PUBLISHED DOCUMENT PD CEN/TR

14383-5:2010

Prevention of crime —
Urban planning and
building design
Part 5: Petrol stations

ICS 13.310; 91.020

NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW

PD CEN/TR 14383-5:2010

National foreword

This Published Document is the UK implementation of CEN/TR

14383-5:2010.
The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical
Committee B/562, Security of buildings.
A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on
request to its secretary.
This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions
of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application.
Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity
from legal obligations.

This Published Document Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication

was published under the
authority of the Standards
Policy and Strategy Date Comments
Committee on 31 March
2010.
© BSI 2010

ISBN 978 0 580 63907 4

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TECHNICAL REPORT CEN/TR 14383-5

RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHER BERICHT January 2010

ICS 13.310; 91.020

English Version

Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part

5: Petrol stations

Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und

des bâtiments - Partie 5 : Stations-service Gebäudeplanung - Teil 5: Tankstellen

This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 10 August 2009. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 325.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION

COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels

© 2010 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 14383-5:2010: E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
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Contents Page

Foreword ..............................................................................................................................................................3
Introduction .........................................................................................................................................................4
1 Scope ......................................................................................................................................................5
2 Normative references ............................................................................................................................5
3 Terms and definitions ...........................................................................................................................5
4 Historical background and design .......................................................................................................6
4.1 General ....................................................................................................................................................6
4.2 The image of the petrol station – First source of prevention ............................................................7
4.3 Designing with regard to sociological and psychological factors ...................................................7
5 Risk assessment and management in petrol station .........................................................................8
5.1 General ....................................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Local factors...........................................................................................................................................8
5.3 Environmental and social risks ............................................................................................................8
5.4 The site ...................................................................................................................................................9
5.5 Who are the potential offenders ...........................................................................................................9
5.6 Types of crime that occur most frequently ...................................................................................... 10
6 Security strategy for petrol stations ................................................................................................. 12
6.1 General ................................................................................................................................................. 12
6.2 Risk analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 13
6.3 Vulnerability of site and building ...................................................................................................... 14
6.4 Security concept ................................................................................................................................. 14
7 Security recommendations for petrol stations ................................................................................ 15
7.1 General ................................................................................................................................................. 15
7.2 Identifying the grade of risk and protection required ..................................................................... 15
8 Access to petrol station – perimeter protection .............................................................................. 16
8.1 General ................................................................................................................................................. 16
8.2 Requirements ...................................................................................................................................... 17
8.3 Forecourt and its secondary activities ............................................................................................. 17
9 The main building ............................................................................................................................... 20
9.1 Risk analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 20
10 Management ........................................................................................................................................ 25
10.1 Staff and manager role ....................................................................................................................... 25
10.2 The part of oil companies and other partners ................................................................................. 25
10.3 Management of the funds in transit in petrol stations .................................................................... 26
10.4 Maintenance ........................................................................................................................................ 26
Annex A (normative) Recommended levels of security ............................................................................... 28 
Annex B (informative) Risk analysis of petrol stations vulnerability to the crime .................................... 29
B.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 29
B.2 Risk assessment ................................................................................................................................. 30
B.3 How to fill in the questionnaire ......................................................................................................... 31
B.4 Application example of the risk analysis ......................................................................................... 32
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................... 50

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Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 14383-5:2010) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention
of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

The status of Technical Report (CEN/TR) was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare
experiences and to harmonise procedures.

CEN/TR 14383, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and building design,, consists of the following parts:

 Part 1: Definition of specific terms1)

 Part 2: Urban planning

 Part 3: Dwellings

 Part 4: Shops and offices

 Part 5: Petrol stations

 Part 6: Schools2)

 Part 7: Design and management of public transport facilities

 Part 8: Protection of buildings and sites against criminal attacks with vehicles

1) Published as EN 14383-1.
2) Published as prCEN/TR 14383-6.

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Introduction
The nature, cost and scale of crime against petrol stations can be hard to quantify and there are many factors
that can influence whether or not an offence is committed. For the purpose of this Technical Report, apart
from the three basic criminological approaches already described in CEN/TS 14383-4, there should be a
further examination of the vulnerability of petrol stations. This vulnerability can depend on multiple factors that
can vary from country to country. The diverse nature of regulations that apply to petrol stations and the
differences in management and trading relations should be accounted for in any risk analysis.

Petrol stations can be described as highly accessible trading sites (they can be reached by foot or by car and
can be left immediately). They can be quite isolated in space (even for citizen urban petrol stations)
sometimes because of their size, their small number of staff, and/or because they have a multiple and free
service function (fuel, food shop, drinks, accessories, car maintenance, etc.), with a wide opening time to the
public.

In addition, factors that do not depend directly on the location of the petrol station and its activities should be
taken into account, i.e. the general physical and social environment, the retailer's commercial strategies, the
power of reaction of law enforcement agencies (police, gendarmerie, local police department).

The result is that crime in petrol stations varies in rate and nature according to the accumulation of the
described risk factors, which means that producing uniform modes of management and security equipments
for petrol stations is very difficult. In practice, each petrol station should be subject to individual analysis in
order to optimize the safety strategies and apply the most efficient tools to prevent crime.

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1 Scope
This Technical Report gives guidelines for a recommended strategy for efficiently combating the different
types of crime liable to be committed against petrol stations.

NOTE Crimes that are liable to be committed against petrol stations could include: armed robbery, violent theft,
burglary (usually by breaking in at night), theft, fraud (failure to pay, use of stolen credit cards or cheques and other
frauds), arson, vandalism and other crimes and offences.

This Technical Report is applicable to new and existing petrol station buildings that are open to and accessible
by the public.

2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.

EN 356, Glass in building ― Security glazing ― Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack

EN 1063, Glass in building ― Security glazing ― Testing and classification of resistance against bullet attack

EN 1143-1, Secure storage units ― Requirements, classification and methods of test for resistance to
burglary ― Part 1: Safes, ATM safes, strongroom doors and strongrooms

EN 1303, Building hardware ― Cylinders for locks ― Requirements and test methods

EN 1522, Windows, doors, shutters and blinds ― Bullet resistance ― Requirements and classification

ENV 1627, Windows, doors, shutters ― Burglar resistance ― Requirements and classification

EN 14383-1:2006, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and building design ― Part 1: Definition of specific
terms

CEN/TS 14383-4:2006, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and design ― Part 4: Shops and offices

EN 50132-7, Alarm systems ― CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications ― Part 7:
Application guidelines

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in EN 14383-1:2006 and the following
apply.

3.1
petrol station
liquid fuel supplying point for motor vehicles that provides supplies for the operation of motor vehicles, and
can provide other services as well (i.e. food, catering, car wash, maintenance and car repair, emergency car
repair)

3.2
petrol
liquid fuel comprising a mixture of several hydrocarbons that are derived from petroleum refining and/or
organic fuel, and which is used to power combustion engines

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4 Historical background and design

4.1 General

The occupation of petrol supply to the general public has greatly changed over time from the petrol pump and
emergency car repair to petrol self service and the multi service station.

The evolution towards the multi purpose service station may have satisfied the customer's need, but it has
also created new opportunities of crime.

A new community business is created that satisfies the customer's need, but it is a business attractive pole
located on very different sites that may generate problems that were unknown till then, ranging from
vandalism, misuse of space to breaking in, armed robbery, racketing, drug use and trafficking, means of
payment fraud, soliciting within the frame of prostitution, etc.

A petrol station is a typical example of a vulnerable business because of the existence of endogenous and
exogenous factors that are linked with petrol supply.

The evolution of this business and the development of trading and service activities make the targeted sites
vulnerable to crime because of the three following characteristics:

 the opening to the public with an access up to 24 hours and seven days;

 a certain isolation linked with the specific requirements and regulations that apply to this type of
installation;

 a reduced human presence for economical reasons.

The interest that may be given by a petrol station to a criminal is not only linked to the profit itself but also to
the easiness for committing the crime, the supposed quickness of execution together with a supposed
reduction of risks taken by the criminal.

Petrol stations may be broken into five groups according to their geographic location:

 motorway petrol stations;

 ring and main road petrol stations;

 shopping centre petrol stations;

 urban district petrol stations;

 rural petrol stations.

The definition of security of a petrol station may be summed up by the consideration of:

 the site location;

 the local environment;

 the structure and the shape of the building (to protect the staff, the customers and their belongings
from any attack).

The main design factors include:

 the physical location;

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 the accesses;

 the location of doors and windows;

 the access control;

 the pedestrian and vehicle flow;

 vulnerable indoor and outdoor areas;

 formal and informal human surveillance.

Significant results in crime and anti-social behaviour control may be obtained by considering these elements
of the architectural approach and taking into account their impact on safety at the design stage and by
keeping in mind management measures at the same time.

To achieve this, planners, oil companies, owners, managers, in close relationship with urban planners,
architects and designers, as well as professionals with crime prevention expertise should form the design
team and should be involved to ensure that crime prevention factors are included in the design.

4.2 The image of the petrol station – First source of prevention

A criminal's first impression can have a great influence on their decision on whether or not to commit a crime.
A well maintained petrol station that is clean and neat may give an impression of comfort and even wealth, but
it may also be a message that the employees that work there are proud of their working place and are more
liable to protect it.

If the staff is encouraged to work as a team, improve the environment and defend the territory against
criminals, crime may be reduced and the quality of service for customers may be improved. Two ways of
achieving this goal are:

 designing spaces in order to give the petrol station a clear identity;

 providing the maximum possible surveillance by a direct or indirect presence. Criminals do not like to
be seen and wherever possible, it is also advised to encourage a mixing of use and occupation. This
can result in more individuals being present to provide any formal surveillance.

4.3 Designing with regard to sociological and psychological factors

The joint design team should consider the various factors that can influence the opportunity to commit crime.
The following are some of the most important factors:

a) Ownership

It is essential that the design of space be such that customers are immediately aware that they are in a private
commercial space that is open to the public, and that they behave accordingly. In this case, it is less probable
that a crime or an anti-social behaviour occurs without provoking a reaction from the staff or the customers.

b) Presence

One of the essential prevention factors to crime is the risk of being seen and identified. Therefore, human
presence and natural surveillance are very important. The design of the petrol station should be carried out to
allow clear sight lines and provide wide natural surveillance from the staff, the customers and public and
private security forces. For the same reasons, buildings should front onto public spaces.

Fear of crime, whether real or perceived by the customers or the staff, needs to be considered and the design
of the petrol stations should take it into account.

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c) Conflict minimization linked with misuse of space

Any design feature preventing space clarity that could give rise to a potential conflict situation having direct
and durable consequences on the business activity of the site should be avoided, e.g. a low fence wall that
could be used as seating, badly designed parking space that could be used as a point for drug dealing.
Features that are badly designed can attract criminal activities and generate a fear of crime that can dissuade
the customers from using the petrol station.

5 Risk assessment and management in petrol station

5.1 General

The typology of risk that may be considered in petrol stations may vary more or less according to the category
of the petrol station as defined in 4.1.

The petrol station is generally a semi-closed space marking a separate space with the road.

It is also a commodity space-taking customers who know what they will get various services.

Within the framework of any new building or renovation development, it is necessary to analyse the type of
crime that could reasonably be expected to occur. It is essential to identify the crime and anti-social behaviour
that belongs to the concerned site in its present or future layout. The primary aim is always to try and deter
crime happening in the first instance (see 6.1).

Any crime prevention strategy is essentially one of risk management. Thus, before an effective strategy can
be developed, it is important to identify and understand the risk factors involved.

5.2 Local factors

When assessing the level of risk, it is essential to give priority to local factors. This should involve the
identification of the crime types in the immediate neighbourhood, to identify the type of crime reported, where
and when incidents occurred and who the victims were. This may be achieved by spatial mapping to identify
crime clustering or hot spots in connection with law enforcement agencies.

It is also important to be aware that factors that may influence the opportunity for crime may not necessarily
be in the immediate locality. For example, the lack of meeting places in a given area may attract young people
to the space offered and the goods on sale.

Where the development is on a new site, it may be that there has been no previous crime problem or records
do not exist. In these cases, it is important to consider the proposed development in terms of potential crime
generation in order to determine the types of crime or anti-social behaviour that could reasonably be expected
to result from this development being completed.

Guidance on methods for assessing the risk of crime and methods aimed at reducing these risks in
neighbourhoods, town centres and industrial estates, is given in CEN/TR 14383-2.

5.3 Environmental and social risks

At the building design stage, security provisions should be considered taking into account the specific location
of the petrol station, decisions taken by agencies external to the petrol suppliers system (state or local
authorities, officials). In this context, they are a whole series of operators whose action directly influences the
policy of security in petrol stations, e.g. a policy that leads to protect the petrol station staff but whose
consequence is to move the insecurity towards the exterior areas and the customers or security measures
relying on technical standards, e.g. fire fighting requirements to prevent the blocking of vehicle at the level of
petrol pumps.

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The physical and sociological environment of the petrol station should also be taken into account as well as
the space in which it is located without forgetting the all of environmental and social factors knowing that these
elements are liable to evolve with time.

5.4 The site

Consideration should be given to the following:

a) The selection of the location of premises may be justified by the market requirements and other factors,
for example security.

b) The security provisions that depend on the chosen location, taking into account:

1) the types of crime that may occur if buildings are in high crime areas or known crime generators; and

2) any special considerations, for example if the premises are in a suburban area with different
requirements.

c) Existing or potential levels of local delinquency as burglary, theft, arson and other crime and offences.
Proximity to areas of public gathering including football and other sports grounds, licensed premises or
playgrounds.

d) The security problems may be influenced by natural or geographical features such as rivers, stream,
waste ground, hiding place, the weather, the season or seasonal factors such as influx of tourists.

e) Advantages that can be obtained from proximity to law enforcement agencies, fire and ambulance
stations or from the existing security perimeters of well maintained premises with high walls or fences.

f) Illumination and coverage provided by existing street lighting.

g) Levels of security that owners and occupiers of other premises in the district apply to their premises.

h) Natural surveillance, i.e. the extent to which property can be seen from other premises.

i) Consideration of other facilities and the neighbourhood (e.g. foods).

5.5 Who are the potential offenders

 Organized gangs;

 armed robbers;

 drug users;

 burglars;

 shop lifters;

 fraud specialists;

 arsonist;

 vandals;

 etc.

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5.6 Types of crime that occur most frequently

5.6.1 General

Petrol stations suffer crime similar to the ones inflected on shops. By nature, the offences committed against
petrol stations depend on the time of the day. Crimes like armed robbery, theft, fraud, occur during opening
time. Crime like burglary and arson take place during closing time, i.e. more often at night. Petrol stations
should be equipped with several types of protection against several types of crime according to the time of the
day.

It should also be remembered that work practices are changing and that petrol stations are having longer
periods of opening or staying open 24 hours and seven days. The risk assessment should therefore allow for
these variations.

5.6.2 Armed robbery

Armed robberies, aimed at the cash and more rarely the safe.

In many cases the cashier is assaulted but these crimes also target the petrol station takings during transfer to
the bank especially at the end of long weekends and holiday rush, bank holidays. The assault is then directed
against the manager of the petrol station itself. Armed robberies that take place at night target more petrol
stations with badly protected cashiers as shopping centre petrol stations are then either closed or turned on
automatic operation. These robberies are as easy to commit as the station offers easy access and escape
routes.

5.6.3 Burglary

Burglaries of petrol stations usually occur when the premises are empty, they target goods in the store, the
safe and the storage room. All techniques are used including ram vehicle able to smash the walls of the petrol
station that are not always sufficiently protected.

Burglaries are easier to commit where the petrol station structure is weak, especially at the roof level.

5.6.4 Theft of goods/shoplifting

It is obvious that petrol stations, because of their anonymous customers and of possibilities of quick escape
for criminals, encourage this type of offence. This situation makes up an attractive field for the commission of
shoplifting that may concern food products, car maintenance accessories (car radios), books, magazines, etc.
The good display in the shop is particularly vulnerable.

It is essential to bring special attention to the display and fitting out of goods for sale to reduce the risk of
shoplifting.

5.6.5 Making off without payment

Various offences whose purpose is to obtain fuel, lubricants or goods and to leave the petrol station without
paying are often committed by:

a) somebody helping you while knowing that you are unable to pay or unwilling to pay the amount owed.
This includes filling part or all of a tank by the pump attendant or petrol supplying professional3);

b) helping oneself and not paying (a self-service petrol station).

3) The legal classification of the crime may vary according to the national legislation.

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5.6.6 Fraud

The fraudulent use of means aimed at obtaining funds, values, goods or the supplying of a service by:

a) the use of stolen or falsified means of payment: credit cards, payment cards, check books, etc.;

b) the use of forged bank notes.

Most of these offences are committed by experienced criminals, at least because of the need to prepare the
means used to commit the offence.

5.6.7 Arson

Because of the presence of highly flammable or explosive products (gas bottles, LPG-c, G.N.V.), petrol
stations are particularly sensitive to the risk of arson.

5.6.8 Vandalism

These are wilful acts of destruction or damage, including graffiti, especially against the facilities available to
the customers of the petrol station.

5.6.9 Misuse of space

This phenomenon usually occurs where young offenders aggressively dominate the area. This behaviour can
be a threat to customers and can lead to damage to petrol station facilities. It can also have an adverse effect
on the petrol station's business.

Other examples of this type of phenomenon can be through prostitution, traveller occupation of the site and
drug trafficking.

5.6.10 Assault and robbery against customers

They are acquisitive crimes characterized by theft from the vehicles, or robbery against the driver or
passengers, or theft of cargo or truck itself as well as theft of vehicle often performed by violence (car jacking).

The criminals are generally young experienced offenders coming from nearby suburbs or moving delinquency
(travellers). According to opportunities (luxury cars, foreign registration plate, with displayed expensive
personal belongings, with no specific surveillance of the area or no human presence nearby, weak lighting,
possibility to know the nature of the cargo in a vehicle parked on a rest area, absence of the owner, etc.) they
decide to commit the offence or not.

In cases of violent robbery, these groups generally operate by teams in fast cars and often make a succession
of several operations on a given route by provoking by example fake accidents to force the driver potential
victim to stop his car.

The action is always backed up by an excellent knowledge of the area, of the escape means and routes (e.g.
locating of technical exits in motorway fencing, weapons, nails boxes to puncture the tyres of following
vehicles, etc.). The attack is generally brutal and quick in order to impress the victims and to deter them from
reacting.

5.6.11 Attacks against payment systems

They are acts intended to obtain in a fraudulent way confidential data relating to the customer's cards of
payment (number of the card, name of the holder, confidential code, validity date, check code, etc.) without his
knowledge, to even recover physically the means of payment itself.

The aim of the delinquents is to obtain by these means money, goods or services.

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The hacking of these data and sometimes theft of means of payment use technical devices mixing mechanics,
electronics and/or video. These systems adding then themselves to the technical equipment of the payment
device.

These offences can take place with the complicity of an employee.

6 Security strategy for petrol stations

6.1 General

The overall strategy for preventing crime in petrol stations should include consideration of the following points:

 the petrol station manager's contract binding him to his supplier or his employer;

 the operating conditions;

 the business opening times;

 the geographical and social environment;

 the crime level reported; and

 the views of staff working at the site.

All technical and human measures to be taken to fight crime should be analysed according to the following
four levels:

 deterrence (dissuasion of attack);

 denial (blocking the attack);

 delay (slowing down the attack);

 alarm (emergency and/or detection devices and procedures allowing to advise law-enforcement
forces that an attack is in progress).

The result of the above analysis should be used to formulate the overall security plan. It is essential that all
petrol stations, whatever their nature or mode of operation and characteristics, should have a security plan.
This plan should cover all security measures and be shown to, and understood by, all employees.

Any policy of protection of petrol stations should incorporate and combine in a smooth way technical
prevention and deterrence measures with the surveillance and prevention human plan of action, keeping in
mind that official security forces are only seldom able to operate on site at the time of occurrence of the crime.
Whatever the case, any security strategy implies choices that will condition the efficiency of prevention
measures, taken to the crime whatever it is. These choices concern:

 the location of petrol stations;

 the internal organisation of the petrol station both on space and building level;

 protection facilities;

 human management.

Certain difficulties appear and must be solved. They concern for example responsibility disputes when
security equipments are managed by other actors than the operator, e.g. the public street lighting which is

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managed by the local authorities, or that this equipment is in opposition with other security requirements (fire
fighting or emergency exits of persons). On the other hand, the policy of the oil companies should be taken
into account, if applicable, whether they have implemented uniform procedures or have a case approach, for
each petrol station.

It should not be forgotten that:

 the reinforcement of security in a site is liable to lead to a transfer to other sites less equipped;

 the supplying of petrol can often be secondary to other activities on the site such as the selling of
cars;

 certain modes of operation (pre payment before petrol supply, automatic petrol supply), differentiated
management of flows (lorries and private cars) are able to bring an answer to security problems;

 the notion of time or schedule should also be taken into account within the framework of technical
and human security management, day/night, week, weekend and bank holidays;

 the important issue of human resources management, most of oil operators setting the number of the
staff according to the quantity of petrol distributed, shop turnover, opening times.

NOTE In this context it should be noted that the recruitment modalities sometimes lead to make beginners in petrol
stations highly concerned by the existing crime level, which makes it difficult to employ stable staff.

In the field of security, the nature and quantity of initial and continuous training given to the various actors
according to the level of responsibilities should be adapted.

In any security policy, the staff motivation should be taken into account, as a lack of motivation may be
weakened by the repetition of delinquent acts without supporting management.

Finally, the response of law enforcement agencies, their prevention and their investigative priorities should be
taken into account in formulating a security strategy as often there is a gap between the expectancy of
operators and the service that can actually be provided by the police.

6.2 Risk analysis

To formulate a security plan, it is first necessary to complete an in-depth risk assessment, in order to assess
the security level needed for a petrol station. The following factors are amongst those that should be
considered:
a) type of business (petrol supplying, gas bottles, food shop, catering, repair and maintenance, car wash
area, parking and rest area);

b) attractiveness to the criminal for goods, petrol, products, spare parts, tires, cash and property belonging to
the customers, cars, personal belongings, valuables, etc.;

c) potential escape routes for the removal of stolen goods (the escape route may not be the same as the
entry route);

d) ease of access from either the streets, open areas, adjacent roofs, floors above and below the premises
concerned if not under single occupancy, and from adjoining premises;

e) degree of inherent security of the premises in relation to its construction;

f) vulnerability relative to local trends in crime;

g) surveillance provided either by normal public activity, routine police patrol in the area or by security
patrolling of the premises and/or its surroundings;

h) installation of safety devices like alarm detection system or CCTV;

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i) the level of watch and attitude of the staff present on the site.

All the factors may vary according to time criteria (business season, opening times, evolution of petrol prices,
etc.). See a risk analysis in Annex B.

6.3 Vulnerability of site and building

In addition to the criteria given in 6.2, the analysis should also include consideration of the following three
types of space around the building. Each type of space has special conditions requiring assessment before
incorporation into the overall security plan:

 peripheral space: the grounds and environment around the site(s) externally from the fence;

 perimetric space: space from the fence to the façade walls of the building, including the fence, the
forecourt, the parking spaces and the openings of the building;

 volumetric space: the enclosed area within the building.

Required risk and protection levels should then be identified by respecting the zonal approach as defined in
CEN/TS 14383-4 from the more general to the more particular, from the environment to the interior spaces,
i.e.

 accessibility to petrol station;

 the forecourt and its second activities;

 the protection of the shop, which is the genuine commercial space of petrol stations (see Clause 8).

6.4 Security concept

It should be outlined that the installation of a petrol station is subject to very strict regulations applicable to
classified installation. Therefore, the risk analysis will largely depend on the applicable regulations according
to the country, and on physical and geographical conditions that are imposed at the creation of new petrol
stations.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, to optimize the concept of security in petrol station, the study shall focus on
taking into account the following provisions:

a) an assessment of the risk in relation to the value of the property and the items that are to be protected,
including any fire or insurance requirements that should be carried out;

b) the design of the building and the security measures employed should ensure as far as possible that
potential intruders cannot gain entry to the premises unseen or detected;

c) the interior layout of petrol station store should be planned so as to minimize losses due to theft;

d) to organize the distribution and control of car and pedestrian flow on the forecourt, in the shop and the
technical areas by distinguishing, if possible, entries and exits of customers, staff and suppliers;

e) to fit in and maintain all of the mechanical and electronic security devices concerning the three spaces;

f) to employ staff that is well trained and motivated to security – safety and capable to use these devices;

g) facilities should be provided for the protection of cash;

h) to protect electrical power supplies and telephone lines and cables for transmitting alarm signals for
emergency;

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i) new and second hand vehicles should be kept in secured areas and under surveillance;

j) precautions should be put in place for the storage and sell of hazardous products (gas bottles, white
spirit, etc.);

k) to fit in an adapted and performing lighting system;

l) the installation of approved CCTV surveillance systems to both the exterior and interior of the premises;

m) the provision where possible of safe places for the staff to retreat to or serve from to minimise the risk of
assault. For example this could be a lockable room or a counter area providing a physical barrier;

n) a means by which staff can raise the alarm.

7 Security recommendations for petrol stations

7.1 General

There is no unique general and absolute solution but a set of measures which given the general layout of the
petrol station will result in either a total transformation or a great improvement of its security, knowing that the
provisions are often different for a new petrol station than for the renovation of an existing structure.

The nature and structure of the site space are the pivotal points of any security strategy as it affects directly
the security on site (organized by the petrol station manager) and indirectly the security outside the site (law
enforcement agencies).

A few main lines for prevention:

 Space should be mastered and to achieve this goal, it would be useful to break it into spaces in order
to better control the flows. A clear and neat design of both the outside and inside of the building may
help the surveillance of the site especially when it is associated with good natural and artificial
lighting.

 Protection technology only has a meaning if it is a link of a security chain on the site whose strength
depends directly on the motivation and know-how of the staff who will have to bring an active
contribution to the considered strategy.

The security in petrol stations depends on the level of interaction between the technological element and the
human element, this level being itself dependent on the proper integration of these two elements which are
the result of a well thought strategy.

 Last, it is necessary to conciliate permanently an open commercial attitude with a firm attitude in the
use of protection techniques. What matters is to build up a close team with a leader who will have to
rely on certain networks (community policemen, local planning authorities, etc.) and to facilitate the
action of police and justice authorities by reporting systematically any event even if it does not justify
the filling of a complaint. A petrol station manager should try to provide any element coming from for
example the protection technical measures installed on the site to allow the identification of criminals
(CCTV4)).

7.2 Identifying the grade of risk and protection required

In order to establish identifiable levels of risk, see a list of reference for activities in Annex A.

4) In compliance with national regulations.

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To each one of these risks corresponds a security level (see Table 1).

Table 1 — Requirements concerning elements and equipment, in relation with the security level
required

Level of protection
Service stations
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Building part / equipment
Doors
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 4-6
ENV 1627 - resistance class
Windows
1-2 1-3 3 3-4 4
ENV 1627 - resistance class
1 2 2-3 3-4 4-5
Shutters
If the test shutter is used together with a burglar resistant window or a door, the
ENV 1627 - resistance class
resistance class can be reduced.
Fixed and moveable grilles
Roller grilles and curtain
2 3 4 5 6
walling
ENV 1627 - resistance class
Glazed parts
P4A / P5A / P6B / P7B / P8B /
EN 356, Class
double glazing double glazing P4A P4A P6B
See also ENV 1627
Cylinder for locks
EN 1303, class 4 4 5 5* 5*
See also ENV 1627
All enclosures reinforced,
(polycarbonate, iron or no no yes yes yes
plywood panelling)
Perimeter protection The use of collision barriers is dependent on the building accesses and the accessibility
Collision barriers (road blocks, of the site with vehicles.
bollards, barriers)
CCTV surveillance optional optional optional yes yes
EN 50132-7
The application of CCTV surveillance is dependent of the situation of the place
Alarm systems
optional optional
Intrusion system 2 3 4
1 1
EN 50130 - EN 50131 Grade
Safe
Required when the valuables exceed a specific amount.
EN 1143-1
Bullet resistance The bullet resistance (ENV 1063, EN 1522) and explosives (EN 13541, EN 13123-1,
EN 1522 EN 13122-2) depends on the risk assessment .
* This component was included in the manual test in accordance with ENV 1630

8 Access to petrol station – perimeter protection

8.1 General

According to the characteristics and the location of petrol stations, the cases are very different. Urban petrol
stations can be located in the immediate neighbourhood of dwelling areas that could be occupied by
disadvantaged communities. Ring and main road petrol stations are located on main thoroughfare near
industrial areas or ring roads, interchange, etc. Motorway petrol stations are generally surrounded by fields as
for shopping centre petrol stations they are located in various areas, dwellings, industrial or countryside.

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8.2 Requirements

Access should be easy for the flows of vehicles, but entry should be made difficult to any illegal purpose or not
using the normal access lanes.

For this purpose, the peripheral protection will maintain the necessary conviviality to any trade and that will
make up a barrier such as concrete elements or low and wide thorn bushes.

In an area that is not adjacent to the public road, this measure will come as a reinforcement of the wire fence
aimed at simply bordering the petrol station.

The peripheral protection, aimed at marking in a clear and obvious way the petrol station from the public
space, should be strictly integrated to the environment by avoiding any artificial or redundant feature that
would contribute to give to the station the look of a specially protected enclave separated from the rest of the
surrounding buildings.

On top of these requirements, special attention should be given to:

 a clear direction signage;

 open and uncluttered approaches;

 unobscured sight lines;

 appropriate lighting.

These considerations equally apply to service roads, parking and rest areas and car wash areas.

8.3 Forecourt and its secondary activities

8.3.1 The forecourt

A certain number of protection measures shall be considered at this level: the choice will result from the
philosophy recommended by professionals in petrol station management.

Thus, a few recommendations among others may be considered to reinforce the security of the forecourt:

a) Implement according to the site sensitiveness, during nighttime a pre-payment system prior to the
delivery of petrol and/or goods.

Implementing this system should imply a reinforced security in the cash count till. Another option may
consist in favouring, at night, the use of automatic pumps.

b) Equip the forecourt area with anti drive back devices avoiding the reversing of vehicles. It shall be
permanently on to avoid petrol theft.

This device, well indicated and non-aggressive, should be covered by a metal plate neutralizing its action
in case a need for emergency and relief vehicle (to be validated).

c) Fit in traffic barriers for the exit. These devices imply the action of the cashier which result is more work or
shared work.

d) Use a high performance locking system on the petrol tanks discharging traps and petrol pumps especially
those that are with an automatic distribution fuel system.

e) Equip the forecourt with CCTV whose cable and cameras will be cleverly fitted in to:

1) keep watch on the sensitive points (petrol pumps and discharging traps);

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2) detect or to raise the doubt at the time of an unusual event;

3) avoid sunlight nuisance during daytime and urban or petrol station lighting during nighttime;

4) resist against vandalism or sabotage.

The conditions of implementation and recording of images will be made in compliance with the national
regulations. The installation will be in order to resist sabotage.

f) Daily visual control of the automatic distribution fuel system in order to identify any installation of outside
device for the recording or transmission of the customer’s means of payment confidential data (see
5.6.10).

8.3.2 Secondary activities

If applicable, the following activities or areas should be made secure:

 cash point;

 carwash;

 workshop;

 gas bottles storage;

 new cars display hall;

 second hand cars parking area;

 parking and rest area.

8.3.2.1 Cash point

In some European countries, an automatic cash point is settled inside the petrol station. The presence of this
type of facility may increase the risk. It should comply with the requirements of EN 1143-1.

Beyond the security elements taken into account by the standard (safe and chair), its setting should be
subjected to a study aimed at integrating the following protection elements:

 vandalism and fraud resistance;

 resistance to break in, especially in case of ram raiding (cars, trucks or road works vehicles).

For this purpose, the cash point should be equipped with anti ram protection of an adapted protection level
and should be permanently under CCTV surveillance including its surroundings.

Moreover, the person in charge for the petrol station will carry out a daily visual control of the materials in
order to immediately identify any installation of outside device with an aim of fraud.

There should be signage to alert customers of potential crimes (misuse of card or data of the card).

8.3.2.2 Carwash

This area does not need particular comments, apart from avoiding using automatic devices with coins
(vandalism and theft). A system working with tokens or special cards delivered after payment at the cash
counter should be preferred.

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May be also provided: a specific surveillance video sensor to detect any suspect move nearby this area
outside operating periods.

8.3.2.3 Workshop

Generally, the risk exists when no activity is going on in the premises (risk of burglary, tyre, spare parts or
tools theft).

Protection will result from the fitting in and operation outside working period of an alarm device controlled
locally or sent to a remote surveillance centre, the detection device should not neglect a possible access from
the roof.

At nighttime, the exterior envelope of the workshop may have a light flash lighting connected with an intruder
detection system.

8.3.2.4 Gas bottles storage5)

The storage of gas bottles should be made in an opened air rack display locked with quality device standards
EN 12320 or EN 1303 made up of expended sheet metal in order to combine a security against theft to
necessary ventilation.

Security can be improved by fitting full width steel cross bars or pad bars, and padlocks. Padlocks and
padlock fittings should conform to the requirements of EN 12320. The bar should be substantial and should be
at least as strong as the padlock. Concealed shackle padlocks should be used as they offer the fewest
opportunities for attack.

Fixing screws and bolts with exposed heads should not be capable of being unfastened from the vulnerable
side. They should be of the clutch head type or have the heads defaced. The threads and the fixing bolts
should be on the interior of the door. Where nuts are used, the exposed threads of the bolts should be burred
or the nuts welded into place.

During nighttime, the gas bottles storage should be well lit.

During petrol station closing time or when the petrol station is located in a sensitive area, it may be protected
by a CCTV sensor system.

8.3.2.5 New cars display hall

The mechanical resistance and electronical protection of the display hall should be adapted to the value of the
property to be protected (strong or reinforced walls, anti-ram exterior or interior device, glazing resistant to
manual attack6) frames and doors7) complying with standards) and equipped with a security lock.

The premises may be under alarm detection connected to a remote control alarm centre during night and
closing days.

8.3.2.6 Second hand car parking area

The exterior park should be protected efficiently by fences or physical obstacles in order to prevent intrusion of
pedestrians or vehicles (ditch, bank, jersey barrier, bollards, etc.).

5) This subclause only concerns the bottled gas distribution. These recommendations do not exempt to respect the
national regulations relating to LPG storage.
6) See EN 356.
7) See EN 1627-1630.

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It should be placed under permanent CCTV. The area should be provided with a powerful lighting during
nighttime.

The vehicles displayed should be locked and neutralized (very little petrol in the tank, steering column
blocked). In case of worsened risk, the area should be protected by a very high wire fence and even with a net
in its superior part in order to fight against vandalism by the throwing of projectiles liable to contain flammable
substances.

The vehicles keys should be kept in a reinforced locker or in a safe under the permanent control of a person
or an alarm detection system.

During a trail with unknown customer, the staff should take a copy of the driving licence and the identity card.
The staff should keep the keys in the hand on changing drivers.

8.3.2.7 Parking and rest area

It is necessary to provide through a good size control device or specific equipment, a good differentiation of
use of the resting areas according to the type of vehicles (private cars, trucks, caravans and camping cars).
This distribution of spaces dedicated according to the type of users helps to improve the natural surveillance.

9 The main building

9.1 Risk analysis

9.1.1 General

The risk analysis of the perimetric space of the main building of a petrol station should focus on the following
points:

 walls, façade and roofs;

 accesses.

The risk analysis of the volumetric space should deal with the following areas:

 the cash counter;

 the shop;

 the toilet area;

 the manager’s office;

 the storage room.

9.1.2 Walls, façade and roofs

Materials resistant to manual attack or damage should be used to ensure the initial provision of security to
prevent the possibility that the structure was crashed with ram vehicle driven by criminals or that the protection
wire fences were pulled by a vehicle, reinforced concrete bollards, jersey barriers, or similar protection devices
may be used. In the case of lightweight construction e.g. fragile sheet cladding, a reinforced lining such as
welded steel mesh can enhance the security of the building fabric.

An unobstructed building line and smooth facings should be used to provide enhanced protection to the
perimetric space as accessible ledges, parapets, indentations, protrusions and sills can provide means of
assisting unlawful entry.

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9.1.3 Public access

Several solutions may be considered to reinforce security at this level:

a) allow in case of problem remote locking device of the entrance door normally free opened;

b) either remote control in the opposite way the unlocking of the entrance door for petrol stations opened at
night;

c) it will be often useful to equip the exit door with a system of detection against shop lifting of items
displayed for sale.

9.1.4 The cash counter

Its mode of operation will be generally different according to the time of the day.

During daytime, the customer will come to pay in the shop, the design of the cash counter should prevent as
far as possible:

 to see the content of the cash drawer and to take hold the values;

 to cross over the cash counter;

 the physical assault of the cashier.

During the night when the shop is closed, the transaction will take place through a reinforced cash counter
both for the glazed or opaque parts, it will be equipped with a secured drawer, or secured parcel device and
intercom.

A clear signage should inform the public that the manager does not keep the keys of the safe8) and/or the safe
is equipped with a time lock.

The cash counter should have an alarm button and/or a pedal directly connected to a remote control centre.

The cash counter should be placed under permanent CCTV.

It is recommended that checks are made by the manager to ensure that existing technologies are used
correctly to deter the misuse of electronic terminals.

For the transactions by credit cards or petrol cards, it is desirable to privilege the use of electronic terminals
making it possible for the customers to carry out the operations themselves in all confidentiality without
separating from their card.

The detention and use of firearms by staff should be forbidden in order not to threaten the safety of customers
and staff.

It is recommended to have a good vision from the shop premises to the petrol pumps. This can be achieved
by increasing the height of the petrol pumps ground.

8) See EN 1143.

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9.1.5 The shop

9.1.5.1 General

The shop in petrol stations is a place where acquisitive crime is liable to develop. Particular attention should
therefore be given to the protection of these spaces.

9.1.5.2 Selling spaces

Various protection elements should be fitted in, e.g. antitheft tagging of products, highly visible shelves,
mirrors, CCTV, nighttime vending machines, etc.

Surveillance procedures should be developed with the staff that should systematically get a proper training.

9.1.5.3 Emergency exit doors

Emergency exit devices operated by a lever handle or push pad should comply with the requirements of
EN 179.

Panic exit devices operated by a horizontal push bar should comply with the requirements of EN 1125.

9.1.6 The toilet area

It should be avoided that this space is used as hiding place for the traffic and use of drugs.

For this purpose, it will be necessary to:

 design the toilets in order to avoid any possibility of hiding something, e.g. flush system without
dismountable manual control plate, water tanks fitted into or behind the wall, etc.;

 use according to the delinquency level an access control device or further a deterrent human
presence (e.g. a frequent passage of the cleaning staff).

9.1.7 The manager's office

This area is hidden from the public; there the manager and the staff can be isolated to:

 deal with and distribute the cashing in and the keys;

 work in a total tranquillity;

 have access to all of the information about the petrol station management, i.e. the feedback from the
technical and security alarms or the feedback images from the CCTV.

The door of this office should be equipped with a door-closing device, permanently locked with an electro
magnetic locking device, electrical lock or a motorised lock and equipped with a peephole or a video camera
to identify the person asking for the access.

The separation wall between this office and the commercial area opened to the public should be equipped
with a small glass resistant to manual attack opening of two way mirror type.

The manager shall have a discreet alarm device connected to a remote alarm centre.

The images recording device should be stored away in order to avoid the theft or sabotage of the recording
device.

A room should be prepared as a place of safety in case of attack.

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9.1.8 The storage room

The storage room should be particularly reinforced. If the envelope is not strong enough, it should be double
in its inner space by a cage made of expended metal inserted in its lower part in the ground concrete.

The door should be break in resistant in compliance with ENV 1627 and equipped either to an access control
device or a lock whose key cannot be reproduced without the owner's card.

These premises should be equipped with an anti intrusion detection system connected with the alarm system
and even to the CCTV system.

9.1.9 Further recommendations

9.1.9.1 Power supply

All power supplies must be very carefully considered. Incoming power should be contained in secure ducting
and in protected areas. Any sub-stations should be in protected areas and secure. Cables or piping should be
in secure ducting. When appropriate, stand by generators should be available.

9.1.9.2 Telephone

Telephone cables should be in secure ducting in protected area, particularly if they are carrying remote alarm
signalling. Public telephones and free phone taxi telephones should be located in positions where users do
not have view of cash tills.

9.1.9.3 Safe

Key security, key combinations and other means of access to safes should be strictly controlled.

Freestanding safes should be located against an interior wall of very strong structure.

NOTE When an intruder detection system is installed, it is important that it should cover the area occupied by the
safe.

The safe should be in compliance with EN 1143, strongly anchored into the concrete and equipped with a time
lock device. This protection should be usefully further equipped by an alarm detection system connected to a
remote alarm centre.

Good concealment is essential and can be achieved by floor coverings in every day use, for example furniture
or carpets. Under floor safes should ideally be situated in the corner of a room to make attack more difficult
and installation should always conform to the fixing instructions of the manufacturer.

It is recommended to locate a deposit safe within the secured area of the counter and as close as possible to
the till.

9.1.9.4 Inside metal roller shutters

Inside metal roller shutters may be used during petrol station closing time to reinforce the protection of areas
considered as sensitive within the commercial area. It may apply to shelves with spirits or tobacco or shelves
displaying valuable goods like car accessories or radios.

9.1.9.5 Lighting

The basic objective of security lighting is to remove the cover of darkness. During nighttime or bad weather, a
sufficient lighting level should be permanently maintained on the entire site. This does not prevent the setting
of spotlights trigged by human presence in sensitive points or the automatic increasing of light level in case of
detection. This allows the alliance of natural surveillance of the site and of intrusion prevention.

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The dazzling caused by this lighting is useful as it makes it difficult for the intruder to see whether he is being
watched or not, but it should be made sure that it does not become a nuisance or a risk for other people or
motorist driving by.

Cables for security lighting should be out of reach of unauthorized personnel and should preferably be
installed underground. If cables cannot be installed underground, they should be enclosed in steel conduit or
mineral-insulated cable. Cables may also be protected by an alarm system in case of power failure.

9.1.9.6 CCTV system

CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications should comply with the requirements of EN 50132.

NOTE It is important to ensure that the use of CCTV does not conflict with local or national regulations, e.g. data
protection, human rights legislation, recording of vehicle licence plates, etc.

The design of a CCTV system should be co-ordinated with:

 existing or planned lighting system for the station, to ensure that the quality of the lighting is sufficient
and fitted to support CCTV;

 areas and activities to be monitored, camera number;

 regular maintenance of the cameras and other elements of the CCTV system, the check of the final
picture quality in case of recording and/or a remote transmission;

 in high crime areas, CCTV cameras may need protection within vandal-proof cages;

 management of recording e.g. time and date generation, number of the camera, it is recommended
to hide the real recorder (on tape, CD-ROM, hard or optical disk) when locally installed. It is also
advisable to use a fake system in case of attack.

9.1.9.7 Intruder detection system

The installation of an electronic intruder detection system designed to automatically detect entry through
openings, the shell of the building and the movement of persons within the premises will enhance physical
security measures. Installations can include deliberately operated devices with which the occupiers can
operate the system in the event of personal attack or emergency. Electronic detection should not, however, be
considered a substitute for physical security.

It is advisable that:

 the alarm box should not be easily accessible;

 the alarm transmission be protected or redundant (e.g. cord phone + G.S.M.);

 the event is taken into account in real time;

 the intervention takes place within the shortest time.

NOTE Guidance on the requirements of alarm systems for the detection of intruders is given in EN 50131-1.

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10 Management

10.1 Staff and manager role

It is clear that human presence is always one of the major factors to reduce risk in petrol stations. The staff is
generally able to anticipate the occurrence of a risk as being in a space that they know perfectly, they
immediately spot even unconsciously any unusual event.

They are also able to get organised by applying instructions and procedures by relying on recommendations
commonly admitted in this business. He makes sure that he and the staff complies with heath and security
law, regulation provisions and company policy.

The part played by the manager is essential.

He should:

 take up references for his staff;

 provide training to risk connected to fire fighting security and safety;

 control knowledge and procedures;

 make use of experience and feedback;

 plan, communicate, explain, and enforce concrete measures and clear procedures by verifying with
teaching skills the good understanding of his training;

 assess the capacity of staff resistance to stress and intimidation;

 get himself involved in the management of difficult situations and listening of the staff and especially
of the staff fears;

 show a capacity to maintain a good relationship with the local communities;

 maintain the partnership with law enforcement agencies.

10.2 The part of oil companies and other partners

In some petrol stations, the oil company plays a very important part in the human and material resources
definition necessary to a good operation given its motivation for the security in petrol stations.

This support given for the motivation of the staff, not only from the manager but also from the oil company, is
essential to avoid at the same time the discouragement of the staff which leads to their disengagement and
even to their leaving (quick changing staff) and the fact that this disengagement may lead to behaviours that
may affect the petrol station security (theft, fraud and even complicity with criminals, e.g. fitting in of a reading
device connected with a credit card payment electronic terminal to misuse customer's credit cards).

Other partners indirectly linked to the petrol stations management (health and safety authorities, motorway
companies, etc.) should get involved to improve security in petrol stations.

The petrol station managers, whatever their size or status, are well advised not to forget security in petrol
stations to the advantage of commercial profit because of three factors:

 the involvement of their direct responsibility which follows up the legal practice evolution;

 the commercial interest not to tarnish the image of the company and lead to a substantial loss of
customers if the level of insecurity because deterrent;

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 the quality concerning the staff conditions of work which if it is deteriorated may lead to problems of
quickly changing staff or difficulties of recruitment.

Further on, staff management also supposes the quality of the organisation of life in the petrol station. In this
field, the following points should be underlined:

 At the local level, the need to include the owner in a team to reduce their isolation share experience
and develop the best strategy of defence to be adopted according to the insecurity situations meets;

 At the oil companies level, it is absolutely necessary that the general management focuses on
showing its involvement in fighting crime and the fear of crime in petrol stations including by
appointing a person in charge of security reporting to the highest level of the hierarchy.

The part of this safety officer should be able especially to include the following tasks:

 coordinate and bring together the action of different partners liable to influence the safety situation;

 build up an organised information system allowing a good circulation of information between the field
actors and the executives;

 provide a permanent technological watch and maintain the representation of the oil companies
interests in the negotiations between this business field and the administration.

10.3 Management of the funds in transit in petrol stations

10.3.1 Cashing it

The general principal is to leave a minimum of cash available in the cash till.

During the daytime and according to the volume of the funds, a simple cash till safe or a pneumatic system
intended to convey the cashing in a protected way should be used (see 9.1.9.3).

10.3.2 Management and transfer

The counting should be done away from the site of staff and customers. According to the amounts, the
transfer to the bank should be carried out by the manager or by a company specialized in the transport of
cash.

If the manager does the transfer, he should do it at irregular times, and change routes and use various and
discreet containers.

It is recommended to use a specialized service in case of large amounts, which may require the compliance
with law and regulation prescriptions. The means of payment should be separate, cash, checks, credit cards
or payment cards. Particular attention that may imply specific procedures should be given during long
weekends and bank holidays in relation with the amount of money and insurance requirements.

The funds should never be left in a transporting vehicle.

The coherence about the terms of insurance contract should be verified (e.g. some insurance policies do not
guarantee when the transport is carried out by persons who are not appointed in the contract) with the
procedures used.

10.4 Maintenance

It is necessary to check periodically and carefully the state of locks, openings and shutters and, generally
speaking, anything that has to do with security and safety, any anomaly noticed at this stage should be
reported officially to the station manager who will take the required measures for immediate repair.

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Some maintenance operations are scheduled by contracts with specialized companies (alarm detection
system, CCTV, fire alarm and fighting devices).

The manager should attend any maintenance visit and regularly test the various technical devices of the
station that fall within his competence.

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Annex A
(normative)

Recommended levels of security

This annex shows for petrol stations the recommended levels of security mentioned in the Annex A of
CEN/TS 14383-4:2006.

Table A.1 – Recommended levels of security

SECURITY LEVEL 1 2 3 4 5

Auto radios (sale and fitting)

Cars (accessories stores)

Cars (exhibition store and/or dealer):

- with auto radios, cassettes, recording, etc.
- with spares and accessories
- with tyres

Cars (exhibition store and/or dealer):

- without auto radios, cassettes, recording, etc.
- without spare tyres and accessories

2
Mini market (sales area < 400 m )

Service station with sale of auto radios, cassettes recording and spare
accessories, grocer's shop, etc.

Service station without sale of auto radios, cassettes recording with spare
accessories, grocer's shop, etc.

Service station without sale of auto radios, cassettes recording without spare
accessories, grocer's shop, etc.

Wines and alcohol in bottles and other individual conditioning

Where a number of goods are kept on premises, and they fall into more than one commodity group, the higher
level of security should be applied.

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Annex B
(informative)

Risk analysis of petrol stations vulnerability to the crime

B.1 Introduction

The level of necessary protection to apply according to the nature of the commercial activity and the held
goods figure in Annex A.

It appeared nevertheless useful to propose a crime risk analysis with the aim of making a diagnosis of the
level of safety of a petrol station to appreciate its vulnerability towards criminality and to do what is necessary
to reduce it in order to evaluate its current protection compared to the necessary protection.

The aim is not to obtain a class of the current protection as high as possible but an adapted protection of the
petrol station.

This analysis is based on four key headings:

a) the potential significance towards people and goods that it is necessary to protect while being placed from
the point of view of the manager of the site;

b) the potential risk and following headings while placing from the point of view of the potential offender;

c) the vulnerability of the building;

d) the human organization.

Heading A will be analyzed with the point of view of the person in charge of the site, the headings B, C and D
will be analyzed while being placed with the point of view of the potential delinquent.

Each heading is rated and symbolized with pictograms in the following way:
 low risk (▼);

 average risk (◄►);

 high risk (▲).

The assessment of potential significance takes into account subjective elements as fear of crime and objective
elements like the stock market value and petrol station essential materials. The assessment of potential risk,
vulnerability of the building and the human organization bring only objective elements into play, it is the
identification of the parameters that can make the petrol station attractive for an opportunist or professional
offender.

The potential significance and the potential risk are taken into account for the assessment of the
recommended protection while the vulnerability of the building and the human organization are used for the
current protection assessment.

By comparison of these two parameters, it is possible to assess the current protection compared to the
recommended protection: if the current protection class is lower than the required protection class, it is
necessary to re-examine certain parts of the site or the building and/or human organization towards the risk.
Conversely, if the current protection class is higher than the required protection class, it may be considered
that the petrol station "is overprotected" compared to the potential risks.

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The objective of this analysis is to go up the necessity to obtain a corresponding protection level. Indeed, if the
two classes are identical, the current protection is adapted to the required protection.

NOTE The risk analysis is based on a list of questions worked out by experts in security/safety. Nevertheless, the
values of the quotations allotted to each question are not fixed and can vary according to the countries and/or local
criteria.

B.2 Risk assessment

B.2.1 Potential significance

The questionnaire mentioned in Table A should be used to evaluate potential significance. It includes three
under headings:
 subjective assessment of the threat;

 objective importance;

 type of feared aggressor.

B.2.2 Potential risk (after having chosen the type of offender)9)

The questionnaire mentioned in Table B should be used to evaluate the potential risk. It includes three under
headings:

 site and physical environment;

 human and social factors of the environment;

 working of the station.

B.2.3 Vulnerability of the building

The questionnaire mentioned in Table C should be used to evaluate the vulnerability of the building. It
includes five under headings:
 the annex;

 roofing;

 glazing/openings;

 external doors;

 walls.

B.2.4 Human organisation

The questionnaire mentioned in Table D should be used to evaluate the human organization. It includes five
under headings:

9) The two types of offenders are characterized by the type of offence, the modus operandi and their level of knowledge
supposed to commit their crime.

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 access control;

 general remarks on human organization;

 general remarks on maintenance;

 electronic protection;

 protection of valuables.

B.3 How to fill in the questionnaire

Three levels were thus given according to the influence of the answer on recommended or current protection.
These levels are characterized by boxes containing the following pictograms (▼, ◄►, ▲).

To fill in the questionnaire, it is sufficient to tick the pictogram chosen while taking care to put only one cross
per heading.

It is then necessary to add the crosses for each pictogram in the sub-totals of each under heading and to
make the total of each heading: potential significance, potential risk, vulnerability of the building and human
organization.

Arrived at the stage of the analysis of the results (Diagnosis Table E), it is sufficient to carry the sum of
crosses obtained for each heading and to apply the weighting coefficients that are specific for them (1 for ▼, 5
for ◄►, and 10 for ▲).

According to the value obtained, a class is given for each heading (A, B, C and D).

A simple calculation gives then the class of required protection (PR) and the class of current protection (Pa).
The comparison of both is possible.

The risk analysis is based on a list of questions, values of quotation and thresholds, worked out by experts in
security/safety. Nevertheless, the values of the quotations allotted to each question and the thresholds are not
fixed and can vary according to countries and/or local criteria.

To facilitate comprehension, the thresholds hereafter were fixed concerning the four headings.

REQUIRED PROTECTION GRADE

Potential significance thresholds NA:

If A < 31 The level is 1
If 31 ≤ A < 57 The level is 2
If A ≥ 57 The level is 3
Potential risk thresholds NB:
If B < 64 The level is 1
If 64 ≤ B < 112 The level is 2
If B ≥ 112 The level is 3

CURRENT PROTECTION GRADE

Break-in resistance level thresholds NC:

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If C < 39 The level is 3

If 39 ≤ C < 78 The level is 2
If C ≥ 78 The level is 1
Human organization level thresholds ND
If D < 90 The level is 3
If 90 ≤ D < 180 The level is 2
If D ≥ 180 The level is 1

B.4 Application example of the risk analysis

Description: it is a petrol station with a workshop and a carwash located in an old residential area of a small
town. It is a family business burgled less than five years in a district with frequent burglaries of dwellings.

An experienced delinquent is feared (burglar).

Table A - Potential significance (see page 40)

A1. Subjective assessment of the threat

A1.1 Most feared kind of offence: robbery: ▲

A1.2 Most susceptible type of offence to occur: burglary: ◄►

A1.3 Fear felt towards people offences: low: ▼

A1.4 Fear felt towards goods offences: average: ◄►

A1.5 Level of attack to the image of the station in case of crime: nil/low: ▼

Sub-total A.1

▼ ◄► ▲
2 2 1

A2 Objective Importance

A2.1 Market value of the stock (fuel stock not included): average: ◄►

A2.2 Type of goods: car accessories: ◄►

A2.3 Petrol station essential material: workshop material: ▼

Sub-total A.2

▼ ◄► ▲
1 2 0

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A3. Type of feared aggressor: experienced delinquent: burglar, drive offs specialist, fraud: ◄►
Sub-total A.3

▼ ◄► ▲
0 1 0

Total A

▼ ◄► ▲
3 5 1

Table B - Potential risk (see page 42)

B1. Site and physical environment

B1.1 Nature of the space in which the petrol station is located: owned space: ▼

B1.2 Housing density over the area: densely built: ▼

B1.3 Access and road network (ways facilitating the escape): double way street: ◄►

B1.4 Remoteness of the station in its environment: not insulated: ◄►

B1.5 Remoteness of the station in its immediate vicinity: buildings on two sides: ▼

B1.6 Presence of elements liable to mask a criminal act: no mask about the surveillance: ▼

B1.7 Noise level in the vicinity: average: ◄►

B1.8 Site openings over railway line or river, a wooded area: no: ▼

B1.9 Level of the public lighting: average: ▲

Sub-total B1:

▼ ◄► ▲
5 3 1

B2. Human and social factors of the environment

B2.1 Type of urban planning of the site: urban zone with dominant of office or residential buildings: ▲

B2.2 Type of neighbourhood: residential urban area: ◄►

B2.3 Crime history of the area: burglary of dwellings < 5 years: ◄►

B2.4 Crime history on the site: burglary on the site < 5 years: ◄►

B2.5 Occupation of the close buildings: building and neighbouring premises regularly occupied: ▼

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B2.6 Relationship with neighbours, social actors, local staff of town mediation, etc.: friendly relations: ▼

B2.7 Relations to the police force (national, local): friendly relations: ▼

Sub-total B2
▼ ◄► ▲
3 3 1

B3. Working of the station

B3.1 Opening hours: day and night: ◄►

B3.2 Payment mode of the fuel during daytime: store: ▲

B3.3 Payment mode during nighttime: prepayment: ▼

B3.4 Protection level of the gas bottle storage against theft: high: ▼

B3.5 Organization of the rest area (differentiation of vehicles) if concerned: no rest area: ▼

B3.6 Is there a specific CCTV surveillance dedicated to the parking and rest area: not applicable: ▼

B3.7 Level of the security-safety on the toilets area: high: ▼

B3.8 Carwash and vacuum cleaners are working with tokens or special cards: yes: ▼

B3.9 Storage of vehicles (on the station area): inside storage: ▼

Sub-total B3
▼ ◄► ▲
7 1 1

Total B

▼ ◄► ▲
15 7 3

Table C - Vulnerability of the building(s) (see page 44)

C1. Outbuildings

C1.1 Workshop: yes, with a reinforced security level communication door: ◄►

C1.2 Car display hall: no: ▼

Sub-total C1

▼ ◄► ▲
1 1 0

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C2. Roofing (one item should be chosen C2.1, C2.2 or C2.3)

C2.3 Uneasily accessible roof

C2.3.1 Roof resistance: average: ▼

C2.3.2 Size of roof openings: no opening: ▼

Sub-total C2
▼ ◄► ▲
2 0 0

C3. Glazing/openings

C3.1 Ram vehicle protection device: existent but weak: ▲

C3.2 Windows and glazing on rear side or non visible: fitted with window bars: ▼

C3.3 Burglar resistance of windows or glazing: with burglar resistant glazing: ◄►

C3.4 Break-in resistance level on easily accessible windows or glazing: non applicable: ▼

Sub-total C3
▼ ◄► ▲
2 1 1

C4. External doors

C4.1 Number of external doors on the main building: one single external door: ◄►

C4.2 External doors in concealed areas: no: ▼

C4.3 Break-in resistance of the weakest external door of the main building (XP EN 1627): average: ◄►

C4.4 Ram vehicle protection device: existent but weak: ◄►

Sub-total C4
▼ ◄► ▲
1 3 0

C5. Walls

C5.1 Break-in resistance level of walls: average: ◄►

Sub-total C5

▼ ◄► ▲
0 1 0
Total C

▼ ◄► ▲
6 6 1

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Table D - Human organization (see page 46)

D1. Access control

D1.1 Partition between private and public space: with a partition: ◄►

D1.2 Differentiated management for vehicles flows (fuel, shop, carwash, parking areas, etc.): no: ▲

D1.3 Dissuasion devices on the forecourt: no: ▲

D1.4 Public access in store: free: ▲

D1.5 Level of the emergency exits management: satisfactory: ▼

D1.6 The non-opened public areas are under control: yes: ▼

D1.7 Accesses lighting: detection lighting on façade: ◄►

D1.8 Quality of access control devices (keys, code, cards) / safety: cheating, reproducibility: satisfactory: ▼

D1.9 Access control devices management (number, hierarchy, traceability): satisfactory: ▼

Sub-total D1

▼ ◄► ▲
4 2 3

D2. General remarks on human organization

D2.1 Image of the petrol station staff (implication, motivation): good: ▼

D2.2 Image of the petrol station manager (implication, motivation): good: ▼

D2.3 Impression on maintenance and management of the station: good: ▼

D2.4 Manpower in station: normal: ◄►

D2.5 Security/safety policy on the station: general application of safety measures: ◄►

D2.6 Turnover of the staff: low: ▼

D2.7 Security-safety professional training level of the staff: average: ◄►

D2.8 Staff capacity of reaction towards a crisis: good: ▼

D2.9 Security-safety plan applied in station: existent and respected: ▼

D2.10 Hierarchical relations between the manager and his staff: good: ▼

Sub-total D2
▼ ◄► ▲
7 3 0

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D3. General remarks on maintenance

D3.1 Level of general maintenance of openings: good: ▼

D3.2 Level of general maintenance of lighting: average: ▲

D3.3 Maintenance level of the mechanical protection devices: normal: ▲

D3.4 Maintenance level of the electronic protection devices: good: ▼

D3.5 Automatic fuel pumps control level (A.F.P.): not applicable: ▼

D3.6 Signage level (clear and sufficient): good: ▼

Sub-total D3
▼ ◄► ▲
4 0 2

D4. Electronic protection

D4.1 Level of the interior/external CCTV: superior: ▼

D4.2 Level of the intruder detection system: superior: ▼

D4.3 An interior lighting is connected to the intruder detection system: yes: ◄►

D4.4 An alert link is connected to an alarm control centre during the opening hours yes: ▼

Sub-total D4
▼ ◄► ▲
3 1 0

D5. Protection of valuables

D5.1 Anti-theft protection of the goods: yes: ◄►

D5.2 Protection level of the manager’s office: good: ▼

D5.3 Protection level of the storeroom: good: ▼

D5.4 Protection level of the room where the funds are stored: average: ◄►

D5.5 Safety level of the safe (resistance grade, anchoring, delayed opening, alarm): insufficient: ▲

D5.6 Turn to company specialized in funds transport: no: ▲

D5.7 Safety level of the transfers and inner funds management: good: ▼

Sub-total D5
▼ ◄► ▲
3 2 2

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Total D

▼ ◄► ▲
21 8 7

Table E - Let us pass to the following phase, which consists in using the summary table for the
diagnosis.
Defer the values obtained for each type of pictogram (▼
▼, ◄►, ▲) and apply corresponding weighting (1, 5,
10) then add to obtain the A, B, C, D total. I.e.:

A = 38

B = 80

C = 46

D = 131

Evaluate the recommended protection grade (PR) according to the potential significance levels (NA) and the
potential risk (NB), i.e.: 1, 2 or 3.

For A: as 38 > 31 and < 57, the NA level is 2.

For B: as 80 > 64 and < 112, the NB level is 2.

The recommended protection grade (PR) = NA + NB – 1 so PR = 2 + 2 – 1 = 3.

Make in the same way for C and D in order to obtain the current protection grade (PA) which is 3.

General diagnosis (see page 49)

The recommended protection grade 3 corresponds to the current protection grade 3.

There is correlation between these two criteria. The protection level of the petrol station is correct.

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TABLE E - DIAGNOSIS
Carry the totals A,B,C,D, numbers by type of pictogram and multiply by the indicate coefficient
A – POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE ▼ 3 x1= 3
◄► 5 x5= 25
▲ 1 x 10 = 10
Sum A – Potential significance A= 38
B – POTENTIAL RISK ▼ 15 x1= 15
◄► 7 x5= 35
▲ 3 x 10 = 30
Sum B – Potential risk B= 80
C – VULNERABILITY OF THE BUILDING(S) ▼ 6 x1= 6
◄► 6 x5= 30
▲ 1 x 10 = 10
Sum C – Vulnerability of the building(s) C= 46
D – HUMAN ORGANIZATION ▼ 21 x1= 21
◄► 8 x5= 40
▲ 7 x 10 = 70
Sum D – Human organization D= 131
ASSESSMENT OF RECOMMENDED PROTECTION GRADE
Calculation of the potential significance NA :
If A < 31 your level is 1
If 31 ≤ A < 57 your level is 2 NA 2
If A ≥57 your level is 3
Calculation of the potential risk level NB:
If B < 64 your level is 1
If 64 ≤ B < 112 your level is 2 NB 2
If B ≥ 112 your level is 3
RECOMMENDED PROTECTION GRADE
According to potential significance related to a crime (NA) and importance of the potential risk associated to the site (NB), your petrol station
requires a protection level (PR) corresponding to the following grade:
Calculate the recommended protection grade PR = NA + NB - 1 : PR 3
Now evaluate the current protection grade (PA) offered by your petrol station
ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT PROTECTION GRADE
Calculation of break-in resistance level of the building NC:
If C < 39 your level is 3
If 39 ≤ C < 78 your level is 2 NC 2
If C ≥ 78 your level is 1
Calculation of the human organization level ND
If D < 90 your level is 3
If 90 ≤ D < 180 your level is 2 ND 2
If D ≥ 180 your level is 1
CURRENT PROTECTION GRADE
According to the vulnerability of your petrol station (NC) and quality of your own organization towards to the risk (ND), your current protection (PA)
corresponds to the following grade
Calculate your current protection grade PA = NC + ND - 1 : PA 3
GENERAL DIAGNOSIS
If your current protection grade (PA) is lower than the recommended grade (PR), you must reduce consequently the risks corresponding on the
one hand to the vulnerability of the petrol station (reduce C) and in addition with your organization toward the risk (D).

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Bibliography

[1] EN 179, Building hardware ― Emergency exit devices operated by a lever handle or push pad, for use on
escape routes ― Requirements and test methods

[2] EN 1125, Building hardware ― Panic exit devices operated by a horizontal bar, for use on escape routes
― Requirements and test methods

[3] ENV 1630, Windows, doors, shutters ― Burglar resistance ― Test method for the determination of
resistance to manual burglary attempts

[4] EN 12320, Building hardware ― Padlocks and padlock fittings ― Requirements and test methods

[5] CEN/TR 14383-2, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and building design ― Part 2: Urban planning

[6] EN 50131-1, Alarm systems ― Intrusion and hold-up systems ― Part 1: System requirements

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