Tan v. Cinco, et al, G.R. No.

213054, June 15, 2016

First Division, Justice Perlas-Bernabe

Doctrine of Judicial Stability

FACTS: Dante Tan, husband of herein petitioner Teresita Tan, failed to pay a loan,
amounting to 50 million pesos, to herein respondents (Simon Lori Holdings, Inc.,
Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr.).
Dante also failed in his promise to settle his loan by selling his shares in a certain
company and assigning said proceeds to herein respondents.

Respondents, thus, filed an action for sum of money against Dante before the RTC-
Makati City which ruled in their favor ordering Dante to pay them P100,100,000.00. A
Writ of Execution (Writ) was eventually issued and implemented wherein Deputy Sheriff
Rommel Ignacio levied on a property registered in Dante’s name. An auction for sale
was conducted but Dante moved to quash the Writ to no avail, hence a Final Deed of
Sale was issued in favor of respondents.

Later, Dante filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that the property auctioned was their
family home but, still, to no avail which prompted the RTC-Makati City to declare that
the attachment and levy on the subject property was validly done, directing the issuance
of a writ of possession in favor of respondents and ordering Dante and all persons
claiming rights to said property to vacate. Dante’s MOR was denied. The RTC-Makati
City’s disposition of the case become final.

However, Teresita Tan, filed before the RTC-Paranaque City a complaint against
respondents for the nullification of the auction sale and cancellation of the certificate of
sale. The RTC-Paranaque initially dismissed the case; but upon reconsideration of
Teresita it reversed itself and ordered the nullification of the auction sale, certificate of
sale and the Final Deed of Sale granted by the RTC-Makati City in favor of herein
respondents. It grounded its decision on Teresita being a third party to the collection
case before the Makati RTC. Respondents filed an MOR but was denied by RTC-
Paranaque. Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground that
the RTC-Paranaque had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-
equal court.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents on the ground of the doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference. Teresita’s MOR was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-Paranaque violated the doctrine of judicial stability
when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null
and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of
respondents?

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court denied the petition. The RTC-Paranaque violated the
doctrine of judicial stability in taking cognizance of Teresita’s complaint despite the fact
that the RTC-Makati has acquired jurisdiction over the collection case from which
Teresita’s complaint emanated. The nullification case should have been dismissed at
the start for lack of jurisdiction as the RTC-Paranaque has no authority to nullify the levy
and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the RTC-Makati, a
coordinate and co-equal court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CONCEPT OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

“The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgements

of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court
can interfere by injunction with the judgements or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale
for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction
over the case and renders judgement therein has jurisdiction over its judgement,
to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgement.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power,
for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control
its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings.
Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the
law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy
against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal
body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court .
This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VII, Section
1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition
for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.”