Jansen

The Russian Federation’s Approach to the
Responsibility to Protect
An Analysis of Russian State Practice on the Responsibility to Protect in light
of the Russo-Ukrainian War
Milan C.F. Jansen
October 2022
Student number: 1270701
ANR: 235446
Tilburg University Law School
Thesis LLM: International Law & Global Governance
Supervisor: Dr. Leena Grover
Co-reader: Ben Grama
Word count (excluding citations, table of contents, indexes, summary,
bibliography and appendices): 13.610
1
Table of Contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 3
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ...................................................................................................... 6

1.2. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ...................................................... 7
1.3. RESEARCH GAP, SOCIETAL AND ACADEMIC RELEVANCE & LIMITATIONS ....................................... 8
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY.................................................................................... 11
1.5. CHAPTER OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 13
2. CASE STUDIES OF LIBYA AND SYRIA .............................................................................................. 14
2.1. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO R2P UP UNTIL LIBYA ........................................................................... 14

2.2. CASE STUDY OF THE LIBYAN CRISIS .................................................................................................. 15
2.3. CASE STUDY OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS .................................................................................................. 19
2.4. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LIBYA AND SYRIA ................................................................... 26
3. CASE STUDY OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR ........................................................................... 32
3.1. THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA IN RELATION TO THE CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT IN UKRAINE .... 32
3.2. THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR ............................................................................................................ 34
3.3. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR ................................... 45
3.3.1. The Right to Self-Determination of the Donbas Population ..................................................... 45
3.3.2. The Protection of Russian Nationals Abroad ............................................................................ 51
4. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LIBYA, SYRIA AND UKRAINE.................................... 55
4.1. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO UKRAINE COMPARED TO LIBYA AND SYRIA ...................................... 55
4.2. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO UKRAINE IN LIGHT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ............... 59
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 64
5.1. GENERAL CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 64

5.2. CHAPTER SUMMARIES ........................................................................................................................ 64
5.3. FINAL REMARKS ................................................................................................................................. 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................... 69
LEGISLATION, TREATIES AND UN RESOLUTIONS .......................................................................................... 69

CASE LAW ........................................................................................................................................................ 70
SECONDARY SOURCES ..................................................................................................................................... 70
Literature ..................................................................................................................................................... 70
UNSC Meeting Records .............................................................................................................................. 71
UNSC Draft Resolutions ............................................................................................................................. 72
Other UN Meeting Reports ......................................................................................................................... 74
Press Releases .............................................................................................................................................. 75
Blogs, News Articles and Websites ............................................................................................................. 76
2
List of Abbreviations
Assad Bashar al-Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa1
EU European Union
FRY Former Republic of Yugoslavia
HR Human Rights
HRMMU Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ International Court of Justice
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IHRL International Human Rights Law
IL International Law
Mass atrocity crimes Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing
MS Member States
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P3 Western Permanent Member States of the United Nations

Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United
States)
1
BRICS refers to the formal institution formed in 2010, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa,
all of which are generally deemed to be developing (economic) countries.
3
P5 Permanent Member States of the United Nations Security
Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United
States)
PNA The protection of nationals abroad
Putin Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation
Qadhafi Muammar al-Qadhafi, former leader of Libya
R2P The Responsibility to Protect
RSD The right to self-determination
Russia The Russian Federation
Syria The Syrian Arab Republic
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
US United States of America
4
1. Introduction
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has plunged the world into an international political and
economic crisis. The Russian Federation has been criticized tremendously for its military
invasion of Ukraine, with the majority of the international community supporting Ukraine’s
territorial integrity.2 Many countries have therefore adopted economic sanctions against Russia
since and it was not long before war crimes were allegedly committed against Ukrainian
citizens.3 Russia’s veto power as a permanent member (‘P5’) of the UNSC has completely
deadlocked the UNSC. Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia has stated that “the lack
of unanimity of its permanent members (…) has prevented [the UNSC] from exercising its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. 4 The
possibilities of military intervention by other States have also been raised, among which are
pleas for the Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P’).5 R2P is an international norm that articulates
the international community’s responsibility to protect civilian populations from mass atrocity
crimes.6 Russia has traditionally been opposed to R2P-related measures throughout major
international human rights crises that have occurred since the adoption of the norm. However,
Russia seems to justify its conduct in the Russo-Ukrainian War with R2P-related arguments,
signaling a significant development in its approach to R2P.
2
See United Nations General Assembly Resolution (“UNGA Res”) ES-11/2 (24 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-
11/2 (adopted by 140 votes to 5; 38 abstentions; 10 absent).
3
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Ukraine’ (1 September 2022)
<https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/ukraine/> accessed 22 April 2022.
4
United Nations Security Council Resolution (“UNSC Res”) 2623 (27 February 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2623.
5
See e.g. Obasesam Okoi, ‘Ukraine and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect Norm’ (E-International
Relations, 5 September 2022) <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/09/05/ukraine-and-the-failure-of-the-
responsibility-to-protect-norm/> accessed 2 October 2022.
6
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘WHAT IS R2P?’ <https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/>
accessed 3 October 2022.
5
1.1. The Responsibility to Protect
R2P is a soft law doctrine,7 adopted unanimously by UN Member States (‘MS’) at the World
Summit Outcome in 2005.8 The doctrine is divided into three Pillars,9 of which the first two
are widely internationally accepted in State Practice.10 The first entails States’ responsibility to
protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes and to prevent them from occurring.11 Pillar
II provides the international community’s responsibility to assist States in these efforts, through
international diplomatic cooperation and non-military measures.12 Pillar III, stating that UN
MS “are prepared to take collective action, (…) through the Security Council, including
Chapter VII, (…) should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from [mass atrocity crimes]”.13 Since Pillar III involves
coercive measures against other States, the topic is controversial within international law (‘IL’).
Pillar III measures can only be carried out when the use of force is authorized by the UNSC.
Such authorization is characterized by political deadlock, which is often the result of the veto
power of one or more of the P5.
R2P has been applied inconsistently in UNSC State Practice, despite having been invoked in
over eighty UNSC resolutions.14 R2P was first affirmed and referred to in a State situation by
the UNSC in the case of Darfur, in 2006.15 In 2009, the Three Pillars of R2P were developed
7
See e.g. Brad Halt, ‘The Legal Character of R2P and the UN Charter’ (E-International Relations, 8 August 2012)
<https://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/08/the-legal-basis-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/> accessed 6 September
2022.
8
UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, paras. 138-140.
9
UNGA Res 63/308 (7 October 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/308.
10
Jenna B. Russo, ‘R2P in Syria and Myanmar: Norm Violation and Advancement’ [2020] 12(2) Global
Responsibility to Protect 211-233 (“Russo”), p. 212.
11
UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ (12 January 2009) UN
Doc A/63/677, pp.8-9 and sect. II. See also UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para. 138.
12
UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para. 139.
13
Ibid.
14
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements
Referencing R2P’ (2 June 2022) <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-security-council-resolutions-and-
presidential-statements-referencing-r2p/> accessed 7 September 2022.
15
UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674; UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706.
6
by UNSG Ban Ki-moon in a report based on paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit
Outcome Document,16 which was later that year reaffirmed by the UNGA.17 After Darfur
(2006), R2P was only rarely included in UNSC resolutions, until Libya in 2011. Libya was an
exceptional case, where Pillar III was successfully invoked and UNSC authorization was
granted for military intervention. The extent to which that mandate was stretched by NATO
(the ‘mission slip’), however, led to strong disagreements between NATO MS and Russia
(among others).18 Since Libya, distrust and reluctance have dominated Russia’s R2P discourse,
which was reflected in the Syrian crisis (2011). Despite strong interest in R2P objectives by
local and international civil groups for the past years,19 recent academic debates have generally
confirmed R2P’s standstill in the UNSC that has existed ever since the Libyan crisis.20 The
controversial intervention in Libya and subsequent failure to spur international action in cases
like Syria cast doubts over the effectiveness of the norm.
1.2. The Russian Approach to the Responsibility to Protect
Russia is often blamed by Western MS for its obstructive approach to mass HR crises that
followed Libya. However, Russia’s contribution to the normative and non-Western
development of R2P should not be misjudged.21 The case study of Libya shows that Russia’s
suspicious approach to R2P was further reinforced by the NATO ‘mission slip’. As a result,
Russia staunchly opposes Pillar III throughout the Syrian crisis. R2P is generally seen by
16
UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ (12 January 2009) UN
Doc A/63/677.
17
UNGA Res 63/308 (7 October 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/308.
18
Mainly the BRICS States criticized NATO’s mission slip. See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011)
UN Doc S/PV.6528, pp. 7 (India), 8 (Russia) and 9-10 (China). See also UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6566th mtg (27 June
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6566, p. 4 (South Africa).
19
See e.g. Luck.
20
See e.g. Spencer Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’ [2012] 13 Melbourne JIL 59-93
(“Zifcak”). See also Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘China’s “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes’ [2016] 6 Asian JIL 89-118.
See also Russo, p. 225, claiming that “R2P’s advancement as a norm has (…) stalled and arguably even regressed
in the period following the 2011 Libya intervention”.
21
See also Vladimir Baranovsky & Anatoly Mateiko, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches’ [2016] 51(2)
The International Spectator 49-69 (“Baranovsky et al.), p. 50.
7
Russia as a pretext to further Western interests,22 which is why it rarely, if at all, refers to R2P
in support of its conduct. Its discourse regarding R2P is consistently focused on the potential
misuses of Pillar III, rather than acknowledging the merits of Pillars I and II. However, the
Russian State Practice corresponds to the objectives of these first two Pillars since these do not
involve coercive measures. For roughly the past decade, the Russian approach to R2P can be
characterized as reluctant and non-interventionist, prioritizing State sovereignty over human
rights.23 Russia is ‘reluctant’ to support R2P measures in the sense that it is suspicious of ‘the
West’ pursuing ‘Western’ goals through instrumentalization of R2P. ‘Non-interventionist’
refers to the principle of non-intervention (Article 2, paragraph 4, UN Charter), meaning that,
in its State Practice surrounding R2P, Russia has traditionally been opposed to any intervention
that might jeopardize the territorial integrity or political independence of States.24 However, in
the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian State Practice signals a significant departure
from its previous non-interventionist State Practice in Libya and Syria.
1.3. Research Gap, Societal and Academic Relevance & Limitations
R2P initially appeared in wake of the mass atrocity crimes committed in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.25 Following the adoption of R2P, there have been multiple
mass HR crises in which the UNSC was unable to act.26 In many of these situations, China and
Russia have opposed the Western P3 on grounds of non-intervention and prioritization of State
sovereignty. However, Ukraine provides a unique situation, because Russia is directly involved
in the hostilities on the ground. That is an unprecedented situation in R2P-related cases.
22
Idem, p. 58. See also UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4, stating that
“[t]he international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on
Libya in the NATO implementation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility
to protect”.
23
See e.g. Baranovsky et al.
24
See Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
(“UN Charter”), art. 2(4).
25
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘WHAT IS R2P?’ <https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/>
26
E.g. Syria, Myanmar and currently Ukraine.
8
Russia’s veto power prevents the UNSC from taking any appropriate action in Ukraine. In
February, UNSC Resolution 2623 was adopted, which stated that “the lack of unanimity of its
permanent members (…) has prevented [the UNSC] from exercising its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security”.27 The political deadlock and
international polarization that have resulted from the Russo-Ukrainian War warrant a closer
look at how Russia’s approach to the intricate doctrine of R2P has developed.
Moreover, this research is relevant because the Russo-Ukrainian War is a currently ongoing
armed conflict and the international community is still attempting to break up the situation.
Since the War started in February 2022, Russia has provided numerous justifications for its
invasion of Ukraine. Initially, Russia claimed to have invaded Ukraine to protect the ethnic
Russian population in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) from genocide perpetrated
by the Ukrainian government.28 Ukraine denies such allegations and has previously declared
its demands for a diplomatic resolution, which includes territorial integrity.29 However, as of
writing, Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced referendums for secession in the four
Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.30 It is therefore unlikely
that the Russo-Ukrainian War will come to an end anytime soon. The actuality of the situation
warrants insight into Russia’s reasoning behind its State Practice, as that might clarify its
(changed) views and contribute to the academic debate surrounding the resolution of the Russo-
27
UNSC Res 2623 (27 February 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2623.
28
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 12, stating that “The purpose of the
special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kyiv regime for
eight years”.
29
Charles R. Davis, ‘Zelenskyy lays out demands for Ukraine-Russia peace talks: ‘End of the war, security
guarantees, sovereignty, restoration of territorial integrity’ (Insider, 17 March 2022)
<https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-lays-out-demands-for-ukraine-russia-peace-talks-2022-
3?international=true&r=US&IR=T> accessed 28 August 2022.
30
Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 21
September 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390> accessed 21 September 2022.
9
Ukrainian War. Although previous R2P-related cases have been studied extensively in the state
of the art, the Russo-Ukrainian War has not (yet).
To demonstrate the development of Russia’s approach to R2P, the cases of Libya and Syria are
studied alongside the current Russo-Ukrainian War. Before Libya (2011), Russia’s attitude
towards R2P seemed to fluctuate, depending on the specifics of the HR crisis at hand.31 This is
briefly addressed before conducting the Libyan case study. The Libyan and Syrian case studies
are combined in a single Chapter, because Russia’s approach to both crises demonstrates a
fundamentally non-interventionist approach, whereas that approach changed significantly in
Ukraine (2022). The intervention in Libya is the main starting point for this Chapter since it is
academically agreed upon that this was the first and only time that Pillar III was ‘successfully’32
invoked.33 The case study of Syria (2011) follows since the UNSC’s failure to adequately
respond to the crisis is significantly influenced by Libya. Both of these cases have been studied
in the state of the art before, but have not been compared to Russia’s current State Practice in
Ukraine. The third and final case study examines the Russo-Ukrainian War, after which the
three cases of Libya, Syria and Ukraine are compared.
The thesis is limited to the three specific case studies for reasons mentioned above, in addition
to the limited word count of this thesis. The annexation of Crimea is closely connected to the
current Russo-Ukrainian War and Russia’s justifications of it. Therefore, Crimea (2014) is
briefly discussed before the case study of Ukraine. The cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
(‘Georgia’, 2008), while relevant to an extent, are not studied in-depth. There is a trend
noticeable in the Russian conduct throughout Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014),34 which
31
Baranovsky et al., p. 50.
32
The extent to which it was succesful as regards R2P’s mandate is a matter of debate in the academic legal field
– but it was the only time that coercive action was taken by invoking Pillar III.
33
See e.g. Zifcak, p. 64.
34
Christian Marxsen, ‘The Crimea Crisis – An International Law Perspective’ [2014] 74(2) Zeitschrift für
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Heidelberg JIL) 367-391 (“Marxsen”), p. 387. See also Lauri
10
relates to the self-determination of ethnic Russians in other States and might therefore be
relevant to the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War. However, the scope of this thesis and focus
on R2P do not justify an in-depth analysis of the cases of Georgia.
This thesis does not assess the legality of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it assess the
accuracy of Russia’s presentation of the facts on the ground.35 Neither does this thesis articulate
a particular point of view concerning the desirability of R2P measures in specific cases. Rather,
it is intended to provide a nuanced and in-depth analysis of Russia’s approach to R2P objectives
in light of the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War. The aim of this thesis is not to articulate an
opinion on Russia’s justifications for its conduct in Ukraine, yet the legal analysis of its
argumentation exposes particular limitations in its discourse, which is addressed where relevant
for understanding Russia’s position on R2P.
1.4. Research Questions and Methodology
The main research question that is addressed in this thesis is:
How has Russia’s State Practice concerning R2P changed in the Russo-Ukrainian War
(2022), compared to the Libyan and Syrian crises (2011)?
The following sub-questions are addressed to answer the main research question:
• How can Russia’s approach to R2P up until Libya (2011) be characterized?
Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (online edn., Oxford University Press 2015) (“Mälksoo”), p.
180.
35
Many States consider Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illegal, see e.g. UNGA Res ES-11/2 (24 March 2022) UN Doc
A/RES/ES-11/2. See also UNGA ‘General Assembly Adopts Text Recognizing Scale of Humanitarian Woes Arising
from Russian Federation’s Ukraine Offensive as Unseen in Many Decades’ (24 March 2011) Press Release
GA/12411. See also e.g. John B. Bellinger III, ‘How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Violates International Law’
(Council on Foreign Relations, 28 February 2022) <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-russias-invasion-ukraine-
violates-international-law> accessed 21 September 2022. There has also been a war of misinformation between
Russia and Ukraine. See e.g. Matthew Holroyd, ‘Ukraine war: Five of the most viral misinformation posts and
false claims since the conflict began’ (euronews, 24 August 2022) <https://www.euronews.com/my-
europe/2022/08/24/ukraine-war-five-of-the-most-viral-misinformation-posts-and-false-claims-since-the-
conflic> accessed 3 October 2022.
11
• What characterizes Russia’s approach to R2P in the Libyan crisis?
o What are the noteworthy differences and similarities between Russia’s
approaches to R2P in the Libyan and Syrian crises?
o How has the Libyan intervention influenced Russia’s approach to R2P?
• What characterizes the Russian approach to R2P in the Syrian crisis (2011)?
• What approach has Russia taken to R2P objectives in the Russo-Ukrainian War?
• What justifications does Russia provide concerning its conduct in the Russo-Ukrainian
War?
o How is the annexation of Crimea (2014) related to Russian conduct in the
contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War?
• How does Russia’s approach to R2P objectives in Ukraine differ from its approach to
Libya and Syria?
o To what extent does this different approach indicate a normative development?
To answer the above questions, this thesis inter alia conducts three case studies of Libya, Syria
and Ukraine, respectively. The case studies are approached with a descriptive legal research
method. This includes relevant legal and background information on the conflicts,
developments of facts on the ground, and the international community’s responses to these
crises. The latter focuses particularly on Russian State Practice through these crises. Where
relevant, official positions of other UN MS are provided to demonstrate how these divert from
the Russian position. Official statements by Putin and the Russian government are also
consulted to provide an account of Russia’s approach to the crises at hand. Press statements
and news articles related to Russian State Practice are also consulted where necessary. Finally,
academic contributions to these cases are consulted and appropriately cited. The case studies
of Libya and Syria is followed by a comparative legal analysis of Russia’s approach to the
respective crises. The case study of Ukraine is followed by analytical legal research on Russia’s
12
conduct in Ukraine and the justifications it provides for its actions. A distinct Chapter is
dedicated to comparative legal research on Libya, Syria and Ukraine. Russia’s distinct
argumentations for its conduct during these crises are compared, as well as possible reasons
behind the differences and similarities. Any legislation, treaties, judgments or precedents that
Russia refers to in its discourse are examined to further elaborate on the Russian approach.
Again, where relevant, differences in Russia’s approach to other MS are also addressed.
Academic literature on Russia’s approach to relevant cases and legal principles are consulted
and were taken into account in the formulation of my analysis.
1.5. Chapter Overview
The thesis is divided into five Chapters. First, Chapter 2 provides a brief account of Russia’s
State Practice concerning R2P before Libya. Chapter 2 then provides case studies of Libya and
Syria, respectively. These case studies examine what occurred during the Libyan and Syrian
crises, and how the international community responded. Naturally, Russia’s approach to the
crises is the main focus. The Chapter concludes with a comparative legal analysis of the cases
of Libya and Syria. Chapter 3 briefly discusses the case of Crimea to provide relevant
background information for the current Russo-Ukrainian War, after which a case study of the
Russo-Ukrainian War is done. The Chapter then analyzes Russia’s justifications for its conduct
in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Chapter 4 compares Russian State Practice in the cases of Libya,
Syria and Ukraine, and analyzes the different Russian approaches in light of R2P. The
comparison is intended to indicate the normative development that R2P has experienced from
the perspective of Russian State Practice through the past decade. Ultimately, a conclusion is
provided in Chapter 5, which highlights the Russian tendency to re-formulate R2P arguments
in support of its actions. I conclude that Russian State Practice in Ukraine signals a departure
from its previously strict non-interventionist approach to R2P.
13
2. Case Studies of Libya and Syria
2.1. The Russian Approach to R2P up until Libya
The Russian approach to R2P has fluctuated throughout the years, meaning it is difficult to
pinpoint a certain State Practice before the Libyan crisis came along in 2011.36 Its attitude
towards intervention (Pillar III), however, can best be characterized as non-interventionist.
Even before R2P was adopted at the 2005 World Summit, Russia’s response to the very first
concept of the doctrine was reluctant:
Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force (…) is unlawful and poses a
threat to (…) the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce (…)
concepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” in order to justify
unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable.37
However, Russia’s approach to the 2001 ICISS report was ultimately positive. The main
Russian argument was that any action based on R2P should require approval of the UNSC –
above all and at all times.38 That would not mean Russia’s full acceptance of the norm. During
debates at the 2005 World Summit and afterwards, Russia would interpret R2P in a restrictive
manner, often stating something along the lines of:
We would once again like to emphasize that, under [R2P], the primary responsibility
lies with national Governments, whose efforts must be supported by the international
community without undermining State sovereignty.39
36
See also Baranovsky et al., p. 50.
37
‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (as archived by the Federation of American Scientists,
28 June 2000) <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm> accessed 3 October 2022.
38
39
UN SCOR, 61st sess, 5577th mtg, (4 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 (Resumption 1).
14
In the case of Darfur (2006), Russia surprisingly supported Resolution 1674, which was very
akin to what would later become Pillar I of R2P.40 Russia’s approach remained cautious when
the UNGA adopted the Three Pillars of R2P, stating that it warned “against taking rash and
hasty steps to apply [R2P] arbitrarily to specific countries and against interpreting it too
broadly”.41 Although Russia did not veto intervention in Libya, the case study shows that the
cautious approach of Russia’s initial State Practice concerning R2P persisted in Libya. This
thesis agrees with Baranovsky et al. in that sense, who state that “R2P-favourable” factors at
the time of Libya might have led to the historic cooperation on Russia’s part, but caution that
“it should not be viewed as a linear trend”.42
2.2. Case Study of the Libyan Crisis
In light of the Arab Spring, Libya was one of the Arab States that experienced rebel uprisings
in 2011, followed by violent clashes between rebel and government forces.43 A UNSC Press
Statement first called on the Libyan Government “to protect its population” after Libyan leader
Muammar al-Qadhafi violently shut down anti-government protests.44 Subsequently, the
UNGA and UNHRC repeatedly called upon Libya to live up to its Responsibility to Protect.45
UNSC action followed after the UNHRC had advised the UNGA to remove Libya from the
UNHRC for its grave HR abuses.46
The UNSC expressed grave concern regarding the Libyan situation and imposed coercive
measures through Resolution 1970, which included arms embargoes, travel bans and freezing
40
UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674, p. 3, para. 4.
41
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Statement by Russia at the 2009 UN General Assembly Debate
on R2P’ (23 July 2009) <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/statement-by-russia-at-the-2009-un-general-
assembly-debate-on-r2p/> accessed 1 August 2022.
42
43
BBC News, ‘Libya profile – Timeline’ (15 March 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445>
44
UNSC ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’ (22 February 2011) Press Release SC/10180-AFR/2120.
45
UNGA Res S-15/1 (25 February 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-15/1.
46
Idem, para. 14.
15
of assets.47 Resolution 1970 was supported by Russia. Combined with suspension from the
Arab League,48 these developments signalled a wide international movement against the
situation in Libya. Russia condemned the Libyan “use of military force against peaceful
demonstrators”49 and implored Libya to comply with the international community’s demands
“in order to (…) preserve Libya as a united, sovereign State with territorial integrity”.50 Russia
described Resolution 1970 as “targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures”.51 Moreover,
it expressed reservations regarding any coercive action in Libya, stating that Resolution 1970
“does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which
could make the situation worse”.52 This indicates Russia’s preference for non-interventionist
measures.
The unchanging situation and potential crimes against humanity committed by the Libyan
government53 eventually led to the UNSC invoking R2P and drafting the groundbreaking
Resolution 1973,54 which marked the very first time that the UNSC authorized military
intervention in a sovereign State without that State’s consent. In addition to reinforcing
Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 provided authorization for MS “acting nationally or through
regional organizations” to take “all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians”, with the
exception of “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.55 Russia
did not oppose Resolution 1973. Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia expressed
reservations, but abstained from voting.56 Led by “common humanitarian values that we share”,
47
UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, pp. 3-5.
48
Natasha Mozgovaya, Shlomo Shamir and News Agencies, ‘Arab League Suspends Libya as Deadly Crackdown
Persists’ (Haaretz, 23 February 2011) <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5126567> accessed 1 August 2022.
49
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6491st mtg (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491, p. 4.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, p. 1.
54
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973.
55
Idem, para. 4.
56
UNSC 'Security Council Approves "No-Fly Zone" over Libya, Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect
Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions' (17 March 2011) Press Release SC/10200.
16
Russia purposefully “did not prevent the adoption of this resolution”.57 Russia’s consensus with
the Western P3 augured well at the time. However, Russia’s abstention did not entail a
fundamentally different approach to State sovereignty and intervention. This is reflected in
Russia’s response to the resolution. It deemed the newly adopted coercive measures “most
unfortunate and regrettable”.58 By stating that the “inevitable humanitarian consequences of
the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall fair and square on the shoulders of those
who might undertake such action”, Russia distanced itself from the West taking initiative in
the implementation of R2P measures.59 It then continued to address further unanswered
questions concerning the imposed measures, e.g. “what limits on the use of force there would
be”.60
Following Resolution 1973, a multi-State coalition was formed under NATO, which started
carrying out airstrikes on Libyan Government structures. Additionally, a no-fly zone and arms
embargo were enforced.61 During the first few months, Libyan rebel forces on the ground
criticized NATO’s efforts for being ineffective in defeating Libyan forces.62 As time went on,
NATO’s military strategy intensified. Slowly but surely, it developed towards the elimination
of Libya’s key leaders,63 despite US President Barack Obama’s earlier assurance that the use
of force would not extend beyond the protection of civilians.64 NATO’s neutrality and
exclusive protection of civilians developed into military support for the Libyan rebels and its
57
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6498th mtg (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, p. 8.
58
Ibid., referring to the authorization of military intervention, considering that Russia had previously voted in
favour of Resolution 1970, which already saw previous coercive measures (e.g. no-fly zone, arms embargo, asset
freeze). See also fn. 58.
59
UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6498th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6498 (17 March 2011), p. 8.
60
Ibid.
61
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO and Libya (Archived)’ (9 November 2015)
<https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm> accessed 14 September 2022.
62
Zifcak, p. 65.
63
See e.g. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, ‘As Goal Shifts in Libya, Time Constrains NATO’ The New York Times,
26 May 2011) <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/africa/27policy.html> accessed 3 October 2022.
64
The White House, ‘Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya’ (18 March 2011)
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya>
17
aim became regime change.65 Resolution 1973’s mandate was ultimately stretched to the
extreme as a result.66
The conflict was brought to an end due to the efforts of Libyan resistance fighters and NATO,
although fighting continued for some time. Resolution 2009 was adopted in the aftermath,
which established a support mission to Libya and was aimed at recovery and reconciliation in
every field affected by the Libyan conflict.67 Whether the Libyan R2P intervention was
ultimately a success is up to debate. It ended in military victory and successfully prevented
further mass atrocity crimes committed by the Qadhafi regime, but launched Libya into a
troublesome aftermath.68
Before the intervention, Russia’s abstention had looked promising for the future of R2P.
However, criticism of NATO’s intervention by the opposing UNSC MS was severe. Brazil,
China, India and Russia claimed abuse of Resolution 1973’s mandate and condemned both the
active aid of the Libyan rebels in the conflict as well as the aim of regime change.69 Russia
specifically accused NATO coalition forces of causing civilian casualties during the bombing
of Tripoli,70 which included the deaths of Qadhafi’s youngest son and three grandchildren.71
Russia referred to “disproportionate use of force”, calling “any act going beyond the mandate
[of Resolution 1973] (…) unacceptable”.72 China addressed the goal of regime change as well,
stating that Libya’s sovereignty and independence must be respected, as well as its “internal
65
See e.g. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, ‘As Goal Shifts in Libya, Time Constrains NATO’ The New York Times
(26 May 2011) <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/africa/27policy.html> accessed 3 October 2022.
66
See also Zifcak, p. 70.
67
UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2009.
68
See UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (22 November
2011) UN Doc S/2011/727.
69
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, pp. 7 (India), 8 (Russia) and 9-10 (Russia,
China).
70
Idem, p. 9.
71
Barry Neild, Xan Rice and agencies, ‘Gadaffi’s son killed in Nato air strike, say Libyan officials’ The Guardian (1
May 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/01/libya-muammar-gaddafi-son-nato1> accessed
3 October 2022.
72
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg, (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, p. 9.
18
affairs (…) be left up to the Libyan people to decide”.73 Such scrutiny was later supported by
South Africa – which voted in favour of Resolution 1973 – as it voiced its criticism on “the
targeting of individuals”, referring to NATO’s military targeting of Libyan leader Qadhafi
himself alongside other Libyan governmental figures.74 Altogether, the BRICS States’ scrutiny
voiced discontent about NATO’s pursuit of regime change. After all, the use of force against
another State with the aim of regime change interferes with that State’s political independence,
which is an integral part of its State sovereignty.75 The stretching of Resolution 1973’s mandate
by NATO76 arguably exceeded the authorization that was given, therefore confirming Russia’s
earlier suspicions that R2P would be used to achieve Western goals. This ‘mission slip’ would
prove to be a substantial obstacle for the UNSC in its response to the Syrian crisis.
2.3. Case Study of the Syrian Crisis
The HR crisis in Syria (2011) occurred around the same time as Libya but stood in stark
contrast when looking at the international response. Whereas Libya marked a (controversial)
milestone for intervention by the international community, the Syrian crisis is characterized by
political deadlocks in the UNSC. The cautious Russian approach to R2P in the Libyan crisis
transformed into a strict non-interventionist and State-centric approach to R2P in the Syrian
crisis, partly as a result of NATO’s ‘mission slip’.
While Syrian civilian protests had occurred earlier, the Syrian situation escalated in March
2011. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad allowed armed forces to violently retaliate against
protests spread throughout the country, claiming that they were part of an imperialist
conspiracy.77 Protests continued throughout April and the military response became
73
Idem, p. 10.
74
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6566th mtg (27 June 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6566, p. 4.
75
See UN Charter, art. 2(4).
76
Sidenote is that not all NATO Member States supported UNSC Resolution 1973, e.g. Germany, which
abstained.
77
UNGA, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ UN GAOR
17th spec sess (23 November 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, para. 30.
19
increasingly violent, which was addressed in the UNSC meeting on 27 April 2011.78 The
OHCHR had reported mass arrests and torture of civilians, in addition to the use of gunfire
against civilians.79 Although all UNSC MS expressed concern about the situation, their
assessments differed significantly. Overall reluctance to intervene was apparent from the
beginning. France strongly condemned the Syrian government, whereas the US and the UK
proposed targeted sanctions.80 Russia disagreed and claimed that the Syrian crisis was purely
a domestic one – it posed no threat to international peace and security.81 Russia also asserted
that external intervention would only cause regional instability in the Middle East.82 Moreover,
the violence in Syria originated from two parties to the conflict and not only from the Syrian
government, which is why Russia desired the UNSC refrained from taking sides.83 The
UNHRC subsequently adopted Resolution S-16/1, which strongly condemned Syrian
government violence against protesters and demanded the Syrian government to cease any HR
abuses.84 The resolution passed, but not without opposition: Russia and China, among others,
voted against and some abstained.85
Following the rising death toll in May, a draft resolution was proposed by Western European
States (‘European draft resolution’), which demanded the Syrian government cease all violence
against its population and protect them instead.86 Since refugees had started to flee to Turkey
and Israel,87 Russia’s argument of a purely internal Syrian crisis no longer held up.
78
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6524th mtg (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524.
79
Idem, pp.2-3.
80
Idem, pp.5 (US), 6 (France and UK).
81
Idem, p.7.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) Res S-16/1, UN GAOR, 16th spec sess (4 May 2011, adopted 29 April
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, paras. 1-2.
85
Idem, p. 3.
86
France 24, ‘European countries hand UN draft of Syria resolution’ (9 June 2011)
<https://www.france24.com/en/20110608-britain-france-syria-un-resolution-crackdown-protesters-killed-
cameron> accessed 3 October 2022.
87
Sybella Wilkes, ‘UNCHR Works with Lebanon to Help Thousands Fleeing Syria Violence’ (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 20 May 2011) <http://www.unchr.org/4dd66d3e6.html> accessed 4 August 2022.
20
Negotiations on the draft resolution carried on in the following months and the violence and
killings intensified.88 In July, a statement was issued by the UNSG’s Special Advisers on the
Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, which considered that the scale of
the HR violations in Syria indicated that crimes against humanity had been committed.89 In
August, a statement by the UNSC President (Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri, India) was issued on
behalf of the UNSC,90 which indicated how torn its MS were about the way to go about the
Syrian situation. The Presidential Statement condemned the HR violations committed by the
Syrian government, yet reaffirmed the UNSC’s “strong commitment to the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Syria” and stressed that a “Syrian-led process” was
“the only solution to the current crisis”.91
The European draft resolution was presented in October, which inter alia strongly condemned
the continued HR violations and demanded the Syrian government to cease these violations.92
In accordance with the UNSC Presidential Statement in July, it called for an “inclusive Syrian-
led political process”.93 Most importantly, the draft seemed to imply that sanctions would be
considered if Syria continued to refuse cooperation, by referring to Article 41 UN Charter.94
The main topic of debate that saw the draft amended many times was whether or not to impose
88
See UNGA, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ UN
GAOR 17th spec sess (23 November 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, para. 80.
89
ReliefWeb, ‘Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis
Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the situation in Syria’ (22 July 2011)
<https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/special-advisers-united-nations-secretary-general-
prevention-genocide-0> accessed 3 October 2022.
90
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6598th mtg (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598. See also UNSC, ‘Statement by the President
of the Security Council’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
91
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6598th mtg (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598, p. 2. See also UNSC, ‘Statement by the
President of the Security Council’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
92
UNSC, ‘France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution’
(4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612, paras. 1, 4(a).
93
Idem, para. 5.
94
Idem, para. 11. The draft refers to UN Charter, art. 41, which includes “measures not involving the use of
armed force” and “interruption of economic relations and of (…) means of communication, and the severance
of diplomatic relations”.
21
sanctions on Syria.95 Ultimately, no sanctions were imposed, but the possibility of future
sanctions was kept open. This prospect of sanctions prompted China and Russia to veto the
draft resolution.96 Russia referred to both the Presidential Statement of August97 and a draft
resolution that it had written in cooperation with China and the other BRICS States (Brazil,
India and South Africa).98 According to Russia, the BRICS draft prioritized non-intervention
and Syria’s national and territorial sovereignty,99 whereas the European draft resolution was
“based on (…) the philosophy of confrontation”.100 The European draft, in its view, also failed
to allocate accountability to the Syrian opposition, which only added to the possibility of
escalation.101 Notably, Russia claimed that “the situation in Syria cannot be considered (…)
separately from the Libyan experience”.102
The international community is alarmed (…) that compliance with [UNSC] resolutions
on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in
implementing the responsibility to protect.103
Russia then continued to describe how the situation in Libya had grown considerably worse
due to the morphing of measures imposed by Resolution 1973 (no-fly zone and arms
embargo).104 Despite previously supporting Resolution 1970 – which imposed similar
measures on Libya105 – Russia claimed that “these types of models should be excluded from
95
UNSC ‘Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government
Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China’ (4 October 2011) Press Release SC/10403.
96
Ibid.
97
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6598th mtg, (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598. See also UNSC, Statement by the President
of the Security Council’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
98
This draft resolution is unavailable online, so cannot be directly consulted.
99
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 3.
100
Ibid.
101
Idem, p. 4.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid., referring to the no fly-zone and arms embargo.
105
Resolution 1970 inter alia imposed an arms embargo on Libya. See UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN
Doc S/RES/1970, p. 3.
22
global practices once and for all”.106 Once again, the importance of an “inclusive intra-Syrian
political process” was stressed.107 Finally, Russia declared its intention to work with the Syrian
government on a peaceful solution108 and refused to “get involved with legitimizing previously
adopted unilateral sanctions or attempts at violent regime change”.109
The opposition of the European draft resolution experienced pressure in November when the
Arab League suspended Syria and imposed sanctions.110 Moreover, the independent
Commission of Inquiry established by the UNHRC in August111 reported that the Assad regime
had committed crimes against humanity.112 The UNHRC responded with Resolution S-18/1,113
urging all main bodies of the UN to take appropriate action in response to the crisis.114 This did
not prevent China and Russia, among others, from opposing.115 The deadlock persisted
throughout the following months. January 2012 saw a controversial draft resolution submitted
to the UNSC by the Arab League.116 The draft – in short – demanded the cessation of all
violence and for Assad to step down and initiate a democratic transition of power through
“peaceful political settlement”.117 Russia rejected the idea of an external demand for Assad’s
abdication:118
106
UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Idem, p. 5.
110
David Batty and Jack Shenker, ‘Syria suspended from the Arab League’ The Guardian (Cairo, 12 November
2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league> accessed 3 October
2022.
111
UNGA, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its seventeenth special session’ UN GAOR 17th spec sess (18
October 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2, p. 4.
112
UNGA, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ UN GAOR
17th spec sess (23 November 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, para. 100.
113
UNHRC Res S-18/1, UN GAOR, 18th spec sess (2 December 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-18/1.
114
Idem, para. 8.
115
Idem, p. 4. China, Cuba, Ecuador and Russia abstained.
116
UN SCOR, 67th sess, 6710th mtg (31 January 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6710, pp. 6-9. See also The Guardian, ‘UN
Draft Resolution on Syria’ (31 January 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/31/un-security-
council-draft-resolution-syria> accessed 3 October 2022.
117
UN SCOR, 67th sess, 6710th mtg (31 January 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6710, p. 7.
118
Idem, p. 8, proposing the “formation of a national unity Government”.
23
The [UNSC] cannot impose parameters for an internal political settlement. (…) The
sides must be encouraged to engage in dialogue rather than be intimidated into doing
so.119
Shortly after, Morocco was supported by 18 MS in the submission of a draft resolution that
incorporated elements from the Arab League draft.120 In accordance with Chinese and Russian
demands, the external demand of a Syrian transition of power was removed from the new draft
and replaced with the familiar “inclusive Syrian-led political process”.121 More importantly, it
assured that no coercive measures122 were to be taken against Syria, instead “[r]eaffirming its
strong commitment to the sovereignty (…) and territorial integrity of Syria”.123 What remained
was a resolution that condemned the killings,124 demanded the Syrian government to withdraw
its military and to comply with Arab League requests.125 The night before the voting procedure,
the Syrian government responded to rebel attacks by shelling the city of Homs, resulting in
over 200 civilian casualties.126 The death toll had passed 5,000 since the fighting started in
March.127 That did not prevent Russia and China from exercising their vetoes. Russia asserted
that other MS had pursued a political agenda of regime change and supported the Syrian
opposition, effectively sabotaging the possibility of a political process in Syria and prolonging
119
Idem, p. 24.
120
UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and United States of America: draft resolution’ (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77.
121
Idem, para. 6.
122
UN Charter, art. 42.
123
UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and United States of America: draft resolution’ (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77, p. 1 (Preamble).
124
Idem, para. 3.
125
Idem, paras. 5(c) and (e).
126
CNN, ‘U.N. Security Council to meet on Syria as deaths mount’ (3 February 2012)
<https://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html> accessed 3 October 2022. See
also Al Jazeera, ‘Hundreds of casualties’ in Syria’s Homs’ (4 February 2012)
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/2/4/hundreds-of-casualties-in-syrias-homs> accessed 3 October
2022.
127
See fn. 126. CNN reports that “at least 7,100 people (…) have died” according to Local Coordination
Committees, but the UN estimated in December 2011 that more than 5,000 people had died since March. See
also Zifcak, p. 83, reporting that “the total number of Syrian people killed climbed past 6000”.
24
the violence.128 In Russia’s eyes, the resolution failed chiefly in “adequately reflect[ing] the
true state of affairs in Syria”.129 Several MS expressed indignation and condemned the
vetoes.130 India, a BRICS country and usual ally of Russia and China’s, shared the Russian
view that all parties to the violence should be condemned, yet supported the draft resolution
because the Arab League initiative preached “a peaceful resolution through a Syrian-led
political process” and because the draft ruled out the use of any coercive measures under Article
42 Charter.131 In any case, that proved to be insufficient of a guarantee for Russia.
No UNSC agreement on the Syrian crisis would come around anytime soon, let alone an R2P
resolution. As of writing, Russia has vetoed sixteen resolutions related to the Syrian crisis,132
demonstrating its non-interventionist approach to R2P. The resolutions that have been adopted
mostly include humanitarian aid and ceasefires, but fail to directly alleviate the humanitarian
crisis.133 So far, over half a million Syrians have died134 and millions have been displaced.135
The Assad regime has been winning ground for the past few years, but Muslim extremist
groups are still fighting in certain regions.136 Even if the Syrian civil war were to be brought to
an end, Assad would be faced with the tremendous task of rebuilding Syria, which would come
128
UN SCOR, 67th sess, 6711th mtg (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, p. 9.
129
Ibid.
130
Idem, pp. 3 (France), 4 (Germany), 5 (United States), 6 (Portugal) and 7 (United Kingdom).
131
Idem, p. 8.
132
See UNSC draft resolutions with UN Doc nos. S/2011/612 (4 October 2011); S/2012/77 (4 February 2012);
S/2012/538 (19 July 2012); S/2014/348 (22 May 2014); S/2016/846 (8 October 2016); S/2016/1026 (5 December
2016); S/2017/172 (28 February 2017); S/2017/315 (12 April 2017); S/2017/884 (24 October 2017); S/2017/962
(16 November 2017); S/2017/970 (17 November 2017); S/2018/321 (10 April 2018); S/2019/756 (19 September
2019); S/2019/961 (20 December 2019); S/2020/654 (7 July 2020); S/2020/667 (10 July 2020).
133
Russo, p.217.
134
See The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Syria: 560,000 killed in seven yrs of war, SOHR’ (12 December
2018) <https://www.syriahr.com/en/108829> accessed 3 October 2022. As of December 2018, more than
560,000 have been killed, as estimated by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
135
See UNHCR, ‘Syria emergency’ (15 March 2021) <https://unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> accessed 3
October 2022. As of March 2021, 6.7 million have been internally displaced and 6.6 million have become
refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
136
World Politics Review, ‘The Syrian Civil War’s Never-Ending Endgame’ (20 July 2022)
<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/the-syria-civil-war-might-be-ending-but-the-crisis-will-live-on/>
25
with domestic crises of its own.137 Thus, the Syrian case confirmed the many uncertainties still
surrounding R2P as an international norm and a strict non-interventionist approach on behalf
of Russia.
2.4. Comparative Legal Analysis of Libya and Syria
In both cases, Russia’s approach to R2P is State-centric and based on non-intervention,
although significantly stricter in the case of Syria. Although Russia abstained from voting in
the case of Resolution 1973, rather than opposing, it voices its discontent with the military
measures adopted in this resolution.138 By abstaining, it distanced itself from the “inevitable
humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya”.139 Its preference
lies with Resolution 1970 instead, which was adopted earlier and imposed a similar arms
embargo and freeze of assets140 but did not involve military force. Russia described the
measures adopted in Resolution 1970 as “targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures”.141
Russia also seemed to foresee issues regarding the ‘mission slip’ of Resolution 1973, as it
proposed questions such as “what limits on the use of force there would be” at the time of
adoption.142
This discourse shows a strong Russian preference for Pillars I and II of R2P, although Russia
never refers to these Pillars of R2P explicitly.143 Pillar I entails the responsibility of States to
protect their populations against mass atrocity crimes.144 Libya failed to do so, which Russia
137
Ibid.
138
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6498th mtg (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498, p. 8, referring to the authorization of
military intervention. This is corroborated by the fact that Russia had previously voted in favour of Resolution
1970, which involved other coercive measures (e.g. no-fly zone, arms embargo, asset freeze). See also fn. 47.
139
140
UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, pp. 3-5.
141
142
143
See also Baranovsky et al., p. 51, stating that “Russia’s discourse is skewed towards the third pillar (and use
of force in particular)”.
144
26
condemned Libya for.145 Pillar II holds the international community responsible to aid States
in such efforts, through diplomacy and non-military measures,146 which is exactly what
Resolution 1970 entails. Pillar III,147 as invoked in Resolution 1973,148 is where Russia draws
the line. Russia explicitly expresses its disapproval of coercive measures when stating that
Resolution 1970 “does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s
affairs, which could make the situation worse”.149 This holds up to the general Russian State
Practice before Libya.150
Why, then, did Russia abstain and not oppose Resolution 1973? Russia itself claims that it
purposefully “did not prevent the adoption of [Resolution 1973]”151 because it considers itself
a “firm [advocate] of the protection of the civilian population” 152 and was “[g]uided by (…)
the common humanitarian values that [the UNSC shares]”.153 Moreover, an important aspect
was undoubtedly the decision to not authorize “a foreign occupation force (…) on any part of
Libyan territory”,154 so as to respect Libya’s territorial integrity. Apparently, these conditions
did not quench Russian reservations concerning Resolution 1973 entirely, but sufficiently for
it to abstain rather than oppose. The ‘mission slip’ by NATO that followed155 is one of the main
reasons why Russia’s approach to R2P became increasingly reluctant after the Libyan
intervention. Along with the other BRICS States, Russia criticized NATO for stretching the
145
146
147
Ibid., meaning military force through the UN Charter’s Chapter VII “should peaceful means be inadequate”.
148
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, p. 2 (“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations”) and para. 4.
149
150
See e.g. UN SCOR, 61st sess, 5577th mtg (4 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 (Resumption 1). See also ‘The
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (as archived by the Federation of American Scientists, 28 June
2000) <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm> accessed 3 October 2022, stating that
“Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force (…) is unlawful and poses a threat to (…) the entire
system of international relations”.
151
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.
154
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, para. 4.
155
See e.g. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, ‘As Goal Shifts in Libya, Time Constrains NATO’ The New York Times
(26 May 2011) <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/africa/27policy.html> accessed 3 October 2022.
27
mandate of Resolution 1973 to the goal of regime change.156 According to Russia’s
interpretation of Resolution 1973, UNSC authorization for military intervention had only been
granted to a limited extent. Regardless, NATO had illegally stretched the resolution’s mandate
to the extent of aiding the rebels and pursuing regime change in Libya. One of Russia’s main
premises had consistently been that UNSC authorization is a strict requirement for military
intervention.157 It reaffirmed this belief in response to the Libyan ‘mission slip’:
“Any act going beyond the mandate established by [Resolution 1973] in any way or
any disproportionate use of force is unacceptable”.158
Russia would later in the Syrian crisis explicitly state that the Libyan and Syrian cases could
not be seen as separate, indicating the effect that the ‘mission slip’ had on its State Practice. In
fact, Russia explicitly expressed concern regarding “resolutions on Libya in the NATO
interpretation” becoming the model for future R2P measures.159 As such, Russia opposed all
Pillar III-related measures in the Syrian crisis.
In contrast to Pillar III, Russian support for Pillar I and Pillar II measures can be discerned.
Russia expressed support for the UNSC Presidential Statement, which condemned the HR
violations by the Syrian government (Pillar I).160 It must be noted, however, that Russia vetoed
multiple resolutions that condemned the Syrian government’s actions,161 with an important
reason being the acknowledgement of the role of the Syrian rebels in the conflict.162 Russia
156
See e.g. UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, pp. 7-10 (India, Brazil, Russia and
China, respectively). See also UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6566th mtg (27 June 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6566, p. 4 (South
Africa). See also Zifcak, p. 69.
157
See fn. 37.
158
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, p. 9.
159
160
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6598th mtg (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598. See also UNSC, ‘Statement by the
President of the Security Council’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
161
See e.g. UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther
Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution’ (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77.
162
28
also repeatedly suggested diplomatic dialogue and a “Syrian-led” political process as a means
of improving the Syrian situation (Pillar II).163
The role of Syrian non-government forces was also significant to Russia’s approach. This, too,
can be connected to the Libyan mission slip. Russia holds that NATO essentially aided the
Libyan opposition in its fight against the Qadhafi regime.164 This supposedly resulted in
civilian casualties.165 In addition to these casualties, the Libyan intervention arguably left Libya
in a poorer post-war state.166 Considering how Russia repeatedly stressed that Western MS
failed to take into account the role of the Syrian opposition forces, 167 an important motive of
Russia’s blocking of Syrian intervention might have been to prevent another military
intervention that supported rebel forces and further endangered the civilian population.
Whether the Syrian (or Libyan) people were better off without intervention is a matter of
speculation. However, Russia held that intervention would lead to escalation,168 as it did in the
case of Libya.169 Baranovsky et al. address this aspect of Russia’s approach to R2P in Libya
and Syria:
“[Russia] suggests that a brutal and repressive regime can sometimes be a better
option than intervention, which makes the whole country ungovernable and prompts
various groups to take up the political and military struggle.”170
163
See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6524th mtg (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524, p. 7. See also UN SCOR, 66th sess,
6598th mtg (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6598, referring to the UNSC Presidential Statement. See also UNSC,
‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
164
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, pp. 7-10.
165
Idem, p. 9, referring to the bombing of Tripoli.
166
See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4. See also UNSC, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (22 November 2011) UN Doc S/2011/727.
167
See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4; UNSCOR, 67th sess, 6711th
mtg (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, p. 9.
168
169
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6491st mtg (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491, p. 4, stating that “forceful interference
in Libya’s affairs (…) could make the situation worse”.
170
29
Apart from the mission slip, other factors need to be taken into account regarding the different
approaches between Libya and Syria. For instance, Assad made false promises of political
reform to keep up a façade of hope for the international community that the situation would
improve.171 This element would also return multiple times in Russia’s arguments during UNSC
meetings.172 On the other hand, Qadhafi left no such doubts as to what his intentions were.173
Russia has played the main part in opposing intervention in Syria, undoubtedly because it has
close military and economic ties with the Assad regime.174 Such considerations, however, are
of a political nature and will therefore not be discussed in-depth.
It is safe to say that the red thread in the Russian approach to R2P in both Libya and Syria
relates to the principle of non-intervention.175 Russia has addressed how an R2P intervention
in Syria would violate State sovereignty as it did in the case of Libya,176 and therefore refused
to allow coercive measures. Russian State Practice in Libya and Syria can be characterized as
renouncing Pillar III with its non-interventionist and State-centric approach, prioritizing State
sovereignty above all else. On the other hand, Russian State Practice implicitly supports Pillar
I and Pillar II measures throughout Libya and Syria. ‘Implicitly’, because Russia does not
explicitly refer to R2P’s Pillar I and Pillar II in its narrative during these crises. Instead, at the
time, it was prone to reject any R2P-related arguments when brought up by other (mostly
171
Zifcak, p. 85.
172
See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4.
173
See e.g. BBC News, ‘Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit’ (22 February 2011)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12544624> accessed 16 September 2022, citing Qadhafi as
calling those demonstrating against his rule “cockroaches” and urging his supporters to attack them.
174
See Zifcak, pp. 90-91. See also Ellen Barry, ‘As Nations Line Up against Syrian Government, Russia Sides Firmly
with Assad’ The New York Times (27 January 2012)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/europe/russia-sides-firmly-with-assad-government-in-
syria.html> accessed 3 October 2022.
175
See UN Charter, Art. 2(4).
176
Compare UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, p. 9, on disproportionate use of
force, with UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4, on concern for the NATO
interpretation of Libya resolutions for future R2P implementations. See also Zifcak, p. 86.
30
Western) MS,177 likely due to suspicion that R2P might be employed by Western MS to serve
hidden agendas.178
177
See e.g. UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4, on concern for the NATO
interpretation of Libya resolutions for future R2P implementations.
178
See also Baranovsky et al., pp. 49 (Abstract), 55.
31
3. Case Study of the Russo-Ukrainian War
3.1. The Annexation of Crimea in relation to the Contemporary Conflict in
Ukraine
In order to understand the Russo-Ukrainian War, one must first understand what happened in
Crimea (2014). At the time, Ukraine was already torn between the EU and Russia. On the one
hand, Ukraine is a possible candidate for EU membership. On the other hand, Ukraine is a
former USSR State, meaning that it holds semi-Russian cultural and historic value. While the
western part of Ukraine (including Kyiv) leaned more towards Europe, eastern parts of Ukraine
held more Russian influence – both in language and ethnic population.
In November 2013, then-President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement and instead pursued closer (economic) ties with Russia, which led to
the Euromaidan protests.179 The protests eventually resulted in the removal of Yanukovych
from office in February 2014. A pro-European Ukrainian government was then installed, yet
such sentiments were not shared by ethnic Russian and pro-Russian inhabitants of Crimea.
Shortly after the protests, pro-Russian military troops took control of Crimea’s infrastructure
and government.180 In the weeks that followed, Russian troops were reinforced in the Crimean
peninsula.181 Under those circumstances, an illegal referendum was held among the Crimean
population concerning Crimean independence.182
179
Open Society Foundations, ‘Understanding Ukraine’s Euromaidan Protests’ (May 2019)
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-ukraines-euromaidan-protests>
accessed 25 August 2022.
180
See Marxsen, p. 369. It is disputed whether the pro-Russian militia – already present at the time at the time
of President Yanukovych’s removal from office – were actually Russian soldiers. See also Ron Synovitz, ‘Russian
Forces In Crimea: Who Are They And Where Did They Come From?’ (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 March
2014) <https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-forces-in-crimea--who-are-they-and-where-did-they-come-
from/25285238.html> accessed 14 September 2022.
181
Ibid.
182
See Marxsen, p. 382, concluding that the referendum violated Ukrainian law and “did not comply with
international standards”. See also John B. Bellinger III (interviewed by J. Masters), ‘Why the Crimean Referendum
32
Not only was Crimea legally incapable of altering Ukrainian through a referendum that was
limited to the Crimean population,183 but the presence of Russian military troops in Crimea
further jeopardized the referendum’s freedom.184 One day after the referendum resulted in a
large majority of the population voting in favour of Crimea’s independence, the regional
parliament of Crimea declared its independence.185 On the same day, Russia recognized Crimea
as an independent State,186 after which the Crimean parliament requested for Crimea to accede
to Russia.187 Crimea was formally admitted to Russia within a matter of days of the
referendum.188 The secession of Crimea from Ukraine is broadly seen as illegal.189 It is thought
that Russian troops played an integral part in enforcing the independence of Crimea, by forcing
the Ukrainian military out of Crimea under threat of force.190 Russia’s conduct is therefore
widely considered to have infringed upon Ukrainian sovereignty.191 Russia’s justifications for
Crimea relate to the larger Russo-Ukrainian War (2022) since Russia provides similar
is Illegitimate’ (Council on Foreign Relations¸ 16 March 2014) <https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-

referendum-illegitimate> accessed 14 September 2022.
183
Marxsen, pp. 380-381. See also John B. Bellinger III (interviewed by J. Masters), ‘Why the Crimean
Referendum is Illegitimate’ (Council on Foreign Relations¸ 16 March 2014) <https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-
crimean-referendum-illegitimate> accessed 14 September 2022.
184
Marxsen, p. 381. See Marxsen for other reasons why the referendum was illegal under Ukrainian law and did
not comply with modalities of international law.
185
See BBC News, ‘Crimean parliament formally applies to join Russia’ (17 March 2014)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26609667> accessed 14 September 2022. See also Marxsen, pp.
367 (Abstract), 383.
186
Vladimir Putin, ‘Executive Order on recognizing Republic of Crimea’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 17
March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20596> accessed 3 October 2022. See also BBC
News, ‘Russia’s Vladimir Putin recognizes Crimea as a nation’ (17 March 2014)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26621726> accessed 14 September 2022.
187
See BBC News, ‘Crimean parliament formally applies to join Russia’ (17 March 2014)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26609667> accessed 14 September 2022. See also Marxsen, p. 367
(Abstract).
188
The Kremlin, ‘Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation signed’
(Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, Moscow, 18 March 2014)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20604> accessed 14 September 2022.
189
See UNGA Res 68/262 (27 March 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/262. See also Marxsen, pp. 380-381, 391.
190
See e.g. BBC News, ‘Russian troops storm Ukrainian bases in Crimea’ (22 March 2014)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26698754> accessed 14 September 2022. See also Marxsen, p.
369.
191
See e.g. Marxsen, p. 389.
33
arguments in both cases.192 These similarities will further be addressed in the remainder of this
Chapter.
3.2. The Russo-Ukrainian War
The Russo-Ukrainian War (2022) was preceded by months of heightened tensions and an
increasing Russian military presence across Ukraine’s border.193 Before the invasion, Putin
repeatedly asserted that Russia and Ukraine are one due to their shared history and culture,194
despite the resistance of many Ukrainians.195 Putin also claims Ukraine has committed
genocide against ethnic Russians in the Donbas.196 which remains unsupported by evidence.197
The Donbas, an eastern region of Ukraine, has seen conflict between the Ukrainian government
and pro-Russian separatists since Crimea (2014).198 According to the OHCHR, the conflict in
the Donbas region alone has caused 14,000 deaths so far.199
192
See e.g. Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by President of Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office,
18 March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603> accessed 15 September 2022. See
also Milena Ingelevič-Citak, ‘Crimean conflict – from the perspectives of Russia, Ukraine, and public international
law’ [2015] 15(2) Intl Comp L Rev 23-45 (“Ingelevič-Citak”), p. 35. See also Marxsen, pp. 368, 372. Intervention
upon invitation is a distinct argument provided by Russia at the time of Crimea. While it has also been mentioned
by Russia in the case of the Donbas, it is not a major Russian argument with respect to Ukraine (2022) and does
substantially inform the analysis of Russia’s approach to R2P.
193
Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Vote on Draft Resolution*’ (25 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-vote-on-draft-resolution.php>
194
See e.g. Vladimir Putin, ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive
Office, 12 July 2021) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> accessed 15 September 2022. See
also Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office,
21 February 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022.
See also Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive
Office, 24 February 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843> accessed 15 September
2022.
195
See e.g. Taras Kuzio, ‘Five reasons why Ukraine rejected Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World”’ (Atlantic Council,
26 March 2021) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/> accessed 15 September 2022. See also
<https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/ukraine/> accessed 3 October 2022.
196
‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 21 February 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022. See also Vladimir
Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 24 February
2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843> accessed 15 September 2022.
197
See Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Ukraine’ (1 September 2022)
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
34
Before the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the UNSC held multiple meetings, while
tensions rose in Ukraine and Russia opposed UNSC attempts to de-escalate.200 A meeting
called by the US on 31 January 2022 first addressed the Russian military build-up near the
Ukrainian border. Russia called a procedural vote in an attempt to block the meeting,201 but the
majority voted in favour of the meeting.202 During the meeting, Russia demanded that Ukraine
would not join NATO.203 Interestingly, the Russian representative articulated that the crisis, at
the time, was “an internal Ukrainian crisis”.204 Russia’s view was that the crisis could only be
resolved through Kyiv’s implementation of the Minsk agreements, which stipulates “direct
dialogue with Donetsk and Luhansk”.205 The situation would deteriorate if Western States kept
pushing Kyiv to sabotage the Minsk agreements.206
The Minsk agreements207 aimed to end the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and the pro-
Russian separatists in the Donbas region of Ukraine.208 Ukraine and Russia disagree over the
interpretation of the Minsk agreements concerning Ukraine’s sovereignty.209 There have been
200
See e.g. Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Vote on Draft Resolution*’ (25 February 2022)
201
A procedural vote is not subject to vetoes by P5 States.
202
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8960th mtg (31 January 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8960, p. 2. See also Security Council Report,
‘Ukraine: Possible Open Meeting*’ (31 January 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/01/ukraine-possible-open-meeting.php> accessed
25 July 2022.
203
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8960th mtg (31 January 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8960, pp. 11-12.
204
Idem, p.12.
205
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
207
The Minsk Protocol was signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2014, in an attempt to resolve the armed conflict in
the Donbas. See OSCE, Протокол о результатах консультаций Трехсторонней контактной группы, Минск, 5
сентября 2014 г. [Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, Minsk, 5 September
2014] (signed 5 September 2014) <https://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258> accessed 3 October 2022 (“Minsk
Protocol”). The ‘Minsk II’ agreement was later signed by Russia and Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements
in 2015. See OSCE, Комплекс мер по выполнению Минских соглашений [Package of measures for the
implementation of the Minsk agreements] (signed 12 February 2015) <https://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221>
accessed 3 October 2022 (“Minsk II agreement”). See also UNSC Res 2202 (17 February 2015) UN Doc
S/RES/2202, endorsing the Minsk II agreement.
208
See Allan, Duncan, The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine (online edn.,
Chatham House 2020) (“Allan”).
209
See Allan, p. 2.
35
multiple attempts to compromise, but to no avail.210 On 17 February, Russia organized a UNSC
meeting on the situation in Ukraine in celebration of the Minsk II agreement (2015). 211 The
meeting saw multiple UN and EU MS reiterating their support for Ukraine and calling for
implementation of the Minsk II agreement in addition to de-escalation measures by Russia.212
Concern was expressed over the Duma’s213 appeal to Putin to recognize the independence of
the Ukrainian breakaway oblasts in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk).214 Russia reiterated its
commitment to solving the Donbas crisis through the Minsk II agreement.215 The Russian
delegate addressed the Duma’s appeal to Putin, stating that it “reflects the Russian people’s
feelings about Donbas” and that “it should not be forgotten that hundreds of thousands of
people in that Ukrainian region have Russian citizenship”.216
Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk on 21 February 2022.217 In doing
so, Putin referred in detail to the Russian origins of Ukraine and how “the people living in the
south-west [Ukraine] of what has historically been Russian land and called themselves
Russians”.218 Shortly after, Putin claimed that Ukraine had no intention of living up to the
Minsk II agreement and deployed Russian troops to the breakaway regions for “peacekeeping
duties”.219 A UNSC meeting was held that very evening, per request of Ukraine. Several
210
See Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine Briefing*’ (16 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-briefing-4.php> accessed 25 July 2022.
211
Russia organizes annual meetings to celebrate the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements”, also known as the Minsk II agreement. This meeting marked the seventh anniversary (The Minsk
II agreement was adopted on 12 February 2015).
212
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8968th mtg (17 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8968, pp. 13 (US), 14-15 (UK), 23
(France), 28 (Germany).
213
The (State) Duma is the lower house of the Russian Parliament.
214
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8968th mtg (17 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8968, pp. 14 (UK), 16 (Ireland), 23
(France).
215
Idem, p. 24, stating that “what we need to do is to concentrate on the implementation of the Minsk
agreements”.
216
217
Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office,
218
Ibid.
219
Andrew Roth and Julian Borger, ‘Putin orders troops into eastern Ukraine on ‘peacekeeping duties’ The
Guardian (Moscow, Washington, 21 February 2022)
36
members announced further sanctions on Russia.220 Some MS drew similarities with Georgia
(2008)221 and Crimea (2014).222 Russia responded to disapproval of its actions by accusing
Ukraine of the “shelling and provocations against Donetsk and Luhansk”,223 sabotaging the
Minsk agreements and refusing to engage in diplomatic dialogue.224 The Russian delegate also
referred to the UNSC’s double standards, claiming that Ukraine was not required to engage in
dialogue, whereas Libya, Syria and Yemen had been.225 Finally, Russia reaffirmed that it is not
a party to the Minsk agreements.226 Ukraine must still comply with the Minsk agreements,
despite efforts of Western MS and Ukraine to rid itself of its obligations.227
UNSG António Guterres addressed Russia’s decision to recognize the Donbas breakaway
regions as a “violation of [Ukraine’s] territorial integrity and sovereignty and inconsistent with
the principles of the [UN] Charter”.228 Such a statement made by the UNSG regarding a P5 MS
of the UNSC is rare and indicates the gravity of the situation.229 During a UNSC meeting
initiated by Ukraine on 23 February, Russia rebutted its supposed violation of Ukrainian
sovereignty by claiming that the Ukrainian government did not adhere to the Friendly Relations
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/ukraine-putin-decide-recognition-breakaway-states-
today> accessed 15 September 2022.
220
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8970th mtg (21 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8970, pp. 5 (France), 6 (UK).
221
Idem, pp. 4 (Albania), 13, 14 (Ukraine). Georgia involved the breakaway of regions Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, which were subsequently recognized as independent by Russia, after it had been controversially
involved in their secessions. See also Mälksoo, p. 173.
222
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8970th mtg (21 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8970, pp. 4 (Albania), 13, 14 (Ukraine).
223
224
Ibid.
225
Idem, p. 12.
226
See also Allan, p. 11, stating that “although signed by Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, the
[Minsk II] agreement does not mention Russia – an omission that Russia has used to shirk responsibility for
implementation and maintain the fiction that it is a disinterested arbiter”.
227
Ibid.
228
ReliefWeb, ‘Secretary-General Considers Russian Federation’s Decision on Status of Donetsk, Luhansk to
Violate Ukraine’s Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity’ (22 February 2022)
<https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/secretary-general-considers-russian-federation-s-decision-status-
donetsk-luhansk> accessed 1 October 2022.
229
Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Yesterday’s Open Meeting’ (22 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-yesterdays-open-meeting.php>
37
Declaration,230 which concerns the right to self-determination.231 Russia went on to refer to the
2014 Euromaidan protests as “the illegal Maidan coup” and further accused Ukraine of using
military force against the ethnic Russian population of the Donbas.232 Russia accused ‘the
West’ of ignoring evidence of the violence against ethnic Russian inhabitants and supporting
Ukraine in a plot to weaken Russia and to move NATO closer to its borders.233 According to
Russia, the Crimean separatists have falsely been addressed as “pro-Russian separatists and
terrorists” since Crimea (2014), while they have actually been trying to break away from Kyiv’s
tyranny.234 Per Donetsk’s and Luhansk’s requests, Russia would start to provide military
support in the Donbas.235 Simultaneously, a “special military operation” in the Donbas was
announced by Putin,236 which the UNSC representative reaffirmed was decided in accordance
with Article 51 UN Charter and treaties consolidated with Donetsk and Luhansk.237
“The purpose of the special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to
abuse and genocide by the Kyiv regime for eight years.” 238
UNSC MS response was fiercely indignant, condemning Russia’s actions and proclaiming
support for Ukraine.239
230
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1970 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) UN Doc
A/RES/25/2625) (“Friendly Relations Declaration”).
231
See UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 11.
232
Idem, p. 12.
233
Ibid.
234
Ibid.
235
Ibid.
236
See Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive
2022.
237
238
Ibid.
239
Idem, pp. 13 (Ukraine, Germany), 14 (US, Albania), 15 (France, Ireland).
38
The Russo-Ukrainian War started on 24 February 2022, when Russian forces invaded
Ukraine.240 Numerous states and regional organizations have adopted economic sanctions
against Russia.241 Many individual states have continued to supply Ukraine with military
weapons.242 Russia has stated multiple times that arms supply of Ukraine would only intensify
the armed conflict and delay peace.243 The War has caused 10,000 civilian casualties and the
displacement of 14 million Ukrainians.244 As of writing, 40 per cent of Ukraine’s population is
in need of humanitarian aid.245 The UN HRMMU “monitors, reports and advocates on the
human rights situation in Ukraine”,246 and has so far reported targeting of civilians, mass
executions and possible forced deportations, torture, rape, sexual violence and forcible
disappearances.247 Russia continuously denies all allegations of committing mass atrocity
crimes in Ukraine.248 Instead, it has repeatedly accused the Ukrainian government of
committing such crimes against the ethnic Russian populations of Ukraine, most notably in the
Donbas.249
240
2022. See also Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Ukraine’ (1 September 2022)
241
See e.g. BBC News, ‘What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy?’ (27 June 2022)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659> accessed 15 September 2022. See also Vladimir Putin,
‘Meeting on economic issues’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 28 February 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67879> accessed 15 September 2022, in which Putin
addresses such economic sanctions as “the empire of lies”.
242
BBC News, ‘Ukraine conflict: What is Nato and how is it changing?’ (29 June 2022)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18023383> accessed 15 September 2022.
243
See e.g. npr, ‘Russia sharpens warnings as the U.S. and Europe send more weapons to Ukraine’ (29 April 2022)
<https://www.npr.org/2022/04/29/1095458518/russia-ukraine-us-military-aid> accessed 15 September 2022.
244
See UNSC ‘Amid Probable Atrocity Crimes, Ukraine Suffering Largest Human Displacement Crisis in World
Today, Political Affairs Chief Tells Security Council’ (28 June 2022) Press Release SC/14951.
245
UNSC ‘Ukraine’s Immediate Fate Important to World, Delegate Tells Security Council, Calling for Cessation of
War’ (24 August 2022) Press Release SC/15004.
246
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN Human Rights in Ukraine’ (July 2020)
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/ukraine/our-presence> accessed 3 October 2022.
247
248
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8983rd mtg (28 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8983. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess,
8986th mtg (4 March 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8986. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8988th mtg (7 March 2022) UN Doc
S/PV.8988. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9056th mtg (6 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9056, p. 20.
249
Most notably the crime of genocide. See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc
S/PV.8974, p. 12.
39
One day after its invasion of Ukraine, Russia vetoed a UNSC draft resolution, which initially
condemned Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and demanded its immediate military
withdrawal from Ukraine.250 Eleven UNSC MS voted in favour of the draft and the draft was
co-sponsored by 81 UN MS.251 Before the vote, the draft was amended to further garner
support, most notably China’s, which ultimately abstained. Instead of a Chapter VII resolution,
the language was adapted to form a Chapter VI resolution, “deploring” Russia’s military action
rather than condemning it.252 Ukraine pointed out that Russia had repeatedly denied any
intention of invading Ukraine, adding that its words have no value.253 Russia stated it had
vetoed the resolution because it was “anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian”, in the sense that it
sought to bring back a Ukrainian system of power that ran “counter to the fundamental interests
of the Ukrainian people”.254 Russia urged the P3 to stop spreading “false information” that the
Russian military was targeting Ukrainian civilians.255
UNSC Resolution 2623 was adopted on 27 February 2022. It called for an emergency special
session (‘ESS’) of the UNGA to take collective action in the Ukraine crisis,256 stating explicitly
250
UNSC, ‘Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution’
(25 February 2022) UN Doc S/2022/155, paras. 2, 4.
251
Idem, para. 2. See also Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Vote on Draft Resolution*’ (25 February 2022)
252
Ibid.
253
UN Web TV, ‘Ukraine – Security Council, 8979th Meeting’ (25 February 2022)
<https://media.un.org/en/asset/k17/k17enj3450> accessed 3 October 2022.
254
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8979th mtg (25 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8979, p.12.
255
Idem, p.14.
256
See UNGA Res 377 A (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377 (V). On grounds of UNGA Resolution 377A(V)
(“Uniting for Peace”), an ESS of the UNGA can be requested by the UNSC when the latter fails to maintain
international peace and security. The request for an UNGA ESS requires nine votes in favour from UNSC members
and is not subject to vetoes, as it is considered a procedural matter.
40
that “the lack of unanimity of its permanent members (…) has prevented [the UNSC] from
exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security”.257 Russia opposed,258 because it considered the resolution to be one-sided and
unconstructive in ways of finding a solution. It considered its veto right “not a privilege but a
tool for ensuring the balance of interests, which is of paramount importance to (…) global
stability”.259 Circumventing Russia’s veto through the resolution supposedly undermined the
UN Charter itself.260 The UNSC’s ESS request arguably shows a strong political signal.261 The
result was UNGA Resolution ES-11/1, which condemned Russia’s use of force and violations
of IHRL and IHL.262
Throughout March, Russia became increasingly isolated in its position on the Russo-Ukrainian
War, all the while denying the use of military force against civilians.263 The ICC Prosecutor
opened an investigation on alleged crimes committed in Ukraine, following 43 State Party
referrals,264 to which Russia has not responded.265 On 16 March, the ICJ provided a provisional
257
UNSC Res 2623 (27 February 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2623. The adoption of the resolution marked the first of its
kind in forty years. See Security Council Report, ‘S/RES/2623’ (27 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2623.php> accessed 1 October 2022.
258
Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Vote on Draft “Uniting for Peace” Resolution*’ (27 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-vote-on-draft-uniting-for-peace-
resolution.php> accessed 3 October 2022. See also UNSC ‘Security Council Calls Emergency Special Session of
General Assembly on Ukraine Crisis, Adopting Resolution 2623 (2022) by 11 Votes in Favour, 1 Against, 3
Abstentions’ (27 February 2022) Press Release SC/14809.
259
260
Ibid.
261
Security Council Report, ‘Ukraine: Vote on Draft “Uniting for Peace” Resolution*’ (27 February 2022)
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-vote-on-draft-uniting-for-peace-
resolution.php> accessed 3 October 2022.
262
UNGA Res ES-11/1 (2 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/1, p. 2 and para. 11.
263
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8983rd mtg (28 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8983. See also UNSCOR, 77th sess,
8986th mtg (4 March 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8986. See also UNSCOR, 77th sess, 8988th mtg (7 March 2022) UN Doc
S/PV.8988.
264
International Criminal Court, ‘Ukraine’ (last updated 11 March 2022) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine>
265
ITV, ‘Russia not responding to International Criminal Court amid war crimes investigation, prosecutor says’
(25 March 2022) <https://www.itv.com/news/2022-03-25/russia-not-responding-to-icc-amid-war-crimes-
investigation-prosecutor-says> accessed 15 September 2022.
41
measures Order, as requested by Ukraine against Russia.266 Russia was ordered to cease its
military conduct in Ukraine.267 ICJ rulings are binding under the UN Charter, meaning that
Russia’s defiance further constitutes a violation of its international obligations. Russia did not
attend prior hearings and claimed that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over the matter, since it had
formally justified the attack on Ukraine on grounds of self-defence in a letter to the UNSG.268
At one point, Russia submitted a UNSC draft resolution in cooperation with other States269 that
did not condemn Russia, instead focusing on humanitarian aid. 270 Russia and China voted in
favour, whereas all other MS abstained.271 Many MS argued that Russia had attempted to
justify its illegal aggression against Ukraine with the draft.272 Rejection of the draft was a
missed chance at alleviating the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, according to Russia.273 On
24 March, a UNGA Resolution was adopted that demanded humanitarian access to Ukraine
and “deplored” Russia’s actions, with an overwhelming 140 votes in favour.274 Russia was
disbanded from the UNHRC on 7 April 2022,275 much like Libya in 2011. In May, Finland and
Sweden both applied for NATO membership. That would move the NATO bloc adjacent to
266
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order) General List No 182
[2022] ICJ. See also United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered
into force 24 October 1945), art. 41, stating that provisional measures are intended to “preserve the respective
rights of either party” prior to a final judgment on the merits.
267
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order) General List No 182
[2022] ICJ, para. 81.
268
Julian Borger, ‘UN international court of justice orders Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine’ The Guardian
(Washington, 16 March 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-
justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine> accessed 3 October 2022.
269
Belarus, North Korea and Syria.
270
UNSC, ‘Belarus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic: draft
resolution’ (24 March 2022) UN Doc S/2022/231.
271
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9002nd mtg (23 March 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9002, p. 2.
272
Idem, pp. 2 (US), 3 (France), 4 (UK and Albania), 8 (Gabon).
273
Idem, p. 9.
274
UNGA Res ES-11/2 (24 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/2 (adopted with 140 votes to 5; 38 abstentions).
See also UNGA ‘General Assembly Adopts Text Recognizing Scale of Humanitarian Woes Arising from Russian
Federation’s Ukraine Offensive as Unseen in Many Decades’ (24 March 2011) Press Release GA/12411.
275
UNGA Res ES-11/3 (7 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/3.
42
Russian borders, which Russia has been wary of before.276 Putin responded by claiming that
Russia has no issues with Sweden or Finland joining NATO. However, if military infrastructure
were to be set up in these States, Russia “would be obliged to respond symmetrically and raise
the same threats for those territories where threats have arisen”.277 As of May, the EU has
banned all Russian oil products.278 Russia responded by stating that it will find other oil
importers.279 Diplomatic dialogue between Russia and Ukraine failed to achieve consensus
multiple times,280 as Putin’s and Zelenskyy’s demands for ending the War seemed
incompatible.281
Throughout June, Russia continued to criticize Ukraine and its Western allies for making false
accusations.282 Many UNSC meetings amounted to nothing more than its members casting
accusations at one another. Russia reaffirmed that its operation in Ukraine would continue until
its goal had been met, which was to “stop the shelling of Donbas by Ukraine and the threat to
both Russia and the residents of southern and south-eastern Ukraine from the territory of the
country that was turned against Russia at the behest of a number of Western countries and from
276
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 12.
277
Andrew Roth, ‘Putin issues fresh warning to Finland and Sweden for installing Nato infrastructure’ The
Guardian (29 June 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/29/russia-condemns-nato-invitation-
finland-sweden> accessed 3 October 2022.
278
John Psaropoulos, ‘Timeline: The first 100 days of Russia’s war in Ukraine’ (Al Jazeera, 3 June 2022)
<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/3/timeline-the-first-100-days-of-russias-war-in-ukraine>
accessed 27 August 2022.
279
Sam Meredith, ‘Russia hits back at the EU’s partial oil embargo, saying it will find other importers for its crude’
(CNBC, 31 May 2022) <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/31/russia-oil-moscow-says-it-will-find-other-
importers-after-eu-ban.html> accessed 15 September 2022.
280
See e.g. Holly Ellyat, “Russia-Ukraine talks fail with no progress on cease-fire, safe passage for civilians’ (CNBC,
10 March 2022) <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/10/russia-and-ukraine-peace-talks-in-turkey-what-you-
need-to-know.html> accessed 15 September 2022.
281
Compare Kelsey Vlamis, ‘Putin shared his demands for ending the war, including Ukraine not joining NATO
and the status of occupied territories: report’ (Insider, 18 March 2022)
<https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-shares-demands-ending-war-ukraine-turkey-2022-
3?international=true&r=US&IR=T> (accessed 28 August 2022) with Charles R. Davis, ‘Zelenskyy lays out demands
for Ukraine-Russia peace talks: ‘End of the war, security guarantees, sovereignty, restoration of territorial
integrity’ (Insider, 17 March 2022) <https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-lays-out-demands-for-ukraine-
russia-peace-talks-2022-3?international=true&r=US&IR=T> (accessed 28 August 2022).
282
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9056th mtg (6 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9056, p. 20, with regard to sexual war
crimes.
43
its nationalist leadership”.283 The July grain agreement allowed for the resumption of grain
transport through Ukrainian ports.284 Russia continued its discourse against the West, stating
that the grain agreement is not a success and that the global food crisis is in truth caused by
Western sanctions against Russia.285 At one point, Russia announced that it had booked
significant progress in its military operation by liberating all of Luhansk and continuing the
offensive in Donetsk.286
Most recently, Putin announced military mobilisation measures “to protect the sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity of Russia and support the desire and will of our compatriots to
choose their future independently”.287 The purpose of the Russian military operation in Ukraine
has changed from liberation of the Donbas region to the liberation of other oblasts as well.288
According to Putin, atrocities were committed by the Ukrainian government in the Kharkov
region against innocent civilians, similar to earlier crimes committed in the regions of Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.289 After Putin announced referendums in Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia,290 all four oblasts voted in favour of accession to Russia
and have been incorporated into the Russian Federation.291
283
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9080th mtg (28 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9080, p. 14.
284
UNSC ‘New Deal to Resume Grain Exports through Ukrainian Ports ‘Beacon of Hope’ for Easing Global Food
Crisis, United Nations Political Affairs Chief Tells Security Council’ (29 July 2022) Press Release SC/14990.
285
UNSC ‘Ukraine’s Immediate Fate Important to World, Delegate Tells Security Council, Calling for Cessation of
War’ (24 August 2022) Press Release SC/15004.
286
UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9104th mtg (29 July 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9104, p. 14.
287
21 September 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390> accessed 21 September 2022.
288
Ibid.
289
Ibid.
290
Ibid.
291
See The Kremlin, ‘Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye
and Kherson regions to Russia’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 30 September 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465> accessed 6 October 2022. See also Euronews, ‘Ukraine
‘referendums’: Full results for annexation polls as Kremlin-backed authorities claim victory’ (28 September 2022)
<https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/27/occupied-areas-of-ukraine-vote-to-join-russia-in-referendums-
branded-a-sham-by-the-west> accessed 6 October 2022.
44
3.3. Analysis of Russia’s Justifications for the Russo-Ukrainian War
The case study of the Russo-Ukrainian War shows that Russia provides multiple justifications
for its invasion of Ukraine. Two main arguments stand out and are repeatedly addressed. First,
the right to self-determination (‘RSD’) of the ethnic Russian population in the Donbas. Second,
the protection of nationals abroad (‘PNA’).292 The remainder of this Chapter will explore the
two IL principles that Russia refers to and analyse Russia’s argumentation in the case of
Ukraine.
3.3.1. The Right to Self-Determination of the Donbas Population
RSD is enshrined in Article 1(2) UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration,293 both
of which have been referred to by Russia. Putin has referred to RSD and Article 1 UN Charter
when announcing the invasion of Ukraine.294 The Friendly Relations Declaration – referred to
by Russia in a UNSC meeting295 – defines RSD as all peoples having “the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic,
social and cultural development”.296 Russia has also justified its recognition of the Donbas
breakaway regions by referring to RSD of the ethnic Russian populations in Donetsk and
Luhansk. For example, Putin has stated that the ethnic Russian population are “[p]eople who
identify as Russians and want to preserve their identity, language and culture”297 and “are
fighting for their elementary right to live on their own land, to speak their own language, and
292
See UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 12, stating that “[t]he purpose
of the special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kyiv
regime”. See also Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential
Executive Office, 24 February 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843> accessed 15
September 2022.
293
Friendly Relations Declaration.
294
2022, stating that “This does not mean that nations cannot enjoy the right to self-determination, which is
enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter”.
295
296
Friendly Relations Declaration, para. 1.
297
45
to preserve their culture and traditions”.298 According to Putin, “[n]ot a single day goes by
without Donbass communities coming under shelling attacks”.299 Russia has also repeatedly
accused the Ukrainian government of committing genocide against the ethnic Russian
population of the Donbas since the Euromaidan protests in 2014.300 The current situation in
Ukraine is often compared to Crimea by Russia,301 in which Russia supported RSD of the
ethnic Russian population in a similar manner.302
Within IL, RSD is mainly limited to ‘internal’ self-determination, meaning that the people in
question (ethnic Russians) cannot break away entirely from a State (Ukraine), but only gain
autonomy within that State’s capacity. The Friendly Relations Declaration stipulates that RSD
“shall [not] be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.303
There are very few exceptions as to when external self-determination is accepted – apart from
secession from colonial rule304 – though it is generally held that RSD may not infringe upon
298
Ibid.
299
2022.
300
See UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 12. See also ‘Address by the
President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 21 February 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022. See also Vladimir
2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843> accessed 15 September 2022.
301
See e.g. Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive
2022, stating that “The people of [Crimea] freely made their choice to be with Russia. The Kiev authorities cannot
challenge the clearly stated choice of the people”.
302
See Marxsen, pp. 384-389.
303
Friendly Relations Declaration, para. 1.
304
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (SCC) (“Supreme Court Canada”), para. 132. See also
Marxsen, p. 385.
46
the territorial sovereignty of States.305 The exception of “remedial secession” may be exercised
“when the state renders an internal self-determination impossible through discriminatory
politics”.306 Along similar lines, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized two other
instances when external self-determination is warranted.307 The first exception, “where a
people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context’,308
is enshrined in the Friendly Relations Declaration.309 The second is not as strongly formalized
in IL,310 which is “when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination internally”.311
Up until Crimea, the state of the art generally provides that Russia is traditionally opposed to
secession based on RSD, and prioritizes State sovereignty.312 Crimea (2014) arguably signalled
a change in the Russian approach to RSD.313 At the time, Putin criticized the supposed sui
generis character of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia (2008), claiming that Crimea found itself
in similar circumstances,314 which is why it should also be recognized as independent.315 The
independent status of Kosovo is acknowledged by the majority of States, but remains an
305
Marxsen, p. 385.
306
Marxsen, p. 385, citing to the works of L. C. Buchheit, C. Tomuschat, M. Suksi and D. Raic.
307
Supreme Court Canada, paras. 133 and 134.
308
Supreme Court Canada, para. 133.
309
Friendly Relations Declaration, para. 1, “bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of self-determination]”.
310
Supreme Court Canada, para. 134, stating that “[a] number of commentators have (…) asserted” this
exception. See also Marxsen, p. 386, stating that the “[Canadian Supreme] court is (…) cautious and leaves it
open whether a respective norm of international law is already established” with regard to this exception, citing
Supreme Court Canada, para. 154.
311
Supreme Court Canada, para. 134. The Court adds, however, that the Vienna Declaration requirement of “the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind” further adds credibility to this theory.
That does not correspond with the situation in the Donbas, which is not exclusively inhabited by ethnic Russian
minorities.
312
See e.g. Marxsen, p. 387. See also Mälksoo , p. 180.
313
Marxsen, p. 387. See also, Mälksoo, p. 180, stating that Russia “destroyed its own earlier argumentation by
its own actions in Ukraine”. See also Mälksoo, p. 182.
314
Although Putin stressed that there were no civilian casualties in Crimea, as opposed to Kosovo.
315
Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 18
March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> accessed 28 September 2022.
47
international topic of debate.316 Kosovo is often claimed by supporters to be an exceptional
case that does not provide a precedent for other cases of secession (sui generis),317 due to the
grave human rights violations that occurred there during the Yugoslav Wars.318 The ICJ has
also ruled that Kosovo’s independence is not in violation of IL.319 Russia, at the time, opposed
Kosovo’s secession.320 In its Written Statement to the ICJ with regard to Kosovo, Russia did
recognize a right to external self-determination in “extreme circumstances”:
[T]he Russian Federation is of the view that the primary purpose of the “safeguard
clause” is to serve as a guarantee of territorial integrity of States. It is also true that
the clause may be construed as authorizing secession under certain conditions.
However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an
outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people
in question. Otherwise, all efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between
the parent State and the ethnic community concerned within the framework of the
existing State.321
316
See ‘International Recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo’ (The Republic of Kosovo – The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Diaspora) archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20210515153650/https://www.mfa-
ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483> accessed 29 September 2022, stating
that “The Republic of Kosovo is recognized by 117 countries”. See also ‘Kosovo – On the road to becoming a
fully-functioning state’ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany, 11 March
2022) <https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/kosovo#anc=Aktuelle> accessed 29 September 2022. However,
there have been States that have retracted their recognition, so it is unclear what the exact number of States is
that recognizes Kosovo as independent.
317
See e.g. UNSC ‘Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council’ (26 March 2007) UN Doc S/2007/168, para. 15.
318
Idem, para. 6.
319
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo
(Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, para. 122.
320
See ‘Written Statement of the Russian Federation’ (ICJ, Accordance with international law of the unilateral
declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 17 April 2009) <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141>
accessed 3 October 2022, paras. 99, 101, 104, stating that the Kosovo Albanians are not oppressed by Serbia
and therefore the secession of Kosovo is not in accordance with IL.
See also Socher, stating that Russia “did not deny Kosovo recognition because of a different view on self-
determination and secession but because it refused to accept the logic of some states which viewed Kosovo as
a “special” case”.
321
‘Written Statement of the Russian Federation’ (ICJ, Accordance with international law of the unilateral
declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 17 April 2009) <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141>
accessed 3 October 2022, para. 88.
48
The “safeguard clause” in the above citation refers to the limitation to RSD as stipulated by the
Friendly Relations Declaration,322 which precludes the violation of another State’s “territorial
integrity or political unity”.323
According to Mälksoo, the Russian utilization of Kosovo in favour of Crimean secession324
was a “stunning turn in legal argumentation concerning the relationship between (…) state
sovereignty and the right of (…) self-determination”.325 Where Russia previously opposed
Kosovo’s secession and denied the existence of its people’s “extreme circumstances”, Putin
suddenly utilized Kosovo as a precedent in favour of the secession of Crimea.326
Other academics argue that Georgia (2008) was the turning point for Russia’s approach to
RSD.327 In line with Russia’s Written Statement to the ICJ, Socher states that Russia
acknowledged a right to external self-determination in “extreme situations” concerning
Kosovo, and is therefore consistent with Crimea in that regard.328 Instead, he asserts, Russia’s
reservations concerning Kosovo were based on the sui generis reasoning employed by
supporters of Kosovo.329 Although there may be debate as to when the change in the Russian
approach to RSD occurred, it is safe to say that in Crimea (2014) and Ukraine (2022), Russia
holds that the “extreme circumstances” of the oppression of ethnic Russian minorities in
322
Idem, para. 83.
323
Friendly Relations Declaration, para. 1. See fn. 303.
324
Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 18
March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> accessed 28 September 2022.
325
Mälksoo, p. 182.
326
See Putin, Vladimir, ‘Address by President of Russian Federation’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 18
March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603> accessed 15 September 2022.
327
Mälksoo, p. 180, stating that “Future historians will debate whether Russia’s policy, which at least rhetorically
favoured state sovereignty over self-determination, changed in 2014 or even in 2008”. See also Socher, stating
that “shortly after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, Russia’s approach towards the secessionist
conflicts in the post-Soviet space arguably changed”, referring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
328
See Socher.
329
See Socher. See also ‘Written Statement of the Russian Federation’ (ICJ, Accordance with international law of
the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 17 April 2009) <https://www.icj-
cij.org/en/case/141> accessed 3 October 2022.
49
Ukraine justify secession from Ukraine. Meanwhile, the larger international community
disagrees with this reasoning and supports Ukraine’s sovereignty in this regard.330
Russia has addressed the limitation stipulated by the Friendly Relations Declaration
specifically in the context of Ukraine in the UNSC, by stating that the current Ukrainian
government does not fulfil the definition of “States conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race, creed or colour”,331 and therefore the Donbas population must be allowed to break away
from Ukraine. In line with this argument, Russia has repeatedly asserted that Ukraine is not
entirely sovereign under its current government. Russia mentions multiple times that the Kyiv
regime is illegal because it was installed as a result of the Maidan ‘junta’.332 Putin refers to
post-Soviet Russia acknowledging Ukraine’s independence and respecting its sovereignty in
the past,333 but claims that the current state of Ukraine is different. While Russia has previously
stated that the Donbas situation was “an internal Ukrainian crisis”, 334 Putin now claims that
that the Ukrainian government “no longer acts in a national capacity and consistently pushes
Ukraine towards losing its sovereignty”,335 despite that Russia has “done everything to preserve
Ukraine’s territorial integrity” by pushing for the implementation of the Minsk agreements.336
330
See UNGA Res ES-11/2 (24 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/2 (adopted by 140 votes to 5; 38 abstentions;
10 absent).
331
332
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8979th mtg (25 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8979, p. 12. See also UN SCOR, 77th
sess, 9069th mtg (21 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9069, p. 19, referring to the “Maidan coup”. See also Vladimir
2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022, stating that
“Maidan did not bring Ukraine any close to democracy (…) [h]aving accomplished a coup d’état”.
333
21 February 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022,
stating that "it was our people who accepted the new geopolitical reality that took shape after the dissolution
of the USSR, and recognized the new independent states [including Ukraine]” and “Our country provided this
assistance while respecting Ukraine’s dignity and sovereignty”.
334
335
336
Ibid.
50
Moreover, in UNSC meetings, Russia consistently refers to Ukraine as ‘Kyiv’,337 emphasizing
that it considers the Ukrainian government an agent of the West, while the interests of Eastern
Ukraine lie in Russia. This indicates that Russia deems Ukraine’s sovereignty diminished to an
extent, or limited. The Russian argument of limited sovereignty is an important aspect of its
support for the right to external self-determination of the Donbas population since it negates
the limitation to RSD as articulated in the Friendly Relations Declaration. This is also where
Russia’s reasoning differs fundamentally from the majority of the international community,
which designates Ukraine as a fully sovereign State.338
3.3.2. The Protection of Russian Nationals Abroad
Another main justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is PNA.339 Russia consistently
reaffirms that its goal is to protect the Ukrainian population with a Russian background,340
which have supposedly been subjected to hostilities and genocide by the pro-European
Ukrainian government.341 The protection of citizens abroad is partially governed by the
principle of self-defence (Article 51 UN Charter).342 Putin has explicitly claimed self-defence
to justify the invasion of Ukraine and referred to Article 51 UN Charter,343 in a similar manner
337
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8970th mtg (21 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8970. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess,
8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974.
338
See UNGA Res ES-11/2 (24 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/2 (adopted by 140 votes to 5; 38 abstentions;
10 absent). See also Marxsen, p. 389, with regard to Putin’s approach to external self-determination in Crimea,
which was very similar to the current approach, stating that it “does not hold a thorough legal analysis”.
339
stating that “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who (…) have been facing humiliation and
genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime”. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc
S/PV.8974, p. 12.
340
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p.12. See also UN SCOR, 77th
sess, 9080th mtg (28 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9080, p. 14.
341
The Spectator, ‘Full Text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine’ (24 February 2022)
<https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine> accessed 21 September
2022, stating “our actions are self-defence”.
342
See e.g. Marxsen, p. 372. Marxsen also provides an alternative to UN Charter, art. 51: “an unwritten
customary exemption of the prohibition of the use of force as provide by Article 2 (4) UN [Charter]”.
343
Ibid. See also Julian Borger, ‘UN international court of justice orders Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine’ The
Guardian (Washington, 16 March 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-
court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine> accessed 3 October 2022, in which it is stated that
Russia had formally informed the UN Secretary-General of its self-defence against Ukraine.
51
to Crimea.344 Russia makes claim to different variations of self-defence,345 but the most
prominent is PNA, as Russia most often refers to the protection of the Donbas population from
the Ukrainian government.
The use of self-defence for PNA in itself is controversial within IL.346 However, it could be
argued that “an attack of sufficient violence upon a substantial number of a State’s nationals,
especially where those nationals are attacked in order to harm (…) their State of nationality”347
warrants self-defence as established in Article 51 UN Charter. Russia’s argument seems to do
just that. By extension of Russian sovereignty, hostilities against Russian citizens abroad are
perceived as a violation of Russian sovereignty,348 as well as a “preparation for hostilities
against (…) Russia”.349 Therefore, Russia “cannot but react to this real danger”.350 Russia
considers itself to have “every right to respond in order to ensure its security”.351 That threat to
Russian sovereignty justifies military intervention – ‘self-defence’ (Article 51 UN Charter)
according to Russia.352
344
See e.g. Marxsen, p. 372..
345
See e.g. The Kremlin, ‘Victory Parade on Red Square’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 9 May 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68366> accessed 28 September 2022, in which Putin seems
to refer to pre-emptive self-defence, by stating that “Russia launched a pre-emptive strike at the aggression
[from Ukraine]”.
346
See Christopher Greenwood, ‘Self-Defence’ [2011] MPEPIL, para. 24 (“Greenwood”). See also Francis Grimal
and Graham Melling, ‘The Protection of Nationals Abroad’ [2012] 16(3) J Conflict and Security L 541-554. See
also Marxsen, p. 372. Side note is that Marxsen considers “such a wide reading of the right to self-defense (…)
highly problematic”.
347
Greenwood, para. 24.
348
2022, referring to the current Ukrainian Military Strategy, which is supposedly “almost entirely dedicated to
confrontation with Russia and sets the goal of involving other states in a conflict with our country. The strategy
stipulates the organization of what can be described as a terrorist underground movement in Russia’s Crimea
and in Donbass”.
349
Ibid.
350
Ibid.
351
Ibid. This argument also speaks to pre-emptive self-defence, but for reasons mentioned in the Conclusion,
this argument will not be discussed in this thesis for the purpose of an R2P analysis. See Chapter 5.3.
352
<https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine> accessed 21 September
2022, stating “our actions are self-defence”. See also Julian Borger, ‘UN international court of justice orders
Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine’ The Guardian (Washington, 16 March 2022)
52
The many times Russia has stated its goal to protect the ethnic Russian minorities, it seems to
be aware of the weakness in its legal argument that PNA “does not include the protection of
ethnic minorities on the territory of another state”.353 Russia seems to address this gap in its
argument by implying repeatedly that these ethnic Russian minorities enjoy Russian citizenship
of some sort. Putin has repeatedly asserted that Russia and Ukraine are one due to their shared
history and culture.354 Putin has also referred to the south-west of Ukraine as “what has
historically been Russian land” and stated that the population there “called themselves
Russians”.355 On another account, the Russian UNSC representative has even stated that
“hundreds of thousands of people in [the Donbas] have Russian citizenship”.356 This indicates
that Russia considers a large part of the Donbas population to be Russian. It is unclear where
the distinction is drawn and whether all ethnic Russians are considered to be of Russian
nationality, so Russia’s ultimate position on the matter remains ambiguous. At the very least,
Russia considers the connection between the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine and Russia
sufficient to invoke self-defence.
Russia’s assessment of the Kyiv regime “losing its sovereignty”357 provides an important
argument in relation to PNA as well. Putin holds that Russia has attempted to respect Ukrainian
sovereignty before its invasion, but that it has receded as a result of the Kyiv regime’s
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-
invasion-of-ukraine> accessed 3 October 2022, in which it is stated that Russia had formally informed the UN
Secretary-General of its self-defence against Ukraine.
353
Ingelevič-Citak, p. 41, with regard to Crimea. See also Marxsen, p. 374, stating that “intervention to protect
the Russian minority” would require “an authorization of the Security Council”.
354
2022.
355
356
357
53
actions.358 This gives more weight to the argument that Russia is not violating any legitimate
State sovereignty when invading Ukraine, to protect its nationals from oppression by an
illegitimate government.
To conclude, Russia’s two main justifications for the Russo-Ukrainian War seem to be closely
connected. More often than not, both RSD and PNA are provided as a justification for the
Russo-Ukrainian War simultaneously, as Russia asserts that the Ukrainian government
commits these crimes to prevent the Donbas people from turning to Russia.359 Relying on both
RSD and PNA with regard to the very same people seems contradictory to an extent. If the
Donbas population is Russian, then how can they freely determine their political status without
external interference?360 This has left Russia susceptible to criticism by MS that support
Ukraine’s sovereignty.361 Russia responds to such criticism by accusing Ukraine of failing to
implement the Minsk agreements and for its unwillingness to engage in dialogue,362 yet
provides no further elaboration as to the relationship between RSD and PNA.
358
Ibid.
359
E.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 9080th mtg (28 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9080, p. 14, stating that Russia had invaded
Ukraine to “stop the shelling of Donbas by Ukraine and the threat to both Russia and the residents of southern
and south-eastern Ukraine from the territory of the country that was turned against Russia at the behest of a
number of Western countries and from its nationalist leadership”.
360
Russia has been criticized for annexation of foreign regions under the guise of self-determination before,
most notably in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014). See UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8970th mtg (21 February 2022) UN
Doc S/PV.8970, pp. 4, 13, 14. See also Ingelevič-Citak, p. 41, assessing the legality of the secession and annexation
of Crimea. See also Marxsen. See also Johannes Socher, ‘Russia and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’
(Centre for East European and International Studies, 7 April 2021) <https://www.zois-
berlin.de/en/publications/russia-and-the-right-of-peoples-to-self-determination> accessed 3 October 2022
(“Socher”), stating that Russia “(ab)used the right of peoples to self-determination as a pretext to justify the
incorporation of the [Crimean] peninsula by the threat and use of force”.
361
See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8970th mtg (21 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8970, pp. 4 (Albania), 13, 14
(Ukraine), drawing similarities with Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014).
362
Idem, p. 11.
54
4. Comparative Legal Analysis of Libya, Syria and
Ukraine
4.1. The Russian Approach to Ukraine Compared to Libya and Syria
The previous Chapter has explored the main justifications provided by Russia for the Russo-
Ukrainian War. However, neither of these two principles was at stake in the Libyan or Syrian
crises as they are in Ukraine. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint exact Russian approaches to
these principles in the context of Libya and Syria. Nevertheless, Russian State Practice in these
crises compared to Ukraine does speak to a larger approach to State sovereignty and the
objectives of R2P.363 This thesis argues that the overarching Russian approach to Libya and
Syria is non-interventionist and State-centric, in the sense that it prioritizes State sovereignty
above all else.364 That approach is difficult to reconcile with the strong support for principles
such as RSD and PNA, as both jeopardize State sovereignty to a certain extent. This Chapter
will therefore assess the Russian justifications for Ukraine in light of the State-centric Russian
State Practice in Libya and Syria to determine where to place the contemporary Russian
approach to R2P.
Chapter 2 provided an account of the major Russian considerations regarding Libya and Syria.
Despite condemning the Libyan and Syrian governments’ incapacity to protect their
populations from mass atrocity crimes,365 Russia remained supportive of a non-interventionist
approach, as it considered that any political interference in these States by foreign or non-
363
These objectives are defined based on the Three Pillars of R2P. See Chapter 1.1 to that end.
364
See Chapter 2.4.
365
See UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6491st mtg (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491, p. 4, with regard to Libya. See
UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4, with regard to Syria.
55
governmental forces would infringe upon Libyan and Syrian sovereignty.366 That strict
approach, which prioritizes State sovereignty above all else, significantly differs from Russia’s
approach to the State sovereignty of Ukraine. By contrast, Russia claims that RSD and the
protection of the Donbas population justify its invasion of Ukraine. The latter implies that
Russia is of the opinion that State sovereignty can be limited in favour of other IL principles.
For a similar situation in either Libya or Syria, rebel forces would have had to attempt to secede
from the parent State, and provided the oppression of the civilian population by the Libyan and
Syrian governments as a justification. Russia’s firm position on State sovereignty and non-
intervention in those cases suggests that Russia’s approach to such claims would not have been
receptive, instead supporting the Libyan and Syrian governments. The same applies to the
hypothetical situation where another State would have invaded Libya or Syria to protect its
nationals on grounds of self-defence. Russia’s indignation at NATO’s active military support
for the Libyan rebel forces is indicative of this.367 After all, Russia’s criticism was directed at
NATO’s disproportionate use of force and the targeting of specific individuals in order to
achieve regime change,368 which interferes with Libya’s political independence – an integral
part of State sovereignty.369 A claim to RSD or PNA would have arguably posed a similar
threat to the State sovereignty of Libya.370 The same reasoning can be applied to Syria. Russia
opposed any interference in Syrian political affairs as a result of the ‘mission slip’ in Libya,371
and continuously emphasized the role of the Syrian rebels in fuelling the Syrian crisis, fearing
366
See UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6491st mtg (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491, p. 4, with regard to Libya. See
also UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6524th mtg (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524, p.7; UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, pp. 4-5, with regard to Syria.
367
UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4. See also UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th
mtg, (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, p. 9.
368
UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6528th mtg, (4 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6528, p. 9.
369
UN Charter, art. 2(4).
370
It must be noted that the exercise of the right to self-determination or the protection of nationals abroad
does not pose as grave a threat to State sovereignty as disproportionate use of force to achieve regime change
in this specific case. The situations are compared because they all jeopardize State sovereignty to an extent.
371
UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4.
56
a repetition of Libya.372 Russia’s tireless support for the Syrian government indicates that it
prioritized Syria’s State sovereignty above all else, even after years of conflict and numerous
civilian casualties.373 Any proposals that did not involve a “Syrian-led political process” were
immediately rejected,374 such as the Arab League’s suggestion for Assad to abdicate.375 It is
important to note that these assertions are hypothetical and cannot be fully corroborated, since
these principles are not addressed in the Russian rhetoric surrounding Libya and Syria.
However, the comparisons do indicate that Russia’s approach to RSD and PNA in Ukraine
(2022) conveys a fundamentally different notion of State sovereignty than it does in Libya and
Syria.
That observation ties in with this thesis’ assertion that Russia considers Ukrainian sovereignty
diminished.376 Despite the atrocities committed against the Libyan and Syrian populations,
Russia remained protective of Libyan and (especially) Syrian State sovereignty.377 By contrast,
Russia has provided several arguments for the limited sovereignty of Ukraine. For one,
Ukraine’s government is repeatedly designated as illegitimate by Russia.378 Additionally, it is
deemed an agent of Western States and/or NATO.379 As a result of this, the Kyiv regime
372
See e.g. UN SCOR, 67th sess, 6711th mtg (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, p. 9.
373
See fn. 132, indicating the sixteen resolutions concerning the Syrian crisis that Russia has vetoed. See also fn.
134 and 135, indicating that over half a million Syrians have been killed and millions have been displaced.
374
375
UN SCOR, 67th sess, 6710th mtg (31 January 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6710, pp. 8 (Arab League), 24 (Russia).
376
stating that the Ukrainian government “no longer acts in a national capacity and consistently pushes Ukraine
towards losing its sovereignty”.
377
See fn. 132, indicating the sixteen resolutions concerning the Syrian crisis that Russia has vetoed. See also fn.
134 and 135, indicating that over half a million Syrians have been killed and millions have been displaced.
378
stating that “Maidan did not bring Ukraine any close to democracy (…) [h]aving accomplisch a coup d’état”. See
also UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8979th mtg (25 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8979, p. 12. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess,
9069th mtg (21 June 2022) UN Doc S/PV.9069, p. 19, referring to the “Maidan coup”.
379
2022.
57
supposedly no longer acts in the interests of the (Eastern) Ukrainian population.380
Furthermore, the narrow historical ties between Russia and Ukraine, according to Putin,381 are
repeatedly reaffirmed to assert the notion that the Donbas population should be allowed to
exercise their RSD and break away from Ukraine. A comparison of the case studies of Libya,
Syria and Ukraine points out a certain implication of Russian rhetoric that there are particular
ranks in State sovereignty, meaning that one State can be more sovereign than another. Russia
provides no exact legal argumentation as to why the atrocities allegedly committed in Ukraine
diminish Ukrainian sovereignty, yet the atrocities committed in Libya and Syria did not impair
those respective States’ sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is also related to the oppression of
populations with a Russian background, which touches upon Russian sovereignty itself. The
situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War pits Ukrainian sovereignty against Russian sovereignty,
in the form of Ukrainian territorial integrity and the ethnic Russian population’s RSD,
respectively. Russia’s reasoning utilizes this perceived threat to Russian sovereignty to justify
the violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, in order to keep the former intact, whereas the
latter has already been compromised to some extent.
That opportunistic argumentation is also applied to RSD itself. The Russian approach to RSD
within Russia differs from its approach to RSD abroad. Mälksoo provides a strict interpretation
of RSD within Russian theory of IL: “the bottom line of Russian views on the matter [is]: no
nationality in the Russian Federation has the right to separate from the country”. 382
Notwithstanding that this observation is made regarding Russian theory of IL, Mälksoo has
also asserted that these views of Russian scholars from the ‘statist’ school correspond with
380
Ibid.
381
382
Mälksoo, p. 126.
58
Russian State Practice.383 Socher also addresses how RSD was “deemed to be subordinate to
Russia’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity” by the Russian Constitutional Court on two
accounts.384 When it comes to the accession of other regions to Russia, however, a
fundamentally different approach to external self-determination is taken. Interestingly, Russia
turns the argument around in the current crisis and claims that Ukraine withholds ethnic
Russian peoples and Russian territories from reuniting with Russia, therefore threatening (an
extension of) Russian State sovereignty. Altogether, this indicates a trend of opportunistic
interpretations of RSD in favour of Russian interests, at least whenever Russia is directly
involved in a conflict.
4.2. The Russian Approach to Ukraine in light of the Responsibility to Protect
What, then, does this mean for Russia’s approach to R2P? In basic terms, R2P prioritizes the
protection of individuals’ HR over State sovereignty. That is a general Western approach to
IL.385 That approach is unsuitable for Russian State Practice in the first decade of the 21st
century.386 Taking into account the Russian non-interventionist State Practice in Libya and
Syria, it makes sense that Russia is reluctant to accept the premise from which R2P departs.
Especially after NATO’s mission slip in Libya, R2P was merely perceived as a pretext to
achieve Western goals.387 In both Libya and Syria, Russia’s State Practice corresponds with
383
Mälksoo, p. 99. See also Shavkat Kasymov, ‘Statism in Russia: The implications for US-Russian relations’ [2012]
3 J Eurasian St 58-68, p. 61.
384
Socher, citing Paola Gaeta, ‘The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court’ [1996]
7 EJIL 563-570.
385
Not all Western States adhere to such notions, but the Western P3 generally do (France, UK, US).
386
Russian State Practice in Libya and Syria is largely befitting of its earlier State Practice with regard to R2P
objectives. See Chapter 2.1 to that end.
387
See e.g. UNSCOR, 66th sess, 6627th mtg (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, p. 4, stating that “[t]he
international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in
the NATO implementation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to
protect”. See also Baranovsky et al., p. 58.
59
Pillar I and II measures,388 but remains fiercely reluctant to allow coercive measures under
Pillar III – especially in Syria.389
In the context of Ukraine, Russia does not explicitly refer to R2P. However, its objectives seem
to correspond wholly with Pillar I and II. In stating how the Kyiv regime commits atrocities
against the Donbas population with a Russian background,390 Russia points out Ukraine’s
responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes. Russia shows support for
Pillar II’s diplomatic and non-coercive measures when repeatedly reaffirming the importance
of the Minsk agreements and stating that it is in the best interests of the “internal Ukrainian
crisis” for the Ukrainian government to engage in dialogue with the Donbas oblasts.391 Russia
explicitly states that Ukraine, unlike Libya and Syria, is spared the obligation to engage in
dialogue by the UNSC.392 This narrative indicates that Russia supports the collective
responsibility of the international community to encourage Ukraine to protect its population
through non-coercive measures, but that it partly blames its “Western colleagues, led by the
[US]” for the failure of such approaches,393 claiming that they and Ukraine, in unison, have
forced Russia’s hand to resort to military force.394
Pillar III is where we see a significant change in the Russian approach. Whereas previously,
Russia constantly reaffirmed the importance of UNSC authorization before taking military
measures, it has now resorted to unilateral use of force to protect the Donbas population from
388
See Chapter 2.4.
389
See Chapter 2.4.
390
Most importantly genocide. See e.g. UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974,
p. 12, stating that “The purpose of the special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to abuse
and genocide by the Kyiv regime for eight years”. See also ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’
(Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 21 February 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828> accessed 15 September 2022.
391
392
393
Ibid.
394
2022, stating that Russia has “done everything to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity”.
60
mass atrocity crimes allegedly committed by the Ukrainian government. The violation of
Ukrainian State sovereignty is justified by PNA (self-defence)395 and the right to external self-
determination of these ethnic Russians, to which they are entitled because of their severe
oppression under the illegitimate Ukrainian government, which has caused Ukraine’s
sovereignty to diminish.396 An important reason as to why Russia considers Ukraine’s
sovereignty limited, is because it supposedly no longer represents its population’s interests.397
In the cases of Libya and Syria, there was no such limited sovereignty, despite the atrocities
that were committed against the civilian population in these States. In contrast to Russia’s
unilateral invasion of Ukraine, Russia has tirelessly blocked intervention in the Syrian crisis up
until recently,398 despite the continued civilian suffering.399
As such, Russia’s State Practice in Ukraine – when compared to Libya and Syria – reformulates
R2P objectives in favour of its own conduct. Yet it also signals a significant departure from
Russia’s earlier State Practice concerning R2P, in which it held that Pillar III could only be
invoked when UNSC authorization was granted. The traditional State-centric view that Russia
has mainly articulated throughout the past two decades is only present in contemporary Russian
State Practice when it comes to Russian sovereignty, but not with regard to Ukrainian
sovereignty.
395
This thesis previously established that Russia sees the ethnic Russians as Russian citizens to an extent, yet it
provides no legal reasoning for this designation. See Chapter 3.3.2.
396
stating that the Ukrainian government “no longer acts in a national capacity and consistently pushes Ukraine
towards losing its sovereignty”.
397
Ibid.
398
See fn. 132, indicating the sixteen resolutions concerning the Syrian crisis that Russia has vetoed.
399
See fn. 134 and 135, indicating that over half a million Syrians have been killed and millions have been
displaced.
61
Therefore, Russian State Practice in Ukraine suggests that not all States are equally sovereign.
In fact, this directly opposes one of Russia’s first responses to R2P, which was rather similar
to Russia’s non-interventionist approach to Libya and Syria:
Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force (…) is unlawful and poses a
threat to (…) the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce (…)
concepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” in order to justify
unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable.400
Altogether, significant normative development of the Russian State Practice concerning R2P’s
Pillar III is seen when comparing these cases. As opposed to the State-centric and non-
interventionist approach taken in Libya and Syria, the Russo-Ukrainian War signals a
movement towards the stance that State sovereignty may indeed be limited in order to prevent
or stop mass human rights violations in particular situations.
Two such situations follow from the case study of the Russo-Ukrainian War. First, when RSD
of Russian minorities is at stake. Russia seems to have developed a progressive approach to
RSD.401 There have been multiple occasions, Ukraine (2022) included, where Russia has
downplayed the State sovereignty of other States in favour of the right to (external) self-
determination of ethnic Russian minorities. Second, when Russian sovereignty is competing
against another State’s sovereignty. Russia’s designation of Ukraine as losing its sovereignty
and thereby justifying unilateral intervention by Russia signals a departure from the traditional
notion of Westphalian sovereignty as enshrined in Article 2(1) UN charter, which articulates
that all States are equally sovereign. The result is a Russian approach that is still relatively
State-centric, but no longer as strictly as was the case in Libya and Syria. Instead, Russia’s
400
‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (as archived by the Federation of American Scientists,
28 June 2000) <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm> accessed 3 October 2022.
401
To accurately address this development, further research into the trend throughout Georgia (2008), Crimea
(2014) and Ukraine (2022) is required.
62
contemporary approach to State sovereignty conveys an opportunistic interpretation of State
sovereignty that prioritizes Russian State sovereignty above other States’ sovereignty.
63
5. Conclusion
5.1. General Conclusion
This thesis has ventured to chart Russia’s State Practice in three distinct cases from roughly
the past decade that involve R2P. Following its analysis of Russian arguments and justifications
for its conduct in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, a significant normative development in its
reasoning with respect to R2P (Pillar III) objectives is pointed out.
The comparison of Russia’s approaches to Pillars I and II of R2P throughout Libya, Syria and
Ukraine provides a rather consistent pattern of conduct. In all three cases, Russia vouches for
diplomatic resolutions to the crises and to not intervene until all available avenues have been
exhausted. The fundamental difference is found in Russia’s approach to Pillar III. Whereas
Russia took a non-interventionist and State-centric approach to Libya and Syria, the Russian
approach is now characterized by the notion that State sovereignty may be limited when
fundamental HR of the Russian population are at stake.
5.2. Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2 has demonstrated the Russian non-interventionist and State-centric approach to
Libya in which it preferred non-coercive measures. Ultimately, Russia did not obstruct UNSC
authorization to intervene in Libya, “guided by (…) common humanitarian values that we
share”,402 despite its serious doubts concerning Resolution 1973.403 NATO’s ‘mission slip’
confirmed Russia’s suspicions that R2P might be used as a pretext to achieve Western goals
(e.g. regime change in Libya) and reinforced a severely strict non-interventionist and State-
402
403
Ibid.
64
centric Russian approach to the nearly concurrent Syrian crisis. Up until now, Russia has
vetoed any resolutions that it feared might interfere with Syrian State sovereignty.404
Chapter 3 thoroughly analyzed the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War. The annexation of
Crimea is closely connected to the contemporary Russo-Ukrainian War, both because of the
larger Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and because of a visible trend in Russia’s conduct and its
justifications in both Crimea (2014) and Ukraine (2022). Both the RSD of the ethnic Russian
population in the Donbas and the protection of ‘nationals’ abroad – the very same ethnic
Russians – are repeatedly provided by Russia as a justification for its unilateral military
invasion of Ukraine.405
Chapter 4 pits both major justifications provided by Russia for its invasion of Ukraine against
the non-interventionist approaches in the Libyan and Syrian crises. Russia does not explicitly
address R2P in its narrative surrounding Ukraine. Moreover, the two main justifications
provided by Russia for its invasion of Ukraine – RSD and PNA – are not applicable to the
Libyan and Syrian crises. It is therefore difficult to point out an exact Russian position.
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the comparative analysis of Russia’s approach to Libya,
Syria and Ukraine points out an opportunistic interpretation of R2P objectives in favour of
Russia’s conduct, in addition to a significant development concerning the overarching notion
of State sovereignty. The latter is observed in two different ways. First, as opposed to (strict)
non-intervention in Libya and Syria, Russia now suggests through its unilateral use of force
against Ukraine that State sovereignty is not absolute and may be limited in favour of
404
See fn. 132.
405
2022, stating that “This does not mean that nations cannot enjoy the right to self-determination, which is
enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter” and “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who (…) have
been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. See also UN SCOR, 77th sess, 8974th mtg
(23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, pp. 11-12.
65
fundamental HR, such as RSD and to protect civilian populations from mass human rights
abuses (PNA).406 Secondly, Russia’s perception of Ukraine “losing” its sovereignty407 – as
opposed to its tireless protection of Syrian State sovereignty408 – implicates a departure from
the Westphalian notion of State sovereignty by which all States are equally sovereign.409
5.3. Final Remarks
This thesis takes Russia’s claims regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War and attempts to derive its
stance on different aspects of R2P. While Russia’s reasoning corresponds with R2P-related
arguments, R2P itself is not explicitly addressed by Russia with respect to the Russo-Ukrainian
War and the doctrine is yet to be invoked in the UNSC. Instead, Russia relies on arguments
that have not been prominent in previous cases like Libya and Syria, such as RSD and PNA.
In order to effectively compare the three cases, the comparative analysis of Russia’s approaches
was based on the overarching notion of State sovereignty, as R2P detracts from State
sovereignty’s prevalence in favour of the protection of mass HR. The principles that Russia
utilizes to justify its invasion of Ukraine were then analyzed and connected to Russia’s
approach to State sovereignty in Libya and Syria, in order to point out any changes in its
approach to R2P. This connection can be argued to not fully reflect Russia’s position on the
matter. The thesis is therefore limited in the sense that it cannot provide Russia’s exact position
on R2P with regard to the current Russo-Ukrainian War. Future UNSC discussions concerning
the Russo-Ukrainian War might clarify Russia’s position on the matter further.
Another limitation is that not every aspect of the Russo-Ukrainian War has been fleshed out to
inform the R2P analysis. This pertains to both Russian arguments and case studies. First, Russia
406
It must be noted that PNA and the protection of civilians from mass atrocity crimes are not one and the same,
but they happen to coincide according to Russia’s narrative in the case of Ukraine.
407
408
See fn. 132.
409
See UN Charter, art. 2(1).
66
has provided other justifications for its invasion of Ukraine, such as pre-emptive (or
preventive)410 self-defence.411 This corresponds with the Russian narrative of Kyiv’s
cooperation with NATO and its goal to further move the NATO bloc towards Russia’s borders,
therefore threatening Russia’s security.412 However, the discussion surrounding the principle
of pre-emptive self-defence is very comprehensive. Differing translations of Putin’s words and
disagreement among scholars and States further complicate the debate surrounding Russia’s
stance on pre-emptive or preventive self-defence.413 Another justification provided by Russia
is that of intervention upon invitation.414 The scope of this thesis does not allow for extensive
analysis of all of Russia’s arguments, but it must be acknowledged that this might further
benefit the analysis of Russia’s R2P State Practice. Secondly, other cases could be studied and
provide relevant perspectives for analysis of Russia’s approach to R2P objectives. Two of these
have been mentioned before, which are the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008).
Multiple academic works cited in this thesis point out a developing trend in the Russian
approach to RSD based on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea.415 The current situation in
Ukraine seems to fit into that trend, but this thesis was limited to a case study of Ukraine and
410
Compare e.g. The Kremlin, ‘Victory Parade on Red Square’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 9 May 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68366> accessed 28 September 2022; Alper Ali Raza, ‘Putin
pleads preventive self-defence’ (Cyprus Mail, 15 May 2022) <https://cyprus-mail.com/2022/05/15/putin-
pleads-preventive-self-defence/> accessed 28 September 2022. Whereas the Kremlin website provides “pre-
emptive” as a translation, Raza refers to Putin’s speech as containing “preventive”.
411
The Kremlin, ‘Victory Parade on Red Square’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 9 May 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68366> accessed 28 September 2022, in which Putin states
in his speech “Russia launched a pre-emptive strike at the aggression [from Ukraine]”.
412
413
Compare e.g. The Kremlin, ‘Victory Parade on Red Square’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 9 May 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68366> accessed 28 September 2022; Alper Ali Raza, ‘Putin
pleads preventive self-defence’ (Cyprus Mail, 15 May 2022) <https://cyprus-mail.com/2022/05/15/putin-
pleads-preventive-self-defence/> accessed 28 September 2022; Marko Milanovic, ‘What is Russia’s Legal
Justification for Using Force against Ukraine?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 24 February 2022) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-
russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-against-ukraine/> accessed 28 September 2022.
414
2022, stating that "The people's republic of Donbass have asked Russia for help". See also UN SCOR, 77th sess,
8974th mtg (23 February 2022) UN Doc S/PV.8974, p. 12.
415
See e.g. Marxsen, p. 387; Mälksoo, p. 180; Baranovsky et al., p. 49 (Abstract). See also Socher.
67
did not include in-depth case studies of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. Further research
into such cases is therefore desirable, if the trend concerning RSD in Russian State Practice is
to be accurately addressed.
Finally, as the Russo-Ukrainian War wages on, future developments might shed new light on
Russia’s approach to R2P objectives. Putin’s most recent speech saw Russia’s argument of
RSD expand to other Ukrainian oblasts, stating that Russia’s goal is now “to protect the
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Russia and support the desire and will of our
compatriots to choose their future independently”.416 After the recent accession of the oblasts
of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to the Russian Federation,417 the question
remains to what extent Russia will continue to infringe upon Ukrainian territorial sovereignty,
and provide RSD and PNA as justifications.
416
21 September 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390> accessed 21 September 2022.
417
The Kremlin, ‘Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and
Kherson regions to Russia’ (Kremlin Presidential Executive Office, 30 September 2022)
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465> accessed 6 October 2022.
68
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The Russian Federation’s Approach to the

Milan C.F. Jansen

Student number: 1270701

Tilburg University Law School

Thesis LLM: International Law & Global Governance

Supervisor: Dr. Leena Grover

Co-reader: Ben Grama

Word count (excluding citations, table of contents, indexes, summary,

bibliography and appendices): 13.610

1.1. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ...................................................................................................... 6

2. CASE STUDIES OF LIBYA AND SYRIA .............................................................................................. 14

2.1. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO R2P UP UNTIL LIBYA ........................................................................... 14

3. CASE STUDY OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR ........................................................................... 32

4. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LIBYA, SYRIA AND UKRAINE.................................... 55

5.1. GENERAL CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 64

LEGISLATION, TREATIES AND UN RESOLUTIONS .......................................................................................... 69

Assad Bashar al-Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa1

FRY Former Republic of Yugoslavia

HRMMU Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine

ICC International Criminal Court

ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ICJ International Court of Justice

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IHRL International Human Rights Law

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

P3 Western Permanent Member States of the United Nations

PNA The protection of nationals abroad

Putin Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation

Qadhafi Muammar al-Qadhafi, former leader of Libya

R2P The Responsibility to Protect

RSD The right to self-determination

Russia The Russian Federation

Syria The Syrian Arab Republic

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSG United Nations Secretary-General

US United States of America

signaling a significant development in its approach to R2P.

power of one or more of the P5.

like Syria cast doubts over the effectiveness of the norm.

1.2. The Russian Approach to the Responsibility to Protect

followed Libya. However, Russia’s contribution to the normative and non-Western

characterized as reluctant and non-interventionist, prioritizing State sovereignty over human

West’ pursuing ‘Western’ goals through instrumentalization of R2P. ‘Non-interventionist’

refers to the principle of non-intervention (Article 2, paragraph 4, UN Charter), meaning that,

from its previous non-interventionist State Practice in Libya and Syria.

1.3. Research Gap, Societal and Academic Relevance & Limitations

in the hostilities on the ground. That is an unprecedented situation in R2P-related cases.

Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.30 It is therefore unlikely

of the art, the Russo-Ukrainian War has not (yet).

fundamentally non-interventionist approach, whereas that approach changed significantly in

three cases of Libya, Syria and Ukraine are compared.

on R2P do not justify an in-depth analysis of the cases of Georgia.

for understanding Russia’s position on R2P.

1.4. Research Questions and Methodology

The main research question that is addressed in this thesis is:

(2022), compared to the Libyan and Syrian crises (2011)?

• How can Russia’s approach to R2P up until Libya (2011) be characterized?