BP DOWNSTREAM

OIL & REFINING

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDIES

(HAZOP)

Training Course Notes

Prepared by: Ian W Morrison

Refining Technology Group
BP Oil, Sunbury

H:/Hazop/Training/BPA Hazop Trg Notes Rev 3 Sep 99.doc

 CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. WHAT IS A HAZOP?

3. WHY DO WE DO HAZOP’S?

4. TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY

4.1 Terms of Reference & Scope of Work

4.2 Timing
4.3 Documents Required
4.4 Team Membership
4.5 Study Initiation
4.6 Process Element Selection
4.7 Process Parameters
4.8 Guidewords
4.9 Causes
4.10 Consequences
4.11 Existing safeguards
4.12 Recommended Actions
4.13 Recording and Reporting
4.14 Follow-up

5. APPENDICES

6. Additional Reading

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1. INTRODUCTION

BP seeks to be distinctive worldwide in its pursuit and attainment of health,

safety and environmental practice - no accidents, no harm to people and no
damage to the environment. Getting HSE Right presents the HSE Management
Systems Framework and the Key Processes to be put in place in order to achieve
the company’s HSE Expectations. The HAZOP technique is one of many used to
meet the HSE Expectations - particularly in Elements 2, 5 & 6 of Getting HSE
Right.

The HAZOP technique is widely recognised as the most effective method

currently available for satisfying two basic requirements. The first is checking a
new design for safety and operability problems whilst it is at the process and
instrumentation diagram stage. The second is the identification of latent safety
and operability problems in existing plant, which have yet to be revealed during
operations.

The HAZOP technique is very powerful in terms of its ability to identify the
potential for incidents. Conducting a HAZOP is a significant consumer of
manpower resources and needs to be planned as an integral part of a project
development activity. The HAZOP should not be considered as an “add on”.

HAZOP has developed over a number of years and there are a number of ways in
which it is applied. This manual describes the BP approach to the technique. It
has been prepared for two purposes.

a) To be support material for BP's HAZOP training programme which provides

an insight into the technique for engineers new to HAZOP and gives more
experienced people the opportunity for practice at an advanced level.

b) To be a handbook for study chairmen when they carry out Studies and need to
promote in their team an awareness of how the technique will be applied.

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 The successful practice of the technique is very dependent on the skills of the
chairman. Whilst this manual identifies his tasks, separate training is available in
chairmanship skills. Both those who will participate in studies, either as chairman
or team member, and those who will be recipients of study reports are encouraged
to participate in this training to learn the behaviours necessary to contribute and
respond optimally in the performance of a HAZOP study.

2. WHAT IS A HAZOP?

2.1 WHAT

HAZOP stands for HAZard and OPerability. It is a method of study for

identifying hazards and operability problems in a process design. It is a
systematic technique that is applied repetitively to small sections of the process
design until all parts of the design have been studied. It is a qualitative means of
identifying potential problems; it does not quantify the problems nor offer
solutions to them.

2.2 WHO

The HAZOP study is carried out by a team that includes members with detailed
knowledge of the process system being studied and discipline engineers to
provide expertise in their own discipline. What all team members contribute to a
successful HAZOP study is an open and imaginative approach to searching for
potential hazards and operability problems.

2.3 HOW

The HAZOP technique is applied to Process and Instrumentation Drawings

(P&IDs) of the process. As stated above, a small section of the process is selected
for study - the PROCESS ELEMENT. A combination of a GUIDEWORD and a
PROCESS PARAMETER is applied to that process element to establish

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 CAUSES of deviation from the intended design conditions. The
CONSEQUENCES of the deviation(s) in terms of hazards or operability
problems are established. Any EXISTING SAFEGUARD in the process design
that mitigates the effect of the consequence is identified. Finally, if considered
necessary by the team, a RECOMMENDATION is made for action to be taken to
improve the safety or operability of the process system.

This cycle is then repeated on the same process element with different
combinations of guidewords and process parameters until all guidewords and
process parameters have been applied.

The whole process is then repeated for the next process element and so on until
the entire process system has been studied.

2.4 TO WHAT

The HAZOP technique was developed to identify inadequacies with respect to

safety and operability in the design of complex chemical processes and it is
ideally suited for this purpose. It can be applied just as readily to existing plant
and to plant modifications. The important factor in application of the HAZOP
technique is that the P&IDs to be studied must be accurate and adequately
detailed.
The material in this manual addresses application of the HAZOP technique to
continuous processes. With some modification of the application method, the
technique can be applied to batch processes also.

2.5 WHEN

For a new facility, ideally a HAZOP study would be carried out at the end of the
detailed design stage when all P&IDs have been finalised and issued for
construction. However, this would lead to a delay (or, at least, potential delay) to
the project while the HAZOP study is carried out, its recommendations evaluated
and any engineering checks or changes implemented. Few projects can

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accommodate a delay of this kind. Therefore, in practical terms, the HAZOP
study is carried out as late as possible in the detailed design stage when P&IDs
are as complete as possible while still allowing sufficient time for HAZOP
recommendations to be considered and incorporated into the design. The precise
timing of the HAZOP study is, therefore, a matter of judgement on the part of the
project management in discussion with the HAZOP chairman.

The paragraphs above refer to a full HAZOP on the detailed process design of a
facility. It is possible also to carry out a preliminary HAZOP on Process Flow
Diagrams (PFDs) or preliminary P&IDs at the end or near the end of basic
engineering. The objective of the preliminary study is to identify major hazards
or operability problems in the basic process design so that they may be overcome
in detailed engineering or, in some cases, an alternative process can be selected.

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3. WHY DO WE DO HAZOPS?

Any plant design, new or existing, will have been prepared using input from more
than one engineer. Often a large team is involved. Whilst an engineer might be
totally competent in his discipline there is always scope for misunderstanding
where one engineer’s work overlays or interfaces with that of another.

Designs that connect to existing installations can be prepared in isolation from all
the experience and knowledge at the facility.

It is frequently the case that design teams lack operational input so that an
important perspective on the design is very limited or totally lacking.

Given the above, there is a need to have proposed, and existing, designs reviewed
for hazards and operability problems by a multi-disciplined team in a thorough,
structured manner. The Hazard and Operability Study technique satisfies this
need and, for new designs, using process and instrumentation diagrams close to
design freeze, allows improvements to be made when it is least expensive.

We carry out HAZOP studies for the following purposes:

• to provide assurance to Business management that a design, whether for a new

facility, a modification to an existing facility or an operating plant is acceptably
safe.
• to be part of the process for satisfying legislators that plants are acceptably
safe.

• to provide a reference point for accident/near miss investigations.

• to provide a reference point for future design or plant modification.

• to provide a reference point for operational personnel when considering

operational procedures for the plant.

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Our approach in the project environment is to encourage the design contractor to
use the technique as a design tool. Likewise, if our own engineers view their
work from a HAZOP perspective more of it will be right first time and there will
be fewer findings when the work is subjected to a formal HAZOP study.

It should be remembered that the design contractor's perspective on a HAZOP

study is unlikely to be the same as BP’s unless we have made some effort for this
to be so. Design contractors may concentrate only on issues that require project
actions. They may ignore operability considerations completely since they often
have no personnel with operating experience. They may report by exception
leaving no audit trail. They may use a team consisting only of people concerned
with the project. None of this is acceptable to BP.

Attempts have been made to produce the same result with less effort and,
therefore, less cost. Amongst the techniques often mentioned in this context are
'What If?' studies, Check Lists, Failure Mode and Effect Analyses and Fault Tree
Analyses. The first two can require as much effort as a HAZOP study and it can
be demonstrated that they are nowhere near as effective. The last two are not
designed to assess an overall process design and cannot be compared to HAZOP.

It can be stated that the HAZOP study is the best technique available to us for the
purposes for which it should be used. When performed well it is a cost effective
mechanism for qualitatively checking for potential hazards and operability
problems.

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4. TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY

4.1 Terms of Reference & Scope of Work

4.1.1 Terms of Reference

The terms of reference should be agreed formally between the client/project and
the HAZOP Chairman before the study commences. It should not be assumed that
the client always knows what a HAZOP study is, what requirements are
necessary for a study to be effective, what the limitations of the technique are and
what should be the extent of the responsibilities of the HAZOP team. In
particular the terms of reference should emphasise that the HAZOP study is
concerned with identifying hazards and operability problems and not with solving
these problems or with quantifying them. However, if the team has the expertise
to recommend specific solutions to identified problems with confidence it should
do so.

If the client requires the HAZQP team to carry out further HAZOP studies on
solutions to the identified problems proposed by the project this requirement
should be covered in the terms of reference. Follow-up studies should be
undertaken only after the main study is completed and must not be allowed to
disrupt the main study.

4.1.2 Scope of Work

Either included in the Terms of Reference or under separate heading, it is

important that the physical and procedural Scope of Work is stated.

The physical Scope of Work for a new facility may state simply that all P&IDs
for the facility will be studied. Alternatively, there may be exclusions such as: all
vendor equipment may be excluded. It is important that the limits of study are
stated and understood clearly by both client/project and HAZOP team.

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For modification work, it may be the intention of the client/project that only new
works are studied. However, it is often necessary for the HAZOP team to study
the effect of new work on existing equipment and vice versa. To ensure that there
is dear understanding between client/project and the HAZOP team, a statement
Such as, “as much of the existing equipment as is necessary to ensure that any
interactions between new and existing facilities have been addressed" should be
included in the Scope of Work.

A common area of problems between client/project and HAZOP teams is the

manner in which "vendor boxes" on P&IDs are treated. Designers will often
show considerable detail in vendor boxes which may be based on either their
knowledge of the vendor equipment they expect to be purchased or on their best
guess at what major items may be included by the vendor. In general, lines and
equipment in vendor boxes should be excluded from the scope of the HAZOP
study and a clear statement of this made in the Scope of Work. This will avoid
possible problems later. If "vendor boxes" are required specifically by the
client/project to be studied in the HAZOP, it must be made clear in the Scope of
Work and in the HAZOP report that the study of any "vendor box" is of
preliminary HAZOP standard only. Whether "vendor boxes" are excluded or
studied it must be recorded in the HAZOP report that full HAZOP of the vendor
details should be carried out when they become available. The full HAZOP
should be done to the same standard as the main HAZOP study.

The same guidance should be applied to "future" equipment identified on the

P&IDs.

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4.2 Timing

The HAZOP procedure can be applied at any stage in the life of a project
although the most detailed study is carried out when the process and
instrumentation diagrams have been finalised. A plan showing how HAZOP
studies fit into the development stages of a Project is given in Appendix 1

4.2.1 For a full HAZOP of the detailed design of a project (or modification),
ideally, the entire design would be frozen and issued for procurement and
construction. This would include the receipt of vendor details and
incorporation of those details into the project P&IDs. This ideal situation
can be achieved only if the project can afford, and has planned for, an
interruption in its schedule while the HAZOP study is carried out AND the
HAZOP recommendations are evaluated and, where appropriate,
incorporated into the design P&IDs. For a large project, this would take a
period of months.

Obviously, this ideal situation seldom arises. The timing of a HAZOP study
becomes a compromise between design being sufficiently advanced to
make the application of the HAZOP technique realistic and leaving
sufficient time after the HAZOP study for recommendations to be followed-
up by the designers. Most commonly, the HAZOP study is carried out when
the "in-house" design is complete and only vendor information on items of
equipment is awaited ie. "vendor boxes" on P&IDs. The missing design
information can be HAZOP'd by reconvening the HAZOP team to review
vendor information at a later date.

4.2.2 For preliminary HAZOP the timing is quite different. A preliminary

HAZOP is carried out on either process flow diagrams (PFDs) or
preliminary P&IDs with limited detail (eg. no piping specifications, no line
sizes, "best guess" instrumentation). The preliminary HAZOP is carried out
near the end or at the end of the basic engineering stage.

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 The aim of the preliminary HAZOP is to identify any major hazards
inherent in the process under study. It must be emphasised that the
preliminary HAZOP does not remove the need for a full HAZOP at the
detailed design stage.

Deciding the appropriate starting time for the HAZOP study is a matter for
careful discussion between the HAZOP chairman and project management.

4.2.3 The aims of the preliminary HAZOP and the full HAZOP are quite
different although the techniques used in both are similar.

• Preliminary HAZOP aims to identify major process hazards to allow

the designers to remove the hazard or provide adequate means of
minimising the hazard. This avoids costly delays at later stages of the
design.

• Full HAZOP aims to identify any hazards or operability problems so

that a safe and operable plant can be constructed and put into service.

4.2.4 In a different context, timing for the duration of the HAZOP study has to be
estimated before the study starts. No two P&IDs are of the same complexity
nor do two HAZOP teams work at exactly the same rate, but, as a rule of
thumb, an "average" HAZOP team will complete two "average" P&IDs in
one working day. However, with a complex process and a less experienced
HAZOP team the completion rate might fall to one P&ID in two days.

4.2.5 HAZOP study requires a continuously high level of concentration by all

team members to be effective. The repetitive nature of the application of
the technique is not conducive to maintaining concentration. The HAZOP
chairman has to be alert to the signs of loss of concentration and tiredness
on the part of team members and make every effort to stimulate the team.

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 Due to the mental efforts required it is seldom productive to try to carry out
the formal meetings of HAZOP studies in long sessions and day after day
over a long period. Ideally, two three-hour sessions per day and four days
per week should be aimed for. As well as avoiding undue tiredness and,
therefore, maintaining concentration for the team it allows the chairman and
secretary to keep up to date with the necessary administrative tasks
involved in carrying out the study.

4.2.6 Summarising 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 above, it can be stated that no two HAZOP
studies are likely to be the same in terms of the time required to execute
them. The main variables to be considered in estimating the duration of a
HAZOP study are:-

• experienced/inexperienced team
• complex/simple process
• complex/simple P&IDs
• computer/manual recording system
• secretarial availability
• need for/availability of specialists
• language
• number of hours/day, days/week

4.3 Documents Required

The essential documents for 2 HAZOP study are Process and

Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs). Without them a full HAZOP
cannot be attempted. Dependent on the depth of knowledge of
HAZOP team members, additional information may be required from
documents such as:

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 • Flow diagrams, heat and material balances
• Cause and Effect charts
• General Arrangement Plan and Elevation drawings
• Safety Analysis Function Evaluation (SAFE) Charts API-RP-14C
• Shutdown Philosophy Document
• Operations and Maintenance Philosophy document
• Safety Philosophy document
• Vendor Information Packages/P&IDs
• Relief/Venting Philosophy, Relief Device Data Sheets
• Drainage
• Chemicals - Data Sheets
• Piping Specification
• Pressure vessel, pump, compressor, turbine etc. data sheets
• Technical Specification Document
• Operating Instructions (particularly for batch operations)
• Pipework isometrics (if available)
• Previous Health, Safety & Environment Review or HAZOP reports

4.4 Team Membership

In order to carry out an effective HAZOP it is necessary to assemble a balanced,

multi-discipline team. Two types of person are required to run a HAZOP
effectively.

• those with detailed technical knowledge of the process eg. process, control,
operations, electrical engineers.

• those with the knowledge and experience of applying the highly structured,
systematic HAZOP approach.

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The Chairman of the HAZOP team should be selected for his ability to effectively lead the
study and have sufficient seniority to give the study recommendations the proper
level of authority. Ideally the Chairman or Team leader should be independent of
the project.

Engineers and scientists of relevant disciplines should be chosen for the positive
contributions they can make to the study through their specialist knowledge and
ability. It is preferable to keep the size of the team down to a manageable level in
order to preserve objectivity. However, this does not preclude bringing in
specialists to discuss particular aspects.

A typical team structure might be:

Core Team: Chairman/Team Leader
Secretary
Process Design Engineer
Control Engineer
Operations Specialist
Project Engineer

Specialists to be consulted on specific points may include:

Safety Specialist Electrical Engineer

Piping Engineer
Research Scientist
Civil Engineer
Chemist
etc.

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For a newly constructed plant, the commissioning engineer may replace the
operations specialist. The presence of the project engineer is desirable but not
essential. If the project engineer's responsibility is purely 'budget and programme'
then a systems engineer is also desirable.

The typical team structure above would be appropriate for a HAZOP study on
new facilities. If the HAZOP were to be conducted on an existing facility or a
modification, the team structure would be made up to benefit from those
personnel on the site who had experience of the facility. It must not be forgotten
that one way of identifying hazards and operability problems is to put plant into
operation and "suck it and see". In the case of the existing facility, direct
experience replaces the project development experience in the HAZOP team.

The attitude of the team must at all times be positive and constructive. HAZOP
studies are extremely intensive exercises and can take an appreciable time so it is
essential that the Chairman/Team Leader maintains the team's enthusiasm and
motivation throughout This can be brought about by displaying positive
leadership, bringing everybody in the team into the discussion (particularly
'drawing out’ the more reticent team members), giving team members specific
tasks under recorded 'actions' and keeping work periods intensive but relatively
short.

Occasionally, where a study may progress over an extended time, there may be
pressure to accept alternates for team members. As far as practicably possible,
this should be resisted. Replacement of team members disrupts the flow of the
study and, most importantly, tends to break up the established team effort, which
is the whole essence of the HAZOP technique.

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4.5 Study Initiation

In preparation for the HAZOP study, the chairman will have agreed with the
client/project on:

• terms of reference
• documents required
• team membership and availability
• estimated duration of Study
• venue for study meetings
• reporting method

4.5.1 It is worth noting that due to the intensive concentration necessary to carry
out an effective HAZOP study, considerable care has to be taken in
selecting the venue for the study. The chosen location should be reasonably
quiet and should be free from distractions such as telephones or team
members being called away for other matters. In this sense, a port-a-cabin
in the heart of a construction site would be inappropriate. Equally a section
of an open-plan office would not be suitable. A room, which can
accommodate a table arrangement giving everyone a dear view of the
P&IDS and allowing good team communication, should be the aim.
Suitable layouts are shown in Appendix 2.

Other factors to be considered in arranging the venue for a HAZOP meeting

are: -
• chairs are comfortable for all day use
• ventilation is adequate
• smoking/no smoking policy is established
• lighting, either natural or artificial, is adequate
• all necessary equipment is available eg. power supply for computer,
flipchart or blackboard for discussing detailed points, means of
putting drawings on a wall or stand.

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4.5.2 When the HAZOP team meet for the first time, prior to starting the formal

study, the chairman should:

i) Have each team member introduce himself (eg. current post,

background, HAZOP experience, married, golfer, gardener, etc.), as
an icebreaker.
ii) Reiterate the terms of reference and programme for the study.
iii) If appropriate, identify additional specialists who are available to be
called upon.
iv) Have someone make a presentation describing the facilities to be
studied and, if available, review a model of the facilities.
v) State the arrangements for meetings ie. Start/finish times, lunch
arrangements etc.
vi) Explain how he/she intends to proceed with the application of the
HAZOP technique and how reporting will be affected.

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4.6 Process Element Selection

The Process Element is the section of line or item of equipment selected for study.
The process element should be large enough to allow sensible discussion in the
teamof potential deviations from the design intent BUT small enough to ensure
that the guide words apply uniformly throughout every part of the element. A few
examples might explain the meaning above more easily.

i)

[ diagram to be inserted here]

This would not allow any meaningful discussion.

ii)

[ diagram to be inserted here]

This would be too large to apply the guidewords uniformly throughout the
section.

iii)

[diagram to be inserted here]

These two process elements - combined pump discharge to vessel, and, the vessel
itself would be about right.

4.7 Process Parameters

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These are the physical characteristics considered by the HAZOP team (in
conjunction with guide words) to establish deviations from the design intent.
eg. no FLOW
more TEMPERATURE
less PRESSURE
incorrect CHEMICAL REACTION

The process parameters to be used in the HAZOP study may have to be varied
according to the section of the process being studied. At the start of a study,
parameters should be carefully selected from the list provided in Appendix 3.
Judgement is required in selecting the parameters to avoid repeated consideration
of those which are inappropriate while still ensuring that occasional special cases
are not missed.

The list provided in Appendix 3 is not necessarily exhaustive and additional

parameters may be used at the discretion of each HAZOP study team.

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4.8 Guide Words

These are the conditional words applied to each of the Process Parameters to give
rise to deviations.
eg. NO flow
REVERSE flow
MORE temperature
LESS pressure
INCORRECT chemical reaction.

A list of Guide Words is given in Appendix 4.

4.9 Causes

Having created a deviation the HAZOP team have to search their minds and
apply their knowledge and experience to establish a cause of that deviation.

eg. Cause
NO FLOW - pump failure
- valve closed
- filter blockage
- vessel empty
- control failure

MORE TEMPERATURE - fire

- control failure
- valve closed
- solar heat
- flare radiation

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 A larger list of common causes is given in Appendix 5. Two Important issues
must be stressed in arriving at causes of a deviation.

(i) Team members must not be inhibited in putting forward their thoughts on
possible causes. Although their suggestion may prove to be inappropriate in the
circumstances, that suggestion may trigger a very important cause in the mind of
another team member which might have been overlooked otherwise.

(ii) Only credible causes should be put on record on the HAZOP log sheets. The
definitions of 'credible' and 'not credible' is one to be resolved in the HAZOP
team. The reason for this restriction is a simple one; to limit the amount of paper
produced by the HAZOP study and, therefore, the amount of reading and
evaluation to be carried out by the recipients of the study report.

4.10 Consequences

Having established a cause of a deviation the HAZOP team should then consider
the consequence(s) of the deviation. The consequences to the overall process as
well as to the line section or equipment item under review should be considered.

eg. DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE

more pressure control failure (i) over-pressure of vessel

(ji) process disturbance
downstream

4.11 Existing Safeguards

The consequences of a particular cause may have been considered by the

designers already. As a result, the designers may have included of equipment to
reduce the likelihood of the cause arising or to reduce the severity of the
consequences.

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 eg. CONSEQUENCE EXISTING SAFEGUARD

(i) overpressure of vessel - PSV ON VESSEL

- PAH ON VESSEL

(ii) pump damage due to cavitation - FAL ON PUMP SUCTION

- SUCTION VALVES LOCKED
OPEN (by Operating Procedures)

Note that it may be necessary to check on adjacent lines and items of equipment
for existing safeguards, not only within the process element under review.

4.12 Recommended Actions

Arising from the consequences of a deviation, and making due allowance for the
existence and adequacy of existing safeguards, the HAZOP team have to decide
if they should recommend any further action on the part of the client/project. The
decision which has to be made is whether the consequences of a deviation are
acceptable or not. In the majority of cases, the experience and judgement of the
HAZOP team will be sufficient to make a qualitative decision on whether action
should be recommended. Occasionally it will not be possible for the team to
make that decision and their recommendation should then be for further
evaluation of the potential hazard to be carried out by others using quantitative
techniques such as HAZAN or QRA.

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There are four main types of recommendations likely to arise from a HAZOP
study.

(i) The solutions to some problems may be obvious and the team may
recommend firm changes to the plant hardware which will either eliminate the
problem or positively reduce the likelihood of occurrence or reduce the severity
of the consequences.

(ii) Not all problems can economically be solved by means of hardware and the
HAZOP team may make firm recommendations for controlling them by
procedures.

(iii) In some cases the solutions to identified problems may be complex or costly
and may have to be referred back to the Project for solution or cost benefit
analysis. In such circumstances the team may suggest several possible solutions
for consideration.

(iv) On occasions the HAZOP team may identify serious problems for which
they do not feel competent to suggest any solution. In such cases the
recommendation would be simply that solutions must be found to permit the plant
to be operated safely.

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4.13 Recording and Reporting

4.13.1 Recording during the HAZOP study

(i) Why?
It is an essential requirement that an auditable record of a HAZOP study is
produced. Auditable in this case means that there has to be a clear record of why
recommendations have been made and, where a recommendation has not been
made, a clear record that the potential deviation was considered by the HAZOP
team but found not to create a hazard.

The purpose of an auditable record is to facilitate checking of the HAZOP study

record at some later date eg. by PHSER 3 team to be able to satisfy themselves
that an adequate HAZOP has been carried out, by a Board of Inquiry following a
serious incident to establish if specific potential deviations had been considered,
by operating staff to familiarise themselves with potential hazards and operating
problems for the development of Operating Procedures.

(ii) How?
A log sheet is used to keep the record of a HAZOP study. A variety of different
forms of log sheet are available within BP and from contractors. A standard BP
log sheet is shown in Appendix 6 (shown A4 but use A3 normally) which
represents the preferred log sheet format. A wide variety of computer-based
recording systems are available. An example of a log sheet from one of these
computer programmes is given in Appendix 7.

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Whatever recording method is used, what has to be recorded on the log sheet is:
• Study name
• P&ID number(s) (including revision no)
• Process element
• Design intent
• Process parameter
• Guide word
• Cause
• Consequence
• Existing safeguard
• Recommendation/Recommended Action

It is important that the entries made under the heading Cause, Consequence and
Recommendation are worded with the agreement of the full HAZOP team to
ensure that the precise intention of the team is stated. The HAZOP log sheets are
completed by the secretary as the study progresses.

The question arises in most HAZOP studies as to how much or how little should
be recorded on the log sheets. To satisfy auditability requirements it is essential
that any deviation established by the HAZOP team for which a cause is identified
is put on record on the log sheet. This is the case whether a consequence or
recommended action arises from that cause or not. This ensures that there is a
record that the HAZOP team identified the cause but considered that no hazard or
operability problem arose from it. If a deviation does not give rise to a credible
cause, there is no requirement to make an entry on the log sheet.

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As well as the log sheets1 the secretary should keep a record of:
Dates of meetings
Team membership at meetings (including part-time)
Reference documents used

Additionally, during the conduct of the HAZOP study the chairman will mark up
a master set of P&IDs to identify each process element studied. These master
P & IDs will form a part of the formal record of the study.

However, to provide overall auditability, at the front of the log sheets in the
report there should be a list of the process parameters and guidewords applied to
each process element throughout the HAZOP study. A statement must be added
to that list to state:-
'These process parameters and guide words were applied to all process
elements".

If, during the course of the HAZOP study, it is found necessary to change the list
of process parameters and guidewords then a revised list should be included in
front of the log sheets to which the revised parameters were applied. If necessary
the statement above can be modified to include "-on P&IDs xxxx to xxxx".

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 4.13.2 Reporting
A formal report of the HAZOP study is issued after the study. Dependent on the
client/project, the required format of the report may vary. A typical BP report
format is given in Appendix 8.

The major part of the report is provided by the study log sheets. This is a further
reason for ensuring that the team's intention is stated unambiguously in the log
sheets.

Apart from the standard sections required of any other report, a HAZOP report
should include a section in which the main findings, in the opinion of the HAZOP
team, are discussed in more detail than is possible on the log sheets. There is no
“average” number of main findings in a HAZOP report - it could be none and it
could be twenty or more - the size of the facility studied and the nature and
magnitude of the recommendations made will determine the number of findings
considered “main”.

4.14 Follow-up

4.14.1 Many different ways of implementing follow-up of a HAZOP study exist

dependent on who the client is and what system they may have/may not have in
place. The essential point to be made is that without the follow-up on actions
recommended by the HAZOP team the HAZOP study is of no value whatsoever -
it becomes a dusty (and expensive) ornament on a shelf!!

One way of implementing follow-up is:

(i) the project evaluate the recommendations and decide which to accept/reject
(ii) one individual is made responsible for recording project evaluations and
project actions.
(iii) individuals are made responsible for ensuring that specific recommendations
are actioned by a fixed date.

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 (iv) the proposed actions from the responsible individuals are collated.
(v) the HAZOP team (or selected members) are reconvened to review the actions
proposed and either accept or recommend further action on the part of the project.

4.14.2 Action Status List

A simple action status list which can be used to keep track of progress on follow-
up activities is shown in Appendix 9. This form of list would be applicable for
most forms of auditing.

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 APPENDIX 3

LIST OF PROCESS PARAMETERS

FLOW
TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE
LEVEL
HEIGHT
CHEMICAL REACTION
RADIOACIWITY
POWER
CORROSION
EROSION
COMPOS~ON
START-UP
SHUT DOWN
MAINTENANCE
INSPECTION
ACCESS
INSTALLATION
DEMOLITION
WEATHER
CATALYST REGENERATION
OTHER

The above list of Process Parameters is neither mandatory nor comprehensive. It

should be treated as a menu from which relevant items can be selected for use by the
HAZOP team. (Additional items may be used as appropriate, for example TENSION
was identified as an important process parameter during a study of a North Sea well
riser pipe to be connected to a dynamically positioned stabilisation unit).

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 APPENDIX 4

LIST OF GUIDE WORDS

NO
MORE
LESS
REVERSE
MISDIRECTED
HIGHER
LOWER
VACUUM
LIFTING
FALLING
INCORRECT
EXCESS

The above list of Guide Words is neither mandatory nor comprehensive. It

should be treated as a menu from which relevant words can be selected to
form a deviation in conjunction with a Process Parameter.

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 APPENDIX 5

COMMON CAUSES OF DEVIATIONS

NO FLOW:- WRONG ROUTING - BLOCKAGE - INCORRECT

BLINDING - INCORRECTLY FITTED NRV - BURST PIPE -
LARGE LEAK - EQUIPMENT FMLURE (CV/ISOLATION
VALVE, PUMP, VESSEL, ETC.) - INCORRECT PRESSURE
DIFFERENTIAL - ISOLATION IN ERROR - ETC

REVERSE FLOW:- DEFECTIVE NRV - SYPHON EFFECT - INCORRECT

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE - TWO WAY FLOW -
EMERGENCY VENTING - INCORRECT OPERATION -
ETC

MORE FLOW:- INCREASED PUMPING CAPACITY - INCREASED

SUCTION PRESSURE - REDUCED DELIVERY HEAD -
GREATER FLUID DENSITY - EXCHANGER TUBE LEAKS
RESTRICTION ORIFICE PLATES DELETED - CROSS
CONNECTION OF SYSTEMS - CONTROL FAULTS - ETC

LESS FLOW:- LINE RESTRICTION - FILTER BLOCKAGE - DEFECTIVE

PUMPS - FOUUNG OF VESSELS, VALVES, REEERICTOR
OR ORIFICE PLATES - DENSITY OR VISCOSITY
PROBLEMS - INCORRECT SPECIFICATION OF PROCESS
FLUID - ETC

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MORE PRESSURE:-
SURGE PROBLEMS - LEAKAGE FROM
INTERCONNECTED HP SYSTEM - GAS
BREAKTHROUGH (INADEQUATE
VENTING) - ISOLATION PROCEDURES FOR REUEF
VALVES DEFECTIVE - THERMAL OVERPRESSURE -
POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS - FAILED OPEN
PCVS - ETC

LESS PRESSURE:- GENERATION OF VACUUM CONDITION -

CONDENSATION - GAS DISSOLVING IN LIQUID -
RESTRICTED PUMP/COMPRESSOR SUCTION UNE -
UNDETECTED LEAKAGE - VESSEL DRAINAGE - ETC

MORE TEMPERATURE:- AMBIENT CONDITIONS - FOULED OR FAILED

EXCHANGER TUBES - FIRE SITUATION - COOUNG
WATER FAILURE - DEFECTIVE CONTROL - FIRED
HEATER CONTROL FAILURE - INTERNAL FIRES -
REACTION CONTROL FAILURES - ETC

LESS TEMPERATURE:- AMBIENT CONDITIONS - REDUCING PRESSURE -

FOULED OR FAILED EXCHANGER TUBES - LOSS OF
HEATING - ETC

MORE VISCOSITY:- INCORRECT MATERIAL SPECIFICATION - INCORRECT

TEMPERATURE

LESS VISCOSITY:- INCORRECT MATERIAL SPECIFICATION - INCORRECT

TEMPERATURE

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COMPOSITION CR:-
LEAKING ISOLATION VALVES - LEAKING EXCHANGER
TUBES - PHASE CHANGE - INCORRECT
FEEDSTOCK/SPECIFICATION - INADEQUATE QUALITY
CONTROL - PROCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES - ETC

CONTAMINATION:- LEAKING EXCHANGER TUBES OR ISOLATION VALVES

INCORRECT OPERATION OF SYSTEM -
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS - EFFECT OF CORROSION -
WRONG ADDITIVES - INGRESS OF AIR-SHUTDOWN
AND STARTUP CONDITIONS - ETC

RELIEF:- RELIEF PHILOSOPRY - 'TYPE OF RELIEF DEVICE AND

RELIABILITY - RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE LOCATION
POLLUTION IMPLICATIONS - ETC

INSTRUMENTATION:-
CONTROL PHILOSOPHY - LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS-
RESPONSE TIME - SET POIWIS OF ALARMS & TRIPS -
TIME AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR INTERVENTION -
ALARM & TRIP TESTING - FIRE PROTECTION -
ELECTRONIC TRIP/CONTROL AMPUFIERS - PANEL
ARRANGEMENT AND IDCATION - AUTO/MANUAL
FACILITY & HUMAN ERROR - ETC

SAMPLING:-
SAMPLING PROCEDURE - TIME FOR ANALYSIS RESULT -
CALIBRATION OF AUTOMATIC
SAMPLER/RELIABILITY -
ACCURACY OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE - DIAGNOSIS OF
RESULT-ETC

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CORROSION/ EROSION:- CATHODIC PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS -
INTERNAL/ EXTERNAL CORROSION PROTECTION -
ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS - ZINC
EMBRITTMENT STRESS CORROSION CRACKING
(CHLORIDES) - FLUID VELOCITIES - RISER SPLASH
ZONES - ETC

SERVICE FAILURE:- FAILURE OF INSTRUMENT AIR/STEAM/

NITROGEN/COOLING WATER/HYDRAULIC
POWER/ELECTRIC POWER - TELECOMMUNICATIONS -
HEATING & VENTILATING SYSTEMS - COMPUTERS -
ETC

MAINTENANCE:- ISOLATION - DRAINAGE - PURGING - CLEANING -

DRYING - BLINDS/BLANKS - ACCESS - RESCUE PLAN -
TRAINING - PRESSURE TESTING - WORK PERMIT
SYSTEM - CONDITION MONITORING - ETC

STATIC:- EARHTING ARRANGEMENTS - INSULATED

VESSELS/ EQUIPMENT - LOW CONDUCTANCE FLUIDS
SPLASH FILLING OF VESSELS - INSULATED FLUIDS -
SPLASH FILLING OF VESSELS - INSULATED
STRAINERS & VALVE COMPONENTS - DUST
GENERATION & HANDLING - HOSES - ETC

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SPARE EQUIPMENT:- INSTALLED/NON-INSTALLED SPARE EQUIPMENT -
AVAILABILITY OF SPARES - MODIFIED SPECIFICATIONS
- STORAGE OF SPARES - CATALOGUE OF SPARES - ETC

SAFETY:- FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEM/ALARMS -

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN ARRANGEMENTS - FIRE
FIGHTING RESPQNSE TIME - EMERGENCY & MAJOR
EMERGENCY TRAINING - CONTINGENCY PLANS -
TLV'S OF PROCESS MATERIALS & METHODS OF
DETECTION -NOISE LEVELS - SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS -KNOWLEDGE OF HAZARDS OF
PROCESS MATERIALS -FIRST AID/MEDICAL
RESOURCES - EFFLUENT DISPOSAL -
HAZARDS CREATED BY OTHERS (ADJACENT
STORAGE AREAS/PROCESS PLANT ETC) - TESTING OF
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT - COMPLIANCE WITH
LOCAL/NATIONAL REGULATIONS - ETC

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 APPENDIX 8

RECOMMENDED REPORT FORMAT

COVER PAGE

CONTENTS PAGE

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

TERMS OF REFERENCE

HAZOP STUDY LOG SHEETS

DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS

APPENDIX LIST

APPENDIX I LIST OF PIPING AND INSTRUMENT DIAGRAMS STUDIED

APPENDIX II REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
APPENDIX III PROCESS PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS USED

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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