Erroneous Appeals;
The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory
language, in establishing the rule that an appeal raising pure
questions of law erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals (CA)
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be
dismissed outright.—The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal,
using mandatory language, in establishing the rule that an
appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to
the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court,
but shall be dismissed outright. The Court thus agrees with
the CA’s decision to dismiss Pfleider’s appeal outright. The appeal
of Pfleider, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues
purely of law. Time and again, the Court has distin-guished cases involving pure
questions of law from those of
pure questions of fact in the following manner — a question of
fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the
issue in that query is factual. On the other hand, there is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an
existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests
solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Jurisprudence dictates that the errors which the
Supreme Court (SC) may review in a petition for review on
certiorari are those of the Court of Appeals (CA), and not those of
the trial court which rendered the decision in the first instance.—
Even if the Court does away with the procedural error committed
by Pfleider when he filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and
deemed this Rule 65 Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, it has
previously held that such an appeal before the Court is limited
to errors of the appellate court and not the trial court.
Jurisprudence dictates that the errors which the Court may
review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA,
and not those of the trial court which rendered the decision in the
first instance. It is thus imperative that the Court refrains from
conducting further scrutiny of the findings of the trial court. To be
sure, the Court’s review here is limited only to the errors of
law committed by the CA and not the RTC.

Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia

as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.—Litis pendentia as a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis
pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject
matter should not
be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order
that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons. [Pfleider vs. Court of Appeals-Cebu City]

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Temporary Restraining

Order; A trial court may issue a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) even without a prior hearing for a limited period of seventy-
two (72) hours “if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury.”—A
temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte “to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex parte.” Otherwise stated, a
trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without
a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours “if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury.” In this instance, a summary hearing, separate
from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required
only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended.

Same; Same; Same; A trial court may also issue ex parte a

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) for twenty (20) days “[i]f it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.” The trial court
has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for
preliminary injunction during this period, the TRO is deemed to
have expired.—A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20
days “[i]f it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.” The
trial court has twenty (20) days from its issuance to resolve the
application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the
application for preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining
order is deemed to
have expired. In this case, the OCA correctly observed that
respondent Judge Mendoza’s failure to serve the summons on PI
TWO after the issuance of the assailed 72-hour TRO cannot be
cured by his claim that it was received by the sheriff, the person
enjoined from implementing the writ of possession. The previous
summons received by the sheriff was also no longer valid
considering that the complaint was amended and admitted by
virtue of respondent Judge Mendoza’s Order dated September 18,
2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules, as bolstered by
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, is explicit that the adverse
party should be immediately served with the summons and a copy
of the complaint.

Same; Same; Same; An already expired Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) can no longer be extended.—The
supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was
belied by respondent Judge Mendoza’s setting of summary
hearing for the extension of the same, five (5) days after the
issuance thereof. Section 5, Rule 58 clearly states that such
summary hearing must be conducted within the 72-hour period.
Instead, respondent Judge Mendoza set the hearing on September
25, 2017, two (2) days beyond the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO.
To make matters worse, respondent Judge Mendoza extended the
72-hour TRO, which had already expired, into a full 20-day TRO.
An already expired TRO can no longer be extended. The TRO was issued on September
20, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules
clearly provides that “[i]n no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the [TRO] exceed twenty (20) days, including the
original seventy-two hours provided.” The effectivity of the 72-
hour TRO issued by respondent Judge Mendoza on September 20,
2017 therefore could only be extended until October 10, 2017,
twenty (20) days after its issuance. Thus, respondent Judge
erroneously extended the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO until
October 12, 2017, two (2) days beyond the period of effectivity of a
TRO explicitly provided by the Rules.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent Judge Mendoza’s failure to

apply the settled laws and jurisprudence on the issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) constitutes gross ignorance
of the law which merits administrative sanction. Section 8(9), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance as a serious
charge.—In this case, respondent Judge Mendoza’s failure to apply the
settled laws and jurisprudence on the issuance of TROs
constitutes gross ignorance of the law which merits
administrative sanction. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court classifies gross ignorance as a serious charge with the
following imposable penalties: 1. Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. [PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO
(SPV-AMC),
INCORPORATED, represented by NICANOR M.
COLLADO, complainant, vs. HON. BERNABE B.
MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 23, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Roxas, Isabela, respondent.]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In order for

a Certiorari petition to prosper, the abuse of discretion alleged
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.—In order for a Certiorari petition to prosper, the abuse
of discretion alleged must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. In the instant case, the Court
finds that there was no error whatsoever, more so grave abuse of
discretion, committed by the CA in issuing its assailed Resolution.
Pleadings and Practice; Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, there are only two (2) modes by which a party may file a
pleading before the courts: (1) by personal filing — presenting the
original copies thereof personally to the clerk of court, or (2) by
registered mail.—The Court stresses at the outset that under
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, there are only two (2)
modes by which a party may file a pleading before the courts: (1) by personal filing —
presenting the original copies thereof
personally to the clerk of court, or (2) by registered mail. The
petitioners Heirs of Francisco admit that they did not file their
Motion for Reconsideration through personal filing, but by or
through private courier/courier service. Filing via private
courier or courier service is NOT a manner of filing
allowed or recognized by the Rules of Court. On this point
alone, the instant Petition merits dismissal. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the Court could accept the petitioners
Heirs of Francisco’s act of filing by private courier as an
alternative mode of filing, it must be stressed that according to
Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, as well as Rule 7 of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a party may file a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution issued by the
appellate court only within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party. [Heirs of Geminiano Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals Special

Former Twenty-Second (22nd) Division]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The grant of

a Rule 65 petition for certiorari requires grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—The grant of a Rule
65 petition for certiorari requires grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion exists where an act is performed with a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Mere errors of
law are not correctible via petition for certiorari.

Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of

Judgments; According to jurisprudence, “[p]ublic policy and sound
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final and executory at some definite time
fixed by law; and this rule holds true over decisions rendered by
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers.”—
According to jurisprudence, “[p]ublic policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final and executory at some definite time fixed by
law; and this rule holds true over decisions rendered by
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers.”
Thus, as correctly held by the CA in its assailed Decision, the
Orders of the DENR had already become final and executory, there is no valid reason for
the
DENR to stay their execution. Moreover, a perusal of the grounds
and issues raised in the instant petition reveal that, in alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR in issuing its
Letter dated February 10, 2009, the petitioners are raising factual
matters, asking the Court to rule on the factual circumstances
surrounding the DENR’s final and executory Orders dated
October 26, 2006 and April 24, 2008. [Local Government Unit of San Mateo, Isabel vs.
Miguel

Vda. de Guerrero]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Under the Rules, a Rule 45 petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law and a review is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor.—The Court will now proceed to the second issue, which is factual. Under the
Rules, a Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law and a review is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. DMCI has not directly pointed to any of the exceptions
where the Court may review the findings of fact of the CA in a
Rule 45 certiorari petition. However, based on its arguments, it
appears that DMCI is invoking the MeTC’s Order dated
September 7, 2012 wherein it stated that the issue on the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since June 12,
1945 by DMCI and its predecessors-in-interest was testified on by
Hilberto Hostillero, representative of DMCI, Francisco Esteban,
former tenant of its predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio Castro,
adjoining owner, and San Pedro; and such proof of possession was
bolstered by the Field Inspection Report of DENR Special
Investigator, Antonio M. Lachica. Since the findings of fact of the
trial court are at odds with those of the CA, the Court is allowed
to make a fact-check. [D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Republic]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule 41 provides the

rules regarding appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—
Rule 41 provides the rules regarding appeal from the Regional
Trial Courts. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides what judgments or
orders are subject of appeal and those where no appeal may be
taken from, viz.: SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.

Same; Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; Appeal is not

available as a remedy to question either the grant or denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue. If the motion is
denied, the order of denial is interlocutory since it does not
completely dispose of the case and is not appealable under Section
1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules. If the motion is granted, the order of
dismissal in one without prejudice since the complaint can be
refiled and is not appealable under Section 1(g) of Rule 41.—
In United Alloy Philippines Corp. v. United Coconut Planters
Bank, 775 SCRA 147 (2015), the Court emphasized that the
dismissal of the complaint based on the grounds of improper
venue, forum shopping and for being a harassment suit, which do
not fall under paragraphs (f), (h) or (i) of Section 1, Rule 16, is a
dismissal without prejudice; and the remedy available to the
plaintiff is a Rule 65 petition inasmuch as only dismissals based
on the grounds under paragraphs (f), (h) or (i) of Section 1, Rule
16 are subject to appeal, the refiling of the same action or claim
being barred, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 16. Indeed, appeal is not
available as a remedy to question either the grant or denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue. If the motion is
denied, the order of denial is interlocutory since it does not
completely dispose of the case and is not appealable under Section
1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules. If the motion is granted, the order of dismissal is one without
prejudice since the complaint can be refiled and is not appealable
under Section 1(g) of Rule 41.

Same; Same; Venue; Personal Actions; Section 2, Rule 4 of the

Rules sets forth the general rule regarding the venue of personal
actions.—Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules sets forth the general rule
regarding the venue of personal actions: SEC. 2. Venue of personal
actions.—All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a) The exceptions are provided in
Section 4, Rule 4, viz.: SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable.—This
Rule shall not apply — (a) In those cases where a specific rule or
law provides otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly
agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive
venue thereof. (3a, 5a) [Pillars Property Corporation vs. Century Communities

Corporation]

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Possession; It

is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an
ejectment case is physical or material possession, where the parties
to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property.—It
is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an
ejectment case is physical or material possession, where the
parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of
determining who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. Where the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked to that of possession, adjudication of ownership is not final
and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. In fact, ironically, in the same Decision by the Court
in the Ejectment Case heavily invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon,
and contrary to their assertion, the Court held that despite the
resolution of the Ejectment Case, respondent Lopez may thresh
out the issue of ownership in the appropriate proceeding, i.e., the
Quieting of Title Case filed before the RTC, Branch 142: [If
respondent] Lopez believes that she is entitled to relief, it may be
secured from the action for quieting of title pending before
another branch of the RTC. x x x It is also not difficult to see
that [respondent] Lopez wants this Court to take cognizance of
circumstances which she believes would support her alleged
ownership of the [subject] property and cast doubt on the
[petitioners Sps. Pozon’s] manner of acquisition, and then rule on
these competing claims, especially since she refuses to accept the
determination of the courts below in the ejectment case that,
based on the TCT in their name, the [petitioners Sps.] Pozon have a
better right to possess the [subject] property. This Court is not a
trier of facts nor can it take cognizance of facts alleged by
[respondent] Lopez that have yet to be proven in an appropriate
proceeding, such as Civil Case No. 96-692 pending in the
RTC[, Branch 142].
Question of Fact; A question of facts exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.—
A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact
cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Court and
are not proper for its consideration. The Court is not a trier of
facts. It is not the Court’s function to examine and weigh all over
again the evidence presented in the proceedings below. A question
of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation. [Pozon vs. Lopez]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; As provided in Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, a review by the Supreme Court (SC) is not a matter of right,
but of its sound discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.—As provided in Section 6,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a review by the Court is not a
matter of right, but of its sound discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor.
Petitioners have failed to convince the Court that the RTC and
the CA have decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Court, or have decided it in a way probably not
in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Court, or
have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court’s power
of supervision. [Fil-Estate Management, Inc. vs. Republic]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum

Shopping; According to Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court,
and as held by a catena of cases decided by the Supreme Court
(SC), it is the plaintiff or principal party who should execute the
certification of non-forum shopping under oath. In the case of the
corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on
behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized
individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial
persons, cannot personally do the task themselves.—According to
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court, and as held by a catena of
cases decided by the Court, it is the plaintiff or principal party
who should execute the certification of non-forum shopping under
oath. In the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing
may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by
specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that
corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally do the task
themselves. Same; Annulment of Judgment; A trial court has no authority
to annul the final judgment of a coequal court.—The CA is correct
in saying that it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of trial court decisions. A
trial court has no authority to annul the final judgment of a
coequal court. However, the aforesaid doctrine does not apply in
the instant case. An action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of
the judgment presupposes that the challenged judgment exists to
begin with. In the instant case, there is no final judgment that
must be subjected to an action for annulment with the CA
because, as indisputably found by the RTC, Decree No. N-182390
supposedly issued by the then CFI of Lanao del Norte and signed
by Hon. Teodulo Tandayag is nonexistent to begin with. The RTC did not invalidate or
nullify Decree No. N-182390; what it
decreed is that Decree No. N-182390 does not exist at all. [Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing
Corp. vs. Heirs of Basilio
Llanes]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction

over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through:
(1) service of summons or through (2) voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority.—Jurisdiction refers to the
power and authority of the court to hear, try, and decide a case.
One of the aspects of jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the parties.
This refers to the fundamental rule that jurisdiction over a
defendant in a civil case is acquired either through: (1) service of
summons or through (2) voluntary appearance in court and
submission to its authority.
Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons Through Substituted
Service; Only in instances wherein, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, may
summons be effected through substituted service, i.e., (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.—
According to the Rules of Court, upon the filing of the complaint
and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding
summons to the defendants. The summons shall be served by
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person. Only in
instances wherein, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time, may summons be effected
through substituted service, i.e., (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. With respect to parties
that are domestic private juridical entities, service may be made
only upon the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Same; Same; Same; In the absence
of service of summons or
when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and
the proceedings and any judgment rendered are null and void.—In
the absence of service of summons or when the service of
summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and the proceedings and
any judgment rendered are null and void. At the outset, it must be
stressed that the fact that service of summons was defective in the
instant case is undisputed.
Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons on Corporations;
Service of summons to someone other than the corporation
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel is not valid.—It is
crystal clear that there were no several attempts made to effect
personal service in the instant case; as correctly found by the
court a quo, there was only a single day’s effort to personally
serve summons upon the therein defendants. Further, as also
correctly found by the CA, the Sheriff’s Report miserably failed to
indicate that the person who received the summons was a person
of suitable age and discretion residing in the residence of the
therein defendants. Nor is there a statement that validates that
such person understood the significance of the receipt of the
summons and the correlative duty to immediately deliver the
same to the therein defendants or, at the very least, to notify the
said persons immediately. Jurisprudence is clear and unequivocal
in making it an ironclad rule that such matters “must be clearly
and specifically described in the Return of Summons.” As regards
the service of summons undertaken with respect to the therein
defendant corporations, i.e., NGI and NPGI, the CA was
also not mistaken in holding that since the summons were
served on a mere OIC property supply custodian, the
services of summons undertaken were defective. Section
11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court sets out an exclusive
enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on
behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone
other than the corporation president, managing partner,

general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-

house counsel is not valid.

Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, one who seeks an

affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.—Despite lack of valid service of
summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary
appearance. According to the Rules of Court, the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. However, the inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. As a general rule, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is
considered voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that respondents
Sps. Sy, et al., did pray in their Motion to Dismiss for a
suspension of the proceedings due to a Stay Order issued by
a different court, which is an affirmative relief, such was
not tantamount to a voluntary appearance as respondents
Sps. Sy, et al., in an explicit and unequivocal manner,
posed vehement objections to the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) over their persons due to improper
service of summons.—While it is true that respondents Sps.
Sy, et al., did pray in their Motion to Dismiss for a
suspension of the proceedings due to a Stay Order issued
by a different court, which is an affirmative relief, such was
not tantamount to a voluntary appearance as respondents
Sps. Sy, et al., in an explicit and unequivocal manner,
posed vehement objections to the jurisdiction of the RTC
over their persons due to improper service of summons.
Therefore, following what is already settled jurisprudence,

the gen- eral rule that asking for an affirmative relief is tantamount to
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court should not be
applied in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Lack of
Jurisdiction; The courts may dismiss an action when there is lack
of jurisdiction, even though the issue of jurisdiction was not raised
by the pleadings or not even suggested by the parties.—Petitioner
UCPB also made the argument that the CA purportedly
committed an error of law because it held that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction with respect to the therein defendant
corporations even when such corporations failed to question the
RTC’s Order before the CA. Such argument fails to convince. The
courts may dismiss an action when there is lack of jurisdiction,
even though the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the
pleadings or not even suggested by the parties. Issues of
jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties. Even if a
party does not question the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide the pending action, the courts are not prevented from
addressing the issue, especially where the lack of jurisdiction is
apparent and explicit. [United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ang-Sy]

Remedial Law; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Rules of Procedure; According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Rules of
Procedure, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in an
analogous and suppletory character.—According to Section 97,
Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, the provisions of
the Rules of Court shall apply in an analogous and suppletory
character. Hence, following Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, which states that an appeal may be taken only from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes the case, and
that an appeal may not be taken from an order disallowing an
appeal, the NCIP RHO IV’s Order denying due course to PDSPI’s
appeal cannot be subject of an appeal before the NCIP En Banc.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Jurisprudence has
held that the special civil action of certiorari will lie even without
a party first availing itself of a motion for reconsideration if,
among other exceptions, the order challenged is a patent nullity or where
the issue raised is one purely of law.—In any case, although the
general rule states that the filing of a prior motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari, such rule is subject to well-recognized
exceptions. Jurisprudence has held that the special civil action of
certiorari will lie even without a party first availing itself of a
motion for reconsideration if, among other exceptions, the order
challenged is a patent nullity or where the issue raised is
one purely of law. Moreover, while the general rule dictates
that it must be first shown that all the administrative remedies
prescribed by law have been exhausted before filing an
extraordinary action for certiorari under the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are however exceptions to this rule, such
as where the issue is purely a
legal one or where the controverted act is patently illegal.

Remedial Law; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Section 46, Rule

IX of the 2003 National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) Rules of Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh Period Rule,
stating that, in a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration
was filed, a judgment rendered by the Regional Hearing Office
(RHO) shall become final only when no appeal is made within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order denying such motion for
reconsideration.—In the instant case, there is no similar provision
in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure which states that in case the
aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of the RHO,
the said party has only the remaining
balance of the period within which to appeal, reckoned from
receipt of notice of the RHO’s decision denying the motion for
reconsideration. Oppositely, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP
Rules of Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh Period Rule, stating
that, in a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration was
filed, a judgment rendered by the RHO shall become final only
when no appeal is made within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the order denying such motion for reconsideration. By issuing an
Order that plainly and unmistakably goes against the
above stated rule, the Court finds that NCIP, RHO IV
gravely abused its discretion.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC)
stresses that the dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds
is frowned upon and procedural rules ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.—
The Court stresses that the dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon and procedural rules ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very aims. Indeed, while the right to appeal is merely
statutory and not a natural right, the courts, as well as
administrative bodies, are nonetheless enjoined to respect the
minimum period laid down by the applicable Rules within which
to allow an appeal. All litigants, to the extent allowed by the
Rules, must be afforded the fullest opportunity for the
adjudication of their cases on the merits. [Puerto Del Sol Palawan, Inc. vs. Gabaen]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; As a rule, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
the Supreme Court (SC) does not pass upon questions of fact as the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on
the SC.—At this juncture, it must be stressed that, as a rule, in
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the Court does not pass
upon questions of fact as the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts are binding on the Court. The Court is not a trier
of facts. Hence, to disprove the factual findings of the RTC and CA
that there was already a valid and binding agreement that was
entered into by the parties during the mediation conferences
before the PMC, it was incumbent on the part of petitioner
Victoria to provide clear and convincing evidence to substantiate
her claim that she never reached an agreement with her siblings
as to the partition of their late mother’s estate during the
mediation conferences.
Same; Special Civil Action; Partition; Oral Partition; In Vda.
de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646 (1991), an oral
partition may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law
that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.—
As stressed by the RTC and CA, the proceedings during the
mediation conferences indubitably show that petitioner Victoria
and her siblings actually came to an agreement as to the partition
of the estate of Ceferina. Hence, that an oral partition has been
entered into by the parties is a factual finding that must be left
undisturbed. The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the
written document bearing the terms of the parties’ agreement is
of no moment. As explicitly held in Vda. de Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 646 (1991), an oral partition may be valid
and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires
partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

Same; Same; Same; The partition among heirs or

renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of property from one
to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in
favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.—
Citing Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196 (1947), the Court in the
above mentioned case explained that under Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, “there is nothing in said section from which it
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential
requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid.” The Court further added that the partition
among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is
not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds. [Fajardo vs. Cua-Malate]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification of Against Forum

Shopping; According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
and as held by a catena of cases decided by the Supreme Court
(SC), it is the plaintiff or principal party who should execute the
certification of non-forum shopping under oath. However, this rule
is not entirely inflexible. The SC has held that if, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign the
certification, another person may be authorized to execute the
certification on his or her behalf through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA).—A perusal of the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping (Certification) dated January 21, 2015
attached to the instant Petition reveals that it was the brother of petitioner Dizon,
Wilfredo V. Dizon
(Wilfredo), and not petitioner Dizon herself, who executed the
Certification. According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
and as held by a catena of cases decided by the Court, it is the
plaintiff or principal party who should execute the certification of
non-forum shopping under oath. However, this rule is not entirely
inflexible. The Court has held that if, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign the certification,
another person may be authorized to execute the certification on
his or her behalf through a Special Power of Attorney. Respondent
Matti, Jr. claims that petitioner Dizon failed to substantiate her claim that there was a
reasonable or justifiable reason for her
failure to personally execute the Certification. This claim,
however, is belied by the evidence on record. Petitioner Dizon
claims that she, a senior citizen, was suffering from sickness
while in London, United Kingdom at around the time of the filing
of the instant Petition, disabling her from traveling to the

Philippine Embassy to personally execute a certification of non-

forum shopping. She presented a Medical Certificate dated

February 11, 2005 and a Statement of Fitness Work for Social

Security or Statutory Sick Pay dated January 23, 2015 to show
that she was in poor medical condition, preventing her from
personally executing the Certification at the Philippine Embassy.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Dismissal of Actions;
The dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is
frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.—The Rules
of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and liberality to
promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are
used to help secure and not override substantial justice. Thus, the
dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned
upon especially if it will result in unfairness. Hence, the Court
refuses to dismiss outright the instant Petition on the basis of the
defective Certification, which was eventually cured by the
subsequent submissions of petitioner Dizon.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Certiorari is

a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.—Certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error was committed. Otherwise, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.

Same; Same; Same; An error of judgment that the court may

commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through
the original civil action of certiorari.—The administration of
justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of
certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as
long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; A wrong judgment is not a
void judgment, provided the court which renders it had
jurisdiction to try the case.—While it is true that the rule on the
immutability and finality of judgments admits of certain
exceptions, such as when the questioned final and executory
judgment is void, a catena of cases has held that a mere erroneous
judgment, though rendered according to the course and practice of
the court is contrary to law, is not a void judgment. A wrong
judgment is not a void judgment, provided the court which
renders it had jurisdiction to try the case.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; As it is a basic rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.—Not only is the foregoing assertion
an argument that should be denied for being raised for the first
time on appeal, such argument is patently erroneous. As it is a
basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations in the complaint, it is an established principle that jurisdiction is not
determined by the amount
ultimately substantiated and awarded by the trial court. [Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. vs.
Ang]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Jurisprudence

has made it clear that “[i]ntervention can no longer be allowed in a
case already terminated by final judgment.”—Foremost, it is not
disputed by any party that Civil Case No. B-8623 has already
been decided with finality; the RTC’s Decision dated May 19, 2013
is already final and executory. The case where the petitioners Yu
seek to intervene in has already ceased. Jurisprudence has made
it clear that “[i]ntervention can no longer be allowed in a
case already terminated by final judgment.” Further, it must
be noted that Civil Case No. B-8623 is centered on the recovery of
sum of money pursued by respondent Miranda against
respondents Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth on the basis of
the latter’s obligation to pay the former for the supply and
financing of the backfilling materials provided by respondent
Miranda for the respondents’ housing project. The petitioners Yu
have no participation whatsoever in the transaction entered into by the respondents
Morning
Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth with respondent Miranda. The said
case does not concern itself with the question of ownership over
the subject properties. The only involvement of the petitioners Yu
in Civil Case No. B-8623 is their claim over the subject properties
registered in the name of respondent Morning Star, which were
subjected to preliminary attachment to secure the judgment debt.
The only purpose of the petitioners Yu’s attempt to intervene is to
question the inclusion of the subject properties in the coverage of
the preliminary attachment imposed by the RTC. It is apparent
that the involvement of the petitioners Yu in the instant case is
incidental to the cause of action subject of Civil Case No. B-8623,
i.e., recovery of sum of money based on an obligation to pay. The
issue on the ownership of the subject properties and the propriety
of their inclusion in the preliminary attachment is not
determinative whatsoever as to whether respondent Miranda has a cause of action for
recovery of money against respondents
Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth. In other words, the
petitioners Yu are not parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination of the recovery of sum of money case can be had —
they are not indispensable parties.
Same; Same; Parties; Necessary Parties; The noninclusion of
necessary parties does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.—At most, the
petitioners Yu may only be considered necessary parties as they
are not indispensable, but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for
a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action. It must be stressed that the noninclusion of necessary
parties does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. In fact, under the
Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for intervention was not even
absolutely necessary and indispensable for the petitioners Yu to
question the inclusion of the subject properties in the coverage of
the Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Under Rule 57, Section 14 of
the Rules of Court, if the property attached is claimed by any
third person, and such person makes an affidavit of his title
thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while

the latter has possession of the at- tached property, and a copy thereof upon the
attaching party,
the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under
attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of
the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property levied upon. No such affidavit was filed by the
petitioners Yu.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Jurisprudence has
held that a writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional
remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending;
it is an ancillary remedy.—Jurisprudence has held that a writ of
preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy issued upon
order of the court where an action is pending; it is an ancillary
remedy. Attachment is only adjunct to the main suit.
Therefore, it can have no independent existence apart
from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the
defendant. In other words, an attachment or garnishment is
generally ancillary to, and dependent on, a principal proceeding,
either at law or in equity, which has for its purpose a
determination of the justice of a creditor’s demand. Any relief
against such attachment could be disposed of only in that
case. Hence, with the cessation of Civil Case No. B-8623, with the
RTC’s Decision having attained the status of finality, the
attachment sought to be questioned by the petitioners Yu has
legally ceased to exist. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; It is elementary that a
judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.—
The petitioners Yu bemoan that there is supposedly no other
remedy available on their part to protect their interests over the
subject properties. Such supposition is incorrect. As already
explained above, under Rule 3, Section 9 of the Rules of Court,
while the noninclusion of necessary parties does not prevent the
court from proceeding in the action, the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party. It is elementary that a judgment cannot
bind persons who are not parties to the action. To once
more, Civil Case No. B-8623 did not deal whatsoever as to who
has the right of ownership over the subject properties. The said
case only concerned itself with the action for recovery of sum of
money instituted by respondent Medina against respondents
Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth. Hence, any action by the
petitioners Yu questioning the registration of the TCTs in the name of respondent
Morning Star in another proceeding will
not interfere nor intrude whatsoever with the RTC’s final and
executory Decision in Civil Case No. B-8623. [Yu vs. Miranda]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; For the

principle of res judicata to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be
precluded must be identical to the issue or fact actually
determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be
party to or was in privity with a party to the former proceeding;
(iii) there was final judgment on the merits in the former
proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due
process, that the party against whom the principle is asserted must
have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior
proceedings.—Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to
the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand
or cause of action. The principle of res judicata precludes the
relitigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any future
or other action between the same parties or their privies and
successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause
of action. For the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to
be precluded must be identical to the issue or fact actually
determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be
party to or was in privity with a party to the former proceeding;
(iii) there was final judgment on the merits in the former
proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due
process, that the party against whom the principle is asserted
must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the
prior proceedings. [Republic vs. Roguza Development Corporation]

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the
Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of
the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency
or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The [CA] generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions
as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a
body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating
factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it
to the [CA]. In Republic v. [CA], this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth
Division of the [CA] to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more
particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces'
and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of
such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The [CA]
therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report"
shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the [CA] is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of
authority to the [CA] to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule
32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a
commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon
motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into
effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report
evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of
evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to
the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic,
the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on
the matter. The same result can obtain herein.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; For a writ

of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must
also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate
grievance.—As held time and time again by the Court, for a writ
of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must
also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he
perceives to be a legitimate grievance. An available recourse
affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the
judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Same; Appeals; Appeal from Decisions of the HLURB; Under
the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), “[a]ny party may, upon notice to the Board and
the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners (BoC) to the Office of the President (OP) within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, in accordance with
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1344 and Administrative Order (AO)
No. 18, Series of 1987.”—To emphasize, under the Rules of
Procedure of the HLURB, “[a]ny party may, upon notice to the
Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the
Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No.
1344 and A.O. No. 18, Series of 1987.” In the instant Petition, the
Sps. Rodriguez failed to provide any explanation whatsoever to
justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP. To stress,
the special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost. The fact
that the only question raised in a petition is a jurisdictional
question is of no moment. Certiorari lies only when there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Indirect
Contempt; The Rules of Court unambiguously state that it is the
regional trial courts (RTCs) that have jurisdiction to hear and
decide indirect contempt cases involving disobedience of quasi-judicial entities.—
Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is
clear and unequivocal in stating that, with respect to
contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such
as the HLURB, it is the regional trial court of the place where the
contemptuous acts have been committed, and not the Court, that
acquires jurisdiction over the indirect contempt case: SEC. 12.
Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.—Unless otherwise
provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed

against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-

judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as

they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by

law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the
place wherein the contempt has been committed shall
have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed
therefor. There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to
support the Sps. Nicolas’ theory that the Court has jurisdiction over a case for
indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial
body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is
pending appeal before the Court. To the contrary, the Rules of
Court unambiguously state that it is the regional trial courts that
have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect contempt cases
involving disobedience of quasi-judicial entities. [Rodriguez vs. Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board

(HLURB)]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; The Rules require that only questions of law should
be raised in a certiorari petition filed under Rule 45.—The Rules
require that only questions of law should be raised in
a certiorari petition filed under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of
facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings
of the appellate courts are “final, binding or conclusive on the
parties and upon this Court.” Factual findings of the appellate
courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to the Court.
The Rules however do admit exceptions. A close reading of the
present Petition shows that what the Court is being asked to
resolve is, what should prevail — the findings of fact of the RTC
or the findings of fact of the CA. Considering that the findings of
fact of both courts are obviously conflicting, the review of which is
an admitted exception, the Court will proceed to rule on the
present Petition.
Same; Same; Actionable Documents; As provided in the Rules,
a written instrument or document is “actionable” when an action
or defense is based upon such instrument or document.—As
provided in the Rules, a written instrument or document is “actionable”
when an action or defense is based upon such instrument or
document. While no contract or other instrument need not and
cannot be set up as exhibit which is not the foundation of the
cause of action or defense, those instruments which are merely to
be used as evidence do not fall within the rule on actionable
document. To illustrate, in an action to enforce a written contract
of lease, the lease contract is the basis of the action and therefore
a copy thereof must either be set forth in the complaint or its
substance must be recited therein, attaching either the original or
a copy to the complaint. The lease contract is an actionable
document. Any letter or letters written by the lessee to the lessor
or vice versa concerning the contract should not be set forth in the
complaint. While such letters might have some evidential value, evidence, even in
writing, does not necessarily have a proper place
in the pleadings.
Same; Same; Same; Not all documents or instruments
attached or annexed to the complaint or the answer are actionable
documents. To qualify as an actionable document pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules, the specific right or obligation which
is the basis of the action or defense must emanate therefrom or be
evident therein.—To clarify, not all documents or instruments
attached or annexed to the complaint or the answer are actionable
documents. To qualify as an actionable document pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules, the specific right or obligation
which is the basis of the action or defense must emanate
therefrom or be evident therein. If the document or instrument so
qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with Section 7 — the
substance thereof being set forth in the pleading, and the original
or a copy thereof attached to the pleading as an exhibit — then
the genuineness and due execution thereof are deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts pursuant to Section 8
of Rule 8. Thus, a simple specific denial without oath is sufficient:
(1) where the instrument or document is not the basis but a mere
evidence of the claim or defense; (2) when the adverse party does
not appear as a party to the document or instrument; and (3)
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.
Same; Same; Specific Denial; Even where the written
instrument or document copied in or attached to the pleading is
the basis of the claim or defense alleged therein, if the party against whom
the written instrument or document is sought to be enforced does
not appear therein to have taken part in its execution, such party is
not bound to make a verified specific denial.—Even where the
written instrument or document copied in or attached to the
pleading is the basis of the claim or defense alleged therein, if the
party against whom the written instrument or document is
sought to be enforced does not appear therein to have taken part
in its execution, such party is not bound to make a verified
specific denial. For example, heirs who are sued upon a written
contract executed by their father, are not bound to make a
verified specific denial; and the defendant, in an action upon a
note executed by him and endorsed by the payee to the plaintiff, is
not bound to make a verified specific denial of the genuineness
and due execution of the indorsement. [Young Builders Corporation vs. Benson
Industries, Inc.]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Appeal to the Court

of Appeals; According to Section 2(a) of the same Rule, the appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CAs) in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.—According to Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
Further, according to Section 2(a) of the same Rule, the appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. In connection with the foregoing, Section 5 of the same
Rule states that the notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to
the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof
appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is being
taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Fresh Period Rule; When a motion for
new trial or reconsideration was filed by the party, which was
subsequently denied by the court, there is a fresh period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.—With respect to the period for filing the
notice of appeal, the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The period of
appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. When a motion
for new trial or reconsideration was filed by the party, which was
subsequently denied by the court, there is a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file the notice of appeal, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is
deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time.
Same; Same; Same; Assuming of course that the notice of
appeal satisfies the content requirements set under Section 5, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, the approval of a notice of appeal becomes
the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed
on time.—Assuming of course that the notice of appeal satisfies
the content requirements set under Section 5, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, the approval of a notice of appeal becomes the
ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on
time. Hence, the RTC’s Order dated September 9, 2010 denying
due course to Bernardo’s seasonably-filed Notice of Appeal was a
departure from the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In
accordance with the Rules, Bernardo’s Notice of Appeal should have been
deemed perfected as to her.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that “each party has
a different period within which to appeal” and that “[s]ince each
party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely
filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not
interrupt the other or another party’s period of appeal.”—The RTC
and CA seem to have confused the right of a party to appeal and
the right of another party to file a motion for reconsideration.
There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party’s right to
appeal dependent or contingent on the opposing party’s motion for
reconsideration. Similarly, a party’s undertaking to file a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered by the other
party’s filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisprudence holds that “each
party has a different period within which to appeal” and that
“[s]ince each party has a different period within which to appeal,
the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does
not interrupt the other or another party’s period of appeal.”
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.—Contrary to the holding of the CA, if the RTC
granted due course to Bernardo’s Notice of Appeal, the RTC would
not have been divested of jurisdiction to decide Soriano’s Motion
for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano’s right to file her
own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated
whatsoever. This is the case because under Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case only upon the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties. Further, the CA’s concern that
allowing due course Bernardo’s Notice of Appeal would have led to
a multiplicity of appeals is unfounded, considering that the
respective appeals of Bernardo and Soriano could have been
consolidated by the appellate court.

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; The remedies of appeal in the

ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative.—It is elementary that a writ of certiorari will not
issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved

party. The reme-dies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the
aggrieved party has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy
in the ordinary course of law. [Bernardo vs. Soriano]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Estoppel; Estoppel

bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the
proceedings before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal.—
Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal
before the Court and abandon its theory in its appeal before the
RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules, petitioner may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and is within the issues
framed by the parties. In the Memorandum for Appellant which it
filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called “duplicate original
copies” of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic
documents. Rather, it insisted that they were duplicate original
copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere
photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC.
As observed by the RTC, petitioner even tried to rectify the
attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by filing a Manifestation
dated August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said
annexes. Unfortunately, as observed by the RTC, the attachments
to the said Manifestation “are merely photocopies of the annexes
attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp
marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp marks” that
were placed in the annexes to the complaint. Because petitioner
has not raised the electronic document argument before the RTC,
it may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal. Even in the
complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the
annexes to be considered as electronic documents as defined in
the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If such were petitioner’s
intention, then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis
for their introduction and admission as electronic documents.
Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not
been raised in the proceedings before the lower courts, for the first
time on appeal. Clearly, petitioner, by its acts and representations, is now estopped to
claim that the annexes to its
complaint are not duplicate original copies but electronic
documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to switch
theories. [RCBC Bankard Services Corporation vs. Oracion, Jr.]

Same; Summary Procedure; The Supreme Court (SC) is aware

that the instant case was considered to be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which does not expressly require that the
affidavits of the witness must accompany the complaint or the
answer and it is only after the receipt of the order in connection
with the preliminary conference and within ten (10) days
therefrom, wherein the parties are required to submit the affidavits
of the parties’ witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues
defined in the order, together with their position papers setting
forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.—The Court is
aware that the instant case was considered to be governed by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, which does not expressly require
that the affidavits of the witness must accompany the complaint
or the answer and it is only after the receipt of the order in
connection with the preliminary conference and within 10 days
therefrom, wherein the parties are required to submit the
affidavits of the parties’ witnesses and other evidence on the
factual issues defined in the order, together with their position
papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
Given the nature of the documents that petitioner needed to
adduce in order to prove its cause of action, it would have been
prudent on the part of its lawyer, to make the necessary
allegations in the complaint and attach thereto the required
accompanying affidavits to lay the foundation for their admission
as evidence in conformity with the Best Evidence Rule.
Same; Small Claims System; No evidence shall be allowed
during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted of additional evidence.—
Section 6 of the Revised Rules for
Small Claims provides: “A small claims action is commenced by
filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of
Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification
Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action, and
Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2) duly certified
photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as
well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support
the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which
was not attached to or submitted together with the Statement of
Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Equity Jurisdiction; For the Supreme
Court (SC) to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be
presented to justify the same.—Petitioner cannot, on one hand,
seek the review of its case by the Court on a pure question of law
and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant
its Petition, nonetheless. For the Court to exercise its equity
jurisdiction, certain facts must be presented to justify the same. A
review on a pure question of law necessarily negates the review of
facts. Petitioner has not presented any compelling equitable
arguments to persuade the Court to relax the application of
elementary evidentiary rules in its cause.
Same; Same; Appeals; Frivolous Appeal; An appeal is
frivolous if it presents no justiciable question and is so readily
recognizable as devoid of any merit on the face of the record that
there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed.—The
present Petition is clearly a frivolous appeal. An appeal is
frivolous if it presents no justiciable question and is so readily
recognizable as devoid of any merit on the face of the record that
there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed. The
Petition indubitably shows the counsel’s frantic search for any
ground to resuscitate petitioner’s lost cause, which due to the
counsel’s fault was doomed with the filing of a deficient complaint.
Thus, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules the imposition
of treble costs on petitioner, to be paid by its counsel, is justified. [RCBC Bankard
Services Corporation vs. Oracion, Jr.]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary

Judgments; As explained by the Supreme Court (SC) in Ybiernas,
et al. v. Tanco-Gabaldon, 650 SCRA 154 (2011), when a court, in
granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, adjudicates on the
merits of the case and declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, such
order or resolution takes the nature of a final order susceptible to

appeal.—As explained by the Court in Ybiernas, et al. v. Tanco-

Gabaldon, 650 SCRA 154 (2011), when a court, in granting a

Motion for Summary Judgment, adjudicates on the merits of the case and declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are
and which party is in the right, such order or resolution takes the
nature of a final order susceptible to appeal. In leaving out the
determination of the amount of damages, a summary
judgment is not removed from the category of final
judgments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; According to Section 1, Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his/her favor.—Summary judgment is a
device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. According to Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his/her favor. According to Section 3 of the same
Rule, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on
file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The term
“genuine issue” has been defined as an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad
faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the
basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or
counter-affidavits submitted by the parties before the court.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary

Judgments; Collection Cases; In a collection case, where the
obligation and the fact of nonfulfillment of the obligation, as well
as the execution of the debt instrument, are admitted by the debtor,
with the rate of interest and/or amount of damages being the only
remaining issue, there is no genuine issue and a summary
judgment may be rendered upon proper motion.—There is no
“genuine issue” which calls for the presentation of evidence if the
issues raised by a party are a sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in
bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis
of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or
counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. In a
collection case, where the obligation and the fact of nonfulfillment
of the obligation, as well as the execution of the debt instrument,
are admitted by the debtor, with the rate of interest and/or
amount of damages being the only remaining issue, there is no
genuine issue and a summary judgment may be rendered upon
proper motion. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines also known as Philippine Export-Import Credit

Agency vs. Philippine Veterans Bank]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Dismissal Without

Prejudice; Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may
be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In
such cases, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.—Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may be
taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In
such cases, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In Strongworld Construction Corp. v. Perello, 496 SCRA
700 (2006), the Court explained: [W]ith the advent of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an order of dismissal without
prejudice is no longer appealable, as expressly provided by Section
1(h), Rule 41 thereof. In Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation v. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc., this
Court had the opportunity to resolve whether an order dismissing
a petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of
ordinary appeal, petition for review on certiorari or a petition
for certiorari. The Court said that, indeed, prior to the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an action
may be appealed by ordinary appeal. Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure recites the instances
when appeal may not be taken, specifically, in case of an order
dismissing an action without prejudice, in which case, the remedy
available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As the dismissal was without
prejudice (not having been premised on Sections 1[f], [h] or [i] of
Rule 16), the remedy of appeal was not available. Instead, petitioners
should have simply refiled the complaint.—As the dismissal was
without prejudice (not having been premised on Sections 1[f], [h]
or [i] of Rule 16), the remedy of appeal was not available. Instead,
petitioners should have simply refiled the complaint. Notably, the
RTC also grounded the dismissal on petitioners’ alleged lack of cause of action. In
Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils. Corp., 762
SCRA 82 (2015), the Court distinguished failure to state a cause
of action and lack of cause of action in this wise: “Failure to state
a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds
to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to
the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action
may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented by the plaintiff.” Considering that, in this case, no
stipulations, admissions, or evidence have yet been presented, it
is perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual
basis on which Sheriff Cachero asserts his cause of action. Hence,
the ground of lack of cause of action could not have been the basis
for the dismissal of this action. [HEIRS OF SATRAMDAS V. SADHWANI and KISHNIBAI
S. SADHWANI, represented by RAMCHAND S.
SADHWANI and RAJAN S. SADHWANI,
petitioners, vs. GOP S. SADHWANI and KANTA G.
SADHWANI, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MAKATI, respondents.]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; The petition under Section 1 of Rule 45 shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.—Rather
than questioning the correctness of the CA’s ruling on its finding
that the DCS is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale,
intervenor Trotin wants the Court to consider the “relevant facts
and documents” referred to and cited in her Affidavit of Merit in
support of her argument that the DCS was novated when the
condition to pay the P900,000.00 balance within two months was
changed to when the Adverse Claim of the Heirs of Diosdado
Bongo would be resolved and finally to after the civil case against
respondents was terminated. Intervenor Trotin is precluded in a
Rule 45 certiorari petition to raise factual issues. Section 1 of Rule
45 is unmistakable: “The petition x x x shall raise only questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” For her novation
theory to be sustained, the Court will have to do a factual review.
While certain exceptions are allowed, intervenor Trotin
unfortunately fails to cite the relevant exceptions to sustain her
plea for the Court to make a factual review.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; New Trial or
Reconsideration; Newly Discovered Evidence; Affidavit of Merit;
Motion for Reconsideration; Section 2 of Rule 37 requires that a
motion new trial or reconsideration on the ground of newly
discovered evidence mentioned in paragraph (b) of the said Section
shall be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such
evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated
documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.—
Newly discovered evidence may be raised as a ground in a motion
for new trial or reconsideration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of
the Rules, which provides: SECTION 1. Grounds of and period
for filing motion for new trial or reconsidera- tion.—Within the period for taking an
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the
trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a
new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party: x x x x (b) Newly
discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result. x x x x Section 2 of
Rule 37 requires that a motion for the cause mentioned in
paragraph (b) of the said Section shall be supported by affidavits
of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or
by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be
introduced in evidence. The affidavit required is an affidavit of
merit which states the facts constituting the movant’s good and
substantial defense, which he may prove if the motion is granted. The requisites for the
introduction of newly discovered evidence are: (1) the evidence
was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such
weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If
the alleged evidence could have very well been presented during
the trial with the exercise of rea- sonable diligence, the same
could not be considered newly discovered evidence. [Mandin-Trotin vs. Bongo]

Expropriation Proceedings; Appeals; Appeal for an Order of

Expropriation; The proper remedy of a defendant in an
expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of expropriation
is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal of the order
of expropriation.—According to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, if the objections to and the defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, the court may
issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first. In the assailed Order of Expropriation, the RTC denied
the objections and defenses raised by petitioner PAFC and Orica
for lack of merit. The RTC held that respondent NGCP “has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of
just compensation.” The RTC also ordered the parties to submit
the names of three Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC,
and set the case for reception of evidence with respect to payment
of just compensation. Section 4 of Rule 67 further states that a
final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property, such
as the assailed Order of Expropriation, may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent
the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. It is
clear from the foregoing that the proper remedy of a defendant in
an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of
expropriation is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
of expropri- ation. The remedy is to file an appeal of the order of
expropriation.
Questions of Law; A question of law arises when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts.—The Court has previously held that “a question
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.” The
Court further explained that for a question to be one of law, “the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides
on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact.”
Expropriation Proceedings; Eminent Domain; Just
Compensation; The power of eminent domain, which is also called
the power of expropriation, is the inherent right of the State to
condemn private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation.—The power of eminent domain, which is also
called the power of expropriation, is the inherent right of the
State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation. The right of eminent domain has been
described as ‘“the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government’ that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method ‘in nature of a compulsory sale
to the State.’” The right of eminent domain is an ultimate right of
the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The exercise of this
power, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights. Hence, it is
considered to be one of the harshest proceedings known to the
law. Because the right of eminent domain is a power inherent in
sovereignty, it is a power which need not be granted by any
fundamental law. Hence, Article III, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution, which states that “private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation” is not a grant, but
only a limitation of the State’s power to expropriate.

Same; The expropriation of property consists of two (2) stages.

The first stage is concerned with “the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit.” The second stage is concerned with “the determination
by the court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.’—The expropriation of property consists of two stages. The
first stage is concerned with “the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.” The second
stage is concerned with “the determination by
the court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.’ This is done by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners.”
Same; As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to
expropriate pertains primarily to the legislature.—It has been held
that, as an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to
expropriate pertains primarily to the legislature. The power of
eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government.
The power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter
may delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies,
public officials and quasi-public entities. According to eminent
constitutionalist and one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., “[t]he authority of the legislature to
delegate the right of eminent domain to private entities operating
public utilities has never been questioned.”
Same; Delegation of Powers; In the hands of government
agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other persons and
entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a
delegated power.—In the hands of government agencies, local
governments, public utilities, and other persons and entities, the
right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power.
In fact, even as to municipal corporations, it has been held that
they can exercise the right of eminent domain only if some law
exists conferring the power upon them. Hence, with the right of
eminent domain not being an inherent power for private
corporations, whose right to expropriate is granted by mere
legislative fiat, the delegate’s exercise of the right of eminent
domain is restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating

law. The scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of
the delegating authority and
may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the
delegating law. [PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid

Corporation of the Philippines]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgments; Motion for

Reconsideration; Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is clear and
unequivocal: the pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed on time and by
the proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment or final resolution
sought to be reconsidered.—Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is clear and
unequivocal: the pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed on time and by
the proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment or final resolution
sought to be reconsidered. Therefore, as to petitioners Prescilla, et al., whose
Motion for Reconsideration is still pending before the CA, Eighth Division, it
must be stressed that the controversy has not been resolved with finality.
Consequently, as far as petitioners Prescilla, et al., are concerned, there is no
judgment that is already ripe for execution.

Same; Same; Judgments; Parties; A judgment of a court is conclusive and

binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the
commencement of the action in court.—It is elementary that a judgment of a

court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-
interest after the commencement of the action in court. A decision rendered

on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or

prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by
a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a
party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. To
reiterate, in G.R. No. 175375, only respondents Lasquite and Andrade as well
as Victory Hills were the parties involved. Petitioners Prescilla, et al. were
not impleaded parties in the said case. While the CA, Seventh Division
recognized this fact, it persistently believed that the Court’s Decision in G.R.
No. 175375 is still binding as to petitioners Prescilla, et al. because the said
final and executory ruling “involved the very same property (Lot 3050) that was
the subject in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 77599 and the Supreme Court passed upon and
determined all the issues involved therein when it reversed and set aside this
Court’s decision and reinstated the decision of the trial court.”
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; There is nothing in the Rules of
Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate courts to suspend the
resolution of a party’s motion for reconsideration on account of a coparty’s
appeal before the Supreme Court (SC).—On a final note, the Court notes that
this complication originated from the CA, Eighth Division’s act of suspending
the resolution of petitioners Prescilla, et al.’s Motion for Reconsideration.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows,
the appellate courts to suspend the resolution of a party’s motion for
reconsideration on account of a coparty’s appeal before the Court. Otherwise stated,
when the trial court or appellate court issues a judgment or final
resolution in a case involving several parties, the right of one party to file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal is not hinged on the motion for
reconsideration or appeal of the other party. Effectively, by failing to resolve
their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Prescilla, et al. were prevented
from exercising their right to appeal. Subjecting petitioners Prescilla, et al. to a
judgment that they had no opportunity to appeal from due to no fault of their own
smacks of violation
of due process. The present problem could have been avoided if only the CA,
Eighth Division expediently resolved petitioners Precilla, et al.’s Motion for
Reconsideration, which has already been languishing for decades. This would
have allowed petitioners Prescilla, et al., to appeal before the Court. Then, the
Court could have consolidated the appeals of petitioners Prescilla, et al., and
respondents Lasquite and Andrade and the question of ownership could have
been settled comprehensively and definitively. The Court stresses that the
objective of the rules of procedure is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. [Prescilla vs. Lasquite]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed (P20,000.00).—According to Section 33(3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA)
7691, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property
located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
P20,000.00.
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that, upon the existence of
certain exceptional circumstances, a party may be barred from
raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of
estoppel.—While it is true that the Court has held that the
jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings, and that lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted
grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any
time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record
that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in
the answer or in a motion to dismiss, nevertheless, the Court has
likewise pronounced that this general rule is not absolute. It is
settled that, upon the existence of certain exceptional
circumstances, a party may be barred from raising lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel. Same; Same; Same; Estoppel by
Laches; A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.—In the
seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968)
(Tijam), the Court barred belated objections raised by a party
with respect to the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court because
the said party raised the objection only when the adverse decision
was already rendered by the lower court and that the said party
had already sought affirmative relief from the lower court and
had actively participated in all the stages of the proceedings. In
Tijam, the Court ruled that allowing the party to raise the ground
of lack of jurisdiction after a long delay of 15 years is unfair to the
opposing party. Hence, the party raising the ground of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time after such lengthy period is already
barred from doing so due to the doctrine of estoppel by laches. The
Court explained that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court has
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such case because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The active participation of the
party against whom the action is brought, coupled with his failure
to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body
where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
body’s jurisdiction.— The Court explained that the active
participation of the party against whom the action is brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or
administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount to
an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. As further nuanced by
the Court in the more recent case of Amoguis v. Ballado, 878
SCRA 1 (2018) (Amoguis), “[t]he edict in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, is
not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction. A court that does not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case will not acquire jurisdiction because
of estoppel. Rather, the edict
in Tijam must be appreciated as a waiver of a party’s right to
raise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of equity. It is only when
the circumstances in Tijam are present that a waiver or an
estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is appreciated.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; After very actively participating in
the proceedings, and after almost three (3) decades of litigation,
the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte cannot now allege for the first time
that their right to be heard was transgressed.—As to the issue on the alleged defective
service of summons, the petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte argue that “there was defective service of Summons.
The court’s process server resorted to substituted service without
complying with the requirement in connection thereto. Thus, the
[RTC] did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner Teresita Rebamonte.” The argument deserves scant
consideration. Aside from the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte being
estopped from raising the question on lack of jurisdiction as
explained above, it must be emphasized that under Rule 14,
Section 20 of the Rules of Court, “[t]he defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons.” In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed
that the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte fully and actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. To repeat,
the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte filed their Answer and Amended
Answer. They even sought affirmative relief from the RTC by
filing a counterclaim against the respondents Sps. Lucero. The
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte participated in the pretrial, during
the trial by presenting their witnesses and cross-examining the
witnesses of the respondents, and were able to ask for a
reconsideration of the RTC’s adverse Judgment. In fact, the heirs
of the late petitioner Lino even sought to substitute their father
as parties in the instant case, which was duly granted by the RTC
in its Omnibus Order. They were able to lodge an appeal before
the CA. After very actively participating in the proceedings, and
after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte cannot now allege for the first time that their right to
be heard was transgressed. The petitioners Sps. Rebamonte’s
insistence that there was a violation of their right to due process
due to the alleged defective service of summons is outright
nonsense. The argument is clearly unmeritorious.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Points of law, theories, issues, and

arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred
by estoppel and cannot be considered by a reviewing court, as

these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.—It is a well-

settled principle that issues of fact and arguments not adequately

brought to the attention of the lower courts will not be considered

by the reviewing courts as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by estoppel
and cannot be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. In any case, the Court has
ruled that “[m]ere failure to substitute a deceased party is not
sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party
alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable
violation of due process.” [Rebamonte vs. Lucero]

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Question of Fact; A question

of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.—From a precursory reading of the
instant Petition, it becomes readily apparent that the instant
Petition puts forward a purely factual issue. In the instant
Petition, the petitioners Heirs of Lupena call for the reversal of
the assailed Decision and Resolution based on the argument that
the Relocation Plan is allegedly competent proof of encroachment.
The petitioners Heirs of Lupena argue that the CA misconstrued
the Relocation Plan when it ruled that, based on the said
document, there was no encroachment of the subject property. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. It is
unmistakably clear that in the instant Petition, the Court is being
asked to reweigh and reassess the evidentiary value of the
Relocation Plan. A catena of cases has consistently held that
questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari
before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. The
Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court’s function to
examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the
proceedings below. [Heirs of Marsella T. Lupena vs. Medina]