Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda: An Account of Ideologues

Author(s): Aida Arosoaie

Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 7, No. 7 (August 2015), pp. 31-37
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351374

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses

This content downloaded from

201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Doctrinal Differences
between ISIS and Al Qaeda:
An Account of Ideologues
Aida Arosoaie

Despite sharing a common religious orientation grounded in Salafi ideology,

Al Qaeda and ISIS have different approaches when it comes to interpreting
and implementing key concepts such as al-wala’ wa al-bara’, takfir and jihad.
This article explores how Al Qaeda and ISIS use the doctrines through an
examination of the works of four key ideologues: al Maqdisi, Abu Bakr Naji,
Abu Musab al Suri and Ayman al Zawahiri.

Introduction

Ever since declaring the establishment of the Islamic State, the Islamic State
of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) has made rapid strides to upstage Al Qaeda
from the leadership position in the global jihadist movement. ISIS has
frequently been described as more dangerous than Al Qaeda in terms of the
threat it posits to a number of countries in the world. Although the group’s
strength, appeal and longevity have often been intensely debated, ISIS
continues to be at the forefront of the jihadist movement.

Mainstream discourse attributes the resiliency of ISIS and its threat potential
to the group’s control of territory, its resources and its astute use of
propaganda, especially through social media, which attracts a large number of
fighters from diverse countries. While such strategies are different from Al-
Qaeda’s, experts and policymakers continue to neglect the divergences
between the jihadi-Salafi principles of ISIS and Al Qaeda. This might lead to
inadequate policies that deal with ISIS as a continuum of the threat from Al
Qaeda, and would prolong rather than weaken, ISIS’ momentum.

Based on a critical examination of jihadi-Salafi principles, this article seeks to

unravel the factors that give ISIS the edge over Al Qaeda among its

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015

31

This content downloaded from

201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie
community of supporters. The main argument of
this article is based on the hypothesis that while
ISIS shares the same jihadi-Salafi ideology the
two groups differ in terms of its application
(Wiktorowicz 2006). This is most evident in
respect of key Islamic concepts, namely, al-wala’
wa al-bara’, takfir and jihad.
The concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, translated as
loyalty and disavowal, focuses on enhancing the
solidarity among the individuals of a specific
group, while at the same time setting a clear
distinction between members of another group.
Essentially, the concept tends to disavow
individuals on the basis of whether they are good
or bad. The jihadi-Salafi can then
excommunicate the individual through takfir
(excommunication) and label them kufar (non-
believers), which then legalises the spilling of
their blood.
Purpose of Jihad
Jihad from the Perspective of ISIS
For jihadi-Salafis, jihad is a contentious concept
in itself focusing predominantly on the physical
dimension of struggle. In this regard, both ISIS
and Al Qaeda differ in their views on jihad. More
specifically, in an audio statement issued in May
2014, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, ISIS’
spokesperson, denounced Al Qaeda Central
(AQC) as a deceiving organisation. Most
importantly, he criticised AQC based on the
latter’s lack of a coherent purpose and the
unwillingness of the group to establish an Islamic
state. Moreover, al Adnani challenged the
legitimacy of AQC based on the fact that it does
not possess territory (Gartenstein-Ross and
Jocelyn 2015). This is an important point of
contention in the jihadi-Salafi world, as territory is
perceived, by some, to be the most important
means of gaining legitimacy. Arguments around
this issue have best been captured in the work of
some ideologues who grew to prominence in the
post-70s period.
A key thinker useful for understanding ISIS’
doctrinal application is al Maqdisi, whose real
name is Abu Muhammad ‘Asim b. Muhammad b.
Tahir al Barqawi. He was born in a small village
on the West Bank, Barqa, and later moved to
Kuwait. Al Maqdisi fought against the Soviets in
Afghanistan but finally settled in Jordan as an
ideologue, where he became the mentor of Abu
Musab al Zarqawi – the founder of Al Qaeda in
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
32
This content downloaded from
201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
“ ...while the two groups
share the same jihadi-
Salafi ideology the two
groups differ in terms of
its application… this is
most evident in respect
of key Islamic concepts,
namely, al-wala’ wa al-
bara’, takfir and jihad. ”
Iraq (AQI). Writing on the issue of jihad, Al
Maqdisi explained that jihad takes two main
forms according to the purpose of the fighting:
qital al-nikaya and qital al-tamkin (Wagemakers
2012, p. 83). The former is carried out with the
sole purpose of hurting the enemy and his
interests, while the latter is concerned with
consolidating one’s presence within a territory.
At the time of his writings, back in the 1980s and
1990s, al Maqdisi was deploring the lack of
mujahideen seeking to carry out qital al-tamkin.
According to Joas Wagemaker’s reading of al
Maqdisi’s perspective, al Maqdisi felt that there
were far too many fighters hurting the enemy, but
there was a severe dearth of those who would
grab and consolidate their power with the
purpose of establishing an Islamic State
(Wagemakers 2012, p. 84). As such, al Maqdisi’s
preferred form of jihad is one akin to the
traditional conceptions of jihad, which was
organised and state-centric. Although his
relationship with Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the
Jordanian prison was short and tumultuous, the
latter seemed to have been inspired by al
Maqdisi’s thoughts. Moreover, the reorganisation
of ISIS in 2010 by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi seemed
to indicate an increased focus on the practice of
qital al-tamkin. Although uncertain whether he
did so based on al Maqdisi’s writings or not, al
Baghdadi started focusing more on consolidating
his power and his expanding influence. ISIS’
focus on power consolidation and expansion of
influence distinguishes ISIS’ and AQC’s main
strategy. AQC’s main strategy, according to Lia
Brynjar’s reading, is focused mainly on hurting
the enemy (Lia 2008).
Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie
Another important ideologue whose ideas seem
to have influenced ISIS strategists is Abu Bakr
Naji. There is very little information regarding
him, with some people even saying that “Naji” is
an appellation referring to a committee (Polk
2013). According to Polk, the most renowned
account of Abu Bakr Naji can be surmised in his
book, The Management of Savagery (Idarah at-
Tawhish) (MacCants 2006). In his writing, Abu
Bakr Naji advocated, among others, that jihad
must be fought with the purpose of establishing a
state and he envisaged a three stage-approach
to this end.
Abu Bakr Naji emphasised the importance of
seizing an area which would be fairly isolated
from the enemy state’s authoritative capacity so
as to give the mujahideen a stronghold and a
potential legitimation link on which they can
capitalise and expand (Polk 2013). Regarding
the management of savagery, the first stage
conceived by Abu Bakr Naji was the one of
vexation. During this stage, the mujahideen were
meant to conduct simultaneous and small-scale
attacks resulting in a weakening of the enemy’s
strength. This would ideally result in a complete
disruption of governing activities and legitimation
links between the population of that specific
territory and the state’s structures.
The second stage was the spread of savagery
which resembles guerrilla warfare and serves the
purpose of expanding the mujahideen’s sphere
of influence.
The third stage, namely the administration of the
savagery, comprises establishing the foundations
for the administrative and governing institutions.
Simply put, the third stage was directly related to
both the setting up of the physical infrastructure
and the governing superstructure of an Islamic
state, while creating the legitimacy to facilitate
the tapping of physical and human resources
(Polk 2013, p. 7).
Abu Bakr Naji’s ideas are seen to have an
influence on ISIS, as evidenced by the manner in
which ISIS capitalised on the conflict in Syria by
gradually building up its stronghold in Raqqa.
Jihad from the Perspective of Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda’s strategy on jihad has been articulated
most prominently by Abu Musab al Suri. Abu
Musad al Suri participated in the Islamist uprising
against the Syrian regime in the 1980s as a
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
33
This content downloaded from
201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
“ Abu Bakr Naji’s ideas
are seen to have an
influence on ISIS, as
evidenced by the manner
in which ISIS capitalised
on the conflict in Syria by
gradually building up its
stronghold in Raqqa. ”
member of Al Taliah al-Muqatilah. Al Taliah al
Muqatilah was a breakaway group of the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood. The group was formed
following the massive crackdown on the latter in
the aftermath of the 1982 Hama Uprising. In
1987, he met with Abdullah Azzam, one of the co
-founders of Al Qaeda al Sulhah, which later
became Al Qaeda. According to Lia Brynjar, Abu
Musab al-Suri’s most renowned book, Call to
Global Islamic Resistance (Da'wat al-
muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-'alamiyyah) spells
out the guideline for a decentralised jihad, which
is believed to have influenced Al Qaeda’s
strategy.
As articulated by Lia Brynjar, al Suri perceived
that the typical jihadi organisation, such as the
one he was a part of during the Syrian uprising,
was an Achilles heel for the jihadi movement due
to its inherently hierarchical structure (Lia 2008).
This was the basis for al Suri’s calls for jihad
carried out individually and without a specific
battlefield. Abu Musab al Suri advocated for jihad
waged throughout two schools – the one of
Individual and Small-Cell jihad and the one of
Open Fronts. More explicitly, jihad must be
carried out by self-contained autonomous cells
and there should be no specific battlefield, but it
should rather be fought openly. By extension, he
argued that the difficulty of openly waging jihad
without a battlefield required that jihad be carried
out as individual acts of terrorism. This has been
coined as Abu Musab al Suri’s most important
idea, rooted in his famous phrase nizam, la
tanzim (system, not organisation) (Lia 2008). Abu
Musab al Suri argued that the leadership of a
group should only provide basic guidance, while
the small, individual cells should be linked by a
“common aim, a doctrinal program and a very
Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie
comprehensive (self-) educational program” (Lia
2008). This is reflected in Al Qaeda’s loose
terrorist networks which are spread out across
the globe under a broadly unifying ideology.
Near Enemy versus Far Enemy
The distinction between near and far enemy,
popularised by Fawaz Gerges, implies the
transition of jihadi-Salafis’ focus from waging
jihad against Muslim apostate governments (the
near enemy) to fighting occupying powers such
as the Soviet Union and the U.S. (the far enemy)
(Gerges 2005). In the case of ISIS, defining the
enemy is directly related to their goal, namely,
the consolidation of power and the creation of an
Islamic state. As such, the focus of its jihad is on
vexing and defeating any enemy that impedes its
objective, be it the near or far enemy. Looking all
the way back to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s period,
in addition to the U.S. troops – considered as the
near enemy due to their direct occupation of Iraq
– the Shiites were also targeted as the most
important enemy due – from ISIS’ perspective -
to their seizure of the governmental apparatus in
Iraq.
Identifying the enemy for ISIS runs along the
same lines put forward by al Maqdisi in his book
Millat Ibrahim. He argued that the apostasy of
Muslim rulers is considered worse than the
“original unbelief” of, for example, Jews in Israel.
In support of his argument, Maqdisi interpreted a
verse from the Quran (O you who have believed,
fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers
and let them find in you harshness. And know
that Allah is with the righteous - 9:123) to mean
that the nearest enemy is the first to be attacked
(Wagemakers 2012, p. 71). Complementing al-
Maqdisi’s identification of the enemy was Abu
Bakr Naji’s own interpretation. Although he did
not specifically address this issue, this could be
discerned from his idea that jihad should be
waged in order for the consolidation of power.
However, Abu Bakr Naji did specifically indicate
the vexing of the U.S. due to its direct occupation
of Iraq. He advocated for vexing the U.S. in such
a way that its collapse would emerge from within.
Specifically, he mentioned that the democratic
nature of the U.S. makes it susceptible to internal
conflicts over its inherent foreign policy
inconsistencies and its interference in the Middle
East, with the illegitimate intervention and
occupation of Iraq being one example (Fishman
2008).
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
34
This content downloaded from
201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
“ In the case of ISIS,
defining the enemy is
directly related to their
goal, namely, the
consolidation of power
and the creation of an
Islamic state. As such,
the focus of its jihad is on
vexing and defeating any
enemy that impedes its
objective, be it the near
or far enemy. ”
The ideas put forward by Ayman al Zawahiri and
Abu Musab al Suri stand in direct contrast with
the arguments of Al-Maqdisi. According to Fawaz
Gerges, it was Ayman al Zawahiri himself, under
the influence of bin Laden, who strongly urged
the mujahideen worldwide to abandon religious
nationalist camps and refocus their attention
towards fighting the far enemy instead of the
near enemy (Gerges 2005, p. 120). Initially, as a
member of Tanzeem al-Jihad in Egypt in 1970s –
a Salafi offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood –
Ayman al-Zawahiri was fully focused on the
removal of the then President of Egypt, Anwar
Sadat, and in its place the installation of an
Islamic regime. However, following his trip to
Afghanistan and his participation in the Afghan
jihad, Ayman al Zawahiri refocused on fighting
the occupying powers, which reflected a shift in
his perspective (Gerges 2005).
Similarly, Abu Musab al Suri’s arguments in his
Call to Global Islamic Resistance were based on
the idea that the mujahideen and jihadi groups
must adapt to the new post-Cold War conflict
environment. This new environment, according to
him, was defined by the increasing international
anti- and counter-terrorism cooperation and the
transition from indirect occupation, understood as
imperialistic influence – to direct occupation of
Muslim lands (Lia 2008).
Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie
Under such circumstances, Abu Musab al Suri
argued that the purpose of consolidating power
and waging an Islamic revolution in one single
country must be postponed until the far enemy,
namely the U.S. and its allies, had been
defeated. The core priority of the mujahideen
became “repelling the invading intruders and
assailants” (Lia 2008). Although a core principle
of Al Qaeda’s strategy, attacking the far enemy
does not come out as a priority for ISIS.
Al-wala' wa al-bara' and Winning Hearts and
Minds
Both groups agree on the necessity of
implementing al-wala' wa al-bara' (loyalty and
disavowal), but they diverge on how is it to be
done. Moreover, from a strategic point of view,
the looser the implementation of al-wala’s wa-l-
bara’ the less successful will the group be in
winning the hearts and minds of the people. The
most relevant example is the excommunication
of Shiites practiced by ISIS and its predecessor,
AQI which, according to AQC, was detrimental to
winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis. Abu
Musab al Zarqawi put forward a strategy of
directly targeting Shiites, justifying his actions by
means of theological arguments. He cited a
number of Sunni ideologues, including Ibn
Taymiyyah, to portray the Shiites as un-Islamic.
He also offered historical arguments which
depicted the Safavid dynasty as a “dagger that
stabbed Islam and the Muslims in the back” and
the Shiites as traitors due to the role they played
in the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258
(Bunzel 2015). Based on these arguments,
Zarqawi concluded that the Shiites were the
primary enemies of Sunni Islam, much worse
than the U.S.
Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s choice of doctrines, and
by extension ISIS’, did not correspond with Al
Qaeda’s strategy. Initially his mentor, al Maqdisi,
in 2004 sent a letter to Abu Musab al Zarqawi
criticising his extreme tactical brutality and his
inconsiderate practice of takfir. The main
argument al Maqdisi provided was that his
practice of takfir alienated fellow Sunnis and
caused hurt to the image of Islam (Wagemakers
2012, p. 47). Similarly critical of Abu Musab al
Zarqawi’s actions was Ayman al Zawahiri, who
also emphasised the need to win the hearts and
minds of the Sunni population. In a letter he
wrote to Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2005, he
mentioned that “Muslim admirers amongst the
common folk are wondering about [Zarqawi’s]
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
35
This content downloaded from
201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
“ ISIS strategically
capitalises on the lack of
a universally-agreed
Islamic eschatological
document… and has
resorted to marketing its
own End of Time
narrative in order to
garner support from the
Muslim masses. ”
attacks on the Shia, and do not understand what
could drive Al Qaeda in Iraq to perform
beheadings, destroy mosques and other such
acts of inhumanity” (Roggio 2005). Ayman al
Zawahiri specifically mentioned in his letter that
he considered the support of the Muslim masses,
i.e., the legitimacy of the Sunni population, the
most important asset for a mujahideen in
carrying out jihad (Al-Zawahiri 2005).
Nevertheless, the indiscriminate brutality and
unfounded targeting of Shiites carried out by Abu
Musab al Zarqawi and nowadays ISIS, run
contrary to the arguments of Ayman al Zawahiri.
Such tactics are perceived to have reduced the
support of the Muslim masses.
However, ISIS also actively sought to win the
hearts and minds of the Muslim people. In
contrast with Al-Qaeda’s strategy of prudent
rhetoric and considerate targeting, ISIS
strategically capitalises on the lack of a
universally-agreed Islamic eschatological
document (in comparison to the Christian Book
of Revelations, which projects an End of Time
narrative) and has resorted to marketing its own
End of Time narrative in order to garner support
from the Muslim masses (Fromson et al. 2015).
In this sense, the choice to name its magazine
Dabiq is not a coincidence. Dabiq, a city near the
Syrian-Turkish border, is mentioned in the Hadith
as the site of the end of time battle when a Mahdi
(the guided one) will be sent to fight the dajjal
(the Islamic equivalent of the anti-Christ). In fact,
constructing its discourse around the End of
Time battle serves as one of the group’s most
Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie

successful recruiting tools, serving as a source for consolidating the group’s legitimacy in
the eyes of Muslims (Saman 2015).

Conclusion

The accounts of four key ideologues, al Maqdisi, Abu Bakr Naji, Abu Musab al Suri and
Ayman al Zawahiri have provided revealing information on differences in how the two
groups implement the aqida (creed). The term aqida refers to the beliefs and doctrines
which Salafis subscribe to (Wagemakers 2012, p. 8).

In summary, three important differences between Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ doctrines stand
out. The first is the divergent purposes that the two groups attach to jihad. While ISIS pri-
oritises the consolidation of power, Al Qaeda places more emphasis on hurting the ene-
my. The second difference is related to identifying the enemy. While for Al Qaeda, the
focus is on the far enemy, for ISIS the distinction is rather blurred, with the group focusing
more on the near enemy. The third difference is related to the groups’ strategies of prac-
ticing al-wala' wa al-bara' and winning the hearts and minds of the people. Al Qaeda pre-
fers to remain more prudent and diligent, while ISIS advocates a more violent behaviour,
capitalising on the eschatological narratives in order to gain the support of Muslim mass-
es.

Aida Arosoaie is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
(RSIS), NTU.

References:

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. “Zawahiri’s Letter To Zarqawi (English Translation) | Combating Ter-

rorism Center At West Point.” Ctc.usma.edu. N.p., 2015. Web. 5 July 2015, https://
www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.

Brunzel, Cole. “From Paper State To Caliphate: The Ideology Of The Islamic State.”
Washington DC: Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project On U.S. Relations With
The Islamic World.

Fishman, Brian. “Jihadists target the American dream.” CTC Sentinel 1.4 (2008): n. pag.
Print.

Fromson, James, and Simon, Steven. “ISIS: The Dubious Paradise Of Apocalypse Now.”
Survival 57.3 (2015): 7-56. Accessed 14 August, 2015. https://www.iiss.org/en/
publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-
2015-b48d/57-3-02-fromson-and-simon-02f4.

Gerges, Fawaz A. The Far Enemy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Print.

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Thomas Jocelyn. 2015. “Zawahiri’s Revenge.” Foreign

Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/31/zawahiris-revenge/.

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015

36

This content downloaded from

201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda – Aida Arosoaie

McCants, William, trans. 2006. “The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage
Through Which the Umma Will Pass.” Accessed on 4 August, 2015. https://
azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-
critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf.

Polk, William. 2013. “Sic Semper Tyrannis: Sayyid Qutub’s Fundamentalism And Abu
Bakr Naji’s Jihadism.” Turcopolier.typepad.com. 5 July, 2015. http://
turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2013/12/download-appendix-a.html.

Roggio, Bill. 2005. “Dear Zarqawi: A Letter From Zawahiri, And A Constitutional Compro-
mise.” The Long War Journal. 5 July, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2005/10/dear_zarqawi_a.php.

Saman, Jean-Loup. “An End-of-Time Utopia: Understanding the Narrative of the Islamic
State.” Rome, 2015. Print.

Wagemakers, Joas. A Quietist Jihadi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Print.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2006. “Anatomy Of The Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 29(3): 207-239. Accessed 8 August, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/10576100500497004?journalCode=uter20.

___________

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 7, Issue 7 | August 2015

37

This content downloaded from

201.150.98.4 on Fri, 02 Oct 2020 13:32:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms