Valencia, 2011

11. THE SIEGECRAFT OF PHILIP V OF MACEDON

1. Introduction

It is clear from the works of Polybius and Livy that much of Philip V’s military
effort was spent in capturing towns from his enemies, and for this reason the
topic of later Macedonian siegecraft surely deserves our attention. Equally, in
order to produce an accurate picture, it is preferable to study the evidence
methodically, rather than adopting a casual approach based on a few well-
known events. Such a systematic enquiry requires the compilation of a
catalogue of sieges, in which each action is classified according to outcome and
procedure (see Appendix). By tabulating the results, any trends and variations
can easily be identified (see Table 1).
It is inevitable that pride of place should go to those events which the
sources describe in greater detail; for example, the siege of Palus in 218 BC (no.
12).1 However, even the bare notice of a storming assault, for example at
Oricum in 214 BC (no. 15), is important simply because it preserves the manner
by which the town was captured. On the other hand, little can be gleaned from
those instances where the method of acquisition is not stated, such as Perippia
in 217 BC (Polyb. 5.102.6; cf. Walbank 1957: 629) or Thronium in 208 BC
(Livy 28.7.9, 11; cf. Walbank 1967: 185). Nor can much be made of the lists of
captured towns which crop up from time to time (e.g. Polyb. 5.108.8; Livy
27.32.9). Finally, although unrelated to a study of Philip’s siege techniques, it is
interesting to note that, on occasion, a siege’s importance lay in its wider
effects, as when Philip’s seizure of Cypsela, Doriscus, and Serrheum in 200 BC
encouraged the surrender of another four neighbouring towns (Livy 31.16.4-5).
If the resulting catalogue is necessarily incomplete, owing to the
selection process, it must be further skewed by the fragmentary nature of
Polybius’s account of events after about 215 BC. Nevertheless, the laws of
averages encourage the belief that a sample grouping of thirty-one sieges
spanning twenty-nine years must form a representative picture of Philip V’s
siegecraft.

2. Direct Assault

The first factor to emerge from this sample grouping is Philip’s unwavering
reliance on the direct approach (cf. Table 1, rows 1-2). Of course, the most
straightforward way to capture a fortified position was by escalade. Polybius

1
Numbers in brackets refer to the catalogue of sieges (see Appendix).
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relates that, at Paeanium (no. 5), Philip stormed the town ‘by making
continuous attacks’ (Polyb. 4.65.3); his description evokes the image of waves
of troops mounting the walls by ladder. On this occasion, the brevity of
Polybius’s account conceals the complexity of the operation. But clearly a
degree of co-ordination was required, as emerges from Polybius’s account of
the siege of Psophis (no. 8). First, Philip arranged simultaneous attacks at three
different points along the town wall (Polyb. 4.71.8); and second, a special task
force was detailed to deal with enemy sorties (Polyb. 4.71.7). By using these
tactics, Philip ensured that the enemy strength was divided by the multiple
attacks, and that any disruption of these attacks was minimised by dealing with
enemy sorties separately. In the event, when the town garrison issued from a
postern, Philip’s special force of Cretans routed them and pursued them through
the gate; at this, the townsfolk lost heart and abandoned the defence of the
walls. A third example, Alipheira (no. 10), demonstrates the general strategy.
Here, Philip deployed his storm troops ‘at many places’ (Polyb. 4.78.6), so that
when the assault commenced the townsfolk did not know which point to defend
first. Meanwhile, Philip himself led a covert attack on an undefended suburb,
burning it and causing further panic, so that the townsfolk fled to the citadel.
No doubt, Philip used a similar strategy to capture Elaus (no. 7),
Oricum (no. 15), and Maronea (no. 25), and after enduring a two-day
onslaught, the garrison of Phoetiae (no. 2) was moved to surrender. Even the
threat of such an attack could lead to surrender, as at the so-called Teichos, a
fort near Dyme (no. 11). More often, the townsfolk simply abandoned the place
in advance of Philip’s arrival, which is what happened at Metropolis (no. 3),
Ithoria (no. 4), Oeniadae (no. 6), and Lasion (no. 9). However, different
tactics were required at Lissus (no. 17), where the defences apparently did not
encourage a storming assault (Polyb. 8.13.3). Here, Philip managed to entice
both the townsfolk and the citadel garrison out onto the level plain which
separated the two fortifications. Catching them in the open, he sprang an
ambush which succeeded in seizing the citadel, and the town soon surrendered.
This last event demonstrates that the topography could, to some extent,
influence the choice of strategy. Equally, strong fortifications occasionally
foiled a storming attack, as at Pergamon (no. 21) and Cnidus (no. 23), and
Philip’s attempt on Athens and Piraeus (no. 28) was extremely opportunistic
and doomed to failure. The final example, Melitaea (no. 13), evaded capture for
a different reason: apparently, Philip had misjudged the height of the walls, and
the escalading troops’ ladders were too short. Interestingly, Walbank has noted
that, judging from the thickness of the surviving remains, the walls may have
been unusually high (1957: 626; cf. Stählin 1931).

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3 . Siegeworks

The direct approach, then, was generally preferred, in many cases without even
the preliminary stage of encamping the army. It is true that major preparations,
such as the encircling of a position either with earthworks or with a cordon, are
often taken to imply the alternative strategy of blockade, but this is not
necessarily so. At Thaumaci (no. 29), it seems from Livy’s abbreviated
description that Philip had posted a cordon of sentries around the town. We are
told that a force of Aetolians secretly entered the town by slipping ‘between the
Macedonian guard-posts’ (Livy 32.4.2: inter custodias Macedonum); but there
is no question of a blockading strategy, as Philip was on the point of sending a
battering-ram forward when the relief force arrived. At Phthiotic Thebes (no.
14), Philip established three camps outside the town, and linked them with a
ditch and double palisade, dotted with watch-towers (Polyb. 5.99.7-9). It is
thought that one of the camps lay on Taburi hill, 250m west of the citadel
(Stählin 1934b, 1584); a complete circumvallation, set a similar distance back
from the town, would have measured around 4! km. But far from blockading
the town, Philip immediately went on the offensive, advancing machinery
against the acropolis, where its north-west defences also formed the outer wall
of the town (Stählin 1934b: 1583-4). Similarly, at the coastal town of Abydus
(no. 27), the assault was preceded by Philip ‘setting up a palisade in one part
and a stockade in another’ (Polyb. 16.30.1), no doubt referring to the different
methods required to encircle the town by sea and land (cf. Walbank 1967: 541;
cf. section 7, below).
At the last two sites, Polybius refers to the Macedonian constructions as
‘siegeworks’ (erga; cf. Table 1, row 3). At a third site, Palus (no. 12), Philip
personally reconnoitred the town, ‘investigating how it was possible to bring up
to the wall siegeworks and machines (erga kai m!chanas)’ (Polyb. 5.3.6).
Having established that there was only one avenue of approach, ‘he decided to
bring up siegeworks here, and to organize the whole siege here’ (Polyb. 5.4.2),
including the deployment of artillery ‘at the best places to hinder the defenders’
(Polyb. 5.4.6). It seems that Philip’s preparations were concentrated at one
point, so it is unlikely that the siegeworks encircled the town. More probably,
they constituted protection for the artillery and a baseline from which to
advance machinery. Something of the sort is found at Echinus in 210 BC (no.
19), where Philip’s siegeworks (erga; Polyb. 9.41.10) comprised a short
counterwork parallel to the town wall, screening three artillery emplacements
(cf. Campbell 2004: plate F).
At Thaumaci (no. 29), the siegeworks (opera; Livy 32.4.2) took an
entirely different form again, for this is one of only two recorded incidents of
Philip using embankments, or assault ramps (aggeres; Livy 32.4.1). The other
occasion was the siege of Ambracus (no. 1), where the town was strongly

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defended, principally by its natural situation in a lagoon, but also by the

presence of an outwork (proteichisma: Polyb. 4.61.7-8). Polybius does not
elaborate upon the nature of this outwork, but his near contemporary, the
engineering writer Philon of Byzantium, assumes that vulnerable sectors around
a town circuit would be screened by a low defensive wall (Pol. 1.68 = Th. 84).
It was perhaps the presence of such an outer defence at Ambracus that obliged
Philip to pile up an embankment. And if the townsfolk were forced to watch
their defences being gradually buried under enemy siegeworks, their surrender
after forty anxious days is quite comprehensible. The embankment may simply
have been intended to facilitate a storming assault by infantry; on the other
hand, if Philip’s ‘other preparations’ (Polyb. 4.63.2) included the construction
of machines such as ram-sheds, they will have required a level runway to bring
them up to the walls. The embankment at Thaumaci was definitely used for this
purpose. As Livy explains (32.4.3-5), the town was sited on a crag (cf. Stählin
1934a, 1332), and we can well imagine that the rocky terrain would need to be
smoothed out into a gently graded slope for the advance of heavy machinery. In
the event, Philip was forced to withdraw before the embankment could be put to
use.

4. Tunnelling and undermining

By far the most common strategy, found at no fewer than eight sites (cf. Table
1, row 21), was the attempted undermining of the town wall. Two distinct
techniques can be discerned. At Palus (no. 12), the Macedonians brought
‘machines’ (m!chanai) up to the wall to facilitate the undermining work (Polyb.
5.4.6). By contrast, at Phthiotic Thebes (no. 14), tunnelling work began some
distance away, so that it took the Macedonians nine days to reach the wall, and
a further three days to undermine a 60 m. stretch (Polyb. 5.100.2-4). It is not
clear which technique was employed at Chios (no. 22), Abydus (no. 27), or
Lamia (no. 31), but it was the long distance version that was used at Echinus
(no. 19), where two tunnels were driven towards the town wall from a
concealed position behind the siegeworks. In mining operations, it was usual to
screen the tunnel mouth from the enemy, in order to preserve secrecy (cf.
Lammert 1932, 1774), but Philip flouted this convention at Prinassus (no. 24),
for a very good reason. Finding that the ground was too hard for mining (a
problem that later led to failure at Lamia), he encouraged his sappers to create
the noise of tunnelling during the day, while by night soil was brought from
elsewhere and piled around the tunnel mouths; the townsfolk fell for Philip’s
psychological ruse and surrendered the town. This predilection for tunnelling
raises the possibility that Vitruvius’s story of mining and countermining at
Apollonia (Vitr. De arch. 10.16.9) belongs to Philip’s siege of 214 BC (no. 16).

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5. Siege equipment

From tactics, we turn to equipment. As the nation that developed siege

machinery most vigorously in the mid-fourth century BC, it is not surprising to
find the Macedonians still employing battering-rams a century and a half later.
Philip clearly planned a battering attack at Thaumaci (no. 29), where Livy
specifically mentions a ram (aries; Livy 32.4.1), and two ram tortoises were
deployed at Echinus (no. 19). Moreover, the machinery (m!chan!mata) which
Philip advanced against the citadel at Phthiotic Thebes (no. 14) may well have
been battering rams, and it is possible (but by no means certain) that the same
kind of attack was intended at Ambracus (no. 1).
A passage of Frontinus may indicate that Philip deployed siege-towers
at Chios (no. 22). Certainly, his reference to lashing ships together in order to
carry towers (Front. Strat. 3.9.8) is reminiscent of the siege of Abydus (no. 27),
where Polybius reports that shipborne machinery was smashed by the
defenders’ stone-projectors (Polyb. 16.30.4); these machines were perhaps a
precursor of the maritime sambuca (cf. Campbell 2003: 22). Finally, the
machines mentioned at Palus (no. 12) and Prinassus (no. 24) were explicitly
linked to mining work, and it seems likely that they were sheds of some kind.
At Palus, these were advanced to the wall to facilitate undermining, and must
have been the so-called ‘digging sheds’ (chel"nai oruktrides, or testudines ad
fodiendum; Campbell 2003a: 15-16), whereas at Prinassus they remained at a
distance, shielding the tunnel mouths, and could have been any type of shelter.

6. Artillery

Philip appears to have deployed artillery on only four occasions. At Phthiotic

Thebes (no. 14), he had a staggering 150 catapults (katapeltai) and 25 stone-
projectors (petrobolika organa; Polyb. 5.99.7). We have seen that, if a
circumvallation surrounded the town, it would have measured about 4! km;
Polybius claims that wooden towers were erected at 30m intervals, so a
complete series would have numbered 150. The correlation with the reported
number of catapults is striking, but we should beware of leaping to unfounded
conclusions: Polybius nowhere states that Philip’s siegeworks encircled the
town, and he certainly doesn’t state that the wooden towers were artillery
positions.
Livy indicates a similarly wide range of artillery, abandoned by the
Macedonians at Apollonia (no. 16), when he lists the ‘catapults, ballistae, and
other artillery-pieces which were gathered for the siege of the town’ (Livy
24.40.14). By contrast, at Echinus (no. 19), Philip’s siegeworks screened just
three artillery positions (belostaseis; Polyb. 9.41.8), the central one of which

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carried a colossal one-talent stone-projector, while the others carried 30-mina

machines. Interestingly, although Polybius describes the machinery in some
detail, he makes no mention of arrow-shooting catapults.
No arrow-shooters were used at Palus (no. 12), either. Polybius reports
that Philip deployed only ‘missiles (bel!) and stone-throwers (petroboloi)’
(Polyb. 5.4.6). Marsden took this to mean that ‘Philip set up arrow-firers and
stone-throwers at suitable points … to prevent the defence interfering with his
assault works’ (1969: 77). Marsden was certainly not the first to equate
‘missiles’ with arrow-shooting catapults (Paton 1923: 13, translates this passage
as ‘balistae and catapults’), but he claimed that this passage of Polybius (along
with two from Philon’s Poliork!tika) proved that the term belos was regularly
employed as shorthand for ‘the machine that hurls the missile’ (1969: 65). This
specialised meaning has become enshrined in Greek lexicology (cf. Liddell et
al. 1940, s. v. !"#$% (5)), but Marsden’s supposition that the word could simply
stand in for ‘arrow-shooting catapult’ (1969: 77 n. 3; cf. 65) is based on a priori
conviction rather than on hard evidence.
First, the readiness of both Polybius and Philon to state katapeltai when
they mean arrow-shooting catapults (e.g., Polyb. 1.53.11, 74.4; 5.99.7; Philon,
Pol. 1.20 = Th. 81; 2.49 = Th. 89; 3.26, 30 = Th. 93) should raise doubts about
their use of belos to signify this particular machine. (The argument is unaffected
by the fact that, in the Belopoiika, Philon appears to use katapaltai in the
comprehensive sense of ‘artillery weapons’: Bel. 17 = Th. 57; 20 = Th. 59; 29 =
Th. 62.) Second, it is clear that both authors often use the word belos to mean
‘missile’ in the broadest sense (e.g., Polyb. 2.23.10; 5.100.2; 6.23.5, 31.14;
Philon, Bel. 5 = Th. 51; 12-14 = Th. 55-56; 51 = Th. 73; Pol. 1.16 = Th. 80;
2.49 = Th. 89; 3.3-5 = Th. 91; 3.18 = Th. 92), and Philon’s usage occasionally
implies artillery balls crashing against gateways (Pol. 1.6 = Th. 79), posterns
(Pol. 1.9 = Th. 80) or windows (Pol. 1.20, 24 = Th. 81).
In one of the two passages cited by Marsden, Philon states that ‘the
emplacements (belostaseis) for the biggest and most numerous missiles (bel!)
are built below the walls and the outworks (proteichismata)’ (Pol. 1.32 = Th.
82); in the other, he advises any besieger, who cannot take a town by treachery
or by blockade, to ‘set up all the missiles (bel!) and announce that you will give
handsome sums of money to the first to mount the wall, and to the second, and
to the third’ (Pol. 4.9 = Th. 97). Far from implying arrow-shooting catapults,
the ‘missiles’ in the first passage are better interpreted as stone-projectors; in
the second, if they are not literally missiles, then any kind of catapult could be
implied. A better example of the latter interpretation is provided by Philon’s
advice to ‘bring into action all of your missiles, rams, drills, ravens (korakes),
and assault-bridges (epibathrai) at appropriate places, both on land and sea’
(Pol. 4.25 = Th. 98); here, the ‘missiles’ are clearly shorthand for missile-
weapons of all sorts (cf. Polyb. 5.75.5).

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So, although Polybius was perfectly willing to use the term bel! to
indicate artillery ammunition, as for example when Hanno brings ‘catapults and
missiles’ from Carthage to Utica (Polyb. 1.74.3-4), he does not appear ever to
have used it as shorthand for the artillery-piece itself (cf. the listing in
Mauersberger 1956, 326). Most damning of all is Polybius’s willingness to refer
to ‘arrow-shooters and stone-projectors’ (katapeltai kai petroboloi) elsewhere
(Polyb. 1.53.11; 8.7.2). Marsden’s interpretation rests upon a supposed parallel
with Philonian usage, but we have seen that Philon mostly used the term to
indicate ammunition, and only occasionally as a blanket reference to ‘missile-
weapons’, but never specifically implying arrow-shooting catapults. At Palus,
‘missile weapons and stone-throwers’ makes no sense. We are left with the
primary meaning of belos, as a missile to be identified according to the context
(cf. Mauersberger, loc. cit.).

7. Conclusion

The systematic study of Philip’s siegecraft allows us to correct two common

misconceptions. First, there is the presumed reliance on siegeworks. For
example, Connolly’s statement, that Philip ‘generally circumvallated a town
with a ditch and palisade before commencing the siege’ (1981: 286), is not
borne out by the evidence. Abydus certainly seems to have been fenced around.
Polybius’s distinction between stakes and a palisade here is usually taken to
refer to the different technique required to block the harbour (cf. Walbank 1967:
541, citing Polyb. 4.56.8), although the most recent editors consider this
interpretation to be problematic (Foulon et al. 1995: 130 n.1). However, it was a
human cordon that was thrown around Thaumaci. And the case of Phthiotic
Thebes is not as clear cut as might be hoped. Rather than spacing his three
camps around the town, Philip seems to have concentrated them at the citadel in
the north-west corner (Stählin 1934b: 1584), and the barrier linking them need
not have encircled the rest of the town. Even if it did, the incidence of encircling
earthworks is still minuscule, representing only 6% of our sample (cf. Table 1,
row 4).
Second, there is the presumed reliance on siege machinery. For
example, Tarn characterised Philip by his ‘splendidly equipped siege train’
(1930: 107). And Garlan, writing of Hellenistic armies in general, has stated
that ‘the action of troops hurling themselves in successive waves against the
enemy positions could only be successful if recourse was also had to many
other methods of destruction and of approaching walls’ (1984: 358), by which
he means tunnels, ramps, and sheds. However, machinery was used in only a
quarter of the sieges in our sample, a similar proportion to the use of tunnels (cf.
Table 1, rows 19 and 21). By contrast, we can now see that, more often than

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not, the strategy adopted by Philip was precisely the unsupported storming
assault that Garlan denies (cf. Table 1, row 16). Our findings give further
support to Pritchett’s conclusion, that ‘the escalade of walls remained common
throughout all periods’ (1992: 141).
Finally, there is an apparent contempt for the general standard of late
Macedonian siegecraft. Cary has stated that ‘the branch of operations in which
Hellenistic armies fell away soonest from Alexander’s standard was siegecraft’,
although he was willing to admit, albeit somewhat grudgingly, that ‘of the later
Hellenistic kings, Philip alone displayed any proficiency in this branch of war’;
however, he immediately qualified his praise by claiming that ‘his captures
were all places of minor importance’ (Cary 1951: 240). It is perhaps unfortunate
that Philip did not approach towns like Pergamon and Athens with the same
degree of organization and tenacity as he displayed at the likes of Phthiotic
Thebes or Echinus. But, by the same token, not all of Philip’s failures should be
put down to technical incompetence. This was undoubtedly the case at Melitaea
and Apollonia. But it was the treacherous conduct of his lieutenant Leontius that
forced his withdrawal from Palus, and his pact with Rome obliged him to
abandon operations at Lamia. Statistically, Philip failed in only a third of his
operations (cf. Table 1, row 7), which is to say that he was successful in almost
70% of our sample.

Duncan B. Campbell
University of Glasgow

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Appendix: Catalogue of sieges

1 . A m b r a c u s (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
Philip encamps outside the strongly fortified town, situated in a lagoon with
only one avenue of approach. Over the course of 40 days, his preparations for a
siege, including the erection of embankments, intimidate the Aetolian garrison
into surrendering; they are expelled from the town.
Sources: Polyb. 4.61.8; 63.1-3; cf. Walbank 1957: 516.

2 . P h o e tia e (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
Philip encamps and spends two days constantly assaulting the town, so that the
Aetolian garrison surrenders and is allowed to depart unharmed.
Sources: Polyb. 4.63.7-8; cf. Walbank 1957: 517.

3 . M e tr o p o lis (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
At Philip’s approach, the Aetolian garrison abandons the town and occupies the
citadel, whereupon the Macedonians burn the town and move on.
Sources: Polyb. 4.64.4; cf. Walbank 1957: 518.

4 . Ith o r ia (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
At Philip’s approach, the Aetolian garrison flees, and the Macedonians raze the
town to the ground.
Sources: Polyb. 4.64.9-10; cf. Walbank 1957: 517-8.

5 . P a e a n iu m (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
Encamping before the well-fortified town, Philip launches several assaults and
takes the place by storm. The Macedonians demolish the town to provide
building materials for Philip’s fortification of Oeniadae (infra).
Sources: Polyb. 4.65.3-4; cf. Walbank 1957: 519.

6 . O e n ia d a e (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
At Philip’s approach, the Aetolian garrison flees, enabling the Macedonians to
occupy the town. Philip fortifies the citadel and surrounds the harbour and
dockyards with a wall, using building materials from Paeanium (supra).
Sources: Polyb. 4.65.6; cf. Walbank 1957: 519-21.

7 . E la u s (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
Philip captures the town in a storming assault.
Sources: Polyb. 4.65.6; cf. Walbank 1957: 520.

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8 . P so p h is (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
Philip advances on the town, collecting missiles and ladders as he goes. Besides
accommodating an Elean garrison, the town is protected by rivers to the west,
south and east, and by a steep hill to the north, so the townsfolk are confident of
their safety. However, Philip sends an escalading force across the river to attack
the eastern wall at three separate points, in response to which the townsfolk
move to defend their walls and the Elean garrison issues from a postern further
up the slope. The escalade continues, undaunted by the stout defence, while
Philip’s Cretan mercenaries rout the Eleans and enter the town at their heels.
While the Macedonians pillage the town, the townsfolk seek shelter in the
citadel, but lacking adequate stores they soon surrender. The Elean garrison is
dismissed and the townsfolk are left unmolested.
Sources: Polyb. 4.70.2-72.9; cf. Walbank 1957: 524.

9 . L a sio n (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
At Philip’s approach, the Elean garrison flees, enabling the Macedonians to
occupy the town and hand it over to the Achaean League.
Sources: Polyb. 4.73.1-2; cf. Walbank 1957: 524.

1 0 . A lip h e ir a (G r e e c e ), 2 1 9 B C .
At daybreak, Philip positions parties of ladder-bearers and mercenaries,
supported by Macedonians, at several points on the most accessible side of the
town. Philip himself ascends the rocky side with picked troops, unseen by the
townsfolk. When the escalade commences, the townsfolk are faced with an
assault on several fronts. Meanwhile, Philip seizes the unwalled suburb below
the citadel, whereupon the townsfolk abandon their walls and rush to defend the
citadel. The Macedonians then capture the town, and the townsfolk soon
surrender the citadel.
Sources: Polyb. 4.78.6-13; cf. Walbank 1957: 530-32.

1 1 . T e ic h o s, a fo r t n e a r D y m e (G r e e c e ), 2 1 8 B C .
Philip encamps before the fort, whereupon the Elean garrison surrenders, and
the place is restored to the Dymeans.
Sources: Polyb. 4.83.1-5; cf. Walbank 1957: 514 (on Polyb. 4.59.4).

1 2 . P a lu s (G r e e c e ), 2 1 8 B C .
Encamping before the town, Philip personally reconnoitres to identify where
best to advance his siegeworks and machines. Then, he deploys stone-projectors
and missiles at the best locations to pin down the garrison, and brings machines
(presumably sheds) up to the wall to enable undermining work. Although the
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wall is undermined and underpinned for two plethra (c. 62 m.), Philip’s attempt
to negotiate is rebuffed, so he sets fire to the wooden props. However, the
assaulting force sent through the resulting breach allows itself to be beaten
back, out of treachery, and Philip abandons the siege.
Sources: Polyb. 5.3.4-4.13; cf. Walbank 1957: 540-1.

1 3 . M e lita e a (G r e e c e ), 2 1 7 B C .
Philip arrives before the town at daybreak and immediately launches an
escalade. However, although the townsfolk are taken by surprise, the ladders are
too short, and Philip abandons the attempt.
Polybius later alleges that Philip had arranged the attack with partisans within
the town, but misjudged the timing and consequently could not call upon their
assistance.
Sources: Polyb. 5.97.5-6; 9.18.5-9; cf. Walbank 1957: 626; 1967, 144-5.

1 4 . P h th io tic T h e b e s (G r e e c e ), 2 1 7 B C .
Philip brings up siege equipment constructed during the winter, including 150
catapults and 25 stone-projectors. He establishes three camps around the town,
linked by a ditch and double palisade, with watch-towers every plethron (c.
31m). Finally, he advances unspecified machinery (battering rams?) against the
citadel, but he is hindered for three days by constant sorties from the town, so
he commences tunnelling work, and in nine days the Macedonians reach the
walls. After another three days, the wall is undermined and underpinned for a
length of two plethra (c. 62m), and suddenly collapses. With the Macedonians
on the point of storming the town, the townsfolk surrender and are sold into
slavery.
Sources: Polyb. 5.99.1-100.8; cf. Walbank 1957: 627-8.

1 5 . O r ic u m (A lb a n ia ), 2 1 4 B C .
Philip captures the unfortified town by force, and installs a garrison.
Sources: Livy 24.40.2-6; Zonaras 9.4; cf. Walbank 1967: 62.

1 6 . A p o llo n ia (A lb a n ia ), 2 1 4 B C .
Philip attempts to tunnel into the town, but the townsfolk dig their own tunnels
for the distance of a bowshot (100 m.?) and hang up bronze vessels in them,
which reverberate in the vicinity of the enemy diggings. The likely destination
of the Macedonian tunnel is calculated, and, having prepared vessels full of
boiling water and pitch, human excrement and burning hot sand, the townsfolk
suddenly release the contents into the tunnel from above, killing the enemy
workers.

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 HELLENISTIC WARFARE

Meanwhile, a Roman relieving force arrives under cover of darkness and

exploits the Macedonians’ lax discipline by attacking their camp by night.
Philip is forced to flee, abandoning his siege equipment, including catapults and
stone-projectors.
Sources: itruvius, De arch. 10.1 .9 10; Livy 24.40.7 15; Zonaras 9.4.

1 7 . L issu s (A lb a n ia ), 2 1 4 B C .
Philip reconnoitres the town, and decides to attack on the level ground between
the town and its detached citadel. Under cover of darkness, he conceals a force
of light armed troops in woodland bordering the plain. ext morning, he
marches his peltasts and light armed infantry around the town, ending up on the
plain. hen the townsfolk issue out to meet them, the light armed troops are
routed and fall back down the slope towards the peltasts, whereupon the citadel
garrison oin in the pursuit. However, the concealed troops now break cover,
st as the retreating Macedonians turn and stand; the Lissians flee back into the
town, but the citadel garrison is cut off. The town soon surrenders.
Sources: Polyb. .1 .1 14.11; cf. albank 90

1 8 . Ia m p h o r y n n a (B u lg a r ia ? ), 2 1 1 B C .
Philip besieges the capital of the Thracian Maedi, and the town surrenders.
Sources: Livy 2 .25. , 15; cf. lbank 19 7: 1 (on Polyb. 9.45. ).

1 9 . E c h in u s (G r e e c e ), 2 1 0 B C .
Philip constructs siegeworks in a few days, consisting of a gallery parallel to the
town wall between two towers; either end of the gallery is anchored by a ram
tortoise, and three stone pr ectors are set up, two mina machines and a 1
talent machine. Two tunnels are driven forward from the gallery. Roofed
passages lead back from the ram tortoises to protect the crews. A oint Roman
Achaean attempt to raise the siege is unsuccessful, and the town surrenders.
Sources: Polyb. 9.41.1 42.4; cf. Campbell 2004: plate F; albank 5.

2 0 . T h a so s (G r e e c e ), 2 0 2 B C .
Philip treacherously seizes the town and enslaves the inhabitants, but the
townsfolk offer their submission provided no Macedonian garrison is installed,
to which Philip agrees.
Sources: Polyb. 15.24.1 cf. albank 479

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 The Siegecraft of Philip V of Macedon

2 1 . P e r g a m o n (T u r k e y ), 2 0 1 B C .
Philip besieges the town, but his attacks are easily repulsed from the strong
fortifications. Finding no forage in the neighbourhood, he petulantly destroys
some extra-mural sanctuaries and withdraws.
Sources: Polyb. 16.1.1; cf. Walbank 1967: 500-3.

2 2 . C h io s (G r e e c e ), 2 0 1 B C .
Philip besieges Chios, utilising mining operations, but makes no headway and
withdraws.
It is thought that Frontinus’s episode, mentioning shipborne towers and wheeled
towers deployed against a coastal town, may belong to this siege. If so, the
passage preserved by Athenaeus and Vitruvius dealing with the foiling of an
amphibious mechanised attack on Chios may also be relevant.
Sources: Polyb. 16.2.1; Front. Strat. 3.9.8; Athen. Mech. 17 = W.27.11-28.5;
Vitr. De arch. 10.16.9; cf. Walbank 1967: 504.

2 3 . C n id u s (G r e e c e ), 2 0 1 B C .
Philip makes assaults on the town, but is foiled by the strong defences and
withdraws.
Sources: Polyb. 16.11.1; cf. Walbank 1967: 512-3.

2 4 . P r in a ssu s (G r e e c e ), 2 0 1 B C .
Philip encamps before the town and, having prepared screens and other
equipment, begins undermining operations, but the ground proves too hard. In
order to fool the townsfolk, he produces the underground sound of tunnelling by
day, and by night transports soil from elsewhere and piles it up around the
tunnel mouths. When he announces that he has undermined the town wall for a
length of 2 plethra (c. 63 m.), the townsfolk surrender.
Sources: Polyb. 16.11.2-6; Front. Strat. 3.8.1; Polyaen. Strat. 4.18.1; cf.
Walbank 1967: 513.

2 5 . M a r o n e a (G r e e c e ), 2 0 0 B C .
Philip captures the town, a Ptolemaic possession, at the first assault.
Sources: Livy 31.16.3-4.

2 6 . A e n u m (G r e e c e ), 2 0 0 B C .
Philip experiences (unspecified) trouble besieging the town, but captures it
through the treachery of Ptolemy’s prefect, Callimedes.
Sources: Livy 31.16.4; cf. Briscoe 1973: 101.

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 HELLENISTIC WARFARE

2 7 . A b y d u s (T u r k e y ), 2 0 0 B C .
Philip besieges the coastal town, erecting a palisade on the landward side and
sinking a stockade of piles along the sea approaches. The townsfolk repulse his
seaborne machinery with stone-projectors and fire missiles, and employ similar
methods against the siegeworks on land, but Philip undermines the town wall.
When his tunnels draw near the hastily constructed inner counter-wall, the
townsfolk seek terms, but Philip demands unconditional surrender and
continues the siege. Then, the townsfolk free their slaves to participate in the
siege, assemble their women and children at two locations (to be killed if the
town falls), and gather their valuables in the agora. Fifty elders are selected to
kill the women and children and dump the wealth into the sea, should the
Macedonians capture the town, and the menfolk swear to die fighting. But when
Philip breaks into the town with much slaughter, the elders attempt to bargain
with him. The surviving townsfolk are ashamed to live when their menfolk have
died defending the town, and they begin to kill themselves; Philip withdraws for
three days, then returns to claim the booty.
Sources: Polyb. 16.30.1-34.12; Livy 31.16.6-18.8; cf. Walbank 1967: 538-44;
Walsh 1961: 178-9.

2 8 . A th e n s / P ir a e u s (G r e e c e ), 2 0 0 B C .
Philip makes an opportunistic assault on Athens with 5,000 light infantry and
300 cavalry, but the townsfolk are forewarned and prepare to stand siege.
Leaving his lieutenant Philocles to make a feint at Athens, Philip moves on to
Piraeus, but when he fails to make progress he returns to Athens, where he is
repulsed by troops issuing from the Long Walls.
Sources: Livy 31.24.2-25.1, 26.6-13; Diod. 28.7; Zonaras 9.15; cf. Briscoe
1973: 124-5.

2 9 . T h a u m a c i (G r e e c e ), 1 9 9 B C .
Philip besieges the town using embankments and shelters; but, when he is on
the point of advancing his battering-rams, a relief force arrives from the
Aetolians and, penetrating the Macedonian pickets, enters the town. From there,
the Aetolians launch attacks on the pickets and on the siegeworks, and Philip
decides to abandon the enterprise.
Sources: Livy 32.4.1-7; cf. Briscoe 1973: 173.

3 0 . P h e r a e (G r e e c e ), 1 9 8 B C .
Retreating through Thessaly before the Romans, burning towns as he goes, Philip
finds Pherae shut against him, so he abandons the operation and moves on.
Sources: Livy 32.13.9; cf. Briscoe 1973: 190.

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 The Siegecraft of Philip V of Macedon

3 1 . L a m ia (G r e e c e ), 1 9 1 B C .
With Roman agreement, Philip besieges the town, while the Romans
simultaneously besiege neighbouring Heraclea; both armies proceed day and
night, as if in competition. Philip wishes to capture Lamia before the Romans
capture Heraclea, so that they cannot interfere with his project. The
Macedonians begin excavating tunnels, but encounter flint which is
impenetrable, so Philip attempts to force the town’s surrender. He fails in this
and, when the Romans capture Heraclea, they instruct Philip to desist.
Sources: Livy 36.25.1-8; cf. Briscoe 1981: 257-8.

Bibliography

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Oxford 1973).
J. Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV-XXXVII (Clarendon Press,
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Glasgow, 2002).
D.B. Campbell, Greek and Roman Siege Machinery, 399 BC-AD 363 (Osprey
Publishing, Oxford 2003).
D.B. Campbell, Ancient Siege Warfare, 546-146 BC (Osprey Publishing,
Oxford 2004).
M. Cary, A History of the Greek World, 323 to 146 BC (Methuen, London 1951).
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Paris 1995). .
Y. Garlan, ‘War and siegecraft’ in edd. F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W.
Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie, The Cambridge Ancient History2 volume 7 part 1
“The Hellenistic World” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984) 353-
362.
F. Lammert, ‘Minenkampf’ RE 15.2, (Stuttgart 1932) 1773-4.
H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon,9 (Clarendon Press,
Oxford 1940).
E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery. Historical Development (Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1969).

151
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A. Mauersberger, Polybios-Lexicon, vol. 1 (Akademie Verlag GmbH, Berlin

1956).
W.R. Paton, Polybius. The Histories (Loeb Classical Library, London 1923) .
W.K. Pritchett, ‘Akarnanian walls and scaling-ladders’ in W.K. Pritchett,
Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, vol. 8 (Gieben, Amsterdam 1992) 115-
143.
F. Stählin, ‘Melitaia’ RE 15.1 (Stuttgart 1931) 534-40.
F. Stählin, ‘Thaumakoi’ RE 5.A.2 (Stuttgart 1934) 1331-7.
F. Stählin, ‘Thebai (3)’ RE 5.A.2 (Stuttgart 1934) 1582-93.
W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military & Naval Development (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1930).
P.G. Walsh, Livy, his Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1961).
F.W. Walbank, F.W. 1957. A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 1: Books
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(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967).

152
 Athens / Piraeus (200 BC)
Phthiotic Thebes (217 BC)
Fort near Dyme (218 BC)

Iamphorynna (211 BC)

Ambracus (219 BC)

Metropolis (219 BC)

Pergamon (201 BC)

Prinassus (201 BC)

Paeanium (219 BC)
Oeniadae (219 BC)

Thaumaci (199 BC)

Apollonia (214 BC)
Alipheira (219 BC)

Maronea (200 BC)

Phoetiae (219 BC)

Melitaea (217 BC)

Psophis (219 BC)

Echinus (210 BC)

Abydus (200 BC)

Thasos (202 BC)
Oricum (214 BC)

Aenum (200 BC)

Pherae (198 BC)

Cnidus (201 BC)
Lasion (219 BC)

Lissus (214 BC)

Ithoria (219 BC)

Lamia (191 BC)

Chios (201 BC)
Elaus (219 BC)

Palus (218 BC)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 blockading strategy 0 0%

The Siegecraft of Philip V of Macedon

2 assaulting strategy x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 31 100%
3 'siegew orks' x x x x x 5 16%
4 inv esting w orks constructed x x 2 6%
5 cordon throw n around tow n x 1 3%
6 assault ramp(s) constructed x x 2 6%
7 siege abandoned x x x x x x x x x x 10 32%
8 tow n abandoned x x x x 4 13%
9 tow n surrendered x x x x x x x x 8 26%
10 tow n deliv ered by treachery x x 2 6%
11 mass suicide x 1 3%
12 tow n stormed x x x x x x 6 19%
13 - surprise attack x 1 3%
14 - w all breached 0 0%
15 - gate forced 0 0%
16 - escalade ? ? ? x x ? x ? ? 9 29%
17 - open gate 0 0%
18 - w all undermined x x x 3 10%
19 - siege machinery ? x x x ? x x x 8 26%
20 - artillery x x (x) x 4 13%
21 - tunnels dug x x x x x (x ) x x 8 26%
153

Table 1: Sieges of Philip V of Macedon

 HELLENISTIC WARFARE

Fig. 10: Location of the sieges of Philip V

154