Limits of Firepower: An Interview with Gen.

Robert Scales

HOMEFRONT
Dirty Harry is lucky
I\\PMJW`WЅKM

A CIT Y UNDER SIEGE — SPRING 1972

HEROES WHO GAVE THEIR ALL TO SAVE SOUTH VIETNAM

rs
Jungle Critteth
fe e bush
in
Menacing w ild li
a r ing t o Sav e a Life
D brea k r u les
s
T wo U.S. sold ierou nded a lly
to rescue a w

South Vietnamese soldiers

encounter small-arms fire
from communist troops
south of embattled An Loc
in April 1972.

AUTUMN 2023
HISTORYNET.com

Cut, Color, Carat, Clarity…Chemistry?
I
s it possible that the mind of a
scientist can create more beauty
and romance than Mother Nature?
The Ultimate Diamond Alternative®,
DiamondAura®, was created with one
mission in mind: Create brilliant cut
jewelry that allows everyone to experience
more clarity, more scintillation and
larger carat weights than they have ever
experienced. So, we’ve taken 2 ½ carats
of our Ultimate Diamond Alternative®
DiamondAura® and set them in the most
classic setting—the result is our most
stunning, fiery, faceted design yet! In
purely scientific measurement terms, the
refractory index of these stones is very
high, and the color dispersion is actually
superior to mined diamonds.
Perfection from science. We named
our brilliant cut diamond alternative
stones DiamondAura because “they
dazzle just like natural diamonds but
without the outrageous cost.” We will
not bore you with the incredible details
of the scientific process, but will only say
that it involves the use of rare minerals
heated to an incredibly high temperature
of nearly 5000˚F. This can only be
accomplished inside some very modern
and expensive laboratory equipment.
After several additional steps, scientists
finally created a clear marvel that looks
“I can’t begin to describe this gorgeous ring...it is
absolutely stunning. The workmanship and style
is out of this world. Please order this ring, you
The Fifth C?
COMPARE THE BRILLIANCE, FIRE & PRICE
Mined Flawless DiamondAura
Diamond Classique Ring
Hardness Cuts Glass Cuts Glass
Cut (58 facets) Brilliant Brilliant
Color “D” Colorless “D” Colorless
Clarity “IF” Clear
Dispersion/Fire 0.044 0.066
2½ ctw ring $60,000+ $39
even better than the vast majority of
mined diamonds. According to the book
Jewelry and Gems–the Buying Guide,
the technique used in our diamond
alternative DiamondAura® offers, “The
best diamond simulation to date, and
even some jewelers have mistaken these
stones for mined diamonds.”
The 4 C’s. Our 3-Stone Classique
Ring retains every jeweler’s specification:
color, clarity, cut, and carat weight.
The transparent color and clarity of
our diamond alternative DiamondAura®
emulate the most perfect diamonds—D
Flawless, and both are so hard they will
cut glass. The brilliant cut maximizes the
fire and radiance of the stone so that the
light disperses into an exquisite rainbow
of colors.
Rock solid guarantee. This .925
sterling silver ring is prong-set with a 1 ½
won’t be disappointed.”
— J., Stuart, FL
Receive these
scintillating Ultimate
Diamond Alternative™,
DiamondAura® Classique
sterling silver stud
earrings FREE!
Read details below.
carat round brilliant stone in the center,
showcased between two round brilliants
stones of ½ carat each. Adding to your
4 C’s, we will include our Ultimate
Diamond Alternative® DiamondAura®
stud earrings for FREE! Try the
DiamondAura® 3-Stone Classique Ring
at $39 for 30 days. If for any reason
you are not satisfied with your purchase,
simply return it to us for a full refund of
the item purchase price and keep the stud
earrings as our gift.
Not Available in Stores
3-Stone Classique Ring
Classique Ring—a $99 value!
Available in whole sizes 5-10
You must use the offer code to get our
special price.
1-800-333-2045
Your Offer Code: DAR984-05
† Special price only for customers using the offer
code versus the price on Stauer.com without your
offer code.
14101 Southcross Drive W.,
Ste 155, Dept. DAR984-05,
Burnsville, Minnesota 55337
www.stauer.com
 NOW IN TWO COLOR CHOICES – DRESS BLACK OR SAGE GREEN – PLUS CONCEAL CARRY OPTION!

THE VIETNAM VETERAN PLUS A

FREE
MA-1 FLIGHT JACKET Now available in Sage Green!
PATCH!

Add an American Flag

Patch for just $20!
FREE VIETNAM VETERAN PATCH
FREE VETERAN ZIPPER PULL
PLUS OPTIONAL WAR PATCHES
OUR VETERANS COMMEMORATIVES U.S. MILITARY
MA-1 FLIGHT JACKET is inspired by historic Military
flight jackets and updated to meet NASA’s
specifications. It's personalized to honor your service
to Country and reflect today's active lifestyles:
• Tailored in rugged wind and water-resistant
Dress Black or Sage Green fabric, comfort
rated at temperatures between 25-40°F
for three-season wear.
• Quality features include “fell stitching”
for superior fit, knit collar, cuffs and
waistband, high visibility orange inner
lining, heavy duty front zipper with storm
flap, multiple snap closure pockets - plus
utility pocket on sleeve. Your MA-1 Jacket
will be personalized with your choices of
Custom Features and Honor Patches.
• EXCLUSIVE CONCEAL CARRY OPTION -
Inside Right and Left universal handgun
padded CCW pockets, four mag pouches and ADD CONCEAL CARRY
two “snap-closure Slash pockets.” TWIN HANDGUN POCKETS
• Thank You Introductory price starting at just $99. FOR JUST $30 EXTRA.

FREE
PATCH HONORS ADD A
YOUR SERVICE SERVICE
FREE Vietnam Veteran BRANCH
patch as our GIFT with PATCH
jacket purchase. FOR $20

ORDER TODAY &

RECEIVE A FREE
ZIPPER PULL! !    
 ! 
OR COMPLETE ORDER FORM BELOW AND MAIL TO: Veterans Commemoratives™, P.O. Box 572, Valley Forge, PA 19481-0572
  I wish to order my Vietnam Veteran MA-1 Flight Jacket as follows: !  !!!!!
Please include my FREE Vietnam Veteran Patch & Zipper Pull! Enclosed is my check payable to Veterans Commemoratives for the Total Due
! BLACK SAGE Charge my credit card for the Total Due
Charge my credit card in two equal interest-free monthly payments
 !!! S M LG XL XXL† 3XL†
! ! !! !  !   !! ................ $ 99.00  ! Visa MasterCard American Express Discover
Conceal Carry Feature (Add $30) ..................................... $_________ CC#: _________________________________________ Exp.: ____ /____
Service Branch Patch* for right sleeve (Add $20)............ $_________ Card Security Code (CSC): _______ Signature: ____________________
MA1JKT-VTN-1023

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Coast Guard

 ! ! Allow 2-3 weeks for delivery.
American Flag Patch for left shoulder (Add $20) ............. $_________
Name ______________________________________________________
† Sizes XXL to 3XL (Add $20)............................................ $_________
Address ____________________________________________________
Plus Shipping & Handling ..................................................... $ 19.95
City__________________________________ State_____ Zip __________
TOTAL DUE: .......................................................................... $_________
© ICM 2023

*Service Branch Patches are purchased from Officially Licensed suppliers.

Phone _____________________ Email __________________________
(In case we have questions and to advise ship date of your order)
By federal law, licensing fees paid to the U.S. Army for use of its trademarks provide support to the Army Trademark Licensing Program, and net licensing revenue is devoted to U.S. Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs.
 AUTUMN ON THE COVER
2023 South Vietnamese
soldiers of the 5th Airborne
Brigade face NVA fire
along Highway 13 south of
An Loc on April 10, 1972.
DIRCK HALSTEAD/GETTY IMAGES,
COLORIZATION: BRIAN WALKER;
INSET: SILVER SCREEN COLLECTION/
GETTY IMAGES

22 UNCOMMON
VALOR AT AN LOC
American advisers rallied South
Vietnamese troops in a valiant
[\IVLWЄIOIQV[\KWUU]VQ[\NWZKM[
*a2WPV,0W_IZL

2 VIETNAM
 6 Feedback   :MÆMK\QWV[ “The Vietnamese
8 Intel Chow Line Invasion, Water Buffalo
giant forest
A Long-Overdue Welcome Home 56 Media Digest scorpion can
14 Tactics 64 Hall of Valor grow up to
Mobile Riverine Force Highest-Scoring American Sniper
16 Arsenal
12 inches long.”
The U.S. Navy’s River Monitors —See story, page 50

EYEWITNESS TO WITHDRAWAL
Did Nixon’s Vietnamization policy ever
stand a chance? A former signal sergeant who
experienced the U.S. drawdown weighs in.
By David L. Anderson

38
30
DARING TO SAVE A LIFE
What if an allied soldier was critically wounded
but U.S. policy dictated you should not help him?
Two American soldiers faced a fateful choice.
By John B. Haseman and John M. Harris

WILDLIFE OF VIETNAM
Every soldier who fought in Vietnam
seems to have a wildlife story (or two).
Here’s a look at some critters and
crawlies that could be found in the bush.
By Zita Ballinger Fletcher

46
50
THE LIMITS OF FIREPOWER
Drawing both on experience and expertise,
Gen. Robert Scales weighs the blessings and
curses of artillery in relation to the Vietnam War
in this exclusive interview. By Warren Wilkins
VISIT HISTORYNET.COM
TRENDING NOW
Hero or Serial Killer?
Hiroo Onoda earned respect for refusing
to surrender for three decades after World
War II. A new documentary exposes his
murderous crimes against Filipino civilians.
By Zita Ballinger Fletcher
www.historynet.com/hiroo-onoda-serial-
killer-documentary
PLUS!
Today in History
What happened today, yesterday—
or any day you care to search.
Daily Quiz
Test your historical acumen—every day!
What If?
Consider the fallout of historical events
had they gone the ‘other’ way.
Weapons & Gear
The gadgetry of war—new and old—
effective, and not-so effective.
HISTORYNET
Sign up for our FREE e-newsletter, delivered
twice weekly, at historynet.com/newsletters
MICHAEL A. REINSTEIN CHAIRMAN & PUBLISHER
AUTUMN 2023 VOL. 36, NO. 2
ZITA BALLINGER FLETCHER EDITOR
LARRY PORGES SENIOR EDITOR
JERRY MORELOCK SENIOR EDITOR
JON GUTTMAN RESEARCH DIRECTOR
DAVID T. ZABECKI EDITOR EMERITUS
HARRY SUMMERS JR. FOUNDING EDITOR
BRIAN WALKER GROUP DESIGN DIRECTOR
ALEX GRIFFITH DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAPHY
JON C. BOCK ART DIRECTOR
GUY ACETO PHOTO EDITOR
DANA B. SHOAF EDITOR IN CHIEF
CLAIRE BARRETT NEWS AND SOCIAL EDITOR
ADVISORY BOARD
JOHN HOWARD, JIM KNOTTS, BARRY McCAFFREY,
PAUL MORANDO, CARL O. SCHUSTER, EARL H. TILFORD JR.,
SPENCER C. TUCKER, JAMES H. WILLBANKS, HEIDI ZIMMERMAN
CORPORATE
KELLY FACER SVP REVENUE OPERATIONS
MATT GROSS VP DIGITAL INITIATIVES
ROB WILKINS DIRECTOR OF PARTNERSHIP MARKETING
JAMIE ELLIOTT SENIOR DIRECTOR, PRODUCTION
TORU KAWASHIMA/YOMIMURI SHIMBUN (ASSOCIATED PRESS); CHANSOM PANTIP (ISTOCK.COM); PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY BRIAN WALKER
ADVERTISING
MORTON GREENBERG SVP Advertising Sales mgreenberg@mco.com
TERRY JENKINS Regional Sales Manager tjenkins@historynet.com
DIRECT RESPONSE ADVERTISING
MEDIA PEOPLE / NANCY FORMAN
nforman@mediapeople.com
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION 800-435-0715 or SHOP.HISTORYNET.com
Vietnam (ISSN 1046-2902) is published quarterly by
HISTORYNET, LLC, 901 North Glebe Road, Fifth Floor, Arlington, VA 22203
Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices.
Postmaster, send address changes to
Vietnam, P.O. Box 900, Lincolnshire, IL 60069-0900
List Rental Inquiries: Belkys Reyes, Lake Group Media, Inc.
914-925-2406; belkys.reyes@lakegroupmedia.com
Canada Publications Mail Agreement No. 41342519
Canadian GST No. 821371408RT0001
© 2023 HISTORYNET, LLC
The contents of this magazine may not be reproduced
in whole or in part without the written consent of HISTORYNET, LLC.
PROUDLY MADE IN THE USA
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ISSUED

GOLD AMERICAN EAGLES

IV E
EXCLUS
In God W
e Trust
AT- CFOESRT
OF

1,965
Only
U.S. ARMED FORCES
$ PLUS
FREE
HONORING ALL WHO SERVED SILVER
EACH
AT COST, ABSOLUTELY NO DEALER MARK UP! CALL NOW!
Beginning today, Nationwide Coin & Bullion Reserve will take orders on a first-come, first-served basis for these beautiful one ounce $50 Gold
American Eagle coins. Gold Eagles are the perfect way for Americans to protect their wealth and hedge against inflation and financial uncertainty.
This offer is for new customers only.. There is a strict limit of one coin per household, per lifetime. Nationwide has set these one ounce $50 Gold
Eagles at the incredible price of only $1,965.00 each. There are no mark ups, no premiums, and no dealer fees. This at-cost offer is meant to help
ease the American public’s transition into the safety of gold. Call 1-800-211-9263 today and take advantage of this amazing offer!

Rated “EXCELLENT”
WHAT OUR CUSTOMERS ARE SAYING
VERIFIED CUSTOMER REVIEWS
First time Buyer Made Easy... My rep called me and made it Received my coins today
so easy to purchase gold for the first time. In fact I enjoyed it so much I It was fast in shipping! The transaction was also smooth and
bought gold a second time and will purchase gold every quarter. the rep was knowledgeable. So great to know this company
Laurence Purchased their introductory and its potential! Kalvin
offer Purchased their introductory
offer. Had a very good experience. No
issues whatsoever.
I received perfect coins... I couldn’t be happier with my pur- Richard M. I have made numerous purchases from… Nationwide Coin &
chase from Nationwide. Fast secure shipping, nicely packaged in excellent Bullion and have always found the experience to be very easy and pleasur-
coin displays. Friendly salesman that are knowledgeable and make sure able. My representative has always been professional, knowledgeable and
you have a great experience. David J. had my best interest at heart. Tom D.

SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT PACKAGES

FREE SILVER, CALL TODAY! Now Available
As a special thank you, for your order of
one $50 Gold American Eagle, Nationwide
will send you a brand new perfect MS70
condition Silver American Eagle, hand
signed by legendary retired U.S. Mint Lead Call today to learn more about our special-arrangement pack-
Sculptor Don Everhart, absolutely FREE! ages that offer discounted premium-grade precious metals.
FREE GOLD AND/OR SILVER COINS IN EACH PACKAGE.
MENTION KEY CODE WHEN CALLING
CHECK KEY CODE: VNM-230801
Ad creation date 6/19/2023. Actual price may be higher or lower due to fluctuations in the gold market. Call for the lowest current price. Nationwide Coin & Bullion Reserve is a retailer of precious
metals and rare coins and does not provide investment advice or financial planning. Anyone considering purchasing metals or rare coins as an investment should consult an investment professional.
Any and all claims and disputes that may arise between customer and Nationwide Coin & Bullion Reserve, including its employees, are to be settled by arbitration in the state of Texas, county of
Harris. The arbitration shall be conducted on a confidential basis pursuant to the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. All transactions with and purchases from
Nationwide Coin & Bullion Reserve are subject to its Terms & Conditions which are available for review on its website at www.nationwidecoins.com/terms-conditions. Coin dates may vary.
 The M50 Ontos had six forward-facing
106mm recoilless rifles capable of firing
either high-explosive or flechette rounds.
Editors’ Response: The M50 Ontos was
designed as an anti-armor system, but there
were not very many VC/NVA tanks to fight in
Vietnam at that stage of the war. So the prima-
ry—but not only—use in Vietnam became
bunker or other hardened position busting. The
106mm had two primary types of ammunition,
HEAT and flechette, used for hard and soft
targets respectively.
The main problem with the Ontos is that all
six of the guns were externally mounted on the
hull, which means that they had to be reloaded
manually from the outside. So once all six tubes
were fired, the crew had to pull back from
enemy contact in order to reload. Furthermore,
before you even engaged targets it was helpful to

Anti-Armor
have some idea of what kind of targets you were
most likely to encounter. If you were sent up

System
against a bunker it wasn’t very useful to be
loaded with flechette.
The six externally mounted guns were
bore-sighted to shoot parallel to the direction of
fire. The mount holding the six guns had a
40-degree traverse, so it was not necessary to
The Summer 2023 issue of Vietnam shows and describes
aim by pointing the whole vehicle.
the M50 Ontos with six forward-facing 106mm recoilless ri-
The Ontos and its forerunner, the M56
ÆM[1_I[IV)ZUa0LQZMK\ÅZMKZM_UIV\ZIQVMLWV Scorpion, were the closest things the U.S. ever
\PMIVL\PM!UUZMKWQTTM[[ZQÆM[1V>QM\VIU_Q\P had to the German assault guns of World War II.
\PM!\P4QOP\1VNIV\Za*ZQOILM1KIZZQML\PM!QV Those German tracked guns were turretless and
KWUJI\[Q\]I\QWV[?MPILIIVLQ\[RMMXI\\PMÅZMJI[M only fired straight ahead. There were some other
<PM¼[IVLM^MV\PM!¼[XZQUIZaX]Z- key differences. The German assault guns had
FEEDBACK XW[M_I[IV\Q̆\IVS1VM^MZMVKW]V\MZML only a single gun, but it was internally mounted
MVMUa\IVS[IVL_MKIZZQML\PM!UW[\Ta and reloaded from inside the vehicle. Most of
JMKI][MQ\_I[UWZMMЄMK\Q^MIOIQV[\J]VSMZ[\PIV\PM the German assault guns did not have a turret,
4)??PI\_MLQLPI^M_MZMÆMKPM\\MZW]VL["IJW]\ and the only way to aim the gun was by pointing
\QVaIZZW_[IJW]\\PM\PQKSVM[[WNIXMVKQTTMIL1[]XXW[M the entire vehicle. The German guns had very
aW]KW]TLKWUXIZMQ\\W\PMMY]Q^ITMV\WNOZIXM[PW\WZ[PW\- heavy frontal armor and could withstand a
O]V_Q\PI_QLMVQVOIVLLM^I[\I\QVO[XZMIL1LWV¼\]VLMZ- pretty heavy hit, but the Ontos not so much.
[\IVLPW_\PM7V\W[_W]TL][MQ\[[<PMWVTa\PQVO1 However, its very steep-sloped front meant that
it generally had a good chance of deflecting most
KIV\PQVSWNQ[\PI\\PMa_W]TL][MÆMKPM\\MZW]VL[IOIQV[\
frontal shots from RPGs.
TIZOMOZW]X[WNI\\IKSQVOMVMUa1\TWWS[TQSM\PMO]V[KW]TL
VW\JMUW^ML?W]TLITTJMXZMTWILML\WJMI^IQTIJTMITTI\
WVKM'<PMMV\QZM^MPQKTM_W]TLPI^M\WJM¹IQUMLºNWZIVa Man vs. Machine
][MWN\PM I was with the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines in
)\.WZ\0WWLQV!!JMNWZMUa>QM\VIU\W]ZW]Z[Y]IL Vietnam from April ’68–May ’69. Our team in
TMILMZIKIZMMZ;O\*]ZSM_I[KITTMLWV\WLWILMUWV[\ZI- the FDC was excellent and we did have a FADAC
\QWVNWZ[WUM^Q[Q\QVOJQO_QO[1JMTQM^M\PMKTIQU_I[\PI\ in the FDC bunker. It was covered and never
PMIVL\PMKW]TLPQ\I\MTMXPWVMXWTMI\!aIZL[_Q\P used. We, led by Sgt. Bickford, would have given
\PMO]VLQ[UW]V\MLNZWU\PMRMMXIVLPQULWQVO\PMIQU that computer a run for its money.
IVLÅZMWN0-ZW]VL[1JMTQM^M\PMKTIQU_I[PM_W]TLPQ\ Mike Casey, Philadelphia, Pa.
Q\I\TMI[\WVKMW]\WN\PZMM[PW\[IVL1¼UXZM\\a[]ZM1[I_
CORBIS VIA GETTY IMAGES

Q\LWVM -UIQTaW]ZNMMLJIKSWVVietnam magazine to

vietnam@historynet.com[]JRMK\TQVM".MMLJIKS
2QU1V\ZI^QI5MLNWZL6A=;)ZUa>QM\VIU^M\MZIV)XZQT 8TMI[MQVKT]LMKQ\aIVL[\I\MWNZM[QLMVKM
! ·)XZQT!)UMZQKIT,Q^Q[QWV!\P4QOP\1VNIV\Za*ZQOILM+
2]Ta¼!·)XZQT¼;8̆.QZMJI[M["4B*ITLaIVL\PM0I_S0QTT @VietnamMag

6 VIETNAM
A Stirring Tribute to Our Heroic Vietnam Veterans

Shown smaller
than actual size
of 8" H x 8½" W

Honoring a Brotherhood Bound in Courage. Limited Edition — Order Today.

This stately commemorative pays tribute to the outstanding men and
women who served in Vietnam, where they experienced a treacherous
new type of warfare that would determine their story and their enduring
bond one with another. It features a genuine glass panel showcasing
imagery of the Vietnam Service Medal and medallion, vintage
photography, dates and moving words, all against a bold, billowing
Stars and Stripes background. A fully dimensional, intricately sculpted
eagle with gleaming bronze and antiqued gold tones stands with wings
ORDER TODAY AT BRADFORDEXCHANGE.COM/VIETNAM
outspread, as if saluting these extraordinary heroes. The panel’s beveled
styling and golden trim are matched by the handsome mahogany-finished
base, which features a brass plaque stating Pride & Brotherhood.
Peak demand is expected so order now in three installments of only
$36.66 each, the first due before shipment, for a total of $109.99*,
backed by our 365-day money-back guarantee. To order, send no money
now. Just complete and return the Reservation Application today.
©2022 BGE 01-39091-001-BI

Where Passion Becomes Art

RESERVATION APPLICATION
SEND NO MONEY NOW Mrs. Mr. Ms.
Name (Please Print Clearly)
The Bradford Exchange
Address
9345 Milwaukee Avenue, Niles, IL 60714-1393
YES. Please reserve the Forever Honored: Vietnam Veterans City State Zip
Tribute for me as described in this announcement.
Please Respond Promptly Email (optional)
*Plus a total of $16.99 shipping and service; see bradfordexchange.com
Limited-edition presentation restricted to 295 casting days. Please allow 6-8 weeks after initial payment for shipment. Sales subject to product availability and order acceptance. 01-39091-001-E39572
VIETNAM VETS HONORED
IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
F
or three days in May, Vietnam veterans and their families were the
guests of honor on Washington, D.C.’s National Mall during a com-
memoration of the 50th anniversary of the withdrawal of the last
combat troops from Vietnam. It marked another effort in the long-
overdue attempt to reconcile the selfless service of so many Vietnam veter-
ans with the politically charged homecoming experienced by many. Hun-
dreds of veterans and their families attended the event, which began May 11
with a ribbon-cutting to open “Camp Legacy,” the
Vietnam veterans
accompanied by their
epicenter of activities, and a flyover by four vintage
families were honored UH-1 Huey helicopters. Speakers included U.S. Secre-
by the nation in a long- tary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro who, on behalf of all
overdue homecoming
commemoration held in
the service branches, said it is “absolutely essential that
Washington, D.C. we, as a nation, take time to focus on this period in our
country’s history, and especially, to thank these most
deserving of our citizens, our Vietnam veterans.”
Over the next three days, dozens of organizations took part in the com-
memorative event, which was open to the public and included panel discus-
sions, musical performances, dramatic storytelling, drill teams, precision
parachute jumps, film screenings, video montages, and more. It was also a
8 VIETNAM
time for veterans to reconnect and share their
common experiences.
The U.S. Vietnam War Commemoration,
which hosted the event, was established by Presi-
dent Barack Obama in 2012 and authorized by
Congress to honor all veterans who served in the
U.S. armed forces at any point from 1955–1975,
regardless of location. The commemoration offi-
cially continues through Veterans Day, 2025.
Addressing the difficult circumstances many
Vietnam veterans and their loved ones faced after
U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY MR. CHRISTOPHER KAUFMANN
the war, Del Toro added, “There are no words that
can do justice to the grief, for the sacrifices made
by the service members and their survivors. No
words. But we can look you in the eye and tell you
sincerely that we stand with you today in solidar-
ity. You have our thanks, our respect and our
steadfast support.”
—Larry Porges
 HOMEFRONT
Enemy Soldier’s
Diary Returned
The Battle of Dak To was one of the bloodiest en-
gagements of the Vietnam War. For three weeks
in November 1967, American and South Viet-
namese forces fought communist troops in the
Central Highlands. Casualties on both sides num-
bered in the thousands. During the battle, Sgt.
Peter Mathews of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Di-
vision was ordered to Hill 724 to count enemy
dead and search for documents and military in-
telligence. Abandoned backpacks were scattered
at the bottom of the hill near some enemy bodies.
Mathews found a diary written in Vietnamese.
The journal’s 93 pages contained poems, colorful
drawing, and prose written in ornate handwrit-
ing. Mathews, with no idea if the diary’s owner
was alive or dead, decided to keep it. He later said,
“I recognized the beauty of it.… I just thought it
was something to really cherish.”
After his return to the U.S., Mathews left the
past behind in a box—until 55 years later, in 2022.
AUTUMN ’71
In his final appearance as James Bond, Sean Connery stars with Jill St. John
Visiting the home of a business client, he spotted in Diamonds Are Forever. The film features two memorable car chase
a traditional Vietnamese hat, which awakened scenes–a rather campy one where Bond avoids villains in a Moon buggy, and
his desire to return the journal to its owner. The another where he drives a 1971 Ford Mustang Mach 1 on two wheels through
client helped connect Mathews with someone the streets of Las Vegas. Viewers will note an editing snafu where the Mustang
who translated the diary. The book came to life. enters a narrow alley on its right-side wheels, and exits on its left-side wheels.
Inside were love poems to a girlfriend and reflec-
Introduced by host Don Cornelius as
tions on soldierly life. One poem read, “Moun- “four beautiful people who represent a
tains, birds, singing, waiting for spring but sleep- mighty mountain of soul,” Gladys Knight
ing with a gun,” along with verses on the glories & the Pips perform live on the first
of Ho Chi Minh and the Communist system. syndicated episode of Soul Train. So
It also contained its owner’s name and address. begins a 35-year syndication run for the
show that refers to itself as the “Hippest
The diary belonged to Cao Van Tuat, a 21-year- trip in America.” Through the years most
old from a village near North Vietnam’s coast. performances are live and boast the likes
The Vietnamese government spotted an online of James Brown, Aretha Franklin, Billy
story in a New Jersey newspaper on Mathews’ Preston, Sly and the Family Stone, and
search for the diary’s owner and found Tuat’s The Jackson 5. The catchy theme song “TSOP (The Sound of Philadelphia),” as
performed by MFSB featuring The Three Degrees, is adopted in 1973.
family, who were able to see colorful excerpts
from the diary online. It was a bittersweet mo- Clint Eastwood stars in Dirty Harry as a hardboiled San Francisco cop
ment. Tuat had been killed in the battle and his chasing a killer on the loose. The script takes cues from Dave Toschi, the
body was never recovered. His family had no real-life chief investigator of the infamous Zodiac Killer. Others considered for
photos of him, so the diary was one of the few the role of “Dirty Harry” Callahan included Frank Sinatra, Steve McQueen, and
tangible remembrances of his life. Paul Newman. ...A mysterious airplane passenger known as D.B. Cooper
(right) leaps from the rear of a Boeing 727 into the
In March 2023, Mathews and his wife flew to
Pacific Northwest night sky with a parachute and
Vietnam to hand over the diary to Tuat’s younger $200,000 in ransom money. Cooper left behind eight
sister, Cao Thi Nong, 78. The event was major cigarette butts in his armrest ashtray; however, no
news in Vietnam. Mathews said that the book felt readable fingerprints were obtained. The butts were later
like a “cinder block” until he handed it over to destroyed while in police custody prior to DNA testing
becoming routine. ...John Lennon releases the single
HISTORYNET ARCHIVES (ALL)

Tuat’s sister, adding, “It felt light once I gave it to

her.” The war has stayed with Mathews, but re-
turning the diary has given him joy. He reflected,
“It’s a fairytale ending after all these years.”
—Larry Porges
“Imagine”—considered by most to be his best
post-Beatles song. The word “imagine” today appears
at the center of a mosaic at Strawberry Fields, the
five-acre memorial landscape dedicated to Lennon in
New York City’s Central Park. —Brian Walker

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 9
 The 1954 Geneva Convention partitioned Vietnam into a communist north and a theoretically
democratic south led by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. As part of his efforts to woo American
support, Diem presented this carved ivory table lamp to U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Donald
R. Heath on Nov. 14, 1954, as a present for President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The carving on
the electrically wired lamp depicts a Vietnamese army on the move—on the front, four men
ride elephants while other soldiers follow on foot past
RELIC onlooking peasants. The carving is attached to a wooden

SPOTLIGHT
base containing a silver plaque engraved in French that
reads, “Le President Ngo-dinh Diem a L. E. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, President des Etats-Unis d’Amerique.” On Jan.
11, 1955, Eisenhower sent a note back to Diem, thanking him for the “lovely gift” while noting
that, “Viet-Nam is very much in our thoughts these days and you may be sure of our sympathy
with your Government in the great difficulties and task of preserving the freedom and
civilization of Vietnam.” On Oct. 26, 1955, Diem was elected president of the Republic of
Vietnam by a suspicious landslide. Even though Diem’s government was riddled with
nepotism, corruption, and religious persecution, Eisenhower continued to court him because
he saw Diem as a necessary evil to combat the growing influence of the communist north. In
1957, Eisenhower invited Diem to the U.S. for a state visit, where the South Vietnamese
leader was hailed as a conquering hero. The honeymoon would not last forever, though, and
U.S. support for Diem soon waned. The South Vietnamese president was overthrown and
assassinated in an American-backed coup on Nov. 2, 1963.

WORDS FROM
THE WAR
The following is an excerpt from a
KTI[[QÅMLLWK]UMV\NZWU2]Ta
!_ZQ\\MVJa=VLMZ;MKZM\IZa
WN;\I\M/MWZOM*ITTJMTW_TMN\\W
8ZM[QLMV\4aVLWV*2WPV[WV*ITT
I\\MUX\ML¸QV^IQV¸\WXMZ[]ILM
\PMXZM[QLMV\\WI^WQL_IZQV
>QM\VIUJMNWZMUIVa)UMZQKIV

TOP: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY MUSEUM COLLECTION; BOTTOM LEFT: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES/W. BALL PAPERS;
TQ^M[_MZMTW[\

BOTTOM RIGHT: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY, AUSTIN, TX; COLLECTION LBJ-NSF: NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

10 >1-<6)5
The Bracelets That Italy
Can’t Get Enough Of
Own the jewelry that’s the toast of Italy

“The renown of Italy’s jewelry, with

le Price its sensual beauty and extraordinary
Impossib acelet craftsmanship, is founded on the
Each Br

$59
goldsmithing skills passed down through
generations.” – The New York Times

A.

B.

I guess I was a little bored. For the past hour, I’d been on
the phone with Daniele, the head of my office in Italy,
reviewing our latest purchases of Italian gold, Murano glass and
The best part about these bracelets? The price. Because of
our longstanding connections in Arezzo, the mecca of Italian
goldsmithing, we can offer both bracelets together for just $99, a
Italian-made shoes and handbags. fraction of the price you’ll pay anywhere else for similar jewelry.
“Daniele,” I said, “What is the hottest jewelry in Italy right now?”
His reply? Woven gold bracelets studded with gems. He texted
me some photos and I knew immediately that this was jewelry
that Raffinato just had to have.
Make the next gift you give your loved one a trip to Italy with
Raffinato is one of america’s LARGEST the Italiano Fantasia Bracelets, stunning accessories that are sure
retailers of italian-made jewelry to turn heads.
Jewelry Specifications:
Presenting the Italiano Fantasia Bracelets, two designs that are • Made in Arezzo, Italy. 18k gold finish
prime examples of Italy’s finest artisanship. Each of these bracelets • DiamondAura®, the Ultimate Diamond Alternative®
includes more than 20 brilliant cut gems of DiamondAura®, our • Fit wrists up to 7 ¼"
Ultimate Diamond Alternative®, in a setting finished with 18
karat Italian gold.
What is DiamondAura®? Why, it’s a sparkling marvel that rivals
even the finest diamonds (D Flawless) with its transparent
color and clarity: Both are so hard they can cut glass. Don’t
believe me? The book “Jewelry and Gems: The Buying Guide,”
praised the technique used in our diamond alternative: “The
best diamond simulation to date, and even some jewelers have
1-888-444-5949
mistaken these stones for mined diamonds,” it raved. Your Insider Offer Code: RFX214-01

Raffinato, 14101 Southcross Drive W., Ste 155, Dept. RFX214-01, Burnsville, MN 55337 www.raffinatoitaly.com

IMPECCABLE ITALIAN DESIGN AND CRAFTSMANSHIP


Daniel Ellsberg, whose leaked “Pentagon Pa-
pers” revealed the U.S. government’s guarded
views of the Vietnam War, died on June 16 at
age 92. Ellsberg, a Harvard-educated former
Marine, was a RAND Corporation analyst
who became an adviser to Secretary of De-
fense Robert McNamara in 1964. He spent
two years in Vietnam for the DoD assessing
\PM_IZIVLIKKWUXIVQML\ZWWX[QV\PMÅMTL
Initially pro-war, his views changed over
time. In 1967, he joined three dozen others in
compiling the Pentagon Papers—a 7,000-page
study commissioned by McNamara—detailing
\PMKWVÆQK\¼[PQ[\WZaIVLZM^MITQVO\PI\NW]Z
successive presidents from Eisenhower to
Johnson had expanded the war illegally, mis-
leading Congress and the public. In 1971, Ell-
sberg leaked the papers to the New York
Times and the Washington Post, who pub-
lished them after court battles debating the
First Amendment. President Richard M.
Nixon ordered illegal wiretaps and a break-in
WN-TT[JMZO¼[NWZUMZX[aKPQI\ZQ[\¼[WЅKMTMIL-
ing to the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s res-
ignation. Ellsberg was charged with
espionage, conspiracy, and crimes that could
have seen him spend decades in prison, but
his case was thrown out in 1974. Ellsberg
continued his activism and advocated nu-
clear disarmament. In 2018 he was awarded
Sweden’s Olof Palme Prize, which noted how
his “moral courage” had led to an “untold
number of saved lives.” He is survived by his
second wife, children, and extended family.
12 VIETNAM
Col. Harry E. Sexton, a deco-
rated naval aviator whose 26-
year Marine career included
more than 400 missions in
Vietnam, passed away Feb.15
in California. He was 90 years _PMV[UITTIZU[ÅZMNZWU
old. Sexton joined the Marine the ground hit his airplane.
Corps in 1952 during the Ko-
rean War and served two
\W]Z[WNL]\aQV>QM\VIUÅZ[\ *ILTaJ]ZVMLIVLJTQVLML
I[IRM\ÅOP\MZXQTW\IVL\PMV from a melted helmet visor,
ÆaQVO*MTT)0̆/+WJZII\-
tack helicopters. He com-
manded Marine Light Heli-
copter Squadron (HSL) 367,
based near Da Nang. On Sept.
10, 1970, Sexton’s group es-
corted Marine transport heli-
KWX\MZ[NMZZaQVO=;/ZMMV
*MZM\[IVL>QM\VIUM[MNWZKM[
70 miles into Laos as part of
a covert mission, Operation
Tailwind. After two days of
PMI^aÅZM\PMITTQMLNWZKM[
needed immediate ex-
traction. Sexton led a recov-
ery team in actions that later
earned him the Navy Cross,
the nation’s second highest
medal for sailors and Ma-
rines. According to his cita-
tion, he “braved the intense
PW[\QTMÅZMI[PM[SQTTN]TTaKW- time
ordinated the extraction ef-
forts of twenty-two Marine
and United States Army and
Air Force aircraft which re-
sulted in the safe medical
evacuation of all of the casu-
alties.” During his career,
;M`\WVIUI[[MLÆQOP\
hours in jets and helicopters.
Along with the Navy Cross,
he was awarded two Legion of
Merit medals, the Distin-
guished Flying Cross, and 44
Individual/Strike Flight Air
Medals before retiring in
1978.
Maj. Brian Shul, a decorated
American pilot who barely
[]Z^Q^MLIÅMZaKZI[PQV
Vietnam but whose Air Force
career continued for another
20 years, died May 20 at age
;P]T_I[ÆaQVOI<̆ 
Trojan ground attack air-
plane near the Cambodia bor-
der in 1974 as an adviser for
the CIA’s Air America—the
last of his 212 combat mis-
sions in Southeast Asia—
The T-28 crashed in the jun-
OTMIVLMZ]X\MLQVÆIUM[
Shul hid from enemy troops
for hours before being air-
lifted to safety. Shul’s burns
were so severe that doctors
gave him little chance of sur-
viving. He endured 15 opera-
tions. Although his face and
PIVL[_MZMLQ[ÅO]ZMLPM
_I[ÆaQVO\_WLIa[IN\MZPQ[
release from the hospital. His
Air Force career continued
CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT: HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES; U.S. NAVY; BRIAN SHUL VIA EDWARD PERNOTTO
for two decades and included
with the A-10 Thunder-
bolt demonstration team as
well as piloting the SR-71
*TIKSJQZL7^MZPQ[KIZMMZPM
logged more than 5,000
PW]Z[QVÅOP\MZRM\[*WZVQV
1948 in Quantico, Va., Shul
_I[QV[XQZML\WÆaIN\MZ[MM-
QVO\PM6I^a*T]M)VOMT[I[I
child. He joined the Air Force
in 1970. Retiring in 1990,
Shul turned to writing and
photography, publishing
seven books on aviation and
nature. In 2011, he was in-
ducted into the Air Force
Legends Hall of Fame.

Tet Offensive History Coin
Yours FREE
N ow get this uncirculated US half dollar
enhanced by Mystic to commemorate
important Vietnam War history – the Tet
Offensive. It’s yours FREE – just send $2.95
for shipping and guaranteed delivery.
A Mystic Exclusive
You Won’t Find Anywhere Else
This half dollar coin pictures US Army
soldiers in combat during the opening days
of the massive Tet Offensive. The image has
been permanently bonded to the coin, so it’ll
be a prized part of your collection for years
to come. This is your chance to get a high-
quality commemorative of this critical part of
the war.
Take advantage of this special offer and
own this exclusive Tet Offensive history coin
Send just $2.95 for shipping and
guaranteed delivery.
FREE – just send $2.95 for shipping and
guaranteed delivery.
Send today and you’ll also receive special
collector’s information and other interesting
coins on approval.
Tet Offensive History Coin
 Yes! Send me the Tet Offensive history coin. Enclosed
R
is $2.95 for shipping and guaranteed delivery. Satisfaction
guaranteed. Strict limit of one coin.
Quick order at MysticAd.com/TN156
Name ______________________________________________________________
Address _____________________________________________________________
City/State/Zip ________________________________________________________
R Check or money order enclosed* *Add state sales tax to order total.
R VISA R MasterCard R American Express R Discover
Exp. Date: ____ / ____
Please send to: Mystic, Dept. TN156
9700 Mill St., Camden, NY 13316-9111

The MRF faced threats from floating
mines, swimmer saboteurs, and
suicide attack boats, as well as from
land ambushes with recoilless rifles.
RIVERINE
OPERATIONS
HOW MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE
OPERATIONS WORKED IN VIETNAM
By David T. Zabecki
Riverine warfare was a central element of combat in Vietnam. The French
and Viet Minh struggled for control of the Red and Black Rivers. Later, the
South Vietnamese and Americans contested with the Viet Cong for the
lower Mekong and its tributaries. With 15,600 square miles of land and
more than 15,000 miles of waterways, the Mekong Delta was of vital strate-
gic importance. Producing some 16 million tons of rice per
TACTICS year, the Delta was the foundation of the Republic of Viet-
nam’s economy. For the communists, the Mekong River
running south from Cambodia was the southernmost branch of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, bringing vital support to 28 VC battalions and 69 separate com-
panies in the Delta, totaling some 82,500 troops. By 1966 the communists
controlled almost 25 percent of the Delta’s population, and their primary
objective was to cut off the South’s rice supply. The twofold objective of the
allies was to sever the flow of supplies to the VC, and eliminate VC forces
and infrastructure. The U.S. Navy’s lighter patrol forces of Task Forces 115
and 116 patrolled the Mekong, Co Chien, Long Tau, and Bassac Rivers and
their tributaries to deny the use of those waters to the VC.
TF 117, also known as the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), was the striking
arm of the joint Army-Navy riverine warfare campaign. Established in late
1966, the MRF was based closely on the French Dinassauts (Divisions Na-
vales d’Assaut), integrated units of naval and army forces established for
riverine warfare in the late 1940s. The MRF’s ground combat element would
have been a natural mission for the U.S. Marine Corps, but all the Marines
in South Vietnam were deployed in the north. The mission fell to the 9th
Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade. Initially, TF 117 only had capacity to main-
tain and transport two battalions at any time. The battalions rotated, with
one maintaining security for their base camp at Dong Tam. The Navy com-
14 VIETNAM
ponent of the MRF was River Assault Flotilla 1,
initially consisting of the 9th and 11th River As-
sault Squadrons. Each squadron could carry a
battalion. Many of TF 117’s boats were modified
conversions of World War II-era Landing Craft
Mechanized-6 (LCM-6), and included armored
troop carriers, heavily armed monitors for fire
support, and radar-equipped command boats.
An important innovation was mounted field ar-
tillery on barges, increasing the mobility and op-
erational range of the artillery battalion. Each
barge carried two 105mm howitzers, crews, and
ammunition. Field artillery requires stationary
firing platforms and fixed aiming points, which
meant that the barges had to be beached and se-
cured along a waterway bank to fire effectively.
The most significant riverine operations were
the CORONADO I through XI series from June
1967 to July 1968. Initially the MRF’s tactics sur-
prised the VC. Accustomed to defending against
attacks from land and air, VC defenses initially
faced away from water. But the VC adapted
quickly. While underway, principal security
threats to the MRF came from command-deto-
nated mines in the centers of the channels. Hug-
ging shorelines brought boats closer to land am-
bushes with heavy fire from recoilless rifles and
B-40 rockets. While anchored, the most critical
threats were from floating mines, swimmer sabo-
teurs, and suicide attack boats.
The 2nd Brigade had to operate with only two
battalions instead of three, depriving the brigade
commander of the ability to attack with the stan-
dard one-third of his force in reserve. It also took
time to get the attack force in position to make
the landings. The afloat force could only move at
a speed of 6 to 10 knots, indicating to the VC that
an attack was coming. Typical operations lasted
two to four days. Once ashore, the main tactical
problem was to seal off the objective area to pre-
vent VC from escaping. When the troops disem-
barked, the boats moved to blocking positions
along nearby waterways to prevent VC from us-
ing them to withdraw. But the VC quickly learned
the drafts of TF 117’s various boats and took up
positions secured partially by streams too shal-
low for the boats to navigate. That made it almost
impossible for the assault force to encircle the ob-
jective completely. Marshy ground and numer-
ous intersecting waterways made it difficult to
move fast on foot. Helicopters solved that prob-
lem, with part of the assault force landing in the
BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES
VC rear. Helicopter assets were always at a premi-
um, however; forces north of the Delta often had
higher priority. As time went on, the VC became
more elusive and difficult to engage decisively. V
 Featuring Vietnam Veteran Dial CHOOSE YOUR SERVICE BRANCH EMBLEM
with Ribbons & Genuine Diamond ARMY NAVY MARINE CORPS AIR FORCE

Custom Watchband features Your

Service Branch and Honor Emblems
THE NEW VIETNAM VETERAN HONOR WATCH
- AN EXCLUSIVE NOT SOLD IN STORES! -

COAST GUARD SEABEE NAVY SEAL

• Water-resistant case frames the Vietnam
Veteran Dial, minted in high-relief with War
Ribbons in Official colors and a genuine • Priced at just $129*, payable in
diamond at 12 O’clock. two convenient, interest-free
monthly installments of $64.50*
• Adjustable 23 Karat Gold decorated each. (See order form for details.)
dress bracelet watch band features
uniquely custom inserts for your • Your satisfaction guaranteed 100%
Service Branch Emblem AND Your or return watch within 30 days for
Honor Emblem. replacement or refund.
So, order today!
• Precision quartz movement provides
accuracy within seconds per month.
YOU HAVE EARNED THE
• Caseback engraved with your RIGHT TO WEAR THIS WATCH
initials and years of service. AS A REMINDER OF YOUR
SPECIAL PLACE IN HISTORY.

CHOOSE YOUR HONOR EMBLEM

“YOU ARE NOT PURPLE HEART BRONZE STAR SILVER STAR

FORGOTTEN”

A VETERANS COMMEMORATIVES™ EXCLUSIVE FREE

- NOT SOLD IN STORES! - “PROUD TO BE
NOW AVAILABLE AT THE INTRODUCTORY PRICE A VETERAN”
GIFT TIN
OF JUST $12900*


         

OR COMPLETE ORDER FORM BELOW AND MAIL TO: Veterans Commemoratives™, P.O. Box 572, Valley Forge, PA 19481-0572

YES! I wish to order my Vietnam Veteran Honor Watch as follows: CREDIT CARD: Visa MasterCard American Express Discover
SERVICE EMBLEM CHOICE: Card #:________________________________________ Exp. Date: ______ /______
Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force
Card Security Code:__________ Signature: __________________________________
Coast Guard Seabee Navy Seal
HONOR EMBLEM CHOICE: SHIPPING ADDRESS Allow 2-3 weeks for delivery.
“You Are Not Forgotten” Purple Heart Bronze Star Silver Star
Name ________________________________________________________________
ENGRAVING: Initials (3): _____ _____ _____ Service Yrs: ________ to ________
Address ______________________________________________________________
ENCLOSED IS MY CHECK/MONEY ORDER payable to “Veterans Commemoratives” for: City______________________________________ State______ Zip ______________
$129.00*, plus $19.95* for engraving, shipping & handling as payment in full OR,
Phone # (_______) _____________ Email __________________________________
CHARGE MY CREDIT CARD as indicated at right: (In case we have questions about your order and to notify you of shipping date.)
* PA residents add 6% state sales tax. ($8.94)
$129.00*, plus $19.95* for engraving, shipping & handling as payment in full OR,
By federal law, licensing fees paid to the U.S. Army for use of its trademarks provide
© 2023, ICM
$64.50* down payment, plus $19.95* for engraving, shipping & handling. Charge
support to the Army Trademark Licensing Program, and net licensing revenue is devoted to
the balance of $64.50* when my watch is ready to ship. There is no finance charge. U.S. Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs. VTNHONWAT-VTN-1023
 Night Navigator
Suppression Raytheon Radar enabled night
Fire and precision navigation.
Mark 16 20mm
cannon
Additional Firepower
Crew often mounted a Mk 2 81mm/
M2 .50MG, and up to 3 light MGs
and other weapons.
Heavy Hitter
Forward turret with 40mm
cannon and M2 .50 MG or
105mm Howitzer

Ad Hoc
Bumpers
Old tires protected
the hull and armor
from collision
impacts.
Armor Protection
Armor plate augmented with
hardened steel bars and
polyurethane blocks
protected against RPGs.

RIVER MONITORS By Carl O. Schuster

On May 24, 1969, a B-40 rocket hit Monitor M-92-1 of River Squadron (RIVRON Designation: Monitor
9) as it was supporting a reconnaissance mission on the My Tho River, wounding Crew: 11-13
three crewmen with fragments. The monitor turned and returned fire with its Length: 18.5m/61ft
40mm and 20mm cannon while the embarked Army liaison directed artillery fire Beam: 5.3m/17ft 6 inches
Draft: 1m/42 inches/3ft 6 inches
and a helicopter strike on the enemy position. Nine Viet Cong reportedly were
(full load)
killed during the 30-minute engagement. The monitor itself suf-
Displacement: 76 tons (full load)
ARSENAL fered no significant damage. Propulsion: 2 x 220shp GM/Detroit
Introduced into service in September 1967, the monitors Diesels – 2 propellers
constituted the battleships of the Mobile Riverine Force. Heavily armed and ar- Top Speed: 8.5kts
mored, they suppressed enemy fire during ambushes and river assaults. Like the Fuel: 450 gallons diesel in two tanks
force’s armored transport carriers (ATCs), they were modified Landing Craft Max Range: 200km/110nm@6kts
Mechanized 6 (LCM-6) boats from World War II. They differed from the ATCs in Electronics: 1 x Raytheon 1900
having the landing ramps removed and their bows rounded off to reduce water Nav Radar, 2 x AN/ARC-46 &
resistance. Monitor gun turrets were armored against shrapnel and small arms fire. 1 x AN/PRC-25 radios
The hull and superstructure were better protected with an armor plate covered by Armor: Hull/Superstructure: 20mm
18 to 24 inches of polyurethane and welded hardened steel bars that either deto- steel splash plate covered by urethane
nated or “shorted-out” enemy shaped charge rounds. The polyurethane absorbed blocks & spaced XAR-30 22mm
the warhead’s blast stream. Below, water blisters protected against underwater hardened steel bars; Turrets: 22mm
damage and added buoyancy that reduced the boat’s draft. hardened steel armor plate
Armament: FWD Turret: 1 x 40mm
Two sets of river monitors were built during the Vietnam War. Eight were
Mk 3 & M2 .50 MGs; Aft Turrets: 3 x
converted into flamethrower variants called Zippos. The last 10 of the 24 built re-
20mm Mk 16 cannon; Well Deck: 1 x
ILLUSTRATION BY GREG PROCH

placed their 40mm cannon with a Mk 49 105mm howitzer turret with a ring of Mk 2 Mod 1 Combined 81mm mortar/
bar armor and better superstructure protection. The monitors were turned over to .50 M2 MG Mount, 4 x .30 M1917
the South Vietnamese Navy on June 30, 1969. They had played a key role for two initially/later M60 7.62mm MGs, 2 x
years, delivering firepower to support the troops operating along the riverbanks, Mk 18 40mm MGs (hand cranked),
but had no role in the U.S. Navy’s post-Vietnam “blue water” operations. V crew small arms (M16s, M79s)

16 VIETNAM
 CHOOSE FROM NINE AWA R D - W INNING T I T L E S
Subscribe Now!
Your print subscription includes access to 25,000+
stories on historynet.com—and more!

HISTORYNET.COM

THE AMERICAN FRONTIER

Harvey Logan, aka Kid Curry,

had a reputation as a killer.

Plus!
os
Vicksburg Cha r
Former teachefor
tastes combate
the first tim
th
Elmer Ellswor

PATTON’S EDGE
A fresh look
g
at his shockin
death

The Wild Bunch’s

KID CURRY
Prelude to Gettysburg

Stalled at the RANGER BATTALIONDAY

THE MEN OF HIS 1STTIL THE
Susquehanna ENRAGED HIM—UN THEY SAVEDN HOW MANY MEN DID HE KILL?
BUTCHER OF BATAA
+ JUDGMENT COMES FOR THE
T A PROXY
Gen. John Brown Gordon’s + THE STAR BOXERS WHO FOUGH
AND GERMANY
+ GEORGE HEARST THANKS WYATT EARP
MAY 2022
HISTORYNET.COM grand plans go up in flames WAR BETWEEN AMERICA WINTER 2023
HISTORYNET.COM
+ INVESTIGATING THE GUNNISON MASSACRE
JUNE 2022
+ HERDING REINDEER IN ALASKA

Ending Slavery An Army Wiped Out

for Seafarers Bicycles at War
Pauli Murray’s Testing the A-Bomb
Remarkable Life
Final Photos of Soviet Female Ace
William McKinley Battle in Paradise
An Artist’s Take
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL on Jim Crow Invasion Stripes
OF MILITARY HISTORY HISTORYNET.com

World War II’s

Can-Do City
Witness to the
No Mercy
Washington’s tough
White War call on convicted
spy John André

ARMS DOUBLE
RACE TROUBLE ARMY AND
GERMANY’S CO MPETED
In 1775 the WAFFEN-SSR’S FAVOR
Continental Army “He was more unfortunate than criminal,” FOR HITLE
George Washington wrote of Benedict
needed weapons— Arnold’s co-conspirator.

and fast

WINTER 2022
HISTORYNET.com JULY 2020
February 2022
HISTORYNET.com

First Woman to Die Tragic Death of CIA’s Barbara Robbins

JULY 3, 1863: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF CONFEDERATE ASSAULT ON CULP’S HILL + BEHIND THE SCENES ON BILLY WILDER’S THE SPIRIT OF ST. LOUIS

50 th A N N I V ER SA RY
HOMEFRONT
Zonk! The dawn of
the Super Bowl era
AVIATION H I S T O R Y

LINEBACKER II AMERICA’S LAST SHOT

AT THE ENEMY

TOP PLUS
THE ALLURE

LEE TAKES The Day the SECRET OF THE

LEARJET

COMMAND
War Was Lost
It might not be the
one you think
DOGFIGHT
WHY A NAVY PILOT IN KOREA HAD TO

16 CRUCIAL DECISIONS OF THE Security Breach KEEP SILENT ABOUT HIS VICTORIES
1862 SEVEN DAYS CAMPAIGN Intercepts of U.S.
radio chatter
75TH ANNIVERSARY HOWARD HUGHES
FLIES THE SPRUCE GOOSE (JUST ONCE)
+THE WAR’S LAST WIDOW TELLS HER STORY + threatened lives
April 2021 WINTER 2023 CRASH AFTER CRASH THE HARROWING WINTER 2023
In one week, Robert E. Lee, with James Longstreet and Stonewall
Jackson, drove the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond.
HISTORYNET.com HISTORYNET.com
FIRST FLIGHT ACROSS THE UNITED STATES HISTORYNET.COM

CHOW LINE
INVASION
THIS MAJOR FACED A CHOICE
WHEN THE MARINES “INFILTRATED”
THE 1ST CAV’S CHOW LINE
By Bob Orkand
In October 1967, as the North Vietnamese Army made final preparations
for what would become known in early 1968 as the Tet Offensive, the 5th
Marine Regiment was redeployed northward to reinforce the demilita-
rized zone. Replacing the leathernecks on Hill 63—which dominated
the southern portion of the Que Son Valley 22 miles south of Da Nang—
was our Army contingent, the 3rd Brigade of the
REFLECTIONS 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The 1st Cav—
famed for our yellow shoulder patch with a horse’s
head—was the Army’s first and only airmobile division, with a huge inven-
tory of helicopters capable of shifting men and materiel around the battle-
field at a moment’s notice. This “materiel” included food—GI rations.
Seasonal monsoon rains gripped much of South Vietnam when our
unit, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Airmobile)—wiped out at the Battle of
the Little Big Horn but resurrected as a combat assault force using Huey
helicopters—was airlifted from fighting on the Bong Son Plain into the
Que Son Valley, replacing the 5th Marine Regiment and redesignating
their hill and principal outpost as Landing Zone (LZ) Baldy. It was an apt
description for the small mound dominating the valley. The monsoons
made it impossible for our large cargo helicopters to sling-load in the bri-
gade’s supporting 105mm artillery pieces.
The Marines were tasked to leave behind a battery of six 155s to keep the
2nd NVA Division off our backs until the monsoons passed by. Along with
the 80 or so Marines of Whiskey Battery, a platoon of perhaps 15 mine-
18 VIETNAM
Faced with soggy C-rations, young U.S. Marines
decided to aim for some of the more generous rations
being enjoyed by their U.S. Army counterparts.
sweeping personnel remained on Baldy to probe
the dirt-packed main supply route each morning
for mines that the local Viet Cong forces may
have planted during the hours of darkness. So
let’s say maybe 100 gyrenes remained on the hill
to take care of their Army brethren until we were
better able to fend for ourselves.
Because the 1st Cav had something like 428
helicopters of all sizes, shapes, and capabilities,
we were able not only to deploy our troops with
unprecedented surprise and mobility, supported
by our gunships and rocket-firing aerial artillery,
but also to feed ourselves very comfortably com-
pared to usual infantry grunts. Choppers that
weren’t in use chasing after NVA and VC bad
guys could find gainful employment resupplying
our sky soldiers not only with C-rations and wa-
ter in five-gallon cans but also pretty fair (if sog-
gy) ice cream, milk reconstituted from powder at
processing plants in Yokohama, Japan, occasion-
al cases of warm Budweiser beer, and large #10
cans of beef stew, corned beef hash, ham and
beans, and other delicacies, which—heated over
outdoor field ranges by our battalion cooks and
liberally doused with Red Devil hot sauce, tabas-
co, and other condiments—made for a pretty
decent meal after a hard day searching for and
fending off the NVA.
On our first day at LZ Baldy, troopers of the
7th Cav ate cold C-rations like most combat in-
fantrymen in Vietnam. On Day 2, “B” rations
(the vastly improved meals originating in the
large #10 cans) were very much du jour. By the
third day, milk, ice cream, candy bars, and even
some homemade brownies were being fed to our
cavalrymen in the evenings.
Now I’ll say this for the 19- and 20-year-old
leathernecks obliged to consume Marine-man-
dated cold C-rations on the far side of LZ Baldy:
they sure weren’t no slouches! When the delicate
aromas of our “home-cooked” gourmet meals
began wafting over the hill to the Marine can-
non-cockers and minesweepers, they began—
cautiously at first—infiltrating our chow line.
Their jungle fatigues looked a little different
from ours; the Marines (who weren’t infantry-
men and therefore were not used to living,
breathing, and sleeping with their M16 rifles
slung across their backs) looked cleaner and
wore fatigues that weren’t as filthy as those worn
U.S. MARINE CORPS
by our cavalrymen. Other than that, you’d con-
clude that they looked like normal American
boys a couple of years out of high school.
 Finally, the Perfect 3-in-1 Chair
The Journey Perfect Sleep Chair® is a reading and
TV watching chair, a powerful lift chair, and the
absolute best sleep chair! It delivers a personalized
comfort solution with its independent back and
footrests — reclining to exactly the right degree …
raising your feet and legs just where you want them
… and supporting your head and shoulders properly
— all at the touch of a button. When you can’t lie
down in bed and get a good night’s sleep due to
heartburn, hip or back aches, or dozens of other
ailments and worries, you would give anything
for a comfortable chair to sleep in. That’s why we
designed the Journey Perfect Sleep Chair — fully
loaded with every feature you need and nothing you
don’t. It’s an unbelievable way to give your body the
rest, relaxation, and therapeutic comfort it deserves.

Overstuffed, biscuit-
style back, generous
seat, and oversized
armrests cradle your
entire body in comfort.
Infinit
e
Reclin
in
Built-in heat Positio g
and massage HY ns!
HQOD\
³DW
helps stress
melt away.

Easy, touch-of-a-button
operation with secure
battery backup in case
of a power outage.
Independent, zero-
gravity movement
feels like you’re
³RDWLQJRQDLUZKLOH
White Glove Delivery! your feet, legs and
Skilled professionals will back are all fully
deliver and set up your Powerful lift mechanism supported.
chair. No fuss. No worries. tilts the entire chair forward
so you can stand up easily
without exerting energy.

Available in a variety of colors, fabrics and sizes. Don’t face another sleepless night.

CHESTNUT LIGHT GRAY SADDLE CHOCOLATE

CALL TODAY!
Leather NEW MiraLux™

1-888-730-4240
BURGUNDY TAN CHOCOLATE BLUE
Please mention code 120031 when ordering.
DuraLux™ and MicroLux™ Microfiber &KRRVHWKHVL]HIDEULFDQGFRORUWKDW²WV\RXUKRPH

enjoying life never gets old™

Because each Perfect Sleep Chair is a made-to-order bedding product it cannot be returned, but if it
46641

arrives damaged or defective, at our option we will repair it or replace it.

© 2023 Journey Health & Lifestyle.
 I was at that time the only major left in our battalion. The other major had
sustained lung damage in the crash of the unit’s command and control heli-
copter and had been medically evacuated out of theater. So I was holding
down two jobs: battalion executive officer and S-3 (operations officer).
One evening on the third day, I was eating my pretty decent evening meal
al fresco on a small folding field table when the battalion’s mess steward came
charging up the hill in a state of high dudgeon.
“Major! Major!” he exclaimed at the top of his lungs. “The f—g Marines are
bucking our chow line!”
As mess sergeant, he had every right to be incensed at this invasion of the
Army’s turf. After all, he was accountable for how many rations were con-
sumed and if his count reflected a hundred or so extra meals being consumed
each day for maybe a week or two, his jungle boots might be held to the fire.
What to do? I could of course direct that the “f—g Marines” be returned to
their own side of the hill, destined to eat cold C-rations made soggier by the
itinerant monsoon rains.
The Water Buffalo
*a2IUM[>I]OPV
James Vaughn, shown here at
the Hai Van Pass in Vietnam, got
into a sticky situation in search
of a shower during the war.
During Vietnam’s dry season there is not a lot of water. It is rationed. As thesays ‘Non-Potable’ (i.e. not for drinking water) on
dry season progressed our water turned yellow. In the communications
center we had a five-gallon plastic jug. We used to fill it for our drinking
water. We would take a pillowcase and fold it in quarters and put it under
the opening of the five-gallon jug. We used it to filter out sand. One of the
things that was down on the list when it came to rationing was showers. It
might have been at least a week since I had taken a shower. You can imagine
the odor of the average guy when we did not shower for a week and the
temperature was over 100 degrees.
One day someone came to the communications center and announced
the water was on in the enlisted men’s shower. I asked the captain if I could
go and shower. His response was, “Please do.” That told me I was pretty ripe.
I went to my hooch and got my soap and towel, then headed for the shower. After leaving Vietnam in 1970, James Vaughn
Once I was all lathered up, the water ran out. I dried off, but sure did feel became a CPA and ran his own tax practice.
uncomfortable. I felt all sticky after I got dressed. The temperature was 100
degrees, so I was sweating. Specialist 4 Woburn heard me complaining and ,WaW]PI^MZMÆMK\QWV[WV\PM_IZaW]
asked, “Do you want to take a bath?” I thought he had lost his mind or was _W]TLTQSM\W[PIZM'Email your idea or article to
goofing on me. I asked, “How is that going to happen?”
20 VIETNAM
Then again, these were after all merely post-
adolescent American boys—just like our caval-
rymen—who were helping protect our rear ends
until we could take care of ourselves. Did we in
the Army have any ingrained right to live better
than our leatherneck brothers in arms?
I looked up into the cloudy sky as the rains
ceased for the moment, praying for divine guid-
ance along with the wisdom of Solomon. Inspi-
ration from above arrived mere moments later. I
knew what had to be done. “Feed the bastards,”
I instructed the mess steward. And we did.
Bob Orkand, a retired lieutenant colonel of
infantry, was drafted during his senior year at
Columbia University.
He told me to be outside my hooch that night
with flipflops and a towel. I was desperate enough
so I was there and waiting. He showed up with a
towel and flipflops himself. We went to the motor
pool and snuck past the guard.
Soon we got to the “water buffalo.” The water
buffalo is a GI slang term used for a 250-gallon
water tank mounted on a two-wheeled trailer.
The trailer is small enough to be dragged by a
jeep or a three-quarter-ton utility truck. Woburn
told me if I squeezed my shoulders and crossed
my arms, I could fit through the top of the water
buffalo’s manhole. I did as he said and in I went.
He followed me in. It felt great. We soaked in the
water. It was cool and I got all the soap rinsed off.
The next morning I went to the motor pool to
dispatch a truck for the communications center.
When I got there, I was alarmed to see that the
sergeant from the motor pool was filling his cof-
fee pot from the water buffalo. I said, “Hey, that
the outside of the water buffalo.”
“It is okay,” he replied. “I fill the tank myself
from the water tower.”
“Yeah, but you don’t know what was in the
tank before you filled it,” I answered.
He was not concerned. “I have been filling the
water buffalo for months, so I know the water is
clean,” he assured me. “Come on in and have a
cup of coffee.”
I declined his offer.
COURTESY OF JAMES VAUGHN
Vietnam@historynet.com, subject line: Reflections
 Versatile Hoodie Crafted
in Easy-care, Comfort Knit
★
One-of-a-Kind Design
with Patriotic Messages
on the Back
★
Available in 5 Men’s Sizes
from Medium to XXXL

Men’s Hoodie
Crafted in a black easy-care cotton blend knit, this hoodie showcases a gray thermal knit lined hood, kangaroo front pockets, knit cuffs
a unique design that serves as a reminder of the brave soldiers who and hem, a full front zipper, and silver-toned metal tippets
have fought and continue to fight for our freedom. On the back, on the hood drawstrings. Imported.
you’ll find dramatic artwork of a silhouette of a kneeling soldier A LIMITED-TIME OFFER,
with powerful wings of American glory. God’s light falls down NOT SOLD IN STORES
upon the soldier symbolizing His almighty protection. The fully Available in 5 men’s sizes M-XXXL, this handsome hoodie is
embroidered sentiment, “NEVER FORGET,” and a banner with a remarkable value at just $99.95* (for sizes XXL and XXXL, add $10),
the words, “FREEDOM ISN’T FREE,” completes the distinctive payable in 3 easy installments of $33.32 and backed by our 30-day
design. Adding to the patriotic look is an American flag patch money-back guarantee. This is a limited-time offer, so don’t delay.
on the front showcasing a silhouette of a kneeling soldier. To acquire yours, send no money now; just return the Priority
Custom details include a comfortable brushed fleece interior, Reservation today!
Order Today at bradfordexchange.com/38813 ©2023 The Bradford Exchange
01-38813-001-BIB

The Bradford Exchange Celebrates 50 Years!

PRIORITY RESERVATION SEND NO MONEY NOW
The Bradford Exchange Signature
9345 Milwaukee Ave., Niles, IL 60714-1393
Mrs. Mr. Ms.
YES. Please reserve the “Freedom Isn’t Free” Men’s Hoodie for me Name (Please Print Clearly)
in the size checked below. Please Respond Promptly Address
❑ Medium (38-40) 01-38813-011 ❑ XXL (50-52) 01-38813-014
❑ Large (42-44) 01-38813-012 ❑ XXXL (54-56) 01-38813-015 City State Zip
❑ XL (46-48) 01-38813-013
Email
*Plus a total of $15.99 shipping and service; see bradfordexchange.com. Please allow 2-4 weeks after
initial payment for shipment. Sales subject to product availability and order acceptance. E39571
 Three U.S. advisers seek protection from
incoming North Vietnamese artillery on April 3,
1972. The communist assault on the South,
dubbed the Easter Offensive, triggered intense
fighting in and around the town of An Loc, just
60 miles north of Saigon, inspiring acts of
sacrifice and heroism among both South
Vietnamese and American defenders.

22 VIETNAM
UNCOMMON
VALOR AT
AN LOC
AS U.S. TROOPS WITHDREW FROM VIETNAM,
AMERICANS WHO REMAINED GAVE THEIR ALL
TO HELP VIETNAMESE ALLIES PROTECT SAIGON
By John D. Howard
 South Vietnamese paratroopers
march north along National
Route 13 (QL 13), the main road
from Saigon, on April 8, 1972.
The troops are heading to the
provincial capital of An Loc to
try to counter the gains made
by the communists when they
poured over the Cambodian
border a few days earlier.
aster came early in 1972 and the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) came with it. On March 30, “Holy Thursday,” three
NVA divisions stormed out of Laos and across the DMZ. It
was the first of multiple assaults that struck not only the
northern provinces of South Vietnam but also Kontum in the
Central Highlands and An Loc, only 60 miles north of Sai-
gon. North Vietnam was “going for broke,” committing its entire combat
capability—14 divisions and 26 separate regiments, all with attached ar-
mor and heavy artillery units. Enemy forces numbered 130,000 troops and
1,200 tracked vehicles, primarily tanks. Aging Communist revolutionaries
controlling Hanoi’s Politburo believed the time was right to achieve a deci-
sive military victory, topple South Vietnam’s government, and embarrass
the United States.
As U.S. military personnel continued to withdraw, American troop
strength was brought down to 69,000. Only two U.S. combat brigades re-
mained—their missions were restricted to guarding airbases and patrolling
the surrounding areas. Although the Military Assistance Command, Viet-
nam (MACV) listed 5,300 men as “advisers,” the only Americans fighting
on the ground were a handful of men serving with provincial advisory
teams and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) divisions and regi-
ments. As a result of Vietnamization, battalion advisers were only autho-
rized in the Airborne Division, Marine Division, and selected Ranger
units. There were also battalion advisers, mainly NCOs, with the ARVN
24 VIETNAM
field artillery battalions.
The term “adviser” was a misnomer. By 1972,
advice was rarely solicited and when offered, rare-
ly heeded. However, U.S. advisers often cajoled
and encouraged their counterparts, particularly
in dire situations when spirits were flagging. The
presence of even a lone American adviser was a
morale booster, as every ARVN soldier knew they
would not be abandoned as long as one American
was with them.
The advisers’ primary role was employing the
massive air assets President Richard M. Nixon
had sent to South Vietnam. U.S. air power proved
decisive in blunting the 1972 enemy offensive.
Advisers routinely exposed themselves to NVA
fire while working with USAF forward air con-
trollers, identifying lucrative targets and adjust-
PREVIOUS SPREAD & ABOVE: AP PHOTO
ing air strikes to ensure bombs were “on target.”
Americans who remained on the front lines,
especially advisers with airborne and Marine
battalions, suffered significant casualties. Adm.
Chester Nimitz’s famous quote after World War
II’s Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945 was equally applica-
 ble to the advisers who helped turn back the NVA
offensive 27 years later: “Uncommon valor was a
common virtue.”
E
arly in 1972, allied intelligence personnel
were watching NVA build-ups in Laos and
Cambodia but had no idea of the timing of
a possible offensive. When it occurred, the ARVN
Joint General Staff (JGS) and MACV were sur-
prised by its scale and ferocity. With fighting rag-
ing in three areas, military officials were unable to
determine the communist main attack. The focus
of III Corps, the ARVN headquarters responsible
for provinces surrounding Saigon, was on enemy
attacks in Tay Ninh. These were diversionary op-
erations, masking the movement of three NVA
units: 5th VC Division, 9th VC Division, and
7th NVA Division. The 5th and 9th were VC in
name only; they were manned and equipped by
the North Vietnamese Army. The situation grew
more tenuous on April 5, 1972, when those divi-
sions—36,000 troops organized into combined
arms teams of infantry, armor, heavy artillery, and
engineers—poured across the Cambodian border
into Binh Long Province. The immediate threat to
the government in Saigon was clear
Maj. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, commander
of the Third Regional Assistance Command
(TRAC), urged Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, III Corps
commander, to reinforce An Loc, the provincial
capital. Hollingsworth, a 1940 graduate of Texas
A&M University, was one of Gen. George S. Pat-
ton’s outstanding tank commanders during World
War II. He led from the front and during his ser-
vice in three wars he was awarded three Distin-
guished Service Crosses (DSC), the nation’s sec-
ond highest award for valor, four Silver Stars and
six Purple Hearts, plus four Distinguished Service
Medals and 38 Air Medals. Known as “Holly,” he
was also a Korean War veteran and had served a
previous Vietnam tour as assistant division com-
mander of the famed 1st Infantry Division. Advis-
ers revered him and were grateful for the air sup-
port he was able to muster.
The district town of Loc Ninh, a few miles
from the Cambodian border, fell on April 7 when
the NVA overran it, killing or capturing nearly
RIGHT: BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES; MAP BY JON C. BOCK
1,000 soldiers. Two U.S. advisers were killed and
seven were listed as missing in action. Only 100
ARVN defenders and one American, Maj. Tom
Davidson, managed to escape the battle and
make their way to An Loc, which was 15 miles
south and obviously the enemy’s next target. The
5th ARVN Division defended An Loc with three
infantry regiments, two ranger battalions, and
provincial forces.
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
Loc Ninh Quang
Tri
Quan Loi LAOS
An Loc
Kontum
CAMBODIA
SOUTH
Lai Khe
VIETNAM
An Loc
SAIGON
MILES
SAIGON 0 100
The Battle for An Loc
April 13– July 20, 1972
On March 30, 1972, 130,000 NVA troops and their heavy armor
attacked South Vietnam. One prong entered from Laos into the
northern provinces, another crossed the Cambodian border and
attacked the Central Highlands city of Kontum, while a third
invaded north of An Loc, directly threatening the capital of Saigon.
If An Loc was lost, there were no ARVN
troops to stop an enemy move on Saigon.
President Nguyen Van Thieu issued a direc-
tive that An Loc must be held at all costs.
The well-publicized order caught the atten-
tion of the communists, challenging them
to quickly capture it. The pivotal battle for
An Loc and the heroism of U.S. advisers
there was a microcosm of the fighting
throughout South Vietnam in what the U.S.
press now called the Easter Offensive.
Hollingsworth
O
n April 7, 1972, President Thieu
convened a meeting of his key ad-
visers and corps commanders to assess the military situation; it
was a grim session. General Minh outlined his circumstances and request-
ed more troops to reinforce An Loc, surrounded by the 5th and 9th VC
Divisions. He also pointed out the 7th NVA Division had cut the main
supply route, QL (National Route) 13, into the provincial capital, isolating
the defenders.
Because of the enemy’s proximity to Saigon, the president made the un-
precedented decision to commit the country’s last reserve, the 1st Airborne
Brigade, to III Corps. He also directed the 21st ARVN Division move from
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 25
 Top and middle: South Vietnamese tanks
and troops move up Route 13 toward An Loc.
Bottom: The communists controlled much of
An Loc in the early days of the offensive, forcing
the South Vietnamese defenders into a small
southern sector at the top of this aerial photo.
26 VIETNAM
the relatively quiet Mekong Delta region and join
the battle in Binh Long Province.
By the afternoon of April 8, the 1st Airborne
Brigade, augmented by the 81st Airborne Ranger
Battalion, was assembled south of An Loc, ready
to fight. The 81st was originally activated as a re-
action force during the days of cross-border op-
erations into Cambodia, Laos, and North Viet-
nam. Now, it was employed as an elite infantry
battalion. It was teamed with the Airborne Divi-
sion because its advisers were part of the Air-
borne Division Assistance Team, also designated
MACV Team 162. The brigade’s 2,000-plus para-
troopers were tasked to open QL 13 into An Loc.
Soldiers of the 7th NVA Division, 8,600 strong,
had prepared extensive defensive fortifications
along the vital supply route. The NVA easily
stopped the 1st Brigade.
With a stalemate occurring, Hollingsworth
recommended a mission change: reinforce An
Loc with the 1st Airborne Brigade and have the
21st ARVN Division clear QL 13. The paratroop-
ers were needed because on April 13 the NVA
kicked off an armor and infantry attack that
threatened the town.
Late in the afternoon of April 14, the 6th Air-
borne Battalion, about 400 paratroopers, con-
ducted a helicopter assault into an LZ near key
terrain just south of An Loc. Two American ad-
visers, Maj. Richard J. Morgan and 1st Lt. Ross S.
Kelly, accompanied the battalion commander, Lt.
Col. Nguyen Van Dinh, in the first lift. The high
ground, Hill 169 and an adjacent feature called
Windy Hill, was needed for an artillery firebase.
It would provide support for the 5th ARVN Divi-
sion because all its guns had been destroyed by
incoming fire.
Initially, the landing was unopposed. Yet the
NVA reacted quickly and stopped the paratroop-
ers from gaining the summits of the two hills.
The advisers called in air strikes. Kelly, accompa-
FROM TOP: AP PHOTO; HENRI BUREAU/SYGMA/CORBIS/VCG VIA GETTY IMAGES; UPI PHOTO
nying attacking troops, directed U.S. Army AH-
1G Cobra rocket and machine gun fire to within
25 meters of his position, forcing the enemy to
withdraw. It was a “danger close” call, but a nec-
essary one.
As the high ground was taken, Morgan, the
senior adviser with the battalion commander,
suffered a severe leg wound. He needed immedi-
ate evacuation or would bleed to death. Fortu-
nately, a U.S. Army Huey helicopter responded
to Kelly’s request for a medevac. The pilots
braved enemy mortar and artillery fire to rescue
Morgan and five ARVN paratroopers who were
also seriously wounded.
Kelly, a 1970 graduate of West Point with less
 Route 13 became a battlefield during
the assault when U.S. advisers called
in B-52 bombers. Here smoke rises
from a bomb strike on May 19, 1972,
as South Vietnamese troops fought to
reach ARVN units and their American
advisers farther north.
than two years in the Army, was now the lone
American responsible for the battalion’s desper-
ately needed air support. The old Army expres-
sion “operating way above his pay grade” de-
scribed Kelly’s circumstances.
T
he remaining battalions, the 5th, 8th, and
81st, plus the brigade headquarters, arrived
on April 15-16. CH-47 Chinook helicop-
ters brought in six 105mm howitzers and em-
placed them on the high ground, secured by two
rifle companies of the 6th Airborne Battalion.
Maj. John Peyton, Morgan’s replacement, was in
the airlift and joined Kelly on the afternoon of
April 16. Peyton was only on the ground two days
before he too was badly wounded and evacuated.
Again, Kelly was a one-man operation.
The North Vietnamese commander was not
about to allow an ARVN firebase to operate in his
area of responsibility. Within 24 hours, NVA ar-
tillery fire destroyed all six howitzers and its
stockpile of ammunition. The battalions airlifted
TOP: AP PHOTO; BOTTOM: HISTORYNET ARCHIVES
in on the 15th and 16th were ordered to move
into the town and join the 5th ARVN Division
defenders who were fending off major NVA at-
tacks. The 6th Airborne Battalion was left on its
own. Two NVA regiments with eight tanks began
to systematically isolate and destroy the 6th.
Kelly used every air sortie at his disposal to
keep the numerically superior foe at bay. The
communist commander was determined to annihi-
late them, regardless of the cost. By April 20, the
6th Battalion had fewer than 150 effective fighters.
Seriously injured soldiers died for the lack of medi-
cal treatment. U.S. helicopters only flew medevac
missions for wounded U.S. advisers—so the evacu-
ation burden fell on the Vietnamese Air Force
(VNAF) helicopter pilots, most of whom were sadly
lacking fortitude.
Supply shortages and the VNAF’s reluctance to
fly caused morale to plummet. Having grown used 6th Airborne
to the robust support from the U.S. Army, the fail- The men of the ARVN’s 6th
ure of the ARVN and VNAF to perform critically Airborne Battalion were
needed tasks was a shock to the paratroopers, in- outmanned and outgunned
as they tried to defend two
cluding the battalion commander. Lt. Col. Dinh hills just south of An Loc
was psychologically overwhelmed and stayed in his during North Vietnam’s 1972
foxhole, almost in a trance. Remnants of two rifle Easter Offensive, but the
companies on the hills, less than 50 men, were reconstituted unit helped
forced off and escaped to An Loc. Eighty other eventually break the
paratroopers, who were not on the high ground, communists’ grip on the
town. Their unit patch diplays
formed a tight perimeter and waited for the NVA. the battalion’s trademark
Kelly began to work what little magic he had left. parachute logo.
He coordinated with the brigade senior adviser, Lt.
Col. Art Taylor, and his deputy, Maj. Jack Todd, for assistance to allow them
to break out to the south, away from An Loc. Todd called Kelly at 7:30 p.m.
and said three B-52 strikes were scheduled just after dark to hit the concen-
trations of North Vietnamese threatening the 6th Battalion. U.S. intelli-
gence had a good “fix” on enemy locations. The bombers would drop “dan-
ger close,” meaning less than 1,000 meters from the friendlies, the minimum
safe distance from B-52 bombs.
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 27

Top: An AC-130H Spectre, armed with a 105mm howitzer (visible jutting out of
the side fuselage) and bravely directed from the ground by U.S. Sgt. Jesse Yearta,
delivered the firepower that helped beat back the NVA in An Loc. Above: A South
Vietnamese soldier surveys the damage after the U.S. bombing.
Kelly’s cajoling and the news of the upcoming bombing strikes snapped
Dinh out of his depressed state. He made the difficult decision to leave the
seriously wounded soldiers behind and prepared the men to move. When
the first 500-pound bombs began to fall, 80 exhausted men headed to the
southeast, away from the enemy. Kelly led while Dinh, farther back in the
column, kept the troops moving. The shock of three successive B-52 strikes
and rapidity of movement gave the bedraggled force some breathing space.
Throughout the night and into the next day, Kelly continued to serve as
“point man” for the small group. On more than one occasion, he called in
air strikes on pursuing enemy troops. When Kelly found a suitable pickup
zone, the adviser used U.S. air strikes to seal off the area and protect the
incoming helicopters.
Finally, VNAF helicopters arrived but they only touched down briefly
and several hovered a few feet off the ground, making it impossible for the
walking wounded to get aboard. They were not taking any enemy fire.
Without warning, they “pulled pitch”—taking off with Kelly hanging on to
one UH-1’s struts and leaving 40 soldiers on the ground.
Threats from the battalion commander failed to intimidate the pilots,
who refused to land again. Fortunately, the corps commander and Holling-
sworth forced the VNAF to return the next day, but they only retrieved half
of the 40 men left behind. Those 60 rescued paratroopers became the 6th
Airborne Battalion’s nucleus as reconstitution began immediately.
28 VIETNAM
On Oct. 17, 1972, Kelly was awarded the Dis-
tinguished Service Cross for his bravery. Without
his personal example, forceful urgings, and time-
ly orchestration of airstrikes, no one would have
survived. His actions belied his rank and experi-
ence and his professionalism saved the day.
D
uring the 6th Battalion’s ordeal, the 81st
Airborne Ranger Battalion was undergo-
ing its trial by fire. It was lifted in on April
16, arriving with 450 soldiers and three U.S. ad-
visers: Capt. Charles Huggins, senior adviser;
Capt. Albert Brownfield, Huggins’ deputy; and
Sgt. First Class Jesse Yearta, light weapons advis-
er. The unit was detached from the airborne bri-
gade and directed to fight its way into An Loc
and occupy positions in the northeastern sector
of the town’s perimeter. The NVA had attacked
several days earlier and gained a significant lodg-
ment, almost to the center of the town. The
communists had nearly reached the east-west
thoroughfare that bisected An Loc, leading one
American defender to report: “The bastards are
almost to Sunset Boulevard.”
As the 81st moved off the LZ, Yearta was hit by
artillery shrapnel but refused evacuation. An
ARVN medic patched him up. Yearta, a hardcore
soldier, continued the mission. At 36, he had
come of age in the Cold War army and spent most
of his career in airborne units. He was known as a
“hard ass,” but the troops held him in high esteem
because he was a fighter and genuinely concerned
for their welfare. The Airborne Rangers of the 81st
had an unbounded affection for Yearta.
On the night of April 22, the battalion was di-
rected to launch a counterattack to eliminate en-
emy positions. Huggins was provided a Spectre
gunship, a USAF AC-130 aircraft equipped with
a 105mm cannon and twin 40mm Bofors guns,
to assist the attackers. The Spectre had cutting
edge technology sensors that allowed it to fire
very near friendly forces, almost within the 50-
meter bursting radius of the 105mm shells. A
rolling barrage was planned with the troops fol-
lowing closely behind it.
Yearta volunteered to accompany the lead
company so he could direct the Spectre’s fire. Not
taking a chance that he might become separated
from his radio operator, he carried his own AN-
PRC 77 radio so he could maintain constant
FROM TOP: U.S. AIR FORCE; AP PHOTO
contact with the airplane. To ensure the Spectre
gun crew could track the leading friendlies amid
battlefield obscuration, Yearta continually fired
small pen flares that the aircraft’s sensors easily
identified. He adjusted both the 105mm cannon
and the Bofor guns by constantly sending correc-

tions, positioning himself almost within the blast
area. The fire was so devastating the NVA was
pushed back and original defensive positions
were restored.
Later, Yearta was asked about the Spectre’s
support that night. He replied in typical fashion,
“Damn! They are good ol’ boys.” Yearta became a
legend among the advisers for the pen flare epi-
sode and was later awarded the Distinguished
Service Cross for his valor.
The siege of An Loc lasted 66 days and resulted
in the destruction of three NVA divisions. It was
ironic that the reconstituted 6th Airborne Battal-
ion, still commanded by Lt. Col. Nguyen Van
Dinh, broke the enemy’s grip on the town. On
June 8, 1972, the 6th Airborne linked with the
town’s defenders after fighting its way from
the south. In mid-June, President Thieu declared
the siege lifted and the 1st Airborne Brigade was
sent to the northernmost province of Quang Tri
to participate in a counteroffensive.
The 1st Airborne Brigade and the 81st Air-
borne Ranger Battalion paid a heavy price for
their part in what some journalists called the
“battle that saved Saigon.” From April 7 thru June
21, the 1st Airborne suffered 346 killed in action
(KIA), 1,093 wounded, and 66 missing; the 81st
lost 61 KIA and 299 wounded.
T
he An Loc campaign took its toll on
MACV Team 162. Nineteen airborne ad-
visers began the operation in April 1972.
Of that number, 10 were wounded and one, Sgt.
AP PHOTO
First Class Alberto Ortiz Jr., died from his
wounds. He was the first of five airborne advisers
Amid the rubble of An Loc, a
monument to South Vietnamese
soldiers stands almost undamaged on
June 14, 1972, toward the end of the
costly “battle that saved Saigon”—
saved for the time being, at least.
killed during the Easter Offensive. One officer, Capt. Battle for
Ed Donaldson, was wounded on April 7, evacuated,
returned to duty in An Loc, and was wounded again,
An Loc
APRIL 13–JULY 20, 1972
for which he required extended hospitalization.
Five battalion advisers with the 1st Airborne Brigade
and the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion were awarded 7,500
the Distinguished Service Cross for their actions in An SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Loc. In addition to Kelly and Yearta, DSCs were award- FORCES
25,000+ REINFORCEMENTS, U.S. AIR
ed to: Capt. Michael E. McDermott, 5th Airborne Bat- FORCE AND U.S. NAVY FIREPOWER
2,280
talion; Capt. Charles R. Huggins, 81st Airborne Rang-
ers; and 1st Lt. Winston A.L. Cover, 8th Airborne
Battalion. For McDermott, it was his second DSC, the KILLED
first being presented in 1967 when he was a lieutenant PLUS: 2,091 MISSING
in the 101st Airborne Division. With two DSCs, a Sil-
ver Star, and a Purple Heart, McDermott became one 35,704
of the most decorated soldiers of the Vietnam conflict. NVA AND VC FORCES
An Loc was destroyed in the Easter Offensive. Only
rubble and burned-out communist tanks remained.
The town was rebuilt and today commerce flourishes.
10,000
One would not know that a climactic struggle oc- PLUS: 15,000KILLED WOUNDED, 40 TANKS
curred there five decades ago; there is no evidence of DESTROYED. N. VIETNAMESE FIGURES:
2,000 KILLED, 5,000 WOUNDED
the battle. Several cemeteries are located just south of
An Loc where the remains of NVA soldiers are interred. At each cemetery,
there is a large statue and plaque dedicated to the heroism and sacrifice of
the communist “freedom fighters.”
After South Vietnam surrendered in April 1975, NVA soldiers desecrat-
ed the 81st Airborne Ranger cemetery in An Loc that the town’s citizens
had meticulously tended to when the 1972 battle ended. Like other ARVN
cemeteries, there is no trace of it today. V
During the 1972 Easter Offensive, John Howard served as senior adviser
with the reconstituted 6th Airborne Battalion and 11th Airborne Battalion.
On a 2011 trip to Vietnam, he returned to Tan Khai and An Loc. For further
reading he recommends James H. Willbanks’ book, The Battle of An Loc
and Dale Andradé’s book America’s Last Vietnam Battle.
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 29
 An American soldier directs a helicopter into
landing position in 1969 by holding his rifle over
his head. Co-author Capt. John Haseman
performed a similar move during the airlift rescue
of a badly injured South Vietnamese soldier in
1972, helping to guide the chopper’s copilot (and
co-author) John Harris to a safe landing area.

DARING TO
SAVE A LIFE
WHEN A VIETNAMESE ALLY WAS WOUNDED,
TWO AMERICAN SOLDIERS HAD TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN OBEDIENCE AND COMPASSION
By John B. Haseman and John M. Harris

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 31
 Haseman was Deputy District Senior
Adviser (DDSA) in Mo Cay District on
Nov. 20, 1972, when he accompanied
an ARVN combat operation. This
photo was taken directly before a
land mine took off the foot of a South
Vietnamese soldier, forcing Haseman
to decide between official Army
policy and his desire to save the life
of a badly wounded comrade.
John Haseman was a captain assigned as a Deputy District Senior Adviser
(DDSA) in Mo Cay District, Kien Hoa Province, in the Mekong Delta. He
had arrived at Advisory Team 88 in July 1971 and was DDSA in Ham Long
District for 10 months before being reassigned to Mo Cay in May 1972.
ov. 20, 1972, began as an ordinary day, at least at the
start. My boss, the Mo Cay District Senior Adviser
(DSA), had departed about a week earlier for much-de-
served home leave that included several days of hospital
care. He was seriously wounded during a major battle in
July 1972 with an NVA regiment in which the Mo Cay
District Chief had been killed in action. I was introduced to the new Dis-
trict Chief, Maj. Manh, before my superior departed for the U.S. At that
time there were no main force Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
units stationed in the province; except for provincial and district level offi-
cers, the soldiers were all locally recruited Regional Force and Popular
Force (RF/PF).
My first operational meeting with Maj. Manh had taken place several
days earlier. A small convoy that included the newly assigned Province In-
telligence (S-2) officer was ambushed just a few kilometers south of Mo Cay
town. Manh hurried off with a small security force without telling me.
When told of the incident by Mo Cay’s communications officer, I quickly
followed with my interpreter. When I arrived at the ambush scene, Manh’s
first words to me were: “I did not tell you because I did not think you would
go out to a dangerous area.” Apparently, he had experienced less-than-good
relations with advisers during his previous duty in the 7th ARVN Division.
“Sir,” I responded, “I am your adviser while the DSA is away. You know
much more about fighting this war than I do, but there are a lot of things I
32 VIETNAM
can do to help you. I want to go with you on all
operations, dangerous or not. Please don’t leave
me behind.” Taken somewhat aback, he answered
that he was glad to know it and would not leave
me behind again.
On Nov. 20, I prepared to accompany Manh
on my first combat operation with him—a
two-company RF sweep through a contested part
of western Mo Cay District. The operation line of
march was centered on a seldom-used rural road.
A company-sized unit would be about 200 me-
ters out on each flank. The troops were well-
spaced and well-led. There had been no enemy
contact. My interpreter and I were with the com-
mand group, which included Manh, his radio
operator, his personal bodyguard and security
PREVIOUS SPREAD: APA/GETTY IMAGES; TOP: COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
staff, and a platoon of RF soldiers to provide
close-in security. I carried the advisory team’s
PRC-25 radio—I always carried it on tactical op-
erations. The Vietnamese commander and the
advisory team interpreter always offered to carry
it instead, but I did not want to wonder where the
radio was if we had contact with the enemy.
The road led northwest and then west. The
trail was muddy and very rocky and was lined
sporadically with young palm trees and open-ter-
rain rice paddies to the north, with the trees of a
dense coconut forest parallel to the line of march.
 Terrain on the south was mixed rice paddies and fruit orchards.
We advanced roughly 3,500 meters when a loud explosion came at
the edge of the tree line on the right flank. A report came in that a
soldier had hit a booby trap that blew off his foot and inflicted head
wounds from shrapnel. Manh stopped forward movement and or-
dered the casualty to be brought to his location on the road. It was
obvious that this soldier was critically wounded.
At this stage of the war, a fairly new official Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) policy required that all medical evac-
uations (medevacs) of Vietnamese casualties had to be done by Viet-
namese Air Force (VNAF) helicopters only. American helicopters
were only supposed to evacuate American casualties. The policy was
designed to force the Vietnamese to be more responsive to their
ground force casualties. I disagreed with the policy because, in my
view, it ignored the fact that the extremely cautious Vietnamese pilots
were not nearly as responsive to the ARVN ground troops as U.S.
helicopter pilots were.
Manh and I knelt on the road with his radio operator while he called the
ARVN side of the joint VN-US Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in the
provincial capital of Ben Tre to request a medevac flight. He was told that
no VNAF helicopters were available. Visibly upset at the rejection, he
turned to me and asked, “Can you help?”
I knew at once that this was a test from Manh. Was his adviser truly
willing and able to help him when help was really needed? I was fully aware
of the MACV policy on medevac for Vietnamese casualties. Yet, in an im-
portant and very favorable coincidence, I also knew that a U.S. Army UH-1
(Huey) helicopter was on the ground at adjacent Huong My District. This
helicopter was detailed to transport the MACV Inspector-General (IG)
team on inspection missions.
I believed the wounded Vietnamese soldier would die if he did not get
prompt medical attention. I refused to remain silent and let this man die for
lack of a Vietnamese medevac. I used my radio to call the American side of
the TOC. The duty officer, a captain, matter-of-factly disapproved my re-
quest, saying, “You know what the policy is on medevacs.” I argued that this
was a life-or-death situation for one of “our” soldiers and that it was critical
to have a medevac if he were to survive. I reminded him of the IG team
helicopter on the ground less than 10 minutes away and strongly urged that
we needed the medevac. He repeated his refusal.
Unknown to me at the time, the duty officer had passed the radio to the
newly arrived Advisory Team 88 Operations (S-3) adviser—a major who
outranked me. I was angry and frustrated. I outright demanded that the
nearby helicopter be requested to fly this medevac. In my sense of urgency
over the badly wounded soldier lying just a few feet away from me, my
open anger was coming very close to insubordination. Fortunately, the
Huong My DSA broke into the contentious radio transmission at that point
and told us to calm down while he asked the pilots if they would be willing
to fly the medevac. A few minutes later, he called back to report that the
crew had agreed to fly the mission for us and were on their way to take off,
with my frequency and call sign, and would contact me after take-off.
The pilot soon radioed me and asked me to confirm our location and
asked about the security situation at the landing zone (LZ). Manh’s security
COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
platoon quickly organized an LZ on the road where no palm trees could
obstruct the landing. I remained on the radio, confirmed to the pilot that
the LZ was secure, and described the area. Meanwhile the casualty was
prepared for evacuation. Moments later we all heard the familiar “whup
whup whup” sound of the approaching Huey, which came into sight flying
Haseman received the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry
with Bronze Star in Ham Long in early November 1972,
just before returning to Mo Cay as DDSA.
over the road. I asked Manh for a soldier to “pop
smoke” to show wind direction and the exact
spot where we wanted the helicopter to land.
I stepped to the center of the road and raised
my rifle with both hands over my head to guide
the pilot. Soon the helicopter was on the ground.
Soldiers quickly loaded the casualty onboard.
Two soldiers—one of them an RF medic—got in
to accompany the wounded soldier to the hospi-
tal. I stepped onto the helicopter’s left skid and
thanked the command pilot for being willing to
help with the medevac.
I could not clearly see either the pilot or copi-
lot and did not get their names. I was very grate-
ful that they had come to help when we needed it
so badly. I recommended they take off to the
north over the rice paddies and definitely not to
fly over the distant tree mass until they had got-
ten high enough to avoid potential enemy ground
fire. With that, I stepped back and saluted the
crew. The pilot lifted off and the Huey was gone.
The entire time from confirmation of the flight to
take off with the casualty was only about 15 min-
utes. Manh quickly got the troops back into for-
mation and the operation continued for the rest
of the day. We had no contact with the enemy,
and no additional casualties.
T
his was an extremely important event for
me for many reasons. First and foremost,
the medevac was crucial to get the wound-
ed RF soldier to a hospital and hopefully save his
life. I was told several weeks later that he had sur-
vived but had needed major surgery to amputate
his foot and ankle. I was outraged by the unspo-
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 33

BEN TRE
DON
NHON
Anatomy
Of A Dire
Rescue
MO CAY
Opera tion MEDE VAC
Route ROUTE
HUONG MY
ken but very real medevac policy corollary: that
MACV was willing to deny a medevac to an al-
lied soldier—in this case, a man who would
probably have died from severe injuries—just to
attempt to make the Vietnamese air force do
their job better. I knew well that, as an adviser, I
did not command the RF/PF soldiers fighting
alongside me. Nevertheless, I thought of them
all as “my” soldiers—my brothers-in-arms. We
laughed together, cried together, talked together,
fought the common enemy together. I trusted
them to be good soldiers and to protect me as
best they could. I would do everything I possibly
could to keep them alive. Therefore, I was espe-
cially grateful to the flight crew who willingly
agreed to conduct this medevac. I have the high-
est regard for, and am very thankful for, all U.S.
Army aviators, whose skill and responsiveness
helped my counterparts and me countless times
during my 18 months as a district adviser. They
always came when called, regardless of the tacti-
cal situation on the ground and the time of day
(or night). Their courage was limitless and deeply
respected by us ground soldiers—Americans and
Vietnamese alike.
Second, this had been a definitive test by the
Vietnamese district chief to determine his advis-
er’s responsiveness and reliability when assis-
tance was needed. There was no way I could ex-
plain that over the radio to the American TOC
personnel. Manh trusted me to be there when he
needed help, and I had passed his test. No adviser
can succeed without establishing trust. Our rela-
34 VIETNAM
tionship for the remaining months of my assignment was close, profession-
al, and worked well for both of us in the challenges we would face.
Third, I knew I was in trouble with my advisory team senior officers in
Ben Tre. Full of emotion and adrenaline in the dire circumstances, I had
openly challenged U.S. policy on handling medevacs for Vietnamese casu-
alties. Perhaps more significantly, I had been intemperate on the radio and
was nearly insubordinate to the Province S-3 adviser. Senior officers do not
take kindly to junior officers demanding anything.
Fourth, in retrospect, the incident provided the district chief the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his own sense of responsibility and trust in me—and
by important extension, to the other members of the Mo Cay advisory
team. Several days later I accompanied Manh to the monthly District Chief/
DSA meeting in Ben Tre. I was nervous, anticipating perhaps difficult
meetings with the Province Senior Adviser (PSA) and the major I had ar-
gued with on the radio. As the meeting convened, the Vietnamese Province
Chief asked me to stand up. He thanked me for what I had done on behalf
of his soldier and commended the outstanding counterpart relationship in
Mo Cay District. Manh had told the Province Chief the details of the event,
knowing I was probably in trouble with the senior officers on the advisory
team. I knew from then on that I could trust Manh to be an outstanding
counterpart. His willingness to intercede on my behalf increased my own
trust and confidence in him.
The PSA thanked me in public—but in private he told me not to do it
again. Later that day I met for the first time the major with whom I had
argued on the radio. He took me aside and quietly but firmly told me I
needed to work on my communications with senior officers. He was cor-
rect. I had been intemperate and disrespectful on the radio. During his first
tour of duty in Vietnam he was wounded in action during an airmobile
assault into the A Shau Valley, and he had earned the right to criticize me.
“Sir,” I said, “I apologize for being disrespectful on the radio. It was a tense
moment for me, and an important test imposed on me by my counterpart.”
I also told him the restriction on using American helicopters to evacuate
Vietnamese casualties was a lousy policy, and I would do it again if I had to.
He was a true gentleman. “John,” he replied, “you’re my kind of officer. You
are doing a great job. Just work on your communications.” We had a mutu-
ally respectful relationship from then on.
I never forgot that particular medical evacuation among the many I re-
quested for RF/PF casualties during my 18 months as a district adviser in
Kien Hoa Province. The event always stood out in my memory.
A
little over two months later, in February 1973, my assignment as
a district adviser ended when the Paris Agreement mandated
the end of the American advisory effort in Vietnam. I spent the
final years of my career in Foreign Area Officer (FAO) assignments in Thai-
land, Indonesia, and Burma, with short stays in the U.S. for language school
courses and assignments at Fort Leavenworth and on the Army staff. On
Jan. 31, 1995, I retired to my home in western Colorado and embarked on
more than 25 years of writing, lecturing, and traveling as often as I could.
In early March 2023 I was a panelist at the annual conference at the Viet-
nam Center, Texas Tech University. That year the conference dealt with
Vietnam in 1973 and the topic assigned to me was my experiences as a
district adviser at the end of the U.S. tactical commitment in the war. Just
before our panel was to begin, several other attendees were gathered in
MAP BY JON C. BOCK
front of our table and the conversation turned to the topic of helicopter and
tactical air support for advisers in the last months of the war. I expressed my
thanks to them “for being there when we needed them.” I began to describe
 John Harris was a young Army Aviator in 1972
when he and his Huey’s crew were called upon
by Haseman to fly the humanitarian rescue
mission. Harris didn’t hesitate, and helped
direct the chopper’s pilot to a hospital.
the circumstances of that event I had faced long ago, on Nov. 20, 1972,
when obtaining a U.S. medevac for a seriously wounded Vietnamese sol-
dier. One of the men paid particular attention, his eyes getting bigger and
bigger as I went along, and then he burst out saying, “I flew that mission!”
And thus, on March 3, 2023, I met Chief Warrant Officer-5 (Retired) John
M. Harris, more than 50 years after he flew as copilot on that mission,
during which he and I had shared a few minutes on the ground on a muddy,
rocky road in Mo Cay District in our efforts to save the life of a soldier.
John Harris flew that humanitarian tactical medevac mission more
than 50 years ago. He had been voluntarily activated the previous
August as a novice 20-year-old WO1 Army Aviator from an Army
Reserve troop unit, specifically for duty in Vietnam. He was later advised
that he was the last USAR soldier mobilized for Vietnam.
efore reporting to Vietnam, I had attended the AH-1G Co-
bra qualification course. As a new Cobra pilot, it was in-
tended that I would be employed in Vietnam as an attack
helicopter pilot, most likely in an air cavalry troop. I was
COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
eager to get into the fight and see some action. However,
soon after I arrived in Saigon I was told that due to recent
losses, the immediate needs of the Army trumped my specific training,
rank, and orders. I was instead ordered to perform duties as a Huey pilot.
On Nov. 8, 1972, I was assigned to the 18th Aviation Company, 164th Com-
bat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade, based
in Can Tho, the capital of Military Region (MR)
IV. Our unit’s mission was to provide aviation
support to the remaining U.S. advisers who were
located in all 16 MR IV provinces; the 7th, 9th,
and 21st ARVN divisions; and the 44th Special
Tactical Zone (STZ), located along the Cambodi-
an border.
Each day, we would usually put up a dozen
UH-1 Hueys whose mission would often be sim-
ply stated as, “Upon arrival, fly as directed by the
Province Senior Adviser.” These missions includ-
ed aerial resupply, visual reconnaissance for both
tactical air and B-52 strikes, personnel transport,
payroll distribution, offshore naval gunfire sup-
port, and much more. We were advised that while
the medevac of any ARVN soldiers was to be pri-
marily performed by the VNAF, if a PSA should
ask us to medevac an ARVN casualty in a time-
critical combat situation, the final decision would
be up to the U.S. helicopter crew.
On Nov. 20, 1972, I was eagerly performing
the duties of a UH-1H Huey copilot, often re-
ferred to in Vietnam as a “Peter pilot” or newbie.
Our initial mission was to fly as directed for Kien
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 35
 A U.S. helicopter lands to medevac
a wounded South Vietnamese soldier
in November 1965. By 1972, the U.S.
Army had instituted a policy forbidding
American medevac missions of ARVN
soldiers in an effort to force the South
Vietnamese air force to be more
responsive to the needs of its own.

I guessed Hoa Province for the first half of the day, followed by
he had been support in the afternoon for the 44th STZ, located
near Chi Lang. This was my 10th mission in Viet-
heavily nam. I was trying to learn as much as possible from
sedated with the aircraft commander with whom I was paired. He
multiple was a very experienced captain with two tours in
doses of Vietnam under his belt as a pilot. We commenced
morphine our support that day by flying a MACV Inspector
General (IG) team to various district headquarters.
to help him We were on the ground at Huong My District and
cope with relaxed in the advisers’ team house as the inspection
extreme team went about their work.
pain. Suddenly we received a call requesting an urgent
medevac for a gravely wounded Vietnamese soldier
in the adjacent district of Mo Cay. My aircraft commander first asked me,
head. During the loading process, I distinctly re-
call that although the wounded soldier’s leg,
which was missing his foot, was covered in
bloody bandages, the expression on his face was
rather detached from reality. I guessed he had
been heavily sedated with multiple doses of mor-
phine to help him cope with extreme pain.
As we prepared to take off, the aircraft com-
mander began to direct me to fly to the nearest
ARVN aid station. If it had been my first or sec-
ond mission, I most likely would have simply fol-
lowed his instructions without comment. But
fortunately, while flying a mission a few days ear-
lier for advisers in nearby Vinh Long Province,
one of them had pointed out the existence of an
ROLLS PRESS/POPPERFOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES

then the crew chief and door gunner, if we were willing to carry out such a
mission. Being new and very “gung-ho,” I was frankly surprised that he had
even posed such a question. I said we absolutely had to go to the aid of an
allied soldier. Both the crew chief and door gunner agreed and off we went.
Approaching the casualty site, we established radio contact with the U.S.
adviser, who had his troops pop smoke and identified the LZ as secure.
Then we set down following his guidance; he was waving an M16 over his
ARVN hospital in Ben Tre. Being rather outgo-
ing, I hastily told the aircraft commander about
this hospital and expressed my strong opinion
that we should fly there instead of the aid station.
I said it would take only a few minutes longer for
us to reach it. I then added, “If I get shot down in
the future, have my foot amputated and a VNAF

36 VIETNAM
 helicopter comes to perform my medevac, I certain-
ly hope that he does the right thing and flies me to a
fully functioning hospital, versus a simple aid sta-
tion, which may save my life!”
The aircraft commander acquiesced and allowed
me to fly directly to the hospital. We dropped the
patient off and I certainly felt good for having assert-
ed myself that day. Once I eventually became an air-
craft commander and in charge of my own Huey, I
always told the story of this medevac to my new “Pe-
ter pilots” and recommended to them that if a simi-
lar situation should ever arise, they too should assert
themselves and be sure to do the “right thing.”
When reflecting back on my rather abbreviated
Vietnam tour, I have always been proudest of assert-
ing myself that day to fly that wounded soldier to a
place with a higher level of care. I performed a few
more minor medevacs for Vietnamese soldiers during my tour but none of
them involved any life-threatening injuries. After the Paris ceasefire took
effect, I remained behind for two months and continued to fly as an aircraft
commander in unarmed Hueys, conducting peace-keeping missions for
the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), which
was composed of military representatives from Canada, Poland, Hungary,
and Indonesia. When I finally left Saigon on March 28, 1973, there were
only about 500 U.S. troops remaining. They all departed the following day.
I
remained on continuous flying status as an Army aviator for over four
more decades, serving as both a Huey and Cobra instructor pilot/tacti-
cal operations officer in multiple assault helicopter companies, attack
helicopter companies, air cavalry troops, and other positions. I served for a
year in South Korea and deployed for “contingency operations” with U.S.
military forces to areas including Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Uzbekistan, Jor-
dan, and Qatar. While in the U.S. Army Reserve, I flew search-and-rescue,
medevac, and firefighting helicopters for multiple agencies including the
U.S. Forest Service and Kern County Fire Department. I retired from Kern
County in late 2021 after receiving the Federal Aviation Administration’s
Wright Brothers Master Pilot Award for safe flight operations for over 50
years. I like to think that after performing that medevac flight in Vietnam, I
was forever motivated to perform to the best of my ability in all subsequent
urgent missions, both military and civil, to which I was called.
In early 2023, I heard from the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association (of
which I am a Life Member) that the Vietnam Center & Sam Johnson Viet-
nam Archive at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas, was hosting a
conference focused on the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the withdrawal
from South Vietnam. I was invited to participate on a panel session focus-
ing on the air war in 1973.
On March 3, the day before my panel was scheduled to meet, I happened
to notice there was to be a panel on the “Last Phase of U.S. Advisory Efforts”
at the end of the war. As I had flown for numerous U.S. advisers during my
tour of duty, I was particularly drawn to that topic. I had a feeling that per-
haps one of the advisers at the conference might have been aboard my air-
COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
craft during one of our support missions. When I read that one of the pre-
senters, Col. John B. Haseman, had been a district adviser in the Mekong
Delta at the same time and in the same area I regularly flew in, I became
even more optimistic that our paths may have crossed. I introduced myself
and Haseman began to express his gratitude for both the tactical air support
A 2023 chance meeting at a conference at Texas Tech
University’s Vietnam Center reunited Haseman (right)
and Harris (left), who met for the first time since their
shared mission more than 50 years ago.
and helicopter assistance he had often received.
He then told me the story of one particular mis-
sion in which he desperately attempted to get a
U.S. medevac for a critically wounded Vietnam-
ese soldier on a patrol with him. As he related the
details, the hair on the back of my neck literally
began to stand up. I thought, “What could be the
chances that he was describing the same medevac
mission that I had played a role in?”
When he confirmed that the wounded soldier
had lost a foot due to a land mine, I knew it was
the same mission. During my planning to attend
the conference, I never dreamed I would relive a
most emotional mission over 50 years later with
the same person I had worked together with to
“push the envelope” on the rules and to do the
right thing when it came to trying to save a
wounded soldier’s life. V
John Haseman has authored more than 250 arti-
cles and book reviews about Southeast Asia politi-
cal-military affairs, as well as many book chapters
on the subject. He is the author or co-author of five
books, the most recent of which, In the Mouth of
the Dragon: Memoir of a District Advisor in the
Mekong Delta, 1971-1973 (McFarland, 2022), de-
scribes his experiences as a tactical adviser at the
district level in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta.
John Harris retired from the U.S. Army Reserve in
October 2013 as a CW5 with over 44 1/2 continu-
ous years of Army service. He was the last U.S.
military aviator from any branch of service who
had flown combat missions in Vietnam to have
retired while still on military flying status.
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 37
President Richard Nixon sits with charts that he used to
illustrate a televised 1971 speech from the White House
announcing the withdrawal of an additional 100,000
U.S. troops from Vietnam by December of that year.
Nixon’s Vietnamization plan entailed a handover of
responsibility for prosecuting the war to South Vietnam.
EYEWITNESS TO
WITHDRAWAL
A FORMER SIGNAL SERGEANT REFLECTS ON
WHAT HE SAW AND EXPERIENCED AS NIXON’S
VIETNAMIZATION POLICY WAS PUT INTO PRACTICE
By David L. Anderson

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 39
Nixon (left) shakes hands
with South Vietnam’s
President Nguyen Van Thieu
at El Toro Marine Corps Air
Station in California in 1973.
Nixon’s plan to rapidly
decrease the U.S. presence
in Vietnam also decreased
the training time for the
handover to ARVN troops.
n June 8, 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon and Re-
public of Vietnam (RVN) President Nguyen Van Thieu
stood side-by-side at Midway Island and formally
launched Vietnamization. The goal was to allow U.S.
operational combat forces to depart South Vietnam as
quickly as possible before the next U.S. presidential
election, leaving South Vietnam able to defend itself. Seven months after
this announcement, I arrived in Cam Ranh Bay as a replacement headed for
the U.S. Army’s 1st Signal Brigade. I was about to have a front row seat on
Vietnamization in practice as a quality assurance NCO. Communication
technology is an essential combat support function, which Gen. Creighton
Abrams, U.S. commander in South Vietnam, had identified from the begin-
ning as critical if South Vietnam’s Armed Forces were to defend their coun-
try on their own.
The short time projected for Vietnamization was inadequate for the
South to build an effective national defense force with sufficient training to
wage modern warfare effectively. Such a project can require years—espe-
cially when the local government’s social, economic, and political founda-
tions have been stunted by a century of colonialism and nearly two decades
of violent internal turmoil. From my vantage point in South Vietnam
40 VIETNAM
throughout most of 1970, these obstacles to rapid
PREVIOUS SPREAD: BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES; ABOVE: HUM IMAGES/UNIVERSAL IMAGES GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES
Vietnamization appeared insurmountable.
I
reported for induction on Oct. 14, 1968, went
through basic training at Fort Bliss, Texas, and
received orders for advanced training at the
Electronic Warfare School at Fort Huachuca,
Ariz. Completing the high frequency radio oper-
ator course (MOS 05B) in five weeks, I remained
at Fort Huachuca as an instructor. With contro-
versy over the war growing, the Army was having
trouble getting junior NCOs to reenlist. Instruc-
tors were needed. On Nov. 14, 1969, after only 13
months in service, I was promoted to Sergeant
E-5. Near the end of November, the training com-
pany’s first sergeant called me into the orderly
room, looked across his desk, and said, “Congrat-
ulations, Sgt. Anderson, you’re going to Vietnam.”
I landed at Cam Ranh Bay on Jan. 6, 1970, with
orders to report to Company C, 43rd Signal Bat-
 talion at An Khe in the Central Highlands. The 1st
Signal Brigade’s clerk at the 22nd Replacement
DEMILITARIZED
Tactical
Zones
ZONE
Dong Ha
Battalion, a buck sergeant like me, modified the Quang Quang Tri SOUTH
original orders. I literally went up the hill from the Tri
Hue
CHINA The Republic of Vietnam
replacement center to the 361st Signal Battalion. I Phu Bai
SEA was divided into four corps
could not believe my luck. Cam Ranh was a large Thua tactical zones. Anderson
Thien
and secure combat base. In the evenings off duty, was transferred for
I CORPS Da Nang
we wore civilian clothes, and there were a lot of TACTICAL assignment to I Corps, a
ZONE Quang Hoi An
creature comforts with barracks, hot showers, Nam
zone which consisted of
mess halls, snack bars, clubs, a big PX, and a beach Tam Ky ;W]\P>QM\VIU¼[Å^M
just over the hill. There was a problem, however. Quang Chu Lai northern provinces.
My MOS was 05B4H: high frequency radio oper-
LAOS Tin Quang Combat commands de-
Ngai
ator, NCO, instructor. My personnel folder also Quang pended on the 12th Signal
listed college graduate, high-speed code intercept Ngai Group to link their tactical
MILES
networks together and
operator, French linguist (based upon Army test- 0 30 SOUTH connect them to larger
AM
VIETN
ing and six semesters of college French), and a
regional and global com-
secret-cryptology clearance from my work at Fort
II CORPS ZONE munications networks.
Huachuca. The 361st operated tropospheric scat-
ter microwave facilities, and the Table of Organi-
zation and Equipment (TOE) of this high tech-
nology installation that could transmit almost 200
miles did not include any slots for high-frequency
radio operators.
The operations sergeant was on his third
straight tour in Vietnam, all at the same job. We
called him “Grandpa” behind his back, which
was a term of respect because it sure looked like
he ran the whole battalion. I knew virtually noth-
ing about tropospheric scatter communication,
but Grandpa was pleased to have me, mainly be-
cause I was a college graduate who could type
and compose a complete sentence. I soon discov-
ered that everyone in the office except the sarge
were college graduates. He immediately put me
to work as the author of various monthly and
quarterly reports but soon realized that I had a
Author David L. Anderson stands next to a Bell OH-58 Kiowa helicopter used for light
more valuable skill—French language ability. observation at the Phu Bai helipad as Vietnamization was underway. The quality
Vietnamization had created an urgent need for assurance team usually flew to sites in a UH-1 Huey, but occasionally the author flew
a linguist. The operations officer was a signal alone with the engineering officer or sergeant major in a light observation helicopter.
corps major with an ARVN signal captain as a
counterpart. The ARVN officer was in the battal- Molière than to conveying military technology. The mentoring process was
ion to learn to manage this integrated wideband slow and not, I am sure, what Washington envisioned Vietnamization to be.
communication site. The American officer had As bad as the situation was for efforts to Vietnamize the 361st Signal Battal-
studied Portuguese at West Point and didn’t ion across a serious language divide, the ad hoc process received a further
know any Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese setback with my sudden transfer out with no apparent way to bridge the
captain spoke French but little English. With no language gap. The commander of the 1st Signal Brigade later acknowledged
training as an interpreter and only basic conver- in his lessons-learned study that the language barrier hampered training.
COURTESY OF DAVID L. ANDERSON; MAP BY JON C. BOCK

sational French, it became my job to help the two
officers communicate.
In the 361st Signal Battalion, Vietnamization
in 1970 hinged on an American officer mentor-
ing an ARVN officer to take command of a high-
ly technical facility through the hand gestures
and college French of a sergeant whose expertise
was tactical, not long-range communication, and
whose French was better suited to translating
B
rigade headquarters at Long Binh refused to issue permanent orders
assigning me to the 361st because my MOS was not authorized for
that type of unit. It transferred me to 12th Signal Group at Phu Bai
for assignment somewhere in I Corps, the five northern provinces of the
Republic of Vietnam. On Feb. 9, I got off a C-130 at Phu Bai airport. I waited
in the transient hooch at Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 12th
Signal Group with my duffle bag packed. I could be off to any of the radio
telephone/teletype sites the brigade operated in support of the 101st Air-

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 41

Top: The 63rd Signal Battalion operated this line-of-sight
microwave relay at Phu Bai. Bottom: The Phu Bai combat base
was spartan in terms of clubs and post exchange services, but
its gate sign proclaimed it “all right” with two L’s for emphasis.
borne Division (Airmobile); 1st Brigade, 5th
Infantry Division (Mechanized); III Marine
Amphibious Force (MAF); 1st ARVN Divi-
sion; 2nd ARVN Division; or Republic of Ko-
rea Marine Brigade. I could expect to spend
the next seven months at a division or battal-
ion headquarters, if I was lucky, or a small re-
Creighton
Abrams mote site if I was less fortunate.
As it turned out, I soon learned that I was
going to be the group’s quality assurance
NCO in charge of a small team of three or four currently being assembled.
Col. D.W. Ogden Jr., the group commander, had created the team and its
“communication evaluation” mission because, I was told, he was tired of
complaints from the combat commanders
(termed “customers”) about the quality of The colonel
signal support from 1st Signal Brigade. The had wanted
combat commands had their own signal as-
sets, but depended on the 12th Signal Group
a sergeant
to link their tactical networks to others in ÅZ[\KTI[[\W
the corps tactical zone and from there to the be the NCO,
Integrated Communication System [ICS], but senior
Southeast Asia and to worldwide networks NCOs were in
operated by the Strategic Communications
Command at Fort Huachuca. The technolo-
short supply.
42 VIETNAM
gy of this vast system—sometimes referred to as
the AT&T of Southeast Asia—was powerful.
Through tropospheric scatter, line-of-sight mi-
crowave, cable, and other electronic assets, a
commander could connect securely by voice,
teletype, or data from a combat bunker to any-
where in the world as long as 1st Signal Brigade
units in the field kept the complex system up and
working.
It was a daunting task for well-educated and
thoroughly trained signal soldiers with access to
reliable equipment. Would the ARVN be able to
manage this critical military infrastructure on its
own, especially in the short time that Washington
had allowed to accomplish Vietnamization? A
new brigade regulation had created Buddies To-
gether (Cung Than-Thien) to train Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces signalmen in highly tech-
nical communications skills. Units like ours were
also expected to conduct surveys by special teams
in each corps tactical zone to determine where
American operators could turn over equipment
and operations to the South Vietnamese.
My team consisted of an electric generator me-
chanic (another sergeant), a radio operator (one
of my students at Fort Huachuca), and a drafts-
man. The latter two were SP4s and served as driv-
ers or guards or were assigned other tasks. We
usually traveled with the group’s engineering offi-
cer and the sergeant major from his office. The
colonel had wanted a sergeant first class (E-7) to
be the NCO, but senior NCOs were in short sup-
ply. He settled for me because of my education
and instructor experience, and my rank was at
least a hard stripe NCO. There were fewer than
10 E-5 and E-6 NCOs in the group headquarters.
The team’s sergeant major (E-9) traveled with us
primarily to back me up if the issues at the site
turned out to be related to command or person-
nel problems.
The U.S. Army history of military communi-
cations in Vietnam describes the urgency of the
task at hand. The recently completed Automatic
Digital Network (AUTODIN) could transmit an
FROM TOP: COURTESY OF DAVID L. ANDERSON (2); U.S. ARMY/GETTY IMAGES
average of 1,500 words per minute, but the tacti-
cal teletype circuits to which it was connected
passed traffic at 60 to 100 words per minute. Sig-
nal operators experienced continuous mainte-
nance problems with their overextended ma-
chines. In the summer of 1970, the Da Nang tape
relay received 20 flash messages (highest prece-
dence) in a 20-minute period from the AUTO-
DIN. This signal company had to relay these
messages to the tactical units on its circuits at 100
words per minute, which required about 20 min-
utes per message. This volume of traffic overheat-
 The 1st Signal Brigade trained ARVN soldiers
at the RVN signal school at Vung Tau and
through the Buddies Together program.
Language barriers and education gaps meant
that ARVN soldiers required longer training
periods than Vietnamization made available.
ed the recipients’ equipment, requiring transmis-
sion to be slowed to 60 words per minute. As the
official history records, “Besides such technical
problems, tactical operators lacking special train-
ing on the operation of the new Automatic Digi-
tal Network were bewildered by its formats and
procedures. The 1st Signal Brigade had to keep
troubleshooting teams constantly on the road to
help inexperienced operators.”
The group’s Operational Report-Lessons
Learned (ORLL) for July and October 1970 re-
corded major emphasis on improved communi-
cations through quality assurance inspections.
Working seven days a week, we were responsible
for maintaining the efficient and effective perfor-
mance of installations operated by 17 units in 5
FROM TOP: COURTESY OF DAVID L. ANDERSON; HISTORYNET ARCHIVES
provinces. The QA team conducted 57 site in-
spections in six months to improve equipment
maintenance, operator efficiency, site operating
procedures, and customer satisfaction. Accord-
ing to the ORLLs, “Partly due to the effort of the
Quality Assurance team the high standards of
customer service provided by units of the 12th
Signal Group were maintained or bettered.”
T
he smallest detail could become significant
when dealing with modern electronics. In
northern I Corps the soil was red clay (red
mud in the rainy season and red dust other times),
which made it extremely difficult to establish a
working electrical ground for the system. In some
cases, poor signal quality or even interrupted trans-
mission was owing to where and how deep the met-
al grounding rods were installed. Without this basic
setup at a tactical location, all the immense techni-
cal power to connect the corps level and global sys-
tem was of no use. It was a variation on the “for want
of a nail” adage. In this case, for want of a ground,
the message was lost; for want of a message, the bat- Signal Ops
tle was lost.
The 1st Signal Brigade, with
My job took me to signal sites from the DMZ the motto, “First to
southward to the Batangan Peninsula. Traveling Communicate,” connected
usually by UH-1 Huey helicopters, we went to commands in the field to a
Camp Carroll (the 1st ARVN Division’s forward complex communications
system known as the “AT&T
command post just south of the DMZ), Quang Tri,
of Southeast Asia.”
Dong Ha, Tan My, Hai Van Pass, Da Nang, Hoi An,
Technology including
Tam Ky, Chu Lai, Duc Pho, and Quang Ngai. Our tropospheric scatter, line-of-
work also included small fire bases and landing sight microwave, and cable
zones: Hawk Hill (5 miles northwest of Tam Ky), provided network access.
LZ Sharon (between Quang Tri and Dong Ha), and
FB Birmingham (southwest of Camp Eagle, headquarters of the 101st Air-
borne, about 5 miles from Phu Bai). We went by road to sites in Phu Bai,
Hue, and Camp Eagle.
We tried to get into and out of a site (especially remote ones) in one day
without having to stay overnight. On one occasion, because helicopters
were unavailable and a signal problem at III MAF needed urgent attention,
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 43

I went from Phu Bai to Da Nang in an open jeep
along Route 1 over Hai Van Pass with only one
other soldier to ride shotgun. That we could
make that drive at all indicated that by 1970 the
level of enemy activity along this key road had
declined significantly. My sense was that the ene-
my was not deterred by the growing size of the
ARVN but was waiting for U.S. troop withdraw-
als to continue. Unknown to me was the CIA’s
Special National Intelligence Estimate of Feb. 5
that “Hanoi may be waiting until more US units
have departed, in the expectation that this will
provide better opportunities with lesser risks,
and that Communist forces will be better pre-
pared to strike.”
Phu Bai was a large and relatively secure base.
It was not Cam Ranh Bay, but there was a sign at
the front gate proclaiming, “Phu Bai is Allright.”
It received periodic mortar and rocket bombard-
ment, especially aimed at runways, helipads, and
signal towers. Signalmen are soldier-communi-
cators who provide specialized skills and defend
their installations against enemy attack. Our de-
44 VIETNAM
As Vietnamization ramped up, so did
U.S. efforts to provide more training to
ARVN troops. Despite the prolonged
U.S. presence in Vietnam, some ARVN
troops showed dependency on U.S.
forces. In this 1969 photo, a U.S.
adviser assists a local soldier in
adjusting his M-16 rifle front sight.
tachment had responsibility for about five perimeter bunkers and had a
quick reaction team in the event of an assault on the base. With the shortage
of junior NCOs in the detachment, I drew the duty as sergeant of the guard,
reserve force NCO, or staff duty NCO at least one night a week.
Most nights were uneventful, but occasionally I was NCOIC during
probes of the perimeter or other imminent threats. One occurred during my
last month in Vietnam. Perhaps Charlie knew I was short, because enemy
bombardments and ground probes of Camp Eagle, nearby Camp Evans, and
Phu Bai increased markedly in July and August 1970. Actually, the enemy
was testing the progress of Vietnamization and not targeting me specifically.
T
here were ARVN troops at many of our bases, but most of them pro-
vided perimeter security, manned artillery pieces, or handled sup-
plies—not operating signal equipment. Similar to what I had wit-
nessed at the 361st Signal Battalion, there were a few ARVN officers and
NCOs shadowing American counterparts, but I observed little interaction
or hands-on communication activity by Vietnamese. Aware of Vietnamiza-
tion goals, I wrote to my parents: “The Vietnamization program is really
going on in earnest over here.… Even 12th Sig. Gp. is getting in on the
ARVN training program. We have about 20 ARVN at various sites in the
Group receiving on-the-job training on a buddy system basis.” In retro-
U.S. ARMY
spect, my estimate of 20 ARVN signalmen over a five-province area sug-
gests that the number being trained was woefully small. With the exception
 of Camp Carroll, an ARVN command post, I sel-
dom heard Vietnamese spoken at signal facilities.
An exception came when my team worked at
a line-of-sight microwave installation near Chu
Lai. A group of American military and civilian
officials appeared. There were ARVN signal sol-
diers at the site. A high-ranking U.S. officer asked
the American signal officer escorting them how
long it would be before the Vietnamese would be
ready to assume operation of this station on their
own. After a long pause, he reasonably estimated
about eight years. Enlisted ARVN signalmen had
an approximately sixth-grade education. It re-
quired two years or more of hands-on experience
for American soldiers with high school diplomas
to develop the technical knowledge and prob-
lem-solving skills needed for this military occu-
pation. The Nixon administration’s timetable for
Vietnamization and turning over the defense of
the RVN to its own military was measured in
months—not years.
ARVN perimeter guards stand at the Hoi An signal site in May 1970. As the author
Lt. Gen. Walter Kerwin, a senior U.S. adviser, prepared to return to the U.S., whole U.S. combat units were leaving Vietnam in
had estimated in 1969 that it would take five years accord with demands from Washington, D.C. Responsibility for the South’s military
for the ARVN to be self-sufficient. Washington’s communication network shifted from the U.S. government to private contractors.
goal was to have Vietnamization completed by
January 1973. My former unit, the 361st Signal In my two assignments as an impromptu interpreter and as a quality as-
Battalion, had been designated as a test of 1st Sig- surance NCO, I experienced some of the problems with Vietnamization.
nal Brigade’s buddy effort to turn over the fixed Studies of combat support at the time and soon after the war frequently
communication system to the South Vietnamese referenced what I personally witnessed—limitations on the effectiveness
Signal Directorate. That initiative explains the of Vietnamization because of language hurdles and lack of expertise on
presence of the ARVN captain in the battalion S-3 the part of the South Vietnamese to sup-
while I was there. That unit’s 1969 ORLLs assessed
that South Vietnam’s armed forces lacked the
The timetable port modern combat operations. In an oth-
erwise upbeat report on Vietnamization at
“broad scientific and technical education base… for turning the end of 1969, Secretary of Defense Mel-
to allow takeover of the ICS in [a] short time over defense of vin Laird singled out the challenge posed
frame.” This study projected a minimum of four the RVN to its by specialized training as a “serious con-
years for the South Vietnamese to take control own military cern.” “More English language instructors
and more realistically eight to 10 years.
As my return to the United States neared, en-
was measured and more trained technicians to man mili-
tary and civil communications systems are
tire U.S. combat units were leaving the RVN. The in months— required,” he admitted. He added that there
1st Signal Brigade’s primary mission of support not years. “were simply not enough qualified persons
for U.S. forces was narrowing. Gen. Abrams had in the Vietnamese manpower pool to fill all
wanted to keep a residual U.S. combat support the demands for technical skills.”
element to bolster Vietnamization, but the Penta- The bravery of the ARVN soldiers and their ability to shoot straight were
gon mandated sweeping reductions. necessary but not sufficient for battlefield success, as Gen. Abrams had per-
I left Vietnam on Sept. 8, after 1 year, 10 ceived when first receiving his marching orders from Washington. As a na-
months, and 26 days active duty and 8 months tion-state, the Republic of Vietnam had major structural weaknesses to
and 5 days in Vietnam. The 12th Signal Group overcome before it could field a modern military establishment. V
soon afterward relocated to Da Nang, as U.S.
commanders consolidated their remaining Anderson went directly from Vietnam in September 1970 to a classroom at
COURTESY OF DAVID L. ANDERSON

strength and transferred their signal assets to the
ARVN. American aid paid private contractors to
operate the network as a stopgap to meet the
South’s military communication requirements,
but the days were almost gone when the U.S.
Congress and public would pay the bill.
the University of Virginia, where he later received a Ph.D. in history. After
45 years of teaching American foreign policy, he is now professor of history
emeritus at California State University, Monterey Bay, and a former senior
lecturer of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. His
twelfth book was Vietnamization: Politics, Strategy, Legacy, published in
2019 by Rowman and Littlefield.

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 45
 THE LIMITS OF
FIREPOWER MAJ. GEN. ROBERT H. SCALES ON
AMERICA’S WAY OF WAR IN VIETNAM
By Warren Wilkins
O
ne of the nation’s foremost authori-
ties on firepower and land warfare,
Robert H. Scales retired from the
Army in 2001 after more than three
decades in uniform, much of it influenced by his
service in Vietnam. A 1966 graduate of the
United States Military Academy, Scales initially
served in Germany before joining the 2nd
Battalion, 319th Artillery in Vietnam. Scales
commanded a howitzer battery in the battalion
and earned a Silver Star in 1969. He would later
lead artillery units in Korea, command the Field
Artillery Center at Fort Sill, and serve as the
Commandant of the U.S. Army War College.
Scales holds a doctorate in history from Duke
University and has written a number of critically
acclaimed books, including Firepower in Limited
War, Certain Victory, and Yellow Smoke: The
Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military. In
an interview with Vietnam contributor Warren
Wilkins, he discusses his experiences in Vietnam,
the role of firepower in that conflict, and the
defining characteristics of American war-making.
46 VIETNAM
On the night of June 14, 1969, you were in command of a
105mm howitzer battery at Firebase Berchtesgaden, located
on a hill on the eastern side of the A Shau Valley, when a force
of approximately 100 North Vietnamese sappers attacked the
base. You received a Silver Star for your actions during the
battle. Tell us about that night.
My four guns and two 155mm howitzers were clustered together on this
mountaintop. In May 1969, the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] attacked my
sister battalion on Firebase Airborne. They destroyed guns, killed 13 soldiers,
and completely eviscerated that unit. One month later, they attacked us. They
attacked early in the morning, and the hole that I lived in was right on the
edge of the perimeter. My battery was the first thing they attacked. The god-
damn infantry that protected us had decided that they were going to be in
charge of illumination. The key to defeating a night attack is illumination. So
the infantry said that they would handle it, but I didn’t believe them. If you
look at Berchtesgaden on Google, you will see this one lone gun at the very
top of the firebase with the tube sticking up almost vertically. Well, that was
my gun. I kept that gun at 1100 mils [milliradians], one-and-a-half second
delay on an illumination round, pointed straight up.
We got involved in this horrendous fight, and I had to get to that gun
because the infantry never fired a round of illumination. The first sergeant
and I fought like hell to get to that damn gun. Finally we got to it, and I
pulled the lanyard. When that illumination round went off, it changed the
whole complexion of the battle. All of the sudden, the light went on and the
troops started killing those guys. They [the NVA] were literally caught in
the open. We fought like hell, beat them back, and killed a whole bunch of
them. Our main mission as artillerymen was to shoot artillery, but an
equally important mission for young gunners is to be able to defend your
position. That was a lesson I learned.
Prior to the sapper attack, your battery had provided
artillery support for the 101st Airborne Division during
the battle for Hill 937, better known as “Hamburger Hill.”
How did the employment of artillery in Vietnam compare
to other American wars?
You can almost draw a graph, starting with the 25th Infantry Division at
Guadalcanal, that traces the density of supporting fires dedicated to the
USNI
maneuver mission up through the Pacific battles, the Battle of the Bulge and

the push into Germany, and then forward to Korea. That graph or curve
goes way up in terms of the ratio of firepower expended versus the maneu-
ver forces employed. Entire ships full of ammunition were expended in
1951-52 to preserve American lives.
By the time we got to Vietnam, this idea of trading firepower for man-
power really started to take hold. So when I was there, no infantry unit was
allowed to maneuver outside the artillery fan. The infantry in Vietnam
would literally maneuver by fire. Artillery was also used as a navigation aid,
to recon by fire and clear the way as units moved through the jungle, and to
fire defensive concentrations.
Speaking of “Hamburger Hill,” you’ve noted that your battery
hammered that hill with thousands of 105mm rounds, air
strikes blasted its slopes and summit, and yet the enemy
KWV\QV]ML\WÅOP\,QL\PQ[KI][MaW]\WZMKWV[QLMZ\PM
MЅKIKaWNÅZMXW_MZWV\PMJI\\TMÅMTL'
When I was at Berchtesgaden, I was higher than Hamburger Hill and could
look down on it through my scope. By the time our infantry had conducted
their fifth or sixth assault, the top of that mountain was completely denud-
ed. I would sit there with my scope, and we’d fire and fire and fire. If our
troops got down, behind a log or something, we could shoot within 40 me-
ters [of them] if we were very careful.
I would look through that scope, and as soon as we lifted our fires, I could
AP PHOTO
see those little guys [the NVA] come out from those underground bunkers
and take up positions and start shooting back. I remember saying to my-
U.S. Army airborne troops manning 105mm
howitzers at a firebase in the A Shau Valley stand
ready to provide support to nearby troops in 1968.
self—and this has been kind of a thesis of all the
books I’ve written about firepower—that fire-
power has a limitation. We saw this in the First
World War when artillery was shocking to both
sides early in the war. By 1917, there were images
of the British “Tommy” [soldier] brewing tea in
the middle of a barrage.
In the age of “imprecision”—before what we
now call “precision” munitions—the primary im-
pact of artillery was psychological and not physi-
cal. It’s what’s called the palliative effect of artil-
lery. By the time I got to Vietnam [in 1968] the
psychological effects of artillery had dropped off
considerably, and the enemy was no longer as in-
timidated by our killing power as he was in 1965.
Two things always amazed me about artillery—
one is the enormous pyrotechnic effect of artil-
lery going off over the enemy, and the other is the
remarkably few enemy it actually kills.
So from my experience at Hamburger Hill, I
learned that there is a crossover point in the use
of artillery and firepower at which its ability to
influence the maneuver battle diminishes consid-
erably. If a soldier is warm and protected—in
other words, if he’s down or better yet under cov-
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 47
 \PMM`Q[\QVOXWTQ\QKIT
KTQUI\MWZLWaW]IOZMM
_Q\PKZQ\QK[_PWIZO]M\PI\
\PMUQTQ\IZa¼[W^MZZMTQIVKM
WVPMI^a[]XXWZ\QVOÅZM[
]VLMZUQVML)UMZQKIV
XIKQÅKI\QWVMЄWZ\[IVL
NIQTML\WILLZM[[\PM\Z]M
VI\]ZMWN\PMMVMUa\PZMI\'
I argue in my book [Firepower in
Limited War] that in a counter-
insurgency campaign, firepower
has its limits. But I failed to men-
tion the psychological impact of
firepower on the civilian popula-
tion and the deadening effect it
has on the innocent. That is par-
ticularly important when you’re
fighting a war seeking popular
support. So the presence of inno-
cents on the battlefield greatly
diminishes your ability to apply
overwhelming firepower. The
second thing we learned in Viet-
nam was that, after a while, fire-
U.S. Marines man a 155mm gun position on Guadalcanal during World War II. Scales power becomes an inhibitor rather than a facilita-
asserts that “you can almost draw a graph” tracing the “density of supporting fires tor of your ability to maneuver. So the days of
dedicated to the maneuver mission” in American warfare beginning at Guadalcanal. using light infantry as a find, fix, and finish force
were greatly diminished because of its inability to
er—it takes an awful lot of rounds to kill him. And no matter how much move outside the arc of artillery.
artillery and firepower you pile onto that—again I’m talking about “dumb” The Army was on the horns of a dilemma. The
artillery and “dumb” firepower—its ability to influence the battle diminish- center of gravity of the American military in
es with time. That was reinforced in Korea and Vietnam. Vietnam was dead Americans, and the NVA
knew it. In World War II, Col. [Hiromichi] Yaha-
The U.S. military—particularly the Army—clearly favored ra, who served with the Japanese army on Okina-
ÅZMXW_MZW^MZUIVM]^MZQV>QM\VIU?I[\PQ[MUXPI[Q[WV wa, wrote a series of missives in which he said,
ÅZMXW_MZ]VQY]M\W\PI\KWVÆQK\WZ_I[Q\UMZMTaIZMÆMK\QWV essentially, the only way you can beat America is
WN_PI\[WUMPI^MKITTML\PM¹)UMZQKIV_IaWN_IZº' to kill Americans. We lost in Vietnam not be-
We do emphasize firepower, but the Russians do the same. Although the cause we were not able to defeat the enemy in
Russians are far more willing to sacrifice human lives than we are, they have battle, or that we had too little or too much fire-
a very similar doctrine…. In Vietnam it was a career ender if your maneu- power, but because too many Americans died
ver force was caught outside the reach of your artillery. And that psycholo- and we tired of it first, just as Ho Chi Minh pre-
gy continued all the way into Desert Storm. As late as Desert Storm, one of dicted the French would do before us. The only
the cardinal tenets of the American way of war was to never exceed the way to save lives in the close fight in Vietnam was
limits of your artillery. through the use of protective fires. But firepower
The American army was caught in a dilemma in Vietnam. We had became a millstone around our necks in terms of
reached the limit, before the point where we could achieve our maneuver our ability to maneuver. It also had a debilitating
objectives, when artillery was no longer all that helpful. So what do you do? effect on our ability to maintain the “hearts and
Do you start expending more human lives to achieve your objectives be- minds” of the people.
cause you are no longer protected by firepower? Or do you fall back under So we reached a plateau in our use of fire-
the protective arcs of your artillery and refuse to maneuver beyond that and power, beyond which we could not go, and for
give the enemy the advantage? And until the “precision” revolution in 1972, which we had no alternative by 1970. Anytime
that’s sort of where we were. you put maneuver forces forward in close contact
NATIONAL ARCHIVES

with the enemy, soldiers are going to die. Yet we

1VZM\ZW[XMK\LWaW]JMTQM^M\PI\IÅZMXW_MZ̆ÅZ[\IXXZWIKPQV got to a point by 1970-71 where, anytime an
>QM\VIU_I[R][\QÅMLOQ^MV\PMWXMZI\QVOMV^QZWVUMV\IVL American soldier died, it would end up on the

48 VIETNAM

When discussing the limitations of firepower, Scales
notes that although artillery was at first shocking to
soldiers in World War I, men soon became accustomed
to it–enough to brew tea during barrages on the front.
front page of the New York Times. So you have
two choices to keep those soldiers safe: lock them
in firebases and let the enemy run amok in the
countryside and control the population, or put
them out there under the protective umbrella of
firepower but greatly limit their ability to maneu-
ver. It was that juxtaposition between keeping
soldiers safe—our vulnerable center of gravity—
or being able to maneuver and control territory,
and we were never able to reconcile that.
The traditional role of the infantry has
always been to close with and destroy
the enemy. American infantry units in
Vietnam, however, typically sought to
ÅVL\PMMVMUa[W\PI\ÅZMXW_MZKW]TL
destroy him. Did this change in tactics
occur organically within individual
XTI\WWV[IVLKWUXIVQM[QV\PMÅMTL
or was it mandated by some higher
PMILY]IZ\MZ[IVL\PMVKWLQÅMLJa
formal regulations?
Actually, it was both. One of the amazing things
about the American way of war—and we saw this
in World War II, particularly as American sol-
TOP: NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND; RIGHT: HISTORYNET ARCHIVES
diers became more literate and as the American
army became more egalitarian—is that tactical
innovation in the American army, beginning in
North Africa, really came from the bottom up,
not the top down. That’s different than the Rus-
sian army, which is ruled by norms driven by the
general staff. The American soldier, when he
learns something that will keep him alive, will
embrace it and proliferate it very quickly. You
build a firepower system around what the sol-
diers are telling you makes it most effective.
Part of the reason that we rely so heavily on the artillery was that the
revolution at Fort Sill [home of U.S. field artillery] was such that we came
up with by far the best artillery firepower system in the world. We just were
never really able to embed it into the Army’s system until our experiences
in North Africa taught us how to do it and how to provide close support.
But we just hit the wall in terms of our ability to do that, because the enemy
has a vote.
What did the Japanese do at Okinawa? What did the Chinese and North
Koreans do? What did the NVA do? They learned how to effectively count-
er American firepower dominance by maneuvering outside of the [fire-
power] range fan, hugging maneuver units so that they couldn’t bring in
heavy close supporting fires, using camouflage, and going to ground.
<WZML]KM\PMLM[\Z]K\Q^MMЄMK\[WN)UMZQKIVÅZMXW_MZ
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese would frequently
¹P]Oº)UMZQKIVQVNIV\Za]VQ\[QVJI\\TM0W_MЄMK\Q^M
was that tactic?
It was very effective. I saw that firsthand. They were literally willing to die
under our artillery fan to stay in their holes, frankly longer than we ever
would, in order to continue to kill us. Remember, their purpose was not to
hold ground. Their purpose was to kill us.
Gen. Vuong Thua Vu, former deputy chief of the North
>QM\VIUM[M)ZUa/MVMZIT;\IЄKPIZIK\MZQbML\PM)UMZQKIV
practice of generating contact with enemy troops and then
calling in artillery and air strikes to destroy them as an
¹W]\UWLMLÅOP\QVOUM\PWLWNIKW_IZLTaJ]\IOOZM[[Q^M
army.” Similarly, some of our Australian and South Korean
allies have suggested that the American infantryman, while
certainly not “cowardly,” nevertheless relied too much on
ÅZMXW_MZ0W_LQL)UMZQKIV[WTLQMZ[IVL5IZQVM[XMZNWZU
in infantry combat?
For a drafted army and to some extent a [drafted] Marine Corps, they per-
formed remarkably well. Whenever the U.S. Army got involved in what
[retired Marine Corps general and former U.S. Secretary of Defense] Jim
Mattis and I call “intimate killing,” they did it remarkably well, considering
what was at stake. The critics have this wrong, because I suspect if you were
South Korean, or Australian, or whomever and had
that firepower available to you, you would fight pre-
cisely the same way. The problem is that you want to
avoid intimate killing, and in that sense the American
army had it right. But the limits of technology pre-
cluded the American army from avoiding intimate
contact without the cost of logistics being so great that
it was no longer effective.
So I have no problem whatsoever with the tactics
that the American close combat forces used in Viet-
nam. My critique has always been with the firepower
system that supported them. I have no problem what- In his book Firepower
soever with finding, fixing, and finishing—the three in Limited War, Scales
words we used to describe Vietnam combat. I do have examines the advantages
and limitations of
a problem with the technology that we used in our firepower by analyzing its
firepower system to do the finishing part. It was always effects in several pivotal
inefficient, logistically burdensome, and reached a recent conflicts. The book
was placed on the Marine
point of diminishing returns. What the “precision” Corps Commandant’s
revolution has allowed us to do is reverse that. V Reading List.
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 49
WILDLIFE OF
VIETNAM
A VARIETY OF DANGEROUS AND OPPORTUNISTIC
CREATURES INHABITED JUNGLE BATTLEFIELDS
By Zita Ballinger Fletcher
A green pit viper can be an alarming
but common sight across the jungles of
Southeast Asia, including in Vietnam.
There are many different types of pit
vipers. Like all snakes, these vipers are
deaf and sense vibrations to “hear.”
Pit vipers are one of the most highly
evolved–and dangerous–types of snake.
Their heat-sensing “pit” organs give
them thermal vision which allows them
to strike with high accuracy at moving
objects even in pitch darkness. Retract-
able fangs add to their attack speed.

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 51
 Wildlife
of Vietnam

W
hen we think about war,
it is tempting to focus
only on its human
participants. Sometimes
it is all too easy to forget that the natural A
world around us is, in fact, alive and
dynamic, and filled with creatures that can
have unpredictable and dangerous
interactions with humans. Soldiers often
run across these creatures when fighting
in harsh or remote environments—indeed
these creatures often literally run, or crawl,
across them. Wildlife in war zones can be
fascinating, annoying, or even fatal.
Animals and insects remind us that,
despite incredible advances in technology
and weaponry, there are still some things
that humans cannot fully control. The
Vietnam War is a particularly good
example of this—a war in which a
“Spooky” gunship could wipe out enemy
troops in wreaths of fiery destruction, yet
something as tiny and fragile as a single
mosquito could bring death by transmit-
ting malaria. Numerous men who fought
in Vietnam mention their interactions
with wildlife—good, bad, or ugly. Many of
these creatures are common across
Southeast Asia, and there are too many to
describe in a single article. In this
portfolio, we take a look at animals and
insects that posed dangers to soldiers in
Vietnam. In some cases, the danger seems
obvious; in others, not so much. It is
worth noting that the enemy often used
venomous creatures against American and
allied troops when possible. The VC made
use of snakes, spiders, and scorpions to
guard entrances to underground tunnel
systems; “guard” snakes were suspended
from tunnel ceilings to strike intruders,
while spiders and scorpions were released
from baskets to sting interlopers entering
passageways [read more at: www.history-
net.com/tunnel-rats-vietnam]. Sometimes
soldiers had to get creative to keep
unwelcome creatures away from them.
There is no question that the presence of
dangerous wildlife made fighting the
Vietnam War even tougher. V
B

52 VIETNAM
 C

There is no
question that
the presence of
dangerous
wildlife made
ÅOP\QVO\PM
Vietnam War
even tougher.

D E
RIGHT, CLOCKWISE FROM TOP: JAMES WARWICK/GETTY IMAGES; STEPHEN DESMOND/ALAMY; MOBRAFOTOGRAFIE/ALAMY
PREVIOUS SPREAD: JOHN SULLIVAN/ALAMY; LEFT, FROM TOP: NATURE PICTURE LIBRARY/ALAMY; EPHOTOCORP/ALAMY;

A The king cobra, the world’s longest venomous snake, can grow up to about 19 feet and when threatened can raise
itself upright to about one third of its full length, which can make it as tall as a person. The king cobra growls, has
sharp eyesight and potent venom, and prefers to eat other snakes. B The bamboo viper is another type of pit viper
found in Vietnam. Pit vipers’ speed, toxicity, and preference for hunting at night make them formidable reptiles.
Rattlesnakes and pythons share the same type of “thermal vision” as pit vipers. C Tigers were once widespread in
Vietnam; these “big cats” hunt alone and prey on large mammals such as deer. Sadly, recent reports indicate that
tigers have possibly gone extinct from both Vietnam and Laos due to hunting. D The Vietnamese funnel web spider
is one of many arachnids that inhabit wooded areas of Vietnam. Despite their delicate appearance, funnel web
spiders can deliver fatal bites and their fangs are often sharp enough to penetrate clothing and shoes. E The
Vietnamese tiger tarantula is a large and highly aggressive spider that lives in muddy undergrowth, often around
rice paddies. It packs a powerful bite and, unlike other tarantulas, tends to be confrontational.

AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 53
 Wildlife of Vietnam

F G

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT: JOHN DOWNER/GETTY IMAGES; ARTERRA PICTURE LIBRARY/ALAMY; DPA PICTURE ALLIANCE/ALAMY; PANTHER MEDIA GMBH/ALAMY;
H I

RIGHT PAGE CLOCKWISE FROM TOP: CULTURA CREATIVE RF/ALAMY; PAKORN LOPATTANAKIJ/ALAMY; JOHN S. LANDER/GETTY IMAGES

F:I\[IZMKWUUWVQV>QM\VIUIVL¹W^MZZIVºÅZMJI[M[:I\[KIZZaIVL[XZMILLQ[MI[M[I[QLMNZWUJMQVOXM[Sa
[KI^MVOMZ[G5W[\WN\PM\QUMJI\[LWVW\JW\PMZXMWXTM0W_M^MZJI\[LWKIZZaZIJQM[IVLW\PMZLQ[MI[M[
<PQ[NZQMVLTaTWWSQVONZ]Q\JI\WNI[XMKQM[KITTML4aTM¼[ÆaQVONW`Q[IXW\MV\QITKIZZQMZWN\PMLMILTa6QXIP^QZ][
H:MLIV\[IZMKWUUWVTaLM[KZQJMLJa>QM\VIU^M\MZIV[I[PI^QVOJMMVIPIbIZLQV\PMJ][P>QM\VIUM[MÅZM
IV\[TQ^MQVZW\\QVOTWO[IVLLMTQ^MZXIQVN]TJQ\M[WN\MVQV[_IZU[;WUM^M\MZIV[PI^MZMXWZ\MLJMQVOJQ\\MVJa
¹JTWWL̆[]KSQVOºIV\[\PI\XZMaMLWV\PMU_PMV\PMa_MZM_W]VLMLI 1V\MZU[WNJTWWL[]KSQVOXM[\[VW\PQVO
Y]Q\MKWUXIZM[\W\PMTMMKP1\Q[WVMWN\PMUW[\PI\MLKZMI\]ZM[I[[WKQI\ML_Q\P\PM>QM\VIU?IZ6WJWLaXIZ\
_I[[INMNZWU\PM[MIY]I\QKXZMLI\WZ[_PQKPWN\MVPIL\WJMJ]ZVMLWЄJ?PQTMWN\MVUILMQV\WXM\[UWVSMa[KIV
KIZZaZIJQM[UISQVO\PMQZJQ\MLIVOMZW][K<PM>QM\VIUM[MOQIV\NWZM[\[KWZXQWVKIVOZW_]X\WQVKPM[TWVO
1\Q[IVIOOZM[[Q^M[XMKQM[SVW_V\WSQTTQ\[W_VSQVL_Q\PIXIQVN]T[\QVOIVLXIZITa\QK^MVWUL<PMUW[Y]Q\W_I[
XZWJIJTa\PMUW[\LIVOMZW][KZMI\]ZMNIKMLJa\ZWWX[QV\PM>QM\VIU?IZJMKI][MQ\[JQ\MKW]TLKIZZaUITIZQI

54 VIETNAM
Wildlife in
war zones can
be fascinating,
annoying, or J
even fatal.

L
AU T U M N 2 0 2 3 55
 LEADERSHIP LESSONS
FROM A WOLFHOUND
Lt. Gen. Robert F. Foley has led a distinguished
career in the U.S. Army. Graduating from the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he served
as a company commander in Vietnam with the
27th Infantry Regiment, famed as the “Wolf-
hounds,” and received the Medal of Honor for
Standing Tall: his actions during Operation Attleboro in No-
Leadership vember 1966. Foley subsequently rose to become
Lessons in the a battalion and brigade commander with the 3rd
Life of a Soldier Infantry Division in Germany, served as West
By Lt. Gen. Robert F. Point commandant of cadets, and was com-
Foley, U.S. Army Ret., manding general of the Fifth U.S. Army.
Casemate Publishers, In his autobiographical book Standing Tall:
2022, $34.95 Leadership Lessons in the Life of a Soldier, Foley
offers us an in-depth view of his
MEDIA life and military career. The book
DIGEST contains a detailed account of
Foley’s life, including his family
background, career milestones, interactions
with comrades, his marriage, faith, and experi-
Foley (center) meets ences with mentors. It is a very personal book
with German officers in
and there is a lot of material to sink into. Readers
1984 during his time
commanding U.S. troops of Vietnam magazine will likely be most interest-
stationed in Germany. ed in Foley’s overall observations about the Viet-
56 VIETNAM
nam War and the details of his experiences as an
infantryman “in country,” especially during Op-
eration Attleboro.
Foley is a battle-tested Wolfhound and it is
with justifiable pride that he frequently alludes
to the prowess of his regiment, organized in 1901
and fighting under the motto, Nec aspera terrent,
meaning “No fear on earth.” Fearless in combat,
Foley also shows himself to be fearless in sharing
his overall views about the Vietnam War itself.
Some soldiers are leery of wading into politics,
but Foley makes some controversial observa-
tions which merit further reflection. Foley’s crit-
icism of the war is not reactionary; he is well-
read on the Vietnam War in addition to having
experienced it himself, and he cites a variety of
firsthand sources as a foundation for his criti-
ROBERT F. FOLEY VIA CASEMATE PUBLISHERS
cisms. Foley alludes with regret to a failed op-
portunity for the United States to form a work-
ing alliance with North Vietnamese leaders,
describing how Ho Chi Minh’s life was saved by
U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officers in
August 1945. “After the OSS dissolution on Oc-
tober 1, 1945, its solidarity with the Viet Minh
 RUGGED ACCESSORIES FOR THE
NEVER-ENOUGH-GADGETS GUY.
JUST INITIAL HERE.
Our durable Lillian Vernon products are built to last. Each is crafted using the best materials
and manufacturing methods. Best of all, we’ll personalize them with your good name
or monogram. Ordering is easy. Shipping is free.* Go to LillianVernon.com or call 1-800-545-5426.

Personalized
Personalized Grooming Kit Bottle Opener
Indispensable zippered manmade-leather case Handsome tool helps top off
contains comb, nail tools, mirror, lint brush, shaver, a long day with a cool brew. 1½x7"W.
toothbrush, bottle opener. Lined; 5½x7". Brewery 817820
817548 $29.99 Initial Family Name 817822
$11.99 each

Personalized Beer Caddy

Cooler Tote
Soft-sided, waxed-cotton
canvas cooler tote with
removable divider
includes an integrated
opener, adjustable
shoulder strap,
and secures 6 bottles.
9x5½x6¾".
817006 $64.99

Personalized 13-in-1 Multi-Function Tool

All the essential tools he needs to tackle any job.
Includes bottle opener, flathead screwdriver, Phillips
screwdriver, key ring, scissors, LED light, corkscrew,
saw, knife, can opener, nail file, nail cleaner and needle.
Includes LR621 batteries. Stainless steel.
818456 $29.99

8LI4IVWSREPM^EXMSR)\TIVXW7MRGIÿćăÿ
*FREE SHIPPING ON ORDERS OVER $50. USE PROMO CODE: H I S V T M F 3 LILLIANVERNON.COM/V T M
OFFER EXPIRES 11/30/23. ONLY ONE PROMO CODE PER ORDER. OFFERS CANNOT BE COMBINED. OFFER APPLIES TO STANDARD SHIPPING ONLY. ALL ORDERS ARE ASSESSED A CARE & PACKAGING FEE.

e c k i t O u t !
Ch
THIS WEEK IN
HISTORY
AN ORIGINAL VIDEO SERIES
Join hosts Claire and Alex as
they explore—week by week—
the people and events that have
shaped the world we live in.
HISTORYNET.COM
vanished in the wake of the American and Allies’ pursuit of a new world or-
der,” Foley writes. He also cites the words of Col. Harry Summers, founding
editor of Vietnam magazine, from the latter’s work On Strategy: “Every mili-
tary operation should be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive and at-
tainable objective.” Foley is plainly skeptical of the Eisenhower administra-
tion’s policies based on an abstract “domino theory.” He argues that the
Vietnam War “had no clearly defined objective” and that “conditions for de-
claring war against North Vietnam did not meet the criteria for a national se-
curity interest.”
On Aug. 5, 1966, Foley became the commanding officer of Alpha Company,
2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) while serving in Vietnam. His de-
scriptions of the actions he took in the war zone demonstrate his competent
leadership. For example, his “cure” for VD among his troops was depriving the
stricken misbehavers of bed rest and ordering them instead to participate in
all regular combat duties, regardless of their physical discomfort springing off
helicopters and shuffling through leech-filled rice paddies. The rate of infec-
tions quickly dropped to zero. “We lived with our soldiers 24 hours a day—we
knew them and they knew us,” writes Foley. He allowed his subordinates lee-
way to devise deceptive methods to counteract communist forces attempting
to infiltrate their base camp in night attacks. Foley also shares humorous anec-
dotes about his encounter with a bamboo viper and an occasion when he top-
pled into a well, only to be serenaded by his grinning men later with a new
take on an old nursery rhyme: “Ding Dong Dell, there’s a captain in the well!”
Foley describes Nov. 5, 1966, as “the most difficult and devastating day” for
his company in Vietnam. During Operation Attleboro, Foley was ordered to
break into an enemy bunker system to create a corridor through which trapped
comrades could escape back to friendly lines. He and his men were facing
NVA regulars, and because the surrounded Americans were so close to enemy
bunkers, his options were limited. “I couldn’t employ artillery, close air sup-
port or gunships,” according to Foley. As his group got stalled in dense under-
brush and his men fell down shot all around him, Foley got “angry as hell” and
took matters into his own hands. Accompanied by Pvt. First Class Charles
Dean, who carried ammunition belts for him plus a grenade launcher, Foley
swooped up an M-60 machine gun and led a charge against the NVA. The
NVA fled the battlefield taking heavy losses and Foley succeeded in rescuing
the hemmed-in U.S. troops. He was wounded by shrapnel from a grenade.
Foley was awarded the Silver Star and later received the Medal of Honor for
his actions, but above all credits his fellow Wolfhounds who followed him into
the fray, saying that their “indomitable spirit…made all the difference.”
True to its title, the book chronicles the evolution of a young soldier into an
effective and capable military leader. Foley shares wise observations about
leadership of soldiers that have withstood the test of time throughout military
history, such as: “Good leaders make it a habit to get out of the command
bunker, walk around the unit area, and be accessible—in the chow line, on the
rifle range, in the mess hall, or in the barracks.” Anyone familiar with the his-
tory of war will know that military science is not the science of agreement or
passivity; the edifice of war history is etched with instances in which com-
manders have not agreed with each other—this friction is beneficial. Foley
shares insights about military leadership in difficult moments. “Leaders must
also have the courage to say no when the mission has unacceptable risk, when
essential resources are not provided, or when following orders is simply not an
option,” writes Foley. “A solid background in moral-ethical reasoning is essen-
tial for leaders to feel confident in asserting their beliefs.… They can’t walk by
the red flags of ethical turmoil and then maintain, during damage recovery,
that there were no indicators.”
—Zita Ballinger Fletcher
HOW DID
BUZZ ALDRIN
FIRST DESCRIBE
THE LUNAR
LANDSCAPE?
A majestic forbidding land,
a very dark desert, magnificent
desolation, or a really groovy place?

For more, visit

HISTORYNET.COM/MAGAZINES/QUIZ

ANSWER: MAGNIFICENT DESOLATION.

BUZZ ALDRIN, THE SECOND MAN TO WALK
THE LUNAR SURFACE, SPOKE THESE WORDS
SHORTLY AFTER NEIL ARMSTRONG SAID
“THAT’S ONE SMALL STEP FOR A MAN,
ONE GIANT LEAP FOR MANKIND.”

Ferocious Tank Battles
After years of wearing down its South Vietnamese
and American opponents with a mixture of guer-
rilla and light infantry tactics, North Vietnam cast
them aside for a thoroughly conventional inva-
sion in 1972, with both sides putting an unprece-
dented emphasis on armored warfare. William E.
Hiestand does a comprehensive survey of the
equipment, organization, doctrine, and combat
practices of the North Vietnamese Army and
the South’s Army of the Republic of Vietnam in
No. 303 of Osprey’s “New Vanguard” weaponry
monographs, Tanks in the Easter Offensive 1972.
Tanks in Ironically, by 1972 the ARVN armored ele-
the Easter ment had evolved markedly since the early 1960s,
7ЄMV[Q^M! when it inherited its armor from the departing
By William E. French, only to be used more for instruments of
Hiestand, Osprey political rivalry, with M24 light tanks cynically
Publishing, 2022, dubbed “voting machines” and their crewmen
$19
“coup troops.” Well trained and motivated, the
ARVN tankers made the most of their M41A3
Walker Bulldog light tanks—essentially enlarged
M24s with higher velocity 76mm guns—but
worked most effectively with their limited supply
60 VIETNAM
Towards the end of
the Vietnam War,
the communist North
resorted to increasingly
conventional battlefield
tactics and threw more
tanks into the fray.
of M48A3s, which could outfight the NVA’s T-54s
in long-range duels. Although aided by South
Vietnamese and American air support that their
opponents lacked, the ARVN armored units were
handicapped by corrupt senior officers and a
fighting doctrine that spread them too thinly
over the three fronts on which they had to fight.
Despite their formidable arsenal of Soviet- and
Chinese-built T-54s and amphibious PT-76 and
Type 63 light tanks, the NVA tankers plunged
into the South with a rather inflexible doctrine
that often caused them to hesitate when they
should have followed up. They also showed that
JACQUES PAVLOVSKY/SYGMA/CORBIS/SYGMA VIA GETTY IMAGES
they had much to learn about coordinating their
tanks’ operations with their infantry and artillery.
When evaluating the performance of both
sides, however, the author rightly reminds the
reader that in practice the Easter Offensive was
not determined by tanks or armored personnel
carriers alone. The campaign saw extensive allied
use of the M72 light anti-tank weapon as well as
the debut of the TOW (tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided) missile. The NVA soldier,
 A conversational
approach to
interpreting
history!
Listen as
hosts Patrick
and Matt connect
you with your
favorite stories
from the past—
as well as ones
you may have
never heard!
@The HistoryThingsPodcast
Download or
listen for FREE
 already experienced at using the RPG (rock-
et-propelled grenade) and recoilless rifle, also
made deadly use of newly introduced AT-3 Sag-
ger anti-tank guided missiles. As for the undis-
puted air power backing the ARVN, the NVA
tankers had to rely on a new generation of
self-propelled anti-aircraft guns alongside its
ubiquitous 12.7 and 14.7mm machine guns.
Profusely illustrated with photographs and profiles, Tanks in the Easter
Offensive 1972 offers a fascinating evaluation of two armies adapting their
combat doctrines to new-generation weapons, very much as they went
along, while the Cold War powers who armed them observed with interest
of their own.
—Jon Guttman

Bombing North Vietnam

The first U.S. Air Force F-4E
Phantoms to arrive in Southeast
Asia are shown at Korat Airbase
in Thailand in November 1968.
In recent years, more and more information has
come to light on North Vietnam’s air defenses
during its war with the United States. On a tactical
level, this has helped the U.S. Air Force and Navy
to check their air-to-air victories against the ene-
my’s...and vice versa. On a strategic level, it has
added insights as to how the original establish-
ment and subsequent changes in doctrine on both
sides affected the course of the air war. The latest
result of this ongoing compilation, Going Down-
town: The U.S. Air Force Over Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, 1961-75, has a somewhat puzzling ti-
Going Downtown: tle, since a firsthand account by that name has
The U.S. Air Force been written by Jack Broughton, a very active par-
Over Vietnam, Laos ticipant in bombing North Vietnam (or “going
and Cambodia, downtown,” as the Air Force called it). The title is
1961-75 a bit confusing, too, since it extends its scope to
By Thomas McKelvey U.S. Air Force operations elsewhere in Indochina.
Cleaver, Osprey Reading past editorial anomalies, author
Publishing, 2022, Thomas McKelvey Cleaver puts his narrative of
$30 the USAF’s experiences over Indochina within
particular history affected U.S. policy toward
Indochina in general and the use and misuse
of USAF air assets from the onset of Ameri-
can involvement. With the benefit of hind-
sight, Cleaver’s analyses of the air war’s prog-
ress include some eyebrow-raising con-
clusions, such as that of the clandestine war
against the Ho Chi Minh Trail by the 606th
Special Operations Squadron and its propel-
ler-driven AT-28Ds, A-1Es, and A-1Hs: “A
squadron that never numbered more than 12
aircraft was more successful in its mission
than the rest of the Seventh Air Force.” An-
other opportunity missed appears in a retro-
spective revelation from North Vietnamese
commander in chief Vo Nguyen Giap that,
“We always knew we would have to cease the
struggle the day the B-52s arrived over Ha-
noi.” The time to have done so effectively,
however, would have been 1965, not 1972.
Within all the “big picture” overviews of the
learning processes of air operations such as Roll-
ing Thunder and the two Linebackers are compel-
ling accounts on the aerial actions therein, as de-
scribed by airmen from both sides. Among the
many new additions that emerge from that more
personal research is the identity of all five victo-
ries scored by USAF ace pilot Steve Ritchie (iden-
tifying his first “MiG-21” as a MiG-19) and a re-
vised description of North Vietnamese losses in
Operation Bolo on Jan. 2, 1967. It also revises
Operation Bolo, from seven MiG-21s claimed by
Col. Robin Olds’ wing and five actually shot down
to four shot down outright and three returning
with various degrees of damage. (An improve-
ment? Too bad Robin isn’t around for comment.)
In sum, Going Downtown should add some
interesting insights to discussions of lessons
learned from Vietnam and is a useful research
tool in combination with the author’s previous
treatment of the U.S. Navy’s involvement in In-
U.S. AIR FORCE

the context of Vietnam’s history with the Western dochina, The Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club.
powers, since American ignorance about that —Jon Guttman

62 VIETNAM
  THE BEAUTY OF
HA LONG BAY!
WARTIME LONDON’S

CRIME sEdŽƵƌƐ
ĞŐŝŶĂƚ
BLITZ!
MURDER . LOOTING . FRAUD
ΨϮ͕ϵϵϱ͊
ϭϯͲĂLJƐ
ŽŶ͛ƚWĂLJ
WHO WAS THE
DŽƌĞĨŽƌ
BLACKOUT RIPPER?
>ĞƐƐ&ƌŽŵ
ŽƉLJͲ
ĐĂƚƐ͊


:HZHDWKHUHG&29,'VRQRZJRZLWKWKHRULJLQDWRU
RIWKHEDWWOHILHOGUHWXUQWR9LHWQDP³RIWHQFRSLHGEXW
QHYHUGXSOLFDWHG0+7KDVEHHQ'LVDEOHG919HW2ZQHG

2SHUDWHGVLQFH 
,1)2#1-703-590-1295
NOTIFY@MILTOURS.COM
READ THE MHT BLOG &
FACEBOOK @
WWW.MILTOURS.COM

Gina Elise’s
PIN-UPS
FOR VETS
Supporting Hospitalized Veterans
& Deployed Troops Since 2006
Pin-Ups For Vets raises funds to better the lives and boost morale for
the entire military community! When you make a purchase at our online
store or make a donation, you’ll contribute to Veterans’ healthcare,
helping provide VA hospitals across the U.S. with funds for medical
equipment and programs. We support volunteerism at VA hospitals,
including personal bedside visits to deliver gifts, and we provide
makeovers and new clothing for military wives and female Veterans.
All that plus we send care packages to our deployed troops.

visit: pinupsforvets.com
Alicia, Army Veteran

HIGHEST
SCORING SNIPER
ADELBERT WALDRON III KILLED
109 ENEMIES IN VIETNAM
By David T. Zabecki
U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Adelbert F. Waldron III was the highest-scoring Amer-
ican sniper of the Vietnam War, with 109 confirmed kills. He was also the
most highly decorated, earning the Distinguished Service Cross twice, the
Silver Star, and three Bronze Star Medals. Born in Syracuse, N.Y., in 1933,
Waldron served in the U.S. Navy from 1953 to 1965, leaving the service as
a petty officer 2nd class. In 1968 he enlisted in the U.S. Army and at age 35
completed airborne school to earn his jump wings. In late
HALL OF 1968 he was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division in the
VALOR Mekong Delta. Upon arriving in-country, Waldron at-
tended the 9th Infantry Division’s sniper school, estab-
lished by the division’s legendary commander, Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell.
Waldron was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment (3-60),
part of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) operating on the waterways of the
Mekong Delta. Waldron’s better-known U.S. Marine sniper counterparts,
Carlos Hathcock (93 confirmed kills), Eric R. England (98), and Charles
Mawhinney (103), used bolt-action rifles. Waldron, however, used the semi-
automatic M-21 sniper rifle—a 7.62mm M-14 rifle fitted with an optical
scope and accurized by the Rock Island Arsenal. He frequently operated at
night using a starlight scope. On several occasions he made his kills from a
moving boat platform, in one case at a range of more than 900 meters.
As a Specialist 4, Waldron earned the Silver Star in January 1969 while on
a reconnaissance mission in Kien Hoa Province. After establishing a night
outpost, Waldron spotted enemy movement to his front. For more than three
hours he engaged the VC force from his concealed position, killing 11. He
withdrew only after the enemy finally detected his firing position.
64 VIETNAM
As a sergeant, Waldron earned his first DSC for
a combined series of 14 sniper missions during
the period from Jan. 16 to Feb. 4, 1969, while serv-
ing with Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry.
On Jan. 19, while his company was being resup-
plied near Ap Hoa, Kien Hoa Province, they were
attacked by a force of some 40 VC. Under a heavy
barrage of small arms and automatic weapons
fire, Waldron engaged the attacking force from an
exposed position, killing a number of the VC and
forcing them to break contact.
Three nights later, on the night of Jan. 22, Wal-
dron’s unit was moving through an area heavily
infested with booby traps. Pinpointing a VC
probing force, Waldron engaged them, moving
through open rice paddies from one firing posi-
tion to another. By skillfully deceiving the com-
munists as to the actual strength of the American
unit, Waldron prevented a night assault by the
main enemy element. Eleven days later, on the
night of Feb. 3, a nearby South Vietnamese Army
unit came under attack. Moving to the sound of
the guns, Waldron spotted a VC element at-
tempting to flank the ARVN soldiers. He broke
up the attack with deadly accurate fire. Later that
night he killed a VC who was collecting the
weapons of his dead comrades.
Waldron received his second DSC for another
combined series of 18 sniper missions in Kien
Hoa Province from Feb. 5 to March 29, 1969. On
Feb. 14, while his squad was on a night patrol near
Ap Phu Thuan, Waldron observed a numerically
superior VC force maneuvering to assault a near-
by friendly unit. Moving rapidly from one posi-
tion to another to deceive the enemy as to the
strength of his squad, Waldron killed several VC
and broke up their attack. On Feb. 26, near Phu
Tuc, Waldron killed a VC rocket team preparing
to fire on MRF boats. At Ap Luong Long Noi on
March 8, when his company was attacked by a
large VC force, Waldron killed many of the attack-
ers and forced them to withdraw. As the official
citation for his second DSC reads, “Despite ad- PHOTO: U.S. ARMY COURTESY OF KYLE J. WASKO; MEDAL: HISTORYNET ARCHIVES
verse weather conditions, poor illumination and
the pressure of arduous missions night after night,
he repeatedly located and engaged many hostile
elements, killing a number of the enemy.”
After returning from Vietnam Waldron served
briefly as an instructor for the U.S. Army Marks-
manship Unit. He left the Army in 1970 and
worked as a firearms instructor at a private para-
military training school operated by former Of-
fice of Strategic Services operative and merce-
nary Mitchell WerBell. Waldron died in 1995 and
is buried in Riverside National Cemetery in Riv-
erside, California. V
 First in War, First in Peace,
First on a Modern Commemorative Coin!
PROOF BRILLIANT
-Exquisite Proof Finish UNCIRCULATED
-Struck at the San Francisco Mint -Crisp, Uncirculated Finish
-Sold Out Limited Edition -Struck at the Denver Mint
-Sold Out Limited Edition

Obverse: Reverse:
George Washington Mount Vernon &
on horseback Heraldic Eagle

Actual size is 30.6 mm

FIRST and ONLY Modern Commemorative Struck in 90% Silver!

W
hen 1982 rolled around, the U.S. Mint hadn’t pro- melted down. Don’t miss out on adding this pair of coveted
duced a commemorative half dollar for nearly three firsts, each struck in 90% fine silver, to your collection! Call
decades. So, to celebrate George Washington’s to secure yours now. Don’t miss out. Call right now!
250th birthday, the tradition was revived. The Mint struck
90% silver half dollars in both Brilliant Uncirculated (BU) 1982 George Washington Silver Half Dollars
and Proof condition. These milestone Washington coins GOOD — Uncirculated Minted in Denver
represented the first-ever modern U.S. commemoratives, 2,210,458 struck Just $29.95 ea. +s/h
and today are still the only modern commemorative half Sold Elsewhere for $43—SAVE $13.05
dollars struck in 90% silver! BETTER — Proof Minted in San Francisco
Iconic Designs of the Father of Our Country 4,894,044 struck Just $29.95 ea. +s/h
Sold Elsewhere for $44.50—SAVE $14.55
These spectacular coins feature our first President and the
Father of Our Country regally astride a horse on the front, BEST — Buy Both and Save!
while the back design shows Washington’s home at Mount 2-Pc. Set (Proof and BU) Just $49.95/set
Vernon. Here’s your chance to get both versions of the coin SAVE $9.95 off the individual prices
in one remarkable, 40-year-old, 2-Pc. Set—a gleaming Set sold elsewhere for $87.50—SAVE $37.55
Proof version with frosted details rising over mirrored fields
FREE SHIPPING on $49 or More! Limited time
struck at the San Francisco Mint, and a dazzling Brilliant
To learn more, call now.
only. Product total over $49 before taxes
Uncirculated coin with crisp details struck at the Denver (if any). Standard domestic shipping only.
Mint. Or you can get either coin individually. Not valid on previous purchases. First call, first served!

Very Limited. Sold Out at the Mint!

No collection of modern U.S. coins is complete without
1-800-517-6468
these first-ever, one-year-only Silver Half Dollars—which Offer Code GWH139-01
Please mention this code when you call.
effectively sold out at the mint since all unsold coins were
SPECIAL CALL-IN ONLY OFFER
GovMint.com • 1300 Corporate Center Curve, Dept. GWH139-01, Eagan, MN 55121
GovMint.com® is a retail distributor of coin and currency issues and is not affiliated with the U.S. government. The collectible coin market is unregulated, highly speculative and
involves risk. GovMint.com reserves the right to decline to consummate any sale, within its discretion, including due to pricing errors. Prices, facts, figures and populations deemed ®

accurate as of the date of publication but may change significantly over time. All purchases are expressly conditioned upon your acceptance of GovMint.com’s Terms and Conditions
(www.govmint.com/terms-conditions or call 1-800-721-0320); to decline, return your purchase pursuant to GovMint.com’s Return Policy. © 2023 GovMint.com. All rights reserved. A+
We’re Bringing Flexy Back
The Stauer Flex gives you vintage style with a throwback price of only $79.
J ust like a good wristwatch movement, fashion
is cyclical. And there’s a certain wristwatch
trend that was huge in the 1960s and then again The Looks of a Classic
in the 1980s, and is ready for its third time in
the spotlight. We’re talking, of course, about the Flex Band Watch for
flexible stretch watch band.
To purchase a vintage 60s or 80s classic flex only $79!
watch would stretch anyone’s budget, but you
can get ahead of the crowd and secure a brand
new version for a much lower price.
We’re rolling back the years AND the numbers
by pricing the Stauer Flex like this, so you can
put some bend in your band without making a
dent in your wallet.
The Stauer Flex combines 1960s vintage cool
with 1980s boardroom style. The stainless steel
flex band ensures minimal fuss and the sleek
midnight blue face keeps you on track with date
and day subdials.
Your satisfaction is 100% guaranteed.
Experience the Stauer Flex for 30 days. If you’re
not convinced you got excellence for less, send
it back for a refund of the item price. Your
satisfaction is our top priority.
Time is running out. As our top selling watch,
we can’t guarantee the Flex will stick around
long. Don’t
overpay to be ÌÌÌÌÌ
underwhelmed. “The quality of their
Flex your right watches is equal to many
to put a precision
that can go for ten times
timepiece on
your wrist for just the price or more.”
$79. Call today! — Jeff from McKinney, TX

TAKE 74% OFF INSTANTLY!

When you use your OFFER CODE
Stauer Flex Men’s Watch
Offer Code Price $79 + S&P Save $220
You must use the offer code to get
our special price.

1-800-333-2045 Flexible Stretch Watch Bracelets in the News:

Your Offer Code: FMW209-01 “The bracelets are comfortable, they last forever,
Please use this code when you order to
receive your discount. and they exhibit just the right balance of simplicity
14101 Southcross Drive W., and over-engineering”
Ste 155, Dept. FMW209-01 – Bloomberg.com, 2017
Burnsville, Minnesota 55337
www.stauer.com
† Special price only for customers using the offer code
versus the price on Stauer.com without your offer code. Rating of A+
• Precision movement • Stainless steel crown, caseback & bracelet
• Date window at 6 o’clock; day window at 10 o’clock • Water resistant to 3 ATM • Stretches to fit wrists up to 8 ½"
Stauer… Afford the Extraordinary.®