ARTICLE IN PRESS

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

The integration of Dow’s fire and explosion index (F&EI) into process
design and optimization to achieve inherently safer design
Jaffee Suardina, M. Sam Mannana,, Mahmoud El-Halwagib
a
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX 77843-3122, USA
b
Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3122, USA
Received 14 March 2006; received in revised form 27 September 2006; accepted 16 October 2006

Abstract

For the processing industries, it is critically to have an economically optimum and inherently safer design and operation. The basic
concept is to achieve the best design based on technical and business performance criteria while performing within acceptable safety
levels. Commonly, safety is examined and incorporated typically as an after-thought to design. Therefore, systematic and structured
procedure for integrating safety into process design and optimization that is compatible with currently available optimization and safety
analysis methodology must be available.
The objective of this paper is to develop a systematic procedure for the incorporation of safety into the conceptual design and
optimization stage. We propose the inclusion of the Dow fire and explosion index (F&EI) as the safety metric in the design and
optimization framework by incorporating F&EI within the design and optimization framework. We first develop the F&EI computer
program to calculate the F&EI value and to generate the mathematical expression of F&EI as a function of material inventory and
operating pressure. The proposed procedure is applied to a case study involving reaction and separation. Then, the design and
optimization of the system are compared for the cases with and without safety as the optimization constraint. The final result is the
optimum economic and inherently safer design for the reactor and distillation column system.
r 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keyword: Fire and explosion index; Inherently safer design; Process safety; Process design and optimization

1. Introduction While an ‘‘inherently safe’’ plant infers a plant that has

Adapted from the Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), hazard is defined as physical or chemical
characteristic that has the potential for causing harm to
people, the environment, or property (Crowl, 1996). It is
very important to note that the hazards are intrinsic and
are the basic properties of the material or its conditions of
use. For example, at a certain condition and concentration,
10,000 lb of propane holds the same amount of energy
which could be released by 28 tons of TNT. Those energies
are inherent to the propane, cannot be changed, and will be
released when equipment or other failure happens and
leads to an incident.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 979 862 3985; fax: +1 979 845 6446.
E-mail address: mannan@tamu.edu (M. Sam Mannan).
no hazards on an absolute basis, such plant with ‘‘zero
risk’’ might be impossible to design and to operate.
Therefore, the need to manage hazards and risks strategi-
cally and systematically arises and one of the strategies is
the inherently safer design concept (as opposed to
inherently safe plant). In addition, the best strategy seeks
to combine inherently safer design with process design and
optimization at the early stages of design where the degree
of freedom for modification is still high.
Mansfield and Cassidy (1994) presented an inherently
safer approach to plant design and general theory on how
it can be built into the design process. Palaniappan,
Srinivasan, and Tan (2004) applied inherently safety index
for identifying hazards and generating alternative designs.
Similar to the aforementioned efforts, others have been
concentrating on the safety analysis methodology without

0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2006.10.006
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80 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

applying it into design and optimization in a single

framework. Therefore, there is a need to systematize the Emergency
incorporation of safety metrics in the design stage. This is Responses
the focus of this paper. Section 2 describes the problem
statement and the proposed approach. Later, the proposed Physical Protection
method is applied to a case study and the results are (Relief devices, etc)
analyzed.
Safety
Instrumented
2. Inherently safer design System

Inherently safer design infers the elimination of hazards Critical Alarms, Human/
Manual Intervention
as much as possible out of a chemical or physical process
permanently as opposed to using layers of protection. Basic
There are four primary principles of inherently safer design Control
concept proposed by Kletz (1991):

1. Intensification—to reduce the inventories of hazardous

materials as more inventory of hazardous chemicals
means more hazards. Conden Top
ser
2. Substitution—to use less hazardous materials in the Product,
XD, D
process. Feed
3. Attenuation—to operate a process at less dangerous ,F,
XF
process conditions (pressure, temperature, flow rate,
etc.).
Bottom
4. Limitation of effects—to design the process according to Product,
the hazards offered by the process in order to reduce the Reboiler B,XB
effects of the hazards. Process
Design
In the US, inherently safer design started receiving more
attention following a highly-praised paper presented by
Kletz in 1985 at the 19th Loss Prevention Symposium of
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
(Hendershot, 1999).

3. Safety studies
The most common and traditional approach has focused
on layers of protection (LOP) where additional safety
devices and features are added to the process, as shown in
Fig. 1 (American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE),
1994). The LOP method has been successful in analyzing
safety systems. However, this approach has several
disadvantages as listed below (Crowl, 1996):
 LOP increase the complexity of the process, and hence the
capital and operating cost. In the oil and gas industries,
15–30% of the capital cost goes to safety issues and
pollution prevention (Palaniappan et al., 2004).
 The hazards within the process remain, even when LOP
are installed and are built based on the anticipation of
incidents, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Since nature might find
creative ways to release hazards, there are always
dangers from unanticipated failure mechanisms that
the LOP are not ready for, as shown in Fig. 2(b).
 Since no LOP can be perfect, failures or degradation in
LOP may pose risks offered by the hazards that lead to
incidents, as shown in Fig. 2(c).
Fig. 1. Typical layers of protection for CPI (adapted from Hendershot,
1997).
Other efforts by the industries and researchers toward
safety studies tend to focus on hazard identification and
control. There has been some work in developing more
advanced hazard and risk analysis methods such as Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause–Consequence
Analysis (CCA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA), and Hazard and Operability
Study (HAZOP) in addition to traditional methods such as
check list, safety review, relative ranking, and ‘‘What–if’’
analysis (Wang, 2004).
Several inherent safety efforts taken by US corporations
and US affiliates of European companies are listed below:
 Dow Chemical Company—Developed the Dow Fire
and Explosion Index (American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE) (1994)) and the Dow Chemical
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J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90 81

Anticipated Potential Incidents Unanticipated Potential Incidents

Layers do not
LOP for
work for
anticipated
incidents unanticipated
mechanisms

a Actual Risk b
Potential Incidents

LOP
Degraded LOP

Actual Risk
c
Fig. 2. Layers of protection characteristics. (a) LOP reduces the anticipated potential incidents, (b) LOP does not reduce unanticipated potential incidents,
(c) degraded LOP does not reduce any potential incidents (adapted from Hendershot, 1997).

Exposure Index (AIChE, 1993) as hazard ranking
methodology based on inherent safety principles.
 Exxon Chemical Company—Described inherent safety,
health and environment review process based on a life
cycle approach (Hendershot, 1999).
 Rohm and Haas Major Incident Prevention Program—
used checklist based on inherent safety principles for
hazard elimination and risk reduction (Hendershot,
1999).
In addition to actions taken by the CPI, actions have
also been taken by government in the form of federal
regulations such as the Process Safety Management (PSM)
regulation promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and the Risk Management
Program (RMP) regulation promulgated by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).
Overall impression these efforts is that inherently safer
design principles have not been systematically applied. As
opposed to layers of protection concept, the concept of
inherently safer design is to reduce the inherent hazards
rather than to control them. There are two advantages
about having lower hazards: they need lesser LOP, less
complex LOP, and offer lower magnitude of hazards, as
shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
Another impression on the traditional approaches is that
the efforts focus on hazard identification and control. In
addition, currently optimization is performed as an attempt
to enhance the process design and the operation conditions
of equipment to achieve the largest production, the greatest
profit, minimum production cost, and the least energy
usage. Whereas, neither objective functions nor constraint
conditions contain safety parameters in the traditional
process optimization.
4. Hazard indices
There are several hazard indices available as tools for
chemical process loss prevention and risk management.
Although no index methodology can cover all safety
parameters, Dow fire and explosion index (F&EI), and
safety weighted hazard index (SWeHI) are found to be
robust (Khan & Amyotte, 2003). The F&EI is the most
widely known and used in the chemical industries. The
following are indices available in the industries and
research:
 F&EI (American Institute of Chemical Engineers
(AIChE), 1994) and Dow’s chemical exposure hazards
(Dow, 1993) as tools to determine relative ranking of
fire, explosion, and chemical exposure hazards. Etowa,
Amyotte, Pegg, and Khan (2002) have developed a
computer program to automate F&EI calculation and
perform sensitivity analysis using Microsofts Visual
Basic. However, their program was not intended to
determine business interruption and loss control credit
factors, to conduct process unit risk analyses, to
automate the sensitivity analysis in order to integrate
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82 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

 Mond Index as a tool to define fire, explosion, and toxic

LOP 2 release hazard (Hendershot, 1999).
 Hazardous waste index (HWI) as a tool for flamm-
ability, reactivity, toxicity, and corrosivity hazard of
waste materials (Khan et al., 2003; Khan & Amyotte,
LOP 1
2003).
 Transportation Risk Screening Model (ADLTRSs) as a
tool for determining risk to people and environment
posed by chemical transportation operations (Khan
et al., 2003).
 Inherent safety index was developed by Heikkila (1999)
Conden
of Helsinki University of Technology. This method
Top
ser
Product,
classifies safety factors into two categories: chemical and
XD, D process inherent safety. The chemical inherent safety
Feed includes the choice of material used in the whole process
,F,
XF
by looking at its heat of reaction, flammability,
explosiveness, toxicity, corrosivity, and incompatibility
of chemicals. The process inherent safety covers the
Bottom process equipment and its conditions such as inventory,
Product, pressure, temperature, type of process equipment, and
Reboiler B, XB structure of the process.
Process
 Overall inherent safety index was developed by Edward
Design and Lawrence (1993) to measure the inherent safety
potential for different routes of reaction to obtain the
same product.
 Fuzzy logic-based inherent safety index (FLISI) was
developed by Gentile (2004). One of the major problems
in applying inherent safety is that safety mostly based on
the qualitative principles that cannot be easily be
evaluated and analyzed. FLISI was an attempt to use
hierarchical fuzzy logic to measure inherent safety and
provide conceptual framework for inherent safety
Fig. 3. Inherently safer process design requires no or less additional LOP
adapted from Hendershot (1997).
analysis. Fuzzy logic is very helpful for combining
qualitative information (expert judgment) and quanti-
tative data (numerical modeling) by using fuzzy
Potential Incidents IF–THEN rules.

5. Problem statement and overall approach

No or Less
LOP needed The problem to be addressed in this paper may be stated
by applying as follows: ‘‘Given a processing system that requires
ISD economic optimization, devise a procedure that achieves
Actual
Risk
optimum process design while insuring that the design
meets certain safety criteria.’’ In order to address the
Fig. 4. Potential incidents for inherently safer design (adapted from problem, several challenges have to be overcome. These
Hendershot, 1997; Hendershot, 1999). include the following:

 What is the best design based on technical and business

F&EI calculation into process design and optimization
framework.
 SWeHI as a tool to define fire, explosion, and toxic
release hazards (Khan, Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003).
 Environmental Risk Management Screening Tools
(ERMSTs) from Four Elements, Inc. for ranking
environmental hazards including air, ground water,
and surface water pollution. (Hendershot, 1999).
performance within acceptable safety level ?
 How to quantify safety and incorporate the safety
metric during design?
 How to perform the conceptual design in a computa-
tionally efficient manner?
This paper attempts to perform this optimization and
analyze the result by modifying common process optimiza-
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90
tion which focuses only on the technical and business
performance. The modified procedure for the use of F&EI
as safety parameter in the optimization is given in Fig. 6.
The following four steps were conducted to illustrate the
proposal methodology:
1. Computerize Dow’s fire and explosion index calcula-
tion.
2. Generate F&EI mathematical expressions as a function
of operating pressure and the amount of materials in the
process units.
3. Propose a general procedure for integrating safety
parameters into process design and optimization.
4. Optimize the reactor and distillation column as a case
study with economic, performance, and safety para-
meters as the constraints to verify the procedure.
Even though some of the data shown came from the
F&EI computer program that we developed, this paper
focuses only on the methodology, thus the development of
the F&EI computer program is not shown.
6. Dow’s fire and explosion index (F&EI) methodology
F&EI is the most widely used hazard index calculation
and has been used and revised for six times since 1967. The
last revision is the seventh edition which was published in
1994 and is applied for this research. Fig. 5 shows the
F&EI procedure.
The F&EI calculation is done as the following. First,
material factor (MF, the measure of the potential energy
released by material under evaluation) is obtained from
databases, material safety data sheet (MSDS), or manual
calculation (using flammability, NF, and reactivity value,
NR). Then, determine the sum of penalties that contributes
to loss probability and its magnitude (general process
hazard factor, F1) and the sum of factors that the factor
that can increase the probability and historically contri-
butes to major fire and explosion incidents (special process
hazards factor, F2).
General process hazards cover six items, namely,
exothermic chemical reactions, endothermic processes,
material handling and transfer, enclosed or indoor process
units, access and drainage and spill control, although it
may not be necessary to apply all of them. Special process
hazards cover twelve items: toxic material, sub-atmo-
spheric pressure, operation in or near flammable range,
dust explosion, relief pressure, low temperature, quantity
of flammable/unstable material, corrosion and erosion,
leakage-joints and packing, use of fired equipment, hot oil
heat exchange system, and rotating equipment. Each of the
items is represented in terms of ‘‘penalties’’ and ‘‘credit
factors’’.
The fire and explosion index (F&EI) is calculated using
(American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), 1994)
F 3 ¼ F 1  F 2,
83
F&EI ¼ MF  F 3 . (2)
The next step is business interruption calculation (BI)
that is done based on F&EI calculated. F&EI will
determine the radius and the area of exposure. Any
equipment within this area will be exposed to the hazard.
The damage factor is then calculated that represents the
overall effect of fire and blast damage produced by release
of fuel or reactivity energy from unit equipment. By having
original equipment cost and value of production per month
(VPM) as an input, the actual minimum probable property
damage (Actual MPPD) can be determined and then BI is
calculated by Eq. (3) (American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE), 1994):
MPDO
BIðUS$Þ ¼  VPM  0:7. (3)
30
7. Case study: overview
Procedure in Fig. 6 is examined in order to support the
argument that integrating safety into process design and
optimization gives benefits without necessarily violating the
economic and technical parameter. Hence, the final design
is the optimum economics and the inherently safer design
for the reactor-distillation column system.
Basic chemical engineering processes include reaction,
separation, and mixing. It is very common in the chemical
process industries that reactor is followed by separator to
separate the un-reacted raw materials and the specified
products. Thus, reactor–distillation column system is a
common system used in the chemical process industries and
studying its optimization is very important.
It is also a fact that in performing economic analysis of a
reactor, the separator should be included since there is
trade-off between reactor–separator systems as shown in
Fig. 7. Economic balance between a high reactor cost at
high conversion and a high separation cost at low
conversion will determine the optimum reactor conversion
based on the total cost. Therefore, it is necessary to have a
procedure to improve reactor performance and/or reac-
tor–distillation column system to produce desired products
while in the range of acceptable economic profit and safety
level.
8. Case study: reactor and distillation column system
The reactor–distillation system is shown in Fig. 8. In
addition, it is important to note that the data presented in
this problem statement are adapted from several sources
without specifically representing a certain process. The
reason behind it is that this research focuses on the concept
of integrating F&EI value, and not in the complexities of
the calculation of F&EI where expert judgment is really
needed for the optimization process which includes a lot of
(1) variables.
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84 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

Select Pertinent Process

Unit

Determine material factor

Calculate F1 Calculate F2
General Process Hazards Factor Special Process Haxards Factor

Determine Process Unit Hazards

Factor F3 = F1 x F2

Detemine F & EI
F & EI = F3 x Material Factor

Calculate Loss Control

Determine Area of Exposure
Credit Factor = C1 x C2 x C3

Determine Replacement Value in Exposure Area

Determine Base MPPD Determine Damage Factor

Determine Actual MPPD

Determine MPDO

Determine BI

Fig. 5. F&EI procedure (AIChE, 1994).

The reactor is to produce 645 million pounds of chemical
B per year from chemical A following the reaction of:
A ! B ðgas phaseÞ
The reaction properties allow only a portion of the
chemical A to be converted into chemical B. Then the output
of the reactor in the form of mixture of A and B will be fed to
the distillation column. Distillation column separates the
chemical A and B in order to have product A in a certain
number of purity. The data used in this case study are:
 A-B (gas phase reaction)
 Hazardous material: chemical A
 Product of the reactor: 645 million pounds of chemical
B per year
 Pressure range: 2–8 atm
 Isothermal and plug flow reactor
 Feasible optimum conversion:40–70%
 Distillation column operating pressure:10–16 atm
9. Objective function and optimization model
Optimization requires mathematical modeling. This
research employs F&EI as the safety parameter which its
mathematical expressions are available by using F&EI
program through its sensitivity analysis feature. The
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J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90 85

PROPOSED DESIGN
Constraints Adjustment
Reactions and Materials Selection
Equipment Selection
Operating Condition Selection
etc

DESIGN & OPTIMIZATION

OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS:
Economic Parameter

MODELING: Dow’s F & EI Method

Safety (Inherently Safer Design Principle )
Material Balance By using F & EI Program
Sizing and Costing of Equipment
Constraints:
Safety (Inherently Safer Design Principle )
Technical Performance
F & EI value < 128

NO ACCEPTABLE
LEVEL

YES Red : improvement in optimization

Black : Current optimization

FINAL DESIGN

Fig. 6. The integration of safety parameter into process design and optimization.

by using the following data:

Total
1. The rate of reaction and the mass transfer characteristics
of the reacting fluid. This determines the volume of the
reactor needed to produce the specified product.
2. The constraints dictated by the reactor are set up such as
Cost ($)

the type and geometry of the reactor. This determines the

Reactor cost of the reactor and thus the economic parameters.
Separator Economic variables of reactor are type, diameter, height,
design pressure, materials of construction, and capacity
(Edgar, Himmeblau, & Lasdon, 2001).

PFR is a cylindrical vessel that can be determined in the

0 1.0
X optimum
Reactor Conversion (X)
Fig. 7. Costs of reactor and distillation column as a function of reactor
conversion (Smith, 1995).
mathematical expressions are presented in the next section
along with other data required for the optimization.
9.1. Reactor optimization data
In this paper we use the plug flow reactor (PFR) as a case
study. The performance of the reactor can be determined
same way as that of the distillation column with several
modifications, only in different orientation. The reactor is a
horizontal pressure vessel in cylindrical form. The free on
board (f.o.b) purchase cost (C P ) of horizontal pressure
vessel including the nozzles, the manholes, a skirt, and the
internals (not plates and/or packing) are described by
Seider, Seader, and Lewin (2004).
Conversion (X) is the measure on how far the reaction
has proceeded and is in the range of 0–1 (100%
conversion). In optimizing a reactor, the conversion might
not reach 100% conversion due to other constraints such
as economic factors. For reactions with more than one
reactant, the material which the conversion is based on
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86 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

Cooling Water

Vapor

Condenser
Top Product,
Chemical A
Reflux
(Liquid)
(Liquid)
F, XF
Chemical A AB (gas phase) Liquid Phase Flow
Volume, Conversion Vapor Phase Flow
Chemical A Tray
and B
Vapor
Steam

Bottom Product,
Chemical B
Reboiler (Liquid)

Fig. 8. Reactor-distillation column system for the case study.

must be specified. Conversion expression is C pl ¼ fnðDi Þ,

amount of material consumed
Conversion ¼ Conversion ¼
amount material provided
C PL ¼ 1580ðDi Þ0:20294 , (10)
¼ Conversion ¼ ðamount in inletamount
streamÞðamount in outlet streamÞ
in inlet stream .
ð4Þ
Pd ¼ fnðPo Þ,
The data for the reactor design and optimization are:

 Objective function: Minimize Total reactor cost Pd ¼ expf0:60608 þ 0:91615½lnðPo Þ þ 0:0015655½lnðP0 Þ2 g.
(11)
Total cost ¼ ðC v þ C pl Þ. (5)

 Technical constraints (Fogler, 2002):

With Cv as cost of vessel, ts as vessel thickness, X as
Volume ¼ fn ðX ; F Ao ; C Ao Þ, conversion, Pd as design pressure, V as volume, CAo as initial
concentration of A, Cpl as cost of the platform, Po as operating
p 2 pressure, W as weight of the vessels, FAo as input material.
Volume ¼ D L
4 i  
F Ao 1 9.2. Distillation column optimization data:
¼ 2 ln  X . ð6Þ
kC Ao 1X
Distillation column consists of tower vessel and plates/
packing. The capital cost of the distillation column is the
 Economic constraints (Seider et al., 2004) summation of the vessel cost and the installed plates/
C v ¼ fn ðW Þ, packing cost. The data for the distillation column design
and optimization are:

C V ¼ expf8:717  0:2330½lnðW Þ þ 0:04333½lnðW Þ2 g,  Objective function Minimize Total reactor cost
(7) Total distillation cost ¼ ðC v þ C pl þ C t Þ, (12)

W ¼ fnðD; ts ; L; Di Þ,  Technical Constraint (Peters & Timmerhaus, 1991)

rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
rL  rG
uf ¼ K 1 , (13)
rG
W ¼ pðDi þ ts ÞðL þ 0:8Di Þ ts r, (8)

 0:5
ts ¼ fnðPd ; Di Þ, 4V t
Di ¼ , (14)
u f  rG  p

P d Di
tp ¼ , (9)
2SE  1:2Pd L ¼ trayspacing  N. (15)
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J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90 87

 Economic Constraints (Seider et al., 2004) Cv ¼ fn (W) Those expressions are the safety constraint in the
2 optimization and are applied according to the procedure
C V ¼ expf7:0374 þ 0:18255½lnðW Þ þ 0:02297½lnðW Þ g,
as shown in Fig. 6.
(16)
W ¼ fn (D, ts, L, Di)
11. Result: optimization
W ¼ pðDi þ ts ÞðL þ 0:8Di Þ ts r, (17)
ts ¼ fn (Pd, Di) Optimization is performed by LINGO optimization
P d Di software and uses principles of process integration (e.g.
tp ¼ , (18) El-Halwagi, 2006). For the reactor-distillation column
2SE  1:2Pd
system, the total cost is the total of the reactor cost and
Cpl ¼ fn(Di)
the distillation cost. As shown in Table 1, in the case study
C pl ¼ 237:1ðDi Þ0:62216 ðLÞ0:80161 , (19) of reactor and distillation column presented in this paper,
the feasible optimization solution without F&EI (safety
parameter) as the constraint is in the range of 40–70% of
Pd ¼ expf0:60608 þ 0:91615½lnðPo Þ reaction conversion. American Institute of Chemical
þ 0:0015655½lnðP0 Þ2 g, ð20Þ Engineers (AIChE) (1994) recommends that Dow’s Fire
and Explosion Index as the safety constraint should not be
more than 128 as shown by the vertical line in the Fig. 10,
With where the conversion is 49%. Therefore, applying F&EI
gives the new conversion range which is 49–70%.
C pl ¼ 237:1ðDi Þ0:62216 ðLÞ0:80161 , (21)
The vertical line also shows the conversion which gives
the F&EI value of 128. If the safety parameter is not
C T ¼ N T F NT F TT F TM C BT , (22)
considered, the total cost will be available for the
conversion in the range of 40–70%, as shown in Fig. 9.
C BT ¼ 369 expð0:1739Di Þ. (23) However, safety parameter will not allow the process to
With Cv as cost of vessel, ts as vessel thickness, Ct as cost of apply those conversions since at this point the process is
the tray, Pd as design pressure, Cpl as cost of the platform, not inherently safer according to Dow’s F&EI methodol-
Po as operating pressure, and W as weight of the vessels. ogy. The feasible range of conversion after safety
parameter has been included is in the range of 49–70%,

10. Result: F&EI mathematical expression Table 1

Optimization result
F&EI calculation is performed on the case study using
Constraints Optimal conversion range
the F&EI program. The sensitivity analysis feature on the
F&EI program provides the mathematical expression of No safety constraint 40–70%
F&EI as a function of pressure and material inventory. As F&EI o128 (recommended by 49–70% (730% less)
shown in Figs. 11 and 12, by varying the operating pressure AIChE, 1994)
at constant material inventory and vice versa, the F&EI
program will automatically generate a chart. By using least 1.22E+06
6.00E+05
squares method, the mathematical expression of the chart Distillation Column Cost
can be determined. This procedure is applied for both the 1.20E+06
reactor and the distillation column. 5.90E+05
Reactor and Distillation cost

For reactor, the expressions are: 1.18E+06

5.80E+05
8 2
F&EI ¼ 3  10 ðInventoryÞ þ 0:0012ðInventoryÞ þ 88:46, Total Cost
Reactor Cost
1.16E+06
(24) Right Axis
5.70E+05
1.14E+06
F&EI ¼ 0:1176  ðpressureÞ þ 109:8. (25)
5.60E+05
1.12E+06
For the distillation column, the expressions are:
5.50E+05
F&EI ¼  1  108 ðInventoryÞ2 þ 0:0018 1.10E+06

ðInventoryÞ þ 101:16, ð26Þ Feasible Area

5.40E+05 1.08E+06
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
F&EI ¼  5  105 ðpressureÞ2 þ 0:1072 Reactor Conversion
 ðpressureÞ þ 106:83. ð27Þ Fig. 9. Reactor-distillation column system cost without safety constraint.
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88 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90

6.00E+05 1.22E+06 REACTOR

Material Inventory vs Fire and Explosion Index
Distillation Column Cost
1.20E+06 180

Fire and Explosion Index

5.90E+05
Reactor and Distillation cost

160
140
1.18E+06
120
5.80E+05
100
Total Cost
Reactor Cost 1.16E+06 80
Right Axis
5.70E+05 60
1.14E+06 40 y = 3E-08x2 + 0.0012x + 88.46
Dow's F & EI= 128 20
5.60E+05 0
1.12E+06 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Material Inventory (1000 Ibs)
5.50E+05 1.10E+06
REACTOR
Operating Pressure vs Fire and Explosion Index
5.40E+05 1.08E+06 128
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 126

Fire and Explosion Index

Reactor Conversion 124
122
Fig. 10. Reactor-distillation column with safety constraint.
120
118
116
as shown in Fig. 10. This is 30% less than the original
114
conversion range which affects the economic performance
112
of the system. F&EI asks for higher conversion of reaction y = 1E-16x2 + 0.1176x + 109.8
110
due to the fact that higher conversion reaction produces 108
more products with less reactant compared to low 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
conversion reaction. In addition, the lower the conversion Pressure (Psig)
the higher the reactant inventory needed thus the higher Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis and F&EI mathematical expression for
material inventory required by the reactor and the higher reactor.
distillation column capacity required to perform specified
separation. This significant decrease in the conversion
range shows that the F&EI as safety constraint will affect Figs. 11 and 12 show that F&EI value decreases with
the overall system in this case study. lower material inventory. Hence, higher reaction conver-
Fig. 10 also shows that the safety parameter is employed sion produces lower F&EI value and it will move the
only as one of the constraint for the optimization. It will cutting point of 128 showed in Fig. 10 more to the right,
not change any of the design value such as the cost, and vice versa.
the reactor volume, the number of trays, etc. As a The advantages of integrating F&EI as safety parameter,
constraint, safety will only limit the feasible area for the into process design and optimization are:
optimization solution. Thus, if the optimization with
constraint is performed, the result will be unacceptable  The final design is an inherently safer design.
and the designer has to adjust the constraint or the other  The trade off between safety and other constraints can
design variables. be adjusted according to the policy of the owner/
In other word, F&EI is incorporated as a cutting point designer.
between inherently safer and non-inherently safer based on  Since both safety studies and design and optimization
F&EI target value and not a variable. In this paper, are performed at the same time, safety and other
conversion range of less than 49% requires the amount of constraints will affect each other significantly.
reactant that produces F&EI value higher than 128 while  The safety level of the design is known even before the
conversion range of bigger than 49% yields F&EI value of optimal design is achieved. Thus, detail design is
less than 128. The F&EI values for conversion range of worked after the safety level is acceptable.
49–70% are absolutely less than 128 and considered as  F&EI value as safety constrain is flexible and
inherently safer according to Dow F&EI method with can be determine based on the objective of the
target value of 128. Hence the F&EI value for conversion design and safety level needed. This changes the cutting
range after the cutting point does not affect design decision point.
significantly as it is already meet the objective function of
the optimization process, which are technical, business and
safety aspect of the system. However, it is important to 12. Conclusion
note that the F&EI value as safety constraint is not
restricted to 128 as it depends on the target value and will Mathematical expression represented safety parameter is
change move the cutting point to a different one. required when safety is included in the optimization. A
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90 89

DISTILLATION COLUMN
160 Operating Pressure vs Fire and Explosion Index

150

Fire and Explosion Index

140

130

120

110

100 y = 5E-05x2 + 0.1072x + 106.83

90

80
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Operating Pressure (Psig)

DISTILLATION COLUMN
Material Inventory vs Fire and Explosion Index
200
Fire and Explosion Index

150

100

50 y = 1E-08x2 + 0.0018x + 101.16

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Weight (1000 Ibs)

Fig. 12. Sensitivity analysis and F&EI mathematical expression for distillation column.

simple way to have it for Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index
can be done by using the F&EI computer program
developed for this paper.
The case study on reactor-distillation column system
proves that the proposed procedures of integrating
safety parameter (Dow’s F&EI in this research) into
process design and optimization framework quant-
itatively and systematically are very useful. The safety
parameter acts as a constraint rather than as the
process variable. It only limits the feasible area of the
conversion optimization solution. It does not change any
of the process variables. In the case study of reactor
and distillation column presented in this paper, the
feasible optimization solution without safety as the
constraint is in the range of 40–70% of reaction conver-
sion. F&EI application as the safety parameter narrows the
conversion range into 49–70%. The conversion range of
40–49% is not inherently safer according to F&EI
methodology.
When F&EI value of 128 as constraint is applied, safety
constraint is not significantly affecting the decision making
any further within the conversion range of 49%–70%. By
applying the different F&EI value as needed, one can find
different and the right cutting point for the design. Based
on the fact that lower reaction conversion demands higher
amount of reactant, lower F&EI value selected reduces the
conversion ranges. This changes the feasible conversion
range for the process under evaluation.
There are several contributions presented by this
methodology:
 Getting safety parameter as a mathematical expression
has been a problem in safety thus inhibits the integration
of safety parameter into process design systematically.
This paper presents a simple way of generating
expressions from available hazard analysis which can
be useful in modeling and predicting the hazard of the
specific process.
 Proving that there is a possibility for Dow’s fire and
explosion index method to be integrated into process
design and optimization framework while satisfying the
specified technical and economic parameters.
 Presenting general idea on how to integrate safety into
process design and optimization. Instead of using only
Dow’s fire and explosion index, reader might assign
other methodology that fits their specific process.
However, the idea is still the same which is having the
mathematical expression of the safety study undergo
and utilize it in the optimization.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
90 J. Suardin et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 79–90
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