G.R.

1051 May 19, 1903

U.S. v. Dorr
FACTS: Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense
of writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the
Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.
The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06
April 1902 as an editorial issue.
The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for
brevity).
The following are part of the article:
“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a
protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…
this kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the
Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who
have during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”
“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands
Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and
men of no personal character”.
“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized
by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.
Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense
against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the
policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having
a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law
and institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by
whom the government of the Islands is administered”?
ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation
of the Art. 292 for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular
Government of the Phil. Island?
RULING: In modern political science, the term government is defined
as “the institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent
society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the government is the
aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration)”.[1]
On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is
used in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing
political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in
this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under
consideration.
Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the
Phil. Islands” is the government as a system, however, the article in
questions attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials
who run it.
The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is
enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men
who are entrusted with the administration of the government which the
writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and
private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not
constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of
Art. 292.
Respondents are acquitted.
[1] ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the time being.

BACANI V NACOCO G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956

FACTS: Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF
Manila.
In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they
requested for the services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for
the said transcript at the rate of P1 per page, amounting to P714 in total.
However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor
General disallowed the payment of such fees and sought for the recovery
of the amounts paid. Consequently, the AG required the petitioners to
reimburse the amounts invoking that the National Coconut Corporation
is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which states that: “‘The Government of
the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to
the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or
other form of local government.”, hence, exempted from the payment of
the fees in question.

ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from

the payments in question?
RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions
of the government namely: constituent and ministrant. The constituent
function refers to the bonds of society and is compulsory in nature, while
the ministrant is more on public welfare like public works, education,
charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there are
functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it
as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to
promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain
aspects of the economic life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to
what we call the government-owned and controlled corporation which is
governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s
welfare, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that
it may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the
Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through
which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or
other form of local government.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the
payment of fees in question; petitioners are not subject to
reimbursement.
Petition GRANTED.

G.R. No.No. L-45798 December 15, 1982

VENANCIO VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, PINAMALAYAN,
BRANCH II, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

The case of G.R. No.No. L-45798 was decided on December 15, 1982
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The case involved the
application of Presidential Decree No. 603, also known as The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, to a defendant who was 19 years old when he
committed the crime of murder but was 21 years old when he was
convicted. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to the
benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and ordered his release
from custody.

In the case of G.R. No.No. L-45798, the defendant was convicted of

murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He did not appeal the
sentence and he was forthwith committed to the National Penitentiary
where he started to serve it.

After the lapse of almost two months from the promulgation of the
sentence, the defendant filed a motion for the application of Chapter 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 603. The motion contained the prayer "that the
release of the accused to responsible authorities be forthwith ordered."

The respondent court granted the motion and ordered the release of the
defendant to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare. The
Solicitor General appealed the order to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to the benefits
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code because he was 19 years old when
he committed the crime. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code is to provide special protection and
rehabilitation for young offenders. The Court also reasoned that the
defendant should not be punished for crimes that he committed when he
was a child.

The Supreme Court ordered the release of the defendant from custody
and directed the Department of Social Welfare to provide him with
rehabilitation services.

ISSUES:

I. WAS THE RESPONDENT COURT AMPLY VESTED WITH

JURISDICTIONAL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO RENDER ITS
RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 17,1975 (ANNEX G) DECLARING
NULL AND VOID ITS PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT ON THE
CASE ON JULY 30,1975 (ANNEX A) AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS TO DELIVER THE PERSON OF
PETITIONER TO THE CUSTODY AND CARE OF THE OFFICER
IN CHARGE OF THE VICENTE MADRIGAL REHABILITATION
CENTER, SAMPALOC, TANAY, RIZAL PURSUANT TO, AND
FOR THE APPLICATION OF, THE BENEFICIAL PROVISIONS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603.

II. AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION OF

DECEMBER 17, 1975 (ANNEX G) AND WITH THE FAVORABLE
FINAL REPORT OF THE INSTITUTION CONCERNED (ANNEX I)
HAVING BEEN DULY SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL, DOES THE
RESPONDENT COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DECLARE
NULL AND VOID ITS OWN AFOREMENTIONED RESOLUTION
AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREUNDER, THEREBY,
RESUSCITATING AND REVIVING ITS SENTENCE OF JULY 30,
1975 (ANNEX A) UPON PETITIONER AND ORDERING THE
LATTER'S RECOMMITMENT TO THE NATIONAL
PENITENTIARY UNDER ITS QUESTIONED ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 4, 1976 (ANNEX R).
 III. HAS THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT
COURT DATED DECEMBER 4, 1976 (ANNEX R) VIOLATED THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CONSTRAINTS OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja

De Ahorras De Manila
G.R. No. L-9959 – 35 Phil. 728 – Political Law – Basic Concepts –
Elements of a State – Government – Parens Patriae
FACTS: In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the
Philippines. The Spanish Government then provided $400, as aid for the
victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said
amount, $80, was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de
Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when
the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the
bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a
complaint. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an
affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. The bank
argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said
amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint against the respondent bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action
against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine
of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will
promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such
right hence as parent of the people, the government has the right to take
back the money intended for the people.
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and
ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
(ECN), petitioners
vs
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
(NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC
COMPANY INC. (PECO), respondents.

FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric

Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company
assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue
delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the
imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a
period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The
universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government
debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties
applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge
and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period
not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the
ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by
the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax
on the part of the ERC
HELD: No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a
tax but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state.
The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory
duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of
revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of
the states police power thru regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by
the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it
therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC.
The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which
is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress;
which before execution must pass both the completeness test and the
sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA
9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from
any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in
form.

Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD

FACTS: Petitioner Southern Luzon Drug Corporation filed a petition

for prohibition against the DSWD, NCWDP (now National Council on
Disability Affairs or NCDA), DOF and the BIR, which sought to
prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003”
and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the “Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons,” particularly the granting of a 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability
(PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.
RA 9257 amended some provisions of RA 7432. The new law retained
the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines but removed the annual
income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges
under the law.
Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount
granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross
income, computed based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the “Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons” was enacted, codifying the rights and
privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was
enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277.
One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in
Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of
PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim
the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income,
based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens
and PWDs is a valid exercise of police power

RULING: Yes. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress
enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442. In the exercise of police power,
"property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the State." Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot be
arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of the
exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and
safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State
exercises, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or
property rights in order to advance common good.
To warrant such interference, two requisites must concur:
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Moreover, the 20% Discount does not violate equal protection. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another."
For a classification to be valid,
(1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions,
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law,
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRES.

AQUINO
G.R. NO. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on

February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were
taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government's assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines."
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was
not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is

legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a

justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. The Supreme Court further held that: The people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the new government.

ETORMA v.RAVELO

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of the judgment of the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance
against the petitioners regarding the validity or invalidity of a free patent
issued, on the ground that the judgment rendered by the Court of
Appeals during the Japanese occupation was null and void.

This Court did not deem it necessary to render a reasoned decision in

deciding the petition for certiorari, for it considered the latter without
merits. Because the decision of the Court of Appeals has become final
several years ago, and the judgments of the Courts in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation are valid and binding in accordance to
the ruling of this Court in the case of Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon. The Acts authorizing and regulating the grant of free patents
to occupants or possessors of public lands are municipal laws, and the
judgments of the courts which apply said laws are not of political
complexion/nature.

Now the attorney for the petitioners alleges that the ruling or doctrine
laid down in the said case of CoKim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon is not applicable to the resent case, inasmuch as the petitioners
herein had refused, by going up to the mountains, to submit themselves
to the authority of the Japanese invaders and the government established
by them in these Islands.

ISSUE: WON the ruling is inapplicable to petitioners since they refused

to submit themselves to the authority of the Japanese.

RULING: The President and Congress of the United States in

describing and branding the Philippine Executive Commission and the
so-called Republic of the Philippines as puppet governments, did not
recognize them as legitimate or de jure governments, and not being de
jure, they are de facto governments under the rules of international law.
An organized government established in a territory must be either de
jure or de facto, since there is no other class of organized government
known in political as well as in international law,

The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in

towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese
garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to these places,
was not sufficient to make the military occupation ineffective, nor did it
cause that occupation to or prevent the constitution or establishment of a
de facto government in the Islands.
Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . . It does not cease,
however, . . . Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of
guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless the legitimate government is re-
established and the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or
guerrilla operations.

The provisions of the Hague Conventions impose upon a belligerent

occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in
force in the country unless absolutely prevented. The fact that the
belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not,
therefore, exempt him from complying with the said precepts of the
Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of
the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny
validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who
is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the
inhabitants or nationals of the enemy’s territory, and prejudice the latter.

The resolution which upholds the validity of judicial acts which are not
of political complexion of defacto governments established by the
military occupant in an enemy territory, is based on the regulations of
the Hague Convention that contain the generally accepted principles of
international law, adopted as a part of the of the lawn of the Nation in
section 3 of our Constitution.

G.R. No. 202860, April 10, 2019LEE T. ARROYO, PETITIONER,

v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ANDULYSSES A.
BRITO, RESPONDENTS.

Doctrine: The doctrine on the immutability of judgments admits of the

following exceptions: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable.46 The Court
applies these exceptions in order to serve the interests of justice.
FACTS: This case involves a dispute arising from the reorganization of
two offices, the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and
the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), due to the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371, known as "The Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997." Following the reorganization, the ONCC
and OSCC were merged as the organic offices of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
The positions of Staff Directors, Bureau Directors, Deputy Executive
Directors, and Executive Directors, excluding Regional Directors and
below, were phased out under the effect of R.A. No. 8371. Brito, who
was the Regional Director for Region V of the OSCC, was temporarily
appointed to the same position.
A dispute arose when Arroyo was appointed as the Regional Director of
Region V, and Brito, along with others, initiated a petition for quo
warranto challenging the appointments. Brito argued his right to security
of tenure and questioned Arroyo's eligibility for the position. The Court
of Appeals (CA) partially granted the petition, reinstating Brito and
another individual to their former positions.
Arroyo moved for reconsideration, claiming that Brito's eligibility was
void due to falsification of his bachelor's degree. The CA denied
Arroyo's motion, stating that Brito's quo warranto petition had become
final and executory.
Arroyo, dissatisfied, filed a petition for certiorari, asserting that Brito is
not qualified for the position due to falsification of his bachelor's degree.
The case revolves around the enforcement of the CA decision and
Arroyo's attempt to challenge Brito's qualifications.
ISSUES: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in directing the execution of its Decision
dated August 30, 2004 granting the quo warranto petition of Brito.

RULING: The court has granted Arroyo's petition based on the

argument that a supervening event has occurred, justifying a
modification of the final and executory quo warranto decision. The court
acknowledges the principle of immutability of judgments, stating that
once a decision becomes final, enforcement is usually a ministerial act.
However, exceptions to this principle include circumstances where
events transpire after finality, rendering execution unjust or inequitable.

Arroyo invoked the exception related to supervening events, specifically

referring to the Office of the President's (OP) Decision in O.P. Case No.
05-F-175, dated December 15, 2005. This decision found Brito liable for
dishonesty due to the falsification of his college degree. Arroyo argued
that this event changed the situation in a way that executing the quo
warranto judgment would be unjust and inequitable.

The court emphasized that for a supervening event to apply, it must be

based on proven or certain facts. Arroyo needed to establish through
competent evidence that events occurring after the finality of the
decision altered the parties' situation, affecting the matter already settled.
While Arroyo raised the issue of Brito falsifying his college degree in
her motion for reconsideration, the OP's final decision on October 30,
2007, came after the finality of the quo warranto judgment. As a result,
the court concluded that the supervening event referred to by Arroyo
transpired after the finality of the judgment Brito sought to execute.